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Euro-Crafting at Border Zones: The Case of the Greco-Turkish Border and the Question of a European Union 'Beyond the State'

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The European Union is often conceptualised as an entity that is profoundly different from that of the modern state. Through a reading of the recent humanitarian crisis precipitated by large-scale migration into Greece, the paper challenges the understanding that the crafting of the European Union ('Euro-crafting') is qualitatively different from the crafting of the modern state. Conceptually, the paper proposes that Euro-crafting should be thought through in relation to practices of statecraft, instead of a priori postulated as qualitatively different from such practices. Putting such an understanding of Euro-crafting to work, the paper explores the recent humanitarian crisis precipitated by large-scale migration into Greece and demonstrates how practices of Euro-crafting mirror the major desire-driven practices of modern statecraft; practices of ordering, bordering, and identification.

INTRODUCTION

A clip uploaded by an anonymous user on YouTube shows a group of thirteen migrants being pursued in November 2010 by a unit belonging to the first land border patrol operation ever undertaken under the flag of the European Union.[1] The short film is shot from a helicopter that evidently helps the ground patrol to track down the migrants. A telescopic infrared sight follows the small group of people, and the migrants are clearly differentiated as white figures against a dark background. At 19:17, according to the clock on the helicopter's dashboard, the helicopter detects the group of migrants. At 19:25, seemingly unaware of being under surveillance, the group stops for

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a few minutes. Two minutes later, the group encounters a border patrol team. One person is apprehended and the remaining twelve run away. But their running is in vain. The helicopter never loses sight of them. The migrants briefly stop and hide in some bushes. And at 20:08, a police team apprehends the group. The little group is surrounded by what appears to be armed guards, and bow down on their knees, stretching their arms up in the air. These are 13 out of some 47,000 people who 'irregularly' crossed the tiny 12.5-kilometre land border between Turkey and Greece in 2010 and for most of them, this is their first encounter with Europe.[2] Many of their fellow travellers would not make it, but instead die on their way to what they thought would be a better life, forty-five of those drowning in the Evros River that marks Europe's border with Turkey.

There is a conspicuous mismatch between the experiences of 'Europe' of those migrants, and the European Union, which the European Commission as well as thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, like to describe as a "border-free, rights-based post-national union."[3] This paper will ultimately want to suggest that the bordering practices at the Evros River as well as the stories of some of those migrants might teach us something about the logics of European integration itself, calling conventional narratives of European integration into question. I will in this paper offer a way of making sense of those events that challenges how the EU is commonly understood. The majority of scholarship in European Integration Studies has tended to regard European integration as a set of processes that have given rise to a sui generis entity, unlike anything hitherto seen in global politics.[4] The alleged novelty of the EU is also an issue that has been raised by geographers working on the EU, and in particular its borders.[5] In this paper, I argue that a close reading of what is going on at the Greco-Turkish border might lead us to a sceptical view of the alleged novelty of European integration – as currently materialising on the European continent – vis-à-vis modern statecraft.

I argue that practices of European integration need to be thought through in relation to – rather than a priori postulated to radically depart from – practices of modern statecraft. Instead of conceptualising the crafting of Europe as qualitatively different from modern statecraft, a critical understanding of European integration should rather highlight their many similarities and problematise the politico-ethical implications of those. The central question here, which scholars writing on the European Union have been grappling with from its very inception, is whether and to what extent practices of European integration merely replicate statecraft at a geographically larger level, something which functionalist David Mitrany in 1965 famously cautioned that European integration was doing.[6] Like Mitrany, I understand this to be important primarily as an *ethico-political* question that goes to the very heart of an important raison d'être for European integration: an acknowledgement of the profound linkages between the modern state

and violence, coupled with a wish, indeed an ethical demand, to think of ways of organising political, social, and economic life in non-violent ways.

The article shares the recent focus in critical geopolitical writing on borders, and in particular, the focus on bordering practices.[7] Importantly, with Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, I understand bordering practices as performative of "political realities and subject-positions," and closely linked to the production of political communities.[8] Moreover, what arguably makes this approach *critical*, is that it highlights the *violence* of such bordering practices, arising from the highly asymmetrical power relations that are made visible at the site of the border.[9] In terms of the European Union, recent writings on geopolitics have emphasised the importance of examining the significance of the EU's multifaceted bordering practices.[10] Luiza Bialasiewicz, for instance, looking at how the EU outsources its border patrolling to Libya, has sought to interrogate what such practices entail "for the EU's self-professed geopolitical identity as a 'normative' or 'civil' power."[11] I shall return to this important question at the end of this article. However, unlike Bialasiewicz's important work, I focus on the similarities of the bordering practices undertaken in the name of the EU, and the ones undertaken in the name of the state. Despite the newness of the EU's border regime in terms of offshoring and outsourcing, there are, I shall attempt to show below, also some familiar features at play.

In the first part, I introduce the situation at the Greco-Turkish border, which my paper will want to engage. Having done so, I introduce the conceptual vocabulary that will be deployed. Here, I propose that practices of European integration should be understood and thought through as an ongoing problematic of analogy between statecraft and what I call *Euro-crafting*; the discursive crafting of Europe.[12] By drawing on various critical literatures and an understanding of 'the state' made explicit by Roxanne Doty, I outline a practice-oriented understanding of statecraft.[13] 'The state', I propose, can be conceptualised as an effect of practices of identification/bordering (i.e., statecraft), animated by a desire for order, stability, and foundation, constitutive of a wide variety of subject positions, but never traceable back to a single origin. On such an understanding of statecraft, I finish the second section of the paper by suggesting that such an understanding directs our focus to the politics of representing Europe in everyday practice at sites of contestation.

