

Greek Anaphora in Cross-Linguistic Perspective*

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Abstract

The Homeric and Classical Greek systems of referentially dependent pronouns support an approach to binding and anaphoric reference which characterizes pronouns by two cross-classifying features, which specify the maximal domain in which their antecedent must be located, and whether they can overlap in reference with a coargument (Kiparsky 2002). By treating reflexivity as a special case of referential dependency, this approach predicts a class of referentially dependent non-reflexive anaphors, or DISCOURSE ANAPHORS, whose characteristic is that they need not have a structural antecedent but can serve as reflexives in contexts where a dedicated reflexive is unavailable. This class is instantiated in the Greek clitic anaphors *é*, *é*, *ó*, *μ*ν. It also predicts a class of reflexive pronouns which must be disjoint in reference from a coargument, attested in Homeric Greek as the bare reflexive *é*-. Greek also gives some support to the BLOCKING principle, which dictates the use of the most restricted pronoun available in a given context. The proposal is compared to the well-known theory of Reinhart & Reuland (1993) on the basis of Greek as well as Germanic (Swedish, German, Dutch, Frisian, Old English), and is shown to provide a better answer to the challenge raised by Evans & Levinson (2009).

Keywords

Binding Theory; anaphora; obviation; disjoint reference; Classical Greek; Homeric Greek

1. Three Types of Anaphors

1.1. Introduction

The referentially dependent pronouns of Homeric and Classical Greek are typologically commonplace, but pose challenges to theories of binding and anaphoric reference. Instead of a single anaphor category posited in classical Binding Theory, or the two types that Reinhart & Reuland (1993) call SE- and SELF-anaphors, Greek distinguishes three types. Anaphors of the third type, which I'll

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
refer to as DISCOURSE ANAPHORS, are well known from a large number of other languages (English, German, Turkish, Modern Greek, Fijian, Malay, Manam, among others). Yet they have caused a lot of theoretical trouble, as well summarized in Cole, Hermon & Huang 2006. Because they need not have a structural antecedent, they have been variously treated as pronominals or logophors. However, they differ from pronominals in that they serve as true reflexive anaphors whenever a dedicated reflexive is either lacking in the language altogether, or prohibited by some constraint in a given environment. I show this for Greek in this section and in section 4 below. And, as I show in section 5, they are quite unlike logophoric pronouns or logophoric uses of reflexives, which could plausibly be assigned to the theory of discourse. It follows that no binding theory that equates them to pronominals—including even the sophisticated theory of Reinhart & Reuland 1993 and Reuland 2001—can provide a coherent account of the discourse anaphors, and that they also cannot be separated from sentence grammar without loss of generality, despite the methodological convenience and/or theoretical motivation that such a segregation of sentence grammar and discourse may have in other areas. Rather, they must belong in the province of a theory of anaphora and pronominal reference that deals with both sentence structure and the organization of discourse. In addition, I argue that the relation of referential dependency to ϕ -feature composition and accentual properties is more complex than has been thought.

My analysis builds on an earlier effort (Kiparsky 2002) to develop a parametric theory of pronouns, which has turned out to apply well to Greek.¹ The descriptive generalizations for Homeric and Classical Greek are set forth in the remainder of this section, followed by a comparison of theoretical approaches in sections 2 and 3. The heart of the argument is in sections 3.2, 4, and 5.

To keep things straight, I'll use ANAPHOR as a collective term for any referentially dependent expression, reserving REFLEXIVE for those anaphors which require a structural antecedent. Anaphors and PRONOMINALS (referentially independent pronouns) together comprise the category of PRONOUNS. Descriptively, the taxonomy that has to be made theoretical sense of looks like this:²

¹) In addition to trawling the texts on Perseus, I consulted the very thorough monograph of Petit (1999) for Homeric Greek reflexives, and Powell (1933, 1934) for Herodotus and Thucydides. I also learned a lot from Peels' (2008) perceptive study of long-distance reflexives in Herodotus, which Eric Reuland kindly brought to my attention.

²) In Kiparsky 2002 I posited an additional intermediate domain, largely for the sake of certain super-long-distance reflexives that can apparently allow an antecedent outside of their finite clause. I now think the class of reflexives in question might be a heterogeneous mix of discourse anaphors and logophors; in any case they will not play a role in the present discussion.



1.2. Homeric Greek

In Homeric Greek, BARE REFLEXIVES bear case, person, and number features. The third person singular bare reflexive is made from the pronominal stem $\acute{\epsilon}$ -. Sg.Gen. $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma$, οὖ, Sg.Acc. $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\epsilon}$, $\acute{\epsilon}$, Sg.Dat. οἱ. The plural forms in $\sigma\varphi$ -, and the first and second person forms, are shared with the personal pronouns, e.g. (2f). The reflexives require a subject antecedent (overt or null) within the same finite domain, either in the same clause, as in (2a,b,c), or across an infinitive clause boundary, either ECM as in (2d,f,g), or object control as in (2h). The same antecedent requirement holds for the reflexive possessive $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\gamma}$, $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omicron}\nu$, which agrees with the head in gender, case, and number, like an adjective (see (2c)).³

BARE REFLEXIVES: finite domain

- (2) a. $\delta\iota$ γάρ αὖτε βίην οὖ_i πατρός ἀμείνων
 he Prt for might-ACC Refl-GEN father-GEN stronger-NOM
 for he_i is mightier than his_i father Il. 1.404
- b. ἀμφὶ $\acute{\epsilon}$ παπτήνας
 around him peer-PART
 glancing warily around **him** Il. 15.574, 4.497
- c. τότε δὲ Ζεὺς_i Ἑκτορ_j δῶκεν ἦ_j κεφαλῇ φορέειν
 then Prt Zeus Hector-DAT give-AOR3SG PossRefl-FDAT head-FDAT wear-INF
 but then Zeus_i gave it (the helmet) to Hector_j (for him_j) to wear on his_j head Il. 16.800
- d. οὖ τινά φησιν ὅμοιον οἱ $\acute{\epsilon}$ μεναι Δαναῶν
 not anyone-ACC say-3SG equal-ACC Refl-3SGDAT be-INF Danaans-PLGEN
 he claims none of the Danaans to be equal to **him** Il. 9.305–306
- e. ἀσπίδα ταυρείην σχέθ³ ἀπὸ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma$
 shield.F-ACC bull-hided.F-ACC hold-AOR3SG from Refl-GEN
 he held the shield of bull's hide away from **him** Il. 13.163

³) To save space, I omit the unmarked categories Nominative, Masculine, and Singular in glossing nouns and adjectives, and Present, Active, Indicative in glossing verbs. Verb forms which are morphologically middle but semantically active are glossed as “DEP[ONENT]”.

- f. ἐμέ φημι πολὺ προφερέστερον εἶναι
me-ACC say-1SG much better-ACC be-Inf
I declare that I am best by far. *Od.* 8.221
- g. φησι ἐέ δ' ἔξοχα πάντων ἀθανάτων κεχολῶσθαι
say-3SG Refl-ACC Prt especially all-PLGEN immortal-PLGEN be angry-PERFINF
[Zeus] says that of all the immortals he is especially enraged *Il.* 24.134
- h. ἧι τ' ἐκέλευσεν ἔοι μνήσασθαι ἀνάγκη
which Prt urge-AOR3SG Refl-GEN remind-AORINF necessity-DAT
[nothing is worse than a belly] which forces one to remember it *Od.* 7.217

If the reflexive is a COARGUMENT of the antecedent, it must be reinforced by αὐτό- 'self', inflected for gender, case, and number. The two words form a phrasal COMPLEX REFLEXIVE, which can be syntactically separated by clitics. αὐτό- must also be added to the 1/2 person pronouns in their reflexive use, as in (3d).

COMPLEX REFLEXIVES: coargument domain

- (3) a. ἐέ δ' αὐτόν ἐποτρύνει μαχέσασθαι
Refl-ACC Prt self-ACC rouse-3SG fight-AORINF
and he rouses himself to fight *Il.* 20.171
- b. πορφυρέη νεφέλη πυκάσασα ἔ αὐτήν
purple-FDAT cloud.F-DAT cover-AORPARTF Refl-ACC self-FACC
covering herself in a purple cloud *Il.* 17.551
- c. ἀμυνόμενοι σφῶν τ' αὐτῶν
defend-MIDPART Refl-PLGEN and self-PLGEN
and defending themselves *Il.* 12.155
- d. σέ γάρ αὐτήν παντί ἔισκεις
you-2SGACC for self.F-ACC all-DAT make-like
for you make yourself look like everything (you take any shape you want) *Od.* 13.313
- e. εὖ ἐντύνασαν ἔ αὐτήν
well prepare-AORPARTF-ACC Refl-ACC self-F.ACC
having well prepared herself *Il.* 14.162
- f. οἷ τ' αὐτῷ κῦδος ἄροιτο
Refl-DAT and self-DAT glory.N-ACC win-AOROPT3SG
and to whoever would win glory for himself *Il.* 10.307

The clitics ἐο, ἐ, οἷ—identical to the bare reflexives ἔο, ἔ, οἷ except for being unaccented—refer to a discourse topic. Being referentially dependent, they cannot be used deictically, nor can they head restrictive relative clauses. But unlike reflexives, they do not require a structural antecedent.

