



THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

Edited by POLLY LOW

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

EDINBURGH READINGS ON THE ANCIENT WORLD

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Edited by
Polly Low

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Edinburgh University Press Ltd
22 George Square, Edinburgh

Typeset in Sabon
by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester, and
printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 0 7486 2585 7 (hardback)

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Acknowledgements

For permission to reprint the articles included in this volume, I would like to thank the following: Cambridge University Press (Chs 1, 6b), Hunter R. Rawlings III and *Phoenix*, the journal of the Classical Association of Canada (Ch. 2), the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies (Ch. 3), University of Michigan Press (Ch. 4), Professor P. J. Rhodes and the estate of D. M. Lewis (Ch. 5), Professor Michael Walbank (Ch. 6a), the Classical Association (Ch. 6b), Oxford University Press (Chs 7, 9), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart (Chs 8, 11), Johns Hopkins University Press (Ch. 10), Mme. J. de Romilly and the Institute of Classical Studies (Ch. 12), Professor Tonio Hölscher and the Center for Hellenic Studies (Ch. 13). Details of the original place of publication of articles are given at the head of each chapter.

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Many people have patiently advised me on various aspects of this volume at all stages of its planning and production. I am greatly indebted to Christy Constantakopoulou, Peter Hunt and Peter Liddel for sharing with me their expertise on both studying and teaching the Athenian Empire; to Tom Harrison and the readers for Edinburgh University Press for their helpful guidance; to Giselle Glasman for producing the translation of Ch. 8; and to Jill Robbins of the Center for Hellenic Studies for assistance with images.

Note to the Reader

The articles and excerpts included in this book were originally published in a range of different journals and books. There is therefore a degree of variation in the conventions used in each piece: there is inconsistency in spelling, particularly in the transliteration of Greek names and terms, some variety in the abbreviations used, and different modes of referencing: chapters using the Harvard (i.e. name and date) system are followed by individual bibliographies; those using 'short titles' usually have footnotes and no bibliography.

The final bibliography contains works referred to by the editor.

Editorial notes and translations of ancient texts are introduced either within square brackets [] or in daggered footnotes †. Some Greek terms, especially those in use in English, have been transliterated.

All abbreviations of ancient texts, modern collections, books and journals, used either in the chapters or in the editorial material, are listed and explained on pages ix–xiv.

Abbreviations

I ANCIENT AUTHORS AND TEXTS

Names of ancient authors given in brackets, e.g. [Xen.], imply the same as Ps. or Pseudo (q.v.).

Ael[ian]	<i>V[aria] H[istoria]</i>
Aesch[ylus]	<i>Sep[tem contra Thebas] = Seven Against Thebes</i>
Andoc[ides]	
Anth[ologia] Pal[atina]	= Palatine (or Greek) Anthology
Antiph[on]	
Ar[istophanes]	<i>Ach[arnians]</i> <i>Eq[uites] = Knights</i> <i>Lys[istrata] or Lysis[trata]</i> <i>Nub[es] = Clouds</i> <i>Pax = Peace</i> <i>Ran[ae] = Frogs</i> <i>Vesp[ae] = Wasps</i>
Ar[istotle] or Arist[otle]	<i>Ath[enaion] pol[iteia] = Const[itution] of [the] Ath[enians]</i> <i>Pol[itics]</i> <i>Rhet[oric]</i>
Dem[osthenes]	
Diod[orus]	
Eup[olis]	
Eurip[ides] or Euripid[es]	<i>Iphig[enia] Taur[ica] = Iphigenia at Tauris</i> <i>Suppl[ices] = Suppliants</i>
<i>Hell[enica] Oxy[rhynchia]</i>	= Oxyrhynchus Historian
H[ero]d[ot]us or Her[odotus] or Herod[otus]	
Hesych[ius]	

Isoc[rates]	<i>Paneg[yricus]</i>
Lys[ias]	
Paus[anias]	
Pindar	<i>Isth[mian Odes]</i>
Pl[ato]	<i>Gorg[ias]</i> <i>Hipp[ias] Maior = Greater Hippias</i> <i>Menex[enus]</i> <i>Rep[ublic]</i>
Pliny	<i>N[atural H[istory]</i>
Plut[arch]	<i>Alc[ibiades]</i> <i>Apophth[egmata] Lac[onica] = Sayings of the Spartans</i> <i>Arist[ides]</i> <i>Cim[on] = Kim[on]</i> <i>Lys[ander]</i> <i>Mor[alia]</i> <i>Nic[ias]</i> <i>Per[icles]</i> <i>Them[istocles]</i> <i>Thes[eus]</i>
Polyaen[us]	
Polyb[ius]	
Ps. or Pseudo	Used before the name of an ancient author (e.g. Pseudo-Demosthenes) to indicate that a work, although traditionally included among that author's writings, was probably produced by a different writer.
Ps[eudo] Xen[ophon]	<i>Ath[enainion] Pol[iteia] = Constitution of the Athenians</i>
Soph[ocles]	<i>El[ectra]</i> <i>O[edipus at] C[olonus]</i>
Strab[o]	
Theopomp[us]	
Th[ucydides] or Thuc[ydides]	
Xen[ophon]	<i>Ages[ilaus]</i> <i>Anab[asis]</i> <i>Hell[enica]</i> <i>Mem[orabilia]</i>


2 COLLECTIONS OF INSCRIPTIONS, JOURNALS AND MODERN PUBLICATIONS

AC	<i>L'Antiquité Classique</i>
AJA	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
AJP or AJPh	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Am. Hist. Rev.</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>Anz. Wien</i>	<i>Anzeiger der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Classe</i>
APF	<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete</i>
<i>Arch. Anz.</i>	<i>Archäologischer Anzeiger</i>
<i>ArchEph</i>	<i>Archaeologiki Ephimeris</i> [Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς]
ATL	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery and M. F. McGregor, <i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> , 4 vols, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939–53
BCH	<i>Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique</i>
BSA	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>Bull. Ép.</i>	<i>Bulletin Épigraphique</i> [included in the <i>Revue des Etudes Grecques</i>]
CA	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
CAH or <i>Camb. Anc. Hist</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
CEG	P. A. Hansen, <i>Carmina Epigraphica Graeca</i> , 2 vols, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1983–9
<i>Cl. J.</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>Cl. Rh.</i>	<i>Clara Rhodos</i> , 10 vols, Rhodes: Istituto storico-archeologico 1928–41
<i>Class. Phil.</i> or CP or CPh	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>Class. Rev.</i> or CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
CQ or <i>Class. Quart.</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CSCA	<i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>
DarSag	C. Daremberg and E. Saglio, <i>Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines</i> , Paris: Hachette, 1875
FGH or FG rH	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , 3 vols, Berlin and Leiden: Brill, 1923–58

- Fornara C. Fornara, *From Archaic Times to the end of the Peloponnesian War*, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome I, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983
- G des A*³ E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd edn, 5 vols, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1910–39
- GG* or *Griech. Gesch.* J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 4 vols, Strasburg: Trübner, 1893–1904 (2nd edn, 1912–27)
- GRBS* *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
- HCT* A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945–1981
- Hesp.* *Hesperia*
- HSCP* or *HSPh* *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
- HZ* *Historische Zeitschrift*
- IG* *Inscriptiones Graecae*. [Most references in this book are to *IG* i³, which is the third edition of the first volume, containing Athenian inscriptions up to 403 BC. (References to *IG* i² are to the now outdated second edition of that volume.) References to *IG* ii² are to the second edition of the second volume, which includes inscriptions from the fourth (and later) centuries.]
- IM* *Istanbuler Mitteilungen*
- Inscr. Didyma* A. Rehm, *Didyma II. Die Inschriften*, Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1958
- Inscr. Dél.* or *I. Délos* *Inscriptions de Délos*, 7 vols, Paris: Champion, 1926–72
- Jahrb.* *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*
- Jeffery, *LSAG* L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece: A Study of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and its Development from the Eighth to the Fifth centuries BC*, rev. edn (with a supplement by A. W. Johnston), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990
- JHS* *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
- JRS* *Journal of Roman Studies*

Kock CAF	T. Kock, <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> , 3 vols, Leipzig: Teubner, 1880–8
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
LIMC	<i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i>
LSCG	F. Sokolowski, <i>Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques</i> , Paris: de Boccard, 1969
LSJ	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , rev. H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie, 9th edn with supplement, ed. E. A. Barber, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968
LSS	F. Sokolowski, <i>Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques. Supplément</i> , Paris: de Boccard, 1962
Meritt <i>Ath. Fin. Doc.</i>	B. D. Meritt, <i>Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century</i> , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932
Michel	C. Michel, <i>Recueil d'inscriptions grecques</i> , Brussels: Lamertin, 1900
ML	R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, to the End of the Fifth Century BC</i> , 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988
Moretti	L. Moretti, ed., <i>Iscrizioni Storiche Ellenistiche</i> , 2 vols, Florence: La nuova Italia, 1967, 1976
<i>Num. Chron.</i>	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
PACA	<i>Proceedings of the African Classical Association</i>
PCPhS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>Phil. Woch.</i>	<i>Philologische Wochenschrift</i>
RE	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
REA	<i>Revue des Etudes Anciennes</i>
<i>Rev. Et. Gr.</i> or REG	<i>Revue des Etudes Grecques</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
RHR	<i>Revue de l'Histoire des Religions</i>
<i>Riv. di Fil.</i>	<i>Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica</i>
RO	P. J. Rhodes and R. G. Osborne, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 403–323 BC</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

SAWW	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien, Philos.-Hist. Klasse</i>
SB Heid. Ak. d. Wiss.	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-Hist. Klasse</i>
Schwenk	C. Schwenk, <i>Athens in the Age of Alexander: The Dated Laws and Decrees of 'the Lykourgan Era' 338–322 BC</i> , Chicago: Ares, 1985
SCI	<i>Scripta Classica Israelica</i>
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
SIG ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edn, 4 vols, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1915–24
Sitzb. Berl. Akad.	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Philosophie, Geschichte, Staats-, Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften</i>
Sitzb. Wien. = SAWW	
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Tod GHI	M. N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , 2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933–48
ZfN	<i>Zeitschrift für Numismatik</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>





Introduction

General Introduction

The history of the Athenian Empire (or Delian League)¹ is traditionally thought to begin in the Persian Wars. In 479 BC a combined Greek force assembled at Plataea and inflicted a decisive defeat on the invading Persian army, ending a threat to the Greek mainland which had reached a level of crisis since the Persian invasion of the previous year, and which had loomed for at least a decade before that (notably in the unsuccessful Persian landing at Marathon in 490). The Greek alliance that fought the Persians in these years and in the more aggressive operations that came immediately after the victory at Plataea was led by the two most powerful city-states of the period: Athens and Sparta. But by the end of 478 leadership had passed to just one of those cities – Athens – and the way was open for a multilateral alliance to become an imperialist organisation, an organisation which, until its final collapse in 404, was less concerned with defending the Greeks against external aggression than with fostering the power and glory of a single state.