In the third section of the paper, I put such an understanding of Euro-crafting to work, ultimately aiming to demonstrate what such a conceptualisation might add to our understanding of the making of Europe vis-à-vis the modern state. I explore the practices of Euro-crafting by examining the recent humanitarian crisis precipitated by irregular migration into the European Union through Greece, in two distinct locales: 1) among migrants, and 2) among people charged with the task of enforcing borders. Taking what the UNHCR in 2010 called a 'humanitarian crisis'[14] at the EU's border

to Turkey as a site of investigation, the paper draws on field research undertaken in 2011 in Greece among members of the Somali community in Athens. I also draw on interviews with members of the EU's border force team, stationed in the border area between Greece and Turkey, as well as newspaper accounts, human rights reports, and other published material. I show how the desire for Europe is constitutive of subject positions ranging from that of 'European border guard' to 'migrant wishing to come to Europe' and argue that far from challenging the characteristic gestures of statecraft, practices of European integration rather appears to be reinforcing them. What is being done in the name of Europe mirrors the characteristic gestures of statecraft, namely; practices of ordering, bordering, and identification, animated by a desire for a bounded identity. It should at the outset be pointed out that since I am only looking at a very particular site, I cannot make any claims to broader generalisation about other border areas where the European Union is crafted vis-à-vis various others. Therefore, my contribution is ultimately conceptual in that it seeks to demonstrate what a performative-oriented approach to the crafting of entities may add to the long-standing debate on the novelty of the EU vis-à-vis the modern state, and show one way of approaching this conundrum with the aid of critical social theory.

"A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS:" THE CASE OF THE GRECO-TURKISH BORDER

There is certainly something to be said for the accuracy of the imagery of a 'Fortress Europe' descending over Europe in the last decade. Ever since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 brought immigration policy into the orbit of European integration, immigration policy – especially dealing with so-called 'irregular migration' – has been increasingly dealt with at EU, rather than national, level. At the same time as geographical borders within the EU have been broken down, most notably with the gradual extension of the passport-free Schengen Area, they have been steadily tightened vis-à-vis third countries. As an overview from 2010 concludes, "It is reasonable to argue that today we have an EU policy on irregular migration that addresses most aspects of the phenomenon and attempts to harmonize national policies and practices."[15] The question of migration into the European Union has also within a relatively short amount of time acquired much significance in European public discourse, often in a language that represents migration as a threat to societal security rather than as an opportunity to revitalise ageing societies within Europe.[16] European countries have, individually and collectively, increasingly resorted to what Aristide Zolberg has called "remote control" immigration policy.[17] This refers to practices of "extending border controls away from the wealthiest 'countries of destination' and closer to what official discourse designates as 'countries of transit and 'origin.'"[18] The

so-called 'Arab Spring' in 2011 only seemed to strengthen the resolve of European governments to seal their borders against what was often portrayed as a coming 'flood' of migrants.[19] In reality, however, leaving the current situation in Syria aside, with the exception of a short increase in migrants from Tunisia, the Arab Spring did not lead to the mass exodus that was feared.[20]

As south European governments have concluded various border enforcement agreements with several African governments in recent years, the flow of migrants has shifted accordingly. In 2005, many migrants arrived at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as well as on the Canary Islands the year thereafter.[21] However, after the Spanish government renewed its Readmission Agreement with Morocco from 1992, and concluded agreements with key transit countries such as Mauritania and Senegal, the flow of migrants shifted to the Italian and Greek coasts and in the latter case, land border. Dissatisfied with this shift, the Berlusconi government concluded border enforcement and repatriation agreements with Khadaffi's Libya, which almost entirely stopped the flow of migrants to Lampedusa in Italy as well as to Malta by late 2009. In addition, the European Commission signed an agreement with Libya in October 2010 to increase border controls despite the fact that the detention facilities in Libya where migrants were held were widely criticised as inhumane.[22] In response, the flow of migrants shifted direction once again. In 2009, some 75% of all irregular border crossings into the EU occurred through Greece.[23] And in the following year, a staggering 90% of all detected irregular border crossings into the EU took place at Greek land and sea borders. The majority of those migrants entered Greece along a tiny 12.5 km land border stretch close to the Greek city of Orestiada (see Figure 1). Some were also trying to cross the Evros River. In 2010, at least forty-five migrants died when attempting to cross the border.[24]

The inhumane conditions in the Greek Evros detention facilities have been severely criticised by a number of human rights organisations. In 2009 the UNHCR went so far as to call the situation at the Evros border a "humanitarian crisis."[25] The EU's own agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) acknowledged the following year that "living conditions there can only be described as inhuman."[26] A temporary overcrowding of such facilities is to be expected when a large number of people arrive in a short amount of time. But despite a widespread acknowledgement of the dire conditions at Evros, Greek authorities have been slow to act. This lack of political will has been widely noticed in the human rights community, and as a diplomat in Athens from another EU Member state puts it: "The refugee situation has not been prioritized by the Greek authorities."[27]

Due to the awareness-raising activities of various human rights organisations, several EU members stopped returning refugees to Greece, thus violating the Dublin II agreement.[28] In January 2011 The European Court of Human Rights ruled that returning an asylum seeker from Belgium to Greece constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human

FIGURE 1 Greco-Turkish border region.

Rights, i.e., that the conditions in the detention centres were so inhumane that they constituted a breach of the ban on "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment."[29] The Greek government has consistently sought to 'Europeanise' the large migration influx. The influx of migrants is presented as a 'European problem' that calls for a 'European solution.' The enforcement of Greece's border to Turkey is cast as a 'European responsibility'. Greece's borders are presented as not just that but rather as Europe's borders. As a Greek police officer in Alexandroupolis put it: "It [the influx of migrants] is a European problem first of all. They don't want to stay in Greece. European politicians will find some problem. Not Greek politicians. Someone has to accept the problem." And as we shall see, in the name of 'Europe', such a responsibility has been assumed.

In October 2010, the Greek government requested assistance from FRONTEX[30] to 'manage' the border. It was the first time in the EU's history that an EU force was deployed to patrol a Member state's land borders. A so-called Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) was assembled and deployed in November 2010. All EU Member states contributed to this armed police force, which for all intents and purposes amounts to a European border patrol force. What are we to make of the EU's active participation in border enforcement activities, and the subject positions that are constituted along with those practices? I want to suggest that it may provoke us to

rethink the long-standing question of how the EU is conceptualised vis-à-vis the modern state. It is to this conceptual question I now turn.

