

MULTILATERALISM AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

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Edited by
Dimitris Bourantonis,
Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas



In this critical juncture in history, when the United States has painfully discovered the limits of what can accomplish unilaterally, the global community is seeking to accommodate a rising China and resurgent Russia, and the world is beset by international terrorism and civil conflicts, a book on multilateralism and security institutions could not be more timely. To address this important topic, moreover, the editors have assembled a virtual "Who's Who" of American and European scholarly experts on international institutions and security. Readers will be rewarded with a wealth of insights and provocative arguments.

John Duffield, Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University, USA

This rich and timely volume brings together a truly impressive set of contributors on the topic of multilateralism in world politics. Why do states engage in multilateral cooperation? When and how do multilateral institutions matter? For anyone interested in these fundamental questions, *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization* is a must read!

Andreas Tallberg, Associate Professor, Stockholm University, Sweden

This book is an impressive contribution to two important intersecting literatures: that of the pressing security problems in the age of globalization and terrorism, and that of interactions between global institutions and the main regional security institutions, especially NATO and the EU.

Julian Taylor, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics at LSE, UK

Featuring an outstanding international line-up of contributors, this edited volume offers a timely examination of two of the most crucial and controversial issues in international relations, namely the evolution of particular concepts of multilateralism and whether international security institutions are the products of state choice and/or consequential.

This book combines a variety of theoretical perspectives with detailed empirical examples.

The subjects covered include:

- the development and contemporary application of the concept of multilateralism
- American foreign and contemporary policy in the post-9/11 era (unilateralism vs. multilateralism)
- humanitarian intervention and liberal peace
- case studies of a variety of security institutions including the EU, UN and NATO
- a broad selection of geographical examples from North America, Europe and Asia

This book is a significant contribution to the contemporary debate on multilateralism and the effects of multilateral security institutions, and will be of great interest to scholars of international relations and security studies.

Dimitris Bourantonis is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Athens University of Economics and Business. His previous books include *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform* (Routledge, 2006) and *The UN's Role in Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations* (Dartmouth, 1993).

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POLITICS / SECURITY STUDIES

formal business

ISBN 978-0-415-44946-5



www.routledge.com

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- 4 Interview with Ahmet Hadžipašić, 2006.
- 5 "The question is not a choice between the state or the entities, but to have the state *and* the entities. There must be some balance here. The key answer is that the state must be authorised to regulate the basic principles and that the entities and the lower levels of government must be bound to behave within the given limits. A balance can be found, such as it exists in every federal state" (Ivanić, interview, February 2006).
- 6 Hadžipašić, interview, 2006.
- 7 *EU Observer*, 12 April 2006, which also reported senior US politicians attempting to press the EU to stand firm on membership.
- 8 For EUFOR's Mission Statement see <http://www.euforbih.org/mission/mission.htm> (accessed 21 April 2006).
- 9 *EU Observer*, 16 March 2006. While the Salzburg text confirmed the future of the western Balkans in the EU, it also highlighted the EU's ability to absorb further members.
- 10 Hadžipašić, interview, 2006.
- 11 As Federation Prime Minister Hadžipašić put it: "The key is when European socialisation comes down to the citizens' level. But we have a barrier here. We cannot fully develop a European strategy if our citizens do not fully understand this and we cannot discuss this with them" (Hadžipašić, interview, 2006).
- 12 BiH Foreign Minister Mladen Ivanić: "The EU thus creates a solution in Bosnia as it sees fit and . . . there are among Bosnian politicians people who accept these European values as their own. But, I cannot say that they do this fully. They are politicians and must survive. Thus they need to maintain a balance" (Ivanić, interview, 2006).
- 13 And throughout the process, the EU had its Police Mission (EUPM) offering advice and guidance on best practices at the operational level, while awaiting the political outcome – a role sometimes almost in competition with EUFOR in its role as a stabilization force.
- 14 "The SEECF leaves positive effects on the domestic scene. The language being used over the past years is far less radical, far more compromising than ever before. I believe that to a significant extent this is the result of the regional element which has become more important over the past years. Thus . . . it is very useful that BiH is a member of such regional organizations" (Ivanić, interview, 2006).
- 15 Ivanić, interview, 2006.
- 16 *EU Observer*, 17 March 2006. Mrs Merkel is reported as saying "from my side I would like to say that we should not avoid the term "privileged partnership"."
- 17 Daviddi, interview, 2006.
- 18 Ivanić, interview, 2006.
- 19 Topčagić, interview, 2006.
- 20 "The biggest problem in implementation is among the politicians. We make the necessary reforms on paper, but then we do all we can not to implement them" (Hadžipašić, interview, 2006).
- 21 To quote the BiH Director for European Integration, Topčagić (interview, 2006).
- 22 "The story about European values is a sort of pressure on us, forcing us to do something which does not seem very attractive politically in the short run. But, also, there is the parallel gradual entry of European values into our pattern of thought" (Ivanić, interview, 2006).

10 From "perverse" to "promising" institutionalism?

NATO, EU and the Greek–Turkish conflict

Panayotis Tsakonas

Introduction

The disagreement of the 1980s and 1990s about whether institutions matter or not has given over to a disagreement – or to much less agreement – over the last decade about exactly how institutions affect states' behavior (Martin and Simmons 2001: 43). Thus, the preoccupation of scholars to respond mostly to the realist premise that institutions are epiphenomenal and they can only serve as useful levers in the hands of the most powerful states to promote their preconceived national interests¹ has been replaced by rational (mainly neo-liberal institutionalist) and social constructivist accounts about how institutions have affected states' behavior.

However, although rational and constructivist efforts have so far generated some promising propositions to better specify the mechanisms of institutional effects and the conditions under which international institutions are expected to lead to the internalization of new roles or interests from their member states,² much less has been done on the role institutions play as facilitators of co-operation and conflict management and/or transformation.³ Bridging "rational-institutionalist" and "constructivist" accounts, this chapter aims at exploring the impact of two of the most successful and prominent international institutions, namely NATO⁴ and the European Union, have had on the management and/or transformation of the long-standing Greek–Turkish territorial dispute.

Interestingly, the phenomenon of the Greek–Turkish conflict – which so far has been heavily biased by policy-oriented perspectives – has long constituted an anomaly in the security community of Europe.⁵ Especially with regard to NATO, the Greek–Turkish conflict is a case that goes against the conventional wisdom of alliance co-operation, and it is thus dismissed as an exception to the positive identification achieved among the Alliance's other members (Law and McFarlane 1996: 39). The loosening of the structural constraints of the Cold War, the reconstruction of the Alliance's identity, especially after NATO's eastern expansion and the strengthening of the institution's status as "a collective security system" (Wendt 1994: 386; Wendt 1996: 53; Risse-Kappen 1996: 357–99) and a community of "like minded

democracies” (Hampton 1998–9: 235), and the strategic upgrading of the eastern Mediterranean region as the new central front of the Alliance seemed to constitute the very factors why the new NATO would be more likely to adopt a bolder approach toward the settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute. Interestingly though, the Greek–Turkish conflict was exacerbated after the end of the Cold War.

A strong optimism that Greece and Turkey would seek ways of resolving their long-standing territorial dispute also emerged after 1999 due to Turkey’s candidacy and potential accession into the EU. It seems, however, that the EU is itself a contentious issue between Greece and Turkey. This is due to the fact that Greece has been a member of the EU since 1981, whereas Turkey, although recognised as a membership candidate at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 and in spite of accession negotiations which began in October 2005, is still generally seen as being a long way from full membership.⁶ Interestingly then, the Greek–Turkish dispute may prove to be a “hard case” regarding the impact of the EU on conflict transformation; indeed it may be possible that the EU, due to its particular involvement in this conflict, may have had a detrimental rather than a positive effect.

Overall, it is indeed puzzling how the feelings of mistrust and threat perception between the two states have persisted in institutional contexts that should have led to the emergence of shared norms, understandings and a sense of collective identity, paving the way for the peaceful resolution of their disputes. Although one may argue that these institutional contexts have restrained the two states from full-scale war, they have not succeeded in generating the sense of collectively being part of a security community given that both states have continued to consider military means a rational and justifiable way to relate to each other.

Hence, the examination of the impact NATO and EU have on the management and/or transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict has both theoretical value and policy relevance. Indeed, the examination of the effects of particular international institutions on the conflict between two states may provide insights into an especially valuable arena, international security, where theorists of all stripes have expected international institutions to be least consequential (Lipson 1984: 1–23; Keohane 1984: 6–7; Grieco 1988: 504; Grieco 1990: 11–14; Mearsheimer 1994–5: 5–49). Moreover, the theoretical inquiry that research should increasingly turn to the question of how institutions matter and emphasize theoretically-informed analysis based on observable implications of alternative theories of institutions (Martin and Simmons 2001: 437) may also be served. An academic inquiry of that kind allows also for a departure from the currently dominant single-issue, single-organization and single-country format to comparative research across time, across states and across international institutions (Simmons and Martin 2002: 205), while the effects of “international socialization” – a process introduced and followed by both NATO and the EU – are to be analyzed in a theory-informed and comparative way (Schimmelfennig 2002: 22; Wichmann 2004: 129).