But such a narrative elides a number of problems, and leaves some key questions unasked. The story of the development of Athenian power need not begin only in 478, but could be traced back at least as far as the political and military reforms of the late sixth century. And Athenian willingness to become actively involved in conflict with Persia is visible from the time of the Ionian Revolt (which began *c.* 499).² The process by which Athens emerged as sole leader of the alliance is also disputed: while some sources (notably Thucydides 1.95) suggest that Sparta was

¹ On naming the Athenian Empire, see the discussion below.

² For an argument in favour of an 'early' start to Athenian imperialism, see R. G. Osborne, *The Athenian Empire*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2000, 1–3. Herodotus describes the Athenian decision to involve themselves in the Ionian revolt as 'the beginning (*archê*) of troubles for both Greeks and barbarians' (5.97): the word *archê* can also mean 'empire'.

happy to leave Athens in charge, others (including Herodotus 8.3) imply that the Spartans' withdrawal was due more to Athenian manipulation than to a genuine willingness to surrender this position of influence.³ Most contentious of all is the problem of the exact nature of the Athenian-led alliance. The sources tell differing stories about the extent to which it was a direct continuation of the coalition which had fought against the Persians up to 478. They also allow for dramatically different interpretations of the process by which this alliance became something to which the label 'empire' can be applied: did the 'Athenian Empire' come into being in 478, or was its development more a gradual, and perhaps even less deliberate, process?

These problems – the origins and aims of the empire, and the wider difficulty of constructing a narrative of the empire's development over time – form the focus of Part I of this book. But it is worth spending some time here discussing two of the fundamental reasons why such questions are so hard to answer: the character of the ancient sources, and the problem of defining 'imperialism'.

ANCIENT SOURCES

The starting point for most discussions of the Athenian Empire is Thucydides.⁴ The historian's declared intention was to write 'the history of the war between Athens and Sparta' (1.1) – that is, the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 (the account is unfinished, breaking off in 411). The Athenian Empire plays a prominent role in the story that Thucydides tells: the growth of Athens' power after the Persian Wars was a crucial factor in provoking the conflict in the first place (1.23); retention of the empire forms a central part of the strategy advocated by the Athenian general Pericles (2.13, 2.65); and the attempts of the allies to revolt from Athenian control are a recurring theme in the narrative of the conflict (the multiple rebellions of 412, described at 8.5ff, mark the beginning of the end of the war). It is, however, important to remember that Thucydides never promises to provide a complete history of the empire, and that we should not, therefore, be surprised to find gaps in his account. Thucydides says nothing, for example, about the transfer of the Delian League's treasury from Delos to Athens, a move often argued to mark a key step in the development of the empire; nor does he report many of the revolts (and suppressions of revolts) that we know from

³ For a compact discussion of the conflicting evidence and its implications, see S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323 BC*, London: Routledge, 2002, 9–13.

⁴ For information on editions and discussions of the ancient sources, see the Guide to Further Reading.

other sources to have taken place; nor does he provide information about many of the day-to-day mechanics of the empire's operation. It is equally, perhaps more, crucial to recognise that the information that Thucydides does provide about the empire is a result of deliberate selection: Thucydides presents the facts which are, in his opinion, most relevant to the wider story which he is telling about the course of the war, and about the rise and decline of Athens' power. While gaps in the story should not be surprising, therefore, they are not necessarily insignificant. Why is the establishment of the system of tribute deemed worthy of comment, but the transfer of the treasury (in which that tribute was stored) passed over in silence? Why does Thucydides spend so much time describing the revolt of Mytilene, and so little on other rebellions? Further examples will be seen throughout this book.⁵

If Thucydides' selection and omission of historical events raise difficulties, still more troubling is the question of how to analyse the non-narrative sections of his work: that is, the speeches, attributed to various characters, which regularly punctuate the action of the history. The speeches pose a notorious problem for all students of Thucydides, but that problem is particularly pressing in this context because it is in the speeches that much of the most explicit analysis of the nature of Athenian imperialism appears.⁶ It is therefore very important to decide whether these speeches represent views which were actually expressed about the empire (would the Athenian assembly, for example, be happy to have their empire described to them as 'tyranny', as it is by Pericles at 2.63 and by Cleon at 3.37?); whether they reflect ideas which were less prominent in official discourse but nevertheless widespread in certain circles; or whether they are simply Thucydides' personal, and possibly idiosyncratic, analysis of the underlying motivations for the behaviour he observed in this period.

Thucydides does, it is true, give an authorial statement on his approach to reporting speeches: 'I have given the speeches roughly as I thought the several individuals or groups would have said what they had to say, keeping as close as possible to the general sense of what was actually said'.⁷ But this statement is notoriously ambiguous, even inconsistent: it contains both a claim to accuracy ('keeping as close as possible . . .') and an admission that Thucydides' own judgement

⁵ Further discussion of this question (as well as suggestions for reading) can be found in the introduction to Part IV.

⁶ For a convenient listing of the speeches in Thucydides, as well as further analysis, see P. Stadter (ed.), *The Speeches in Thucydides*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973.

⁷ Gomme's translation in the *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*: the discussions of this passage there, and in Hornblower's *Commentary on Thucydides*, are a useful starting point for analysis of Thucydides' claim and its implications (and have guidance on further reading).

has played a part in the shaping of the speeches ('roughly as I thought . . .'). Its interpretation has been a longstanding (and ongoing) source of scholarly disagreement. The dominant trend in older scholarship was to place greater emphasis on the second part of the statement, and to treat the speeches as essentially accurate renditions (albeit with Thucydidean stylistic overlay) of political debate in the Athenian Empire. More recent work, which has become more alert to the literary artifice in all aspects of Thucydides' work (the narrative, as well as the speeches), has been correspondingly less trusting of the verbatim accuracy of the speeches, and has tended to view them as sites of historical analysis rather than historical reportage.⁸ Reflections of both viewpoints will be found in the articles in this volume, and it is worth being alert to the way in which the speeches are used as evidence for imperial actions and ideology (particularly since authors are not always explicit in stating or justifying their views on this question).

One reason for Thucydides' dominance in analyses of the Athenian Empire – and also a reason why disputes over the correct interpretation of his account are so hard to resolve – is the shortage of ancient evidence with which his version of events can directly be compared. The only other surviving continuous narrative of the period appears in Diodorus' *Universal History*. This first-century BC text, drawn largely, and generally uncritically, from work of the fourth-century historian Ephorus, is usually (and legitimately) thought to be far inferior, in reliability as well as analytical depth, to Thucydides' account. Other historians of the classical period – Herodotus and Xenophon – do provide valuable information about the early and late stages (respectively) of the empire, but there is too little direct overlap with Thucydides' narrative to make comparison an easy task.

Of other literary sources, one of the most important is the comic playwright Aristophanes, not so much for the facts he provides (although, as will be seen, his plays have been used as a source of evidence for details of imperial policy⁹) but for the broader impression he conveys about attitudes to empire (the humour derived from the meddling Athenian imperial official in the *Birds*, 1035–55, for example). The difficulty, as with all attempts to use comedy to write history, lies in assessing where the humour comes from, and how far it has distorted reality.¹⁰ Tragedy, too,

⁸ For this approach to the speeches, see above all C. Macleod, *Collected Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, chs. 8, 10, 11.

⁹ See especially Chs. 5, 6b.

¹⁰ For a discussion of Aristophanes' depiction of imperialism, see W. G. Forrest, 'Aristophanes and the Athenian Empire', in B. Levick (ed.), *The Ancient Historian and his Materials*, Westmead: Gregg, 1975, 17–29.

can provide a rich source of reflections – albeit often of a more indirect or allusive sort – on Athens’ imperial role.¹¹

Another stimulating, and problematic, source for contemporary attitudes to imperialism is Pseudo-Xenophon’s *Constitution of the Athenians*, a political pamphlet of uncertain date and authorship, which describes with grudging respect the ways in which the Athenians have profited from their empire. (The alternative name for the author of this work – the ‘Old Oligarch’ – derives from the text’s grumpily anti-democratic perspective.) The empire also makes cameo appearances in other works: fourth-century oratory; another, more sober, *Constitution of the Athenians* (attributed to the philosopher Aristotle); and some of the lives of the biographer Plutarch. As will be seen, these texts offer scattered insights into imperial history which sometimes diverge significantly from the Thucydidean version of events; as will also be seen, however, the reliability of their assessments is regularly challenged.