FROM STATE TO STATECRAFT: IDENTIFICATION, BORDERING, ORDERING

Ever since the heyday of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, most observers have conceptualised the European Union and its predecessors as an entity somewhere 'in between' an international organisation and a federal state, often invoking a rather problematic teleological narration of political organisation.[31] In 1985 former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors famously referred to the EC as an 'Unidentified Political Object.'[32] Fanciful images about everything from 'blind men touching different parts of an elephant' to 'geese flying in formation' had to be resorted to in order to capture the alleged exceptionality of the EU.[33] And although there is a massive amount of different takes on what the EU is, there is as Stefano Bartolini more recently wrote, almost perfect agreement that the EU is not a state. Rather, the EU is widely believed to be different from any other political arrangement.[34] Unlike much of the scholarship on Europe in Political Science, several Geographers writing on European borders, such as Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, have noticed that "many analogies might be drawn with regard to nation building processes" and the European Union.[35] For example, Valentina Kostadinova has in a reading of the European Commission's discourse on the European Neighbourhood Policy's construction of borders, shown that despite certain gestures to 'softer' and more permeable borders, this discourse ends up affirming rather traditional Westphalian 'hard' ones.[36] Overall, in their analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Freerk Boedeltje and Henk Van Houtum argue that

> the EU devises a rhetorical hierarchy of 'old' and 'new' Europe, pre-accession, candidate, non-candidate and permanent non-Europe. The EU is hence b/ordering its geopolitical space through defining itself, its neighbours and its complex multilateral and bilateral relations emphasizing a post-Westphalian connotation of itself.[37]

How then to theorise the alleged difference between the European Union and the modern Westphalian state? A fruitful entry to this conundrum, I suggest, lies in reflecting on what account of 'the state' the European Union is usually compared to. Traditional theories of 'the state', to which the EU is almost always compared, confer a certain ontological standing onto its purported object of study.[38] In other words, such theories infuse it either explicitly or implicitly, with a certain *is-ness*. In the Liberal, Pluralist, and Marxist theoretical traditions, 'the state' is broadly speaking seen as an

authoritative and controlling apparatus, obstructing or enabling the freedom of the already constituted individual. Further, 'the state' is understood as a distinctly separate institution from the rest of society, upon which it exercises a repressive negative power.[39] In Max Weber's famous definition, fully within the ontologising social contract tradition and indeed rather Hobbesian, a 'state' is defined by its monopoly to legitimately exercise violence within a territorially defined space.[40] Against such an understanding, the EU clearly does not qualify for the designation of a 'state'. This was for example made clear in a recent ruling by the German federal constitutional court over whether the Lisbon Treaty was compatible with Germany's Basic Law.[41] Within the terms of such a discourse of 'the state', it is hard to disagree with the Court's definition of the EU as a "long-term association of states which remain sovereign . . . and in which the peoples, i.e. the citizens, of the Member States remain the subjects of democratic legitimation."[42] On such an understanding, the EU clearly *falls short* of a state, to use a metaphor that risks slipping into a statist teleology. This understanding of a state, however, is not terribly illuminating for the purposes of a critical understanding of how the state works and the ethical implications of statecraft, that is, what statecraft *does* to concrete sets of social relations in everyday life. Nor does it offer us much theoretical purchase on what is done in the name of the European Union at the Evros River.

On more critically oriented understandings of 'the state', 'the state' is not understood as a 'thing' but as a web of practices, and a variety of authors have pointed to ways in which one may so to speak *crack the state open* by examining the practices that enact it.[43] Hence, by examining and laying out in the open the many discursive rationalities that are constitutive of it, the state is no longer conceived of as a singular political power but a loose assembly of various practices.[44] Thus, such an approach decentres the state. 'The state' is perceived as an *outcome* and *effect* of the various rationalities, discourses, and performances that make it up, and as such is a phenomenon that stands in need of an explanation, not a taken-for-granted starting point for social, economic, or political analysis. As Philip Abrams once put it, "The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is."[45] Social order, or what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe refer to as *hegemony*, comes about as a result of the complex, and ultimately contingent, interplay between various social forces rather than as the product of some either beneficial *or* sinister controlling central authority such as the state. In Timothy Mitchell's words: "[The state] should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist."[46] Or, as Foucault, to which Laclau, Mouffe, and Mitchell owe a substantial debt, put it: "The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities."[47]

Further, of great consequence for a critical approach to the question of statehood is to recognise that signifying practices about 'the state' are in and of themselves *enactments* of the state, and not (merely) representational locutions. To use John Austin's well-known distinction, statements about the state are both *performative* and *constative* locutions.[48] The question that one may then want to ask is precisely how it becomes possible for those speaking of and in the name of the state *to get away with* using the state in a constative mode – to ontologise it – as if one were simply referring to an entity beyond and outside of language, *as if* the referent was not being (re)produced and conjured up in the moment of its naming. In short, how does the state *get away* with its claim to statehood, i.e., the claim to 'being' a state? One of Foucault's great contributions in this regard lies in his meticulous demonstration that those officially authorised to speak in the name of the state are not the major *doers of statecraft*.[49] Since the state representatives are themselves not major doers of statecraft, in order to succeed, statecraft must have a self-erasing quality to it, where the most important enactments of the state take place at the myriad of social practices 'at the bottom' of society in everyday practice, at the same time as the constitutive function of those practices are forgotten and repressed *as such*.[50]

When departing from the ontologising tradition of thinking about 'the state' as infused with a certain 'is-ness', one may instead put forward an understanding of 'the state' as nothing but an effect of desire-driven practices, which we shall collectively refer to as *practices of statecraft*. As Roxanne Doty writes:

> The 'state' is nothing but a desire that is manifested in practices of statecraft, practices that can originate in government bureaucracies and institutions, churches, schools, corporations, theaters, novels, art museums, our backyards, our front yards, our kitchens, and living rooms and bedrooms.[51]

A minimalist understanding of statecraft could be understood as simultaneous practices of identification, bordering, and ordering.[52] 'The state' then, can be conceptualised as an effect of a plethora of practices of identification/bordering (i.e., statecraft), animated by a desire for order, stability, and foundation, constitutive of a wide variety of subject positions, but never traceable back to a single origin.

