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II.—EMOTION

BY GEORGE FITCHER

I HAVE two main aims in this paper : to show that one important traditional theory as to the nature of the emotions is fundamentally wrong, and to show that having an emotion is a much more complicated affair than it is often supposed to be.

The traditional theory I wish to criticize is that to have an emotion is just to have a certain unique inner feeling or group of inner feelings, to undergo a special inner experience. I shall refer to this hereafter as the Traditional View, or sometimes simply as the View. In most versions of the View, for 'inner' one can read 'mental'. The feelings that are alleged to be involved are just like sensations such as pains, tickles, and itches, in that they are immediately felt or experienced and have a fairly definite duration, but they differ from them in being mental rather than physical. The View is an attractive one, and might well be that which unreflective common sense would adopt. Hume certainly held it (see *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, Part I, Sect. 1). William James, in certain passages, adopts another version of it : he maintains that the feelings are not peculiarly mental ones, but just the sensations of the bodily changes which occur when one has the emotion.

My theory . . . is that *the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.*¹

In this paper, I shall make no attempt to distinguish between physical sensations and the sort of mental feelings I have described, since what I have to say is independent of that distinction. Most of the time, I shall refer elastically to both as sensations.

I

Emotions are very often, and perhaps always, directed towards something : a person is afraid of Smith, is afraid that it will fall, is angry at Jones, is indignant because his name was withdrawn, is overjoyed at the turn of events in Ceylon, and so on. Of cases like these, I shall say that the emotion has an object or is directed towards an object. Note that I thus use the expressions 'having an object' and 'being directed towards an object' very broadly : when I say that an emotion is directed towards an object I do

¹ Williams James, *The Principles of Psychology*, ii. 449. Author's italics.

not necessarily mean that there is some individual thing, person, or animal towards which it is directed. If a person is standing on a swaying bridge and is afraid of falling into the gorge, there is no individual *thing*, in the sense of physical object, person, animal, etc., that is the object of his fear. Still, there is a reference to something beyond the person himself, or beyond his present state, or at least beyond the emotion itself. There is, in short, some "intentionality", and this is all that I mean when I say that an emotion has an object or is directed towards an object. Still, it will prove convenient to have a distinction between emotions which are, and those which are not, directed toward a particular thing, person, or animal (or group of them); so I shall call the former *agent-directed* emotions and the latter *non-agent-directed* emotions.

How can the Traditional View account for this feature of most, if not all, emotions? How can a sensation have an object? Certainly it makes no sense to speak of bodily sensations of themselves being directed towards anything: a pain cannot be a pain of, or toward, anything. And mental sensations do not seem to contain anything that would allow them to be directed toward an object either. The Traditional View is evidently forced to admit that there must be some kind of "cognition" accompanying an emotion, in order to account for the emotion's having an object. The emotion itself consists just in the sensation, but the accompanying cognitive element is what directs the sensation, and hence the emotion, towards its object.

The question now arises: what sort of cognition is it that is supposed to accompany the emotion? In what does the cognition consist? Leaving aside those cases in which the object of the emotion is something immediately confronting the person, there are any number of answers to this question which a defender of the Traditional View might offer. The most plausible, however, seem to be the following:

1. The cognitive element consists in the having of an image; the mere having of the image is what directs the emotion (*i.e.* the sensation) towards its object, namely, that which the image is an image of.
2. The cognitive element is twofold: it consists in the having of an image plus the belief that the emotion (*i.e.* the sensation) is directed towards the object of the image (what the image is an image of).
3. The cognitive element consists in having the belief that the emotion (*i.e.* the sensation) is directed towards a certain object *O*.

No full-scale criticism of these replies is possible here, but I shall indicate briefly why they seem to me to be unacceptable. I shall begin with the first reply, and use anger as an example of an emotion.

According to the Traditional View, a person's anger is one thing, and his image another—it is an accompaniment of his anger. But, then, it must be possible on occasion for the wrong image to come before a person's mind when he is angry. This possibility proves fatal to the first reply. According to that reply, the having of the image of an object is the very thing that directs a person's emotion toward that object. Hence, if the image of his uncle comes before someone's mind while he is experiencing feelings of anger, then he is necessarily angry with him, and it will not make sense to say either that he is really angry with someone else (*e.g.* his father) or that he realizes that he is not really angry with his uncle, but rather with someone else (*e.g.* his father).

But suppose Smith receives a letter which he knows to be from his father in which his father insults Smith viciously. It might happen, for one reason or another, that an image of Smith's uncle comes before his mind while he is experiencing feelings of anger: according to the first reply, we must say that he is therefore necessarily angry with his uncle, despite the fact that the uncle may have nothing to do with the letter and Smith may very well know it. And this is absurd. Or suppose the letter that angers Smith says that Smith's father brutally and unjustly struck his wife (Smith's mother). If any image comes before his mind, it is doubtless that of his mother in floods of tears, and according to the first reply, Smith would then have to be angry with *her*. But this, too, is absurd. It is not in the least self-contradictory for a person to assert that he is angry with his father but that the only image before his mind is that of his uncle or of his mother, yet the first reply makes this state of affairs logically impossible.