The most extensive source of non-Thucydidean evidence for the empire comes not in literary texts but in inscriptions.¹² Classical Athens was not unique in the Greek world (or in antiquity) in recording on stone many of the decisions made and regulations passed by its assembly, or in keeping public accounts of dedications in sanctuaries and other aspects of religious practice. But fifth-century Athens does differ from other city-states of the period in the amount of material which was recorded in this way,¹³ and the documents which have been preserved provide a crucial insight into many aspects of Athens’ imperial practice. Moreover, as publications which are usually authorised by the city of Athens, inscriptions offer the closest thing to official documentation that exists for the empire.

The relevant inscribed material can crudely be divided into two categories. Inscribed decrees record regulations aimed at specific cities (for example, the decree setting up a new, democratic, system of government in the subject-city of Erythrae, discussed in Ch. 3); grant rewards, and responsibilities, to certain individuals (notably proxeny decrees: see Ch. 6); and set up more wide-ranging procedures for the whole empire (the most notorious case being the Coinage Decree, discussed in Ch. 5).

¹¹ For such readings, see, for example, T. Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia*, London: Duckworth, 2000, or S. Mills, *Theseus, Tragedy and the Athenian Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. The context in which tragedies were performed (the festival of the Great Dionysia) was strongly associated with displays of imperial power: see p. 160.

¹² Other sorts of material evidence, particularly art and monumental building, can be used, although the general archaeological impact of the Athenian Empire remains underexplored: see Chs. 10, 13. Collections and translations of epigraphic evidence are discussed in the Guide to Further Reading.

¹³ For a discussion of this phenomenon and the possible reasons for it, see C. W. Hedrick, ‘Democracy and the Athenian epigraphical habit’, *Hesperia* 68 (1999), 387–439.

The second category is the catalogue or list, of which the most famous examples are the lists which record the details of the tribute collected from the empire and dedicated on the Acropolis at Athens each year (these are discussed in the introduction to Part III).

Epigraphic evidence does present substantial problems. The texts are often poorly preserved, and the process of their reconstruction can involve considerable amounts of historical interpretation: it is important, therefore, not to assume that inscriptions necessarily provide unmediated access to untainted historical facts. Inscriptions are often very hard to date accurately, a problem which will be discussed in much greater detail in Part I. And they also pose a larger methodological problem: how should the evidence of inscriptions be combined with that of Thucydides? There is a tendency to assume that these two authoritative types of evidence will tell the same story about the empire, and therefore to use inscriptions to fill in the gaps in Thucydides' account (and vice versa). Such an approach will be seen in several articles in this book. But it should be noted that inscriptions provide material which differs from the Thucydidean version in tone as well as content – much of our evidence for allied co-operation with the empire comes from inscriptions, for example – and that there is scope to use epigraphic evidence to correct, as well as confirm, the story of empire which appears in the literary sources.

A final point which should be noted about all the ancient evidence for the Athenian Empire, both material and literary, is that it is almost exclusively produced by Athenians. Views are sometimes attributed to the subject-states (especially by Thucydides), but it is only possible to speculate as to how accurately such sentiments reflect their opinions. This ignorance also affects efforts to pin down more tangible effects of empire (such as the financial impact on the subject-states). Several articles in this book attempt to explore the experience of empire from the perspective of the allies, but they also clearly reveal the massive problems inherent in such a task. More work is now being done on the history of Greek city-states outside Athens and Sparta, and it is possible that it will one day be possible to discuss with much more confidence the impact of the empire on its subjects. As things stand, however, this line of research, which has been among the most fruitful in recent work on other empires, is all but impossible for the Athenian Empire.¹⁴

¹⁴ For such approaches, see the influential work of E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Knopf, 1994, ch. 3, or the work of the Subaltern Studies group (which originally focused on the experience of empire in South Asia, but has come to be much more widely applied), in, for example, R. Guha and G. C. Spivak (eds.), *Selected Subaltern Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. This work has been more influential in the study of Roman imperialism: see, for example, D. J. Mattingly (ed.), *Dialogues in Roman Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxbow, 1997.

IMPERIALISM

The ancient sources therefore provide an incomplete picture of the detailed history of the Athenian Empire. But they also leave us with gaps in our knowledge of more abstract elements of the empire's history, including, most strikingly, its name.

The label 'Athenian Empire' is a modern invention, as is the alternative 'Delian League'. Neither name is neutral. The name 'Delian League' is derived from the location in which the alliance of 478 was drawn up. As has already been noted (and as will be further explored in Part I), the connection between that alliance and the events which follow is the subject of considerable disagreement, in ancient sources and in modern scholarship. Use of the term 'Delian League' can, therefore, indicate the adoption of a particular position in that debate: a belief, that is, that the terms of the original alliance were not just insincere propaganda but did have a real impact on Athenian conduct, for at least some of the fifth century. Describing the organisation as the 'Athenian Empire', on the other hand, can imply the opposite: this is not a mutually beneficial alliance, but an institution focused on Athens' own interest, over which Athens exercises supreme power. 'Empire' can also, however, be claimed to be too strong a label because it connotes a mode of direct political control and exploitation which was alien to the Greek world.¹⁵

Modern labels are, therefore, problematic, but ancient terminology is even more complex, and no less loaded in its implications. No single name is applied to the Athenian Empire in the ancient sources. It is sometimes referred to as an *archê*, a word which is often translated 'empire', but which literally means 'rule' (it can also be applied to the control of a magistrate inside a city). At times it is called an alliance (*summachia*), or a hegemony (*hegemonia*). In Thucydides in particular, but also elsewhere (for example, in the fourth-century orator Isocrates), the Athenians' activity is referred to as tyranny (*tyrannia*), and the condition of the allies as slavery (*douleia*).¹⁶ The language used in epigraphic texts is different again: some documents talk simply about 'the cities', others of the cities which the Athenians rule (*archein*), or the cities over which they have power (*kratos*).

¹⁵ For definitions of empire and imperialism in modern international theory, see M. W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, ch. 1. A. Colás, *Empire*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, adds a useful historical perspective to the theoretical task of defining and studying imperialism.

¹⁶ See C. J. Tuplin, 'Imperial tyranny: some reflections on a Classical Greek political metaphor', in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), *Crux*, London: Imprint Academic: 1985, 348–75.

The various terms used are not synonyms (*summachia*, for example, is a neutral word for alliance, with no necessary presumption of hierarchy; *tyrannia*, fairly obviously, is pejorative) and it seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the variation in labels might be significant. Pinning down what that significance is, however, is a more difficult task. Attempts have been made to identify a chronological progression in the terms used, from milder expressions in the early years of the empire (the 'Delian League' years), to more aggressive language later in the century. But such attempts are undermined by the difficulty of dating many of the texts in which the more 'imperialistic' language appears (references to 'ruling' cities, for example). They might also be based on a questionable methodological premise: is it safe to assume that the Athenians were consistent, or honest, in the way in which they described their empire, either to themselves or to their subjects, or might they still be happy to refer to their 'allies' even while behaving in ways that modern scholars would define as overtly imperialistic?¹⁷

The problem of labelling the Athenian Empire is a small part of a larger issue: the difficulty of studying imperialism in the Greek world. No ancient source provides an explicitly theoretical, analytical account of Greek imperialism. Interstate politics in general is, in fact, strikingly undertheorised by Greek authors (particularly in contrast with their extensive interest in other aspects of political theory).¹⁸ All evidence for Greek views on the nature and definition of empire therefore has to be extracted from works whose main interest lies elsewhere (from brief comments in Plato's *Republic* or Aristotle's *Politics*, for example),¹⁹ or extrapolated from specific examples (the Athenian Empire, but also the actions of Sparta in the early fourth century, and Philip II of Macedon from the 350s onwards).²⁰ It is no surprise that the picture of imperialism that emerges from these sources is both incomplete and inconsistent. Interference in the internal politics of other states, for example, is portrayed in some contexts as a 'tyrannical' act, but elsewhere as evidence of praiseworthy altruism. Collection of financial contributions is often depicted as a fundamental characteristic of an *archê*, yet some city-states

¹⁷ On consistency, see Osborne, *Athenian Empire*, 34–6; on honesty, P. A. Low, 'Looking for the language of Athenian imperialism', *JHS* 125 (2005), 93–111.

¹⁸ A feature discussed by M. I. Finley, 'War and empire', in his *Ancient History*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1985, 67–87; R. Purnell, 'Theoretical approaches to international relations: the contribution of the Greco-Roman world', in T. Taylor (ed.), *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*, London and New York: Longman, 1978, 19–31.

¹⁹ Greek imperialism is discussed in the context of Greek political thought by R. Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005, ch. 5.

²⁰ The difficulty of separating the history of Greek imperialism from the general history of Greek interstate activity is demonstrated in W. S. Ferguson's *Greek Imperialism*, London: Constable, 1913 (which remains the most recent attempt at a general study of the subject).

(such as Sparta) receive payments from an alliance (the Peloponnesian League) which is only rarely described in such terms. Moreover, ancient descriptions and definitions of empire are always coloured by some sort of value judgement: just as the labels used for empires range from the benign to the pejorative, so definitions and descriptions of imperial motivations and actions are never presented in neutral terms. Imperialism may be a source of glory or of shame, depending on the perspective of the writer, but it is never a subject for disinterested analysis.