Let me by way of elaborating present an understanding of the relation between identification and bordering, which simultaneously produce the ontologising effect of 'a state'. As Yosef Lapid points out, in the social sciences the category of identity was for a long time conceptualised as analytically prior to that of a border.[53] That is to say, borders or boundaries were seen to more-or-less naturally emerge to enclose an identity, understood as a self-identical 'thing' or even essence. Borders, then, had nothing to do with

the actual substance or content of an identity. This understanding, however, has for decades been challenged in a number of disciplines; Fredrik Barth in Anthropology, and Andrew Abbott in Sociology to name but a few, and indeed more generally in much of the critically oriented literatures in the social sciences and humanities. On this understanding, practices of identification and bordering always go hand in hand. Practices of identification are simultaneously practices of bordering so that identification and bordering are in fact two different sides of the same coin. To make a claim to identification is in fact always a boundary-drawing practice, since an identity purports to 'be' something, which entails its alleged separateness from other 'beings.' Most recently, as mentioned in the introduction, a focus on the identity-performing functions of boundary drawing practices has been taken up by Critical Border Studies scholars, where the performativity of the border is stressed.[54] Thus, an identity or entity is ultimately understood as an ongoing accomplishment of practice, and therefore intimately linked to bordering practices. Bordering practices performatively delimit a space by ascribing territorial borders to an entity, thereby constituting a bounded identity.

What about *practices of ordering* then? Arguably, what animates practices of identification/bordering is a desire for order, stability, and foundation. As Doty writes: "The state is a desire to overcome ambivalence and undecidability, to make the numerous and diverse points of order, e.g., geographic, ethnic, moral, economic, and so on resonate to affect a coherent whole."[55] Stephen Toulmin, for example, has written about such desire for foundations as historically emerging in response to the violent religious war ravaging the European continent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and clearly epitomised by the philosophies of Descartes and Hobbes. In Toulmin's understanding, Western modernity is imbued with a Quest for Certainty, as a response to the very turbulent era in European political life, philosophically reflected in an obsession with epistemology, or finding the grounds for secure knowledge.[56] However, one may also, in a Derridean vein, understand this 'quest' or desire as inherent in the use of language itself. We all desire to make the world we encounter *representable*, and thereby intelligible, since that is a condition of possibility for living, acting and orienting ourselves in the world. There is certainly however a distinction to be drawn between acknowledging this inevitable violence inherent in representation, and to partake in the imperative of "offer yourself up to representation, i.e. speak my language, use my logic, and abide by my law, or you shall not be allowed a voice," – an imperative which is characteristic of the logocentric tradition in the West – and possibly elsewhere, as explicated by Derrida. We may thus summarise and synthetise the preceding discussion in the following way. Statecraft, critically understood, involves the imposition of an inside/outside boundary of differentiation constituting an effective outside (the foreign, the different, the alien) that can be deployed in the negative affirmation of an identity at the same time as effecting a certain

forgetfulness as to the arbitrariness of that very practice. 'The state' then, emerges as an effect of an ensemble of practices of identification/bordering.

How to put such an understanding of statecraft to work? And what could such an understanding of statecraft contribute to, when interrogating the performative crafting of Europe? Critical anthropologists have, on a similar understanding of statecraft, sought to interrogate "the conditions in which the state successfully represents itself as coherent and singular."[57] If we understand states as "produced through everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and performances,"[58] our focus is directed to everyday representations. Following Joe Painter, I also seek to draw attention to the "mundane practices" by which the crafting of entities occur.[59] In Cris Shore's many writings, several affinities are brought out between a critical, anthropological approach to the European Union, and the way critical writers in IR and Geography treat 'the state'.[60] Signifiers such as 'identity' and 'culture' are not understood as distinct and self-enclosed entities that simply exist; on the contrary, such signifiers are understood as messy, fluid and above all *contested*. However, instead of looking at the performative constitution of Europe in Brussels as Shore has done,[61] I turn to what may at first glance be deemed a marginal site in Euro-crafting. On closer inspection though, as the recent literature on border studies has emphasised, it is at the margin of the state where the messiness, and indeed the violence inherent in its reproduction is best brought out.[62] Moreover, the theoretical framework presented above allows me conceptually to connect the bordering practices of the EU, which one may most clearly observe at territorial border sites, to practices of identification, which one may observe at a multitude of different geographical locations. The desire for identity entails that borders must be instituted that in turn need patrolling. Thus, the desire for a coherent bounded subject of Europe that is omnipresent in the discourses of politicians, civil servants, and journalists in Brussels, the symbolic capital of Europe, is complicit with the direct physical bordering practices at the border between Greece and Turkey. In view of the theoretical understanding of statecraft outlined above, I will in the following part of the paper return to the humanitarian crisis in Greece and offer a reading of what is happening.

ORDERING, BORDERING, AND IDENTIFYING EUROPE

How is the desire for Europe that is circulating in this border area constitutive of subject positions involved in the performative constitution of Europe? And to what extent does such desire mirror the practices of identification, bordering, and ordering characteristic of modern statecraft? I will in what follows show how the desire for Europe is productive of a number of subject positions, which solidify rather than challenge the characteristic practices of modern statecraft. More specifically, I will show how two subject positions

are performatively constituted: 'migrant desiring to come to Europe' and 'European border guard'. 'Europe', much like the modern state, emerges as an effect of practices of ordering, bordering, and identification. Euro-crafting thus does not only work by producing various others (the non-European migrants), but it also produces the subject positions that are filled by *the physical agents* that are charged with the task of defending the subject of Europe. This assumption is much in line with writers in critical geopolitics who, as Merje Kuus put it, assume that "political agents do not exist prior to their actions but are constituted as actors through their practices."[63] Thus, the practices characteristic of modern statecraft may also be said to be operative in the crafting of the European Union.

