

MICROECONOMICS
Principles and Analysis

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: BASICS

LIMITATIONS OF CRUSOE MODEL

- ✘ The Crusoe story takes us only part way to a treatment of general equilibrium:
 - + There's only one economic actor.
 - + So there can be no interaction.
- ✘ Prices are either exogenous (from the mainland? the world? Mars?) or hypothetical.
- ✘ But there are important lessons we can learn:
 - + Integration of consumption and production sectors.
 - + Decentralising role of prices.


When we use something straight from Crusoe we will mark it with this logo

ONWARD FROM CRUSOE...

- ✘ This is where we generalise the Crusoe model.
- ✘ We need a model that will incorporate:
 - + Many actors in the economy...
 - + ...and the possibility of their interaction.
 - + The endogenisation of prices in the economy.
- ✘ But what do we mean by an "economy" ...?
- ✘ We need this in order to give meaning to "equilibrium"

OVERVIEW...

The components of the general equilibrium problem.



THE COMPONENTS

- ✘ At a guess we can model the economy in terms of:
 - + Resources
 - + People
 - + Firms
- ✘ Specifically the model is based on assumptions about:
 - + Resource stocks
 - + Preferences
 - + Technology
- ✘ (In addition -for later - we will need a description of the rules of the game)

WHAT IS AN ECONOMY?

- ✘ Resources (stocks) R_1, R_2, \dots n of these
- Households (preferences) U^1, U^2, \dots n_h of these
- Firms (technologies) Φ^1, Φ^2, \dots n_f of these

AN ALLOCATION

A *competitive allocation* consists of:

Note the shorthand notation for a collection

utility-maximising

- ✗ A collection of bundles (one for each of the n_h households) $[\mathbf{x}] := [\mathbf{x}^1, \mathbf{x}^2, \mathbf{x}^3, \dots]$

profit-maximising

- ✗ A collection of net-output vectors (one for each of the n_f firms) $[\mathbf{q}] := [\mathbf{q}^1, \mathbf{q}^2, \mathbf{q}^3, \dots]$

- A set of prices (used by households and firms)

$$\mathbf{p} := (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n)$$

HOW A COMPETITIVE ALLOCATION WORKS

$$\mathbf{p} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{q}^f(\mathbf{p}), f=1,2,\dots,n_f\}$$

$$\mathbf{p}, \{y^h\} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{x}^h(\mathbf{p}), h=1,2,\dots,n_h\}$$

just a minute! Where do these incomes come from??

- Implication of firm f 's profit maximisation
- Firms' behavioural responses map prices into net outputs
- Implication of household's utility maximisation
- Households' behavioural responses map prices and incomes into demands
- The competitive allocation

AN IMPORTANT MISSING ITEM

- ✗ For a consumer in isolation it may be reasonable to assume an exogenous income.
 - + Derived elsewhere in the economy.
- ✗ Here the model involves all consumers in a closed economy.
 - + There is no "elsewhere."
- ✗ Incomes have to be modelled explicitly.
- ✗ We can learn from the "simple economy" presentation.

OVERVIEW...

General Equilibrium: Basics

The economy and allocations

Incomes

Equilibrium

A key role for the price system.

MODELLING INCOME

- ✗ What can Crusoe teach us?
- ✗ Consider where his "income" came from
 - + Ownership rights of everything on the island
- ✗ But here we have many persons and many firms.
 - + So we need to proceed carefully.
 - + We need to assume a system of ownership rights.


WHAT DOES HOUSEHOLD H POSSESS?

- ✗ Resources R_1^h, R_2^h, \dots

$$R_i^h \geq 0, i=1,\dots,n.$$




- Shares in firms' $\zeta_1^h, \zeta_2^h, \dots$ profits

$$0 \leq \zeta_f^h \leq 1, f=1,\dots,n_f.$$



THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF PRICES

- Net output of firm f , good i : $q_i^f = q_i^f(\mathbf{p})$ depends on prices:
 - Supply of net outputs
- Thus profits depend on prices:
 - Again writing profits as price-weighted sum of net outputs
$$\Pi^f(\mathbf{p}) := \sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i^f(\mathbf{p})$$
- So income can be written:
 - comes = resource rents + profits
$$y^h = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i R_i^h + \sum_{f=1}^{n_f} \zeta_f^h \Pi^f(\mathbf{p})$$
- Incomes depend on prices:
 - Note that the function $y^h(\cdot)$ depends on the ownership rights that h possesses
$$y^h = y^h(\mathbf{p})$$