The second and third replies can be disposed of together. Neither of these replies is satisfactory, for both are circular. Both replies claim that the person having the emotion must have a belief of a certain sort, namely, a belief that the emotion (*i.e.* the sensation) is directed towards a certain object. But what is it that he is supposed to believe? What is it for his emotion to be directed towards an object? We cannot understand what it is that he is alleged to be believing until we understand what it is for an emotion to be directed towards an object. But the appeal to the belief was made in the attempt to explicate this very thing. It is evident then that no appeal to any such belief can possibly be made without being circular, *i.e.* without presupposing a

solution to the very problem which the appeal was meant to solve.

We have seen how the Traditional View of emotions runs into serious difficulties in trying to say how an emotion can have an object. There are considerations of quite a different character which also render the View untenable. The first of these is that we can ask for a person's reasons for his emotion, or for the grounds of his emotion. ("Why are you afraid of him?" "Why is he angry with her?" "I am afraid of him because he hits me all the time" "He is angry with her because she threw an egg at him.") The second of these considerations is that depending on the goodness or badness of a person's reasons for his emotion, we can say that it is warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable, and so on. It strikes me as a most important fact about emotions that they can very often be spoken of in these ways, that such things as "You have no right to be angry with him", "Your resentment is quite uncalled for", "You shouldn't be afraid of him: your fear is unreasonable", and so on, can be said.

These considerations seem to render the Traditional View untenable: for although we can speak of emotions in the ways indicated, we cannot do so of sensations. Certainly not of bodily sensations, at any rate: it makes no sense to ask for a person's reasons for having a tickling sensation in his throat, or to call a twinge or an itch justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable. And I know of no relevant difference between mental and physical sensations which would permit the former to be judged in these ways either.¹

The Traditional View may offer the following reply to my criticism: "The emotion still consists of nothing but sensations, but it can be called reasonable or unreasonable depending on its causes, if it be granted that the causes of emotions are always beliefs—and in fact this seems to be the case. For example, suppose the cause of a person's fear of falling into the river is his belief that the bridge he is on is unsafe. The fear can be called unreasonable if this belief is unreasonable, and reasonable if the belief is so."

It is highly doubtful that this reply adequately explains how, on the Traditional View, emotions can be reasonable or unreasonable. One surely cannot explain in this way how bodily sensations might be deemed reasonable or unreasonable. If my headache

¹ Errol Bedford made this point against what I am calling the Traditional View in his article "Emotions", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LVII, p. 296 f.

is caused by the belief that my fortune has been lost, no one would be tempted to judge my headache unreasonable on the grounds that my belief is so. One feels that no alleged explanation could possibly be sound, since it seems to make no sense to speak of a bodily sensation being reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified, and so on ; and on the Traditional View, the same must be said of emotions. The View does not allow the notions of reasonableness and justifiability to gain any foothold in the concept of an emotion.

Hume takes the bull by the horns and boldly states that emotions cannot be reasonable or unreasonable, although he admits that one can sometimes speak loosely of the unreasonableness of an emotion :

... 'Tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, when a passion, such as hope or fear . . . is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, when in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. (*Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Sect. 3, p. 416 of the Selby-Bigge edition.)

But strictly speaking, he continues, the emotion itself can never be unreasonable :

In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable ; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment. (*ibid.*)

There is much that is wrong with Hume's account. First, his second group of cases are not examples of unreasonable emotions at all. Second, only some cases of his first type could be called cases of unreasonable emotion. For example, suppose a spinster is frightened because she thinks that there is a man under her bed : if there is no reason whatever to think there is a man there, then her fear is indeed unreasonable. But if she hears a man's voice emerging from under the bed threatening her with bodily harm, her fear is not unreasonable even if it should turn out that there is no man, her friends having played a cruel joke on her with hidden loudspeakers. Third, in the legitimate cases of unreasonable emotions, it is wrong to say, as Hume does, that it is not the emotion itself which is unreasonable but only the judgment, no matter how strictly one speaks : in the first of the two examples involving the spinster, her judgment is indeed unreasonable, but so is her fear. To be sure, the feelings of her

stomach turning over and her heart racing cannot be called unreasonable, but neither are they her fear.

And finally, Hume is wrong in asserting that it is only "in two senses that any affection can be call'd unreasonable": there are many more. Consider the emotion of fear, for example: a person's fear may be unreasonable in at least these five different, although not necessarily mutually exclusive, ways:

(a) His reason for being afraid is expressible in a statement which, if true, would state a good reason for being afraid, but which is actually false and, in the given circumstances, obviously false—*i.e.* it would be unreasonable to believe that it is true. Thus it is unreasonable to be afraid of falling for the reason that the bridge is unsafe, if it is perfectly obvious that the bridge is entirely safe. (Baseless or unfounded fear.)

(b) He acknowledges that there is no danger, and yet he is afraid. Thus it is unreasonable to be afraid of falling if one admits that there is no chance whatever of falling, or of a particular cow if one admits that the beast is harmless. (Irrational fear.)

(c) His reason for being afraid, although expressed in a true statement, states an extremely bad reason, or what we might call "no reason", for being afraid. It is unreasonable to be afraid of falling for the reason that a bird has just flown by or that a black cat has just crossed one's path. (Superstitious fear.)

(d) The object of his fear is an unsuitable one. For example, it is unreasonable to be afraid of baby lambs (a silly or neurotic fear) or that one's hair might become mussed (a vain or neurotic fear).

(e) The object of his fear is a suitable one, but his fear is too great. It is reasonable to have a moderate fear of snakes, but a person's fear of snakes is unreasonable if he is so afraid of them that he faints at the sight of them, even in a zoo. (Abnormal or inordinate fear. One cannot have an abnormal fear of baby lambs, because there is no such thing as a normal fear of them.)