Migrant Desiring Europe

Greece has one of the lowest refugee recognition rates in Europe. In 2007, for instance, some 0.04 percent of all asylum seekers were granted refugee status in first instance, and some additional 2 percent in the second instance.[64] In the wake of the debt crisis hitting Greece in 2010, with the openly racist Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party surging in the polls, migrants are subject to much abuse and violence, verbal and physical.[65] Therefore, the few migrants who are granted the status of refugee often leave Greece for other European countries, where it is easier and safer to make a living. Many of the migrants also do not wish to lodge asylum applications in Greece, since the rejection rate is staggering and once asylum has been denied in one EU Member state, the claim cannot be tried in another state. Having experienced the Greek Byzantine bureaucracy, few migrants wish to remain there but are prevented to leave due to EU migration law (the Dublin II Convention); the asylum seeker may only apply for asylum in the country where s/he first entered the EU.

When a migrant crosses the border, s/he is supposed to report to a Greek police station. At the station, the migrant is given a notice saying that s/he has 30 days to leave Greece. Since there is no way of gaining legal recognition as a non-EU migrant worker, the migrant who wishes to stay has two options: stay illegally or seek asylum. If s/he chooses to remain in Greece illegally, s/he receives no health care, has no right to work, and will face the threat of deportation every day. Thus many migrants seek asylum. The asylum process is complex and it is difficult even to physically lodge a claim for asylum since there is only one place in Greece where one may register one's asylum claim, namely at the overcrowded Police Directorate for Aliens in Athens.[66] When the migrant has filed an application for asylum, s/he is then issued a document by the authorities, to which many asylum seekers refer as a 'pink card'. This document grants the person access to health care and authorises him or her to work, even though the right to health care is hampered by a lack of interpreters, and the right to work

is often ineffective due to a combination of high unemployment, language barriers, and blatant discrimination. The asylum process may take up to several years – in some instances as long as seven years – even though the recently passed new asylum legislation is supposed to speed up the process.

I spoke to some fifteen Somali migrants in the Somali community centre in Athens.[67] The community centre was located on one of the worst streets in Athens, infamous for its prostitution and drug peddling. The centre functioned as a day centre, where Somalis come to eat and spend time.[68] On the streets in the neighbourhood, many migrants slept in shifts. Several of the refugees I interviewed had a hard time recollecting their previous experiences. As they spoke of their life in Somalia, their journey to Greece, and their life in Athens, many showed signs of severe anxiety. One man in his early thirties confessed: "When I think a lot, I think of throwing myself in front of a train." Some common themes emerged from their stories. Many of them had been threatened by the Islamist militant rebel movement al-Shabaab. Almost all of them had embarked on strenuous and dangerous journeys. The story of Abdulrashid, a man in his early twenties, is in many ways representative. His father was killed by al-Shaabab and he fled Somalia in 2008. He entered Greece through Turkey and managed to make his way to Finland. However, since he was fingerprinted in Greece, according to the Dublin II Convention, he was obliged to ask for asylum in Greece, his point of entry. Fearing deportation from Finland, he ran away to Norway, where he spent some nine months. Again under threat of being deported back to Greece, he went to Sweden, where the Swedish police finally deported him back to Greece. Having spent nearly two years adrift in Europe, Abdulrashid was thus returned to Greece in late 2010. He lodged his application for asylum in Athens, and has since then been trying to make do as well as he can. He describes the Greek authorities as "very nasty", adding that "you can feel the hatred from their faces":

> What I wanted was to get protection. They totally failed to give me and all the refugees whether Somalis, Afghans . . . Europe is good because it is very stable, it is not dangerous. But [the] system of getting into Europe is hard. . . . Before I came to Europe, I was always pro-Western, and that is the reason why I fled from al-Shabaab. Because I was always against any extremist ideology whether Islamism or Christianism or whatsoever. But when I have looked very deeply about the treatment we are getting from Europe right now, I think [many refugees] are becoming closer to the same ideology that so many Islamists have. Once I saw Europe as pro-freedom, pro-democracy, pro-transparency . . . but now . . . while I am here in Europe, I cannot see anything. It is totally not there.

A twenty-four-year-old woman told another typical account. She had spent 3.5 years in Greece, thus arriving in 2007 at a time when there were few Somalis in Athens. On her way across the Mediterranean Sea, several of her fellow travellers died due to disease. When approaching the Greek shore,

the coastguard told the ship to go back where it came from. The survivors nevertheless got to Greece and her claim to asylum was, like almost everybody else's, rejected. When trying to leave Greece, she was arrested and a court sentenced her to one year and seven months in prison for forging travel documents: "In prison you will find foreigners who have done drugs etc., and even they were amazed since we were only with false papers and still have to be here." She tried to leave Greece six times altogether. She described life in Athens as arduous, sharing a small place with some twenty other migrants: "In hospitals, they don't treat you. If you are trying to get a job, they say that you are Muslim and black."

A fifty-two-year-old man, who had been in Greece for one and a half years eating leftover food from trashcans to survive, had no specific country in Europe on his mind, but wanted to go somewhere he could find peace, stability, and in a position to give his children a better life. A woman in her fifties likewise had no specific country on her mind when she fled Somalia for Europe. She was eventually returned from Sweden back to Greece, despite that her son was hospitalised there: "I thought Europe [would be] a better thing, but [the Europeans] are merciless people." Ali, a man in his forties whose children are living as refugees in Ethiopia said: "I only came because I wanted protection from Europe." Adawe, a man in his late twenties, who used to work as a journalist in Somalia and had been in Greece for seven months said: "I thought that if I reached Europe, I'd find a better place to live in. I wanted to get more education, learn, work, and do my own life." In fact, most of the migrants I spoke to used 'Europe' to describe the place they wanted to go to, rather than any of the old nation-states. Moreover, severe disappointment with this 'Europe' characterised their stories. A Moroccan migrant, taking part in a hunger strike in March 2011 in Athens summed up this mood of despair: "Europeans hate immigrants even though we helped build their economies . . . but Europe has to help because Europe in the past was the colonial power, it supported those dictators. Today it is reaping what it sowed."[69]

In the stories of the migrants, 'Europe' is, much like a traditional state, ordered, bordered, and identified. In their stories, 'Europe' is being constituted as an entity to which they at first ascribed much promise, but which has now let them down. The understanding of Europe many of them initially held mirrors cosmopolitan, humanitarian Europe, in which subjects, be it collective or individual, are treated with respect and state power is circumscribed. The Europe that many of them now talk about, however, has failed to live up to this promise.