The difficulty of pinning down a clear or objective ancient definition of imperialism has encouraged some scholars to abandon the attempt to analyse the Athenian Empire on the basis of ancient interpretations, and instead to take as a starting point for discussion a theoretical framework based on their own definition of imperialist activity. The article which forms the second part of this General Introduction, Finley's 'balance sheet' of the Athenian Empire, is a particularly influential version of such an approach. Finley emphasises the dangers of becoming trapped in an ultimately fruitless quest to find an impartial and unambiguous definition of imperialism, and suggests instead a 'crude typology' of imperialist behaviour – a deliberately broad list of the ways in which a state can exercise its power over others. In taking this approach, he aims to arrive at a more objective picture of the Athenian Empire, and to avoid the qualitative, even moralising, judgements which (he argues) often characterise studies of the subject.

As was noted above, Finley is quite right to identify this tendency to conflate the analysis of empire with attempts to either justify or condemn it. He is also right to suggest that much modern scholarship on the Athenian Empire has been similarly influenced by a desire to judge the Athenian Empire as well as (or even instead of) to write its history. Attempts to link the history of the Athenian Empire to the practice of British imperialism are visible from the eighteenth century onwards, and Athens was used as both a negative and a positive model for the democratic state setting out on a programme of imperial expansion.²¹ Such comparisons were not restricted to Britain: in 1877, the leading German scholar Wilamowitz gave a lecture in honour of

²¹ Examples of the Athenian Empire as negative paradigm include W. Young, *The Spirit of Athens*, London: Robson, 1777 (who warns that: 'extensive conquests are destructive to the people whose form of government approaches to the free or democratic': 116); G. Murray, 'The exploitation of inferior races in ancient and modern times', in F. W. Hirst, G. Murray and J. L. Hammond, *Liberalism and the Empire*, London: Johnson, 1900, 118–57. For positive analogies, see, for example the Earl of Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, London: John Murray, 1910 (Athens and Britain as democratic empires), A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911, ch. 7 (Athenian and British Empires as bringers of liberty).

the Emperor's birthday, in which he argued that the Athenian Empire should act as a model for Germany's own *Colonialpolitik* (imperial policy).²²

The tendency to see comparisons between the Athenian Empire and modern versions of imperialism has persisted,²³ and even where the comparative approach is not explicitly used it is inevitable that analyses of the subject are informed by contemporary perceptions of imperial practice.²⁴ Even Finley's attempt to exclude moral judgement from his typology of imperialism might be seen as being itself a result of a distinctive (and moral) perspective on the nature of foreign politics: moral detachment should not be mistaken for objectivity. Finley's analysis of the Athenian Empire (and that of all the authors in this book) deserves just as much careful and critical scrutiny as that of Thucydides.

THE ORGANISATION OF THIS VOLUME

This volume does not include an overview of the Athenian Empire's history (other than the brief survey given above), but suggestions on good narrative accounts of the empire (and other general studies) can be found in the Guide to Further Reading (on pp. 340–2). Nor is there a section devoted only to studies of the ancient sources. Problems of source-criticism (and particularly the use of Thucydides and inscriptions) are prominent in Part I, but every article in the book gives an insight into the ways in which different sorts of ancient evidence, literary and material, can enable (and complicate) the study of the Athenian Empire.

The book opens instead with Finley's general survey of the 'balance sheet' of the Athenian Empire. Finley claims that his analysis is primarily economic, but, as has already been seen, he engages with a much wider range of key methodological problems. How is empire to be defined, and how should it be studied? What are the general headings under which an analysis of ancient imperialism might be carried out? Finley's assumptions and conclusions are not necessarily correct, and the articles in the rest of the book will show that very different ways of

²² The lecture was published as 'Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit', in A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (eds.), *Aus Kydathen*, Berlin: Weidmann, 1880, 1–96.

²³ See, for example, essays in B. S. Strauss and R. N. Lebow (eds.), *Hegemonic Rivalry*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991; D. R. McCann and B. S. Strauss (eds.), *War and Democracy*, Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. Note also the more wide-ranging comparative studies of Doyle's *Empires* and Colás's *Empire*.

²⁴ A phenomenon discussed by T. Harrison, 'Through British eyes: the Athenian Empire and modern historiography', in B. Goff (ed.), *Classics and Colonialism*, London: Duckworth, 2005, 25–37.

approaching the empire are possible, but the agenda that he sets out provides a useful starting point for investigation of the subject.

Subsequent sections are thematically arranged, each dealing with a different problem in the history of the Athenian Empire. The first part tackles the question rejected by Finley as unanswerable: what were the original aims of the empire, and how did it (or did it at all?) develop from the Delian League into the Athenian Empire? While Finley is probably right to argue that secure answers are hard to find, the process of asking the questions does reveal important things about the nature of the empire, the ways in which it might have developed over time, and the ancient evidence for these changes.

Part II explores some of the methods by which the Athenian Empire was controlled, investigating the ways in which the Athenians attempted to regulate the actions of the subject-states, the personnel who were responsible for enforcing those regulations, and the potential use of persuasive, rather than coercive, techniques as a means of imperial control. Part III reopens Finley's 'balance sheet' and the question of the economic impact of empire. How much did the Athenians gain from the empire, and how much did they think that they gained? Were Athenian profits balanced by allied losses, or has the economic burden of empire on the subject-states been overemphasised?

The final part raises another question rejected by Finley: how popular was the Athenian Empire? Should it be seen as inherently exploitative, or did some benefits – particularly political benefits – derive from its existence? It is in this section that the complex relationship between democracy and empire comes under particularly close scrutiny. How can 'imperial tyranny' be reconciled with internal democracy? Does the empire foster democracy, inside Athens or beyond it? And has the empire's attitude to democracy influenced the way in which it has been judged, by ancient and modern commentators?

There is unfortunately no space in this volume to explore other manifestations of empire in the Greek world, or even Athens' own imperial revival in the fourth century. The postscript, however, gives a very brief account of the aftermath of the Athenian Empire, and the ways in which this imperial afterglow can help to illuminate the history of what went before.

I *The Fifth-Century Athenian Empire: A Balance-Sheet*^{† 1}

MOSES FINLEY

I

‘Every doctrine of imperialism devised by men is a consequence of their second thoughts. But empires are not built by men troubled by second thoughts.’²

I start with that aphoristic formulation, the truth of which has been demonstrated in the study of modern imperialisms, as an antidote to the familiar practice of *beginning* a discussion of the Athenian empire with aims and motives and quickly sliding over to attitudes and even theory, thereby implying that the men who created and extended the empire also began with a defined imperialist programme and theories of imperialism. An outstanding current example of the procedure I have in mind is the attempt to date a number of Athenian laws and decrees (or to support a proposed date) by what may be called their imperialist tone. If they are ‘harsh’, it is argued, they smack of Cleon and should be dated in the 420s B.C., and not in the time of the more ‘moderate’ Periclean leadership, the 440s or 430s.³ Insofar as the argument is not circular, it implies the existence of an identifiable programme of imperialism, or rather of both successive and conflicting programmes, and that requires demonstration, not assumption.

A second source of confusion is the unavoidable ambiguity of the word ‘empire’. Stemming from the Latin *imperium*, ‘empire’ becomes entangled with the word ‘emperor’, and much of the extensive discussion throughout the Middle Ages and on into modern times ends in a

[†] Originally published in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 103–26.

¹ The ancient authorities and modern bibliography will be found in Schuller (1974), Meiggs (1972). I have kept both to a minimum.

² A.P. Thornton, *Doctrines of imperialism* (New York, 1965), 47.

³ E.g. H.B. Mattingly in *Historia* X (1961), 184, 187; Erxleben in *APF* XXI (1971), 161.

tautological cul-de-sac: an empire is the territory ruled by an emperor.⁴ Everyone knows that there are, and have been in the past, important empires not ruled by an emperor, and I see no purpose in playing word-games in order to get round that harmless linguistic anomaly. To suggest, for example, that we should abandon ‘empire’ as a category in Greek history and speak only of ‘hegemony’ does not seem to me helpful or useful.⁵ It would have been small consolation to the Melians, as the Athenian soldiers and sailors fell upon them, to be informed that they were about to become the victims of a hegemonial, not an imperial, measure.

That is not to question the legitimacy of efforts to differentiate among empires. All broad classificatory terms – ‘state’ is the obvious analogy – embrace a wide spectrum of individual instances. The Persian, Athenian and Roman empires differed among themselves in important ways, as do modern empires. It then becomes necessary, as with all classifications, to establish the canons for inclusion or exclusion. Those who play with ‘hegemony’ seem to me to give excessive weight to purely formal considerations, which, if adopted rigorously, would fragment the category ‘empire’ so much as to render it empty and useless. Common sense is right in this instance: there have been throughout history structures that belong within a single class on substantive grounds, namely, the exercise of authority (or power or control) by one state over one or more other states (or communities or peoples) for an extended period of time. That is admittedly imprecise, but large-scale human institutions can never be classified by other than imprecise canons: again I cite ‘state’ as an analogy.

A notable example of the formalistic approach is the concern of some historians to define and date the point at which a voluntary association of states was converted into an Athenian empire. The year 454 is a favourite date, because, it is generally believed, the ‘league treasury’ was then transferred from Delos to Athens.⁶ At most, such an action was a symbol, a brutal statement of the reality, but not the reality itself. The word ‘voluntary’ is not even a good symbol, leading historians into remarkable verbal contortions. ‘It seems possible to go farther and to state that though coercion of members apparently was regarded as legitimate – and probably even compulsion against states that did not wish

⁴ See R. Folz, *L’Idée d’empire en Occident du Ve au XIVE siècle* (Paris, 1953).

⁵ E. Will, *Le monde grecque et l’orient: le Ve siècle (510–403)* (Paris, 1972), 171–3; cf. V. Ehrenberg, *L’état grec*, translated C. Picavet-Roos (Paris, 1976), 187–97.