If the Traditional View is unable, as it evidently is, to account for all these types of unreasonableness of emotions, it must be rejected; and so a fresh start has to be made. What I propose to do in the next section is to look at typical emotion-situations—*i.e.* situations in which someone has an emotion—and try to discover what their characteristic features are.

II

When it is said of someone that he has an emotion, this may be said of him either in (a) an occurrent or in (b) a dispositional

sense. A person who is frightened by a face at the window, or gets angry at two boys because they are mistreating a dog, has an emotion in the former, occurrent, sense—he is actually *in the grip* of the emotion. But a person who hates his father, or is jealous of his landlord, has an emotion in the latter, dispositional, sense—he may not actually be feeling the emotion now. Some emotion-words are used primarily in an occurrent sense (e.g. ‘frightened’), some primarily in a dispositional sense (e.g. ‘love’, ‘hate’, ‘envy’), and many are frequently used in both senses (e.g. ‘afraid’, ‘angry’). In cases of type (a) I shall say that a person has an *occurrent emotion*, and in type (b), a *dispositional emotion*. So, for example, if Paul sees two boys mistreating a dog, and becomes angry at them for it, he has an occurrent emotion; but if Paul was insulted by Jerome and is angry with him for a week thereafter (although not, of course, actually *feeling* angry all that time), he has a dispositional emotion during that week.

It seems that a factual belief, or some factual knowledge or awareness, is required if a person is to have either an occurrent or a dispositional emotion. Consider an agent-directed emotion—agent-directed anger, for example. Suppose *P* is angry at Jones or at the man who was in the kitchen last night. In order for this to be the case, *P* must at least believe that there is someone called Jones or that there was a man in the kitchen last night. However, it would be infelicitous to insist that there must in every case be a relevant *belief*. If Jones, well known to *P*, is standing directly before *P* in broad daylight, it would be inappropriate to say that *P* believes there is a man called Jones: the concept of belief does not apply in such circumstances. *P* then simply *sees* Jones. Under other conditions, we may have to speak rather of *P*’s knowing, or being aware, or assuming, that Jones exists. To cover this wide range of cases with an artificial portmanteau expression, let us say that one feature of an agent-directed emotion is that the angry person has some kind of general *apprehension*, or *misapprehension*, of the object of his emotion. (The qualification “or misapprehension”, which is necessary in order to include false beliefs, false assumptions, mis-seings of various kinds, and so on, will henceforth be omitted.)

In the case of non-agent-directed emotions, the person must apprehend whatever feature of the situation—past, present, or future—is the object of his emotion. Thus if a person is irritated because it is raining, he must believe, know, assume, or whatever—*i.e.* he must apprehend—that it is raining. And if a person is frightened of falling off the ledge, he must apprehend that there is some danger that he might fall off the ledge. And so on.

Some form of apprehension of the object is obviously but a bare minimum condition for having an emotion. We must now move closer to the heart of the matter. An important characteristic of occurrent-emotion-situations is evidently that the person acts or behaves, or at least has an inclination to act or behave, in certain ways. If Paul is afraid of falling into the river, he walks carefully, holds on to things, looks down cautiously into the torrent, and so on. If something prevents him from behaving so, or if he just considers it, for one reason or another, better not to behave so—if, in short, he hides or controls his emotion—he at least has an inclination to behave in these ways. Again, if Paul is angry at two boys for mistreating a dog, he rushes to stop them, hits them or makes threatening movements towards them, drives them off, and so on—or at least has an inclination to do so.

Something analogous, but further removed from immediate action, seems to be a salient characteristic of dispositional-emotion-situations, something from a wide range which includes such things as a desire to do (or not to do) something, a desire that such-and-such a situation or condition should (or should not) happen or exist, or should (or should not) cease to exist, and even a mere belief that such-and-such a thing, person, situation, or condition is, or would be, good (bad) or better (worse) than another. For example, if Paul loves Suzy, he wants to be with her, he wishes good things for her, he wants her to get well when she is ill, and so on. If John envies Jim his position, he thinks Jim's position is better than his own, he wants a comparable position for himself, and so on.

Modes of behaviour and inclinations to them are typical of occurrent emotions, while wants, desires, beliefs, and so on, are typical of dispositional emotions; but these correlations are anything but perfect. Thus a want, or desire, or belief often figures in occurrent emotions: when Paul is frightened of falling, it is certainly true that he wants not to fall, and in some circumstances it may be true to say that he thinks falling would be a bad (horrendous, disastrous) thing. Again, certain dispositional emotions—and perhaps all—can become occurrent: that is, there will be times when the person *feels* them, when they “well up” inside him. And then certain typical modes of behaviour, or inclinations to behave, will arise, as in the case of pure occurrent emotions.

These characteristics of different emotion-situations, ranging from modes of behaviour and inclinations to behave (occurrent emotions, primarily) through wants or desires, and up to beliefs like the belief that something is, or would be, good or bad

(dispositional emotions, primarily) can all be grouped together under the artificial portmanteau heading of *evaluations*, and can be further subdivided into positive and negative evaluations—that is, evaluations in favour of, and against, respectively, whatever is evaluated.

