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The Greek Junta and the International System

A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74

Edited by Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie G. H. Pedaliu

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10 The challenges of modernism

Greece, environmentalism and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1969–79

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, novel fields of international deliberations emerged, involving among others human rights, monetary affairs, science and technology (computers, communications, satellites, the Sea Bed, nuclear energy) and the environment, representing the search of the middle classes of a now affluent West for a better 'quality of life'.¹ Thus, the international agenda of the nascent post-industrial era was being expanded beyond the more 'traditional' themes of the Cold War, détente and the intensifying problems of the global South.

International environmental cooperation made a huge leap in 1972, when the UN Conference on the Human Environment was called in Stockholm. Environmental issues formed part of Basket II in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe leading to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Environmental projects were developed in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Economic Community (EEC). NATO also came at the forefront of this process. Since 1958, the Atlantic Alliance had developed scientific cooperation through its Science Committee,² but in 1969 President Richard Nixon surprised his allies by suggesting the setting up of an environmental programme, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The CCMS developed a series of specific pilot studies involving, among others, air and water pollution, disposal of hazardous waste and road safety, and after 1973 worked on important energy projects.³

This chapter will discuss the Greek reactions to the CCMS. It will be argued that the dictatorship was an anti-modernist force, unable to perceive the issues and to act. The country's adjustment to the new environmental agenda was made only partially through initiatives of civic society, and largely against the wishes of the junta. Greece's full participation in environmental international processes took place only after the restoration of democracy, and formed an integral part of the transition.

The Colonels and the CCMS

Environmentalism could come both as an anti-modernist discourse, expressing nostalgia for an imagined authenticity of the 'aboriginals', or as a modernist

venture, aiming to respond creatively to technological advances and the evolution of the value systems. The Americans certainly projected the latter version. The problem was that the Greek dictators failed to understand these aspects. Facing huge problems of legitimacy in NATO, where Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy threatened to raise the issue of the Greek regime,⁴ the Colonels viewed the CCMS as a political rather than an environmental issue. They tried obliquely to use the CCMS to acquire legitimization within NATO; when they failed in this, they simply ignored it.

Initially, in 1969, the Greek dictatorship saw the CCMS as an opportunity: on the road to the setting up of the CCMS, Athens offered to pilot a project on social security.⁵ As could be expected, the Scandinavians and the Dutch would not accept the Greek dictators lecturing them on a field on which they were in the European *avant-garde*. In autumn 1969, at a moment when the Americans were desperately trying to secure the participation of the reluctant Scandinavians at the CCMS, while Oslo and Copenhagen were already active in the CoE against the Greek dictatorship, the writing was on the wall. The Scandinavians and the Dutch refused to participate in CCMS pilot studies if the Greek dictatorship were to undertake a social project.⁶ In early November 1969, when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the creation of the CCMS, the Danes reserved their position regarding its competence to discuss social issues, among others because of this Greek ambition.⁷ In the face of this opposition, the junta (evidently, also the Americans) retracted. During the first CCMS plenary session of December 1969, the Greeks did not table what the British called 'their threatened paper on social security'.⁸

From then on, realizing that they would not be allowed to use the CCMS to secure international acceptance, the Colonels chose to ignore it. In the following years, Athens expressed some verbal support for the CCMS – for example, during its June 1970 session against drug abuse, involving mostly the Turkish production of opium⁹ – but did little in practice. In March 1970, when the issue of admitting observers from the CoE was discussed by the NAC, the Greeks 'retaliated' for their recent expulsion from that organization by opposing the idea, but finally it was decided to admit observers.¹⁰ Late in 1970, Athens (together with London) raised strong objections to the CCMS Oil Spill Resolution creating obstacles for the dumping of waste in the seas, but this was due to the economic interests of the Greek mercantile marine rather than the result of an active interest in the process.¹¹ Despite their vulnerability to earthquakes, the Greeks failed to send a delegation to the San Francisco May 1971 conference, organized by the CCMS Disaster Assistance project: pointing to lack of funds, the Greeks merely nominated as their representative their Consul General, who then went to the Americans and asked for a bibliography in order to attend the conference, since Athens had sent him nothing.¹² The junta also turned its attention to other organizations. In 1972, it asked for the support of the newly founded UN Development Programme to deal with air pollution in the Athens area, and a project was agreed in August 1973.¹³ But it is interesting that Greece did not participate in the CCMS' successful Air Pollution pilot study.

