Prerequisites

Almost essential Monopoly

Useful, but optional Game Theory: Strategy and Equilibrium

Duopoly

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Overview...

Duopoly

How the basic elements of the firm and of game theory are used. Background

Price competition

Quantity competition

Assessment

Basic ingredients

- Two firms:
 - Issue of entry is not considered.
 - But monopoly could be a special limiting case.
- Profit maximisation.
- Quantities or prices?
 - There's nothing within the model to determine which "weapon" is used.
 - It's determined *a priori*.
 - Highlights artificiality of the approach.
- Simple market situation:
 - There is a known demand curve.
 - Single, homogeneous product.

Reaction

- We deal with "competition amongst the few".
- Each actor has to take into account what others do.
- A simple way to do this: *the reaction function*.
- Based on the idea of "best response".
 - We can extend this idea...
 - In the case where more than one possible reaction to a particular action.
 - It is then known as a reaction *correspondence*.
- We will see how this works:
 - Where reaction is in terms of prices.
 - Where reaction is in terms of quantities.

Overview...

Duopoly

Introduction to a simple simultaneous move price-setting problem. Background

Price competition

Quantity competition

Assessment

Competing by price

- There is a market for a single, homogeneous good.
- Firms announce prices.
- Each firm does not know the other's announcement when making its own.
- Total output is determined by demand.
 - Determinate market demand curve
 - Known to the firms.
- Division of output amongst the firms determined by market "rules."
- Let's take a specific model with a clear-cut solution...


Bertrand – basic set-up

- Two firms can potentially supply the market.
- Each firm: zero fixed cost, constant marginal cost *c*.
- If one firm alone supplied the market it would charge monopoly price $p_{\rm M} > c$.
- If both firms are present they announce prices.
- The outcome of these announcements:
 - If $p^1 < p^2$ firm 1 captures the whole market.
 - If $p^1 > p^2$ firm 2 captures the whole market.
 - If $p^1 = p^2$ the firms supply equal amounts to the market.
- What will be the equilibrium price?

Bertrand – best response?

- Consider firm 1's response to firm 2
- If firm 2 foolishly sets a price p^2 above p_M then it sells zero output.
 - Firm 1 can safely set monopoly price $p_{\rm M}$.
- If firm 2 sets p^2 above *c* but less than or equal to p_M then firm 1 can "undercut" and capture the market.
 - Firm 1 sets $p^1 = p^2 \delta$, where $\delta > 0$.
 - Firm 1's profit always increases if δ is made smaller...
 - ... but to capture the market the discount δ must be positive!
 - So strictly speaking there's no *best* response for firm 1.
- If firm 2 sets price equal to *c* then firm 1 cannot undercut
 - Firm 1 also sets price equal to c.
- If firm 2 sets a price below *c* it would make a loss.
 - Firm 1 would be crazy to match this price.
 - If firm 1 sets $p^1 = c$ at least it won't make a loss.
- Let's look at the diagram...

Bertrand model – equilibrium



Bertrand – assessment

- Using "natural tools" prices.
- Yields a remarkable conclusion.
- Mimics the outcome of perfect competition
 - Price = MC.
- But it is based on a special case.
- Neglects some important practical features
 - Fixed costs.
 - Product diversity
 - Capacity constraints.
- Outcome of price-competition models usually very sensitive to these.

Overview...

The link with monopoly and an introduction to two simple "competitive" paradigms.



quantity models

- Now take *output quantity* as the firms' choice variable.
- Price is determined by the market once total quantity is known:
 - An auctioneer?
- Three important possibilities:
- 1. Collusion:
 - Competition is an illusion.
 - Monopoly by another name.
 - But a useful reference point for other cases
- 2. Simultaneous-move competing in quantities:
 - Complementary approach to the Bertrand-price model.
- 3. Leader-follower (sequential) competing in quantities.


Collusion – basic set-up

- Two firms agree to maximise joint profits.
- This is what they can make by acting as though they were a single firm.
 - Essentially a monopoly with two plants.
- They also agree on a rule for dividing the profits.
 - Could be (but need not be) equal shares.
- In principle these two issues are separate.