I want to stress that when I say a person has or makes an evaluation of something, one or more of a whole range of different things might be meant, depending on the circumstances. The term ‘evaluation’, as I am using it, is not meant to suggest that the person must make an evaluational judgment, or even that he must have what might be called an evaluational belief. Sometimes the evaluation will be constituted by a conscious judgment or by a belief or assumption, but sometimes not. For example, if *Q* slaps *P* in the face, and *P* becomes angry at this, one would not want to say that *P* judges that *Q*’s action was a bad thing or even that he believes it to be. He may only angrily strike *Q* in return. Still, one wants to say something about *P*’s attitude to *Q*’s act in the evaluational dimension: and whatever the most appropriate locution might be in this case, I think it not wholly unnatural to say, as I do, that it will designate a species of negative evaluation.

Perhaps it strikes you as odd to put together in one class (*viz.* that of evaluations) such widely different things as modes of behaviour, inclinations to them, desires, and conscious judgments. But although they are obviously in many ways quite different, there is one way in which they are intimately connected. Consider, for example, items from the two ends of the scale—namely, modes of behaviour and conscious judgments: the former, I would argue, are natural manifestations of the latter. Animal-protector Paul, angry at two boys for mistreating a dog, rushes at them, tries to drive them off, and so on. Let us suppose that his anger is not blind rage, and that he acts in these ways *because* he makes the evaluational judgment that the boys’ treatment of the dog is wicked. The ‘because’ here makes it look as though Paul’s evaluational judgment and his modes of behaviour are two wholly different things—perhaps because we compare this case to ones like “The penny is flat because the train ran over it” or “The plant is flourishing because Priscilla waters it every day”. But it would be better to compare it rather with cases like “He kicked the ball because he was trying to score a goal”, where the two things mentioned on either side of the ‘because’ are intimately connected. Paul’s behaviour is the natural manifestation of his evaluational judgment, so that there is more than a merely empirical correlation relating them. In the given situation,

any person who believes strongly that the boys' behaviour is wicked would normally act as Paul does, or at least have an inclination to do so ; and if a person's anger is so great that he makes no conscious evaluational judgment or even has no conscious evaluational belief, then when he acts as Paul does, he acts *as if* he made such a judgment or had such a belief. One could almost say that to act as Paul does *is* to think that the boys' treatment of the dog is wicked. And a similar intimate, more than merely empirical, connection can be shown to exist between wants or desires and evaluational beliefs or judgments—between, say, wanting a certain car and thinking that it would be a good thing to have it.

For these reasons, I consider it reasonable to include under the heading "evaluations" such otherwise quite different things as evaluational modes of behaviour, inclinations to them, wants, desires, assumptions, beliefs, and judgments. Some emotions include evaluational beliefs or judgments predominantly—namely, the "calm passions", like envy. Some emotions include desires or wants predominantly—for example, love. And still others—"hot passions", like anger—include actions or inclinations to them, predominantly. But this is naturally only a rough statement ; most emotions, including those just mentioned, very often include evaluational elements of different kinds—*e.g.* anger is often characterized by certain modes of action and by a negative evaluational belief or assumption.

An evaluation requires some "cognition", or, to use the artificial portmanteau term already introduced, some apprehension, on the part of the person who makes the evaluation. Suppose Paul is angry at Johnny because he thinks that something Johnny did was wicked : in order to have that evaluational opinion, he must believe, or know, or assume, and so on—*i.e.* must apprehend—that Johnny did that thing which he considers to be bad. The relation between the evaluation and the apprehension is a logically close one, for the statement of the evaluation entails the statement of the apprehension—the statement that Johnny's act *x* was bad or wicked entails the statement that Johnny performed act *x*. Since, in agent-directed emotions, the statement of this new apprehension specifies something—some act, ability, trait, propensity, condition, or whatever—about the agent that is the object of the emotion, I shall call it, in these cases of agent-directed emotions, *specificatory* apprehension of the object, thus distinguishing it from the general apprehension of the object noted earlier. With non-agent-directed emotions, the distinction between a general apprehension of the object

of the emotion and a specificatory apprehension of it cannot, of course, be made: there is just the apprehension of whatever feature of the situation constitutes the object of the emotion.

At this point, the following objection might be raised against my thesis: "You yourself have already mentioned a clear counterexample to it, namely irrational fear (example (b), p. 331). Consider occurrent fear of falling, for example. I grant that most people who are frightened of falling—when they are, say, walking along a swaying bridge or a narrow ledge high above the ground—apprehend (as you put it) that there is a real possibility that they might fall. But as you yourself said, there is also such a thing as an irrational fear of falling: a person is safe behind strong bars on an obviously secure balcony overlooking the street below, and he admits that there is no chance whatever that he might fall, but he is still frightened of falling. So here is an example of fear of falling in which the apprehension of the object is missing—although its shadow, as it were, is admittedly present, since the person acts *as if* he believed he might fall."

It is difficult to know what one ought to say about cases like these. One might say, for example, that the person described is not really frightened of falling, but is simply nervous or apprehensive. Again, although such a person may hotly deny that he believes he might fall, still a strong case could be made out for the claim that he nevertheless does think he might. His actions, gestures, and facial expressions, for example, are those of a man who thinks that he might fall. On the other hand, it also seems plausible to say that the person does not think that he might fall.

But in any event, two points need to be made—a specific one about this particular case, and a more general one about the sort of view being defended in this paper. The first, and less important, point, is that the artificial expression 'apprehension' was invented to cover a multitude of "modes of awareness", of which belief is only one. My thesis does not require that the man who is afraid of falling must believe that he will fall, or even that he believe he might fall. It is enough if he simply imagines himself falling or perhaps thinks that it is conceivable that he could fall.

