

# WHY DID YUGOSLAVIA DISINTEGRATE?

## AN OVERVIEW OF CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS

◆ Jasna Dragović-Soso<sup>1</sup> ◆

In January 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia formally ceased to exist with the international recognition of several of its republics as sovereign states. But when did the country actually disintegrate and what were the causes of its breakup? Why was it so violent? And, who, if anyone, was to blame? These questions have given rise to a tremendous outpouring of literature of both a scholarly and a journalistic nature, while the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration and the roots of the violence have remained subjects of considerable disagreement. During the 1990s, as the wars of the Yugoslav succession were going on, passions ran high in response to the immense suffering, destruction, and war crimes, giving rise to some of the most heated scholarly debates not only within Yugoslavia's successor states but also in the Western academic community. Duelling explanations for these events were also generally linked to rival policies, polarizing scholarly opinion further and often giving it a highly politicized character.<sup>2</sup> Even now, years after the country disintegrated and emotions have subsided, new histories of the "rise and fall" of Yugoslavia and studies of different aspects of the breakdown continue to appear, testifying to the continuing interest in the subject and the undiminished relevance of the debates to which it gave rise.

This chapter will present a critical overview of the main lines of explanation that have emerged in the scholarship since the early 1990s, along with an examination of the most important debates that they have engendered.<sup>3</sup> Overall, studies of the disintegration of Yugoslavia have tended to reflect frameworks of analysis more generally found in the social sciences and in history: some authors have placed a greater emphasis on long- and medium-term structural factors, others on the role played by agency or historical contingency.<sup>4</sup> This review will thus follow a chronological time frame, which will serve to highlight the causal factors emphasized by various authors in their accounts of Yugoslavia's breakup. The five categories of explanation examined here are:

1. Explanations focused on the *longue durée*, emphasizing “ancient hatreds,” a “clash of civilizations,” or the legacy of imperial rule in the Balkans
2. Explanations focused on the historical legacy of the nineteenth-century South Slav national ideologies and the first Yugoslav state-building experiment from 1918 to 1941
3. Explanations focused on the legacy of Yugoslavia’s socialist system, its constitutional development and federal structure, its ideological delegitimation, and its economic failure
4. Explanations focused on the period of Yugoslavia’s breakdown in the second half of the 1980s and the role of political and intellectual agency
5. Explanations focused on the impact of external factors

As I consider each of these categories of explanation, I will highlight the existing scholarly challenges or complements to them and indicate where I believe gaps in our knowledge continue to exist.<sup>5</sup>

### The Longue Durée: Ancient Hatreds, Civilizations, Empires

The *longue durée* explanations were generally the first to appear in the early 1990s (alongside explanations centered on the role of political agency discussed below). Initially, there were two main variants of these types of explanations: one that has since become known as the ancient ethnic hatreds argument and the other as the clash of civilizations argument. What such explanations had in common was their vision of conflict’s being the result of Yugoslavia’s multinational and multiconfessional character—a character that in the view of these authors was forged in the distant past, giving rise to immutable and conflicting primordial identities among the country’s different national groups. A third, more nuanced explanation, emerged later on and highlighted Yugoslavia’s historical geography of being located in the frontier regions of large multinational empires. Unlike the first two variants, this explanation did not represent an essentialist vision of Yugoslavia’s peoples and did not fall into the trap of historical determinism.

The first, ancient hatreds, variant of the *longue durée* approach portrays the Yugoslavs as intrinsically predisposed to violence and mired in their deep-seated hatred of each other. Among scholars, the best known exponent of this vision was the veteran American diplomat and historian George Kennan. In his preface to the 1993 reprint of the Carnegie Endowment’s 1913 inquiry into the Balkan Wars, Kennan argued that the “aggressive nationalism” motivating the wars of the Yugoslav succession of the early 1990s “drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past: a tendency to view the outsider, generally, with dark suspicion, and to see the political-military opponent, in particular, as a fearful and implacable enemy to be rendered harmless only by total and unpying destruction.”<sup>6</sup> Kennan’s vision of “tribal ancient hatreds” was replicated by some Western journalists and politicians, but scholars of Yugoslavia overwhelmingly rejected this explanation from the start, pointing

out that peaceful coexistence and even cooperation between the Yugoslav peoples was just as much a characteristic of the region as periods of conflict.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the effort to counter the “ancient hatreds” thesis gave rise to a whole new body of literature that applied Edward Said’s Orientalist paradigm to the Balkans and focused not so much on the Balkans *per se* but on lingering Western images of the region.<sup>8</sup>

The second variant of the *longue durée* approach is the clash of civilizations thesis, first proposed by political scientist Samuel Huntington in 1993.<sup>9</sup> Although this view was also not widely adopted by scholars of Yugoslavia, it attracted considerable scholarly and public attention and debate.<sup>10</sup> The clash of civilizations approach emphasizes Yugoslavia’s historical geography of being situated at the centuries-old fault line between Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism, arguing that Yugoslavia’s disintegration and wars typify the new “cultural” or “civilizational” type of conflict that affects the post-Cold War world. In Huntington’s own words, “countries that bestride civilizational fault lines tend to come apart.”<sup>11</sup> He also noted that although there were many ingredients to “civilizational” identity (such as history, language, tradition, culture), religion was the most important, “perhaps *the* central force that motivates and mobilizes people.”<sup>12</sup> Finally, in Huntington’s view, the Yugoslav conflict of the 1990s demonstrated not only an internal clash of civilizations but broader patterns of “civilizational kinship,” explaining why Orthodox Greeks and Russians generally sympathized with the Serbs, Muslim countries backed the Bosnian Muslims, and the West favored Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes.

While appealing by virtue of its simplicity, this argument suffers from some of the same flaws as the ancient hatreds one. I will not dwell here on the internal contradictions of Huntington’s thesis or his tenuous definition of civilizations but merely on how these arguments apply to the Yugoslav case.<sup>13</sup> First of all, what needs to be highlighted is that although Yugoslavia clearly was a diverse, multinational state, the more salient differences within it were regional variations rather than civilizational ones. Some scholars have thus noted that inhabitants of any particular locality or region had more in common with each other whatever their ethnic or religious background than they did with other Yugoslavs—including their own ethnic or religious brethren—in other parts of the country.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the cleavage used more often to explain the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s has been the rural-urban divide, which has in some accounts even led to the characterization of these wars as “the revenge of the countryside.”<sup>15</sup> Ideological differences have also represented a more important source of conflict in the past (such as those between communist Partisans and royalist Chetniks, or the fascist-inspired Ustasha during the Second World War), cutting across ethno-national identities. And, in contrast to the current literature focused on Yugoslavia’s internal divergences, scholars have in the past also noted the many cultural, linguistic, and other similarities between the Yugoslav peoples that once gave rise to the very notion of “Yugoslavism” as a unifying idea and have posited that the Yugoslavs’ national disputes were essentially a case of “narcissism of minor differences.”<sup>16</sup> Huntington’s differentiation between intercivilizational fault-lines and

those that have existed within the entities he defines as civilizations is also difficult to sustain. His vision of a “Western” civilization ignores the much more violent historical and religious fault lines, such as the Protestant-Catholic watershed that affected Europe for centuries or the intra-Islamic divisions that have been a feature of Middle Eastern relations.<sup>17</sup> Finally, the civilizations paradigm fares no better when accounting for foreign policy decisions during Yugoslavia’s dissolution and wars: it cannot explain why the United States and the European Community governments initially opposed the German policy of recognizing the breakaway republics in 1991 or why the “West” eventually did intervene on behalf of Muslim Bosniaks in 1995 and Albanians in 1999. It also does not account for the Greek government’s participation in the NATO bombing of Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrins in 1999.

Indeed, as many scholars have pointed out, the clash of civilizations approach is essentially ahistorical and static. Because it views civilizations as constants, it makes no effort to explain why cultural, historical, or other differences become highlighted *at a particular time*, nor does it view identity-formation as a fluid and continuous historical process.<sup>18</sup> This is especially clear when it comes to its treatment of religion (according to Huntington the most basic and fundamental ingredient of civilizational identity and thus an “unchangeable” given). As the many studies of the role of religion in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s have shown, rather than a preexisting incompatibility of different religions in the multinational and multiconfessional Yugoslav state, it is the instrumentalization of religion by the various national elites and the conflict itself that reinforced religious cleavages and antagonistic identities.<sup>19</sup> In other words, rather than focusing on culture as Huntington does, these studies examine the role of agency.

The ubiquity of the ancient hatreds and clash of civilizations explanations in parts of the media and the statements of some Western politicians—often used by the latter to justify inaction during the wars of the Yugoslav succession—produced a situation in which scholars generally felt compelled to emphatically reject all *longue durée* explanations for Yugoslavia’s dissolution and wars. Yet the essentialist visions of ancient hatreds and civilizations aside, the question remains whether there *are* any legacies of the *longue durée* that could contribute to our understanding of why Yugoslavia disintegrated—judiciously placed within a multifactorial approach and without falling into the trap of historical determinism. While such factors alone do not explain Yugoslavia’s dissolution, they could arguably present one as yet underexplored aspect of it. In this respect, it might be useful to highlight Yugoslavia’s historical geography of having been located at the periphery of two large, multinational empires—the Ottoman and the Habsburg.<sup>20</sup>

In a rare work of scholarship on the impact of the Ottoman legacy on Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Dennison Rusinow notes that the structure of the Ottoman imperial system—defined as it was on a confessional rather than a territorial basis and granting considerable local autonomy to its constituent peoples—inhibited the homogenization and assimilation that was concurrently shaping the development

of states in other parts of Europe. This legacy, Rusinow argues, continued to defy all subsequent attempts at establishing homogenous national states in the region, with control over all of their territory—particularly in border areas, which have seen periods of ethnic strife and rebellion in the era of nation-building since the nineteenth century and where most of the fighting of the 1990s also took place (Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Military Frontier in Croatia and Kosovo).<sup>21</sup>

The utility of a *longue durée* approach has also been noted by Maria Todorova, who highlights the importance of subjective understandings of the imperial legacy in addition to the “objective” impacts of empire on demography, state structures, and social and economic patterns. She notes that competing perceptions of the imperial legacy in the region have dominated the scholarship, with many authors exhibiting a tendency toward implicitly presupposing monolithic entities that either stand in opposition to such a legacy (particularly regarding the Ottoman heritage) or form an organic part of it (as within the “Central Europe” paradigm).<sup>22</sup> An important aspect of such interpretations of empire has been the way in which historical visions of empire have shaped over time the various Yugoslav local, regional, and national identities.<sup>23</sup> In addition, as she argues, the variable and multifaceted regional legacies of empire in the Balkans need to be understood in the context of their interaction with the nineteenth-century West European ideal of the homogenous nation-state.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, a number of scholars have argued that the dissolution of multinational Yugoslavia represents a quintessentially European process dating from the unravelling of the large multiethnic nineteenth-century empires and experiencing a high point in the radical racial ideologies and civil strife of the Second World War. From this perspective, the breakdown of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and the wars of the 1990s represent a continuation of this trend. In the words of historian Gale Stokes, the process of “redrawing of state borders onto ethnic lines” was “not an aberrant Balkan phenomenon or the striking out of backward peoples involved in tribal warfare” but “the final working out of a long European tradition of violent ethnic homogenization.”<sup>25</sup> In Stokes’s view, the sources of this process are to be found in the continuing relevance of the political ideology of nineteenth-century nationalism, which emerged in reaction against the multinational empires and provided the inspiration of Balkan national uprisings and state-building projects until today.

## The Weight of History: National Ideologies and the Legacy of the First Yugoslav State

Historical explanations rooted in Yugoslavia’s twentieth-century experience have tended to focus on the national ideologies of its constituent peoples and the failure of the integrative ideology of “Yugoslavism.” In the English-language scholarship, the historian Ivo Banac is probably the earliest exponent of the argument that the “real reason” for the country’s disintegration lies in Yugoslavia’s twentieth-century history and in the national ideologies of its main national groups rather than in explanations

based on ancient hatreds, problems of modernization, or social structures.<sup>26</sup> Already in his 1984 history, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, Banac argued that “these ideologies assumed their all but definite contours well before the unification and could not be significantly altered by any combination of cajolery or coercion.”<sup>27</sup> Other scholars have since made a similar point in their studies of Yugoslavia’s dissolution (although not necessarily adopting Banac’s view of these ideologies).<sup>28</sup> There are two main schools of thought concerning the role of national ideologies in Yugoslavia’s ultimate failure as a state.