The profit frontier

- To show what is possible for the firms...
- ...draw the *profit frontier*.
- Show the possible combination of profits for the two firms
 - given demand conditions
 - given cost function
- Start with the case where cash transfers between the firms are not possible

Frontier – non-transferable profits



Frontier – transferable profits



Collusion – simple model

- Take the special case of the "linear" model where marginal costs are identical: $c^1 = c^2 = c$.
- Will both firms produce a positive output?
 - If unlimited output is possible then only one firm needs to incur the fixed cost...
 - ...in other words a true monopoly.
 - But if there are capacity constraints then both firms may need to produce.
 - Both firms incur fixed costs.
- We examine both cases capacity constraints first.

Collusion: capacity constraints

- If both firms are active total profit is $[a-bq]q [C_0^1 + C_0^2 + cq]$
- Maximising this, we get the FOC: a-2bq-c=0.
- Which gives equilibrium quantity and price:

$$a-c \qquad a+c$$

$$q = \frac{a+c}{2b}; \qquad p = \frac{a+c}{2}.$$
So maximised profits are:
$$[a-c]^{2}$$

$$\Pi_{M} = \frac{[a-c]^{2}}{4b} - [C_{0}^{1} + C_{0}^{2}].$$

- Now assume the firms are identical: $C_0^1 = C_0^2 = C_0$.
- Given equal division of profits each firm's payoff is $[a-c]^2$

$$\Pi_{\rm J} = - C_0 \,.$$

Collusion: no capacity constraints

- With no capacity limits and constant marginal costs...
- ...there seems to be no reason for both firms to be active.
- Only need to incur *one* lot of fixed costs C_0 .
 - C_0 is the smaller of the two firms' fixed costs.
 - Previous analysis only needs slight tweaking.
- Modify formula for Π_J by replacing C_0 with $\frac{1}{2}C_0$.
- But is the division of the profits still implementable?

Overview...

Duopoly

Simultaneous move "competition" in quantities

Price competition

Background

Quantity competition

•<u>Collusion</u> •**The Cournot model** •<u>Leader-Follower</u>

Assessment

Cournot – basic set-up

- Two firms.
 - Assumed to be profit-maximisers
 - Each is fully described by its cost function.
- Price of output determined by demand.
 - Determinate market demand curve
 - Known to both firms.
- Each chooses the quantity of output.
 - Single homogeneous output.
 - Neither firm *knows* the other's decision when making its own.
- Each firm makes an *assumption* about the other's decision
 - Firm 1 assumes firm 2's output to be given number.
 - Likewise for firm 2.
- How do we find an equilibrium?

Cournot – model setup

- Two firms labelled f = 1,2
- Firm f produces output q^{f} .
- So total output is:

• $q = q^1 + q^2$

Market price is given by:

• p = p(q)

- Firm *f* has cost function $C(\cdot)$.
- So profit for firm *f* is:

• $p(q) q^f - C(q^f)$

- Each firm's profit depends on the other firm's output
 - (because p depends on total q).

Cournot – firm's maximisation

- Firm 1's problem is to choose q^1 so as to maximise $\Pi^1(q^1; q^2) := p (q^1 + q^2) q^1 - C^1(q^1)$
- Differentiate Π¹ to find FOC:

 $\partial \Pi^1(q^1; q^2)$


 $\frac{1}{\partial q^1} = p_q(q^1 + q^2) q^1 + p(q^1 + q^2) - C_q^1(q^1)$

- For an interior solution this is zero.
- Solving, we find q^1 as a function of q^2 .
- This gives us 1's *reaction function*, χ^1 :

 $q^1 = \chi^1 (q^2)$

• Let's look at it graphically...