The second and more general point is that even if there were, in odd cases like that of irrational fear, no sort of apprehension of the object of the fear, this would not upset my thesis. For I am not suggesting that the features of emotions which I have discussed are essential features of absolutely all emotion-situations, but rather something weaker—namely, that they are characteristic features of emotion-situations. In other words, I claim that these features are present in all the standard or central cases,

but admit that there are peripheral cases of emotion-situations in which one or perhaps two of them are lacking, although of course I would argue that there can be no cases in which they are *all* missing. Irrational fear of falling is a peripheral case of fear of falling, as is witnessed by the very fact that we dub it 'irrational'. It shares most features with the standard cases of such fear, but also differs from them in the one leading respect that the characteristic apprehension of the object is lacking; and it is only in virtue of the shared features that we call it fear of falling. There is doubtless no single feature that is common to all cases of fear or even to all cases of fear of falling, and my thesis is that some mode of apprehension of the object is a feature of most cases of it, including all the normal or central ones, but not that it is necessarily present in all cases.

The same goes for the element of evaluation: there will be non-standard or peripheral cases of emotions of which one might plausibly maintain that the person makes no evaluation. Normally, when *P* hates *Q* for certain things *Q* has done, he thinks that these things are bad, detestable, horrendous, or something of the sort. If he thought that there was nothing whatever wrong with what *Q* has done, he could not, without oddity, hate him for having done those things. If *P* hates *Q* not for anything he has done, but rather for having a holier-than-thou attitude, for example, he then considers *that* to be a bad thing. But there is doubtless such a thing as irrational hatred, wherein a person apparently hates someone *Q* (he acts towards *Q*, let us say, as if he did) and yet does not think, or at least strongly denies that he thinks, that anything *Q* has done or said, or anything he will do or say, or any of his traits, is in any way bad or reprehensible. (But again the shadow, at least, of some such belief is present.) In this case, too, if we describe the person's emotion as one of hatred, we do so because of the many important features it shares with standard cases of hatred: because he acts towards *Q*, for example, as a person who hates *Q* in a standard way might act. (This sort of case, too, is tricky, however. Besides saying that *P* has an irrational hatred of *Q*, there are other ways in which we could describe the situation, depending on the circumstances: (a) "He does not *really* hate *Q*; he only sometimes acts as if he did", (b) "He does not really hate *Q*; but he sometimes gets very annoyed with him", (c) "He instinctively hates *Q* without realising why he does; the truth of the matter is that he subconsciously believes that *Q* has evil designs on his mother, and that's why he hates him.")

I have been maintaining that having some apprehension and

making some evaluation are characteristic features of emotion-situations. Are sensations also characteristic features of them? They certainly exist in many cases of occurrent emotions, and a person with a dispositional emotion often experiences them too. But (a), there may be some "calm passions" which do not normally include any such sensational element. It is not absolutely clear whether hope is an emotion or not, but if it is, it would seem to be one of these: there are not, I think, any characteristic hope-sensations. If *P* hopes that she will come today, he simply believes that she might come, and considers that her coming would be a good thing. He may also experience one or more sensations, but he need not; and even if he does, it is doubtful that they will be any part of his *hope*. Envy, too, seems to be an emotion for which there are no typical sensations.

And (b), even those emotions which do have characteristic sensations—such as fear and anger—sometimes exist without the sensations. For example, if the person's evaluation is strong enough and his reactions violent enough, it may be quite gratuitous to insist that feelings are also present. If *P* comes upon *Q* just as *Q* is setting fire to *P*'s house, and *P* rushes at him in a blind fury, it seems singularly inappropriate to insist that *P* must be having certain sensations. In fact *P*, in such circumstances, probably experiences no sensations of any kind, and yet he is undoubtedly extremely angry. Again, if a person's attention is too strongly diverted to other matters, he might have an emotion without having the sensations or feelings that usually go with that emotion. A young man, *P*, is being interviewed for an important job, and he is extremely anxious to make a good impression. One of the interviewers, *Q*, makes an insulting remark to *P*, and thereafter an observer might detect an icy tone creeping into *P*'s voice when he addresses *Q*, although there are no other signs of anger. The iciness is not intentional, however, and in fact *P* is so intent on following the conversation and on creating a good impression, that he is not even aware of it; and he is certainly too engrossed to experience any feelings of anger. I think we might say, under these circumstances, that *P* was nevertheless angry with *Q*—although this is undoubtedly an odd case, as we should also have to add that he was unaware of it at the time.

From these examples, it would seem that where (a) the existence of certain sensations is a characteristic feature of a given emotion, and (b) those sensations happen to be missing on a particular occasion, there must then on that occasion be some overt action or behaviour, or at least an inclination to overt action or behaviour,

on the person's part if he is to have that emotion—*i.e.* have it in an occurrent sense. And this must surely be true, I think: for if a person neither has any anger-sensations, nor acts angrily, nor even has the slightest inclination to act angrily, there appears to be no sense whatever in which he *is* (occurrently) angry.

Hence it is seen that what holds for the elements of apprehension and evaluation is also true for the element of sensations: they are characteristic features of emotion-situations—although only for some emotions, not for all—not absolutely essential ones, so that there may be occasional emotion-situations which lack them.