European Commission and FRONTEX: De-fending Europe's Territory

The Commission's Directorate-General for Home Affairs, headed by Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, is charged with providing direction for the

EU's border management strategy, which is in turn coordinated and increasingly implemented by FRONTEX. The Commission has taken an active role in migration management, and called for 'solidarity' with Greece in light of the huge influx of migrants. Malmström thus spoke after the deployment of the RABIT team: "We have shown European solidarity . . . . Within ten days, officers from 25 countries have arrived here in the Orestiada area to assist the Greek authorities. This is also thanks to the excellent work of FRONTEX."[70] The Commission has mildly rebuked Greece for failing to provide adequate detention facilities for migrants. It has also expressed reservations about the Greek government's plans to build a wall: "Walls of fences are short-term measures that are not meant to deal with the question of illegal immigration in a structural way."[71]

FRONTEX was established by a Council Regulation in October 2004, and became operational in the following year.[72] In the face of mounting pressure that 'something should be done' about high levels of 'irregular' migration, it was established in order to co-ordinate border management among the Member states. Having better integrated external borders was presented as a 'necessary corollary' to the passport-free Schengen Area. The Regulation asserts:

> Effective control and surveillance of external borders is a matter of the utmost importance to Member States regardless of their geographical position. Accordingly, there is a need for promoting solidarity between Member States in the field of external border management.[73]

The main tasks of FRONTEX are to 1) coordinate joint operations to manage the EU's external borders; 2) assist Member states on training national border guards; 3) conduct risk analyses; 4) monitor research regarding management of borders; 5) assist Member states in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; and 6) assist Member states in returning third-country nationals.[74] Every year, FRONTEX's Risk Analysis Unit, draws up an Annual Risk Assessment, detailing patterns and forecasts of irregular migration into the European Union, and provides recommendations for how to deal with those.[75] Europe is thus constituted as one territory in need of being secured from irregular migration. Analogously to the modern state, the European Union depends upon the perpetuation of a desire for its being, and FRONTEX partakes in conjuring up such desire, in the guise of manifold external 'risks.' And the intra-European 'solidarity' that FRONTEX as well as Malmström refer to is one, like in the case of traditional statecraft, where the compassion for some literally spells death to others.

On 24 October 2010, FRONTEX received a request from the Greek government to deploy a so-called RABIT team. Just a little more than a week later, a force of 175 FRONTEX personnel were deployed on Greece's border to Turkey. And the RABIT team did seem to meet its objective. Already in

January 2011, FRONTEX reported significant decreases in levels of undocumented migration through the border area. In December 2010, the average detection rate had fallen by 57%.[76] The FRONTEX force assists the Greek authorities in patrolling the border area, interviews and screens migrants seeking to determine the nationality of refugees, and collects information about networks of human traffickers that help the migrants to cross the border areas. The patrol forces ambush the arriving migrants but usually do not, as of the summer of 2011, detain the migrants. The migrants are told to go to the nearest police station whereas the facilitators are arrested. Chief Inspector Gennaro Di Bello confirms this policy: "If we follow the refugees, it's only to ensure that nothing happens to them."[77]

The main FRONTEX contingent is stationed in the small town of Alexandroupoli, and I interviewed several members of the force in July 2011. All EU Member states have a pool of people available for deployment with FRONTEX. Their missions last for a month, they then go back to their home country, and may return in a few months for another mission. During FRONTEX field operations, a Greek officer is always in command. FRONTEX personnel (known as 'guest officers') wear their national uniforms with both their national flag and the EU's flag on them. Motivations for joining FRONTEX vary. A Finnish dog handler and team leader, who has been deployed at the border four times, says that he wanted to join FRONTEX to get some experience in a 'target rich area.' He takes part in a special operations' team that ambushes and apprehends facilitators, and to a lesser extent migrants, at night at the Evros delta: 'First priority is to arrest facilitators, if we can apprehend migrants, we do it.' The migrants react differently when being apprehended. Some of them are happy and some of them are scared. It depends on what the facilitators have told them, he says. Since the apprehensions take place at night, and the facilitators sometimes are armed, even heavily so, the situation is often quite tense and sometimes migrants try to run away.[78]

Several of the guest officers were touched by the human hardship they encountered. A Romanian guest officer recounted the story of how he performed first aid on a Muslim woman who was minutes from dying. A Finnish guest officer described the situation as 'unworthy of Europe.' Many of them also speak of the futility of their work. As a self-described 'grunt' put it:

> It doesn't really matter what we are doing here. It is in a way kind of frustrating. This cannot be solved by increasing border control. There are always people willing to come to Europe from Africa and Asia. Even if we put a very big fence around Greece, they will go to Bulgaria, and Italy . . . . [It makes no sense having] a Somalian woman trying to cross the river in a rubber boat, with a one-year-old baby . . . running as hell like in a jungle next to a river . . . . The problem is not here but in Brussels, they are out of touch with what is going on.

The FRONTEX police officers were in agreement that they are not only working on behalf of their own state, but rather for 'Europe'. A German border guard says, 'I think it is important to support the Greeks. This is Europe's border, after all.'[79] Or as a Romanian guest officer puts it, 'Not so many migrants are willing to establish their families in Romania, but it affects us, because we are European Union. In the second hand we are here to support Greek authorities, in the first hand the European Union.' An Austrian guest officer, who is a forged documents and stolen car expert and has been working on one of the border crossing check points says, 'I feel I am working for Europe. We are more or less a big country.' Thus, loyalties to 'Europe' emerge, much like loyalties to states, when an entity is perceived to be threatened by a return of a Hobbesian state of nature.

So what has the presence of FRONTEX done to avert, or at least mitigate, the humanitarian crisis in Greece? Since the arrival of FRONTEX there have been no reports of informal pushbacks, in which migrants would simply be pushed back to Turkish territory. FRONTEX has also devoted a considerable amount of attention to what they refer to as the ethics of border management. In 2010, FRONTEX commissioned a rather extensive research study undertaken by the Center for the Study for Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham, which identified common European standards of ethical conduct in border management.[80] And before FRONTEX members are deployed, they have to undergo training in human rights.