Last, but not least, the policy relevance of a study examining NATO’s and the EU’s impact on the Greek–Turkish conflict is directly related to the Greek and Turkish policy makers’ ability to better define their countries’ future expectations from those two institutions. By analogy, it may also provide NATO and the EU with insights into the limits and/or the unintended effects of their actions, and thus contribute to their ability to refine the strategies they follow in ways that would lead to the positive transformation of the disputants’ conflict.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part a review of the relevant literature regarding the role of international institutions in interstate conflict is presented; particular reference is made to research efforts undertaken so far in investigating whether and how NATO and the EU matter in managing and/or transforming the Greek–Turkish conflict. Secondly, two core arguments, which seem to account most for the positive and/or negative impact of EU and NATO on the Greek–Turkish conflict, are presented. A point of methodological nature is also made; it refers to the need to assess NATO and EU institutional effects on the Greek–Turkish dispute by adopting a multi-stage process: one that links an institution’s characteristics with certain institutional effects and socialization outcomes. Thirdly, relevant empirical evidence is used to test the chapter’s central arguments and to explain why NATO’s role is doomed to remain poor and parochial in the years to come, while that of the EU can change the interests and/or the identity scripts of the conflict parties.

Literature review

Institutions and interstate conflict

Unsurprisingly, the ways through which institutions may diminish interstate – and intrastate – conflicts have been the focus of the conflict resolution literature (Rumelili 2006). This literature treats [international and regional] institutions as third parties that have the ability to mediate disputes and provide diplomatic “good offices” (Young 1967; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Miall 1992), as well as to bridge the parties in conflict or change the nature of the conflict either through various side payments and/or penalties – which are expected to change the conflict parties’ cost–benefit calculations about the utility of a negotiated settlement (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Amoo and Zartman 1992) – or through problem-solving [social-psychological] approaches that will change the disputants’ perceptions, values and behaviors (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999; Fisher and Keashley 1991: 29–42).

Needless to say that, although a range of capacities exist for the resolution of conflicts among their members, institutions’ third-party roles are often constrained by their limited resources and enforcement powers (Amoo and Zartman 1992; Chayes and Chayes 1996). By implication, the main argument of the conflict resolution literature is that institutions seem to be more

effective in preventing conflicts in their early stages than by promoting [and monitoring] their member states' and prospective member states' compliance with the institution's fundamental norms, such as democracy and respect of human rights.

Neo-liberal institutionalist accounts of how international institutions may promote peaceful relations argue that institutions can shape state strategies by conveying information, reducing transaction costs – especially those associated with bilateral negotiation, monitoring and verification – and providing opportunities for side payments, linking issue areas, increasing the level of transparency, attenuating the fear of unequal gains, raising the price of defection and discouraging cheating and thus fostering co-operative ventures (Keohane 1984: 146–7; Keohane 1986; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991).

For constructivists, institutions can not only affect states' behavior or strategies; they can also alter their identities by promoting a "common/collective security identity." Providing legitimacy for collective decisions, international institutions – according to constructivist premises – transmit through the "process of socialization" (Schimmelfennig 2000) their norms and rules to their members as well as to prospective member states (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1999a). Motivated by ideational concerns to join international institutions, namely the legitimization/justification of their national identity (Hurd 1999), states gradually define their national identities and interests by taking on each other's perspectives, thus building a shared sense of values and identity (Wendt and Duvall 1989; Wendt 1994).

Based on both institutionalist and constructivist premises, much work has been done on the mechanisms that institutions use to transmit their norms both to member states and to prospective members and thus to inducting actors into their norms and rules. Although such work does not explicitly address the linkage between institutional effects and interstate conflicts, its findings on the ways states' behavior is being changed due to the internalization of institutional rules and norms can also tell much about the changes that may follow in states' position over a border conflict. In accordance with this line of reasoning, most recent studies have tried to better specify the mechanisms through which institutions are able to socialize states and state agents, as well as the conditions under which institutions are expected to lead to internalization of new roles and interests (*International Organization* special issue, 2005).

More specifically, these studies have aimed at theoretically highlighting and empirically testing three distinct mechanisms connecting institutions to socializing outcomes – namely "strategic calculation," "role playing" and "normative suasion" – and thus identifying the various causal paths leading to socialization. In accordance with this line of reasoning and building on rationalist and constructivist premises, certain studies suggested that particular socialization mechanisms are usually at work (e.g., "strategic persuasion" and/or "normative suasion") and linked them to particular state behavior and/or policy (Schimmelfennig 2005; Gheciu 2005).

NATO, EU and the Greek-Turkish conflict

Particular efforts have also been undertaken to investigate the effects NATO and the EU have had on the Greek-Turkish conflict. Building on various theoretical strands, research into the effects of NATO and the EU on Greece's and Turkey's strategies toward co-operation and positive identification and, more specifically, into their conflict transformation has shown whether these institutions matter and, more importantly, how they matter even though their impact may have "perverse," undesirable, implications.

As has already been noted, NATO's role in the transformation of the Greek-Turkish conflict has been dismissed as an exception to the positive identification achieved among the other Alliance's members (especially after the end of the Cold War, when it was expected that liberal international institutions such as NATO would facilitate this collective identity and positive identification among its members). By implication, the theoretical expectations of constructivism, that is that institutional linkages not only shape and constrain states' behavioral strategies but also reconstruct their identities and interests, were proved wrong.

Interestingly enough, NATO's positive role in its two members' conflict was also challenged on rational-institutionalist grounds, which would confine the impact of international institutions/organizations to behaviors of states. Indeed, although it was shown that, contrary to realist expectations, institutions (including alliances) do reshape states' definitions of their interests and they do pattern international interactions, they do not, however, always foster co-operation, even among their members. NATO's parochial and/or negative role on the Greek-Turkish conflict was thus explained as a "malfunctioning" of particular rationalist premises and as an indication that certain institutional provisions of the Atlantic Alliance have unintentionally exacerbated relations between Greece and Turkey (Krebs 1999).

More specifically, it was argued that the persistence of conflictual relations between Greece and Turkey in the context of their joint membership in NATO was due to three factors: firstly, NATO had created an incentive structure that intensified, rather than mitigated, the two allies' conflict; secondly, arms transfers among NATO's powerful members and the disputants had exacerbated the latter's security dilemma and had triggered a spiral of diplomatic tension; and, thirdly, instead of leading to the amelioration of the two allies' conflict, "issue linkage" and "transparency" – with which NATO had provided the two disputants – have contributed to the deterioration of their conflict (Krebs 1999).

It was also argued that by providing Greece and Turkey with a security blanket against the Soviet threat during the Cold War era NATO had allowed them to shift the focus of their foreign policy from the Soviet threat to their more parochial conflicts and their national issues. Hence, instead of ameliorating Greece's and Turkey's security dilemma, NATO had intensified their dispute. In addition, when the Alliance acted as a facilitator of "issue

linkage” it had contributed to the deterioration of the conflict because the multiple issue areas linked together by the Alliance gave Turkey and Greece the opportunity to manipulate these linkages to their political and strategic advantage (since they sought for bargaining leverage), thus broadening the conflict and producing escalating levels of tension (Krebs 1999: 360, 365). Even the Alliance itself – and its fora – became an object of contest.⁷

A series of other institutionalist provisions have also proved unable to produce the fruitful results rational institutionalism expects. For example, “transparency” – which is expected to raise the costs of cheating within an institutional context and thus play a central role in the amelioration of conflict between members of the institution – has not been sufficient to promote co-operation between the two NATO members. By the same token, the “information model” – which stresses the role of institutions in the provision of information and in the learning process – does not seem to apply in the Greek–Turkish dispute and NATO.

Indeed, instead of lessening the one’s fears of the expansionist aims of the other, the transparency that NATO’s internal mechanisms provided made the power disparities between Greece and Turkey more acute. In the same vein, information about respective military capabilities was seen by Greece and Turkey as a means to get a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the other. By implication, matters then turned on a more “security dilemma” situation, in other words on intentions and motives and on how the one expected the other would use its armed forces (Krebs 1999: 366). In the absence of reassuring information regarding Turkey’s goals, Greece viewed Turkish superior capability as a real threat. Therefore, any confidence-building enterprise NATO decided to promote should have gone beyond the conventional knowledge regarding the two states’ military capabilities and dealt with the two states’ real intentions.

Last, but not least, certain institutional deficiencies of the Alliance had negative effects on the allied rivals’ dispute. More specifically, NATO’s shortcomings with regard to its potential contribution to a Greek–Turkish confidence-building enterprise were coupled with a particular “institutional impediment” that has so far contributed enormously to the Greek–Turkish arms race, namely NATO’s Cascade Program.⁸ The latter has in fact violated the spirit of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty (namely to build-down offensive capabilities), since it simply transposed the problems from the former central front to the flanks. Thus, through NATO’s Cascade Program, Greece and Turkey became the principal recipients as the countries with the largest stocks of old Treaty Limited Equipments (TLEs). It is characteristic that, with regard to the volume of weapon systems, by the end of 1995, Greece and Turkey were the greatest importers of military material worldwide.⁹

All in all, rational institutionalist assessment of the role NATO has played in the Greek–Turkish dispute seems to suggest that although NATO has so

far succeeded in preventing the Greek–Turkish conflict from turning into a hot war it has unintentionally exacerbated relations between its two members as well as failing to promote co-operation, in the form of confidence- and security-building measures, or to facilitate positive identification among its members, or to provide the confidence it can facilitate the positive transformation of its members’ dispute in the future.

From a constructivist perspective, and through a case study of Greek–Turkish relations in the period 1995–9, another study has shown how – by situating Greece and Turkey in different and also liminal/precarious positions with respect to “Europe” – the community-building discourse of the EU reinforced and legitimized the two states’ representations of their identities as different from and also as threatening to each other, allowing thus for the perpetuation of their conflicts (Rumelili 2003).