The view of the emotions being defended here is easily able to handle the problems which wrecked the Traditional View, namely, those of explaining how emotions can have objects, how a person can have reasons for his emotions, and how an emotion can be criticized as warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable, and so on. On the present view, it is easily understandable how emotions can have objects; because according to it, emotion-situations consist in part of an element of apprehension and an element of evaluation, and these are paradigms of things that have objects. Thus, the emotion is directed towards something in virtue of these constituent elements. I do not mean to suggest that there is no problem whatever as to how certain modes of apprehension (beliefs, for example) and certain sorts of evaluations have objects; but I do not think that they are insoluble, and it would anyway seem to constitute a solution to the problem of how emotions can have objects to show that this problem reduces to that of how such things as beliefs and modes of action have objects.

On the present view of the emotions, it is easy to explain how a person can have reasons for his emotion and how the emotion can be deemed warranted or unwarranted, reasonable or unreasonable, and so on. An emotion-situation consists in part of some apprehension and of an evaluation, and one understands how a person can have reasons for these things. The emotion can be judged reasonable or unreasonable according to whether the apprehensions and evaluations themselves, and their supporting reasons, are so.

A great deal could be said concerning the various different, but related, ways in which emotions can be criticized, but I cannot undertake such a huge task here. I content myself simply with giving examples of some different ways in which a person's agent-directed emotion—anger, say—can be deemed unreasonable, corresponding to the characteristic elements of such an emotion that have been discussed in this section.

(a) *General apprehension of the object.* If a person is angry at the child who broke the vase, his anger is unreasonable if it should be obvious to any sensible observer that there is no such child, and that the vase was knocked over by the banging shutter. The anger is unreasonable in virtue of the person's unreasonable belief or assumption about the existence of the object of his anger.

(b) *Specificatory apprehension of the object.* It is unreasonable to be angry at a child for hurting a dog if it is obvious to any sensible observer that he is not hurting the dog. The anger is unreasonable in virtue of the person's specificatory belief which, in these circumstances, is unreasonable. In cases in which there is at least one reason which supports the apprehension, the anger can be unreasonable if the supporting reason is sufficiently bad. Thus it is unreasonable to be angry at a person for insulting you if your only reason for thinking he did so is the report of an obviously or notoriously unreliable person.

(c) *Evaluation (1).* It is unreasonable to be angry at one's teen-age daughter for wanting to go to a perfectly respectable dance. In this case, it is the evaluation which causes the emotion to be unreasonable: for it is unreasonable to consider that the girl's desire is bad or wicked.

(d) *Evaluation (2).* It is sometimes unreasonable for a person to have too high a degree or too great an intensity of anger. It is, for example, unreasonable for a man to get so angry with his son for disobeying him in some minor matter that he beats him into unconsciousness, or even so angry that he trembles all over and grows quite pale. Here, too, it is the evaluation which accounts for the unreasonableness: it is unreasonable to deem the son's action to be *that* bad.

A note in passing: a case could be made for the claim that when only the general or specificatory apprehension (or the reasons which support it) is at fault, the emotion itself, strictly speaking, is not unreasonable, and that only an unreasonable evaluation can result in the emotion's being so. There is something in this claim: in examples (a) and (b), above, it does at any rate seem more natural to upbraid the angry person by saying something of the form "It is unreasonable to be angry at — when —" than it would be to say "Your anger is unreasonable"; whereas in examples (c), especially, and (d), to a lesser degree, it would be entirely natural to say "Your anger is quite unreasonable".

I have been talking so far as though all emotions could be criticized in the reasonable/unreasonable dimension; but in

fact there is at least one important emotion—love—of which this is not normally true. If Paul loves Suzy, there seems to be no clear sense in which his love might be called reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational, and so on. A love can be unsuitable, dangerous, unfortunate, disastrous, unhealthy, a blessing, and lots of other things, but not, in general, reasonable or unreasonable. To be sure, if a person loves an object that is wildly odd—if he loves, say, his cat (*i.e.* loves it as one person usually loves another) or his mother's shoes—then his love is “sick” or psychotic, and might therefore be called irrational; but within the vast range of cases in which one person loves another, it hardly seems possible to distinguish the reasonable ones from the unreasonable ones—the distinction seems not to apply at all. This strikes one at first as odd, for love and hate are supposed to be opposites, and hatreds can certainly be unreasonable, and very likely reasonable as well. This fact—that loves cannot ordinarily be criticized as reasonable or unreasonable—also appears to be embarrassing to the view of emotions being defended here; for if love, like the other emotions, involves evaluations, why should it not be criticizable in that way?

There is, however, a way of accounting for this otherwise puzzling fact within the framework of the present view of the emotions; this can be done by noting some distinctions amongst different sorts of evaluations involved in emotions of different kinds. The evaluations made by a man in love with a girl are such as these: he wants to be with her all the time, he wants her to be healthy and happy, he wants to embrace her and give her presents, he wants her to love him in return—and so on. The significant feature, for us, of these evaluations is that they are, in a manner of speaking, indefensible: for in them, something is deemed good in itself. The man in love wants, for example, to be with his beloved; and he wants this simply because he enjoys her company for its own sake—there is no reason for it, he just wants to be with her. This does not mean that if he were asked “Why do you want to be with her all the time?”, he could not give any answer at all. He could specify which of her qualities makes being with her a pleasure: “Because she is so witty (kind, intelligent, imaginative).” But such a reply obviously does not give the whole story, nor even the heart of it: it is an answer which a person might give in public when he does not wish to reveal his deeper feelings. It may be a complete answer to the question “Why do you like her?” or “Why do you enjoy talking with her?” or “Why do you enjoy going out with her?”, but not to the question “Why do you want to be with her all the

time ?"—at least, not when the person addressed is in love with the girl. For him, the only really honest answer, finally, is either no answer—*e.g.* "Because I just do"—or one which merely rules out other possible reasons that there might be, but does not itself give a reason—for example, "Because I love her". "Because I love her" rules out ulterior reasons altogether—for instance, that he is after her money, or that he avidly wants to learn about ants, a subject on which she is an acknowledged authority; and it also rules out the primacy of such non-ulterior reasons as "Because she is witty". It says, in effect, that in the final analysis there just is no reason, and that he simply *does* want to be with her all the time.