In fact, the available archival evidence points to a situation worse than a mere Greek absence. By 1973, the Greek Foreign Ministry wanted to do something, but lacked the political power base to produce results, as the government was indifferent. In March 1973, approached by the Americans regarding the Advanced Health Care pilot study, the official of the Greek Foreign Ministry responsible for the CCMS, Constantine Ailianos, replied that he was pressing to get a Greek representative appointed to the Alcohol Countermeasures project, but it was proving impossible since there was much government confusion over the issue.¹⁴ In the same year, Athens, together with Lisbon, expressed interest in the Geothermal Energy pilot study, but finally the country was not represented in the preparatory meetings that took place in New Zealand and New Mexico.¹⁵ In September 1973, Athens failed to submit its follow-up report on Disaster Assistance, one of the early projects which had been concluded. The Greek delegation to NATO, in an effort to compensate for this, offered to make an oral presentation during the forthcoming CCMS plenary, and the Americans melancholically commented: 'This [is] probably [the] best we can expect.'¹⁶ Other NATO members also failed to submit follow-up reports, but in Greece's case this complemented its general absence.

This was not a problem of the Greek diplomats only. Recent research has shown that the officials of other Ministries faced similar predicaments. Despite the rapid expansion of international cooperation on the conservation of monuments, a subject of obvious importance for the country, the Greek state did not participate in these processes; Greek scientists went to meetings as individuals, not as representatives of their country. Still, officials of various Ministries (Interior, Economic Coordination, Culture, Public Works) were trying to follow international developments and were making preparatory work – for example, the charting of traditional settlements in need of care. It should be noted that these officials used the criteria of the CoE, from which Greece had been expelled.¹⁷ But it was impossible to get the government to act. Thus, the environmental agenda in Greece during the junta was furthered by civic society rather than by the state. In 1972, the foundation of the Hellenic Society for the Environment and Cultural Heritage, by Costas and Lydia Carras, was a watershed, and was in fact caused by the founders' concern about the disastrous policies of the junta on the country's architectural legacy.¹⁸ The Society attracted the support and active cooperation of many prominent Greeks and continues to play a major role in environmental and cultural affairs today.

A new departure in international environmental cooperation was attempted by the Spyros Markezinis government, which took power briefly in October–November 1973 during the so-called 'liberalization' experiment of the junta. While the George Papadopoulos regime wanted to ensure the continuation of the dictatorship under another mantle, the new Prime Minister aimed to effect a real transfer of power to the politicians. He also tried to adjust to the environmental agenda. Markezinis, a person with old connections with Whitehall, immediately turned to the British. He asked the Ambassador to Athens, Sir Robin Hooper, that the British make available to his government a team of experts to assist on

problems of pollution. It was clear that Markezinis' motives were political rather than environmental. He was evidently trying to use an 'apolitical' issue in order to strengthen cooperation between his government and one of the leaders of the West. Markezinis proposed to cooperate with Professor Sir William Hawthorne, Master of Churchill College, Cambridge, with whom he was acquainted. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials wanted to help Markezinis and were in principle in favour of the idea. As they noted, cooperation 'on an uncontroversial and unpolitical subject such as this' was in Britain's interest.¹⁹

The FCO's Science and Technology Department (STD) noted that the Department of Trade and Industry would also want to accept the request in order to facilitate trade with Greece; the Department of the Environment was reserved, mostly because of the overextension of its experts. Thus, it was possible to assemble 'a core multi-disciplinary team' led by a person outside the British government structure. The STD went out of its way to stress that '[t]his is not the place for the more evangelical environmentalists' – a reference to the obscure status of the Markezinis government, functioning under the Greek junta. The British team of experts would study the Greek request, and would then present options to the Greek government, but would not make decisions.²⁰ In other words, the FCO itself was viewing the project through the lens of British political aims, not for its environmental value; only Hawthorne himself, whom the FCO approached with the suggestion 'to do what he can to help the Greeks', noted that he would need to make sure that the project made sense scientifically. He would soon visit Athens to ask Markezinis to clarify his proposals.²¹