The first focuses on the inherent incompatibility between Serbian national ideology and those of the other two “state-building nations”—the Croats and the Slovenes. One variant of this argument is championed by Banac himself, who argues that Serbian national ideology was shaped from the start by a desire for assimilation and territorial expansion and that it was thus incompatible with the desire of the Croats and Slovenes to be recognized as different and equal nations.<sup>29</sup> Noting that by the time of Yugoslavia’s unification in 1918 the national goal of uniting all Serbs into a single state was omnipresent among Serbian intellectual and political elites, he highlights the instrumental role of Serbia’s political and military dominance and its victor status at the end of the First World War in imposing the Serbian national vision for the new Yugoslav state—a state that effectively became a “Greater Serbia” despite Croatian opposition.<sup>30</sup> Banac emphasizes the continuity of these nineteenth-century national ideologies throughout the first Yugoslavia’s existence and into the socialist period when “in the context of Communist thinking, all of Yugoslavia’s six territorial parties came to resemble, even duplicate, the national ideologies that have evolved and prevailed in the given party-state before the [Second World] war.”<sup>31</sup> According to him, Serbia’s communists after Tito’s death in 1980—particularly with Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power in 1987—“had more in common with the prewar Radical Party, the party of Serbian supremacy, than with Slovene or Croat communists.”<sup>32</sup> For Banac, the Slovenes’ and Croats’ drive for independence at the end of the post-Tito decade were thus essentially a “defensive mechanism” against the renewed threat of Serbian hegemony.<sup>33</sup>

The second variant of the national ideologies explanation can be found in the writings of some Serbian historians. In contrast to Banac, they portray Serbian national ideology as the main integrative and pro-Yugoslav force and blame what they see as an inherently obstructionist Croatian national ideology (shaped by a virulently anti-Serb Catholicism and the influence of Austro-Hungarian rule) for Yugoslavia’s problems and ultimate dissolution.<sup>34</sup> For them, all Croatian appeals for Yugoslav unity in the nineteenth century merely represented a tool to win over the Habsburg Serbs to the project of securing a separate Croatian unit within the Empire and ultimately an independent Croatian state.<sup>35</sup> They argue that Serbian political and intellectual elites were not simply pursuing the expansion of the Kingdom of Serbia but were genuinely (and, from these authors’ perspective, mistakenly) committed to a common Yugoslav state and willing to sacrifice Serbian

national interests to this project. As proof for this claim they cite the Serbian government's rejection in 1915 of the "Greater Serbia" option offered by the Allies in the secret Treaty of London in favor of a Yugoslav state.<sup>36</sup> In the words of historian Ljubodrag Dimić:

For the sake of the new [Yugoslav] state, Serbia sacrificed its sovereignty and its tradition, as well as more than a quarter of its population [in the First World War]. It defined and diplomatically secured the Yugoslav programme, and with its army preserved the integrity of that state. At the end of the war, Serbia was among the victors and, by including the other Yugoslav nations (the Croats and the Slovenes) in the newly created Yugoslav state, it enabled the latter to leave the defeated powers and—virtually without any war losses of their own—side with the victors.<sup>37</sup>

Indeed, while these authors acknowledge Serb political dominance in the first Yugoslavia, they note that this political preponderance did not result in the oppression of Slovenes or Croats, who themselves dominated the economy, enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy, and generally prospered—using the common state as a stepping stone toward their main goal of national integration and ultimately independence on those territories they claimed as their own. From this perspective, the decentralization and eventual dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia merely confirmed the victory of long-standing and inherently "separatist" Croatian and Slovenian aspirations for their own national states.<sup>38</sup>

Both sides in this controversy date back at least to the Yugoslav historical debates of the early 1970s, and are thus not unique or particularly new to the scholarship on Yugoslavia's dissolution.<sup>39</sup> Despite their differences, however, the implication of these rival explanations is essentially the same: Yugoslavia was an essentially "impossible" country from the start, whether because of inherent Serbian "hegemonism" or Croatian and Slovenian "separatism." In this respect, such explanations are no less deterministic than the *longue durée* approaches.<sup>40</sup> Rather than examining the various alternatives that did exist at every stage both in Serbian and Croatian national thought and seeking to understand what in the particular circumstances of the time conditioned the choice of some alternatives over others, they generally ascribe the worst possible motives to the "other side" and assume that bad outcomes are necessarily the result of premeditation and plan.<sup>41</sup>

Another school of thought on national ideologies focuses not on the differences between Serbs and Croats but, rather, on the incompatibility of all "particularist" nationalist visions (Serb, Croat, Slovene) with an overarching, supranational "Yugoslavism" acting as the cultural and ideological foundation of the common state. As Andrew Wachtel puts it, Yugoslavia was "the quintessential battleground between collectivistic national visions based on ideals of synthesis versus those based on particularity."<sup>42</sup> This is echoed by Aleksandar Pavković, who highlights the fundamental similarity of aims of Serbian and Croatian national ideology: the achievement of national statehood on a particular and, to a large degree, overlapping territory.<sup>43</sup>

As both these authors argue, the only way of uniting the country's diverse national groups and overcoming such competing claims to territory was by means of the overarching national ideology of Yugoslavism. In their view—as in that of most authors writing in the 1990s—however, Yugoslavism was ultimately incapable of keeping particularist nationalisms at bay. Pavković argues that it essentially came too late (he refers to it as a “belated national idea”), whereas Wachtel argues that it was abandoned as a cultural nation-building project by Yugoslavia's political and intellectual elites in the 1960s.<sup>44</sup> Without the previous dismantling of Yugoslav cultural unity and revival of separate national cultures, he argues, the political and economic malaise of the 1980s would not have led to the disintegration of the state.

Although these approaches add valuable insight into the importance of cultural nation-building and the powerful role played by national ideology as opposed to material factors, there are a number of problems with their characterization of a quintessential conflict between an overarching, supranational Yugoslavism and particularist nationalisms. The first of these concerns the problem of identity. As has been argued by a number of authors, Yugoslavism and other particularist identities were not mutually exclusive but often coexisted with each other—sometimes even within the same person, as illustrated by the self-definition of a former Yugoslav diplomat as “a Dalmatian from Dubrovnik, a Belgrader, a Croat—and therefore a Yugoslav.”<sup>45</sup> Sociological research undertaken in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s confirms this ambivalence in questions of national identity, and it appears that the more educated social strata generally tended to identify with notions of Yugoslavism.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, even recent studies of popular culture have indicated the continued existence of a shared identity despite the country's collapse.<sup>47</sup> On a political level, Yugoslavism was adapted to specific national circumstances and blended with various particularist national goals at different times.<sup>48</sup> Dejan Jović's work on the Yugoslav communist elite also indicates that—far from abandoning ideas of national unity in the 1960s—they in fact adapted Yugoslavism to their evolving ideological and political needs. Jović also argues that even those political leaderships that brought the country to its collapse in the 1980s often acted under the assumption that they were doing what they could to save it.<sup>49</sup> All of this research raises the question of whether the very malleability of Yugoslavism as a national ideology—which had been its greatest strength over time and had contributed to the Yugoslav state's being created not once but twice<sup>50</sup>—perhaps ultimately led to its undoing, as different factions in the debate over the common state proposed their own ultimately irreconcilable understandings of it.<sup>51</sup>

Secondly, what is often missing from accounts of Yugoslav national ideologies is the fact that their evolution over time was significantly shaped by their dynamic interaction with each other. There has been a tendency to view these ideologies as somehow separate from each other—built on the basis of religious, cultural, and ideological tendencies internal to each national group. Yet, in many instances already in the nineteenth century there was evidence that the adoption of particular ideological



stances—whether over issues such as language or in regard to the political agendas of the different actors—decisions were made in reaction to and anticipation of processes and actions that were taking place among political and intellectual elites of other national groups. Once a common state of Yugoslavia was established, such dynamic interaction became even more apparent, shaping political and cultural agendas and standpoints.<sup>52</sup>

Thirdly, the existing historical explanations also highlight the continuing need for analyses of the legacy of the interwar state for the subsequent evolution of Yugoslavia.<sup>53</sup> In this respect, it seems that too much emphasis has been put on national ideologies; perhaps it was ultimately the practical reality of life in the interwar state that was instrumental for its internal legitimacy problem rather than the intentions underlying different political strategies and state-building concepts. New research could thus focus on the everyday experience of state centralism and Serb political, military, and administrative dominance in interwar Yugoslavia for the non-Serbs *and* on the effects of the apparently permanent crisis of this state on the Serbs, many of whom identified with Yugoslavia and saw themselves as its guardians.<sup>54</sup> In this respect, much would be gained by shifting the focus from the study of elites to social history.

Despite their various problems and lacunae, however, these explanations do raise the important question of historical continuity. If we accept that separate Serbian and Croatian national ideologies were defined well before 1918, then—even without ascribing the worst possible motives to them—the question of Yugoslavia’s viability as a state inevitably arises. Was any common state possible that would have accommodated the Serbs’ and the Croats’ (and, later on, also the other Yugoslav nations’) desire for national statehood on at least partially the same, nationally mixed, territory? Could “Yugoslavism” as a political or a state-building project alone (rather than as a synthesizing national ideology) have satisfied these various particularist national aspirations, replacing their ideals of independent statehood with loyalty to the common state? In other words, the dilemma of satisfying desires for national statehood and of defining the principles governing the notion of self-determination, as well as the issue of how to divide sovereignty and power within a single political entity, were present in 1918, 1945, and throughout Yugoslavia’s existence until 1991. In this respect, our understanding of Yugoslavia’s historical legacy would be enhanced by new diachronic comparative analyses linking the interwar experience with that of postwar socialist Yugoslavia.<sup>55</sup> Finally, more synchronous comparative work is also necessary. Are Serbian and Croatian national ideologies different from other European ideologies? How does the integrative ideology of Yugoslavism compare to other overarching notions of identity and political nation-building, such as *Deutschtum*, *Italianità*, or even Britishness? Clearly, there is much to be gained from examining the Yugoslav experience alongside wider European trends, as some scholars have argued throughout the 1990s.<sup>56</sup>

## Yugoslavia's Socialist Experience: Institutions, Ideology, Modernization, and Legitimacy

The third body of scholarship traces the causes of dissolution specifically to the country's socialist experience. Most of these scholars clearly differentiate between the fact of Yugoslavia's disintegration and its violent nature, and generally their analyses seek to explain the former rather than the latter. Most of them also highlight the transformation of Yugoslavia in the late 1960s and early 1970s into a semiconfederation as the major turning point in the country's evolution.