⁶ As an outstanding illustration, note how the 454 ‘turning-point’ dominates the analysis of Nesselhauf (1933). For an incisive brief critique, see E. Will, *Le monde grecque et l’orient*, 175–6. It is anyway far from certain that the transfer of the treasury occurred as late as 454; see W.K. Pritchett, ‘The transfer of the Delian treasury’, *Historia* XVIII (1969), 17–21.

to join – the reduction even of revolting members to the status of subjects was contrary to the constitution.⁷ Matters are not improved by a sprinkling of ‘Weberian’ terminology: ‘indirect rule is defined as this: that the means of ruling is created by or creates an interest among those who are being ruled in being ruled’ [‘indirekte Herrschaftsmittel bestehen darin, dass sie auf ein Interesse des Beherrschten am Beherrschtwerden bauen bzw. dieses hervorrufen’].⁸

Thucydides, with his incomparable eye for reality, did not confuse it with the symbols and the slogans. ‘First’, he writes in opening his narrative of the Pentakontaetia (1.98.1), ‘they (the Athenians) besieged Eion on the Strymon River’, still in Persian hands, and then the island of Skyros in the north Aegean. Their populations were enslaved *and their territories were colonized by Athenian settlers*. Next Athens compelled Carystus on Euboea to join the league; clearly the ‘voluntary’ principle had had a very short run. Soon Naxos tried to withdraw from the league (the precise date is uncertain), only to be besieged and crushed by Athens. Naxos ‘was the first allied city to be enslaved against established usage’, comments Thucydides (1.98.4), employing his favourite metaphor for Athenian interference with the autonomy of the subject-cities in the empire.

Of course the Athenian empire underwent significant changes in the more than half a century of its existence. So has every other empire of similar (or longer) duration in history. To establish and explain the changes is a valid historical concern, but I find it a misconceived enterprise to seek one point along a continuous line which permits us to say that there was no empire before and that there was an empire thereafter. Carystus refused to join the alliance and was forced in; Naxos sought to leave and was forcibly prevented. And they were only the first of many city-states in that position, subject to the authority of another state which acted to advance its own interests, political and material.

I do not dispute that the ‘Delian league’ (a modern name for which there is no ancient authority) was welcome when it was created in 478 B.C., both because of the popularity of the vengeance appeal and, fundamentally, because of the need to clear the Aegean Sea of Persian naval forces. The Persians had twice invaded Greece unsuccessfully, and no

⁷ J.A.O. Larsen, ‘The constitution and original purpose of the Delian league’, *HSPb* LI (1940), 175–213, at p. 191.

⁸ Schuller (1974), 3. His central thesis of ‘two layers’ (*Schichte*) in the structure of the later empire and his listing of continuities and discontinuities, follow from his initial confusion between the psychological notion of ‘eine Interesse am Beherrschtwerden’ and the realities of power.

one in 478 could have had the slightest confidence that the Great King would accept the defeats passively and would not return in a third attempt. Control of the Aegean was the most obvious protective measure, and Athens successfully won the leadership of such an undertaking. An Athenian, Aristides, was given the task of fixing the amount of money or the number of ships equipped and manned which each member-state would provide for the combined league fleet. The Athenians supplied the league treasurers (*Hellenotamiai*) and the military-naval command. Within a dozen years (the exact number depends on the date of the battle of Eurymedon, which no scholar dates later than 466 B.C.), the league's formal objective was achieved. The Persian fleet of 200 triremes, most of them Phoenician, was captured and destroyed in a great land-and-sea battle at the mouth of the Eurymedon River in southern Asia Minor. Yet the 'league' remained in existence without a moment's faltering and its membership grew, willingly or by compulsion as the case may have been in each instance, exactly as before Eurymedon.

The chief executant of Athenian policy in those years and the commander-in-chief at Eurymedon was Cimon. He had been personally in charge at Eion, and again in 465 B.C., shortly after Eurymedon, when Thasos, the largest and wealthiest island in the north Aegean, tried to withdraw from the alliance. After a siege lasting more than two years, Thasos capitulated and was condemned to surrender her fleet (henceforth paying tribute in money), to dismantle her walls, to pay Athens a large indemnity, and to surrender the ports and the mines she possessed on the mainland. And Cimon, of course, far from being a 'radical democrat' or 'demagogue' like Pericles, let alone Cleon, represented the traditional, oligarchically inclined, landowning aristocracy of Athens. Had he lived longer, he no doubt would have opposed many of the policies adopted by both Pericles and Cleon with respect to the empire. However, his opposition would not have been on moral grounds. There is no difference in 'harshness' between the treatment of the people of Eion and Skyros in Cimon's day and Cleon's proposal nearly half a century later to massacre the people of Mytilene. Our sources, in fact, do not reveal a single Athenian who opposed the empire as such, not even Thucydides son of Melesias or his kinsman and namesake, the historian.⁹

Certainly neither Athens nor her allies anticipated *all* the consequences of the first step of association in 478, in particular what would

⁹ Even if one thinks, as I do not, that at the end of his life the historian came to believe, retrospectively, that the Athenian empire had been a mistake, that would not affect my argument.

happen if a member-state chose to 'secede'. Nor can anyone today know what decision-making individuals in Athens hoped or desired. What, for instance, were the long-range aspirations of Themistocles and Aristides for Athens and Athenian power? The Delian league was the first of a number of major instances in classical Greek history of the deployment of Panhellenism, with or without the name, 'to justify the hegemony and mastery of one *polis* over other states by proposing a common aim, war against the barbarians'.¹⁰ Hope and aspirations do not imply a defined programme, but their presence in Athens in 478 is demonstrated by the rapidity with which Athens not only acquired the decision-making power for the league but also was prepared, in manpower, ships and psychology, to exert force in the strictest sense, to impose her decisions and to punish recalcitrants.

This is not to underestimate the Panhellenic appeal, any more than the real fear of further Persian invasions. The pull of ideology is never to be underestimated, nor is it easy to untangle ideology and reality. In a conflict, how does one measure the respective importance of the two elements in determining the decision of a weaker state? A prudent state could 'voluntarily' save itself from the frightful consequences of resistance and 'involuntary' subjection, but some did not. An early British juridical distinction between ceded and conquered territories was soon abandoned precisely because the two overlapped much of the time.¹¹ Lacking, as we do, the data from the Athenian empire with which to attempt such refined distinctions, we may still examine that empire operationally, that is, analyse as best we can, and as concretely, the observed behaviour patterns, and assess the gains and the losses of both the imperial state and the subject states.¹²

For that purpose, a crude typology of the various ways in which one state *may* exercise its power over others for its own benefit will suffice:

- (1) restriction on freedom of action in inter-state relations;
- (2) political, administrative and/or judicial interference in local affairs;
- (3) compulsory military and/or naval service;
- (4) the payment of 'tribute' in some form, whether in the narrow sense of a regular lump sum or as a land tax or in some other way;
- (5) confiscation of land, with or without subsequent emigration of settlers from the imperial state;

¹⁰ Perlman (1976), 5.

¹¹ Martin Wight, *British colonial constitutions 1947* (Oxford, 1952), 5. The parallel with Roman 'allies' in the third and second centuries B.C. comes immediately to mind.

¹² I need hardly say that I find it both irrelevant and anachronistic to play with the notions of *de iure* and *de facto* exercise of power, as does e.g. Schuller (1974), 143–8.

- (6) other forms of economic subordination or exploitation, ranging from control of the seas and Navigation Acts to compulsory delivery of goods at prices below the prevailing market price and the like.

The present essay will focus on the economics of imperial power. I do not imply by that concentration that the politics of the Athenian empire do not merit analysis or that economics and politics were separable, autonomous aspects of the story. However, I have nothing new to contribute on the foreign-policy aspect, except perhaps to ask: Why was Athens concerned to convert other Greek *poleis* into dependent agents in inter-state relations, and, in particular, what material benefits did Athens obtain (whether deliberately envisaged or not) from her success in the endeavour? Interference in internal affairs is less well understood, largely because of the inadequacy of the evidence, and again I shall restrict myself to those measures which either had or may possibly have had an immediate economic impact.

Because of the paucity and one-sidedness of the sources, no narrative is possible, and that means no adequate consideration of development and change. If what follows therefore has a static appearance, that is not because I hold the improbable view that the relations between Athens and her subjects were fundamentally unchanged from 478 to 404 but because I know of no way to document significant change, and no other way to avoid falling into the harshness-of-Cleon trap I have already discussed. We have the impression, for example, that over the years Athens interfered with increasing frequency and toughness in the internal affairs of some or all of the subjects: certain criminal cases had to be tried in Athens before Athenian juries, the right to coin money was taken away for a period, and there were other measures. What little we know about these actions rests almost entirely on epigraphical finds, and although it is usually possible to offer a plausible reason for the introduction of a particular measure at the time of a particular inscription, there has been too much unhappy experience with the crumbling of such logic upon the discovery of a new inscription. Besides, the dates of some of the most critical measures, such as the coinage decree, remain the subject of open controversy.