The FCO informed Ambassador Hooper that it intended to accept Markezinis' proposals. But this telegram was sent on 16 November 1973, exactly during the turmoil for the occupation of the Athens Polytechnic, and just one day before its suppression by Greek armoured units.²² On the very same days, according to the junta's 1973 'Constitution', the Markezinis government was stripped of all power and the army took over. The initiative was dead. Replying to the FCO on 22 November, Hooper suggested that the FCO take the 'parliamentary temperature' in London, following the bloody suppression of the Polytechnic uprising: 'I don't suppose Monty Woodhouse will now be very receptive.'²³ Moreover, Hawthorne's trip to Athens had been scheduled for 25 November, the very day when the ultra-extremists under Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides launched their coup that toppled the Papadopoulos regime, as well as the (by now, nominal) Markezinis government.

During the 'liberalization' experiment, additional initiatives also came from lower echelons of the public sector, involving the CCMS energy projects. In July 1973, the head of the Greek Atomic Energy Commission (the Democritus nuclear research centre), A. Spyridonos, and Panayiotis Gounaris of the Greek Public Power Corporation (PPC) participated in an organizational meeting of the Solar Energy pilot study.²⁴ Gounaris, the driving force behind the PPC's geothermal projects, also showed strong interest for the CCMS' geothermal energy study. In September 1973, he accompanied American experts in a visit to Greek installations (Milos, Aidipsos and Thermopylai).²⁵ This seemed to be a time of good prospects.

However, the advent of the Ioannides dictatorship was a fatal development. This regime was even more backward politically than the previous version of the junta; adjustment to modernist trends was simply out of the question. Thus, Greece was limited to a rather low-key participation in the solar and geothermal energy projects, as well as in the energy conservation study, but ambitions for a more active involvement were not realised. NATO documents of late 1973 and early 1974 discuss the preparatory meetings on geothermal energy of experts from Canada, West Germany, France, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Turkey and the US, as well as of Japan, Mexico and New Zealand; the similar meetings on the disposal of hazardous substances of experts from the US, France, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark and West Germany; and the studies on energy conservation by experts from Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the US, Portugal and Turkey. Greece was effectively absent.²⁶ These documents, moreover, were forwarded to the delegations by the NATO Executive Secretary, George Sekeris, a Greek diplomat who was persecuted by the junta for his involvement in the Navy Mutiny of spring 1973, dismissed by the Athens government, and immediately employed in this important post by the alliance. In the spring of 1974, Gounaris and the PPC again attempted to co-pilot a project of the geothermal energy pilot study, but the government was not receptive. The PPC informed the US Embassy that it could not send a delegation to the forthcoming meeting in Iceland.²⁷

The rapprochement with the CCMS, 1974–79

Ironically, Greece's transition to democracy, under the respected statesman Constantine Karamanlis in July 1974, was followed in August by its withdrawal from the NATO military command in protest for the West's inaction during the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.²⁸ Relations with the CCMS suffered as well. A Greek delegation attended an already scheduled solar energy conference in France in September 1974.²⁹ However, in November (two days before the Greek general elections), the new US Ambassador to Athens, Jack Kubisch, reported to the State Department that he had conveyed to the government invitations to energy conferences in Brussels and Milan, but the Foreign Ministry replied that the country could not participate due to insufficient notice. Essentially, Kubisch noted, the Greeks indicated that they were not interested.³⁰

Despite its withdrawal from the military command, since early 1975 Athens opted for a gradual stabilization of relations with NATO. The available evidence suggests that the CCMS became one of the channels through which the Greeks tried to maintain their contacts with the alliance. On their part, the Americans were willing to use the CCMS in order to effect a low-key rapprochement on technical and environmental issues. The Americans used the CCMS in the same period and in a similar manner in the case of Portugal (which faced its post-revolutionary turmoil) and in order to facilitate Spain's rapprochement with the alliance.³¹ They proved eager to provide encouragement and technical aid once the Greeks showed that they would be interested in specific projects.