DISCOURSE ANAPHORS

- (4) a. σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦεν ὄλεθρος
near Prt him-DAT was ruin
[Context: Zeus_i gave it to Hector_j,] yet his_j ruin was near (continuation of (2c))
Il. 16.800

- b. ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος
 which-FACC by divination.F-ACC which-FACC him-DAT give-AOR3SG Phoebus
 Ἄπόλλων
 Apollo
 [Calchas, who had guided the ships] by the art of divination which Phoebus Apollo had
 given him Il. 1.72
- c. ἀτασθαλίαι δέ οἱ οἶῶ ἐχθραὶ ἔσαν
 reckless deeds.F-Pl Prt him-DAT alone-DAT hateful-FPl were-IMP3PL
 [Context: Leiodes arose.] Reckless deeds were hateful only to him. Il. 21.146
- d. μισθός δέ οἱ ἄρκιος ἔσται.
 reward Prt him-DAT certain be-DEPFUT3SG
 [Context: Who is there who would promise me this deed and and accomplish it for a
 great gift?] His reward will be certain. Il. 10.304

Unlike anaphors, PRONOMINALS are referentially independent. They can introduce a new discourse topic (though they need not do so), require no antecedent, and can be used deictically and as heads of restrictive relative clauses.

Each of the three types of Homeric anaphor has numerous parallels in familiar languages. Bare reflexives are SE-anaphors in the sense of Reinhart & Reuland 1993, comparable to Dutch *zich* and Swedish *sig*. The complex reflexives are what R&R call SELF-anaphors; Homeric ἐξ αὐτόν (later Greek ἐαυτόν) are analogous to Dutch *zichzelf* and Swedish *sig själv*; in fact, the second component αὐτό- also functions outside of the pronominal system as an “emphatic” predicate of identity, e.g. αὐτόν βασιλεῖα ‘the king himself’ (Il. 7.179), just as *själv* does. As for discourse anaphors, though not as highly profiled in Germanic, they are represented by English *it* (as opposed to *he*, *she*, which are pronominals). Another well-known example is German *er*, *sie*, which behave like discourse anaphors when referring to inanimates and like pronominals when referring to animates. The ones that also function reflexively, such as Old English *hine*, are more famous because they pose a more obvious puzzle for binding theories; we will investigate a selection of them below and show that they have analogs in Greek.

Note that discourse anaphors cannot be directly equated with the category of “weak pronouns” introduced by Cardinaletti & Starke (1996). The three-way classification proposed by these authors is based on different criteria than mine, which overlap in some respects but do not directly relate to binding properties. In particular, I show in Kiparsky 2002 that Old English *hine*, both in its reflexive uses and its non-reflexive uses, can appear in “strong” positions, as under contrastive stress.

It is also worth repeating that not all discourse anaphors are actually used reflexively. For example, English *it* is not. In virtue of blocking, the potential reflexive function of a discourse anaphor is only manifested in environments

where a reflexive pronoun is not available. It is manifested across the board in those languages that lack a special class of reflexive pronouns altogether. This “elsewhere” behavior of pronouns has been noticed by several researchers (Pica 1987, Bouchard 1983:58 ff., Burzio 1989, 1996, 1998, 2010, Déchaine & Manfredi 1994). My claim is that *only* the specific class of pronouns I am calling discourse anaphors can function as reflexives in this way, and that their reflexive function is constrained by the principle that more specific (restricted) anaphors BLOCK less specific ones within an extended binding domain hierarchy, due to their greater faithfulness/informativity.

This approach implies that cases of apparently overlapping distribution of reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns must reflect a covert ambiguity. This is almost certainly true for the well-known variation in prepositional phrases (*John put the gun in front of him/himself*) (for one account, see Kiparsky 2002). For long-distance anaphora, the variation in a number of languages is known to depend on perspectival factors and the presence of speech participant pronouns (see below).

1.3. Classical Greek

Two post-Homeric innovations transform the Homeric system into the system of Classical Greek prose. The bare 3Sg. reflexives ἔο, ἔ, οἶ, as well as the 1Sg. and 2Sg. pronouns ἐμέ, σέ in their reflexive function (e.g. (3d)), fused with αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτῶ into a set of new compound reflexives ἐμαυτό-, σεαυτό-, ἑαυτό-. In a second development fully completed only after Herodotus, bare αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτῶ replaced unaccented ἐο, ἔ, οἶ as discourse anaphors, while still keeping the emphatic use they already had in Homeric, e.g. αὐτοῦ Κύρου ‘of Cyrus himself’ (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.21).

The loss of the simple reflexives ἔο, ἔ, οἶ caused the distinction between bare and complex reflexives seen in (2) and (3) to be neutralized in the third person. The new compound reflexives that replace them in Classical Greek have the combined distribution of both; they simply require a subject antecedent within the same finite domain, either in the same clause or across an infinitive clause boundary, and they don’t care whether it is a coargument or not. On the other hand, coargumenthood still matters for the reflexives of the first and second persons. In these persons, compound reflexives must have an antecedent within their clause. If the antecedent is a coargument, the compound reflexives are obligatory, otherwise the plain first and second person pronouns are also possible.

The outcome of these changes is that anaphors now differentiate between four successively larger domains, (A) coarguments, (B) clause-internal, (C) finite, (D) discourse. These are presented in (5)–(8).

(A) If the antecedent is a coargument (and therefore necessarily within the same clause), the reflexive is obligatory for all persons: in (5a), *ἐαυτάς* ‘themselves’ could not be replaced by *σφᾶς* ‘them’, and in (5b), *ἐμαυτήν* ‘myself’ could not be replaced by *ἐμέ* ‘me’.

Coargument

- (5) a. αἱ γὰρ γυναῖκες [...] ἐαυτάς ἐπικατερρίπτου
 the-FPL for women.F-PL Refl-FPLACC threw-down-IMPf3PL
 the women threw themselves down Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.13
- b. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τάχει ἔρριψ’ ἐμαυτήν τῆσδ’ ἀπὸ στύφλου
 but not in haste throw-AOR1SG Refl.F-ACC this-FGEN from rugged-FGEN
 πέτρας;
 rock.F-GEN
 why did I not throw myself at once from this rugged rock? Aesch. *PB* 747

(B) With a clause-internal non-coargument antecedent, a reflexive is obligatory in the third person, as it is in (A). In the first and second person, though, there appears to be an option.

Clause-internal non-coargument

- (6) a. πολλάκις λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ
 often speak-INF force-FUTPASS1SG about myself-GEN
 I shall often be obliged to speak about myself Dem. *De Cor.* 4
- b. περὶ ἐμοῦ βούλομαι εἰπεῖν ἐπίφθονον μὲν ἀληθές δέ
 about me-GEN want-1SG say-AORINF invidious.N-ACC but true.N-ACC Prt
 I want to say something odious but true about me Gorgias, *Palamedes*

(C) The third person reflexive *ἐαυτό-* can have an antecedent across a clause boundary, but it must be within a finite clause. Non-reflexive *αὐτοῦ*, *αὐτόν*, *αὐτῶ*, the plural *σφέων*, *σφίσι*, *σφέας* (*σφᾶς*), and in Herodotus, the 3Sg. clitic *μιν*, also occur in this configuration, as in (7d,e,f); in (7g) the reflexive anaphor *ἑωυτῶ* alternates with the discourse anaphor *αὐτόν* in parallel infinitive clauses governed by the same verb. Again, first and second person reflexives are more restricted: they cannot have a long-distance antecedent at all. For example, reflexive *ἐμαυτοῦ* could not replace *ἐμοῦ* in (7f) (in the intended sense where *περὶ ἐμοῦ* is in the lower clause).

Across clause boundary but within same finite domain

- (7) a. ὁ δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν μ’ ἐκέλευεν ἑαυτῶ
 he Prt follow-INF me-ACC order-IMPf3SG himself-DAT
 He bade me follow him Dem. *Phormio* 13
- b. συνέπεισε τὸν δῆμον [...] φυλακὴν ἑαυτῶ δοῦναι
 persuade-Aor3Sg the people-ACC [...] guard.F-ACC himself-DAT give-INF
 He_i persuaded the people to give him_i a guard Dem. *Const.* 14.1

- c. *ἑαυτῷ μὲν χρήσασθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους*
 himself-DAT Prt use-INF order-IMP3SG him-ACC and also Spartans-PLACC
ὅτι βούλονται
 whatever want-3SG
 He entreated him and the Spartans to do what they pleased with him Thuc. 7.85.1
- d. *λέγεται δεηθῆναι ἢ Κίλισσα Κύρου ἐπιδείξαι τὸ στράτευμα*
 say-Pass3SG ask-Inf the.F Cilician.F Cyrus-GEN show-INF the army.N-ACC
αὐτῇ
 her.F-DAT
 the Cilician_i [queen] is said to have asked Cyrus to show the army to her_i
 Xen. Anab. 1.2.14
- e. *τοὺς φυγάδας ἐκέλευσε σὺν αὐτῷ στρατεύεσθαι*
 the-ACC exiles-ACC urge-AOR3SG with him-DAT wage war-INF
 [Cyrus] urged the exiles to go to war together with him Xen. Anab. 1.2.2
- f. *ἀκούω περὶ ἐμοῦ Θηραμένην ἄλλους τε λόγους*
 hear-1SG about me-GEN Theramenes-ACC other-PLACC and words-PLACC
βλασφήμους εἰρηκέναι
 slanderous-PLACC utter-PERFINF
 I hear that Theramenes has uttered other slanderous statements about me
 Dem. Letters 4
- g. *ὁ δ' ἐκέλευε αὐτοὺς οἰκία τε ἑωυτῷ ἄξια*
 he Prt order-IMP3SG them-ACC house.F-PLACC and Refl-DAT worthy-PLACC
τῆς βασιληίης οἰκοδομήσαι καὶ κρατῦναι αὐτόν
 the-FGEN dominion.F-GEN build-AORINF and strengthen-AORINF him-ACC
δορυφόροισι
 spearmen-PLDAT
 He ordered them to build him houses worthy of his royal power, and to strengthen him
 with spearmen. Hdt. 1.98.2

(D) In discourse anaphora, *αὐτό-* is used in the oblique cases, as the functional counterparts of nominative \emptyset , *οἱ*. For example, in (8a), the demonstrative *ἐκείνων* ‘their’ brings in a discourse topic, which is then anaphorically referred to by *αὐτούς*. In the more complex (8b)—the continuation of example (7e)—there are two concurrent foregrounded topics, Cyrus and the exiles, each referred to by *αὐτό-*.