The first, institutionalist, approach focuses on the evolution of Yugoslavia's federal structure. It emphasizes the "confederalization" of Yugoslavia since the early 1970s—embodied by the Constitution of 1974—as the main factor that eventually led to state collapse. The legal scholar Vojin Dimitrijević thus argues that the constitution, among other things, "weakened the [Yugoslav] federation by paralyzing the decision-making process and removing real federal competences, [and] promoted the federal units into sovereign states and the only real centres of power, making decision-making in the federation subject to consensus."<sup>57</sup> Other scholars have noted that the powers of the federal units were such that, by the time of Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia had "disappeared de facto from the constitutional order of the country in that 'Yugoslavia' was now only what the federal units decided, by consensus, it would be."<sup>58</sup> Valerie Bunce, who takes on much of this analysis in her comparative study of the collapse of socialism and the state in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, also argues that "the very institutions that had defined these systems and that were, presumably, to defend them as well, ended up functioning over time to subvert both the regime and the state."<sup>59</sup> These scholars all argue that the republics effectively "constructed" nations and gave them (to quote Bunce) "the institutions, elites, boundaries, and, ultimately, incentives and opportunities they needed to mount nationalist movements, to liberate themselves from regimes and states, and to construct new regimes and sovereign states in their place."<sup>60</sup> Indeed, Bunce explains the violent nature of Yugoslavia's dissolution (in contrast to the other two cases) partly as a function of Yugoslavia's having gone the farthest on this road—by the late 1970s it was, in her view, essentially confederal, thus pitting the (strong) republics against each other, not against a weakened centre.<sup>61</sup>

These institutionalist arguments highlight the structural importance of Yugoslavia's system, which provided the faultlines along which state dissolution was ultimately to take place. Certainly the evolution of Yugoslavia's system made republican competition and disagreement a more important feature in the absence of Tito as the ultimate arbiter during the political debates of the 1980s. However—although there can be no doubt about the progressive weakening of the centre—the institutionalists' characterization of the strength of the republics is more questionable. Indeed, Bunce's assessment of Serbia's institutional power does not really correspond to the reality of Serbia's situation in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, Serbia's constitutional

particularity of being the only republic with two autonomous provinces (which had been raised to the status of republics in all but name) was noted by Serbian commentators at the time and created the most important impetus for Serbia's revisionist stance toward the 1974 Constitution, as well as the rise of nationalism among its intellectual opposition.<sup>62</sup> The limits to large-scale nation-building were also demonstrated by the suppression of the Croatian "spring" in 1971; whereas the 1974 Constitution eventually fulfilled most of the Croatian constitutional demands, the mass resurgence of traditional Croatian nationalism was met by large-scale repression in the republic.<sup>63</sup> It would thus be more accurate to say that while the *tendency* in Yugoslavia was toward the creation of a more confederal structure with units acting as *de facto* national states—the *reality* of the individual federal units and the level of attainment of this status was extremely variable (with Yugoslavia's smaller republics having gone farther on this path than Serbia and Croatia).<sup>64</sup> Finally, these institutionalist analyses do not account for the *causes* of Yugoslavia's constitutional development. As Dejan Jović notes, "a constitution is not a factor in and of itself, but above all it is the outcome of politics, which is the interaction of different subjective positions in the context in which it happens."<sup>65</sup>

Jović's own study of the dissolution of Yugoslavia focuses on ideology and makes the case that it was ideological innovation rather than nationalism or economic rationale that lay behind the decentralization of the late 1960s and 1970s. For him, these changes were "the expression of the ideological position of the Yugoslav political elite, which wanted to use advantageous economic, political and international trends in order to promote the socialist project as it had formulated it in its own vision."<sup>66</sup> Based on his analysis of the writings of Edvard Kardelj, the principal architect of Yugoslavia's constitutional and ideological evolution, Jović concludes that "the main aim of Kardelj's concept was to increase the difference between socialist Yugoslavia and the pre-war, 'bourgeois' one, and between the Yugoslav self-management model of socialism and the model of state socialism developed in the Soviet Union," as well as to preserve this system after the passing of Tito and the Partisan generation.<sup>67</sup> Jović also argues that in the last fifteen years of its existence Yugoslavia acted more as an "ideological community" than a state, so that—when the political elite's consensus on this ideological project broke down in the 1980s—no other foundation was left for the continuation of the Yugoslav state.

A somewhat different perspective on the argument that the Yugoslav system contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction is given by scholars who have placed economic factors at the forefront of their explanations. These scholars note that Yugoslavia, despite all its institutional peculiarities, suffered from exactly the same systemic weaknesses as all the other socialist economies, such as low efficiency, lack of technological dynamism, and low adaptability. These weaknesses became increasingly obvious against the background of the wider processes of change characterized by increasing interdependence and globalization, which intensified from the late 1970s.<sup>68</sup> Self-management only exacerbated these problems by further politicizing

all aspects of Yugoslavia's economic life, eliminating other political alternatives, and thwarting the application of market-driven economic rationale. John Allcock notes that by the time the federal commissions trying to tackle the economic crisis concluded that the reform of the economy required a complete revision of the political system, the republics' interests were too divergent and the legitimacy of the federal centre was too tied to the ideology of self-management to allow the necessary reforms to take place.<sup>69</sup> In his view it was this combination of Yugoslavia's failed modernization and the lure of Western levels of prosperity that ultimately sealed the fate of the country.

What these approaches have in common is their emphasis on the crisis of the Yugoslav system—a crisis that manifested itself in the 1980s but whose roots ran much deeper, sometimes even to the very core of the Yugoslav system itself.<sup>70</sup> In this respect, there are two questions that arise: a first that concerns the alternatives to this particular evolution and a second that focuses on the interconnectedness between the Yugoslav state and the Yugoslav system. The explanations analyzed in this section make a convincing argument that the viability of the Yugoslav state was intrinsically tied to the viability of its system based on its twin claims of providing a different and unique road to socialism and of having resolved Yugoslavia's national question (by virtue of its federal structure, which gave equality to each of its nations). However, when did this system actually become unviable, and—specifically—were there roads not taken in the course of Yugoslavia's evolution that could have prevented the full-scale crisis and breakdown of the 1980s?

Here, a number of scholars have pointed to the watershed of 1971, marked by the suppression of the Croatian "spring" and the purge of the party "liberals" in Serbia and Croatia (and, perhaps somewhat less importantly, in Slovenia and Macedonia). Had the liberals remained in power, could their policies of economic modernization and constitutional decentralization have guaranteed Yugoslavia's survival in the longer term? Would they have been able to steer Kardelj's ideologically-inspired system toward a more realistic process of political and economic modernization and possibly ensured the system's legitimacy—albeit on grounds other than those of the Partisan generation—and thus prevented its ultimate collapse? While all this remains in the realm of speculation, it would nevertheless be fruitful to explore the period of liberal rule in the late 1960s and early 1970s in greater depth than has been done so far.

Secondly, it would be worthwhile examining the interconnectedness between Yugoslavia's system and the state in more detail. By the 1980s, both the economic and political pillars of Yugoslavia's *system*—as well as its ideological foundation—were clearly in crisis. Yet, while most scholars were predicting that some sort of change was inevitable, the complete disintegration of the state, and particularly the kind of violence it was to engender, were not yet being envisaged.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, one could make the case that the final disintegration of the Yugoslav state in 1991 came as a surprise not just to most scholars but also to most of Yugoslavia's citizens.<sup>72</sup> Even in Slovenia, which was arguably set on the course to independence after its referendum

at the end of 1990, polls indicated ambivalence about whether independence would actually be achieved.<sup>73</sup> So the question remains: if the state had effectively already “withered away,” why did nobody notice?

Finally, there is also the question of why Yugoslavia’s disintegration was violent, which most of these explanations do not seek to answer.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, there is a general acknowledgment among scholars that while longer-term structural factors may contribute to explaining why violence is more likely to occur in certain regions, the timing of such violence is highly contingent on the events and the context in which it takes place. Some scholars have thus attributed the outbreak of conflict to what is known in international relations theory as the “security dilemma.” The argument is that in a situation of state dissolution marked by the absence of an overarching “sovereign,” various groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) find themselves having to resort to “self-help” in order to protect their own security—a function that is normally the preserve of the state. In such circumstances, individual actions to reinforce their own group’s security—even if undertaken for purely defensive purposes—will undermine the security of other groups, producing a spiral akin to that of an arms race between countries. In conditions of heightened uncertainty and fear and a particular military balance—the argument goes—preemptive action and the possibility of escalation leading to war become more likely.<sup>75</sup> A number of scholars have pointed out, however, that the security dilemma represents a symptom of conflict rather than a cause of it, and that what needs to be explained is the construction (and subsequent instrumentalization) of the security dilemma itself, along with the fear and hatred that fueled it. In this respect, they highlight the role played by political and intellectual elites and the importance of human agency.<sup>76</sup>

### The twilight of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political and Intellectual Agency

The fourth cluster of explanations for Yugoslavia’s demise focuses on the last years of the country’s existence and the role of political and intellectual agency. In the view of these authors, although Yugoslavia was experiencing a general systemic crisis in the 1980s, there was nothing foreordained about its dissolution as a state; rather—they argue—state collapse was the outcome of the policies and strategies of specific domestic (or, according to some authors, international) actors taking place within the particular context of the end of the Cold War. As Dennison Rusinow put it:

Yugoslavia’s second disintegration actually became “inevitable” only shortly before it occurred, and primarily because the calculations and/or ineptitude of post-Tito politicians from several regions and nations, superimposed on a decade of mounting economic, political and social crisis that had “de-legitimized” the regime and system *but not yet the state*, transformed endemic tensions and conflicts among its diverse nationalities into collective existential fears for their communal survival that progressively infected them all.<sup>77</sup>

In Rusinow's view, as in that of most other authors in this group, Yugoslavia did not "dissolve" of its own accord, as a result of structural and historical forces, or the delegitimation of its socialist system. The country could have effected a peaceful transformation as communism collapsed, but it was violently destroyed by certain republican leaderships, who used the state-controlled media and other levers of power to produce a veritable "industry of hate" and launch wars aimed at the creation of new states.<sup>78</sup>

The question of agency will be examined by focusing on three main debates characteristic of the scholarship belonging to this last group of explanations: the first debate concerns the motivations, goals, and strategies of the political leaderships, particularly of Serbia's leader Slobodan Milošević, who has been singled out as the most responsible for the country's violent breakup; the second debate concerns the role and responsibility of intellectuals, and specifically of the Serbian Academy's 1986 draft Memorandum; and the third debate concerns the extent to which disintegration was an elite-led, as opposed to a grassroots, phenomenon. After considering these three debates surrounding these internal factors, I will finally turn to the role of external factors in Yugoslavia's breakup, examining the work of authors who have placed their emphasis on the importance of Western policies toward the Yugoslav crisis.

In the scholarship—as well as in the writings of journalists and Western policy makers involved in the Yugoslav crisis—there is a near consensus concerning the centrality of the role played by Serbia's leader Slobodan Milošević in the disintegration process. The general perception of his importance is mirrored in the fact that (at the time of writing this chapter) there are at least twelve English-language books specifically devoted to analyzing Milošević—compared to the scant interest in any of his contemporaries among the Yugoslav leaders.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, many accounts of Yugoslavia's disintegration and wars begin in 1987 with Milošević's rise to power and his first speech in Kosovo Polje, where he famously declared to the local Serbs that "nobody [would] be allowed to beat [them]."<sup>80</sup> But the exact nature of Milošević's role and strategy, as well as the importance and strategies of other actors, remain matters of considerable dispute.

One side of the debate on Milošević's role takes a broadly intentionalist approach in the sense that it derives motives from actions and ascribes a level of coherence to these actions indicating a premeditated strategy. In his 2002 biography, Louis Sell thus states that "Yugoslavia did not die a natural death; it was murdered, and Milošević, more than any other single leader, is responsible."<sup>81</sup> In Sell's view, until January 1990 Milošević pursued "a careful and well-planned strategy, aimed first at winning supreme power for himself in Serbia proper and then at dominating all of Yugoslavia."<sup>82</sup> This hegemonic strategy, as well as his harnessing of Serbian nationalism and the repression unleashed by him against the Kosovo Albanians convinced the leaders of the other republics that "there was no place for them in a country that also included Milošević," effectively leaving them no other choice but to opt for independence.<sup>83</sup> At this point, Sell argues, Milošević adopted a new strategy of

using armed force to carve out a “Greater Serbian” state “with the full knowledge that this would cause the disintegration of Yugoslavia and war.”<sup>84</sup>

Other scholars do not share this intentionalist view of Milošević. According to Lenard Cohen, “it would be wrong to assume that the blueprint for the entire course of events connected with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the subsequent wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and various policies such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ were all part of some master plan or conspiracy hatched by Milošević and a coterie of Serbian intellectuals during the 1987–1988 period.”<sup>85</sup> Instead, Cohen presents Milošević as a ruthless, intelligent, and tactically astute but ultimately reactive and unstrategic political gambler who was far too much of a pragmatist to have followed any preset plan for a Greater Serbia and whose only overarching cause was to ensure his own political survival. In his 1993 book *Broken Bonds*, Cohen distributed blame for the country’s disintegration more evenly among the republican leaderships, viewing it a result of their failure in the second half of the 1980s “to agree upon a revised model of political and economic coexistence that could have preserved some form of state unity”—a failure he attributes to both inter-elite mistrust and elite-led ethnic nationalism.<sup>86</sup> In his political biography of Milošević, Cohen explicitly rejects what he calls “the paradise lost/loathsome leaders perspective” that came to replace the “ancient hatreds” paradigm in American policy circles in the mid-1990s, as placing too great an emphasis on the instrumentalization of ethnic divisions, fears, and grievances by leaders and assuming that once those leaders were out of power such differences would be overcome.<sup>87</sup>