Most recent studies exploring the impact of the EU on the Greek–Turkish conflict, however, suggest a rather promising role for the EU in regard to the positive transformation of the long-standing dispute. Indeed, these studies argue that the EU, especially after 1999 when Turkey was recognized as a membership candidate, can have a positive transformative impact on a series of border conflicts (the Greek–Turkish being one) through four particular “pathways” (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006: 563–93; Celik and Rumelili 2006: 203–22).

It is worth-noting that these studies view the EU both “as a framework”, that can eliminate the bases of interstate conflicts in the long run through democratization and gradual integration, and “as an active player”, which can impact border conflicts [also in the short run] through direct and indirect ways. Thus the EU appears as a necessary condition that can have a direct (“compulsory” and/or “connective”) as well as an indirect (“enabling” and/or “constructive”) impact on the disputants’ – especially on Turkey’s – strategies towards co-operation and, by implication, on the positive transformation of the two states’ conflict.

Argument and methodology

Either from a rational-institutionalist or a constructivist perspective, the relevant literature has so far argued that the Atlantic Alliance has played only a parochial role in the Greek–Turkish conflict. At the same time, a certain amount of optimism has been expressed, especially after 1999, for a promising EU role in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute. Apart from simply sharing the aforementioned pessimism and optimism with regard to NATO and EU impact on the transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute, this chapter attempts to specify the reasons that NATO’s role has always been – and is doomed to remain – poor, while the EU appears as being able to change the interests and/or the identity scripts of the conflict parties.

More precisely, through a comparative assessment of the empirical records of NATO and EU roles in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict,

this chapter attempts to specifically show when and under what conditions the two institutions have been able to impact the conflict parties' strategies toward co-operation and conflict transformation. To this end, two interrelated conditions that seem to account most for NATO's perverse and EU's promising roles in the Greek–Turkish conflict are being developed and empirically tested: Firstly, the type of norms NATO and the EU have exerted on the conflict parties,¹⁰ and the subsequent consequences for the two institutions' legitimacy and credibility appear as a strong determinant for the conflict's positive or negative transformation. In other words, what accounts most for NATO's perverse and EU's promising role in the Greek–Turkish conflict seems to be related to the strength of the norms each institution exerts as well as to the credibility each institution enjoys vis-à-vis the parties in conflict.

Secondly, NATO and EU's positive and/or negative effects on the disputants' strategies toward co-operation and positive identification are determined by the "type of socialization" NATO and EU mechanisms produce. To put it differently, whether the institutional mechanisms – by which NATO and EU seek to attain domestic salience and legitimacy – are directed towards the conflict parties' elites only or towards the conflict parties' elites as well as the public and the society does matter because a "thorough" internalization of the institutional rules and norms, and not a solely "elite-driven" one, is a crucial determinant for the positive transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute.

Interestingly, as a comparison of the empirical records of NATO and EU roles in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute will suggest, the reasons that seem to account for NATO's parochial role in the Greek–Turkish conflict are the ones that should get the credit for a promising role on the part of the EU in the positive transformation of the long-standing dispute.

It should be noted, however, that the fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions also demonstrates the limits of the EU's potential role in the positive transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict. Indeed, as the EU case demonstrates, to contribute to the positive transformation of a conflict as well as to the disputants' strategies, international security institutions should – apart from fulfilling the aforementioned conditions – also be careful enough to promote the right mix of conditionalities and incentives for distributing rules and norms and for resolving "distributional conflicts."

An additional point of a methodological nature needs particular reference here. It is the basic premise of this chapter that in order to analyze the effects of international institutions on interstate conflicts a multi-stage process should be followed. The aim of this process is twofold: firstly, to integrate institutional and constructivist insights into the effects of international institutions on shaping states' interests and identities towards co-operation and positive identification, respectively; secondly, to bring domestic politics more systematically into the study of international institutions (Cortell and Davis 2000) by highlighting the ways different states use the same institutions as well as the ways in which the nature or interests of the state itself are potentially changed by the actions of institutions.

Thus, for assessing the effects of NATO and the EU on the positive and/or negative transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict, the pathway our analysis follows can be viewed as a multi-stage process that attempts to link an institution's characteristics (norms, views, strategies) with certain institutional effects and/or socializing outcomes. The first stage in this multi-stage process involves an institution's approach towards both the conflict parties and the conflict itself. The issues raised at this stage of analysis refer to particular structural conditions, such as the issue of membership.

In the second stage, particular attention is paid to the mechanisms and to the processes by which international norms stemming from different international institutions can attain domestic legitimacy and salience in different states and so influence foreign policy decisions. The mechanisms that institutions use to exert their norms and influence are thus considered as intervening variables linking input (international institutions' characteristics) and output (conflict transformation and/or conflict parties' strategies towards co-operation and positive identification) (Checkel 2005: 805).

In the third stage, attention turns to the ways institutional actions are perceived, acted upon, manipulated and, most importantly, internalized by the conflict parties' elites and societies. Analysis is at this stage related to the examination of the particular socialization and/or internalization effects of institutional actions and to the domestic degree of salience (Cortell and Davies 2000; Checkel 1997).

Following this multi-stage process in assessing institutional effects on interstate conflicts, the type of impact of a particular institution on the conflict parties can be assessed both from an institutionalist perspective (how institutional action reflects upon the conflict parties' *strategies*) and a constructivist perspective (how institutional action may reconstruct the conflict parties' *identities* and *interests*). Particular inferences can thus be suggested about the reasons that account for NATO and EU's positive and/or negative roles in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict.

Empirical illustrations: assessing NATO and EU role and performance

Strength of norms and credibility

Throughout its evolution NATO has been characterized as an exclusive institution whose primary concern was to enhance the security of its members with respect to non-members (Duffield 2006: 638). Moreover, as the prime security institution of the Western community, NATO has always worked as a community-building agency, and international socialization – through "teaching" and "nursing" activities – has been one of its fundamental tasks. The Atlantic Alliance has thus developed and exerted a set of both constitutive and specific norms.¹¹ The former were interrelated with the collective identity of the Alliance and refer to basic liberal norms, such as democratic

political participation and representation, the rule of law and a market-based economy. The latter regulate behavior in individual issue areas and reflect the Alliance's field of specialization, such as norms of international military co-ordination and standardization and norms of civil-military relations.

Especially in the post-Cold War era, NATO has followed an exclusive strategy of community building, which consists in "socialization from the outside," as the Alliance's constitutive norms have been communicated to outsider states by telling them which conditions they should meet before being entitled to join (Schimmelfennig 2003). Specifically in the post-Cold War era and following NATO's transformation, there have been clear references on the part of NATO to democratic – among other – principles as well as to civil dominance over the military. It should be noted at this point that the transmission of such norms has been successful in east and central European states where the prospects of membership induced states to undertake democratic and economic reforms and to settle their outstanding territorial and ethnic conflicts (the examples of Romania and Hungary are striking), but it had played relatively little role in promoting democracy in an already existing NATO member, namely Turkey.

With regard to the conflict between two of its members, Greece and Turkey, the NATO role has been problematic, in terms of two particular issues: the norms and standards being transmitted as well as of the solutions to the conflict proposed.

During the Cold War, NATO's primary concern was to consolidate operational stability and cohesion in the Alliance's southern flank by deterring a Greek–Turkish crisis and/or conflict in the Aegean (Stearns 1992; MacKenzie 1983; Couloumbis 1983). In other words, NATO was interested in regulating behavior in individual issue areas and such a concern reflects the marginal interest that NATO (and the US) had in investing to facilitate the resolution of the two countries' dispute. NATO has also never been interested in making clear to its two allies that there would be costs inherent in any effort by one of the parties to either cheat or defect from the rules agreed within the alliance's institutional context. Such a stance would mean that NATO should be able to play the role of guarantor of any confidence-building enterprise undertaken by the two neighbors but, as the history of NATO relations with its two allies in conflict suggests, NATO did not have such an ability.¹² By implication, the norms NATO has exerted can be valued as specific and/or regulative, that is, in the management of the two allies' conflict,¹³ and, most importantly, as particularly weak given that the Alliance had always kept a safe distance from emphasizing the necessity of the resolution of territorial disputes among its members as a precondition for the continuation of their membership (Oguzlu 2004: 461).

By exerting weak and constitutive/regulative norms on the disputants and by maintaining that the ultimate goal was securing operational stability in the Alliance's southern flank (i.e., conflict management), NATO acted as a substitute for more substantive and long-term solutions.¹⁴ By maintaining

an attitude of detached concern, hands-off policy and impartiality to the conflict¹⁵ and by offering to the disputants the certainty the Alliance would do whatever it takes to prevent Greece and Turkey from fighting each other in order for stability in the Alliance's flank to be secured, the two allies had no incentive to take responsibility for resolving their own differences. It also gave them little reason to place NATO priorities above their own when it came to force planning and deployment, weapons procurement and other aspects of their national defense policy (Oguzlu 2004: 464). Indeed, with regard to the Greek–Turkish conflict NATO has never been – and never will be – in the position to clearly declare and enforce its commitment to international treaties and international law and/or to recognize in no uncertain terms the status quo of the territorial integrity of its member states.