Discourse anaphora

- (8) a. *ἔχω γὰρ τριήρεις ὥστε ἐλεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων_i πλοῖον: ἀλλὰ*
 have-1SG for triremes with which overtake-INF the their-GENPL ship-ACC. But

[...] οὐκ ἔγωγε αὐτούς_i διώξω
 [...] not I-EMPH them-PLACC pursue-Fut-1SG

I have triremes for overtaking their ship. But I shall not pursue them. Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.8

- b. ὑποσχόμενος αὐτοῖς_j εἰ καλῶς καταπράξειεν ἐφ' ᾧ
 promise-AORMIDPART them-DAT if well accomplish-AOROPT3SG for which-ACC
 ἐστρατεύετο, μὴ πρόσθεν παύσεσθαι πρὶν αὐτούς_j καταγάγοι οἴκαδε.
 fight-IMP3SG not before stop-FUTINF before them-ACC lead-AOROPT3SG home
 οἱ_i δὲ ἡδέως ἐπειθοντο: ἐπίστευον γὰρ αὐτῷ_i
 they Prt gladly obey-IMP3PL trust-IMP3PL Prt him-DAT

[Context: Cyrus_i urged the exiles_j to go to war together with him_i,] \emptyset_i promising them_j that, if he_i should successfully accomplish the mission for which he_i was going to war, he_i would not stop until he_i had brought them_j home. And they_j gladly obeyed, for they_j trusted him_i. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.2

Perhaps surprisingly, neither of the Greek stages are easy to reconcile with current theories of binding and anaphora. I will attempt an analysis in two of them, the very sophisticated one of Reinhart & Reuland (1993) and Reuland (2001), and a rather more naive proposal of my own (Kiparsky 2002). Their affinities make for some instructive comparisons, which in my opinion come out in favor of the latter.

2. Binding, Blocking, and Obviation

My proposal (Kiparsky 2002, I'll call it Blocking and Obviation Theory, or BOT for short) is based on the idea that the structural properties of pronouns, and of anaphors in particular, are exhaustively characterized by two features, whose settings specify (a) their anaphoric domain, and (b) whether they are **OBVIATIVE** or **NON-OBVIATIVE**.


- (9) a. *Antecedent domain*: In what domain is their reference determined?
 b. *Obviation*: Can they overlap in reference with a coargument?

The values of the domain feature specify an upper bound on the domain in which the reference of an anaphor must be determined. Pronominals have no such domain and the feature is unvalued for them.

(10) Values for domain specification of referentially dependent pronouns

- a. Within the same clause: clause-bound reflexives, e.g. *himself*.
 b. Within the same finite sentence: long-distance reflexives, e.g. Swedish *sig*.
 c. Within a discourse or shared context, e.g. Modern Greek *o idhios*, Turkish *kendisi*, Marathi *aapaṅ*, Malay *dirinya*.

They form a stringency hierarchy:



The anaphoric domain hierarchy.

By separating reflexivity from the more general property of referential dependency, we predict a class of referentially dependent non-reflexive anaphors, with a well-defined profile that is quite distinct from the familiar local and long-distance reflexives, as well as from referentially independent pronominals. This class of anaphors has long been recognized by descriptive grammarians and typologists under the designation DISCOURSE ANAPHORS. The clitic anaphors *έο*, *έ*, *οί* instantiate it in Greek. BOT offers a way to accommodate this kind of anaphor in binding theory.

BLOCKING dictates the use of the most restricted element available in a given context. The principle of Blocking is not specific to binding theory, but a general principle of grammar (essentially the same as the Elsewhere Condition). For example, anaphors are used in preference to pronominals in contexts where the constraints on both are otherwise satisfied, and anaphors which require clausal antecedents are used in preference to anaphors which permit long-distance antecedents in contexts where the constraints on both are otherwise satisfied. Burzio (1996, 1998) was the first to build Blocking explicitly into binding theory in order to account for the (quasi-)complementarity between anaphors and pronominals. Other, conceptually different approaches to anaphor/pronominal complementarity are the “obligatory reflexivization” transformation of Lees and Klima 1963, and R&R’s principle that when a chain that licenses a reflexive can be formed, it must be, because it is more economical.

Within GB-style binding theories, extending and parametrizing the syntactic binding domain is not very attractive because it creates an arbitrary asymmetry between Principle A and Principle B. Why should anaphors have expanded binding domains, when pronominals do not (Cole, Hermon & Huang 2006: 49–50)? BOT is not subject to this objection, for in this approach only anaphors *have* a syntactic binding domain, and there is no Principle B. The work that Principle B does in other theories is apportioned between Blocking and the OBLVIATION constraint, neither of which can, for principled reasons, have a parametrizable domain.

Obviation requires coarguments to have disjoint reference (Hellan 1988, 1990, Dalrymple 1993).

(12) Obviation

A pronoun marked as obviative cannot overlap in reference with a coargument.

- (16) a. Jan bewundert/hasst sich. 'Jan admires/hates himself' German
 b. *Jan bewundert/haat zich. Dutch

And Old English *hine*, *him* freely allowed coargument antecedents, whereas Modern English *him* does not; contrast (17a) and (17b):

- (17) a. þætte nænig biscopa hine oðrum forbære
 that no bishop him others-DAT advance-SUBJ-3P
 'that no bishop shall put himself above others' Old English (*Bede* 5.278.27)
 b. *No bishop_i shall put him_i above others'

Continental Scandinavian and Dutch distinguish two types of verbs. A class of “middle” verbs, such as *wash* and *defend*, typically allows short reflexives as coarguments. This class (first identified in the theoretical literature by Hellan 1988:108 ff. for Norwegian, and and Everaert 1986:204 for Dutch) is illustrated for Swedish in (18). Verbs of the *attack* type require the complex reflexive *sig själv* as a coargument, as would be expected given the obviativity of *sig*. Verbs of the *defend* type allow the bare simple reflexive *sig*; *själv* may be added for emphasis but is not required. Hence (18a) is unambiguous, whereas (18b) is ambiguous:

- (18) a. Generalen_i tvingade översten_j att kritisera sig_{i,*j}
 'The general forced the colonel to criticize him/himself.'
 b. Generalen_i tvingade översten_j att försvara sig_{i,j}
 'The general forced the colonel to defend him/himself.'

Additional examples of each type of verb are given in (19):

- (19) a. Verbs requiring long reflexives (*sig själv*): *hata* 'hate', *föredra* 'prefer', *förstå* 'understand', *angripa* 'attack oneself', *förakta* 'despise', *älska* 'love', (*be*)*straffa* 'punish', *åtala* 'accuse', *ange* 'denounce', *avguda* 'idolize', *använda* 'use (as)', *laga* 'fix', *känna* 'to know oneself', *lura* 'delude', *undervisa* 'teach', *hylla* 'celebrate'.
 b. Verbs allowing short reflexives (*sig*): *tvätta* 'wash (oneself)', *raka* 'shave (oneself)', *gömma* 'hide (oneself)', *rädda* 'save', *förnedra* 'demean', *upprepa* 'repeat', *kittla* 'tickle', *massera* 'massage', *arkebusera* 'execute (by shooting)', *skydda* 'protect', *unna* (*någonting*) 'allow (something)', *kalla* (N.) 'call (N.)', *hänga* 'hang', *förklara* 'explain', *försörja* 'support oneself (financially)', *utbilda* 'educate', *fråga* 'ask', *rättfärdiga* 'justify', *identifiera* 'identify', *frigöra* 'free', *framställa som X* 'portray as X', *sköta* 'take care of.'

A traditional generalization is that simple reflexives like *sig* occurs with typically “self-directed” (or “inherently reflexive” verbs), while complex reflexives such as *sig själv* occurs with typically “other-directed” (or “inherently non-reflexive” verbs). From that perspective, (19b) is full of surprises. It is surely more usual to tickle, ask, and execute others than to do these things to oneself, yet these verbs are fine with reflexive *sig*. Another generalization that has been noted, as perhaps working in concert with the first, is that *sig* tends to refer to the corporeal self—the body—while *sig själv* refers to the personal self, or

identity. This is supported by contrasts such as *beundra sig* ‘admire oneself (e.g. in a mirror)’ vs. *beundra sig själv* ‘admire oneself (feel admiration for oneself)’ (Hellan 1988).⁴ For Frisian, Reuland & Everaert (2010) propose a rather different that subject experiencer verbs such as *admire*, *love*, *hate* take *himsels*, and agentive verbs such as *wash*, *defend* take *him*. My impression is that agentivity is not quite the right criterion, and that the Frisian distribution is generally similar to that of Dutch and Scandinavian. For what it is worth, an informal internet search of contemporary Frisian usage brings up many examples of *himsels* with agentive verbs; in most cases their Swedish translations allow or even require *sig själv*, as indicated in (20):⁵

- (20) *Man stekt himsels yn 'e brân* ‘man sets himself on fire’ (headline) (Sw. *tänder eld på sig själv*), *Hy begeliedt himsels op gitaar* ‘accompanies himself on guitar’ (Sw. *ackompanjerar sig själv på gitarr*), *set himsels op dy kaart* ‘put itself on the map’ (Sw. *satte sig själv på kartan*), *ûntwikkele himsels* ‘developed himself’ (Sw. *utvecklade sig själv*), *presintearret himsels* ‘presented himself’ (Sw. *föreställde sig (själv)*), *neamt himsels Marco Borsatan* ‘calls himself M.B.’ (Sw. *kallar sig (själv) (för) M.B.*), ... *himsels oan de duvel ferkocht* ‘sells himself to the devil’ (Sw. *säljer sig (själv) till djävulen*), *Ik wie mysels fergetten* ‘I want to forget myself’ (Sw. *jag vill glömma mig (själv)*).

