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<th>Academy</th>
<th>Peripat.</th>
<th>Pyrrhonists</th>
<th>Stoics</th>
<th>Epicureans</th>
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<tr>
<td>c. 347: Plato dies, succeeded by Speusippus</td>
<td>344: Zeno born</td>
<td>c. 341: Epicurus born</td>
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<td>c. 339: Speusippus dies, succeeded by Xenocrates</td>
<td>c. 334-c. 324: Pyrrho and Annarchus in East with Alexander</td>
<td>c. 318: studies under Pamphilus</td>
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<td>314: Xenocrates dies, succeeded by Polemo</td>
<td>c. 357: Timon born</td>
<td>c. 321: studies under Nausiphanes</td>
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<td>c. 293: Arcesilaus arrives in Athens</td>
<td>c. 311-310: sets up schools in Mytilene and Lamprocus</td>
<td>307: founds Garden in Athens</td>
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<td>c. 276: Polemo dies, succeeded by Crates</td>
<td>c. 297: Zeno lives in Athens, and in the following years studies under Crates (Cynic), Silpo, Polemo, Diodorus Cronus</td>
<td>Colotes fl. c. 310-320</td>
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<td>c. 273: Crates dies, succeeded by Arcesilaus and Antisthenes who institutes skepticism</td>
<td>c. 271: Epicurus dies, succeeded by Hermaicus</td>
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<td>244: Arcesilaus dies, succeeded by Lacydes</td>
<td>258: Zeno dies; succeeded by Cleantus</td>
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<td>c. 235: Timon dies</td>
<td>Sphantus, fl. c. 240-270</td>
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<td>c. 219: Carnesius born</td>
<td>c. 232: Cleantus dies, succeeded by Chrysippus</td>
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<td>(?) Carnesius becomes head of Academy</td>
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<td>153: Carnesius on embassy to Rome with Peripatetic Crito and Stoic Diogenes</td>
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<td>c. 152: Diogenes dies, succeeded by Antipater</td>
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<td>c. 149: Antipater dies, succeeded by Panaetius</td>
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<td>c. 106: Chrysippus dies, succeeded by Zeno of Tarsus</td>
<td>109: Panaetius dies</td>
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<tr>
<td>(?) Zeno dies, succeeded by Diogenes of Babylon</td>
<td>Zeno of Sidon, c. 135-126 B.C.</td>
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<td>c. 132: Diogenes dies</td>
<td>Demetrius Lacon, younger contemporary of Zeno</td>
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<td>80-45 B.C.</td>
<td>Philodorus, fl. 80-</td>
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<td>c. 53 B.C.: Lucretius writes De rerum natura</td>
<td>45 B.C.</td>
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<td>47-46: most of Cicero’s philosophical works written</td>
<td>Agrippa (1st cent. A.D.)</td>
<td>Seneca Empiricus, fl. 1st A.D.</td>
<td>Epicurus, 1st A.D.</td>
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(1) Now, if someone thinks that nothing is known, one thing he doesn't know is whether that can be known, since he admits to knowing nothing. I shall therefore not bother to argue my case against this man who has himself stood with his own head in his footprints. (2) And anyway, even allowing that he knows this, I'll still ask him: given that he has never before seen anything true in the world, from where does he get his knowledge of what knowing and not knowing are? What created his preconception of true and false? And what proved to him that doubtfully differs from certainty? (3) You will find that the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted. (4) For something of greater reliability must be found, something possessing the intrinsic power to convict falsehoods with truths. Well, what should be considered to have greater reliability than the senses? (5) Will reason have the power to contradict them, if it is itself the product of false sensation? For reason is in its entirety the product of the senses, so that if the senses are not true all reason becomes false as well. (6) Or will the ears have the power to confute the senses, and touch to confute the ears? Or again, will this sense of touch be denounced by the mouth's taste, confused by the nose, or convicted by the eyes? That is not, in my view, the way things are. For each has its own separate capacity and its own power, thus making it necessary that sensing what is soft, cold or hot be a separate operation from sensing the various colours of things and seeing whatever properties regularly accompany colours. Likewise the mouth's taste has: separate power, the recognition of smells is separate, and separate again that of sounds. It necessarily follows that the senses cannot convict each other. (7) Nor, again, will they be able to confute themselves, since all will always have to be considered of equal reliability. (8) Hence whatever impression the senses get at any time is true. (9) Even if reason fails to explain why things which proved square when close up seem round at a distance, it is nevertheless better, when one's reason proves inadequate, to give wrong explanations of the respective shapes, than to let the self evident slip from one's grasp and thus to violate the primary guarantee and shake the entire foundations on which life and survival rest. (10) For not only would all reason cave in, but life itself would instantly collapse if you lost the confidence to trust your senses, and to avoid precipices and other such hazards while aiming towards things of the opposite kind.