All the above have resulted in NATO experiencing a low level of credibility and a gradual lessening of its importance as an institutional platform in which the intra-member co-operation process could result in the mitigation of the anarchical effects of the international system.¹⁶ It should be stressed that during the Cold War the credibility of the Alliance was also affected by the preponderant position of the US in NATO and the subsequent US policies vis-à-vis Greece and Turkey. It is not a coincidence that US military sales and aid to Greece and Turkey on a "7-to-10" ratio was interpreted by Greece as a sign of US acquiescence in Turkey's greater geopolitical value and hence, led to Greek thinking that any NATO-framed solution on the Cyprus issue and the Aegean dispute would be likely to favor Turkey at the expense of Greece. By analogy, Turkey interpreted the US "7-to-10" policy as a sign that the US concurred with Greece that Turkey posed a threat to Greece in the Aegean sea.¹⁷

Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, NATO started losing its attraction for Turkey and Greece as an institution able to define their collective Western/European identities. The new priorities of the Alliance, namely the promotion of the normative ideational elements of the Western international community in central and eastern European countries through enlargement, reduced the attention paid by the Alliance to Greek–Turkish relations and both countries became marginal to NATO's new identity and missions (Oguzlu 2004: 470–1). Although NATO started as a pan-European co-operative security organization it was gradually transformed into "one of the European security organizations" (Aybet 2000) while, during the 1990s, the EU became the institutional platform upon which Turkey and Greece could prove their European identities and work out their disputes.

It is worth noting that, although the security concerns emerging in the Balkans and the Greater Middle Eastern regions from the second half of the 1990s onwards pushed Greece and Turkey into a position of "front-line states," the consequent promise that NATO might start dealing with the Greek–Turkish conflict in a committed manner was not realized. Faced with increasing "Americanization"¹⁸ of the Alliance and the European acquiescence in US involvement in European security (Art 1996; Duffield 1994–5),

Greece tried to identify its security interests with those of its partners in the EU, whereas Turkey, rebuffed by the EU's gradual discriminatory policies, has had to improve the quality of its strategic security relations with the United States on a more bilateral and less multilateral basis.

NATO has gradually lost its power of attraction in Greek and Turkish eyes and, as a consequence, the credibility of the Alliance as a promising actor has been seriously eroded. Furthermore, the efforts of the European members of the Alliance to develop an autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has dramatically eroded the multilateral and transatlantic character of NATO and led to a gradual lessening of its importance as an institutional platform in which the intra-member co-operation process could result in the mitigation of the anarchical effects of the international system.

Throughout the Cold War years the European Community (EC) did not have, as the cases of Northern Ireland and Gibraltar indicate, either a clear procedure or an institution to deal with disputes between its members that concerned political issues of high national salience (Alford 1984: 34). Especially with regard to the conflict between Greece, a full member since 1981, and Turkey, an aspirant country since the early 1960s, the EC approach towards the resolution of the conflict has been a hesitant, if not an indifferent, one (Stephanou and Tsardanides 1991). In fact, the EC never decided as a whole to mediate in either managing or resolving the Greek–Turkish dispute. Mainly concerned about keeping both Greece and Turkey anchored to the West, the EC has been purposely kept out of the conflict, thus leaving some space for intervention to either the US or to isolated diplomatic activities of some of its members (Meinardus 1991). Unsurprisingly, the indifference of the EC to the resolution of the conflict has been viewed, interpreted and, most importantly, dealt with differently by the disputants.

Greece's membership of the EC, though largely economically motivated, was also meant to bolster the existing Greek government and, most importantly, to strengthen the country's international position, especially its deterrent capability against Turkey.¹⁹ Enjoying a comparative advantage as a full member of the EC, Greece tried to use the latter as a diplomatic lever against Turkey. As Greek and Turkish analysts argue, the EC collective approach towards the conflict was greatly influenced, if not captured, by Greece's views and desiderata on Cyprus and Greek–Turkish relations (Coulombis 1994; Guvenc 1998–9). Indeed, successive Greek governments have shown remarkable continuity in using the Cyprus issue for blocking EU–Turkey relations since the 1980s (Kramer 1987; Stephanou and Tsardanidis 1991).²⁰ At the same time, advancement in relations between the EC and Turkey have remained linked to the exercise of Greece's veto power, unless Turkey first meets particular criteria – related mainly to the state of democracy and the respect for human rights – and/or abandons its revisionist policy in the Aegean.²¹

Unsurprisingly, the EU was perceived by Turkey as just another platform through which Greece, taking full advantage of its position as a member,

could exert pressure on Turkey and pursue its national agenda with respect to Turkey. Furthermore, the perception of an EC captured by Greece was negatively interpreted as a reflection of a European reluctance to take Turkey into Europe (Ugur 1999). This reluctance, in turn, fuelled a dominant conviction in Turkish political culture, namely the “Sevres syndrome,” or fear of dismemberment as a result of a Western conspiracy (Kirisci and Carkoglu 2003). It is thus evident that by choosing to keep out of the Greek–Turkish dispute, the European Community was exerting rather weak norms over the disputants about the management and/or resolution of their conflict. Indeed, the hesitancy and/or indifference of the EC to intervene in disputes over national issues had negatively affected the EC “third-party” capacity as well as its credibility to act as an honest broker for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute, and overall its ability to have a positive impact on the conflict.

The institutional strengthening of the EC and its genesis into the EU was not followed by a more credible stance towards the Greek–Turkish conflict. Following the Imia crisis in January 1996, some normative pressure was applied on the aspirant Turkey by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The former expressed the EU's solidarity with Greece and warned Turkey that its relationship with the EU was supposed to take place in a context of respect for international law and the absence of the threat or use of force. The European Parliament expressed its concern over Turkey's territorial demands vis-à-vis an EU member and stated that Greece's borders constituted EU borders as well. On a stricter note, the EU Council of Ministers issued a statement in July 1996 urging Turkey to appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Imia, to show respect for international law and agreements as well as for EU's external borders, and to declare its commitment to the aforementioned principles. It also considered that disputes should be settled solely on the basis of international law, that dialogue should be pursued along the lines which have emerged in previous contacts between the interested parties and it called for the establishment of a crisis-prevention mechanism.²² Interestingly, the only result of the normative pressure exerted by these two prominent EU organs and the EU Council on the conflict was the further justification of the dominant perception in the Turkish elite, namely that the EU was being captured by Greece (Rumelili 2004b: 13).

A conflict-resolution proposal was for the first time made on the part of the EU, by an initiative taken by the Dutch Presidency in April 1997. In search of a solution to the continuing exercise of the Greek veto on the EU financial packages offered to Turkey, the Dutch Presidency initiative called for the establishment of a “Committee of Wise Men” (where Greece and Turkey would propose a “wise man” from a third party) who would study the Greek–Turkish problems, identify possible solutions and then refer the problems that could not be resolved to the ICJ. It must be stressed that through the Dutch Presidency proposal the EU had for the first time in its history acted as a typical “third party,” without making any explicit link either to Turkey's membership prospects or to Greece's status within the EU (Rumelili

2004b: 15–17). This in turn reflected a move of the EU from its traditional stance of hesitancy or indifference to a new stance towards the conflict, innovative and persuasive, though unfortunately only to a certain sector of the Greek and Turkish elite. It is thus not a coincidence that although the proposal was eventually diluted, due to the strong nationalist opposition it faced within Greece and Turkey, it was followed by the Madrid Declaration in July 1997, which marked a positive step in the two states' search for peaceful relations.

The 1997 European Council in Luxembourg was the first one to introduce the conditionality factor in the EU's intervention in the Greek–Turkish conflict. Thus, the settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute and the establishment of stable relations with Greece appeared as a condition for strengthening EU links with Turkey. Apparently, the Luxembourg EU decisions were not addressed to both disputants but only to the aspirant Turkey, identifying its dispute with an EU member as an impediment to its candidacy and asking Turkey to comply with this norm and/or condition without offering it, however, the carrot of candidacy. Unsurprisingly, the EU's introduction of a negative conditionality, without being followed by any carrot or reward, was interpreted by Turkey as a policy of “conditional sanctions” imposed by Greece on an ambivalent, if not reluctant, EU with regard to Turkey's membership (Rumelili 2004b: 17–18).

As has been made evident, the EU impact on the transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict remained parochial prior to the late 1990s. This was not only due to the EU's hesitant, if not indifferent, stance towards the dispute, which had in turn affected negatively its “third-party” capacity as well as its credibility to act as an honest broker. Empirical evidence shows that the EU's impact on the transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict remained dependent on the weak norms the EU had been exerting since the early 1990s towards the disputants, since the few initiatives taken did not incorporate any membership carrot for the aspirant country and served only to reinforce the latter's perception that the EU's initiatives towards the settlement of the conflict had been “captured” by the disputant who happened to be a member of the EU. It was thus clear that the EU's credibility would remain at a low level and that the EU itself would not have a positive impact on the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute.

Things seemed to change dramatically in the late 1990s, however, especially prior to the EU's “big bang” – namely its enlargement to the east. A radically different EU – more supranational, more post-sovereign, more post-modern, more multi-cultural and more demanding – seemed to be emerging. European integration has always been credited with ensuring peace in Europe. Particularly the EU's enlargement process has widely been legitimized by arguing that it will bring peace and stability to a part of Europe that would otherwise be in danger of returning to violent conflict, with possible spill-over to the old member states. Built on core principles, values and norms, the EU sought to export its success story to those who were willing and who could meet

the criteria. Pursuing its enlargement task, the new post-Westphalian EU demanded that the candidate countries undergo a radical transformation process following certain principles and adopting the EU Community Law in earnest. Most important, these characteristics were reflected in the norms and rules/conditions encouraged by the EU to states that sought to become members, such as one of the disputants, namely Turkey.