Finally, some scholars have argued that while political elites were indeed important in bringing about Yugoslavia’s demise, they did not actually aim to destroy the country. They also believe that far too much emphasis has been placed on Milošević and Serbia’s policy. Susan Woodward thus argues that it was the Slovenian leadership of Milan Kučan that first “attacked the stabilizing political mechanisms of the socialist period” and first began using “popular Slovene national sentiment and protest activity to serve the republic’s objectives in foreign policy and reform” (although Serbia was not far behind).<sup>88</sup> In her opinion, however, neither Kučan nor Milošević were following a coherent plan; instead, she argues, they were both responding to specific events and “choosing tactics of consequence, but not necessarily thinking out the chain of those consequences or the logic of their daily steps.”<sup>89</sup> Dejan Jović also argues that “the sources available . . . do not provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion that the members of the Yugoslav political elite in this period (including, therefore, Slobodan Milošević and Milan Kučan) intended to break up Yugoslavia.” He believes that, in fact, “many of those whose actions in the end brought about the disintegration had a completely opposite motive: to save Yugoslavia, not to destroy it.”<sup>90</sup>

Despite the wealth and variety of sources available to scholars studying Yugoslavia’s dissolution (which include memoirs, interviews, and speeches by the actors themselves, transcripts of discussions within government bodies, accounts by various

international negotiators, and testimonies and evidence presented to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), the problem concerning the role of Milošević is that so far no official government document or transcript of a meeting has been discovered that would incontrovertibly implicate Milošević in a coherent, premeditated strategy of breaking up Yugoslavia in order to create a Greater Serbia.<sup>91</sup> The evidence used by advocates of all the scholarly interpretations discussed above is based on witness accounts and memoirs, media reports, and Milošević's public pronouncements made during the period. But this evidence is in many cases contradictory and hardly impartial, leaving a variety of interpretations possible. The main stumbling block remains the fact that Milošević's policy style was extremely secretive, leaving very little documentary trace. Strategic decisions were usually made in the privacy of his home, with his wife, Mira Marković (who is alleged to have had a significant influence on him), and a small group of select advisors (who were often changed and only privy to limited discussions).<sup>92</sup> As has been noted, his public pronouncements do not represent a clear statement of purpose. Until 1991 and even after the onset of the war, he never openly rejected Yugoslavism; to the contrary, he usually professed his actions were aimed to preserve the common state.<sup>93</sup> While the sincerity of such statements may be doubted—as, indeed, it most often has been—it has been difficult to extrapolate a clear strategy from his speeches and interviews. Rather, such a strategy has been pieced together by scholars from specific actions (such as the creation of Serb “autonomous units” in Croatia and Bosnia in 1990), eyewitness accounts (such as that of Milošević's 1991 meeting with Croatia's President Tudjman in Karadjordjevo, where they allegedly agreed on the carving up of Bosnia) and the conduct of war in the 1990s (notably the pattern of “ethnic cleansing” campaigns).<sup>94</sup>

Also, Milošević's policy went through several different stages in the 1980s and 1990s, often leaving former mentors and advisors surprised and puzzled at his chameleon-like permutations. Beginning his career as an economic reformer but a political conservative committed to keeping alive Tito's “image and legacy,” in 1988–89 Milošević turned to nationalist populism. Having backed the Serbs' war effort in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, by 1994 he recast himself as an advocate of peace, accepted the fall of the Serb “republic” in Croatia, and played an instrumental role in ensuring the success of the Dayton peace accords in 1995, giving up many important Bosnian Serb territorial claims. In 1998, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Milošević once again adopted an indiscriminately belligerent and repressive policy in the province and a more directly authoritarian form of rule in Serbia. When he was expected to be recalcitrant and a tough negotiator (as in Dayton), he ended up being more than accommodating; when he was viewed as a political pragmatist who was only concerned with his own power and would give in quickly to superior U.S. and NATO pressure (as in Rambouillet and its aftermath in 1999), he did nothing of the kind—even at the risk of war against the world's most powerful alliance. Although many *ex post facto* explanations for



Milošević's behaviour have been given, during the period of his rule, scholars, pundits and international negotiators found it virtually impossible to predict his actions or the course of his policy.

The overwhelming focus on Milošević and Serbia's policy has left some crucial gaps in our understanding of the role played by political agency. Only a few scholars have examined the dynamics of the road to Slovenian independence dating from the initial debates over the shape of Yugoslavia in the early 1960s to the post-Tito constitutional debates, as well as the personal and political transformation of Milan Kučan and of Slovenia's process of "national homogenization" at the end of the 1980s. The connection between the "Croatian Spring" of 1971 and the revival of nationalism in 1989, along with the return of many of the leading personalities from 1971 onto the Croatian political scene, have not been explored.<sup>95</sup> Neither have the post-1971 Croatian leadership's chronic lack of popular legitimacy and its own internal divisions, which facilitated the rise of Franjo Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union at the end of the 1980s. The Slovenian and Croatian proposal for a Yugoslav "confederation" in October 1990, which has often been hailed as a missed opportunity to save Yugoslavia in some form and thus forestall the descent into violence, has also not been adequately analyzed.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, while the impact of Milošević's reckless and belligerent actions on the electoral results and proindependence policies in other Yugoslav republics have been highlighted, the same kind of approach is often missing from analyses of Serbia's evolution; in other words, to what extent did Milošević's actions, as well as his electoral successes, represent a response to the policies and standpoints taken by other Yugoslav actors?

Finally, existing analyses of Yugoslavia's dissolution have not paid adequate attention to the pro-Yugoslav alternatives that existed in the political sphere of all the republics, as well as on the federal level. Considering that sociological data point to the existence of considerable grassroots support for some kind of Yugoslavia, why were the pro-Yugoslav forces so unsuccessful at politically mobilizing that support in the late 1980s? The existing literature provides some answers to this question: Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have highlighted the role of electoral sequencing (the fact that the first multiparty elections in 1990 were held on the republican instead of the federal level), whereas institutionalist accounts have emphasized the decentralization of Yugoslavia, which meant that, by the 1980s, republican leaderships had control of the key levers of power, including the media.<sup>97</sup> What is missing, however, is a more thorough analysis of the forging and the internal dynamics of the Yugoslav alternative itself, made up as it was of a myriad of intellectuals and civic groups and, from 1989, political parties. A reflection about the implications of the official abandoning of Yugoslavism in the mid-1960s for the ultimate failure of the Yugoslav political option and of the cooptation of a Yugoslav rhetoric by Milošević in the late 1980s would also be a welcome addition to such an analysis. Within this general examination of Yugoslav alternatives, the role of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as an authoritarian Yugoslav option represents another important case study. Considering

the army's commitment to upholding Tito's legacy and the Yugoslav state and the fact that military coups at a time of deep national crisis are certainly not uncommon, why did the JNA not intervene at crucial moments when it could have done so (as, for example, in March 1991 when the Serbian-led resignation of several members of the collective federal presidency deliberately created an opportunity for a JNA takeover)? How unified was the army leadership at this stage, and in what ways did its own evolution mirror the disintegration of Yugoslavia's political and cultural institutions? Would a military coup have been a realistic way of preventing the violent disintegration of the country, as has at times been argued?<sup>98</sup>

The second debate in the scholarship concerns the role and responsibility of intellectual elites in the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution, and once again the overwhelming focus has been on Serbian intellectuals. This debate has most often crystallized around the draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, an eclectic and contradictory document drafted by a commission of sixteen academicians charged with analyzing the causes of Yugoslavia's post-Tito crisis. The text, which is divided into two parts—one on the causes and manifestations of the crisis and one specifically concerned with “the status of Serbia and the Serbian nation”—was leaked unfinished to the press in September 1986 and vehemently criticized by the Serbian political establishment. In 1989, with Milošević's resorting to a more nationalist discourse and populist tactics to help him force through constitutional changes that aimed at the recentralization of Serbia and Yugoslavia, the document was revived—in Croatia and Slovenia as the “master plan” of Milošević's policy and in Serbia as a prescient analysis of Yugoslavia's woes and Croatian and Slovenian secessionism.<sup>99</sup> Since then, the Memorandum has become the most-cited text in accounts of Yugoslavia's disintegration and remains unavoidable in any discussion of the causes of the breakdown.

There are several opposed positions on the nature and the significance of the Memorandum. Some analysts view the document as the intellectual foundation of Milošević's “Greater Serbia” policy and even as a “blueprint for war.”<sup>100</sup> As Branimir Anzulović puts it, the Memorandum “formed the ideological platform for the pan-Serbian policy of Slobodan Milošević” and “became a program for action when the disintegration of the communist order made many Serbs believe that they had a unique opportunity to transform federal Yugoslavia into Greater Serbia with the help of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav armed forces.”<sup>101</sup> Other scholars, such as Aleksandar Pavković, argue—to the contrary—that many Serbian intellectuals remained Yugoslav in their orientation, in some cases even after the end of the common state in 1991. Although Pavković notes the contradictions inherent in the document (unfinished as it was and with different parts written by different authors) and states that the Memorandum contained an expression of an “unspecified and rather rudimentary Serbism—the conception of an independent state of the Serbs”—he argues that the Memorandum advocated above all a “reformed Yugoslav federation” of the kind that prevailed prior to the decentralizing reforms of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>102</sup> In his view,

the Memorandum's significance lies not so much in the solutions it proposes but in the very fact of its "re-opening" of the "national question" in the 1980s, triggering a new debate on Serbian national goals. Finally, a somewhat different point of view is taken by Audrey Budding. Like Pavković, she rejects the view that the Memorandum represented "an explicit post-Yugoslav Serbian national program," but for her the document had a more ominous significance, acting as an "indicator" of a particular belief system and a change of attitude toward the common state—increasingly viewing Yugoslavia as expendable but without acknowledging the destruction that its breakup would entail.<sup>103</sup>

My own view is closest to this third interpretation. The Memorandum does not advocate the dissolution of Yugoslavia, let alone the creation of a Greater Serbia or ethnic cleansing. Of course, this does not mean that some intellectuals associated with the Memorandum did not eventually come to embrace such policies, but at the time when it was written (between the summer of 1985 and September 1986) mentioning anything of the kind would have led to instant imprisonment.<sup>104</sup> There is also no proven connection between the authors of the Memorandum and Milošević at the time, nor was Milošević's own position significantly different from that of the rest of the Serbian leadership, which unequivocally condemned the text. This said, however, the Memorandum is important in a different way: it represents above all a repository of Serbian nationalist grievances against Yugoslavia and an embodiment of the kind of discourse that was becoming dominant in Serbia's intellectual circles—a discourse that was based on an extreme vision of victimization, used terms such as *genocide* to depict the situation of the Serbs in Yugoslavia (particularly in Kosovo), and created links between it and the greatest Serbian trauma of the twentieth century—the mass extermination of Serbs in the wartime Independent State of Croatia. In a situation where public discourse about both the historical memory of the war and the present situation of the Kosovo Serbs was ideologically predetermined and certain themes represented official taboos, these types of images were extremely potent, providing a sense of existential crisis that could be harnessed for a more belligerent and uncompromising policy and could later be used to justify repugnant wartime practices such as ethnic cleansing.<sup>105</sup>

The debate on the nature and significance of the Memorandum raises a wider question about the role and responsibility of intellectuals, not just as the articulators of a nationalist worldview but also as the carriers of a political alternative. In view of Yugoslavia's single-party system and the historical legacy of intellectual engagement in East-Central Europe where the cultural sphere often had to act as a surrogate for politics, intellectuals should have been the natural vectors of a democratic opposition to what was essentially an undemocratic regime. And, indeed, this was the case from the late 1970s, particularly in the two least repressive republics, Serbia and Slovenia, where intellectual oppositions coalesced around the defense of freedom of expression and civil rights. In the end, however, the language of democracy became subsumed in the language of nationalism, and the struggle for democratic change was inherently

tied to the struggle for national rights and entitlements to territory. In this respect, one of Yugoslavia's main problems was that in the 1980s, when opportunities for a different outcome still existed, the divided and bickering republican intellectual oppositions did not present any genuine alternative to the undemocratic and unproductive practices of the regime. The voices of those individuals who advocated dialogue and compromise on all sides were drowned out by the increasingly radical and ubiquitous nationalist rhetoric. It is this failure to present a peaceful political alternative and to set an example of tolerance and compromise that represents Yugoslavia's intellectual elites' most devastating contribution to their country's violent dissolution. Indeed, the first common Yugoslav institution to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s was a cultural one—the Yugoslav Writers' Union—representing an important precursor of the political breakdown of the common state.<sup>106</sup>

Finally, as in the case of political agency, existing analyses of the role of intellectuals in Yugoslavia's dissolution process call for more comparative work.<sup>107</sup> The activities and discourse of Serbian intellectuals have been analyzed in great detail, but what of parallel streamings in other Yugoslav republics? Slovenian intellectuals (particularly contributors to the journal *Nova revija*) have played as important a role as their Serbian counterparts in the revival of nationalism in their own republic, but their trajectory has not received nearly as much attention in the literature. The development of the Croatian dissidence since the suppression of the 1971 "spring" would also merit more sustained examination, as would the evolution of the intellectual sphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Sociological analyses of the transmission of the ideas and "products" of intellectuals to the mass level, particularly in the course of the 1980s, are also missing. For example, it would be interesting to know who actually read the Memorandum in the 1980s and how the ideas contained in it reached the wider public. Who were the "consumers" of the nationalist histories and literary works that began to appear in the 1970s and 1980s throughout Yugoslavia? It is only when we are able to answer questions like these that we will gain a better understanding of the impact intellectuals had on Yugoslavia's process of dissolution.