The first such indication came in early February 1975, when the Greek government noted that it was 'thinking of attending' a meeting of the Rational Use of Energy project of the Energy Conservation pilot study.³² The US Permanent Representative to NATO, David Bruce, asked the State Department to send material to Athens and encourage its participation.³³ From this point onwards, the Greeks became more active in the CCMS projects. Elias Clis, who in late 1975 became the CCMS officer of the Greek delegation to NATO, noted to this author that the government instructed the delegation to terminate the period of isolation and inward-looking attitudes of the junta. Greek participation in CCMS projects aimed to effect a low-key rapprochement with the alliance, but also to produce firm results on environmental policy, secure the participation of able scientists and further the transfer of technology to the country. The new head of the delegation, Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, a major figure of Greek diplomacy, was also pivotal in encouraging this elevated participation in CCMS work.³⁴

In March 1975, the Greeks informed the US delegation to NATO that three experts of the Ministry of Social Welfare would attend a meeting on air pollution assessment and modelling in Cologne.³⁵ In May, Athens indicated that Professor Nicolaos Matsaniotis, the Director of the Aghia Sophia Hospital in Athens, would represent the country in a meeting in Munich of the Emergency Medical Services project of the Advanced Health Care pilot study.³⁶ Later in May, the Greek government appointed Professor A. Deligiannis, the new President of the national Committee for Atomic Energy, as its contact for the Solar Energy pilot study. Deligiannis immediately indicated his availability to participate in the forthcoming meeting in California.³⁷ In June, the Greek delegation to NATO informed the alliance that the country would participate in an experts' meeting of the Coastal Water Pollution pilot study, and that Professor N. G. Koumoutsos, the Dean of the School of Chemical Engineering of the Athens Polytechnic and coordinator on the energy conservation project, would attend a meeting on Rational Use of Energy – Industrial International Data Base.³⁸

This was a turning point regarding Greek participation at the CCMS. This trend was accelerated in the following period. In September 1975, James Breeze, the American coordinator of the Geothermal Energy pilot study, visited installations in Greece (the island of Milos) and in Turkey. He was received by Gounaris, the head of the Geothermal Research Division of the PPC, who had now become the Greek representative to the project.³⁹ In the same year, the Greeks also signed the Memorandum of Understanding of the Solar Energy project; this was their most solemn association with CCMS work.⁴⁰ In 1976, Greece expressed strong interest to participate in the preparation of CCMS projects on drinking water (some Aegean islands had problems with their water supply) and on an earthquake warning system (a telling difference with the junta's attitude towards the 1971 San Francisco conference).⁴¹ Initially, Greece appeared as a possible co-pilot of the Drinking Water pilot study, although it did not assume such roles in the end.⁴²

More importantly, there was a modest elevation of the Greek participation in CCMS plenary sessions. The country sent prominent national experts to the

sessions. Gounaris attended the spring 1975 plenary session, when the Greeks, the Turks, the Italians and the Americans held additional informal meetings on geothermal projects.⁴³ In the autumn session, Greece was represented by George Kournoutos, the Director General of the Department of Scientific Research and Development of the Ministry of Culture, and by Petros Seizanis of the PPC.⁴⁴ According to the American delegation to NATO, the Greek team did particularly well in the autumn 1975 plenary session, taking an active part in discussions about energy projects.⁴⁵ Kournoutos, Gounaris and Ioannis Eleftheriades from Environmental Affairs of the Ministry of Economic Coordination formed the Greek delegation in the spring 1976 plenary session, under the direction of the Permanent Representative, Theodoropoulos, and the delegation's CCMS officer, Clis.⁴⁶ Kournoutos became the official responsible for CCMS issues.⁴⁷ Thus, Athens opted for a low-profile, technocratic approach. It sent prominent and capable experts to the projects and plenary sessions, expecting tangible results. Still, it carefully refrained from sending political figures to CCMS plenary sessions.