(1) denique nil sciri sibi quiput, id quoque nescit
an sciri posset, quoniam nil scire factur.
hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam,
qui capite ipse suo in statut vestibig sese.
(3) et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum
queram, cum in rebus veri nil viderit ante,
unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire vicissim,
notitiem veri quae res falsque crearet
et dubium certo quae res differe probari.
(5) invinies primis ab sensibus esse creatam
notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli.
(7) nam maiore fide debet reprehendere, an auras
tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris,
an confutabunt nares occulte revincent
non, ut opinor, ita est. nam sorsum cuique potestas
divisat, su a vis cuiquest, ideoque necesse est
et quod molle sit et gelidum fervescit seorsum
et sorsum varius rerum sentire colores
et quaeque coloribi' sint coniuncta videre.
sorsus item sapor oris habit vim, sorsus odores

noscuntur, sorsum sonitus, ideoque necesse est
non possint alios ali convincere sensus.
(9) nec porro poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese,
aqua fides quoniam debet semper haber.
(11) proinde quod in quoquest ait visum tempore, verumst.
(13) eti non poterit ratio dissolvcre causam,
cur ea quae fuerint iuxtum quadrata, procul sint
visa turund, tamen praestat rationem egentem
reddere mendo causa utriusque figurae,
quam manibus manifesta suis emittere quoquam
et violare fidem primam et convellere tota
fundamenta quibus nixatur vita salutique.
(15) non modo enim ratio naut omnis, vita quoque ipsa
concitat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus alius
precipitasse locos vitare et cetera quae sint
in genere hoc fugienda, sequi contraria quae sint.
(1) All sensation, he [Epicurus] says, is irrational and does not accommodate memory. (2) For neither is it moved by itself, nor when moved by something else is it able to add or subtract anything. (3) Nor does there exist that which can refute sensations: (4) neither can like sensations refute like, because of their equal validity; (5) nor unlike, since they are not discriminatory of the same things; (6) nor can reason, since all reason depends on the senses; (7) nor can one individual sensation refute another, since they all command our attention. (8) And also the fact of sensory recognitions confirms the truth of sensations. (9) And our seeing and hearing are facts, just as having a pain is. (10) Hence sign-inferences about the non-evident should be made from things evident.

(1) Epicurus used to say that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existent and like the thing which moves the sense; (2) and that those who say that some impressions are true but others false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence. (3) At any rate, in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being moved by the images, was true, in that the images objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held a false opinion.

(1) When we see from far off the square towers of a city, the reason why they often seem round is that any corner is seen as blunted from a distance, or rather is not seen at all, its impact fading away and failing to complete the passage to our eyes, because during the images’ travel through a large expanses of air the corner is forced to become blunt by the air’s repeated buffettings. Thus, when all the corners simultaneously escape our sensation, it becomes as if the stone structures are being smoothed on a lathe. (2) They are not, however, like things genuinely round seen close-to, but seem to resemble them a little in a shadowy sort of way.
7. Lucretius 1.379-86

nec tenem hic oculos falli concedimus hilum.
nam quomque loco sit lux atque umbra tueri illorum est; cadam vero sinit lumina necere,
umbraque quae fuit hic eadem nunc transact illuc, an potius fiat paulo quod diximus ante,
hoc animi demum ratio discernere debet,
 nec possunt oculi naturam noscre rerum.
proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adstringere nolit.

Nor in this [shadow illusions] do we admit that the eyes are in any way deceived. For their function is to see where light and shade are. But whether or not it is the same light, and whether the shadow that was here is the same one as is passing over there, or whether rather it happens in the way we said a moment ago, this falls to the mind’s reason to discern. The eyes cannot discover the nature of things. So do not trump up this charge against the eyes, for a fault which belongs to the mind.
(1) Thus Epicurus, in the *Κατά Πολυάριθμον* ("Yardstick"), says that sensations, preconceptions and feelings are the criteria of truth. (2) The Epicureans add the "focusings of thought into an impression".

So we should pay heed to those feelings which are present in us, and to our sensations—universal sensations for universal matters, particular ones for particular matters—and to all self-evidence which is present by virtue of each of the discriminatory faculties.

If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken.

(1) First, then, Herodotus, we must grasp the things which underlie words, so that we may have them as a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlelement, and not have everything undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs, or have words which are empty. For the primary concept corresponding to each word must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are going to have a reference point for matters of inquiry, puzzlelement and opinion. (2) Second, we should observe everything in the light of our sensations, and in general in the light of our present focusings of thought or of any of our discriminatory faculties, and likewise also in the light of the feelings which exist in us, in order to have a basis for sign-inferences about evidence yet awaited and about the non-evident.