Indeed, prior to the enlargement, the norms and conditions promoted by the EU were both constitutive (e.g., democratization, rule of law, respect of minority and human rights, the role of the military in politics etc.) and specific/regulative (e.g., certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing the state's internal structures to European standards etc.). Moreover, the EU asked states that sought to become members to organize their domestic and foreign policies on the premises that underlie liberal-pluralistic democracy. The EU thus appeared as having a power of attraction stemming from its normative ability to determine the confines of appropriate state behavior in the European theatre.

Especially with regard to the Greek–Turkish conflict, in the 1999 EU Council in Helsinki the EU's role and credibility with regard to its positive transformation and resolution of the dispute was tremendously enhanced.²³ What seemed to make the difference in the EU's transformative ability towards the conflict was a series of issues that may be put under the same heading: exertion of strong norms and positive conditions.

First of all, the EU decisions at Helsinki established the – peaceful – resolution of outstanding border disputes as a community principle (Rumelili 2004a: 9). This in turn meant that the EU was not interested in providing a “patchwork” solution that would either settle for short-term solutions or consolidate the abnormal (to both sides) status quo. Instead, for the first time in the history of the two states' conflict, there was a clear reference²⁴ to the final forum and/or mechanism the two states should use for resolving/ending their long-standing conflict. By imposing a particular time-framework (2004 was identified as the deadline) and by indicating the final forum to which the disputants might refer for the ending of their conflict (i.e., the ICJ), the EU succeeded in encouraging and, moreover, facilitating substantive and long-term solutions, instead of offering short-run and ad hoc ones.

Secondly, due to the Helsinki decisions, progress on Turkey's candidacy and membership of the EU was linked to the resolution of its border disputes with an EU member. What is of particular importance here is that the strong carrot of candidacy/membership was incorporated along with a positive conditionality. Thus, the EU's stance towards the conflict was viewed, especially by the Turkish elite, as a policy of “conditional rewards,” and not – as had been the case in the past – as a policy of “conditional sanctions.” The incentives for the disputants to find a better way of resolving their conflict were also increased. For Turkey, the Helsinki European Council Conclusions constituted both an alert and an incentive that “there was light at the end of the tunnel” and therefore Turkey had to successfully address the issues causing

instability in a particular part of the Union. They also entailed, implicitly yet clearly, certain commitments for Greece, as the latter would have to enter into a dialogue with the candidate state in order to resolve their dispute, and in case that failed also agree with Turkey what the agenda to be brought before the ICJ for its final verdict to their dispute should be.

Thirdly, the resolution procedure adopted in Helsinki by the EU – namely a “two-step compromise structure” involving first negotiations on all issues followed by adjudication of unresolved issues – reflected a compromise proposal, allowing the disputants not to perceive EU influence as an imposition, but as a deal struck on a balanced distribution of gains.²⁵ It should be stressed at this point that, besides the EU Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament also contributed, especially after 1999, to the mitigation of the distributional conflicts by “keeping account” of deals struck, compromises made and gains achieved. As examples of effective mechanisms for resolving “distributional conflicts” one may refer to EU Commission Reports and EU Summits and Councils’ Conclusions where the progress achieved in Greek–Turkish relations since Helsinki were recorded.²⁶ Particularly with regard to the conflict between a member state and a candidate state, the EU emphasised the flexibility of the *acquis*²⁷ in order to accommodate special concerns arising between the disputants. In this manner, disputes perceived by the European Commission as a “series of issue conflicts” were translated into possible solutions through pragmatic approaches.²⁸

To sum up, the 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki constituted a breakthrough in the way the EU had intervened in the Greek–Turkish conflict. For the first time the EU adopted a clear and strong position with regard to the dispute between a member and a candidate for membership, in addition to making the long-term goal of the resolution of the conflict a community principle and incorporating the strong carrot of future membership along with a positive conditionality. By applying strong and convincing norms and conditions to a particular inter-state conflict the EU had thus succeeded not only in strengthening its ability to be viewed “as a framework” with potential positive effects in the long run, but also as “an active player” able to impact the conflict through a plethora of ways.

Unfortunately, severe damage to the EU’s ability to apply strong norms, and hence to its credibility to positively affect the conflict, occurred at the 2004 EU Summit in Brussels, where as a result of the EU Council’s decision that EU–Turkey accession negotiations would start on October 2005 an issue of paramount importance for the resolution of the conflict disappeared.²⁹ More specifically, the EU decided – obviously with Greece’s concession – that the Helsinki timetable urging the two countries to solve their bilateral differences, or else agree by December 2004 to refer them to ICJ, should be withdrawn. Turkey – in addition to the Copenhagen criteria – was now simply asked by the EU to commit to good neighborly relations and resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, *including if necessary*

jurisdiction of the ICJ (our emphasis). By implication, progress on Turkey’s membership would no longer be linked to the resolution of its dispute with Greece, with an obvious decrease in both disputants’ incentives (especially Turkey’s) to find a way of resolving their conflict. It thus seemed that a resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict should, for the immediate future, be sought outside the EU context and be achieved sometime in the distant future by a hesitant Greece and a – hopefully – increasingly Europeanized Turkey en route to Brussels.

Depth of internalization

As suggested by the relevant literature, the mechanisms that institutions use to exert their norms are not competing or mutually exclusive and can be differentiated according to the logic of action they follow. Thus, the mechanisms following the “logic of appropriateness” (when actors do what is deemed appropriate) can be either “cognitive” [they teach domestic actors what is deemed appropriate in a given situation] or “normative” [they seek to convince states of their norms]. On the other hand, the mechanisms following the “logic of consequentiality” (based on a cost–benefit analysis, actors choose the action that maximizes their individual utility) may either be “rhetorical” [institutions use social-psychological rewards for compliance and punishment for non-compliance] or “bargaining” [institutions use material threats and promises either directly to coerce a state to follow its norms or indirectly to alter the domestic balance of power in favor of actors that support its norms] (Schimmelfennig 2002: 12–13; Checkel 1999). Needless to say those institutional mechanisms are to be directed towards the conflict parties’ elites and/or societies.

Through the aforementioned mechanisms and following particular socialization policies, institutions exert their norms and, most importantly, impact the domestic landscape of the states to be socialized. A useful categorization of the “domestic impact” distinguishes between normative effects and the depth of internalization (Schimmelfennig 2002: 9–10). The former refers to the kind of institutional impact and includes the “formal conception of norms” (mainly seen in the transfer of institutional norms to domestic laws or in the creation of formal institutions that enforce the institutional norm), “the behavioral conception of norms” (measured by the extent the behavior of the states under socialization is consistent with the behavior set by the institutional norm) and the “communicative conception of norms” (related to the ways the communication or discourse among the domestic actors is being affected). The depth of internalization or the “norm salience” (Cortell and Davis 2000: 70–1) refers to the extent the international norm has been transposed into a state’s domestic political institutions and culture. By implication one may refer to degrees or levels of internalization and/or salience (high/intermediate/low internalization or high/moderate/low degree of salience). Needless to say, different kinds of normative effects (formal, behavioral,

communicative) may also be detected at different levels of internalization or norm salience.

Obviously, it is a rather difficult enterprise to measure the depth of internalization or salience of the institutional norms, rules and conditions. In assessing NATO and EU normative effects and internalization on the Greek–Turkish conflict, empirical evidence is used for the exploration of only measurable effects of NATO and the EU on the conflict, such as changes in the disputants' (especially in Turkey's) institutions and policies, due to internalization of institutional norms (Cortell and Davis 2000: 70). Needless to say, it is a rather difficult enterprise for changes in the domestic political discourse to be objectively assessed, although they seem to be the most important ones. However, an effort will be made to assess changes in the disputants' behaviors and strategies towards co-operation and resolution of their conflict as "deeper" changes in the disputants' interests and identities.

As has already been noted, throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold War era the norms exerted by the Atlantic Alliance with regard to the conflict between two of its allies were weak and regulative, focusing on securing operational stability in the Alliance's southern flank. What is of particular importance, however, is that the particular norms exerted by NATO were directed – and are still being directed – only towards the disputants' elites. Indeed, NATO's regulative norms, basically limited to regulating behavior in individual issue areas between the disputants' governments, such as norms of military co-ordination and standardization, have been transmitted through cognitive and normative mechanisms to the Greek and Turkish elites only. NATO inability to ameliorate the Greek–Turkish security dilemma and provide a sense of collective identity between Greece and Turkey is attributed mainly to the domestic discourse in Greece and Turkey about its role. Specifically, both Greece and Turkey viewed NATO as a strategic instrument to serve their preconceived national interests, rather than as an institutional platform to realize their collective security interests.³⁰

It was characteristic in Greek security thinking during the Cold War that NATO was valued more as constraining Turkey than for contributing to collective security against the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, Greek military expenditures have always been more influenced by Turkish military spending than by common alliance defense policy vis-à-vis a common external threat (MacKenzie 1983: 117). The Turkish invasion of Cyprus – an island considered by Greece as an integral part of "Hellenism" as well as of its borders – in July 1974, brought about a major change in Greek strategic thinking. For the majority of the Greek public as well as Greek security analysts and policy makers the fact that "a NATO member, using NATO weapons, had taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to occupy another democratic European country" (Moustakis and Sheehan 2000: 96) was ample proof of NATO's inability to play the role of guarantor of Greek–Turkish borders in Cyprus.