However, a much more fundamental ethical problem remains. From the beginning, voices critical of the establishment of FRONTEX were heard. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles stated:

> Any decreases in the number of irregular entries into the EU stemming from the implementation of immigration control measures are presented as a success by the EU and as a factor that contributes to saving human lives. This interpretation fails to acknowledge the consequences of these measures for individuals fleeing persecution.[81]

Indeed, in a document released by FRONTEX, its first joint sea operation, a mission called Hera, aimed to deter irregular migration from Western Africa to Europe, is described as a significant success. With aid from West African countries, the route from Senegal, Mauritania, and Cape Verde, to the Canary Islands was entirely shut down. FRONTEX believes that this closure 'without doubt prevented countless deaths.'[82] However, the circumstances that the potential migrants were facing at their respective homelands are left out of the assessment. The fundamental raison d'être of FRONTEX is undoubtedly to prevent migrants from coming to Europe, at least in the numbers they do now. This purpose is not always stated in plain language. The 'prime objective' of the deployment of the RABIT team in Greece in 2010, is according to FRONTEX to 'assist Greek border-control authorities in securing the land

border with Turkey from a heavy influx of irregular migration.'[83] The purpose of FRONTEX is thus clearly to limit the amount of migrants entering Europe, or, as the FRONTEX executive director Ilkka Laitinen puts it in more oblique language 'to have an impact on the migratory flows in the area.'[84]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have argued that a critical approach to European integration first of all needs to get beyond the representationalist understanding of a political entity, where there is an identity already formed and the leadership represents the inner identity and interest of that political entity. The performative understanding of statecraft that I put forward here – where the realm of performativity is always prior to the realm of constativity – understands states as *effects* of desire-driven practices of ordering, bordering, and identification. When examining what is being done in the name of Europe in Greece, I have attempted to demonstrate that much like the modern state, Europe is being ordered, bordered, and identified. Thus, the way the signifier 'Europe' is deployed and circulated by migrants as well as members of the EU's border force in many ways mirrors modern statecraft. Euro-crafting conjures up an entity which is purportedly in need of being defended from external threats much like the modern state.

It is important to emphasise that since the article only deals with one particular site of bordering Europe, it is problematic to generalise the findings to Euro-crafting as a whole. More work on the bordering practices that enact the European Union as a bounded identity is needed to draw firmer conclusions. However, I would like to suggest that the argument made here ultimately calls into question the rather complacent view of the EU as a 'gentler' entity than the modern Westphalian state. If one focuses on the bordering of Europe, it might challenge the discourse of the EU as a civilian power which, as Veit Bachmann and James Sidaway put it, "reproduces 'Europe' as an exemplary space and agent."[85] Instead, such a focus squarely places the focus on *the violence* involved in crafting a bounded identity, regardless of whether we write this subject as 'Greece' or 'the European Union.'

The desire for a bounded identity entails a plethora of more-or-less violent bordering practices. Thus, the inevitable corollary of a coherent European subject with a clearly delineated identity is borders that need to be patrolled in the name of the imagined centre's identity. On such an interpretation, the violence that this article has sought to bring out ultimately stems from the desire for a bounded identity. As Parker and Adler-Nissen put it: "The level of violence, past and present, devoted to fixing and holding borders is plain to see."[86] And it is this violence inherent in bordering practices that I have sought to draw attention to in the article, and provide a conceptual account of. The problem of a statist discourse lies precisely in

that it authorises 'the state' to engage in violence; it is a discourse which naturalises and legitimises boundary-drawing practices with highly detrimental consequences for some people's lives. In the stories of the migrants wishing to come to 'Europe', we may hear of the suffering and hardship that the desires for a bounded entity give rise to. In the stories of the border guards, on the other hand, 'Europe' emerges as a natural entity, to which one owes a loyalty to protect from intruders. And then finally, the desire for Europe produces the subject positions that are filled in by the border guards, patrolling the boundaries of the precariously produced object of desire.

Progressive visions of European integration, while acknowledging the positive role of the EU and its many predecessors in reconciling the old historical antagonists on the European continent, need to better resist the desire for bounded identities. In other words, such visions need to break with statist discourses of bounded subjects. There are no easy solutions on how to do that, but there is a glaring absence of such a discussion in today's debates on the future of Europe. Ultimately, and on a final note, perhaps one of the best antidotes to the fear-mongering rhetoric of "immigrants threatening European ways", which is one source of the desire for a bounded Europe, is to listen to the imaginations of the kind of Europe that migrants want to come to. The stories of Europe I heard all spoke of a space which promises freedom from repressive state violence, and respect for basic human rights.

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NOTES

1. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSLVtaUpqI0&feature=player_embedded>, accessed 18 June 2013.

2. Charlemagne, 'The Unstoppable Flow', *The Economist*, 19 Feb. 2011.

3. V. Schmidt, 'Re-Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47 (2009) p. 24.

4. S. Borg, 'European Integration and the Problem of the State: Universality, Particularity, and Exemplarity in the Crafting of the European Union', *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2013), AOP doi:10.1057.

5. See for example L. Bialasiewicz, 'Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean', *Geopolitics* 17/4 (2012); X. Ferrer-Gallardo, 'The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Rebordering', *Political Geography* 27/3 (2008); V. Kostadinova, 'The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders', *Geopolitics* 14/2 (2009); M. Kuus, 'Policy and Geopolitics: Bounding Europe in EUrope', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101/5 (2011),

6. D. Mitrany, 'The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4/2 (1965).

7. N. Parker and R. Adler-Nissen, 'Picking and Choosing the 'Sovereign' Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices', *Geopolitics* 17/4 (2012).

8. N. Parker and N Vaughan-Williams, 'Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the "Lines in the Sand" Agenda', *Geopolitics* 17/4 (2012) p. 729.

9. Ibid., pp. 731–732. See also M. B. Salter, 'Theory of the /:The Suture and Critical Border Studies', *Geopolitics* 17/4 (2012) p. 735.