This explains why a person's love of another, like his preference for chocolate over vanilla ice-cream, cannot be adjudged reasonable or unreasonable; because it includes evaluations for which, in the end and in the nature of the case, there can be, within wide limits, neither standards of criticism nor justifying reasons.

Most other emotions—including hate—differ from love in this respect. The evaluations made by a man *P* who hates his neighbour *Q* are such as these: (*a*) he wants to avoid *Q*; he wishes to see him come to grief; when he meets him, he has an inclination to say rude things to him—and so on. And he does so, normally, because (*b*) he thinks or knows or assumes—*i.e.* apprehends—that *Q* has done something which *P* considers to be evil against him, or that *Q* has what *P* deems to be a despicable character, or something of the sort. Unlike love-evaluations, none of these hate-evaluations is a straightforward evaluation of something as good (or evil, for that matter) in itself. And there are generally accepted standards by which they can be judged: for example, when it is known what *Q*'s actions have been, there would be general agreement, on the part of disinterested observers, as to whether or not *Q* had done something *evil* against *P*, and if so, as to how bad, how serious, it was. This means that a man's hatred, unlike his love, can be deemed reasonable or unreasonable.

III

I want now to say something about the various uses of emotion words, for I consider it to be a major point in support of my thesis concerning the emotions that it explains the possibility of these uses.

We tend to have much too restricted a notion of the use of words in general, and of emotion words in particular. As Wittgenstein says, ". . . We think of the utterance of an emotion as though it were some artificial device to let others know that

we have it.”¹ Certainly the Traditional View would have us think so. But in fact there are many occasions on which we use emotion words to perform jobs other than reporting our inward state. Consider, for example, the following first-person locutions: ‘I am afraid that —’, ‘I fear that —’, ‘I am sorry to say that —’, ‘I am ashamed to admit that —’, and ‘I am embarrassed to report that —’. One of the speech acts a speaker performs in using these locutions is that of asserting whatever follows ‘that’. But there is for our purposes a more important speech act performed as well, namely that of indicating the speaker’s attitude towards, or evaluation of, whatever is the object of the assertion. For example, if I say “I am afraid that the men trapped in the mine are lost”, I assert (more or less cautiously, depending on the circumstances) that the men trapped in the mine are lost, and, in addition, I signal or indicate that I consider this to be an unfortunate state of affairs.² What I do not do is state that I am having certain sensations—*e.g.* a sinking sensation in my stomach or cold thrills along my spine: I may have no such sensations whatever, and still not be in the least hypocritical or deceptive in asserting what I do. If I believe that the trapped men are not lost, or if, believing them lost, I do not genuinely consider their plight to be an unfortunate thing, then I can be charged with dishonesty, hypocrisy, or insincerity, but not if I have no sensations characteristic of being frightened.

This use of emotion words is at least partially explained by my thesis that an evaluation is one feature of having an emotion. Since part of being afraid (frightened) that something will happen is that one considers that thing to be bad or unfortunate, it is only to be expected that when a speaker says “I am afraid that the men trapped in the mine are lost”, he indicates that he considers this to be an unfortunate state of affairs.

In the examples of the use of emotion words just cited, the speech act of asserting what follows the ‘that’ is at least as important as the speaker’s indicating his attitude towards, or evaluation of, whatever is the object of the assertion. But there are many other cases in which this second linguistic job becomes the important one—becomes indeed the whole point of making the utterance. This would almost always be true when the following utterances are made: “I am very angry with you”,

¹ *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 103.

² Bedford makes essentially the same point (*op. cit.*, pp. 292–295.) For an excellent account of this use of emotion words, see J. O. Urmson “Parenthetical Verbs” in *MIND*, lxi (1952), 480–496, reprinted in A. Flew (ed.) *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*. My own discussion here is greatly indebted to Urmson’s.

“I am overjoyed at the news of your success”, “I am ashamed of what I did”, “I resent that remark”, “I am disgusted with your behaviour”, “I am proud of your performance”, and “I hate you”. The primary job performed by the speaker in making these utterances is normally that of indicating his attitude toward, or evaluation of, whatever it is that is being referred to. Thus to say “I am angry with you” is normally to indicate that one considers what the hearer did to be a bad thing—it may thus be to scold or upbraid the hearer. To say “I am overjoyed at the news of your success” is normally to indicate that one considers the news to be good—it may thus be to congratulate the hearer. To say “I am ashamed of what I did” is normally to indicate that one considers what one did to be very bad—if the hearer is the offended party, it may thus be to apologize for having done it.