By implication, Greece in the mid-1970s found that it had neither institutional nor military safeguards against potential Turkish aggression. Thus,

for the majority of the Greek public, NATO was seen to fail since Cyprus and the Aegean disputes were regarded as the results of Turkish expansionism that the West refused to curb (Borowiec 1983: 29–81; Alford 1984: 13). Greece's withdrawal from NATO in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was a decision taken by the Greek premier Karamanlis for the appeasement of an infuriated public, which blamed the Alliance for "doing nothing" to deter Turkish revisionist policies against Greece and Cyprus.

It is worth noting that a certain amount of anti-Americanism, and by implication of anti-NATOism, seems to be an endemic characteristic of the Greek political and social discourse, reflected in the reaction of the Greek public to the Yugoslav wars, the NATO bombing in Kosovo, the terrorist attacks in New York and on the Pentagon, and more recently during the US invasion of Iraq. This anti-US and anti-NATO stance seems to be something that goes much further than the traditional anti-Americanism of the Left and completely transcends Greece's political spectrum (Michas 2002).

By exerting regulative and short-term norms to Greece's elite and by maintaining an attitude of detached concern, a hands-off policy and impartiality to the conflict, NATO has reinforced these anti-NATO and anti-US feelings and attitudes. Neither has it managed to change the Greek elite's long-standing assumption that the United States and NATO should be more actively engaged in its defense and thus be turned into "security-providing" hegemons.³¹ Hence, the participation of Greece in NATO was seen by the Greek elite to be useful as a deterrent factor, a factor of limitation, or one of allied mediation, in an eventual Greek–Turkish confrontation (this was precisely the reason for Greece's reintegration into the Alliance in 1980) but in no case did it take the form of mediation for the resolution of Greek–Turkish differences.

Being a military alliance, NATO regulative rules and norms have been addressed – almost by default – to the military part of the Turkish elite, which has a constitutionally preponderant status and role in Turkish politics. Interestingly enough, the fact that the socialization of the Turkish elite into the Western mentality during the Cold War occurred mainly in the military delayed, if not prevented, the process of democratization in Turkey (Vamvakas 2001). Indeed, almost convinced that the generals would keep Turkey within the orbit of NATO, while managing more successfully the internal instability, the United States – the Alliance's dominant power – co-operated actively during the Cold War with particular Turkish military regimes and signed several defense and economic agreements (Oguzlu 2004: 462).

In the post-Cold War era and following an exclusive "socialization from the outside" strategy of community building, NATO exerted particular constitutive norms by making clear references to democratic principles as well as to civil dominance over the military. Although the transmission of such norms has been relatively successful in east and central European states – where the prospects of membership induced states to undertake democratic and economic reforms – it played relatively little role in promoting democracy in Turkey.

Interestingly, for the Turkish elite the internalization of NATO's post-Cold War identity, which resembled more a pan-European security organization rather than a collective defense alliance, appeared as a way to register its Western, and most importantly, its European identity. As a result Turkey took part in many NATO-led peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in and around Europe and became an ardent participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace. However, this process resulted only in the increase of Turkey's bargaining power and significance in the eyes of the US, rather than in the confirmation of Turkey's European identity (Oguzlu 2004: 468–72). Hence, apart from not internalizing the normative ideational elements of the Western international community, neither did the Turkish elite manage to use NATO as the institutional platform upon which to prove its "Europeanness."

Things have seemed to evolve much more positively with regard to the results produced by the exertion by the EU of strong norms, rules and conditions to the disputants' elites and society. The good news about the potential impact of the EU on the transformation and resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict is that the EU's strong norms and positive conditions exerted since the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki have started producing some promising results with regard to changes of the disputants' strategies and interests towards co-operation and positive identification. The bad news is that this process seems to have been seriously damaged by the "watering down" of the norms, rules and conditions related to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict decided at the 2004 EU summit in Brussels.

As has been illustrated above, the EU impact on the transformation and resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict remained parochial until the late 1990s. At the 1999 Helsinki summit the EU put into motion a mix of cognitive, normative, rhetorical, and most importantly, bargaining mechanisms³² for internalizing a set of strong norms and rules in the disputants' domestic agenda (Tallberg 2002: 609–43). Thus, apart from agreeing on making the resolution of the conflict a community principle and providing the Turkish elite with the strong carrot of candidacy along with a positive conditionality, the EU also actively promoted Turkey's democratization by asking it to proceed with a "small revolution" internally in order for the European *acquis* to be internalized.

The new EU policy of "conditional rewards" was received positively by the Turkish elite, who started reconsidering past views that decisions in the EU were fully captured by Greece. They were now prepared to accept a compromise deal for the resolution of Turkey's long-standing conflict with an EU member.³³ It is worth noting that almost all EU summits and councils' conclusions and decisions from Helsinki onwards have established certain procedures and mechanisms to monitor Turkey's progress in fulfilling the conditions set by the EU.³⁴ Moreover, the EU compliance system seemed to be operating using a combination of enforcement and management mechanisms in applying norms, which contributed to the EU's ability to combat detected violations, thereby reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon. By implication,

the use of carrot and stick by the EU to promote political reforms in Turkey seemed to be having a multi-pathway impact on the Greek–Turkish conflict.

An examination of Turkey's internalization of the European *acquis* after its EU candidacy in 1999 reveals that a "thorough" adoption of the EU's legislation, norms, rules and requirements was put into motion.³⁵ Most importantly, such a thorough adoption of the *acquis* took place with the participation of, and legitimacy provided by, several political and social actors, beyond those in government. More specifically, these normative and internalization effects of the EU on Turkey took place on a series of levels, namely on "the domestic institutions" level, the "elite" level and the "societal" level.

Various EU Council conclusions ask for certain EU norms and rules (in the form of conditions) to be enmeshed into domestic institutions. Indeed, from 2001 to 2004 various political reform packages were adopted in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria that resulted in deepening Turkey's Europeanization process (Bac 2003: 21). Turkey has so far taken some big steps forward in order to fulfill these conditions and has thus managed – inter alia – to regulate the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body and in accordance with the practice of EU member states,³⁶ to fulfil certain economic and legal conditions (e.g., harmonization of the country's legislation and practice with the European *acquis*) and to extend cultural rights of minority groups in practice (allowing mother-tongue broadcasting and education as well as the liberalization of laws restricting freedom of speech and association).

At the elite level, the formal conception of norms (the transfer of EU norms to national laws) had, in turn, certain internalization effects (constitutive effects) on the basic political actors in Turkey. Especially the civil-military elite, which appears as the primary "securitizing actor" able to define the internal and external threats to the state – whose EU membership becomes the primary objective – has slowly, painfully, but steadily entered a process of "de-securitization." It was the EU, especially through the *acquis communautaire*, that increased the chances of successful de-securitization by providing a reference point to legitimize conflict-diminishing policies.

One may at this point stress the change in Turkey's elite interests over the Cyprus issue due to the EU membership incentive and the EU's normative impact on Turkey's political elite (Tsakonias 2001: 1–40). Indeed, despite strong reservations about the role of the EU and veiled threats to EU members that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would be either integrated into Turkey or that Turkey would withdraw its own candidacy if the Greek-Cypriot administration was accepted as a full member before the Cyprus problem was solved, nothing happened. Quite the contrary, it seemed that there was a general understanding among the Turkish elite that the Cyprus issue had to a great extent been Europeanized and that Turkey would need to reach acceptable compromises with Greece, the Greek Cypriots and the European Union should it aspire to join the EU. Particular credit should

be given to the Turkish government, which had firstly neutralized and finally replaced the intransigent Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in order for the Greek-Cypriot community to support the Annan Plan for the reunification of the island. Ironically, the EU had a less positive impact on the Greek-Cypriot elite and the Greek-Cypriot public who rejected the UN Secretary General's plan for the reunification of the island.

Most importantly, at the societal level, Turkey's EU membership candidacy has empowered the domestic actors in both Greece and Turkey who are in favor of promoting Greek–Turkish co-operation, and allowed them to use the EU to legitimize their co-operative policies and activities. Indeed, the explicit link made by the Helsinki Council decisions – between Turkey's progress on EU membership and the peaceful resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute – has given official and private efforts to promote Greek–Turkish co-operation significance, urgency, and most importantly, legitimacy. Thus, after 1999 a pro-EU coalition (benefited by the EU's mixed strategy of conditions and incentives) emerged, which gradually and steadily gained ground over another vocal "anti-EU" coalition (Onis 2003: 9–34). In addition, Turkey's EU membership candidacy has unleashed funding to civil society efforts directed toward Greek–Turkish co-operation. The effectiveness of the EU in promoting Greek–Turkish co-operation has thus stemmed, not so much from its direct interventions, as from the success of various domestic actors in using the EU as a funder, a symbol and a legitimating handle (Rumelili 2005: 43–54).³⁷

In a general sense, the more democratization has taken root, the more diverse societal and political groups have challenged the primacy of the Kemalist understanding of foreign policy. To put it differently, it has gradually become more difficult for the National Security Council, the Foreign Ministry and the Chief of the General Staff, the traditional actors in the Turkish foreign policy-making process, to have the luxury of ignoring what public opinion thinks on foreign policy issues. It seems therefore that the ongoing democratization process in Turkey is continuously having an impact on the process, style and content of Turkey's foreign policy, leading towards a more rationalized and multilateralist stance and a gradual re-definition of Turkey's national interest that is closer to European rules and norms of behavior.³⁸

An overall assessment of the normative and internalization effects of the EU on Turkey suggests that the degree of salience or the level of internalization could be characterized as "moderate to high." Indeed, although norms appearing in the domestic discourse have produced some change in Turkey's national agenda as well as in its institutions, they still confront countervailing institutions, procedures and normative claims. However, although for some norms and rules the domestic discourse still admits exceptions, reservations and special conditions, it seems that gradually a legitimization of alternative policies at the elite level has been taking place and the activities of civil society and norms retain more and more salience as a guide to behavior and policy choice.