10. See note 5.

11. Bialasiewicz, 'Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing' (note 5) p. 844.

12. The way I use 'discourse' here follows the understanding of Laclau and Mouffe, on whose understanding of discourse there is nothing specifically linguistic about it. See E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso 1985). For a pioneering case for discourse analysis in European Integration Studies, see T. Diez, 'Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies', *Cooperation and Conflict* 36/1 (2001). I am throughout the paper using 'crafting' instead of 'writing', to avoid any confusion about narrowly associating the enactment of Europe only with linguistic practices. My use of 'crafting' implies agreement with a poststructuralist insistence on examining the ways in which subjects are performatively enacted in all kinds of social practice.

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14. 'UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece is "a humanitarian crisis"', *UNHCR Briefing Notes*, 21 Sep. 2010, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4c98a0ac9.html>, accessed 10 June 2013.

15. A. Triandafyllidou (ed.), *Irregular Migration in Europe – Myths and Realities* (Farnham: Ashgate 2010) p. 37.

16. R. van Munster, *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU* (Houndmills: Palgrave 2009).

17. A. Zolberg, 'Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy', in C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (eds.), *The Handbook of International Migration* (New York: Russell Sage 1999).

18. W. Walters, 'Europe's Borders' in C. Rumford (ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies* (London: SAGE 2009) p. 496.

19. L. Bialasiewicz, 'Borders, Above All?', *Political Geography* 30 (2011) p. 299.

20. P. Fargues and C. Fandrich, 'Migration after the Arab Spring', *MPC Research Report* 9 (2012).

21. See Ferrer-Gallardo (note 5).

22. 'The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances, and Torture', *Amnesty International* (London: Amnesty International 2011) p. 88.

23. 'Border Burden: Greece Struggles to Deal with a European Problem', *The Economist*, 19 Aug. 2010.

24. However, many more have died trying to come to Europe. Amnesty International estimated that at least 1,500 migrants had drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, following the Arab Spring between March and September 2011. See Amnesty International (note 22) p. 88.

25. UNHCR (note 14).

26. 'Coping with a Fundamental Rights Emergency – The Situation of Persons Crossing the Greek Land Border in an Irregular Manner', *Fundamental Rights Agency*, Vienna (2011) p. 18.

27. Interview, Athens, March 2011.

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29. Council of Europe, 'M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece', Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 Jan. 2011, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html>, accessed 10 June 2013.

30. European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. FRONTEX is the EU's agency for external border security, see further below.

31. H. Friese and P. Wagner, 'Survey Article: The Nascent Political Philosophy of the European Polity', *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 10/3 (2002).

32. H. Drake and Jacques Delors: *Perspectives of a European Leader* (London and New York: Routledge 2000) p. x.

33. J. Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) p. 5.

34. S. Bartolini, *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring between the Nation-State and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) p. xiii. See also P. Joenniemi, 'Turning into a Sovereign Actor? Probing the EU Through the Lens of Neighbourhood', *Geopolitics* 17/1 (2012).

35. Ferrer-Gallardo (note 5). See also, for example, J. W. Scott, 'Reflections on EU Geopolitics: Consolidation, Neighbourhood and Civil Society in the Reordering of European Space', *Geopolitics* 16 (2011) p. 164.

36. Kostadinova (note 5).

37. F. Boedeltje and H. Van Houtum, 'Brussels is Speaking: The Adverse Speech Geo-Politics of the European Union Towards its Neighbours', *Geopolitics* 16 (2011).

38. Borg (note 4).

39. See P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy* (Houndmills: Macmillan 1987); C. Hay, M. Lister, and D. Marsh (eds.), The State: Theories and Issues (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2006).

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41. Zitierung: BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 421), Federal Constitutional Court, available at <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>, accessed 12 June 2013.

42. Ibid.

43. See Laclau and Mouffe (note 12); R. K. Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematic', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17/2 (1988); R. K. Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War', in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations – Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989); T. Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics', *American Political Science Review* 85/1 (1991); C. Weber, 'Performative States', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27/1 (1998); D. Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1998); J. Painter, 'Prosaic Geographies of Stateness', *Political Geography* 25/7 (2006).

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49. Foucault (note 47).

50. In IR this point has perhaps best been brought out by Richard Ashley; see, for example, his 'Living on Border Lines' (note 43).

51. Doty, *Anti-Immigrantism* (note 13) p. 12. Doty's work is in turn informed by Deleuze and Guattari; see in particular G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. by R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983).

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54. For the diversity of such approaches, see in particular Salter (note 9).

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57. A. Sharma and A. Gupta (eds.), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell 2006) p. 10.

58. Ibid., p. 27.

59. Painter (note 43) p. 753.

60. See C. Shore, 'Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 9/4 (1996); C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London and New York: Routledge 2000); C. Shore, 'Whither European Citizenship? Eros and Civilization Revisited', *European Journal of Social Theory* 7/1 (2004).

61. Shore, *Building Europe* (note 60).

62. See, for example, N. Parker and N. Vaughan-Williams et al. 'Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies', *Geopolitics* 4/3 (2009).

63. Kuus (note 5) p. 1142.

64. T. Maroukis, 'Irregular Migration in Greece', in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.), 'Irregular Migration in Europe – Myths and Realities' (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010), p. 103. It should be noticed that the second instance was abolished altogether in 2009, but then reinstituted in 2011.

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67. The interviews were conducted in an open-ended, semi-structured manner, lasting between thirty minutes and an hour each.

68. Two weeks after my visit, several hundreds of right-wing extremists attacked the centre, destroyed much of the things inside, sprayed the walls, and injured ten of the Somalis. Shortly thereafter, the centre closed down.

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73. Ibid., §5.

74. Ibid., chap. 2, art. 2.

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82. 'Hermes Extension: Joint Operations Background', *FRONTEX*.

83. 'Greece RABIT 2010 Deployment', *Frontex Press Kit – RABITS 2010 Deployment*, p. 2.

84. 'Papoutsis, Besson, Malmström and Laitinen Visit RABIT Operational Area', *FRONTEX Press Release*, Nov. 2010, p. 5.

85. V. Bachmann and J. D. Sidaway, 'Zivilmacht Europa: A Critical Geopolitics of the European Union as a Global Power', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 34 (2008) p. 104.

86. Parker and Adler-Nissen (note 7) p. 774.