(1) Preconception, they [the Epicureans] say, is as it were a perception, or correct opinion, or conception, or universal 'stored notion' (i.e. memory), of that which has frequently become evident externally: e.g. "Such and such a kind of thing is a man." (2) For as soon as the word 'man' is uttered, immediately its delineation also comes to mind by means of preconception, since the senses give the lead. (3) Thus what primarily underlies each name is something self-evident. (4) And what we inquire about we would not have inquired about if we had not had prior knowledge of it. For example: 'Is what's standing over there a horse or a cow?' For one must at some time have come to know the form of a horse and that of a cow by means of preconception. (5) Nor would we have named something if we had not previously learnt its delineation by means of preconception. (6) Thus preconceptions are self-evident. (7) And opinion depends on something prior and self-evident, which is our point of reference when we say, e.g., 'How do we know if this is a man?'
(1) Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, some are true, some false. True are those attested and those uncontested by self-evidence; false are those contested and those unattested by self-evidence. (2) Attestation is perception through a self-evident impression of the fact that the object of opinion is such as it was believed to be. For example, if Plato approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But when he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the gap is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself. (1) Non-contestation is for that which is evident from the non-evident thing posited and believed. For example, Epicurus, in saying that there is void, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not to be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a result of everything's being full and solid. Therefore the non-evident thing believed is uncontested by that which is evident, since there is motion. (4) Contestation, on the other hand, something which conflicts with non-contestation. For it is the elimination of that which is evident by the positing of the non-evident thing. For example, the Stoic says that void does not exist, judging something non-evident; but once this is posited about it, that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist necessarily motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated. (5) Likewise, too, non-contestation is opposed to attestation, being confrontation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be. For example, someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the gap is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. That is what non-contestation is like; the thing believed was not attested by the evident. (6) Hence attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something's being true, while non-contestation and contestation are the criterion of its being false. And self-evidence is the foundation and basis of everything. (1) Opinion they also call 'supposition', and they say that it is true an false. If it is attested or uncontrasted, it is true; if it is unattested or contested, it comes out false. (2) Hence their introduction of 'that which is awaited' – for example, waiting and getting near the tower an learning how it appears from near by. 

sunt aliquot quoque res quorum unam dicere causam non satis est, verum pluris, unde una tamen sit; corpus ut examinum siquid proculi ipse iacere conspicis homini, sit ut omnis dicere causam conveniat leiti, dicitur ut illius una. nam neque cum ferro nec frigore vincere possis interisse neque a morbo neque forte vencio, verum aliqua genere esse ex hoc quod contigit ei

There are also a number of things of which it is not enough to name a cause, but rather many causes, one of which in a manner will however be the act one – just as, if you were yourself to see at a distance the dead body of a man, it would be appropriate to list all the causes of death, so as to inclu the specific cause of his death. For you would not be able to establish if he had died by the sword, from cold, from disease, or by poison; yet you know that it was something of this kind that happened to him. A likewise in many other matters we are in a position to say the sam
Who attack sign-inference by similarity do not notice the difference between the aforesaid [senses of 'in so far as'], and how we establish the 'in so far as' premise, such as, for instance, that man in so far as he is man is mortal. (2) For we establish the necessary connection of this fact from that the very fact that it has been an observed concomitant of all the instances which we have encountered, especially as we have met a variety of animals belonging to the same type while differing from each other in all other respects all share such-and-such common characteristics. (3) Thus we say that man, in so far as and in that he is man, is mortal, because we have encountered a wide variety of men: without ever finding any variation in this kind of accidental attribute, or anything that draws us towards the opposite view. (4) So this is the method on which the establishment of the premise rests, both for this issue and for the others in which we apply the 'in so far as' and 'in that' construction—the peculiar connexion being indicated by the fact that the one thing is the inseparable and necessary concomitant of the other. (5) The same is not true in the case of what is established merely by the elimination of a sign. But even in these cases, it is the fact that all the instances which we have encountered have this as their concomitant that does the job of confirmation. For it is from the fact that all familial moving objects, having while other differences, have it in common that their motion is through empty spaces, that we conclude the same to be without exception true also in things non-evident. And our reason for contending that if there is not, or has not been, fire, smoke should be eliminated, is that smoke has been seen in all cases without exception to be a secretion from fire. (6) Another error which they make is in not noticing our procedure of establishing that no obstacle arises through things evident. For the existence of chance and of that which depends on us is not sufficient ground for accepting the minimal swerves of atoms: it is necessary to show in addition, that nothing else self-evident conflicts with the thesis.