In the 2004 summit in Brussels, however, there was a setback to the EU's

willingness to actively contribute to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. As noted above, with Greece's concession, the EU decided to withdraw the Helsinki timetable, which had set December 2004 as a deadline for the resolution of the conflict either through an agreement between the disputants or via the compulsory reference of the Greek–Turkish dispute to the ICJ. The 2004 Brussels decision thus had certain consequences not only for the credibility of the EU to be "an active player" in the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict but also for its ability to be viewed "as a framework" with potential positive effects in the long run.

Indeed, from 1999 to 2004 the EU made the long-term goal of the resolution of the conflict a community principle and exerted clear and strong rules and norms to the disputants.³⁹ Most importantly, the strength of the norms the EU exerted after 1999, being supported and transcended by a mix of cognitive, normative, rhetorical and bargaining mechanisms, managed to achieve a moderate degree of internalization by Turkey, the disputant whose behavior deviated more from institutional norms. It would seem, by de-linking progress on Turkey's membership with the resolution of its dispute with Greece, the 2004 EU summit decreased both disputants', especially Turkey's, incentives to search for a – solely bilateral – compromise solution.

Even worse, a series of other developments may further exacerbate the EU's ability to constructively intervene and contribute to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. Indeed, in the years to come the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict is expected to become even more secondary to the EU's priorities in its enlargement policy (Celik and Rumelili 2006: 208). Moreover, representations of Turkey as "non-European," especially after the rejection of the European Constitution by France and The Netherlands, have resurfaced in many EU countries, Greece included, as the European identity discourse began to emphasize the "non-European" characteristics of Turkey. Such developments may move Turkey back to an ambiguous, if not threatening, institutional position in relation to the EU and thus have detrimental consequences for the resolution of its conflict with Greece.

Conclusions

The examination of the impact NATO and the EU have had on the management, transformation and/or resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict has both theoretical value and policy relevance. Building on various theoretical strands, research – on the effects of NATO and the EU on Greece's and Turkey's strategies toward co-operation and positive identification and, more specifically, on their conflict transformation – has shown whether and mainly how these institutions matter.

The relevant literature has so far argued for a parochial role of the Atlantic Alliance in the Greek–Turkish conflict while a certain amount of optimism has been expressed, especially after 1999, for a promising EU role in the

transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute. Through a comparative assessment of the empirical records of NATO and EU roles in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish conflict, this chapter argues that two interrelated conditions seem to account most for NATO’s perverse role and the EU’s promising role in the Greek–Turkish conflict.

The first is related to the strength of the norms the two institutions have exerted on the conflict parties, while the second concerns the “type of socialization” and/or the depth of internalization the two institutions’ mechanisms have produced. Specifically, and in accordance with recent findings, which argue that compliance crises tend to occur when the implementation of inter-governmental agreements is not backed by a public discourse at the societal level (Zurn and Joerges 2005), empirical findings show that in order for a “thorough” internalization to take place institutional norms should be directed at both the elite and the public. This chapter also draws attention to the need for international security institutions that fulfill the aforementioned conditions to be careful to promote the right mix of conditionalities and incentives to the disputants in order to positively contribute to the transformation and/or resolution of an inter-state dispute.

Notes

- 1 Structural realism believes that international institutions matter only at the margins of international relations, and whatever power they have is derived from the power of their members (Mearsheimer 1994–5).
- 2 See the special issue of *International Organization* on “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe” (2005).
- 3 The literature distinguishes between conflict management (regulation of conflictual relations) and conflict transformation (the transformation of subject positions from incompatibility/antagonism to compatibility/tolerance).
- 4 We here adopt Keohane’s remark that “alliances are institutions” (Keohane 1988: 74). However, Russett’s and Oneal’s point that “the ways alliances affect interstate relations will not be the same as the ways that institutions with economic functions operate” (Russett and Oneal 2001: 166) is also taken into account.
- 5 Greece and Turkey have been allies in NATO since 1952. They have also been associate members of the European Community since 1961 and 1963, respectively. Greece became a full member in 1981, and Turkey became a candidate of the EU in 1999. However, despite their joint participation in and/or close association with these institutions, Turkey and Greece have continued to maintain antagonistic relations. In addition to armed conflict over Cyprus in 1974, Turkey and Greece have been in numerous near-war situations in 1964, 1967, 1976 and in 1996, over Cyprus and the continental shelf, airspace and small islets in the Aegean.
- 6 Greece has in the past vetoed financial protocols in relation to the Association Agreement with Turkey, and caused a delay in the conclusion of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. Although these issues are now largely settled, many Turkish politicians see Greece as an enemy inside the EU, causing unfavorable and unjustified treatment.
- 7 As Monteagle Stearns has noted: “instead of enabling them to reconcile their differences by direct negotiation, their [Greece and Turkey] common alliance with the United States and Western Europe often appears to act as an impediment. Bilateral disputes acquired multilateral dimension.” See Stearns (1992: 5).

- 8 After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s policy made provisions for the transference of the comparatively more sophisticated weapon systems of certain countries (e.g., United States, Germany), which had to be reduced under the CFE Treaty, to those NATO member states that had obsolete weapon systems, in order to streamline the latter.
- 9 See Koucik and Kokoski (1994: 36). In accordance with NATO’s Cascade Program, Greece received 986 tanks, 350 ACVs and 403 artillery pieces, while Turkey received 922 tanks, 800 ACVs and 203 artillery pieces.
- 10 Responding to Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro’s remark that “the literature has generally been biased toward studying those norms that *have* affected state policies” (Kowert and Legro 1996), this chapter deals with an institution whose weak norms have failed in affecting the policies of two of its members that are in conflict in a way that would promote the adoption of co-operative strategies.
- 11 For the distinction between “constitutive” and “regulative” norms, see Dessler (1989: 454).
- 12 One of the most recent examples of NATO’s failure to play the role of guarantor of a particular confidence-building enterprise taking place within the Alliance’s institutional context was during an Alliance exercise named *Destined Glory* in September 2000. During that exercise – whose main goal was to build confidence between Greece and Turkey – in the Aegean, NATO failed to make clear, especially to the Turkish side, that any defection of what had been discussed and agreed within the context of the Alliance would entail certain costs for the party that decided to defect. However, although none of the participants expressed a reservation or an objection to the exercise plans during the initial phase of the planning in NATO Headquarters, Turkey decided some days after the beginning of the exercise to prohibit the flights of the participating Greek aircraft over the Greek islands of Lemnos and Ikaria, which according to Turkey should be demilitarized. Although NATO’s Office of the Legal Adviser rejected Turkish claims, Turkey insisted on preventing Greek aircraft from executing their NATO missions by intercepting them while flying above the Greek island of Lemnos. The closing of Turkish national airspace to Greece’s aircraft participating in the exercise, which Turkey had previously harassed and intercepted, rendered Greece’s further participation impossible and compelled it firstly to ask for the suspension of the exercise and then to withdraw from it. It would have been particularly useful had NATO managed to ensure the participation of all forces in the entire area of the exercise as well as to conduct the exercise as previously agreed during its planning phase. Unfortunately, NATO’s mismanagement of the particular exercise sent wrong messages to the party that decided to deviate from the scenario agreed within the alliance’s institutional context, given that Turkey’s determination to exploit the conduct of a NATO exercise in order to score politically against Greece did not entail any costs. Most importantly, it made NATO’s ability to play the role of guarantor of any confidence-building enterprise between Greece and Turkey rather questionable.
- 13 For some analysts this is related to internal power configuration, namely to NATO’s continuing dependence on US preponderance and sufferance.
- 14 Gallarotti’s work on “adverse substitution” is very telling about the destabilizing effects of International Organizations (IOs). According to Gallarotti, an IO is prone to failure when it – *inter alia* – serves as a substitute (i.e., a less costly and less viable multilateral scheme offering short-run and ad hoc solutions) for more substantive and long-term solutions (i.e., managing the conflict, not resolving it). In his words: “the institution provides a ‘patch work’ solution that consolidates the abnormal to both sides’ status quo and thus reduces the incentives for disputants to find a better way of resolving it.” See Gallarotti (2001: 381–2).
- 15 Contrary to Tuschoff’s observation regarding the perceived impartiality of NATO