- ### WHAT IS AN EQUILIBRIUM?
- What kind of allocation is an equilibrium?
 - Again we can learn from previous presentations:
 - Must be utility-maximising (consumption)...
 - ...profit-maximising (production)...
 - ...and satisfy materials balance (the facts of life)
 - We can do this for the many-person, many-firm case.

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM: BASICS

- For each h , maximise $U^h(\mathbf{x}^h)$, subject to $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i^h \leq y^h$

• Households maximise utility, given prices and incomes
 • Firms maximise profits, given prices
 • For all goods the materials balance must hold

- For each f , maximise $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i q_i^f$, subject to $\Phi^f(\mathbf{q}^f) \leq 0$

- For each i : $x_i \leq q_i + R_i$

aggregate consumption of good i .

aggregate net output of good i .

CONSUMPTION AND NET OUTPUT

- “Obvious” way to aggregate consumption of i : $x_i = \sum_{h=1}^{n_h} x_i^h$
 - Sum over households
 - Appropriate if i is a rival good
 - Full additional resources are needed for each additional person consuming a unit of good i .

- An alternative way to aggregate:

$$x_i = \max_h \{x_i^h\}$$

- Opposite case: a nonrival good
- Examples: TV, national defence...
- Aggregate output: $q_i := \sum_{f=1}^{n_f} q_i^f$
 - By definition
 - if all the q^f are feasible will q be feasible?
 - Yes if there are no externalities
 - Counterexample: production with congestion...

TO MAKE LIFE SIMPLE:

- Assume incomes are determined privately.
- All goods are “rival” commodities.
- There are no externalities.

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM: SUMMARY


- It must be a competitive allocation
 - A set of prices \mathbf{p}
 - Everyone maximises at those prices \mathbf{p}
- The materials balance condition must hold
 - Demand cannot exceed supply: $\mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{q} + \mathbf{R}$

AN EXAMPLE

- Exchange economy (no production)
- Simple, standard structure
- 2 traders (Alf, Bill)
- 2 Goods:

	<u>Alf</u>	<u>Bill</u>
• resource endowment	(R_1^a, R_2^a)	(R_1^b, R_2^b)
• consumption	(x_1^a, x_2^a)	(x_1^b, x_2^b)
• utility	$U^a(x_1^a, x_2^a)$	$U^b(x_1^b, x_2^b)$


ALF'S OPTIMISATION PROBLEM



- Resource endowment
- Prices and budget constraint
- Preferences
- Equilibrium

- Budget constraint is $\sum_{i=1}^2 p_i x_i^a \leq \sum_{i=1}^2 p_i R_i^a$
- Alf sells some endowment of 2 for good 1 by trading with Bill


BILL'S OPTIMISATION PROBLEM



- Resource endowment
- Prices and budget constraint
- Preferences
- Equilibrium

- Budget constraint is
$$\sum_{i=1}^2 p_i x_i^b \leq \sum_{i=1}^2 p_i R_i^b$$
- Bill, of course, sells good 1 in exchange for 2

COMBINE THE TWO PROBLEMS



- Bill's problem (flipped)
- Superimpose Alf's problem.
- Price-taking trade moves agents from endowment point...
...to the competitive equilibrium allocation
- The role of prices

- This is the **Edgeworth box**.
- Width: $R_1^a + R_1^b$
- Height: $R_2^a + R_2^b$.

ALF AND BILL AS A MICROCOSM

- ✦ The Crusoe equilibrium story translates to a many-person economy.
- ✦ Role of prices in allocations and equilibrium is crucial.
- ✦ Equilibrium depends on distribution of endowments.
- ✦ Main features are in the model of Alf and Bill.
- ✦ But, why do these guys just accept the going prices...?
- ✦ See General Equilibrium: Price-Taking.