The third scholarly debate covering the proximate causes of Yugoslavia's breakdown concerns the extent to which dissolution was an elite-led, as opposed to a grass-roots-driven, phenomenon. The strongest statement of the former position is provided by V. P. Gagnon, who has argued that the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were imposed from outside on peaceful multiethnic communities (such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina), in particular from Milošević's Serbia and Tudjman's Croatia. The violence that accompanied Yugoslavia's dissolution was, in Gagnon's view, "a strategic policy chosen by elites who were confronted with political pluralism and popular mobilization" in an attempt to demobilize domestic challengers and impose political homogeneity within their own republics.<sup>108</sup> Affirming that ethnicity is a fluid and malleable identity, Gagnon argues that the Serbian and Croatian political elites did not simply play the "ethnic card" by appealing to preexisting identities and fears but "constructed" ethnicity as

“a hard category” and ethnic groups as “clearly bounded, monolithic, unambiguous units”; as he puts it, “it is the very inability of elites to ‘play the ethnic card’ as a means to mobilize the population that leads them to rely on violence.”<sup>109</sup>

Other scholars, such as Rogers Brubaker, have, in contrast, argued that it would be wrong to treat the mobilization of national minorities (such as the Croatian Serbs) as a simple story of outside manipulation. While he acknowledges the important role played by nationalist elites from Serbia in the process of Croatian Serb mobilization, he notes:

Although representations of wartime atrocities—often greatly exaggerated—were indeed widely propagated from Belgrade, memories of and stories about the murderous wartime Independent State of Croatia and especially about the gruesome fate of many Croat and Bosnian Serbs (Bosnia having been incorporated into the wartime Croatian state), were not imports. They were locally rooted, sustained within family and village circles, and transmitted to the postwar generations, especially in the ethnically mixed and partly Serb-majority borderland regions.<sup>110</sup>

In this respect, Brubaker argues, national minorities should be recognized as active participants in the conflict and as political subjects in their own right, not just as pawns of hostile outside forces.

This debate raises some important questions, the first being the nature of historical memory of past conflict and its role in national mobilization. Most existing studies indicate that ignoring historical memory is impossible when trying to account for Yugoslavia’s violent breakup. This is particularly true of those parts of the country—the multiethnic border regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina—that saw the worst of the civil and national strife during the Second World War and that were again the main theaters of war in the 1990s.<sup>111</sup> As Jan-Werner Müller correctly notes, however, “while very few would doubt that memory mattered and exercised power in the Yugoslav wars, even fewer would be able to explain precisely how it mattered.”<sup>112</sup> Understanding the role played by historical memory inevitably entails an examination of both “official memory”—sponsored and propagated by the political authorities and intellectual elites under the communist regime, as well as by their various successors in the post-Yugoslav states—and “private” memory, generally transmitted across generations through family oral history.<sup>113</sup> The problem is, however, that all such memory (both official and private) is inevitably partial, multiple, and conflicting; most commentators of Yugoslavia’s wars have noted the impossibility of reconciling the diametrically opposed historical narratives presented not only by the various national groups but also by supporters of different ideologies (communist, liberal, or nationalist) and members of different social strata. Even more importantly, as the anthropologist Ger Duijzings notes in his study of history and memory in eastern Bosnia, “views even conflict within the self-same individuals in their attempts to resolve all these contradictions and construct coherent stories for themselves.”<sup>114</sup>

This type of evidence corroborates Gagnon's argument that memory and identity were—within certain parameters—fluid categories that were shaped largely by their particular context. Much valuable work already exists on the construction and instrumentalization of memory by political and intellectual elites in the Yugoslav republics.<sup>115</sup> Yet, in order to understand better why certain images and stereotypes resonated with parts of the population in such a potent way (while others, notably of periods of peaceful coexistence, were suppressed), more research is needed into the way that everyday social interaction, rumor and hearsay, economic crisis and local power relations shaped identity and memory. In other words, it is the *interaction* between existing private memories, the changing official memory—shaped as it was by accounts of the victimization of one's own nation—and the evolving patterns and relations of everyday life that needs further study. A fruitful way of tackling this complex task might be to move away from national or even republican categories and focus instead on local or family histories.<sup>116</sup>

The second, related, question concerns the nature of national mobilization in the period leading up to Yugoslavia's breakdown and the outbreak of war. To what extent was this mobilization orchestrated and controlled from above, and to what extent did it come about as a local, grassroots phenomenon in response to the particular community's fears and grievances, as well as specific political opportunity structures of the time? As Nebojša Vladislavljević notes, the overwhelming focus on elites has resulted in comparatively few studies' being devoted specifically to the grassroots aspects of national mobilization.<sup>117</sup> His own work on the Kosovo Serb mobilization in the 1980s indicates that this was a genuine grassroots social movement that predated Milošević's rise to power and remained an autonomous political force, despite at times cooperating with the Serbian regime.<sup>118</sup> Indeed, grassroots national mobilization was recurrent in the country even before the late 1980s, as shown by the mass demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians in 1968 and 1981 and the 1971 Croatian spring.<sup>119</sup> Analyses of the 1989 mobilization of Kosovo Albanians in response to Serbia's constitutional changes have also indicated the essentially grassroots nature of this political protest.<sup>120</sup> The rise of the Slovenian youth and social movements in the early 1980s, as well as the 1988 "national mobilization" that coalesced against the trial of three Slovenian journalists and an army officer before a military court (known as the *Mladina* trial), were also largely grassroots-driven forms of political protest.<sup>121</sup>

In their different ways (and despite their various exaggerations), all these grassroots movements did represent expressions of genuine popular discontent with aspects of the Yugoslav system and reactions to real discrimination combined with an acute sense of fear—emotions that could be harnessed by political elites for policies that were sometimes far removed from the desires of those they allegedly represented. They also show that despite Yugoslavia's comparatively liberal and "Westernized" veneer, it remained an essentially undemocratic state where breaches of human and civil rights were endemic and where citizens did not have recourse to legitimate

institutions to voice their grievances. Minimizing grassroots discontent and writing off such mobilization as simply manipulated from above means ignoring the conditions that not only enabled the rise of nationalism but also made particular leaders possible and popular. As some scholars have noted, the inauguration of democratization with the 1990 multiparty republican elections did not resolve this fundamental problem but only exacerbated it by further empowering nationalist leaderships.<sup>122</sup> Finally, the overwhelming focus on political elites does not enable us to understand the continuing problems in the region even after the political removal (or death) of former leaders, such as the persistence of nationalism and the challenge of defining states and constructing democratic institutions.

### The Impact of International Factors

The great majority of the scholarship on Yugoslavia's dissolution has tended to emphasize internal causes rather than external ones. Although there has been a tremendous amount of debate on the international *reaction* to the Yugoslav crisis, scholars have seen the international context and the policies of the major Western institutional and state actors as a contributing factor at best. Generally, they mention the end of the Cold War in relation to both the erosion of Yugoslavia's internal legitimacy and its loss of strategic importance to the West, which conditioned Western ambivalence and "lack of will" to act decisively in the Yugoslav crisis.<sup>123</sup> Since the mid-1990s, however, this has begun to change as more and more studies have appeared arguing that Western policies were a crucial cause of the country's disintegration. Two main explanations have emerged in regard to the role of external factors in Yugoslavia's breakdown: a first, focused on international financial institutions and American neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s, and a second, focused on the support of certain Western states, particularly Germany, for Slovenia's and Croatia's independence.

The role of external economic factors in the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration was first highlighted in the English-language scholarship by Susan Woodward in her 1995 book *Balkan Tragedy*. Woodward argues that the breakdown of Yugoslavia's political and civil order was exacerbated by Western insistence on economic austerity policies, which upset the delicate checks and balances that governed state authority, turning normal political conflicts over economic resources and reforms into constitutional conflicts and a crisis of the state.<sup>124</sup> She notes that, in a situation of harsh austerity, budgetary conflicts and economic policy aimed at reducing trade deficits and foreign debt, republican governments effectively abandoned the systemic guarantees of national equality, defied tax obligations to the federation, and began increasingly to question the very foundations of state legitimacy.<sup>125</sup>

Woodward's analysis has since informed the work of a number of other scholars, particularly in Great Britain. Kate Hudson thus argues that in the 1980s Yugoslavia's external debt made it particularly vulnerable to the liberal macroeconomic

reform advocated by Western financial institutions, which fuelled the resistance of the wealthier republics against subsidizing the poorer parts of the federation and encouraged their perception that without the ballast of the rest of the country they would more easily gain admission to the German economic zone and the European Community.<sup>126</sup> This situation was exacerbated following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, when Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance to the United States and the reintroduction of capitalism and the institutionalization of liberal democracy in the region became the only remaining superpower's prime objectives. David Chandler notes that after 1989, although the United States still nominally supported the Yugoslav federal government of Prime Minister Ante Marković, it perceived the weakness of the federal government as a liability and undermined the federation's legitimacy by asserting that unity could not be preserved by force. Instead, new American officials (notably the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann), who were "keen to reshape their links in the region," increasingly began to argue in favour of "democracy" over "unity."<sup>127</sup> This change in U.S. policy was immediately seized upon by separatist forces in Slovenia and Croatia, which portrayed their own cause as one of human rights, self-determination, and democracy against the "communist national-authoritarianism" of Milošević's Serbia and the Yugoslav army. In this, they received support from leading politicians in Germany and Austria, as well as from leading German-language newspaper editors and journalists sympathetic to their cause. Thus emboldened, the Slovene and Croat leaderships refused to compromise either in the negotiations on reforming the federation or—in the case of Croatia—in their talks with the Serb minority in the republic. Instead of unequivocally backing the federal government, Western policy-makers attempted to "mediate" between the state and the separatist republics, thus effectively legitimating separatist claims and eventually imposing a settlement on the separatists' terms.<sup>128</sup> Chandler concludes: "Far from contributing to peace and stability, the policy and actions of Western powers undermined the federal institutions that held Yugoslavia together and then prevented compromise solutions, between and within republics, that could have minimized the conflict."<sup>129</sup>

Scholars emphasizing the role of external factors in Yugoslavia's disintegration have been particularly critical of the Western powers' recognition policy in 1991–92. Raju Thomas thus argues that Yugoslavia did not disintegrate or collapse, but rather that it was "*dismembered* through a selective and prejudicial international recognition policy of its internal 'republics.'"<sup>130</sup> According to Thomas, Yugoslavia's crisis of the 1980s was not unique; it was a "domestic constitutional crisis" of the kind that represented a "perennial Yugoslav situation." The implication is that without external meddling and "promises of support for secession followed by formal recognition" this crisis would not have led to the disintegration of the state.<sup>131</sup> Other scholars have viewed the European Community (EC) Arbitration Commission (also known as the Badinter Commission) as deeply flawed. The Commission's Opinions of November 1991 that Yugoslavia was "in the process of dissolution" but that its



internal (i.e., republican) borders were inviolable have been singled out for particular criticism. Leslie Benson thus argues that “the combined effect [of these two opinions] was to deny the legal existence of Yugoslavia, so cutting the ground from under the feet of the Serbs, and to make lines on maps the object of diplomacy.”<sup>132</sup>