- high-level military commanders, which has enabled them to resolve conflicts and gain national concessions on disputed issues (Tuschoff 1999: 140–61), the Greek–Turkish case aptly demonstrates that NATO has never been in the position to serve as a neutral actor in politically charged situations.
- 16 This did not mean, however, that the Alliance had ceased to be perceived by successive Greek governments as a potential provider of security against the “Turkish threat.” See Tsakonias and Tournikiotis (2003). For reference to particular examples regarding successive Greek governments’ efforts to get a formal security guarantee, see Dimitras (1985).
 - 17 For these remarks, see Oguzlu (2004: 466).
 - 18 With an increase in the United States’ relative power vis-à-vis the European members of the Alliance, in the post-Cold War era NATO has mainly remained a political instrument of the US Government. Decisions about enlargement, the definition of the new missions of the Alliance and of the geopolitical boundaries of the Alliance have mainly reflected the concerns and priorities of the successive US governments in the 1990s. As such, NATO has gradually turned out to be a state-centric platform for the US to enlist possible allies in their global-scale security initiatives and undertakings. See Layne (2000) and Croft (2000).
 - 19 In the words of one senior Greek official: “Turkey would thus think twice to attack an EU member state.” See *The Economist*, 26 July 1975, and *The Guardian*, 19 May 1976 (as quoted in Valinakis 1997: 279). See also the speeches of the premier, Constantine Karamanlis, in *Kathimerini* [Greek daily], 11 April 1978 and 1 January 1981, as quoted in Valinakis (1997: 283).
 - 20 It was not until March 1995 that Greece decided to lift its veto towards the EU–Turkey Customs Union agreement. In exchange for the removal of the Greek veto on the Customs Union, accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would begin in March 1998. Cyprus would thus be included in the next round of enlargement accession negotiations. With regard to Turkey’s European orientation, decisions made in Luxembourg and Cardiff, in January and June 1998 respectively, further burdened the already tense and fragile Greek–Turkish security agenda, as the postponement of Turkey’s accession negotiations remained linked to Greece’s deliberate policy of keeping the doors of the EU closed.
 - 21 In 1986, Greece vetoed the resumption of the Association relationship between Turkey and EC and the release of frozen aid to Turkey. A year later, when Turkey applied for EC membership, Greece was the only member that openly opposed referring the application to the EC Commission for an Opinion. See Guvenc (1998–9). It is characteristic that even up to the EU–Turkey Association Council in April 1997, Greece maintained its veto and continued blocking EU aid to Turkey worth 375 million ECUs. As explained by the then Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, the veto was to be maintained until Turkey stopped disputing Greek sovereignty in the Aegean. See Athens News Agency, Daily Bulletin, 30 April 1997, statement by Foreign Minister Pangalos.
 - 22 Declaration adopted by the Fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU at the General Affairs Council on 15 July 1996, Brussels, SN 3543/96.
 - 23 Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership after Helsinki depended on resolving two issues: its border conflict with an EU member-state, Greece, and the Cyprus issue. With regard to Greek–Turkish relations, Helsinki made it clear to Turkey that it had four years – until 2004 – to resolve the conflict with neighboring Greece before the rather critical review that would assess Turkey’s path towards the European Union took place. Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions states: “[...] the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.” Regarding the Cyprus issue, the Helsinki European Council reiterated in Paragraphs 9a and 9b that although a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus’s accession to the EU, this very settlement would not be a precondition for accession. At the same time, the European Council ambiguously stressed that “all relevant factors” would be taken into account for the final decision on accession. The fifteen Heads of State and Government of the European Union have sent a clear message to Turkey that the division of Cyprus must end by the date of the next EU meeting at the latest. After that date, even a divided Cyprus would become member of the Union. In that sense, Turkey, which illegally occupies the northern part of the island, could no longer block the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. See Helsinki European Council Conclusions, online at http://www.europa.eu.int/council/offl/concluldec99_en.htm.
 - 24 Both the Helsinki Conclusions and the provision on Greek–Turkish relations, in the “medium-term priorities” of the Accession Partnership, do refer to the resolution of the two states’ outstanding border disputes.
 - 25 For this remark, see Rumelili (2004b: 14). The approach adopted in the Helsinki Summit is indeed different from past approaches. For example, the EU Council of Ministers stated in July 1996 (after the Imia crisis) that “the cases of disputes created by territorial claims, such as the Imia islet issue, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” Similarly, the Luxembourg Council Decisions of December 1997 urged “the settlement of disputes, in particular, by legal process, including the ICJ.”
 - 26 Commission discourses also include references to the continuous improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey. The improvement is sometimes linked with words like “significantly” (EU Commission Regular Report 2001: 89) or “dramatically” (EU Commission Regular Report 2004: 52). In this context, the Regular Reports refer to the signing of bilateral agreements that aim to deepen the co-operation between the two countries (EU Commission Regular Report 2003: 41 and EU Commission Regular Report 2002: 18 and 44), agreement on a number of confidence-building measures (2004: 2003: 41; 2002: 44; 2001: 31), the exploratory talks in the Aegean that started in March 2002 (EU Commission Regular Reports in 2004 and 2002: 18 and 44) as well as symbolic movements such as the “official visit” of the Turkish PM to Greece and his “private visit to Western Thrace where he called on the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority to contribute to Greece’s prosperity” (EU Commission Regular Report 2004) and the public commitments at the highest level to continued rapprochement (EU Commission Regular Report 2003: 41). In some documents, there have also been references to the Greek–Turkish rapprochement at the level of civil society (EU Commission Regular Report 2001: 89). The evolution of Turkish foreign policy and its perception of security interests towards EU standards has also been recorded, though the Greek–Turkish dispute remains unresolved (EU Commission Report, October 2004). See Pace (2005).
 - 27 The EU *acquis*, also known as *acquis communautaire*, concerns the “legal order” of the Union.
 - 28 According to the EU Commission discourse, Greek–Turkish conflict appears as a series of “issue conflicts”: “There are a number of contentious issues in the Aegean area between Turkey and an EU Member State, Greece, including disputes about the demarcation of the continental shelf. Turkey also challenges sovereignty over various islets and rocks. The boundaries of the two territorial waters and airspace are also problematic” (Regular Report 1998: 51). The European

- Commission sees the role of the EU as a forum where the Greek-Turkish dispute can be discussed in the context of political dialogue (Regular Report 2001: 33) while the use of carrot and stick to promote political reforms in Turkey could be seen to have a multi-pathway impact on the Greek-Turkish conflict. See Pace (2005).
- 29 The government that emerged from the parliamentary elections in March 2004, burdened with the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek/Cypriots and hesitant to pay the cost that a compromise settlement with Turkey before the Helsinki deadline (i.e. the end of 2004) would entail, opted for a transference of the dispute's resolution to the future. For an analysis of Greece's "socialization" strategy vis-à-vis Turkey, see Tsakonas (2007).
- 30 There is a plethora of examples, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, that verify this thesis. Back in mid-1950s Greece argued for the establishment of a NATO patrol-boat base on the island of Leros, which was vetoed by Turkey because the latter considered that this Dodecanese island – in accordance with the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris treaties – should remain demilitarized. See Iatrides (2000: 32–46). By analogy, Turkey was constantly vetoing the inclusion of the island of Lemnos in the planned military exercises of the Alliance in the region in order to prevent the promotion of Greece's goals through NATO; see Karaosmanoglu (1988: 85–118).
- 31 Several cases during the Cold War and after can be reviewed to illustrate Greece's attempts to get from either NATO or the US a formal security guarantee. They include Premier Andreas Papandreou's request in 1981 to the Alliance to provide Greece with a security guarantee against another ally, namely Turkey. The rejection of such a request by the Alliance led to Papandreou's refusal to sign the particular NATO summit final communiqué; the same request was posed again in 1990 to the US government in return for its access to military bases and other facilities in Greece. See Dimitras (1985); Tsakonas and Tournikiotis (2003).
- 32 Making use of its bargaining power means that EU conducts policies through which it addresses primarily the political leadership of the conflict parties. This is probably the most obvious way through which the EU attempts to exert influence. In its relations with Turkey the EU has, on the one hand, repeatedly used the "carrot" of a future membership in order to "convince" the Turkish government not only to pursue conflict transformation vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict or the contested border issues with Greece, but also to engage in far-reaching constitutional and economic reforms. On the other hand, the "stick" of threatening suspension of financial assistance has in the past been used by the EU to exert political pressure on Turkey and normative power.
- 33 On elite receptivity as a factor essential to the socialization process, see Ekenberry and Kupchan (1990: 284).
- 34 After Helsinki and in order to prepare for membership, the Accession Partnership called upon Turkey to prepare a National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which should be compatible with the priorities established in the Accession Partnership. The purpose of the Accession Partnership was to set out the specific short-term and medium-term priorities and intermediate objectives for political, economic and legal/administrative reforms in a single framework, and touch upon Turkey's internal, as well as external, front. In July 2003, the Turkish government revised its National Programme on the Adoption of the Acquis in line with changes and political reforms adopted since 2001.
- 35 For a good account of the political and legal reforms which have been stimulated since Turkey's EU candidacy, see Bac (2003: 17–31).
- 36 A development that has had certain repercussions for the Turkish military ability to solely define the issues that concern the country's national interest.
- 37 Especially after 1999, again slowly but steadily, one could notice, both within Turkey and the TRNC, the surfacing of a plethora of political parties, business associations and civil society organizations which have challenged the "orthodox" well-established Turkish policy on Cyprus and started demanding that Turkey and TRNC cease adopting a skeptical view of the EU and the accession of the island to the EU.
- 38 Our focus on the institutional effects on Turkey's foreign policy behavior is mainly related to the fact that, as theory suggests, convergence effects appear when institutions exert their greatest influence on precisely those states whose behavior deviates substantially from institutional norms. See Martin and Simmons (2001). In the Greek-Turkish dyad, Turkey is undoubtedly the one of the disputants whose behavior deviates more from institutional norms. Hence, the assessment of the EU's ability to exert its normative and internalization effects on Turkey's foreign policy.
- 39 Based on the observation that the level of internalization of the EU's norms and rules on Turkey has been a moderate one, we consider the EU norms and rules as particularly strong. This assessment follows Cortell and Davis' remark that "the strength of a norm is a function of its level of "institutionalization", namely of the norm's tenets in the states' constitutional, regulative and/or judicial systems." See Cortell and Davis (2000: 70).