Cournot – the reaction function



Cournot – solving the model

- $\chi^1(\cdot)$ encapsulates profit-maximisation by firm 1.
- Gives firm's reaction 1 to a fixed output level of the competitor firm:


• $q^1 = \chi^1(q^2)$

- Of course firm 2's problem is solved in the same way.
- We get q^2 as a function of q^1 :


• $q^2 = \chi^2 (q^1)$

- Treat the above as a pair of simultaneous equations.
- Solution is a pair of numbers $(q_{\rm C}^1, q_{\rm C}^2)$.
 - So we have $q_{\rm C}^1 = \chi^1(\chi^2(q_{\rm C}^1))$ for firm 1...
 - ... and $q_{\rm C}^2 = \chi^2(\chi^1(q_{\rm C}^2))$ for firm 2.
- This gives the *Cournot-Nash equilibrium* outputs.

Cournot-Nash equilibrium (1)



Cournot-Nash equilibrium (2)



The Cournot-Nash equilibrium

- Why "Cournot-Nash" ?
- It is the general form of Cournot's (1838) solution.
- But it also is the Nash equilibrium of a simple quantity game:
 - The players are the two firms.
 - Moves are simultaneous.
 - Strategies are actions the choice of output levels.
 - The functions give the best-response of each firm to the other's strategy (action).
- To see more, take a simplified example...

Cournot – a "linear" example

- Take the case where the inverse demand function is: $p = \beta_0 - \beta q$
- And the cost function for *f* is given by: $C^{f}(q^{f}) = C_{0}^{f} + c^{f} q^{f}$
- So profits for firm f are: $[\beta_0 - \beta q] q^f - [C_0^f + c^f q^f]$
- Suppose firm 1's profits are П.
- Then, rearranging, the iso-profit curve for firm 1 is:

$$q^{2} = \frac{\beta_{0} - c^{1}}{\beta} - q^{1} - \frac{C_{0}^{1} + \Pi}{\beta q^{1}}$$

Cournot – solving the linear example

- Firm 1's profits are given by
 - $\Pi^{1}(q^{1}; q^{2}) = [\beta_{0} \beta q] q^{1} [C_{0}^{1} + c^{1}q^{1}]$
- So, choose q^1 so as to maximise this.
- Differentiating we get:


 $\partial \Pi^1(q^1; q^2)$

$$\bullet \quad ---- = -2\beta q^1 + \beta_0 - \beta q^2 - c^1$$

- FOC for an interior solution $(q^1 > 0)$ sets this equal to zero.
- Doing this and rearranging, we get the reaction function:

•
$$q^1 = \max \left\{ \frac{\beta_0 - c^1}{2\beta} - \frac{1}{2} q^2, 0 \right\}$$

The reaction function again



Finding Cournot-Nash equilibrium

- Assume output of both firm 1 and firm 2 is positive.
- Reaction functions of the firms, χ¹(·), χ²(·) are given by: a - c¹
 q¹ = -c¹
 <u>2b</u>
 -¹/₂q²
 <u>2b</u>
 -¹/₂q²
 <u>2b</u>
 <u>2c</u>
 <u>2c</u>
 <u>2b</u>
 <u>2c</u>

$$q_{\rm C} = \frac{1}{2b} - \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{2b} - \frac{1}{2} q_{\rm C} \right] .$$

- Solving this we get the Cournot-Nash output for firm 1: $q_{\rm C}^{1} = \frac{a + c^2 - 2c^1}{3b}$.
- By symmetry get the Cournot-Nash output for firm 2: $q_{\rm C}^2 = \frac{a + c^1 - 2c^2}{3b}$.

Cournot – identical firms

- Take the case where the firms are *identical*.
 - This is useful but very special.
- Use the previous formula for the Cournot-Nash outputs.

$$q_{\rm C}^{1} = \frac{a + c^{2} - 2c^{1}}{3b} ; q_{\rm C}^{2} = \frac{a + c^{1} - 2c^{2}}{3b} .$$

Put $c^{1} = c^{2} = c$. Then we find $q_{\rm C}^{1} = q_{\rm C}^{2} = q_{\rm C}$ where

$$q_{\rm C} = \frac{a-c}{3b} \quad .$$


• From the demand curve the price in this case is $\frac{1}{3}[a+2c]$

Profits are

Reminde

$$\Pi_{\rm C} = \frac{[a - c]^2}{9b} - C_0 \,.$$

Symmetric Cournot



Cournot – assessment

- Cournot-Nash outcome straightforward.
 - Usually have continuous reaction functions.
- Apparently "suboptimal" from the selfish point of view of the firms.
 - Could get higher profits for all firms by collusion.
- Unsatisfactory aspect is that price emerges as a "by-product."
 - Contrast with Bertrand model.
- Absence of time in the model may be unsatisfactory.