In Greek, verbs broadly similar to the *defend* class allow middle voice to express reflexivity between the subject and a coargument, in roughly the kinds of verbs whose Swedish or Dutch counterparts allow bare reflexives, e.g. *λούομαι* ‘I wash myself’, *ἀπαλλάττομαι* ‘I absolve myself’, *ξυρέομαι* ‘I shave myself’, *ἀπολύομαι* ‘I clear myself’, *ἀπολογέομαι* ‘I defend myself’, *ἀμύνομαι* ‘I defend myself’, *ἐντόνομαι* ‘I equip (for) myself, prepare (for) myself’ (cf. active with reflexive in (3e)).

The upshot is that, in addition to two verb classes, we must distinguish three types of bare reflexive pronouns: (1) those that allow coargument antedecedents with any type of verb (German *sich*, Old English *him*), (2) those that allow coargument antedecedents only with *defend*-type verbs (Dutch *zich* from, Frisian *him*,

⁴ Many verbs denoting operations on the body are typically causative with *sig* and non-causative with *sig själv* and with regular objects: *tatuera sig*, literally ‘tattoo oneself, but normally equivalent to *låtta tatuera sig* ‘have oneself tattooed’, versus *tatuera sig själv* ‘tattoo oneself, *tatuera honom* ‘tattoo him’.

⁵ In fact, Frisian seems to allow the complex reflexive even with some agentive verbs for which Swedish requires or prefers the simple reflexive: *ferstoppe himsels achter in steapel moalsekken* ‘wedged himself behind a pile of flour bags’ (Sw. *klämde in sig bakom en stapel mjölsäckar*), *hat himsels aardich opwurke en is no kantoarhâlder* ‘worked himself up nicely and is now office manager’ (Sw. *arbetade sig upp*), *Ik ha mysels omdoopt* ‘I have re-christened myself’ (Sw. *jag har döpt om mig*), *Mar ik wol my sels net herhelje* ‘but I don’t want to repeat myself’ (Sw. *men jag vill inte upprepa mig*).

Swedish *sig*), and (3) those that reject all coargument antecedents (Marathi *aapan*, Homeric Greek ξ -). Further, *self*-type elements render pronouns compatible with coreferential coarguments. Ultimately one would hope to specify the meaning of these lexical items in the appropriate way so that the compositional semantics will yield the right results in a natural way. A somewhat mechanistic placeholder for such an as yet unavailable analysis is to assign the appropriate value of the feature [\pm Obviative] to the verbs and pronouns in question and to account for their permissible combinations by the requirement that coreferentiality of coarguments must be licensed by a [-Obviative] element. The obviation feature cross-classifies with the antecedent domain hierarchy to yield a complete typology of binding properties for pronouns.⁶

- (21) a. $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{G. } sich \\ -\text{Obviative} \end{array} \right]$ $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{D. } zich \\ \end{array} \right]$ $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Hom. Gk. } \xi \\ +\text{Obviative} \end{array} \right]$
 b. $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{'defend'} \\ -\text{Obviative} \end{array} \right]$ $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{'criticize'} \\ +\text{Obviative} \end{array} \right]$
 c. $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{'self'} \\ -\text{Obviative} \end{array} \right]$

The obviativity features of a DP's and VP's constituents are unified, with the values of complements and modifiers having priority over those of heads. If the resulting VP is [+Obviative], binding is blocked. Thus, the Homeric Greek [+Obviative] reflexive ξ - cannot have a coargument antecedent unless modified by [-Obviative] $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ -. And a pronoun that is unspecified for obviativity (e.g. Dutch *zich*, Swedish *sig*) can have a coargument antecedent with a [-Obviative] verb such as 'defend; but not with a [+Obviative] verb such as 'criticize'.

Are there deeper principles that derive the feature values from some independent properties of pronouns, or must they simply be lexically stipulated? Phrasal anaphors and transparently compounded anaphors are predictably [-Obviative] in virtue of their [-Obviative] modifiers like *self*, $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ -, which pass their feature to the complex reflexives they form. These are actually compositional. Complex reflexives of the form POSS+N (where N = 'head', 'body' etc.) get around obviation by a kind of syntactic Trojan horse that smuggles in the semantic coargument as a structural possessor. But for simple anaphors,

⁶) [+Obviative] reflexives that require local antecedents are not attested, which is not surprising since they would be usable in very few contexts. In Kiparsky 2002 I conjectured that obviativity for locally bound reflexives is actually manifested as subject-orientation. The intuition is that subject-orientation is a kind of relativized obviation. That would make both German *sich* and Homeric Greek ξ - [+Obviative], and Dutch *zich* and English *himself* [-Obviative], simplifying the pronoun typology, but requiring some changes to the feature combinatorics. I set this alternative aside for now.

there exist only tendencies that connect the form and function of anaphors (Faltz 1977) but no absolute principles (Huang 2000), and the tendencies can be understood as consequences of well-understood historical processes (Kiparsky 2008). As far as I have been able to determine, obviation is an unpredictable lexical property of simple pronouns; attempts to reduce it to φ -feature composition, to morphological or phonological properties, or to any parameter of the language at large, are unlikely to succeed, as I will argue further in section 4. It is true that long-distance reflexives are typically monomorphemic and have a reduced set of morphosyntactic feature specifications, but as we have just seen, Classical Greek $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - is a clear example of a long-distance reflexive that is bimorphemic and inflects for all morphosyntactic features of the nominal system. The rise of Homeric phrasal $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$ and its transition to the classical single-word $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$ neatly demonstrates both the diachronic origin of the correlation, and its breakdown: the characteristic trajectory is that complex reflexives arise as strategies for defeating the obviation of the pronouns they come from, but when their compositionality is lost they may begin to act like simple intrinsically non-obviative reflexives.

One might object on conceptual grounds to a theory in which the near-complementarity of pronominals and anaphors is derived from the interaction of two distinct theoretical principles, Blocking and Obviation. In fact, this is a virtue of the analysis because it explains where the complementarity fails. As an illustration of the independence and interaction of blocking and obviation in English, consider (22) and (23). In (22), Blocking is required to exclude the ungrammatical sentences, for obviation is inapplicable because there is no coargument relation. For example, in (22a), *I* and *me* are not coarguments, so the reason **me* is excluded must be because it is pre-empted by *myself*.

(22) a. I believe $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *me \\ myself \end{array} \right\}$ to have been cheated.

b. Richard_i seems innocent to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *him_i \\ himself \end{array} \right\}$.

c. You praise everyone except $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *you \\ yourself \end{array} \right\}$.

As for Obviation, we have already seen that it is independently necessary for the semantics of sentences like (13). This leads to the interesting prediction that *neither* the reflexive *nor* the pronominal is available in cases like (23). Here **them* cannot be excluded by Blocking because the reflexive *themselves* is not licensed (since split antecedents are excluded for independent reasons), but Obviation correctly rules it out.

(23) John_i discussed Bill_j with $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *themselves_{i,j} \\ *them_{i,j} \end{array} \right\}$.

Reflexive pronouns show a much discussed ambiguity between the bound variable and coreferential readings, as illustrated by (24) (Hestvik 1990).

- (24) John considers himself competent, and so does Fred. (ambiguous)
 a. Fred considers John competent, too. (strict)
 b. Fred considers himself competent, too. (sloppy)

If we assume that the second conjunct in *do so* VP anaphora gets its meaning from the first, then (24) has the strict reading (a) from (25a) and the sloppy reading (b) from (25b).

- (25) a. $\lambda x (x \text{ considers (John competent)}) (\text{John})$ (coreferential)
 b. $\lambda x (x \text{ considers } (x \text{ competent)}) (\text{John})$ (bound variable)

The point of interest is the contrast between (24) and the ostensibly parallel (26), where the “sloppy” reading seems to be obligatory,

- (26) John hates himself, and so does Fred.
 a. Fred hates John, too. (strict)
 b. Fred hates himself, too. (sloppy)

and where the reflexive, therefore, has only the bound variable reading of (27b).

- (27) a. $\lambda x (x \text{ hates } y \wedge y = \text{John}) (\text{John})$
 b. $\lambda x (x \text{ hates } x) (\text{John})$

The bound variable reading is said to be obligatory when the anaphors are “locally bound” (Lebeaux 1985, Bouchard 1983). The question is, what is the relevant “local” domain? For Reinhart & Reuland, the core of reflexivity involves coargumenthood, and in Kiparsky 2002 I argued that the bound variable reading is obligatory when the antecedent is a coargument. The reflexive must then be [–Obviative], and interpreted as a bound anaphor. Thus, only “sloppy identity” is available in (26). Noncoargument reflexives, even in local domains (adjuncts, resultatives, ECM constructions, conjuncts) pattern with possessives and with LD anaphora in allowing simple SE-type reflexives in languages that distinguish them from SELF-type reflexives.⁷

I predict this generalization for Greek as well, though I have not made a systematic study of the Greek data in this respect. The following example means, and (if I am right) could only mean, that the men also threw themselves down, not that men also threw the women down (“sloppy” rather than “strict” identity).

⁷) On the other hand, Hestvik 1990 and Hestvik & Philip 2001 argue that possessive and locative reflexives are included in core binding. Cole, Hermon & Huang (2006, section 8) also conclude that there is a division between local and long-distance reflexives, the former demarcated by traditional GB’s ‘governing category’. However, they also recognize the evidence for the narrower, coargument domain.

- (28) αἱ γὰρ γυναῖκες [...] ἐαυτὰς ἐπικατερίπτου, καὶ
 the-PLNOM Prt women-PLNOM [...] themselves-FPLACC threw-down-IMPF₃PL and
 οἱ ἄνδρες ὡσαύτως
 the-PLNOM men-PLNOM likewise

the women threw themselves down, and the men did likewise.

Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.13

If the antecedent is not a coargument, however, the strict reading is available in English, and we predict the same for Greek.

- (29) a. John considers himself competent, and so does Fred. (*ambiguous*)
 b. John has a picture of himself, and so does Fred. (*ambiguous*)
 c. Mary quoted every author except herself, and so did Bill. (*ambiguous*)
- (30) a. John thought that Mary's parents would approve of someone like himself, and so did Fred. (*ambiguous*)
 = "Fred thought that they would approve of someone like Fred" (*sloppy*)
 = "Fred thought that they would approve of someone like John" (*strict*)
 b. John loves his wife, and so does Fred. (*ambiguous*)
 c. John has a picture of himself, and so does Fred. (*ambiguous*)
 d. Mary quoted everyone except herself, and so did Bill. (*ambiguous*)
 e. John will succeed in spite of himself, and so will Fred. (*ambiguous*)

Then how should the generalization be expressed? Suppose that in the mapping of syntactic structures into semantic representations, arguments are associated with variables ($x, y \dots$), and variables in turn are assigned to intended referents (individuals $a, b \dots$). We then posit constraint (31) (Kiparsky 2002):

- (31) Coarguments that overlap in reference must be indexed to the same variable.

To repeat: obviation applies in a semantic domain (coarguments) and constrains semantic interpretation, whereas Blocking applies in a syntactic domain and constrains syntactic representation. And the two principles apply to different classes of elements, interacting with each other and with other constraints.

Descriptively speaking, the strength of blocking decreases with the size of the domain. In long-distance domains, variation between reflexive and non-reflexive is observed in Swedish, Icelandic, Latin, Czech, Russian, and Chinese, as documented in Kiparsky 2002. This variation is known to involve at least in part speaker perspective (Thráinsson 2007), intervention effects of first and second person subjects or "pivots" (as in Chinese, see Cole et al. 2006), and the avoidance of ambiguity. In her study of Herodotus' use of ἑωυτόν (the counterpart of Attic ἐαυτόν in his Ionic dialect), Peels (2008, Ch. 3) makes a good case that all these factors govern the use of non-reflexives in cases where long-distance reflexives are allowed (e.g. (7d,e)).

We are now ready to spell out the Greek systems of anaphora.

- (32) Homeric
 a. $\xi\omicron, \xi, \omicron\iota$ must be bound within their finite clause.
 b. $\xi\omicron, \xi, \omicron\iota$ and the personal pronouns are [+Obviative].
 c. $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - is [-Obviative]. Therefore, adding it to $\xi\omicron, \xi, \omicron\iota$ and the 1/2. person pronouns enables them to have coargument antecedents.
 d. Unaccented $\xi\omicron, \xi, \omicron\iota$ are non-reflexive referentially dependent pronouns.
- (33) Homeric Domain Obviation
 $\acute{\epsilon}$ - Discourse +
 ξ - Finite +
 $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\acute{\epsilon}$ — +
 $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - — -
- (34) Classical Greek
 a. $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - is non-obviative and must be bound within its finite clause.
 b. $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ -, $\sigma\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ are non-obviative and must be bound within their clause.
 c. $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - is a [-Obviative] discourse anaphor.
- (35) Classical Greek Domain Obviation
 $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - Finite -
 $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - Clause -
 $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\acute{\epsilon}$ — +
 $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ - Discourse -

3. Reinhart and Reuland

3.1. Reflexivity Theory

Reinhart and Reuland (1993) put forward a sparser typology, with two types of anaphors: SELF-anaphors, which bear the features [+SELF, -R], such as English *himself*, and SE-anaphors, which bear the features [-SELF, -R], such as Swedish *sig*. Pronominals and referential NPs are [-SELF, +R]. (Keep in mind that they use the terms ‘pronoun’ and ‘pronominal’ as synonymous terms for referentially independent expressions.)

(36)		SELF	SE	Pronominal
	Reflexivizing function	+	-	-
	R(eferential independence)	-	-	+

R&R propose that the distribution of anaphors and pronominals is jointly governed by a pair of conditions on the relation between the reflexivity of a predicate (defined in terms of argument coindexation) and its formal marking on the predicate, and by a syntactic condition on A-CHAINS (links between anaphors and their antecedents). The conditions on the relation between reflexivity and reflexive-marking are reproduced in (37):

- (37) a. Condition A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive.
 b. Condition B: A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked.

The definitions in (38) tell us what they mean.

(38) Definitions

- a. The SYNTACTIC PREDICATE formed of (a head) P is P, all its syntactic arguments, and an external argument of P (subject).
- b. The SYNTACTIC ARGUMENTS of P are the projections assigned θ -role or Case by P.
- c. The SEMANTIC PREDICATE formed of P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level.
- d. A predicate is REFLEXIVE if and only if two of its arguments are coindexed.
- e. A predicate (formed of P) is REFLEXIVE-MARKED if and only if either P is lexically reflexive or one of P's arguments is a SELF anaphor (defined as “an anaphor that is able to reflexivize a predicate”).

SE-anaphors are pronouns, while SELF anaphors are DPs. The SELF contained in complex reflexives is an identity predicate of category N, which combines with a determiner (pronominal or SE) into a referentially dependent DP. SELF “reflexive-marks” the predicate of which it is a syntactic argument, by covertly adjoining to its head and restricting its interpretation.

Long-distance anaphora is licensed by syntactic chains—A-chains—that connect an anaphor to its antecedent. Configurational effects on anaphor binding derive from constraints on A-chain formation. A-chain can cross non-finite clause boundaries, but not finite clause boundaries. Anaphors may appear outside A-chains, but in that case they are subject only to discourse factors, in particular to those governing their logophoric uses.

- (39) a. A maximal A-chain ($\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$) contains exactly one link— α_1 —that is both +R and Case-marked, and exactly one θ -marked link. (RR 698)
- b. An NP is +R (Referentially independent) iff it is fully specified for φ -features.

(39b) implies that whether a pronoun is an anaphor or a pronominal is predictable from its morphosyntactic feature composition. If it is specified for a restricted set of morphosyntactic features (φ -features), it is anaphoric, because it cannot project an independently interpretable argument. Specifically, a SE-anaphor is a featurally deficient determiner, which like ordinary pronouns occupies the head position of a DP. It is deficient if it lacks at least number and gender, and it may also lack person and/or case. Although it cannot project an independently interpretable argument, it is still a syntactic argument, since it is a pronoun, and therefore falls under Condition B.

3.2. RT on Greek

Let us consider what RT would say about the individual Greek anaphors discussed in the previous section. The compound reflexives *ἑαυτό-*, *ἑμαυτό-*, *σεαυτό-* of post-Homeric Greek are anaphors, but what kind? On the one hand, RT tells us that the complex reflexives are SELF-anaphors, for they are morpholog-

ically complex, they bear the φ -features of person, gender, number, and case, and they are not subject to condition B, and do not need strengthening by a SELF-element. On the other hand, the theory also says that the complex reflexives are SE-anaphors, for they are subject-oriented, occur in adjuncts and other non-coargument positions, and function as long-distance anaphors. But the theory is so constructed that no pronoun can be both a SELF-anaphor and a SE-anaphor, for the two categories have incompatible properties. The categorial distinction between them cannot be neutralized in a single lexeme. A given reflexive either has the required φ -features or it doesn't have them, and it is either a determiner or a full DP. So RT ends up having to claim that the compound reflexives *ἑαυτό-*, *ἐμαυτό-*, *σεαυτό-* of post-Homeric Greek are two sets of homonymous pronouns.

Next, what about the Homeric Greek bare reflexives *ἔο*, *ἔ*, *οἶ*? They are specified for number, person, and structural case, but not for gender. Thus, they do not meet the criteria for defectivity either, because they bear at least one φ -feature that SE-anaphors are not supposed to have. In fact, the bare reflexives are specified for the same features as the first and second person pronouns, which certainly *can* project independent arguments. And the bare reflexives are morphologically identical with the third person non-reflexive pronouns, which also project independent arguments. So it is hard to see how the third person bare reflexives could be morphologically too impoverished to project independent arguments.

Reuland and Reinhart (1995) further suggest that *phonological* defectiveness—in particular the lack of stress or of stressability—also causes a pronoun to be anaphoric. They hypothesize that even simple reflexives are somehow like SELF reflexives if they are stressable, noting that German *sich* is stressable and that it can refer to a coargument without being strengthened by a SELF element, in contrast to Dutch *zich* and Scandinavian *sig*, which are neither stressable nor can refer by themselves to a coargument. But for Greek, the accentual criterion goes in the wrong direction. It is the *accented* bare reflexive *ἔ*- functions as a SE-reflexive, while its unaccented clitic counterpart functions as a discourse anaphor (which would have to be treated as a pronominal in RT). So, within Greek, neither φ -feature composition, nor stress, or stressability, can be the criterial difference between SELF-reflexives, SE-reflexives, and pronominals.

The unaccented clitic *έο*, *έ*, *οἶ* is certainly referentially dependent, in that it cannot be used deictically, nor head restrictive relative clauses, or introduce new discourse topics in any other way. But unlike reflexives, it does not need an antecedent, not even a long-distance one. In principle, it could refer to something not mentioned that is unambiguously clear from the context. Pronouns of this type, DISCOURSE ANAPHORS, are extremely common; in fact, English *it* has the same properties, unlike the gendered pronouns *him* and *her*. Note that

they are not necessarily “unstressable”: *it* can get contrastive stress under focus, and apparently so can the discourse anaphors in Homer; the accent on *οἱ* in (40) must be contrastive, for it is not a reflexive since it does not have a subject antecedent:

- (40) οὐνεκα οἱ προτέρη δῶκε χρύσειον ἄλεισον
 because her-DAT first gave-AOR3SG golden-NACC cup.N-ACC
 [But Athena rejoiced at the wise and just man,] because he gave the golden cup to *her* first
 [rather than to someone else] *Od.* 3.53

In order to understand the unaccented clitic *έο, έ, οί* we will need to take a closer look at the discourse anaphors. In the next section we do this by turning to the 3Sg. object clitic *μιν*.