Nor was this opening to the CCMS an isolated policy. After 1974, the Greek government made a determined effort to make a comprehensive reform, including its adjustment to the new demands of environmental policy, and to make up for the time lost since the mid-1960s. The established and inclusive Greek democracy was founded then, a process crowned by the adoption of a new Constitution in June 1975 and the immediate submission of the Greek application for accession to the EEC.⁴⁸ Greece became the first Western country to insert a special article on the environment in its 1975 Constitution.⁴⁹ By the second half of the 1970s (a time when the air pollution of the Athens area had peaked), new initiatives were launched: for example, the beginning of the building of the Acropolis Museum,⁵⁰ the programme for the conservation of the Acropolis monuments through UNESCO,⁵¹ the setting up of the National Council of Regional Planning and the Environment, the plan for the urban development of Athens,⁵² the programme to deal with the problem of traffic in Athens,⁵³ the traditional settlements programme of the Hellenic Tourism Organization,⁵⁴ and the setting up of a Ministry for the Environment under Stefanos Manos in the 1980 George Rallis government. It was the first time that Greece was trying to put together a coherent environmental policy. Evidently, its attitude towards the CCMS was part of this larger process.

A new turning point in Greece's relation with NATO scientific cooperation was reached in spring 1979, when two major developments took place: the launching of Science for Stability, a special programme of the NATO Science Committee, providing for the technology transfer to the alliance's less developed members; and the launching of a new CCMS project, with Greece as the pilot country. The Science for Stability programme provided for technological aid to Portugal, Greece and Turkey, to 'help them strengthen the technological infrastructure needed for their growth and stability', improve their training capabilities, adjust to the 'realities of problem-oriented research efforts', and thus arrest the 'growing scientific and technological disparities' within the alliance. It involved,

for all three countries, the development and use of skilled manpower; research, development and adaptation; and indicative proposals for projects of cooperative applied research on power development, industrial waste water treatment, irrigation, urban supply and aquaculture, solar energy technologies, new processing methodologies for low-grade coals (lignites), ocean and coastal resources, pollution of the sea and food production. National programmes for Greece would involve oceanography, research and development of water resources, and training and research in computer sciences.⁵⁵ Notably, the programme skillfully dealt with sea projects without touching upon the ongoing Greek-Turkish dispute on the Aegean Sea Bed. The programme was used as a means of stabilizing these countries within NATO, and some opposition was expressed in the alliance regarding its concept of 'using science sponsorship as assistance money'; anyway, it went on until the late 1990s.⁵⁶

In the same month of April 1979, Greece for the first time submitted a proposal to pilot a CCMS study on conservation/restoration of monuments. The first suggestions had come in 1978 by the Americans, and during the autumn 1978 CCMS plenary session, Greece offered to act as pilot.⁵⁷ An organizational experts' meeting was held in Paris, under US and French tutelage, in March 1979. The Greek proposal, submitted in April 1979, pointed to the huge availability of monuments in member countries and to the need to address the problems of adverse environmental effects (Greece already had experience on this through its UNESCO projects on the Acropolis), to develop cooperative programmes and to create a model for international cooperation in the preservation of cultural property.⁵⁸ During the May 1979 CCMS plenary, the Greeks noted that their proposal was an indication of their priority to participate more actively in the CCMS.⁵⁹ The Greek proposal was approved, and the programme came under the coordination of the prominent archaeologist Christos Doumas. A first meeting of experts was held in Athens in October 1979, and a second in Bonn in November 1980. Three sub-projects were launched: air pollution and conservation of documents (measurement), led by West Germany; documentation, led by France; and methods of treatment of documents, led by the Netherlands. The US, France and West Germany were co-pilots. However, the conclusion of the project delayed due to the complicated character of the subject. In 1983, the Americans suggested coordinating with the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Environmental Monitoring for Architectural Conservation.⁶⁰ The project was finally concluded in 1986.⁶¹

Marine pollution also became a subject of elevated Greek involvement in CCMS work. Athens became a co-pilot (together with Turkey and the US) in a French-led project on Remote Sensing for the Control of Marine Pollution, launched in 1977.⁶² During the May 1979 plenary session, the Greeks offered to act as co-pilots in a US-led pilot study on Estuarine Management, arguing that 'although [Greece] had no real estuaries, it did have many coastal areas which came within the category covered by the study'.⁶³ However, the US undertook this study without co-pilots. In 1983, Greece became co-pilot in an Italian-led study for Forest Fires.⁶⁴