We know, too, that the Athenians developed a considerable administrative machinery for the empire, 700 officials, says Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* 2.4.3), about as many as the number for internal affairs. Apart from suspicion about the duplication of the figure 700, there is no valid reason to question his accuracy. ‘We do not know enough to say that 700 is an impossible figure’¹³ is needlessly sceptical. And again the

¹³ Meiggs (1972), 215.

sources let us down: the evidence for the administration is almost entirely epigraphical; it does not take us back earlier than the Erythrae decree (*IG I² 10 [IG i³ 14]*), probably of the mid-450s; it allows barely a glimpse into the division of functions.¹⁴ Nothing can be deduced from silence here: there are virtually no Athenian inscriptions (other than dedications) before the mid-fifth century, and even the tribute drops from sight between the original assessment by Aristides and 454. We may safely assume, I believe, that administrative officials (both military and civilian, in so far as that distinction has any meaning in this context) other than the *Hellenotamiai* began to appear at least as soon as there was resistance to membership, that their numbers increased and so did their duties and powers as the years went on. No long-range or systematic Athenian planning is implied in that assumption. What is indisputable is the existence and scale of this administration in the end, not only very large by Greek standards but also, as has apparently not been noticed, relatively larger than the formal administration in the provinces of the Roman empire.

II

In any study of the Athenian empire, two of the categories in my typology – military-naval service and tribute – must be considered together, because they were manipulated together by Athens for most of the history of the empire. When the league was founded, the member-states were divided into those which contributed cash and those which contributed ships together with their crews. As time went on, the latter group was whittled down until only two members remained, Chios and Lesbos, although others are recorded as having contributed a few ships to a campaign on a few later occasions, as did Corcyra, an ally outside the league. We have no list of the original muster of ship-contributing states nor any statement of the principles on which the states were assigned to one category or the other.¹⁵ In a general way it is obvious that ships would have been required of the larger maritime states with proper harbour facilities, not of inland states or of very small ones. Honour would have also played its part. In 478, at any rate, Chios or Lesbos would not lightly have surrendered their warships and everything that their possession implied; a few decades later, they pathetically clung to their continued ship-contribution as a

¹⁴ The fullest accounts will be found in Meiggs (1972), ch. 11; Schuller (1974), 36–48, 156–63. Neither includes the *Hellespontophylakes*, discussed below, sect. IV.

¹⁵ See Blackman (1969), 179–83.

symbol of 'autonomy' in contrast to the tribute-paying mass of subject states.¹⁶

However, if the surviving ancient texts fail us on the situation at the foundation of the league, Thucydides is explicit enough about the reason for the change in the pattern: 'reluctance to go on campaign led most of them, in order to avoid serving abroad, to have assessments made in money corresponding to the expense of producing ships' (1.99.3). 'To avoid serving abroad' cannot be taken at face value: these states had not in the past built, equipped and manned warships merely in order to repel attackers, and there are enough instances of their willingness to 'serve abroad'. Now, however, they were serving an alien, imperial state on its terms and at its command. Hence the reluctance, which first showed itself in a refusal to meet the required contributions (Thuc. 1.99.1), and after the high price of refusal had several times been revealed, turned into the most abject surrender, the conversion of the 'league' fleet into an Athenian fleet in the narrowest sense, part of it consisting of ships confiscated from the subjects (Thuc. 1.19) and another part paid for out of their annual tribute. Thucydides openly condemns the subjects for thus reducing themselves to impotence. But I suggest that the difference in naval power between 478 and, say, 440 was basically only a quantitative one. Athenian control of the combined fleet was near enough complete at the beginning to justify H.D. Meyer's judgement that the league was 'from the moment of its creation an Athenian instrument of compulsion (*Zwangsinstrument*)'.¹⁷

Some of the purposes for which the instrument was employed will be considered later. Here I want to examine the financial implications, without resorting to the arithmetical guessing-games that litter the scholarly literature. The few figures in the surviving sources are too skimpy, too unreliable, and often too contradictory to underpin the mathematics, and the epigraphical data add to the confusion rather than help to clear it. I shall therefore restrict myself to a few considerations *exempli gratia*, none of which is undermined by a large margin of error.

First, however, it is necessary to get rid of two fetishes. One is a single numeral: 'The original tribute assessment totalled 460 talents' (Thuc. 1.96.2). It requires a powerful will to believe to accept that figure as credible, and a mystical faith to bring contributions in ships within the

¹⁶ Meyer (1960) weakens an otherwise sharp-eyed analysis by his insistence that there were never more than half a dozen or so ship-contributing states, and by treating ship construction solely as a privilege granted deliberately by the Athenians.

¹⁷ Meyer (1960), 499.

total.¹⁸ The expenditure of ingenuity in the attempt to reconcile 460 with other amounts scattered among the sources could be indulged as a harmless pastime were it not that they divert attention from the realities of the situation. The objective was a fleet, not coin, yet scholars debate whether Aristides began his survey with a target of 460 talents or merely ended his work with a bit of meaningless addition, producing the meaningless total of 460. Can it be seriously suggested that in the early fifth century B.C. anyone would have begun the difficult task of assembling a coalition fleet by setting a target in cash, not in ships? And what is the point to a tribute total without a ship total, of which there is not a trace in the sources?

A major difficulty in the attempts at reconciliation is created by the totals of payments, normally under 400 talents, that appear (or are conjectured) on the 'Athenian tribute lists', a group of inscriptions which collectively are my second fetish.¹⁹ Their discovery and study have of course been the greatest modern boon to our knowledge of the Athenian empire, but it has become necessary to insist that the 'tribute lists' are not a synonym for the empire, and that they do not represent the whole of the monetary inflow into Athens from the empire. I believe that the only figure of money income from the empire which can be defended, both substantively and contextually, is the one Thucydides (2.13.3) attributes to Pericles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War – 600 talents. The tribute was the largest component, but from the viewpoint of Athens it was fiscally irrelevant whether the cash arrived as tribute, as indemnities or as income from confiscated mines.²⁰ But even if my faith in 600 talents should prove to be ill-founded, my analysis of the financial implications of the empire would not suffer in the least.

The figure of 600 talents certainly did not include the 'cash value' of ship-contributions, by then restricted to Lesbos and Chios. For the earlier period of the empire, however, it is essential to obtain some notion of the relative burden of the two types of contribution.²¹ Unfortunately, the cost of building and equipping a warship is unknown; the widely quoted figure of between one and two talents in the mid-fifth century is a guess, but it will serve our purposes. The

¹⁸ The most convincing discussion of this text seems to me to be M. Chambers, 'Four hundred sixty talents', *CPh* LIII (1958), 26–32.

¹⁹ Throughout I shall ignore the temporary wartime reassessment of the tribute in 425, certainly an important indication of the strength and character of Athenian power but too much of an anomaly to be included in the analysis I am trying to make.

²⁰ It does not trouble me that Thucydides calls the 600 talents *phoros*. Xenophon surely had the same figure in mind when he gave the total Athenian public revenue at the time as 1,000 talents 'from both domestic and external sources' (*Anab.* 7.1.27).

²¹ For what follows, the fullest collection and analysis of the evidence will be found in Amit (1965).

normal life of a trireme was twenty-plus years, against which must be offset damage or loss in storms, shipwreck and battles, all varying greatly from year to year and incalculable. Then there was much the largest cost item, the pay for the crews, 200 in round numbers on each trireme, 170 of them rowers. That ranged from one third or one half a drachma early in the fifth century to one drachma a day at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, or one talent per ship per month at the higher rate. Again there are too many uncontrollable variables – the number of ships on regular patrol duty, on guard duty or on tribute-collecting assignment, the number and duration of campaigns year by year and the number of participating warships, the number of days devoted annually to training, essential for the rowers in triremes,²² the share of ‘allied’ ships in the total activity of the league in all these respects.

We must therefore attempt a comparative assessment without precise figures, and one fairly late instance will serve as a point of departure. In the spring of 428 B.C. ten triremes from the Lesbian *polis* of Mytilene arrived in the Piraeus ‘according to the alliance’ (Thuc. 3.3.4). The ten triremes, Blackman writes, were ‘a small squadron for routine service; more could of course be called for if necessary for a particular campaign’.²³ Yet this small squadron cost Mytilene five talents a month in pay, at the half-drachma rate, in addition to the costs of construction, maintenance, repair and equipment. The fragmentary ‘tribute lists’ for the years 431–428 show such annual tribute payments, in round numbers, as 10–15 talents from Abdera, 10 from Lampsacus, 15 or 16 from Byzantium, 9 from Cyzicus – all in the higher range of recorded contributions, not exceeded by more than half a dozen or so states. The comparison with the cost of ships’ crews therefore suggests that, once the Persian fleet was shattered at Eurymedon, the move by the subject-states to shift from ships to tribute was motivated not only by patriotism and love of freedom but also by public finance. For the maritime states, tribute often meant a reduced financial burden, in some years a substantial reduction. One comparative figure may help assess the burden: the average annual outlay on the Parthenon, a very expensive temple, was 30–2 talents,²⁴ equal to the highest recorded tribute, a sum which the crews of twelve triremes would have earned in pay (at the lower rate) in one five-month sailing season (and there were times when warships remained at sea outside the ‘normal’ season).

²² See L. Casson, *Ships and seamanship in the ancient world* (Princeton, 1971), 278–80.

²³ Blackman (1969), 195.

²⁴ R.S. Stanier, ‘The cost of the Parthenon’, *JHS* LXXIII (1953), 68–76.