Finally, scholars have noted that even those guidelines that were provided by the Arbitration Commission were ultimately disregarded, as the EC, headed by Germany, proceeded to grant recognition to the seceding republics prior to the achievement of an overall settlement and without regard to the Arbitration Commission’s recommendations, which—when they came out in January 1992—were contrary to some of the decisions made by the EC member governments.<sup>133</sup> Above all, it has often been argued that Germany’s preemptive recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on December 23, 1991, effectively sabotaged international efforts to negotiate an overall settlement for Yugoslavia by creating a diplomatic *fait accompli* and removing the one tool that the international community could have credibly used to get the parties to compromise.<sup>134</sup> As Susan Woodward put it:

The precedent set by the German maneuver was that the principle of self-determination could legitimately break up multinational states, that EC application of this principle was arbitrary, and that the surest way for politicians bent on independence to succeed was to instigate a defensive war and win international sympathy and then recognition.<sup>135</sup>

Similarly, the American drive for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 has at times been blamed for being the spark that set that republic on fire.<sup>136</sup>

In contrast to these views, some scholars have argued that the Western powers’ main mistake was not the recognition of the seceding republics but the continuing adherence to the fiction of a “united” Yugoslavia, which only encouraged the army-backed Serbian military onslaught. Citing the visit of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade on the eve of the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991, Sabrina Ramet thus argues that America’s commitment to Yugoslavia’s unity must have been read by Milošević as “an open invitation to ignite hostilities.”<sup>137</sup> In a similar vein, Daniele Conversi has defended Germany’s drive for immediate and unconditional recognition of the two breakaway republics, arguing that such a policy could have acted as a deterrent against Serbia’s territorial designs and that internationalizing the conflict would have enabled more effective international (military) intervention to protect the borders of the newly recognized states.<sup>138</sup> Ramet details the approach she believes would have been advisable at the time:

What could the West have done? First, the West could have granted *de facto* recognition to Slovenia and Croatia at the end of June 1991, and begun talks about arms supplies to these two republics. Second, the economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro could have been imposed earlier (at the latest in August 1991). Third, Slovenia and Macedonia could have been granted full diplomatic recognition (de

jure and de facto) in December 1991, after the EC study commission commended these two republics on their respect for human rights. Croatia could have been given a solemn pledge of full recognition upon the fulfilment of certain tasks. Fourth, the West could have conducted aerial bombardment of Serbian transport infrastructure, fuel tanks, arms factories, hydroelectric plants, radar stations, and farmlands (the last of these to impact food supplies) as a demonstration of seriousness of purpose and in order to complicate the Serbian war effort. . . . Fifth, the West could have provided guarantees of the borders of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, arranged for the peaceful partition of Bosnia into three roughly equal sections, and assisted the sides in conducting population exchanges to eliminate minority problems in Croatia, Serbia and the truncated Muslim Bosnia. And, sixth, the West could have proposed an international conference to settle the Kosovo question . . . (that is, . . . the transfer of all or most of the province to Albania).<sup>139</sup>

In other words, rather than seeing Western policy as favouring the secessionist republics and undermining Yugoslavia's unity, these scholars argue that it in fact contributed to the pursuit of the Greater Serbian project and the onset and escalation of the conflict.<sup>140</sup> The European Community's recognition policy was thus the right course of action, but effectively came too late and was not accompanied by more robust forms of intervention which it made possible by internationalizing the conflict.<sup>141</sup>

This debate on the role of Western policy in Yugoslavia's break-up is based on very different answers to two related questions: first, the question of the continuing viability and desirability of Yugoslavia as a state; and second, the question of the intentions and policies of the main domestic actors in the Yugoslav drama. One side in the debate has generally viewed Yugoslavia as a greatly weakened and crisis-ridden state but as an essentially viable and desirable one. Although they generally did not endorse Milošević's policy, these scholars saw Serbian concerns over the breakup of the common state as legitimate and the outbreak of war as the result of policies of all the sides involved. From this point of view, their preferred course of action would have been an unequivocal commitment to Yugoslavia's unity and a stronger international economic and political backing for the federal government of Prime Minister Ante Marković and other democratic pro-Yugoslav forces in the country. The other side in the debate has tended to emphasize the legitimacy of Croatian and Slovenian desires for independence over that of Yugoslavia as a state. Scholars belonging to this group argue that Yugoslavia's federal institutions were neither representative nor legitimate and believe that the internal breakdown of the federal state had gone past the point of no return by spring 1991. They generally have little sympathy for Serbian concerns, viewing them as a mere pretext for what they argue was essentially a war of aggression and territorial conquest. From this perspective, they would have preferred immediate recognition of the Yugoslav federal units (including Kosovo) and a strong military commitment to protecting their borders.<sup>142</sup>

This controversy over the role of external factors raises further questions that have to date not received conclusive answers. As many scholars have noted, there was

no such thing as a single Western policy in the spring of 1991—rather there were many mixed messages, based primarily on interests and calculations that had less to do with Yugoslavia than with other geopolitical concerns linked to the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union.<sup>143</sup> Yet, if we are to understand how Western policies affected the calculations of the main Yugoslav actors, more information is needed on the actual contacts that took place between them and on any eventual promises made by Western interlocutors to their Serbian, Slovene or Croat counterparts in the last few years of Yugoslavia's existence. Secondly, a better understanding is needed of how the various Yugoslav leaderships *interpreted* Western leaders' statements and how their interests and policies were shaped by their *perceptions* of the changing geopolitical context. Such information is now accessible from the many memoirs and eyewitness accounts that have appeared since the early 1990s, as well as testimonies before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the publication of certain government documents and transcripts. A close examination of these types of sources may help us understand, for example, the nature of Slovenian and Croatian contacts with politicians and opinion-makers in Germany (and other Western countries), and how such contacts may have affected their calculations and strategies in the drive for independence in 1990–91. It would also contribute to an assessment of whether Serbian policy was driven by the perception that the Western powers would allow it to use force with impunity or whether—to the contrary—it was based on the conviction that the international environment was no longer genuinely committed to Yugoslav unity and that, in the process of redefining Yugoslavia's political space, control over territory could present a position of strength. Another question that has not received enough attention due to the overwhelming focus on Western policy is the “Russian factor,” particularly in regard to the policies and calculations of the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav army high command. What was the nature of contacts between Serbian politicians and Yugoslav army generals with members of the conservative Russian political and military establishment, and how did such contacts affect the Yugoslavs' decisions in the run-up to war? As Yugoslavia's breakup recedes farther into history, it is such analyses of the interaction between external and internal factors that represent the most fruitful way forward.

## Conclusion

In his analysis of official U.S. approaches to Yugoslavia, Lenard Cohen highlights the paradigm shift that occurred in the mid-1990s from the “ancient hatreds” theory to an explanation focused on the role of “loathsome leaders” in the country's violent breakup.<sup>144</sup> It would be fair to say that most European politicians, as well as many journalists writing on the Yugoslav wars, also adhered to one of these two paradigms. In this respect, the academic scholarship on Yugoslavia's disintegration has, on the whole, been more nuanced—overwhelmingly rejecting the ancient

hatreds paradigm and showing greater sensitivity to the multiple causal factors that brought about Yugoslavia's violent demise. As I have shown in this chapter, explanations in academic accounts of the breakup have ranged from those emphasizing historical legacies and the failings of the Yugoslav communist system to those focused on the various domestic and international factors that shaped the last years of Yugoslavia before its breakdown in 1991. This said, however, scholarship does not exist in a vacuum but tends to be influenced by the dominant cognitive frameworks of its time and often seeks to respond to prevailing public perceptions and political debates. From this point of view, the scholarship on Yugoslavia's disintegration has been no different.

Throughout the wars of the 1990s, academics have not remained above the fray. More often than not, they felt compelled both to dispel public perceptions of specific Yugoslav national groups (particularly when such perceptions were derogatory and prejudicial) and to position themselves in regard to policy debates on the ethics and instruments of international intervention. Writing at a time when the human toll of the wars was rising and when international responses were often confused, inadequate, or—in the view of some authors—too partial toward one or the other side in the conflict, in the early 1990s academics were generally critical of their governments' policies toward Yugoslavia. As the United States, followed by its NATO allies, adopted a more directly interventionist approach in the mid-1990s and again at the end of that decade, academic opinion became more polarized—with some enthusiastically endorsing the use of military force first against the Bosnian Serbs (in 1994–95) and then against Milošević's Serbia itself (in 1999), and others vehemently opposing such action. Throughout the decade, therefore, scholars generally found it very difficult to maintain an academic distance from their subject, and their analyses often reflected their political positions and convictions. In the heated atmosphere surrounding the disclosures of war crimes and inhumane practices not seen in Europe since 1945, academic conferences and communications often became arenas of acerbic, emotionally tinged, and at times openly aggressive exchanges.

In view of these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that—despite the sheer quantity of studies—certain types of explanation have generally been privileged over others, leaving significant lacunae that call for further research and reflection. While there are, of course, exceptions to the rule, the academic literature on Yugoslavia's breakup has been focused on elites rather than on local, social, and family histories and on grassroots forms of mobilization. It has also been overly concentrated on Serbia, and—once war began—on Bosnia and later Kosovo, leaving significant gaps in our understanding notably of the evolution of Slovenia and Croatia in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there has been a tendency to “read history backwards,” ignoring alternatives that did exist to the dominant nationalist discourses and policies throughout Yugoslavia's history. At times Yugoslavia's national groups have been treated in an overly “homogenous” way (as the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, etc.) at the expense of highlighting the diversity of experiences and attitudes

existing within each of them. Whether on an elite or a grassroots level, accounts of the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution have often neglected the *interactive* nature of the various particularist nationalisms or of the policies and decisions of the different federal, republic, and province leaderships. The policies of outside powers also need further elucidation, both in terms of their motivation and their impact on the Yugoslav actors' strategies and decisions. Finally, studies of Yugoslavia have historically tended to emphasize the country's exceptionalism at the expense of more comparative approaches that would have integrated events and processes in Yugoslavia into wider European and international frameworks. By highlighting the different historical precedents and legacies, the "congenital birth defects" contained in Yugoslavia's two state-building experiments of the twentieth century, and the processes and policies that informed the country's final breakdown in the late 1980s, this book seeks to fill some of these gaps and shed new light on the debates that have characterized both academic and non-academic reflections on this event.

## Notes

1. I thank Audrey Budding, Lenard Cohen, Dejan Jović, and Veljko Vujačić for their helpful suggestions for this chapter.
2. A thoughtful treatment of these divisions can be found in Dušan J. Djordjevich, "Clio amid the Ruins: Yugoslavia and Its Predecessors in Recent Historiography," in Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case (eds.), *Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 3–7.
3. This chapter deals with scholarly approaches to Yugoslavia's dissolution. Most book-length accounts provided by journalists (with one notable exception, cf. footnote 4) have focused overwhelmingly on the period immediately preceding state collapse and the outbreak of war. The most important of these (and adopting a variety of perspectives) are: Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1996); Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992); Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences* (London: Hurst, 1995); Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up* (London: Verso, 1993); and Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise* (London: Routledge, 1999). A useful collection of essays mainly by journalists is Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway (eds.), *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).
4. Other comprehensive literature reviews can be found in: Sabrina Petra Ramet, "For a Charm of Pow'rful Trouble, Like a Hell-Broth Boil and Bubble': Theories of the Roots of the Yugoslav Troubles," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), pp. 731–763; Dejan Jović, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches," *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2001), pp. 101–120; James Gow, "After the Flood: Literature on the Context, Causes, and Course of the Yugoslav War—Reflections and Refractions," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (July 1997), pp. 446–484; Gale Stokes, John Lampe, and Dennison Rusinow with Julie Mostov, "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–150; and Sarah A. Kent, "Writing the Yugoslav Wars: English Language Books on Bosnia (1992–1996) and the Challenges of Analyzing Contemporary History," *American Historical Review*, Oct. 1997, pp. 1085–1114.