Thus, the transition to democracy also saw a significant stepping up of the effort to adjust, participate in international environmental cooperation and achieve results. Of course, the country still had a long way to go. As the US Embassy noted in September 1975 (at a time when the Americans were making similar enquiries in all NATO members), in Greece the use of seat belts in cars was not yet compulsory, whereas it had become compulsory in dictatorial Portugal since 1970.⁶⁵ More importantly, environmental policy suffered from the conflict of responsibilities of the many Ministries involved (a usual problem in all Western European countries since the early 1970s). In mid-1978, on the occasion of a visit by members of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to Greece, the Americans noted that the Ministry of Economic Coordination was the main government department responsible for the environment, but this competence was also shared with many other Ministries and state authorities (Public Works, Culture, etc.). The system, the Americans commented, was not effective: 'This bureaucratic landscape appears filled with obstacles.' However, there were encouraging signs: 'Quality of professionals and officials appears quite high and individuals are most anxious to identify areas for collaboration.'⁶⁶ These weaknesses, evidently, were behind the decision to form a Ministry of the Environment in 1980. This, however, was merged during the 1980s with Public Works, a sector that tended to shadow the environment.

Conclusions

Environmental cooperation was one of the 'new frontier' international issues that emerged in the late 1960s. The environment is a useful indicator of the ability of a society or a state to adjust to the new version of modernity. However, the junta abysmally failed to address the emergence of the CCMS. The Colonels tried to use it politically in order to secure intra-alliance recognition; and when they failed to achieve this, they simply lost all interest in environmental issues. There is strong evidence that parts of the civil service (the Foreign Ministry or officials of the Ministries of Culture and of Public Works) and civil society tried to adjust to the new trends, but in a small country such as Greece, the indifference/hostility of the government could block everything. A parenthesis is evident during the 1973 'liberalization' experiment and the Markezinis government that tried to create functional lines of communication with the British on a bilateral basis; during this period, state officials, on their own initiative, also tried to effect a functional involvement in CCMS energy studies. However, this again led nowhere as the 'liberalization' experiment ended with the violent suppression of the Athens Polytechnic uprising, and the November 1973 coup. The junta was an anti-modernist force, representing a socially hyper-conservative, ethno-populist and essentially anti-Western attitude.⁶⁷ It could not comprehend the modernist nature of the ascending Western environmentalism in the dawn of the post-industrial era.

The full adjustment of Greece took place during the transition to democracy. Although Karamanlis withdrew the country from the NATO military command,

he intended to secure Greece's place in the Western world; he oversaw a rapid modernization of Greek institutions, internal policies and foreign relations, with the environment as a part of this process. On the CCMS, the Karamanlis government displayed the same mixture of forward attitudes, prudence and realism that ensured its success in other fields as well. From early 1975, Greece began to cooperate in CCMS work more intensely. It did not send political figures to the CCMS processes, but was represented by prominent technocrats, ensuring an effective participation. The aim was twofold: both to effect a rapprochement with NATO on an uncontroversial, apolitical level, thus contributing to the overall policy of stabilizing relations with the West; and to secure firm results on the level of environmental policy itself. This meant that the government was giving more breathing space to the experts – something that had been denied to them by the junta. By the late 1970s, Greece was co-pilot on one project and it piloted another, while it expected alliance aid in high-technology.

The adjustment to the new international environmental agenda was an integral, though low-key, aspect of the Greek transition to democracy, which not only involved the 'overriding' levels of the Constitution, relations with the US and NATO, and the accession to the EEC, but expanded to cover the wider modernization of the Greek state and society. This oblique use of the CCMS, as a modernist project bringing the new democracies of Southern Europe closer to NATO, is also evident in the cases of Portugal and Spain during their own transitions to democracy. It is a useful reminder of the interactive and multi-level character of the democratic transitions of the 1970s (and arguably the ones that followed). The conclusion of the Treaty of Accession to the EEC, in May 1979, and Greece's formal entry in January 1981, meant that, to some extent at least, the country acquired an 'automatic' mechanism for its adjustment through EEC legislation. But it is doubtful whether this should be treated as a 'happy ending'. EEC/EU procedures are indispensable, but cannot substitute for the fuller development of an environmental movement and a more structured environmental policy by the Greek state itself.