To construe these utterances as statements of fact, as reports of one’s inward state, as the Traditional View would lead us to do, is normally to miss their point—or, if done deliberately, it is to be rude, sarcastic, funny, or something of the sort. For example, if someone says “I resent that remark”, it would doubtless be impertinent to answer “That’s false: you are experiencing no such emotion (feeling)”. Again, one would merely be impudent or sarcastic if to the utterance “I am very angry with you”, he were to reply as follows: “Very interesting. When did these feelings begin? Do you think they will pass away soon? Try to overcome them; I know how unpleasant they can be.” On the other hand, the replies “What have I done that is so bad?”, or “You shouldn’t be angry at me for that; it was just a harmless prank”, or “I am sorry: I admit I behaved very badly” are entirely appropriate.

I do not wish to assert that it is always the case that whenever a person makes one of the listed utterances, he performs the speech act indicated: for example that whenever someone says “I am angry with you”, he is always upbraiding the hearer. On the contrary, I think it is certainly true that “I am angry with you”, in some contexts, is merely a report of the speaker’s feelings or state of mind (although I think that even in such cases, the statement might sometimes be true in the absence of any sensations). And there may be still other uses of these words as well.¹ But it seems equally clear that these sentences are used and, I should think, most commonly used, to perform the speech

¹ Wittgenstein’s view, for example, is that to say “I am angry with you” is, in many cases, to engage in learned anger behaviour: it is like snarling or baring one’s teeth. This is a use of emotion words which I do not consider in this paper. I think this view has much to recommend it,

acts I have indicated—to upbraid the hearer, to congratulate the hearer, and so on. And the point I wish to make here is that my thesis about emotions explains the possibility of these speech acts: because if an emotion includes an evaluational element, then one would expect emotion words to have these uses. For example, if to *be* angry with someone for having done something is, in part at least, to consider that his doing it was something bad, then we should expect that to *say* to the culprit that one is angry with him would be (at least in part) to voice or express this belief—*i.e.* to claim that his action was bad, and thus to upbraid the hearer.

The foregoing account of utterances like “I am very angry with you for doing that” is incomplete in a way which is not directly relevant to the purposes of this paper, but which should perhaps be remarked. Even in those cases in which this sentence is used to upbraid the hearer, it is normally used to do something else as well. A speaker can upbraid his hearer in many ways for having done something bad: for example, he might say “That was a very naughty thing to do”. One difference between the use of this impersonal locution, in which there is no overt reference to the speaker, and the use of the personal “I am very angry”-locution, is that in the latter, the speaker not only upbraids the hearer, but also indicates that he has taken offence at what the hearer did, and that he “holds it against him”. Thus, a perfectly natural reply to the remark “I am very angry with you for doing that” would be “Don’t hold it against me: I didn’t mean any harm by it” or “I didn’t mean to offend (displease) you.” Similarly, “I am not angry with you any more” is normally a remark of reconciliation, not a report of the cessation of anger feelings or sensations.

To conclude, I should like to mention an additional advantage of the general thesis about emotions that has been defended here: on this view, it becomes a little easier to understand how one’s reason can control one’s emotions. For one thing, we understand fairly well how reason can control evaluations and some kinds of apprehensions, *e.g.* beliefs, and these are, according to the present view, important constituents of emotion-situations. On this view, too, it is easy to see how emotions can vary in intensity with changes in one’s knowledge or beliefs. For example, if I am at first angry at someone for having done something, and later

especially as applied to such utterances as “I love you”. Wittgenstein also realizes that in certain contexts, these same remarks may serve quite different functions, *e.g.* to describe one’s inward state. (See *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 187–189.)

learn that what he did was entirely justified, then I shall almost certainly no longer be angry with him. I cannot normally be angry with a person for doing something if I think that what he did was perfectly proper in every respect. Hence, a change in knowledge can, by itself, result in the restraint or the removal of an emotion, and on my thesis this is readily understandable. On the Traditional View, it is difficult to understand how reason or changes in one's beliefs or knowledge can have the slightest effect on an emotion.

Hume, who defends the Traditional View, does not flinch from its consequences on this point. He asserts that reason cannot cause, restrain, or remove an emotion, any more than it can do so with a pain, a tickle, or an ache. He says: "Reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any . . . affection" (*Treatise*, Book III, Part I, Sect. 1, p. 458 of the Selby-Bigge edition). But this conclusion just shows once again how very wrong the Traditional View of the emotions is.

It seems to me that the fundamental mistake committed by the defenders of the Traditional View is this: confronted with the words 'anger', 'fear', and the rest, they ask "What do these words stand for? What exactly are anger and fear? What is their essence?" Narrowing down their attention further and further, like the closing of the aperture of a lens, they finally focus on the feelings or sensations, and think they have found what they have been seeking. But their pleasure must be short-lived, for they are confronted at once with unanswerable questions: How can these things have objects? How can they be reasonable or unreasonable? They are like men who, in the search for the real artichoke, strip it of its leaves (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, sect. 164): whatever they end up with, it is not the real thing and it is not enough. What I have tried to do in this paper is to keep the entire emotion-situations in view, and then to discover what the characteristic features of these situations are. To ask the question "Yes, but are these features actually parts of the emotion itself or are they mere accompaniments of it?" is to go wrong from the start, as the Traditional View does: it is to assume that there is something which is the essential anger or fear and to which therefore these elements or features either belong or do not belong. I have tried to show that if we look at the total situations in which emotion words are applicable, the characteristic features of these situations show with abundant clarity how emotions can have objects and how they can be reasonable or unreasonable.

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