Two offsetting considerations are commonly introduced into the calculation, as in the following statement by Blackman: ‘. . . but the pay was mainly if not entirely going to their own citizens. A long season probably meant active campaigning rather than routine patrols, and this gave greater hope of booty to offset expenditure.’ They ‘may well have expected to cover their costs as a result; this was probably the case in the early years, at least until after Eurymedon and perhaps until the early 450’s.’²⁵ The ‘social welfare’ consideration may be dismissed out of hand: it is not a fifth-century conception, especially not among the oligarchies which still controlled some of the larger maritime states: besides, many of ‘their own citizens’ quickly found employment as rowers in the Athenian navy. As for booty, which everyone no doubt hoped for, so long as they had to campaign and fight, there is little evidence in the ancient sources about any campaign during the relevant period except for Eurymedon. The silence of the sources is not a compelling argument on one side, but it seems to me impermissible on the other side to fill out that silence with ‘may well have expected to cover their costs’. As for Eurymedon, it is a flight of the wildest imagination to think that the Delian league gambled its combined fleet, with their men, and the independence of Greece on a major naval battle chiefly, or even significantly, for the booty they would collect if they won.²⁶

Large-scale naval (and military) engagements were both expensive and unpredictable, to the participants if not to later historians, even those with heavy advantages on one side. It required something like a full year, from about April 440 to about April 439, for Athens to subdue Samos.²⁷ The island was then still a ship-contributor and was able to muster 70 warships, 50 of them in fighting condition, and posed the further threat, real or imaginary, of support from a ‘Persian’ fleet. Athens sent several large flotillas, perhaps totalling more than 150 (a portion of which was diverted against the ‘Persian’ threat) and a military force with siege equipment; she also summoned Chios and Lesbos to make their contributions, 25 triremes together in the first year, 30 in the second. There were victories on both sides, and then an eight-month siege forced Samos to surrender. There was considerable loss of life and material (including triremes). The financial cost to Athens may have been 1,200 talents (though that figure is reached by too many textual

²⁵ Blackman (1969), 186.

²⁶ I see no need to spend time on R. Sealey’s view that the ‘League of Delos was founded because of a dispute about booty and its purpose was to get more booty’: ‘The origin of the Delian league’, *Ancient society and institutions. Studies . . . Victor Ehrenberg* (Oxford, 1966), 253; see A.H. Jackson, ‘The original purpose of the Delian league’, *Historia* XVIII (1969), 12–16; Meiggs (1972), 462–4.

²⁷ On the ancient evidence for what follows, see Gomme’s commentary on Thuc. I.116–17.

emendations for comfort). The victor's terms included a heavy indemnity, paid to Athens, and the surrender of the Samian fleet, marking her permanent disappearance from the roster of ship-contributors. We have no details of the Lesbian-Chian involvement, but each month would have cost them 12–15 talents in pay alone, and they received not a penny for their pains, either in indemnity or in booty.

Triremes were purpose-built warships fit for no other use. There was no interchangeability with merchant ships or fishing vessels, nor was there any other professional employment for tens of thousands of rowers.²⁸ Hence, as states lost genuine freedom to make war, there was little point, and great expense, in constructing, maintaining and manning a squadron. So they sought relief by inviting Athens to transfer them to the tribute-paying category, a request that could not have been *imposed* on an *unwilling* Athens. That Athens did agree indicates that she could afford the fiscal loss as the price for a fully Athenian navy, with all that it meant in power and self-satisfaction. She could afford it because the state's finances were in a healthy condition, thanks to the imperial revenues, direct and indirect. We are unable to do the sums, just as we cannot properly calculate how Athens managed to put aside so much of her public revenues as a reserve fund, reaching 9,700 talents at one moment (Thuc. 2.13.3). That is a pity, but it does not alter the reality.

III

Tribute, in its narrow sense, is of course only one way that an imperial state drains funds from subject states for its treasury. It is probably neither the most common nor the most important, as compared, in particular, with a tithe or a monetary tax on the land of the subjects. Of the latter there is no trace in the Athenian empire, and indeed there is only one recorded instance of state exploitation of confiscated property, that of the gold and silver mines on the mainland taken from Thasos after her unsuccessful revolt.²⁹ These mines continued to be worked by individuals, as they had been before – most famously by Thucydides (4.105.1), presumably as an inheritance from his Thracian ancestors – but the Athenian state took its share of the profits, as from the mines of Laurium at home.

It was in the area of private enrichment, not public, that land played a major role in the Athenian empire. The number of Athenian citizens,

²⁸ See de Ste Croix (1972), 394–6.

²⁹ Thuc. 1.101.3; Plut. *Cimon* 14.2 (presumably based on Stesimbrotus of Thasos, 107 F 5).

usually from the poorer strata, who were given either allotments of confiscated land or, at least in Lesbos after the unsuccessful revolt there in 428, a substantial, uniform (and therefore arbitrary) 'rent', roughly equivalent to a hoplite's pay for a full year, on holdings retained and worked by the islanders, may have totalled 10,000 in the course of the imperial period.³⁰ The most naked kind of imperial exploitation therefore directly benefited perhaps eight to ten per cent of the Athenian citizen body.³¹ Some confiscations were in places from which the defeated population had been totally expelled, but many were in areas in which the local people remained as a recognized community, and there the settler pattern that has dominated so much of the history of later imperialism was evident,³² though rather in embryo because the settlements were short-lived.

Colonies and cleruchies are not the whole story, though most accounts of the empire rest with them, 'too preoccupied in studying the misdeeds of Athenian imperialism through official institutions and collective decisions' to give due weight to 'the action of individuals who played their part in the general concert'.³³ Individual Athenians, most of them from the upper end of the social and economic spectrum, acquired landed property in subject territories where there were neither colonies nor cleruchies. The evidence is scarce, but one piece is remarkable enough for a closer look. In the surviving fragments of the very detailed record, inscribed on stone, of the sale by public auction of the property confiscated from men convicted of participation in the double sacrilege of 415 B.C., the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms, there are included a few landed estates outside Attica, in Oropus on the Boeotian border, on Euboea and Thasos, and at Abydos on the Hellespont and Ophryneion in the Troad.³⁴ One group of holdings, dispersed in at least three regions of Euboea, belonged to one man, Oionias. It went for 8 1/2 talents,³⁵ a sum to be compared with the largest (composite) landed holding recorded for Attica itself, that of the banker Pasion at his death in 370/69 B.C., which, we are told, was worth twenty talents (Ps.Dem. 46.13).³⁶

³⁰ The list is conveniently set out in Jones (1957), 169–73. One need not accept the demographic argument in which the data are embedded.

³¹ It is unnecessary for me to embark on the unresolved difficulties faced in trying to sort out colonies and cleruchies; all earlier discussions have been replaced by Gauthier (1966) and Erxleben (1975).

³² See Finley (1976).

³³ Gauthier (1973), 163. This article is fundamental for what follows.

³⁴ For the texts of this block of inscriptions, now conventionally known as 'the Attic stelai', see W.K. Pritchett in *Hesperia* XXII (1953), 225–311, with full analysis in XXV (1956), 178–328.

³⁵ Col. II, lines 311–14; cf. II 177. The figure is so large as to create the suspicion that there may be an error in the text.

³⁶ J.K. Davies, *Athenian propertied families 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford, 1971), 431–5, estimates Pasion's total wealth at about 60 talents.

It must be emphasized that men like Oionias were not from the classes who were assigned land in colonies and cleruchies, and that the properties sold up following their conviction (or flight) were not within 'cleruchic' blocks.³⁷ They had acquired their holdings by 'private enterprise', though we have no idea how that was achieved. Throughout the Greek world in this period, land ownership was restricted to citizens, unless a *polis* by a sovereign act granted special permission to a non-citizen, which it appears to have done rarely and then only for notable services to the state. It is wildly improbable that Alcibiades and his friends had each individually been granted this privilege by Oropus, Euboea, Thasos, Abydos and Ophryneion in gratitude for their benefactions. It is equally improbable that only men caught up in the escapades of 415 were in this privileged group. Were it not for the chance find of a batch of fragmentary inscriptions, we should have known nothing about the whole operation beyond four or five off-hand general remarks in the literary sources, yet Oionias, otherwise unknown, turns out to be one of the richest Athenians of any period in its history. Nor, finally, have we any idea of the number of properties abroad held by the men sold up: only some twenty of the known fifty victims have been identified in the surviving epigraphical fragments, and by no means all of their possessions are listed in the texts we have.

As I have already said, we do not know how these acquisitions were brought about. Were they obtained 'legally' or 'illegally'? Only the Athenian answer is clear: the Athenian state accepted the legitimacy of the title and sold the estates as the property of the condemned men. That the Athenian empire was the operative element seems certain to me: I need not repeat what I have already said about the ambiguity of the concept of 'voluntary action', and we are here concerned with men who had influence and power inside Athens, men to be courted by subjects. It is even more certain that there was great resentment in the empire over this breach of the principle of citizen monopoly of the land, hence the Athenian concession in the decree founding the so-called second Athenian league in 378/7 B.C., that neither the Athenian state nor any

³⁷ I am not persuaded by the argument of Erxleben (1975), 84–91, that the Euboean holdings, including that of Oionias, were built up through purchase of Athenian cleruchic estates on the island; or by the unsupported suggestion of de Ste Croix (1972), 245: 'I would suppose that the Athenian State claimed the right to dispose of land confiscated from the allies . . . also by making grants *viritim* to individual Athenians, who would presumably purchase at public auction.' Such suggestions were effectively undercut in advance, in a few lines, by Gauthier (1973), 169. Nor do I understand how Erxleben, like many others, can accept as fact the statement of Andocides (3.9) that after the peace of Nicias, Athens acquired possession of two thirds of Euboea. The whole passage is demonstrably 'one of the worst examples we have of oratorical inaccuracy and misrepresentation': de Ste Croix (1972), 245.

of its citizens will be permitted 'to acquire either a house or land in the territories of the allies, whether by purchase or by foreclosure or by any other means whatsoever' (IG II² 43.35-41). No one would have requested and been granted the inclusion of such a blunt prohibition unless there were strong feelings on the subject, which are reflected in the excessive formulation and which can have resulted only from the bitter experience of the 'first Athenian league'.³⁸

IV

The moment we turn to the sixth category of my typology, 'other forms of economic exploitation or subordination', we are immediately plunged into the contentious field of Greek 'trade and politics'. On that I have stated and argued my views at length elsewhere.³⁹ My chief concern at present is with the consequences of Athenian imperial power in assisting individual Athenians to derive direct economic advantage other than through employment in the navy and related industries or through the acquisition of land in subject territories. Indirect gains were inevitable: power always attracts profits, as in the much vaunted plentitude and variety of commodities available in Athens, from which shippers, artisans and peddlers made gains. Many of the latter were not Athenians, however, and Hellenistic Rhodians were in the same advantageous position without the same political power behind them. Nevertheless, that such gains were a by-product of the Athenian empire is indisputable, though the magnitude of the gain cannot be measured and its place, if any, in Athenian policy cannot be deduced simply from its existence. *Handelspolitik* [commercial policy] is not a synonym for *Machtpolitik* [power politics], no matter how often historians make the slide.