5. This is not to say, of course, that authors necessarily adopted monocausal explanations for Yugoslavia's dissolution. However, it would be fair to say that some authors have been identified as leading proponents of particular types of explanation and will be identified as such.
6. *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict* by George F. Kennan (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 11.
7. The best-known journalist's account based on the "ancient hatreds" approach was Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). For a knowledgeable refutation of this vision (though possibly overemphasizing harmony) see Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London: Hurst, 1994).
8. See particularly Maria Todorova's critique of Kennan in "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 453–482, and her *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), as well as Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: Imperialism of the Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
9. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49, and his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
10. It has also been evoked by some nationalist politicians and intellectuals in the former Yugoslavia, as well as by their Western sympathizers, to legitimize their policies and claim a greater degree of "Europeanness" for their nation. This has been the case particularly with Franjo Tuđman, the first president of independent Croatia, and Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia, and can also be found in the "Central Europe" rhetoric against "the Balkans" in Slovenia from the mid-1980s. For a well-known Western intellectual's endorsement of such an Orientalist vision, see Alain Finkielkraut, *Comment peut-on être croate?* Paris: Gallimard, 1992. Finkielkraut presents "the aggression" against Croatia as "directed against its very Europeanness" (p. 26). For a critique of all such discourses, see Milica Bakić Hayden and Robert Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 141–174, and Milica Bakić Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 917–931. For a good overview of all such myths, see Pål Kolstø, "Introduction: Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society," in Pål Kolstø, *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe* (London: Hurst, 2005), pp. 1–34.
11. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 22–49 passim.
12. Ibid.
13. For example, Huntington cannot decide between the novelty of the clash of civilizations and its ancient nature. First he argues that conflicts of the past (between princes, nation-state, and ideologies) were primarily conflicts "within the Western" civilization, only to then emphasize that civilizational differences are "the product of centuries" and that "over the centuries . . . differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflict" (ibid., pp. 23–25).
14. Aleksa Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor: The Break-Up of Yugoslavia," in Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), *Nations and Nationalism in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 86–88. See also John Allcock, "Huntington, 'Civilizations,' and Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Sociological Critique," *Sociological Imagination*, Vol. 36, No. 2–3 (1999), p. 138.

15. See, for example, Bogdan Bogdanović, *Grad i smrt* (Belgrade: Beogradski krug, 1994). For a critique of the revenge of the countryside approach, see Xavier Bougarel, “Yugoslav Wars: The ‘Revenge of the Countryside’ between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 157–175.
16. Djilas, op. cit., p. 87, and see also his “Funeral Oration for Yugoslavia: An Imaginary Dialogue with Western Friends,” in Dejan Djokić (ed.), *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992* (London: Hurst, 2003), pp. 321–323.
17. Ivo Banac, foreword to Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. xiv, and Stevan K. Pavlowitch, “Who Is Balkanizing Whom? The Misunderstandings between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 123, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 203–204.
18. This is also argued by Allcock, “Huntington, ‘Civilizations,’ and Bosnia and Hercegovina,” op. cit., p. 139. It is particularly highlighted by the social constructivist school, notably by V. P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
19. On the role of religion in Yugoslavia’s dissolution and wars see notably Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Xavier Bougarel, “L’Islam bosniaque, entre identite culturelle et ideologie politique,” in Xavier Bougarel and Nathalie Clayer (eds.), *Le Nouvel Islam balkanique* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001), pp. 79–132; Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslav Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans* (New York: Continuum, 1994); Lenard J. Cohen, “Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilization,” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 481–499; Radmila Radić, “The Church and the ‘Serbian Question’” in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *The Road to War in Serbia* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), pp. 247–273; Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Milorad Tomanić, *Crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj* (Belgrade: Krug, 2001); Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Bojan Aleksov, “Adamant and Treacherous: Serbian Historians on Religious Conversions,” in Kolstø, op. cit., pp. 158–190; and Maja Brkljačić, “‘Velebit je hrvatski Sinaj’: O hrvatskoj katoličkoj imaginaciji,” *Reč*, Vol. 70, No. 16 (June 2003), pp. 147–170.
20. I am grateful to Audrey Budding for this point.
21. Dennison Rusinow, “The Ottoman Legacy in Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Civil War,” in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 81.
22. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, op. cit., p. 166. It should be noted that Todorova focuses on the Ottoman legacy, but a similar point could be made about the legacy of the imperial experience in the Balkans more generally.
23. Ibid. See also her “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in Brown, *Imperial Legacy*, op. cit., pp. 45–77. In this regard it is necessary to mention the work of two scholars. Veljko Vujčić explores the impact of the very different imperial legacies—among other factors—on Serbian and Russian national mobilization in his “Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization, and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25 (1996), pp. 763–801, and “Perceptions of the State in Russia and Serbia: The Role of Ideas in the Soviet and Yugoslav Collapse,” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 20/2, 2004, pp. 164–194. John Allcock provides a thoughtful *longue durée* analysis of violence in the region (*Explaining Yugoslavia*, London: Hurst, 2000, Ch. 13).
24. Ibid., p. 175.

25. Gale Stokes, "Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession," in Norman Naimark and Holly Case (eds.), *Yugoslavia and its Historians* (Palo Alto: Stanford, 2003), pp. 204 and 194.
26. Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," *Daedalus*, Vol. 121, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 143. This view is restated in his *Raspad Jugoslavije* (Zagreb: Durieux, 2001), p. 116.
27. Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 406.
28. Aleksandar Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. ix; Gale Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 109; Andrew Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 4; Paul Lendvai, "Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis," *International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1991), pp. 251–261. See also Charles Ingrao, "Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: An Historical Perspective," and the responses by Istvan Deak, John Lampe, and Gale Stokes, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1999), pp. 291–333.
29. Ivo Banac, "Nationalism in Southeastern Europe," in Charles Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995), p. 113. According to Banac, this Serbian hegemonic tendency was expressed by the merger of Vuk Karadžić's linguistic definition of all South Slav *štokavian* speakers as Serbs (which included most Croats and Bosnian Muslims) and Serbia's nineteenth-century program of state expansion, as expressed in a secret 1844 government document known as the *Načertanije*. Similar views can be found in Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara, and Neven Šimac, *Le nettoyage ethnique* (Paris: Fayard, 1993); Jasna Adler, *L'Union forcée: La Croatie et la création de l'État yougoslave (1918)* (Geneva: Georg editeur, 1997); Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 1; and Mojmir Križan, "New Serbian Nationalism and the Third Balkan War," *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 46, No. 1–2 (June 1994), pp. 47–68. Branimir Anzulović, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide* (London: Hurst, 1999), presents a variation on the same theme.
30. As Banac puts it, the first Yugoslav state was "centralized, with Serbs holding all the levers of power—the army, dynasty and state institutions—and it was basically irrelevant whether it was called Greater Serbia or Yugoslavia" (*Raspad Jugoslavije*, op. cit., p. 117).
31. Banac's foreword to Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p. xvi.
32. *Ibid.*
33. "Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac," in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz (eds.), *Why Bosnia?* (1994), p. 161.
34. Milorad Ekmečić, *Srbija između Evrope i Srednje Evrope* (Belgrade: Politika, 1992), p. 11. Whereas for Banac "religion played virtually no part" in the construction of Croatian national ideology, for Ekmečić, it "without a doubt inspired all separatist movements which rejected the Yugoslav idea and later the Yugoslav state, and without a doubt was also the principal cause of that state's historic collapse" (Banac, "Nationalism in Southeastern Europe," op. cit., (Banac, "Nationalism in Southeastern Europe," op. cit., p. 112 and Ekmečić, op. cit., p. 16)
35. This is notably the claim of historian Vasilije Krestić. See, for example, *Un peuple en hôte: Les Serbes de Croatie et l'État croate*, (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1993).



36. See, for example, Ljubodrag Dimić, *Srbi i Jugoslavija* (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1998) or Đorđe Đ. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i Hrvati* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1995).
37. Dimić, *Srbi i Jugoslavija*, op. cit., p. 33.
38. See, for example, the chapters by Vasilije Krestić and Slavenko Terzić in *Velika Srbija: istine, zablude, zloupotrebe* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 2003), pp. 243–260 and 315–328.
39. They are also unlikely to be laid to rest in the near future. On these earlier polemics, see Michael Boro Petrovich, “Continuing Nationalism in Yugoslav Historiography,” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1978), pp. 161–177.
40. John Lampe makes a similar point in his *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 4.
41. Some scholars have challenged these assumptions by highlighting the diversity of approaches to the “national question” that coexisted with each other within each national group, as well as within the various political movements in interwar and wartime Yugoslavia. See Jill Irvine, *The Croat Question* (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, *the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904–1928* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) and his “‘We Were Defending the State’: Nationalism, Myth, and Memory in Twentieth-Century Croatia” in John Lampe and Mark Mazower (eds.), *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003), pp. 54–81; Marko Bulatović, “Struggling with Yugoslavism: Dilemmas of Interwar Serb Political Thought,” in *ibid.*, pp. 254–90; Dejan Djokić (ed.), *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992* (London: Hurst, 2002) and his *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst, 2007); and Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Rethinking Yugoslavia: Serbian Intellectuals and the ‘National Question’ in Historical Perspective,” *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 170–184.
42. Andrew Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 17.
43. “The ideology of Croat state rights claimed, on the basis of the historic rights and the continuity of the Croat medieval state, the whole of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as Croat lands which were to form the future independent Croatia. The Serb national liberation ideologies proclaimed (a rather non-historic) right of the Serbs living in the very same regions to be freed from foreign rule and unified with Serbs in Serbia. Although the boundaries of this latter claim had never been clearly demarcated, substantial portions of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina were often included in the territories to be liberated by each side” (Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 10–11).
44. *Ibid.*, and Wachtel, op. cit., p. 229. Wachtel does not provide an explanation as to why it was abandoned, however.
45. Cvijeto Job, *Yugoslavia’s Ruin: The Bloody Lessons of Nationalism. A Patriot’s Warning* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 5.
46. See, for example, Steven L. Burg and Michael L. Berbaum, “Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 536–551, or V.P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004, chapter 2).
47. See, for example, Eric Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia* (University Park: Penn State Press, 1999), or Catherine Baker “The Politics of Performance: Transnationalism and its Limits in Former Yugoslav Popular Music, 1999–2004,” *Ethnopolitics* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2006), pp. 275–93.

48. See the various contributions to Djokić, *Yugoslavism*, op. cit., and Audrey Helfant Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs: Serbian National Identity, 1961–1971," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1997), pp. 407–426.
49. Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla* (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003).
50. As highlighted by the title of John Lampe's history of Yugoslavia, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
51. This is particularly highlighted in Audrey Budding's contribution to this volume.
52. On such interaction between Serbian and Slovenian national ideologies in the period leading up to Yugoslavia's dissolution see Jasna Dragović-Soso, "Saviours of the Nation": *Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism* (London: Hurst, 2002), chapter 4.
53. This is the subject of Mark Biondich's contribution to this volume.
54. This latter point is examined by Marko Bulatović, "Struggling with Yugoslavism," op. cit.
55. Such as comparisons of the perceptions of the Yugoslav state and ideology among the Croatian and Slovenian communist elites in the late 1950s and early 1960s with those of the 1920s, or of Franjo Tuđman's vision of a Croatian state in the 1990s with the Croatian unit incorporating parts of Bosnia created within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the 1939 *Sporazum* (Agreement). A striking parallel exists also in regard to Serb elite responses to the decentralization of socialist Yugoslavia after 1971 with those articulated in response to the 1939 *Sporazum*. This latter comparison is effectively made by Veljko Vujačić, "Perceptions of the State in Russia and Serbia: The Role of Ideas in the Soviet and Yugoslav Collapse," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2004), pp. 181–186.
56. Stevan Pavlowitch, "Who is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstandings between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West," *Daedalus*, Vol. 123, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 203–223. See also Maria Todorova, "The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of East European Nationalism," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 140–164. Lenard Cohen's contribution to this volume examines the existing comparative analyses of Yugoslavia's dissolution.
57. Vojin Dimitrijević, "Sukobi oko ustava iz 1974," in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *Srpska strana rata* (Belgrade: Republika, 1996), pp. 466–67. See also Robert Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), chapter 2.
58. Ivan Vejvoda, "Yugoslavia 1945–91: From Decentralization without Democracy to Dissolution," in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (eds.), *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth* (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 15–16. The different interpretations of the 1974 Constitution, particularly in regard to the issue of self-determination, are analyzed by Audrey Budding in her chapter.
59. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 2.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
62. This issue is particularly well-treated in Veljko Vujačić, "Institutional Origins of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 51–61, and Jović, op. cit.
63. On the Croatian spring, see Jill Irvine's contribution to this volume.
64. The ability of some republics to scupper federal attempts at educational integration is analyzed in Andrew Wachtel's and Predrag Marković's chapter in this volume.
65. Jović, op. cit., p. 86.
66. Jović, op. cit., pp. 132–33.