4. Referentially Dependent Non-Reflexive Pronouns

4.1. *Greek μιν*

In early Greek, Plural *σφέων, σφίσι, σφέας (σφῶς)*, and the 3Sg. object pronoun *μιν* function as discourse anaphors, and also as reflexives, duly reinforced with *αὐτό-* when locally bound to a coargument. We will focus on *μιν*, which is a gender-neutral accusative singular clitic. Pl.Acc. *σφεας* can be considered its plural counterpart and works in a similar way; the following argumentation could be essentially replicated for this pronoun. *μιν* is rare in Homeric, but (41a) illustrates its local reflexive use with *αὐτό-*, and (41b) illustrates how *μιν* serves by itself as a discourse anaphor.

- (41) a. αὐτόν μιν πληγῆσιν ἀεικελίησι δαμάσας
 self-ACC him-ACC blow.F-PLDAT cruel-FPLDAT overpower-AORPART
 disfiguring himself with cruel blows *Od.* 4.244
- b. πρίν μιν καί γῆρας ἔπεισιν
 before her also old age overtake-3SG
 [I will not set her free.] Sooner old age will be upon her. *Il.* 1.29

Note that *μιν* follows *αὐτό-* in (41a), whereas the other anaphors precede *αὐτό-* in complex reflexives. The reason is that *μιν* is always clitic and must lean on something to its left.

μιν is common in the Ionic dialect of Herodotus, which represents in some ways an intermediate stage between Homeric and the classical language. Its range of uses are illustrated in (42)–(44).

μιν as a local reflexive, coargument antecedent

- (42) a. κελεύειν τοὺς πορθμέας [...] αὐτὸν διαχρᾶσθαί μιν
 order-INF the-ACC sailor-PLACC [...] self-ACC kill-INF him-ACC
 the sailors told him to kill himself *Hdt.* 1.24.3

- b. αὐτήν μιν [...] ῥίψαι ἐς οἴκημα σποδοῦ πλέον
 self.F-ACC [...] throw-INF into room.N-ACC ash.F-GEN full-NACC
 [The priests told of her that when she had done this] she threw herself into a room full
 of [hot] ashes *Hdt.* 2.100.4
- c. ῥίψαί μιν ἐς τήν θάλασσαν ἑωυτὸν
 throw-AORINF him the-FACC sea.F-ACC himself-ACC
 he threw himself into the sea. *Hdt.* 1.24.5

In (42a) and (42b), *μιν* is strengthened by *αὐτόν*, which is the usual anti-obviation predicate. In (42c), though, it is strengthened not by *αὐτόν* but by *ἑωυτὸν*. I conjecture that the reason is that *αὐτό-* was in the process of losing its function as an anti-obviation at this time, since the phrasal reflexives had been fused in the singular into inherently [-Obviative] complex reflexives, requiring no further strengthening.

μιν as a long-distance reflexive (binding into infinitive clauses)

- (43) a. ἰκέτευσέ μὴ μιν ἀναγκαίῃ ἐνδέειν διακρῖναι τοιαύτην
 beg-IMPf3SG not him-ACC compulsion.F-DAT put-INF choose-INF such-FACC
 αἴρεσιν
 choice.F-ACC
 he begged her not to compel him to make such a choice *Hdt.* 1.11.4
- b. συνιῆσα οὐκ αὐτήν μιν μνώμενον
 understand.F-PART not her-ACC him-ACC want-PART
 [Cyrus proposed to queen Tomyris, but she,] understanding that he [...] wanted not her
 [but her kingdom, refused] *Hdt.* 1.205.1

μιν as a discourse anaphor

- (44) a. τῶν μὲν δὴ οὐδὲν προσίετό μιν
 them-GEN Prt Prt not one satisfy-DepImpf3Sg him-ACC.
 [Croesus examined all the writings.] None of them satisfied him. *Hdt.* 1.48.1
- b. ἡ γυνὴ ἐπορεύετο μιν ἐξιόντα
 the-F woman.F notice-3SG him-ACC exit-PART-ACC
 [Gyges sneaked out of the room.] The woman saw him leave. *Hdt.* 1.10.2

After Herodotus, the non-reflexive uses of the plural *σφέων*, *σφίσι*, *σφᾶς* are lost, and *μιν* disappears entirely.

In terms of our parametric approach, *μιν* must be a non-reflexive referentially dependent pronoun—a discourse anaphor. The relevant parameter specification for anaphors only fixes the *upper* bound of the domain in which the reference of the must be identified. The setting for *μιν* merely says that it must get its reference within the discourse. Nothing precludes it from having a local or long-distance antecedent within a subpart of the discourse. The theory does not allow *directly* imposing a lower syntactic bound on the distance between

antecedent and anaphor. A lower bound on an anaphor emerges only *indirectly* when one or more competing anaphors prevail over it in a smaller domain. In general, when discourse anaphors serve as reflexives, it is only when they are not blocked by another anaphor. For example, a discourse anaphor will be blocked in those domains where a more restricted anaphors that require an antecedent within the clausal or finite domain is available; thus *it* does not occur in environments where *itself* is permitted.

There are essentially two ways in which a discourse anaphor can function as a reflexive. The more obvious way for there to be no blocking is when there is no competing more restricted anaphor in the language. So, in languages without reflexives, non-obviative discourse anaphors can fill in for them, and function effectively as reflexives. This is what happens in languages whose pronouns are built on the opposition between proximate and obviative pronouns (rather than on the opposition between pronominals and anaphors). These famously include Algonquian (for a BOT analysis, based on Grafstein 1988, 1989, see Kiparsky 2002), and what Cole et al. (2006) call “pronominal long-distance reflexives” (such as Malay *dirinya* and Turkish *kendisi*, Rudnev 2011), which lack logophoric conditions, as they point out, are from this perspective really [–Obviative] discourse anaphors.

- (45) a. & he hine & his ðeode gelædde to mærsianne
and he him and his people brought to celebrate
and he brought himself and his people to celebrate Old English (*Bede* 5 19.468.7)
- b. þonne wolde heo ealra nyhst hy baþian & þwean
then would she of all latest her bathe and wash
[having first washed the other servants of Christ that were there] then she would last of
all bathe and wash herself Old English (*Bede* 4 19.318.20)

The second way in which blocking can fail is when the discourse anaphor successfully competes with a more restrictive reflexive on the basis of another advantage. Specifically, a discourse anaphor which is morphologically underspecified or which is a clitic can be preferred over a more restricted reflexive anaphor for reasons of economy. This is an instance of the pervasive tension between feature subsumption (preference for the more highly specified form) and economy (preference for the simpler form), which underlies much grammatical variation.⁸ In Kiparsky 2005 I model its dynamics in OT and provide

⁸) For example, in Sanskrit, the first and second person plural clitic pronouns *nas*, *vas*, which suppress the distinction between accusative, dative, and genitive case, coexist with their more complex orthotonic counterparts *asmán*, *asmábhī*, *asmákam*, *yuṣmán*, *yuṣmábhī*, *yuṣmákam*, which express those case distinctions. The former wins out on markedness, the latter by faithfulness; variation results in so far as the relevant constraints are unranked.

examples of it from several languages. Feature subsumption and economy are there formalized in the obvious way as FAITHFULNESS and MARKEDNESS constraints, respectively.

The variation between the clitic $\mu\nu$ and the orthotonic reflexives in local domains is a classic instance of such variation between a simpler underspecified form and a more complex fully specified form.

How would RT deal with $\mu\nu$? Previous RT analyses of similar situations where discourse anaphors are also used reflexively have explored a variety of solutions. Let us see whether these would work for $\mu\nu$. (1) We cannot appeal to ϕ -feature deficiency, since $\mu\nu$ bears number, person, and case. (2) Could we exploit its isolated nature in the pronominal paradigm—the lack of a matching dative, for example—and posit that feature values which are not contrastive in some sense don't count? That seems out of the question because $\mu\nu$ *must* count as positively specified for accusative case, third person, and singular number, simply in order to be restricted to the right referents and the right syntactic contexts. For example, it does not occur as a dative object, it cannot have a plural antecedent, and it cannot have a first and second person antecedent. (3) Another way out would be to suppose that accusative case on objects in Greek is not a structural case, as Reuland and Reinhart 1995 propose for Frisian, and Reuland and Everaert 2010 for Old English (dubiously, as we shall see in a moment). It seems clear that this is not a viable analysis, since the Greek accusative has all the hallmarks of a structural case, including replacement by nominative case under passivization. (4) Nor can the lack of accent or the clitic status of $\mu\nu$ be made responsible for its referential dependency, for Greek has a very full set of inherently unaccented clitic pronouns that *cannot* have a local antecedent (with or without $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ -), and therefore *must* count as pronominals in RT. (5) The discourse anaphoric uses of $\mu\nu$ cannot be explained away as logophoric either, because they have none of the defining characteristics of logophors, as I show in section 5.

Apart from the empirical and technical difficulties that these analyses face, they are unsatisfactory for two general reasons. First, they end up splitting $\mu\nu$ into two or even three different homonyms, without any independent evidence in the language. Secondly, they fail to provide a unified analysis for the remarkably uniform and orderly behavior of discourse anaphors across languages.