Overview...

Duopoly

Sequential "competition" in quantities

Price competition

Background

Quantity competition

•<u>Collusion</u> •<u>The Cournot model</u> •Leader-Follower

Assessment

Leader-Follower – basic set-up

- Two firms choose the quantity of output.
 - Single homogeneous output.
- Both firms know the market demand curve.
- But firm 1 is able to choose first.
 - It announces an output level.
- Firm 2 then moves, knowing the announced output of firm 1.
- Firm 1 knows the reaction function of firm 2.
- So it can use firm 2's reaction as a "menu" for choosing its own output...

Leader-follower – model

- Firm 1 (the leader) knows firm 2's reaction.
 - If firm 1 produces q^1 then firm 2 produces $\chi^2(q^1)$.
- Firm 1 uses χ^2 as a feasibility constraint for its own action.
- Building in this constraint, firm 1's profits are given by $p(q^1 + \chi^2(q^1)) q^1 - C^1(q^1)$
- In the "linear" case firm 2's reaction function is $a-c^2$



$$q^2 = \frac{a^2 c}{2b} - \frac{1}{2}q^1$$

So firm 1's profits are

 $\left[a-b\left[q^{1}+\left[a-c^{2}\right]/2b-\frac{1}{2}q^{1}\right]\right]q^{1}-\left[C_{0}^{1}+c^{1}q^{1}\right]$

Solving the leader-follower model

- Simplifying the expression for firm 1's profits we have:
 1/2 [a + c² bq¹] q¹ [C₀¹ + c¹q¹]
- The FOC for maximising this is:

 $\frac{1}{2} [a + c^2] - bq^1 - c^1 = 0$

• Solving for
$$q^1$$
 we get:
 $q_8^1 = \frac{a+c^2-2c^1}{2b}$.

• Using 2's reaction function to find q^2 we get: $q_{\rm S}^2 = \frac{a + 2c^1 - 3c^2}{4b}$. Leader-follower _____identical_firms

Of course they still differ in terms of their strategic position – firm 1 moves first.

- Again assume that the firms have the same cost function.
- Take the previous expressions for the Leader-Follower outputs:

$$a + c^2 - 2c^1$$
 $a + 2c^1 - 3c^2$

 $q_{\rm S} = \frac{2b}{2b}$; $q_{\rm S} = \frac{4b}{4b}$. • Put $c^1 = c^2 = c$; then we get the following outputs:

$$a - c$$
 $a - c$ $a - c$


$$q_{\rm S} = \underline{}_{2b}$$
; $q_{\rm S} = \underline{}_{4b}$

- Using the demand curve, market price is $\frac{1}{4}[a+3c]$.
- So profits are:

$$\Pi_{\rm S}^{1} = \frac{[a-c]^2}{2} \qquad 2 \qquad \frac{[a-c]^2}{16b} - C_0 ; \quad \Pi_{\rm S}^{2} = \frac{[a-c]^2}{16b} - C_0$$

Reminder

Leader-Follower



Overview...

Duopoly

How the simple price- and quantitymodels compare. Background

Price competition


Quantity competition

Assessment


Comparing the models

- The price-competition model may seem more "natural"
- But the outcome (p = MC) is surely at variance with everyday experience.
- To evaluate the quantity-based models we need to:
 - Compare the quantity outcomes of the three versions
 - Compare the profits attained in each case.

Output under different regimes



Profits under different regimes



What next?

- Introduce the possibility of entry.
- General models of oligopoly.
- Dynamic versions of Cournot competition