67. Ibid., p. 136.
68. Vesna Bojičić, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Causes and Consequences of Dynamic Inefficiency in Semi-Command Economies," in Dyker and Vejvoda, *op. cit.*, p. 28. See also, John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 315–21, and Susan Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Economic factors in Yugoslavia's demise are explored in Michael Palairé's chapter in this volume. The revival of nationalism in the 1960s, which is analyzed in Dennison Rusinow's chapter, was also largely shaped by economic factors.
69. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
70. Sabrina Ramet has also emphasized the illegitimacy of the socialist system as the "root cause" of Yugoslavia's disintegration, for example in her *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (chapter 3) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
71. An exception to this rule is Steven Burg's prescient article, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1986), pp. 170–93. Burg states that "it might not be long before the country simply disintegrated—peacefully if true 'confederation' were achieved, or violently, if nationalist programs were to escalate" (p. 189).
72. See, for example, the opinion polls cited by Dejan Jović in this volume.
73. Ibid.
74. The exception here is Bunce, discussed above.
75. See, for example, Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27–47.
76. See notably Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*, *op. cit.* A critique of the security dilemma can also be found in Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 9–10, and Veljko Vujčić, "Perceptions of the State in Russia and Serbia," *op. cit.*, pp. 168–171.
77. Dennison Rusinow, "The Avoidable Catastrophe," in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša S. Adamovich (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 14 (author's emphasis).
78. Ibid. The role of the media has received a lot of attention in the literature. See notably Mark Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: Article 19/International Centre Against Censorship, 1994) and Aljoša Mimica and Radina Vučetić's thorough analysis of the Serbian daily *Politika* from 1988 to 1991, "*Vreme kada je narod govorio*" (Belgrade: Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2001).
79. The nine biographies are Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević* (Boulder: Westview, two eds., 2001 and 2002); Slavoljub Djukić, *Milošević and Marković: A Lust for Power* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Duško Doder and Louise Branson, *Milošević: Portrait of a Tyrant* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Vidosav Stevanović, *Milošević: The People's Tyrant* (London: IB Tauris, 2002); Adam LeBor, *Milošević: A Biography* (London: Bloomsbury, 2002); and Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). There are also several books specifically devoted to Milošević's trial in The Hague: Norman Cigar and Paul Williams, *Indictment in The Hague: The Milošević Regime and Crimes of the Balkan Wars* (New York: New York University Press, 2002); William Schabas and William Scharf, *Slobodan Milošević on Trial: A Companion* (New York: Continuum, 2002); and Chris Stephen, *Judgement Day: The Trial of Slobodan Milošević* (London: Atlantic, 2003).
80. There is also disagreement over the extent to which Milošević's famous statement was prepared in advance and to which it represented a spontaneous response to the Kosovo

- Serbs' claims of being mistreated by the Kosovar police. (For the former view, see Silber and Little, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–47, and for the latter, Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–110.)
81. Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 4.
  82. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
  83. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
  84. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
  85. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
  86. Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 265.
  87. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, *op. cit.*, p. 465.
  88. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
  89. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
  90. Jović, *op. cit.*, pp. 491–492.
  91. As is argued by Eric Gordy in his contribution to this volume.
  92. Marković's role is particularly highlighted by Slavoljub Djukić in *Milošević and Marković: A Lust for Power* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).
  93. This is well-argued by Jović, *Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla*, *op. cit.*
  94. This last approach can notably be found in James Gow, *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries* (London: Hurst, 2003).
  95. They are the subject of Jill Irvine's contribution to this volume.
  96. This is the subject of Dejan Jović's contribution to this volume.
  97. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," *Daedalus*, Spring 1992, pp. 123–39. The institutionalist approaches are discussed above.
  98. This position is notably taken by the historian John Fine, "Heretical Thoughts about the Postcommunist Transition in the Once and Future Yugoslavia," in Naimark and Case (eds.), *Yugoslavia and Its Historians*, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 259–61. The role of the JNA in Yugoslavia's dissolution is discussed in Florian Bieber's contribution to this volume.
  99. On the events surrounding the Memorandum's publication and its revival in 1989, see Jasna Dragovic-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 182–89 and 220–21.
  100. Sell, p. 46. See also Gjidara, Grmek, and Simac, *Le nettoyage ethnique*, *op. cit.* Križan, "New Serbian Nationalism and the Third Balkan War," *op. cit.*; Magaš, *op. cit.*, p. 4; and Philip J. Cohen, "The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s," in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 39.
  101. Anzulović, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
  102. Aleksandar Pavković, "Yugoslavism's Last Stand: A Utopia of Serb Intellectuals," in Djokić, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–57.
  103. Audrey Budding, "Serbian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: Historical Background and Context," Expert Report for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, p. 57. See also her "Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization: The Case of the 'Memorandum of the Serbian Academy,'" *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Harvard Ukrainian Studies Special Volume, 22, 1998, pp. 49–69.
  104. As it did in the case of Vojislav Šešelj in 1984. (See Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–59.)
  105. All these arguments are elaborated in *ibid.*, chapter 4.
  106. See Jasna Dragović-Soso, "Intellectuals and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The End of the Yugoslav Writers' Union," in Djokić, *Yugoslavism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 268–85.

107. This is done by Nicholas Miller in his chapter in this volume.
108. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*, op. cit., p. 7. See also his "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994–95), pp. 130–66.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
110. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 72.
111. An analysis of the legacy of the two world wars in Yugoslavia's dissolution is presented by Stevan K. Pavlowitch's contribution to this volume.
112. Jan-Werner Müller, "Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power, and the Power over Memory," in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 2.
113. For an illuminating treatment of the two types of memory, see Dejan Jović, "Official Memories' in Post-Authoritarianism: An Analytical Framework," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, pp. 97–108.
114. Ger Duijzings, "History and Reminders in East Bosnia," Appendix 4 of *Srebrenica: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences, and Analyses of the Fall of the Safe Area*, Special Report of the Netherlands Institute of War Documentation, Amsterdam, 2002–2003, available on the World Wide Web at <http://213.222.3.5/srebrenica> (Appendix 4), accessed 08/07/2005.
115. See, for example, Wolfgang Höpken, "War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 190–227; Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1994), pp. 367–390; Ivo Goldstein, "The Use of History: Croatian Historiography and Politics," *Helsinki Monitor*, 1994, pp. 85–97; Robert M. Hayden, "Recounting the Dead: The Rediscovery and Redefinition of Wartime Massacres in Late- and Post-Communist Yugoslavia," in Rubie S. Watson (ed.), *Memory, History, and Opposition Under State Socialism* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1994), pp. 167–201; and Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, op. cit., chapter 2.
116. As do Duijzings, op. cit., or Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). The journalist Chuck Sudetic's *Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia* (New York: Penguin, 1998) is another good example of such an approach.
117. Nebojša Vladislavljević, "Nationalism, Social Movement Theory, and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs, 1985–1988," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 5 (2002), pp. 771–90. Roger Petersen also emphasizes the grassroots nature of ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia in his *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 10.
118. *Ibid.* See also his "Grassroots Groups, Milosevic, or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of Mobilization of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2004), pp. 781–96.
119. An excellent analysis of the Albanian protests of 1968 and 1981 can be found in Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989). On the Croatian "spring," see notably Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991* (2nd ed.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), chapter 7; Dennison Rusinow, *Crisis in Croatia*, Fieldstaff Reports (IR-72), Southeast Europe Series, 19/4, 1972; and Stephen Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

120. See notably Shkelzen Maliqi, "The Albanian Movement in Kosova," in Dyker and Vejvoda (eds.), *Yugoslavia and After*, op. cit.
121. On the Slovenian social movements, see Danica Fink-Hafner, *Nova družbena gibanja—subjekti politične inovacije* (Ljubljana: Fakultet za družbene vede, 1992); Tomaž Mastnak, "From Social Movements to National Sovereignty," in Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft (eds.), *Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 95–108, and his "Civil Society in Slovenia: From Opposition to Power," in Jim Seroka and Vukašin Pavlović (eds.), *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 49–66; and Jozef Figa, "Socializing the State: Civil Society and Democratization from Below in Slovenia," in Irvine et al. (eds.), *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 163–182.
122. See notably Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).
123. See, for example, James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst, 1997).
124. Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), p. 15.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80. John Lampe, on the other hand, argues that in the 1980s both Western governments and private initiatives (such as that of the American-led independent consortium, the Friends of Yugoslavia, assembled by former U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger) made important efforts to alleviate the burdens of Yugoslavia's international debt crisis. Such initiatives were misguided, however, because they appeared to sanction the existing system and its resistance to reform, and it was the postponement of reform rather than its rigid implementation that exacerbated Yugoslavia's crisis (Lampe, op. cit., p. 325).
126. Kate Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 56–57.
127. David Chandler, "Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989–1999," in Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (eds.), *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p.21.
128. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–23.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
130. Raju G. C. Thomas, "Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Secession: Principles and Practice," in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), p. 3 (author's emphasis). In another contribution to the debate over terminology, Aleksandar Pavković argues that Yugoslavia was experiencing "recursive secessions" rather than "dissolution" (Aleksandar Pavković, "Recursive Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: Too Hard a Case for Theories of Secession?" *Political Studies*, Vol. 48 [2000], pp. 485–502).
131. Thomas, op. cit., p. 5.
132. Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 164. The argument for the inviolability of internal borders was based on the principle of *uti possidetis*, originally applied in international law to settling decolonization issues in Latin America and Africa with a purpose to "prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles" ("Opinion No. 3 of the Arbitration Committee," *European Journal of International Law*, 3/1992, p. 185). The appropriateness of this principle for Yugoslavia's situation has been contested in parts of the scholarship. See notably Peter Radan, "The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1997), pp. 549–52, and his *The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 228–33.

133. Notably, the Commission opposed recognition for Croatia until it had satisfied the provisions concerning treatment of minority populations, while recommending the recognition of Macedonia, which was, however, opposed by Greece. See Richard Caplan, *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 37–38.
134. See, for example, Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Steven Burg, “The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis,” in Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami (eds.), *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 249. The two main international negotiators, Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance were also deeply critical of Germany’s recognition policy (See Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, *op. cit.*, p. 235).
135. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
136. Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 102, Woodward, *op. cit.*, pp. 197–98, Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
137. Sabrina Petra Ramet, “The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding ‘Vietnam’ and Blundering into ‘Abyssinia,’” *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1994), p. 197. In fact, Baker’s visit was nowhere near as clear an expression of support for Yugoslav unity. Rather, Baker gave different messages to the different parties: to Croatia and Slovenia that the United States would not recognize any “unilateral” acts on their part, while concurrently warning Milošević that the United States would not endorse any use of force and that if it had to choose between unity and democracy it would choose the latter. A detailed account of Baker’s visit is provided by the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, in *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 133–38.
138. Daniele Conversi, *German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1998.
139. Ramet, “The Yugoslav Crisis and the West,” *op. cit.*, p. 202.
140. This argument is also made by James Gow particularly in regard to Bosnia, which in his view should have been internationally recognized in January 1992, along with a credible commitment to defend it against the “Serbian project” of carving out parts of its territory. (Gow, *Triumph*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 89)
141. For an elaboration of this argument, see Caplan, *op. cit.*, particularly chapter 4.
142. Paul Shoup explores the implications of Western policy-makers’ visions of Yugoslavia’s crisis and different policy alternatives in his chapter in this volume.
143. Most authors argue that the turning point in Western policy in favour of recognition was not the result so much of the evolution of events within Yugoslavia but of the failed military coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, which announced the impending dissolution of the Soviet state. After that, the only discrepancy between Germany and some of her partners in the EC concerned the *modalities* of recognition (i.e., the timing and conditions for recognition) but not the principle of recognition itself. See Caplan, *op. cit.*, p. 18. For a contrasting view, see Dejan Jović’s contribution to this volume.
144. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, *op. cit.*, pp. 451–55. A similar point was also made by Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