4.2. *Parallels*

To appreciate the typological parallels, and the full extent of the damage that RT does to the analysis of them, let us briefly review the discourse anaphors that are analogous to $\mu\nu$ in the other languages mentioned. For the Old English case in (45), RT suppose that it has “the parametrically fixed property of no structural

case for the object”, so that its pronouns do not have the full set of ϕ -features, and are hence referentially dependent. The assumption that Old English lacks structural case is implausible, since it has the same four-case system and in all relevant respects the same clausal syntax as German, whose accusative and nominative cases are certainly structural (as Reuland and Reinhart 1995: 251 themselves note), and for that matter the same case system as Greek. Like German, Old English has a lexically marked class of verbs whose objects bear inherent case, which is retained under NP-movement processes, but apart from these, verbs assign structural accusative case to their nominal and pronominal objects, which is replaced by nominative case in passives (Fischer 1992, Denison 1993: 104, Fischer et al. 2000). This is a standard diagnostic for structural case.

In support of their claim, Reuland and Everaert cite van Gelderen’s (2000) proposal that Old English pronouns had no structural case. As grounds for her view, van Gelderen cites the following properties of Old English: (1) “the morphological richness of [the pronominal] paradigm”, (2) “the thematically predictable nature of the (object) Cases in [certain types of] sentences” (see also 2000: 205), (3) a supposed lack of verbal passives, and (4) the existence of exceptional Case marking (2000: 20). Let us consider these points in turn.

Van Gelderen’s argument (1), based on rich pronoun inflection, when spelled out morphs into the weaker claim that objects bear “mainly” inherent case: “the Case to the object is mainly inherent as many Cases are distinguished morphologically”, which is “indicative of non-structural Case” (2000: 62). But the existence of “many” Cases in a language (four in Old English, as in Greek and German) in no way implies the absence of structural case. There is no theoretical link between how many Cases a language has and whether some of them are structural.⁹ In fact, the most common analysis of Old English is that Dative and Genitive are inherent cases, whereas accusative is a structural Case. But this way of salvaging the RT theory of anaphora requires that Old English has *no* structural case, at least on pronouns.

Also irrelevant is argument (2), that the case assigned to objects in Old English is in many cases thematically predictable, and argument (4), that some objects in Old English are assigned an unpredictable case (“exceptional Case marking”). No-one doubts these things, but nothing follows from the existence of thematically predictable Case or unpredictable Case in a language about the existence of structural Case in that language. Many other languages have a similar mix of thematic predictability and unpredictability, yet uncontroversially have at least one structural Case, the Accusative.

⁹ Finnish, with as many as fifteen cases, certainly has several structural Cases, including Nominative and Partitive.

Van Gelderen's argument (3) does go to the heart of the matter: all passives in Old English are adjectival, and their agent phrases are really instrumental (p. 210). But this claim is refuted by every page of Old English prose. Verbal passives with promoted nominative subjects and specified human agents are frequent in the texts from the entire OE period. Their eventive character is diagnosed by adjuncts that are incompatible with non-eventive readings, such as manner adverbs (46a), temporal adverbs that locate the event at a point or interval of time or specify its duration (46b), locatives (46c), true agentive phrases (46d), and by contextual plausibility (46e).

- (46) a. Manner adverbs: *Hit wæs ðá swá gedón* 'it was then done so' *Gen.* 1, 9, 15, *Gif ungefulod cild férlíce biþ gebroht tó ðam mæssepreóste* 'if an unbaptized child be brought to the mass-priest suddenly' (*L. Ælf.* 26).
- b. Temporal and frame adverbs: *ær þam ðe Romeburg getimbred wære syx hund wintran 7 fif, in Egyptum wearð on anre niht fiftig manna ofslegen, calle fram hiora agnum sunum* 'six hundred and five winters before Rome was built, fifty men were killed in one night in Egypt, all by their own sons' *Orosius* 40, 11, *Hér wæs Eáðward cynng ofslegen on éfentíde* 'here King Edward was killed in the evening' (*Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* 979), *Donne þincþ him ðæt he síe on carcerne gebroht* 'then it seems to him that he is brought into a prison', *Bt.* 37, 1.
- c. Locative adverbs: *Hugo eorl wearþ ofslegen innan Angles ége* 'Earl Hugo was slain in Anglesey', *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* 1098, *On ðém cérestan gewinne Amilcor wearð from Spénum bebridad and ofslegen* (*Orosius* 4, 7); 'In the first battle, Hamilcar was overcome and killed by the Spanish'.
- d. Agent phrases: *Wearþ Rómeburg getimbred fram twám gebróðrum* 'Rome was built by two brothers', *Orosius* 2, 2, *Wearð Alexander ofslegen from his ágenne méder* 'Alexander was killed by his own mother' [history tells us that 'his own mother' is an Agent and not an Instrument].
- e. Context: *Wearð his hors ofslegen þe hé on sæt* 'the horse that he was riding on was killed' (*Chr.* 1079). A non-eventive, adjectival reading would mean that he was riding a dead horse; the context (as well as common sense) shows that this was not the case. *Seó wearð gebróht and beséad þám cynninge* 'she was brought and announced to the King' *Hml.* A. 94, 87, *Alfþun biscop forðferde on Sudberi, ond he wearð bebyrged [on] Domuce, ond Tidfrið wearð gecoren æfter him* 'Bishop Alfred died in Sudbury, and he was buried at Dunwick, and Tidfrið was chosen after him' *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* 798 (the burying and choosing of a successor are consecutive events, not states).

To summarize: R&R's solution to the problematic anaphoric properties of Old English *hine* depends on the claim that these pronouns do not get structural case. Of van Gelderen's arguments for this claim, three are irrelevant, and one is false.

Reuland & Reinhart 1995 make a somewhat similar claim for Frisian, where pronominals like *him* 'him' and *har* 'her' can be used reflexively, so that (47b) is ambiguous.

- (47) a. Marie_i(F.) wasket har_{i,j}.
 Marie_i washes herself/her.

Compared to German and Old English, Frisian has a reduced Case system, in fact so reduced that the problem becomes not so much motivating the absence of structural Case as the presence of inherent Case. R&R's argument rests on a contrast between two object pronouns in the third person feminine singular (*har* vs. *se*) and third person plural (*har*, *harren* vs. *se*). *Se* differs from *har* (and from other pronouns, such as *him*) in that it cannot be locally bound:

- (48) a. Marie_i wasket harsels_i/har_{i,j}/se_{*i,j}
 Marie_i washes herself/her/her

As ordinary objects with disjoint reference, both *se* and *har* are allowed (examples from the Internet).

- (49) a. mar hy seach **har** net en groete **har** ek net.
 but he saw her not and greeted her also not
 but he did not see her and did not greet her

- b. hy miende wol dat hy **se** mei nommen hie, ... mar hy seach
 he remembered well that he them with taken had, ... but he saw
 se net
 them not

he did remember that he had taken them along, but he did not see them.

Following Hoekstra 1994, R&R base an account of these data on the observation that *se* (unlike *har*, *him*, etc.) cannot occur in free datives or in locative PPs, a distributional restriction which they attribute to a requirement for *se* to receive structural Case under government by a lexical projection. They further posit that *har* and *him* can *only* get inherent Case, that Frisian has a subsystem of inherent Case with only one member, and that a pronoun object bearing an inherent case of this kind is φ -defective, and bears the feature $[-R]$, i.e. referentially dependent, as a result of which reflexive uses of *har* are possible.

But *har* and the other personal pronouns also have a pronominal use, with disjoint reference with respect to the subject (as in (49a)), in which case they cannot be φ -defective, hence cannot bear inherent Case. Thus R&R analysis entails that Frisian object pronouns (other than *se*) are systematically ambiguous, bearing either the language's sole putative inherent Case, or a morphologically identical accusative case which is structural, hence not retained under passivization:

A simpler explanation for the distribution of Frisian *se* is based on the fact that it is unaccented, unlike *har* and *him* (Sipma 1913: 66, Tiersma 1985: 65). If we suppose that because *se* is unaccented it must lean enclitically on a lexical (major category) word to its left, which for syntactic reasons can only be the verb or adjective that governs it, then it follows that it cannot stand as a bare dative, or be governed by a preposition. In short, instead of hypothesizing an

otherwise unmotivated inherent Case for Frisian, and positing morphosyntactically defective twins for most of its pronouns (such as *har*, *him*, etc.), we can derive the limited distribution of *se* from the fact that it is phonologically weak. As far as binding is concerned, the difference between *har* and *se* among Frisian pronouns is then that the latter is obviative, hence not used reflexively, in line with what seems to be the general pattern that clitic forms of pronouns tend to be obviative, as in Greek.

In a response to criticism by Evans & Levinson (2009), Reuland & Everaert (2010) have further clarified the RT treatment of languages without reflexive pronouns by proposing an analysis of Fijian, where “in the third person, a verb with the transitive marker *-a* and without an explicit object is interpreted as having unmarked reference to a third-singular object which is noncoreferential with the subject. If coreference or reflexivity is intended, a full object pronoun (e.g. *'ea*, third-singular object) is required, and although this might be interpreted disjointedly, it encourages a coreferential reading” (Dixon 1988, 256).

- (50) a. *sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta.'ini' o Mika_i*
 ASP correct Art Mike
 ‘Mike corrected him’ (*himself)
- b. *sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta.'ini' 'ea_{i,j} o Mika_i*
 ASP correct 3sg+Obj Art Mike
 ‘Mike corrected himself (preferred) or ‘Mike corrected him’

R&E’s idea is that Fijian licenses the reflexive interpretation of the overt pronoun in (50a) by a “doubling” procedure, involving the adjunction of the full pronoun *'ea* to a covert null pronoun; the structure of (50a) would then really be as shown in (51):

- (51) a. *sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta.'ini' [∅ 'ea]_{DP} o Mika*
 ASP correct 3sg+Obj 3sg+Obj Art Mike
 ‘Mike corrected himself

The RT analysis again comes at a price: once covert doubling of pronouns is allowed, then additional constraints must rule out the ungrammatical combinations in (52), and the typology predicted by the theory expands in unwanted ways.