Notes

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- 2 See John Krige, *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006); and the collection of NATO documents in *Science and the Alliance: NATO's Third Dimension* (Brussels: NATO Archives, 2014).
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- War and the Environment* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Simone Turchetti, *Greening the Alliance: The Diplomacy of NATO's Science and Environmental Initiatives* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019).
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 - 6 Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591, Crowe (Oslo) to State Department, 25 October 1969; London, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FCO 41/411, Richards (NATO) to Thomas (FCO), 19 November 1969.
 - 7 TNA/CAB 168/279, Burrows (NATO) to FCO, 6 November 1969.
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 - 9 NARA, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 NATO, Box 3032, Tasca (Athens) to State Department, 29 June 1970.
 - 10 TNA/FCO 55/409, Flower (NATO) to Elam (FCO), 13 March 1970.
 - 11 See NATO/AC/274-R6, 30 December 1970; and the Greek objections in TNA/FCO 76/224, Annino-Cavalierato (Greek Permanent Representative to NATO) to Randers, 4 January 1971.
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 - 14 NARA, RG 59, Tasca to State Department, 27 March 1973, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, accessed 27 October 2015.
 - 15 NARA, RG 59, McAuliffe (NATO) to State Department, 27 March 1973, Tasca to State Department, 26 April 1974, Rogers (Washington) to Athens, 26 June 1973, and Stearns (Athens) to State Department, 17 September 1973, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, accessed 27 October 2015.
 - 16 NARA, RG 59, McAuliffe (NATO) to State Department, 25 September 1973, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, accessed 27 October 2015.
 - 17 Maro Kardamitsi-Adami, 'Πολιτική Διάσωσης των Παραδοσιακών Οικισμών: κατά και μετά τη Δικτατορία' [*The Policy of Conservation of Traditional Settlements: During and after the Dictatorship*] in Pavlos Sourlas (ed.), *Η Δικτατορία των Συνταγματαρχών και η Αποκατάσταση της Δημοκρατίας [The Colonels' Dictatorship and the Democratic Transition]* (Athens: Foundation of the Parliament, 2016), 267-79.
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 - 20 TNA/FCO 55/1001, minute (Rothwell), 1 November 1973.
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 - 31 Hatzivassiliou, *The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society*, 79-80, 217.
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11 'The situation in Greece'

American human rights activism in the wake of the 1967 coup*

Sarah B. Snyder

In the wake of the 1967 coup, prominent American academics were concerned about the fate of Greek political leader Andreas Papandreou, whom many of them knew personally. Their efforts to prevent Andreas' execution and secure his release from prison evolved into broader advocacy aimed at the repressive regime.¹ Given the tepid condemnation of the coup and subsequent repression by Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's administrations, years of activism by Americans followed.

A transnational campaign against the politically repressive junta developed, and non-state actors played a significant role in forcing foreign governments such as the US to grapple with human rights concerns.² The plight of an identifiable political prisoner with many transnational connections such as Andreas Papandreou served as a rallying point for disparate actors in the US. A loosely linked collection of academics, members of Congress, concerned citizens, international human rights groups and ad hoc non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the US Committee for Democracy in Greece, succeeded in keeping policymakers' attention on human rights violations. Finally, Greece's location in Europe and history as the birthplace of democracy meant that, for some, human rights abuses there were harder to overlook than those in places more culturally or geographically distant.

Congressional activism

Many American critics viewed the government's attitude towards the Greek colonels in the context of their own opposition to the war in Vietnam and intervention in the Dominican Republic.³ For example, Representative Donald M. Fraser, a Democrat from Minnesota, expressed concern about US support for the regime, especially in terms of military assistance and information policy, as well as public and private investment in the country. He pushed the State Department to do more than have a 'hands off, no comment, position regarding the denial of human rights in Greece today', indicating he was particularly troubled at reports that the Greek regime was torturing its political prisoners.⁴ He also wrote to the Secretary of State and the White House to communicate apprehension about Andreas Papandreou, who had formerly been a professor at the University of Minnesota.⁵ He

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