- (52) a. **sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta.'ini' ['ea 'ea]_{DP} o Mika*
 ASP correct 3sg+Obj 3sg+Obj Art Mike
 ‘Mike corrected himself
- b. **sa va'a-.dodonu-.ta.'ini' [∅ ∅]_{DP} o Mika*
 ASP correct 3sg+Obj 3sg+Obj Art Mike
 ‘Mike corrected himself

From the BOT perspective, Fijian has two vanilla pronouns: (1) an obviative null pronoun (like Spanish \emptyset , and comparable to Greek $\acute{\epsilon}$ -), and (2) non-obviative

'*ea*, which may be interpreted as coreferential or disjoint (like Greek accented ξ̄-). The preference for coreferential interpretation of '*ea* is an expected blocking effect, though it remains unexplained why it is not stronger.

5. Logophoric Use of Anaphors

The final possibility for accommodating μιν in RT that remains to be examined is that it is a logophor. Almost all anaphors that appear to be bound from outside a finite clause in Greek turn out to be discourse anaphors rather than reflexives: unaccented ἐ- in Homer, and αὐτό- in the classical language. But in both dialects we do sometimes find reflexives in positions where they have no syntactic antecedent, not even a long-distance one. The theoretical literature on anaphora refers to this special use of reflexives as LOGOPHORIC, co-opting a term originally referring to a distinct class of pronouns attested in some languages that conforms to (53) (from Clements 1975: 171, see also Hagège 1974, Sells 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1989, Sigurdsson 1990, Reuland 2006, Thráinsson 2007).

- (53) a. Logophoric pronouns are restricted to reportive contexts transmitting the words/thoughts of an individual other than the speaker/narrator.
 b. The antecedent is not in the same reportive context as the logophoric pronoun.
 c. The antecedent designates the individual whose words/thoughts are transmitted in the reported context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs.

Such instances of logophoric reflexives as I have found in Homeric Greek have the same properties as the logophoric reflexives reported for modern Icelandic and Faroese by Thráinsson (2007, Ch. 9): non-obligatoriness, non-occurrence in speaker-oriented clauses (e.g. adverbial or adjunct clauses), human antecedents, non-factive predicates of saying and thinking only, and restriction to bare unstrengthened reflexives (that is, Icelandic *sig* and Homeric ξ̄-). Whoever wrote down and edited the Homeric MSS (presumably the Alexandrian scholars) understood Homeric grammar well enough to see that they are not simply discourse anaphors but reflexives of a special kind, and took care to put the accent on them that reflexives require.

- (54) a. ὁ δ' Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλον ἐλέσθω, ὃς τις οἶ τ'
 he Prt Achaean-PLGEN other-ACC choose-IMP3SG who ever Refl-DAT and

ἐπέοικε καὶ ὃς βασιλεύτερός ἐστιν
 suit-3SG and who kinglier is

[Context: Achilles contemptuously rejects marriage to Agamemnon's daughter.] Let him_i [Agamemnon] choose another of the Achaeans who is more suitable to him_i and more kingly *Il.* 9.392

- b. πειρήθη δ' ἔο αὐτοῦ ἐν ἔντεσι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς
 test-PASSAOR3SG Prt Refl-GEN self-GEN in armor.N-PLDAT glorious Achilles

εἰ οἷ ἐφαρμόσσειε
 whether Refl-DAT fit-AOROPT3SG

And the noble Achilles tested himself in his armor, whether it fitted him *Il.* 19.384–385

c. ὅσάκι δ' ὀρμήσειε πυλάων Δαρδανιάων [...] εἴ πως οἶ
 whenever Prt rush-OPT3SG gate-PLGEN Dardanian-PLGEN [...] if how Refl-DAT
 καθύπερθεν ἀλάλκειεν βελέεσσι
 from above defend-AOROPT3PL arrow.N-PLDAT

Whenever he would rush straight for the Dardanian gates, [...] hoping they [the Trojans] might defend him from above with arrows *Il.* 22.194–196

(54a) could be rendered in English with *himself*. In context, its use is entirely appropriate. The reflexive keeps the relative clause within the scope of the imperative, ensuring its intensional interpretation: Achilles is implying that Agamemnon will find no-one more worthy than him.

Icelandic allows long-distance reflexives whose antecedents are apparently in different sentences (Thrainsson 2007: 472). It occurs in the special type of reported speech known as “free indirect discourse”, which occurs in Classical Greek as well. It is naturally analyzed as subordinated to ellipsed main clauses with a verb of saying or thinking, whose subject is the antecedent of a long-distance reflexive. Here is a characteristic Greek example.

(55) a. ἔωυτούς δὲ γενέσθαι τοσούτῳ ἐκείνων ἀνδρας
 Refl-PLACC Prt become-MIDAORINF so much-DAT those-PLGEN men-PLACC
 ἀμείονας, [...] ταῦτα δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι λέγουσι.
 better-PLACC [...] thatN.PLACC Prt Athenians-ACC say-3PL

[Context: The Athenians themselves say (λέγουσι) that they expelled the Pelasgians justly; that ... (there follows a sequence of bare ECM (accusative+infinitive) clauses describing the expulsion).] They (ἔωυτούς, the Athenians) were much better men than the Pelasgians. [...] That is what the Athenians say. *Hdt.* 6.137.3–4

Each ECM clause comes under the scope of an implicit λέγουσι ‘they say’. Greek seems to do this only with sequences of infinitive clauses, whereas the Icelandic construction involves finite subjunctive clauses. This does not necessarily indicate that Greek and Icelandic anaphors differ with respect to their binding domain; it looks like it has to do with their respective syntax of indirect discourse, perhaps involving different conditions under which ellipsis of the governing predicate is permitted.

Comparison of these logophoric uses of reflexives with the previously described uses of μιν as a discourse anaphor reveals fundamental differences. With μιν there is no explicit or implicit governing predicate of saying or thinking, and the perspective is the narrator’s, not that of someone whose speech or thought is represented. I conclude that μιν is not a reflexive with a logophoric use.

R&R (1993) and Reuland (1996) define the category of FOCUS LOGOPHOR as a discourse anaphor that marks focus or emphasis. It shares with other logophors the negative property that it does not stand in a syntactic relationship to an antecedent, but unlike them it is complex (obviative), e.g. *himself*, German *sich selbst*, and is available only in configurations where chain formation is structurally licensed. (56a) is the best example of this type I found in early Greek prose, and (56b) is another clear example from a later author.

- (56) a. [Κροίσος_i] ἔλεγε [...] ὡς τε αὐτῷ_i πάντα ἀποβεβήκοι τῇ περ ἐκείνος_j [ὁ Σόλων]
 [Croesus] said [...] that everything had turned out for him [Croesus] as he [Solon]
 εἶπε, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν_i λέγων ἢ οὐκ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον
 had said, speaking no more of himself [Croesus] than of every human being. *Hdt.* 1.86.6
- b. [Κροίσος_i] ἠρώτησε δὲ τὸν Σόλωνα τίνα τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονέστατον ἐώρακεν,
 And he_i [Croesus] asked Solon_j who of all living beings he_j found most fortunate,
 ὡς τοῦτ' ἔγε πάντως ἀποδοθησόμενον ἑαυτῷ.
 thinking that he_j would in any case award this to himself. *Diodorus Siculus* 9.27.1

The subject of the participle λέγων in (56a) is *Solon* and the subject of the participle ἀποδοθησόμενον in (56b) is *Croesus*. An unintended local binding relation is available in each case: in (56a), that Croesus said that Solon was not speaking of himself (Solon), rather than saying that Solon was not speaking of Croesus himself (the intended meaning), and in (56b), that Croesus expects Solon to nominate himself (Solon) as the most fortunate creature, rather than nominating Croesus (the intended meaning). These sentences illustrate R&R's insightful observation that a “focus logophoric” interpretation can successfully compete with syntactic binding, as is indeed confirmed by the English translations, where *himself* is quite idiomatic. As far as I know, μιν is never used as a focus logophor either.

Herodotus has several instances of reflexives in finite complement clauses headed by ὄκως, expressing the intended goal of the event denoted by the main clause (Powell 1933: 217):

- (57) a. ποιέων ἅπαντα ὄκως αἰ Ἀθῆναι γενοίατο ὑπ' ἑωυτῷ
 do-PART all-ACC to the-PL Athens.F-PL become-AOROPT3PL under Refl-DAT
 τε καὶ Δαρείῳ
 and also Darius-DAT
 doing all he_i could to subjugate Athens to himself_i and to Darius *Hdt.* 5.96.1
- b. ἐβουλεύετο ὄκως [...] ἑωυτοῦ τὸ ἔργον ἔσται
 plan-IMP3SG to [...] Refl-GEN the-NACC work.N-ACC be-DEPFUT3SG
 he planned for the accomplishment to be his own *Hdt.* 3.154.1
- c. κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως
 for oligarchy.F-ACC Plt Refl-PLDAT self-PLDAT only suitably to

πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες
live-FUT3PL serve.PART-PL

only to make them_i subservient to them_j by establishing oligarchies among them_i

Thuc. 1.19.1

These seem borderline cases between long-distance anaphora and focus logophora; if they are the former, they would be the only finite clauses in all of the work of these authors out of which reflexives can be bound. Either way, it is not clear why they are so common in just this type of clause.

In any case, comparison of the logophoric use of reflexives with the discourse anaphoric uses of *μιν* immediately shows that they have nothing in common. Non-reflexive *μιν* cannot be explained away as a logophor.

This completes our argument. The bottom line is that Greek joins Old English, Frisian, Fijian, Turkish, and Malay in attesting a class of true anaphors distinct both from reflexives and from pronominals, whose characteristic is that they may but need not have a structural antecedent. This class of anaphors requires an extension of binding theory, if not along the lines of BOT, then to something that equals and hopefully exceeds BOT's empirical coverage.

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