The problem can be stated in this way. Control of the Aegean was for Athens an instrument of power. How was that instrument employed to achieve ends beyond collection of tribute, land settlement, interference in internal political arrangements, suppression of petty wars and the more or less complete elimination of piracy? More precisely, was it in fact employed for any ends other than those I have just listed, and, in particular, for commercial ends?

Given the nature of the ancient economy, two of the most important and most profitable forms of modern colonial exploitation were ruled

³⁸ On the excess phraseology see M.I. Finley, *Studies in land and credit in ancient Athens* (New Brunswick, 1952), 75-6.

³⁹ Finley (1965); (1973a), ch. 6. On the fiction of 'commercial wars' see also de Ste Croix (1972), 214-20.

out, namely, cheap labour and cheap raw materials; in more technical language, the employment, by compulsion if necessary, of colonial labour at wages well below the market wage at home, and the acquisition, again by compulsion if necessary, of basic raw materials at prices substantially below the market prices at home. A third form of exploitation, which was available and which loomed so large in republican Rome, seems to have been absent in the Athenian empire. I refer to the lending of money to subject cities and states at high rates of interest, usually in order to provide the latter with the cash required by them for their tax (or tribute) payments to the imperial state. The possibilities of *Handelspolitik* are therefore narrowed to competitive commercial advantages sought by non-economic means, that is to say, by the exercise of power without manipulating prices and wages.

The evidence is notoriously slight, almost to the point of non-existence. In the second chapter of the *Constitution of the Athenians*, Pseudo-Xenophon hammers the point, repeated in blunt words in the next century by Isocrates (8.36), that imperial Athens 'did not permit others to sail the sea unless they were willing to pay the tribute'. These two writers are so notoriously tendentious that any of their generalizations is suspect, but not *ipso facto* false. Not so easily dismissed is the provision in the Athenian decree of 426 B.C. allowing Methone on the Thermaic Gulf to import a fixed amount (lost) of grain annually from Byzantium, upon registering with Athenian officials there called *Hellespontophylakes* (Hellespont Commissioners). Similar permission was given in the same period to Aphytis (near Potidaea). Only two texts, but they go some way towards documenting Pseudo-Xenophon and Isocrates. The inscriptions do not say that Methone and Aphytis could not sail the sea without paying tribute; they say both less and more: both cities were guaranteed the right to 'sail freely' but neither could purchase Black Sea grain without Athenian permission.⁴⁰

The presence of the *Hellespontophylakes* implies that all other cities were, or could be, similarly controlled. Whether or not the *Hellespontophylakes* represented 'a system of strict organisation'⁴¹ cannot be determined but they deserve more attention than they customarily receive. Potentially, with the backing of the Athenian navy, they could deny any and every Greek city access to the Black Sea, and therefore access to the main seaborne route not only for grain, but also for

⁴⁰ IG I² 57 [IG i³ 61], 18–21, 34–41 (Methone); 58 [IG i³ 63], 10–19 (Aphytis).

⁴¹ G.B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the history of his age* (London, 1911), 77. We have no idea of the duties of the *Hellespontophylakes* apart from this reference. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22 and Polyb. 4.44.4 say that Alcibiades introduced the first toll collection in 410, at Chrysopolis in the territory of Calchedon across the straits from Byzantium.

slaves, hides and other important products. When were they installed? The temptation to label them a 'wartime measure' must be resisted. Not only does it introduce the argument from silence, about which I have already said enough, but it ignores the fact that very few years since 478 were not 'wartime' years.⁴²

I do not suggest that the *Hellespontophylakes* were introduced early in the history of the empire. They were, after all, only the capstone of the structure, an organization designed to bring about a closed sea. What I do suggest is that such an aim was the automatic consequence of naval power, within the Greek *polis* system, and that steps in that direction would have been taken by the Athenians when and as they were able, and found it advantageous, to do so.⁴³ Short of going to war, there was no more useful instrument for punishing enemies, rewarding friends, and persuading 'neutrals' to become 'friends'.⁴⁴ And if employment of the instrument meant going to war, *tant pis*. The revolt of Thasos, Thucydides writes (1.100.2), arose from a quarrel 'about the *emporía* [trading-posts] on the Thracian coast and about the mines the Thasians exploited'. That was as early as 465 B.C., and, though we do not know the issue dividing Athens and Thasos over the *emporía*, it can scarcely be unrelated to the 'closed sea' ambitions of the imperial state, which then simply took over the *emporía* after Thasos was defeated. Of course Athens did not yet have the ability to close the sea which she was to have later, but it is surely wrong to say that the aim itself was *unthinkable* in the 60s and 50s.⁴⁵ That is to commit the hegemony-into-empire error once again.

The question, in sum, is not when or whether the 'closed sea' was thinkable but when and how Athens was able to close the sea to suit herself. And why. As we shall see in a moment, Athenian purposes did not require total control, even if that were within their reach. The Corinthian warning, in 432, that inland states would soon learn what maritime states already knew, that Athens was able to prevent them from bringing their produce to the sea and from buying what they required in turn (Thuc. 1.120.2), is meaningful but must be understood

⁴² Correctly Schuller (1974), 6–7.

⁴³ The best statement of this proposition is by Nesselhauf (1933), 58–68, though I shall indicate disagreement on two points.

⁴⁴ An interesting example of 'rewarding friends' has been seen in the 24 small cities, most of them in the Thracian and Hellespontine districts, who 'volunteered' tribute in the years from 435, by Nesselhauf (1933), 58–62, and more fully by F.A. Lepper, 'Some rubrics in the Athenian quota-lists', *JHS* LXXXII (1962), 25–55, who take these instances as proof of the doctrine that tribute payment was a necessary condition of sailing the sea. The explanation is admittedly speculative; nothing more may be involved than local manoeuvres in a period of unstable relations between Athens and Macedon; see Meiggs (1972), 249–52.

⁴⁵ Nesselhauf (1933), 64.

correctly in practical terms. So is the ‘Megarian decree’. Not even the most monumental special pleading has succeeded in diluting the plain words, repeated three times by Thucydides (1.67.4, 1.139, 1.144.2), that a decree, moved by Pericles in 432, among other provisions excluded the Megarians ‘from the harbours of the Athenian empire’. All the elaborate arguments about the impossibility of blockade by triremes and about the ease of ‘sanction-busting’, founded in fact though they are, are irrelevant.⁴⁶ The Athenians claimed the right to exclude the Megarians from all harbours, and they could have enforced that claim *had they wished*. The long story that began with Eion and Skyros was known to every state which had a harbour, and there were Athenian officials (as well as *proxenoi* and other Athenian friends) in every important harbour-town.

That Athens did not wish to *destroy* Megara is patent, and significant. What she wished, and accomplished, was to *hurt* Megara and at the same time to declare openly and forcefully that she was prepared to employ the ‘closed sea’ ruthlessly as an instrument of power. The coinage decree, whenever one dates it, was precisely the same kind of declaration.⁴⁷ Both were expressions of *Machtspolitik* – but not, in the normal sense of that term, of *Handelspolitik*. At this point, we must introduce into the discussion the distinction first formulated clearly in the field of Greek history by Hasebroek, the distinction between ‘commercial interests’ and ‘import interests’ (specifically food, shipbuilding materials, metals).⁴⁸ Athens could not survive as a great power, or indeed as any kind of large autonomous *polis*, without a regular import on a considerable scale of grain, metals and shipbuilding materials, and she could now guarantee that through her control of the sea. In not a single action, however, did Athens show the slightest concern for private Athenian profits in this field: there were no Navigation Acts, no preferential treatment for Athenian shippers, importers or manufacturers, no efforts to reduce the large, perhaps preponderant, share of the trade in the hands of non-Athenians.⁴⁹ Without such moves, there can be no *Handelspolitik*, no ‘monopolization of trade and traffic’.⁵⁰ And on this score there was no difference between the landowner Cimon and the tanner Cleon.

⁴⁶ De Ste Croix (1972), ch. 7; see the judicious critique by Schuller (1974), 77–9.

⁴⁷ I shall not repeat my reasons for holding the currency decree to be a political act without any commercial or financial advantage to Athenians; see Finley (1965), 22–4; (1973a), 166–9.

⁴⁸ First formulated in a lecture (Hasebroek 1926), the analysis was then extended in a book (Hasebroek 1928); see Finley (1965).

⁴⁹ See most recently E. Erxleben, ‘Die Rolle der Bevölkerungs-klassen im Aussenhandel Athens im 4. Jahrhundert v.u.z.’, in *Hellenische Poleis*, ed. E.C. Welskopf (Berlin, 1974), I 460–520; more generally, de Ste Croix (1972), 214–20.

⁵⁰ Nesselhauf (1933), 65.

Many Greek *poleis*, and especially most larger and ambitious ones, had a comparable need to import. Athens could now block them, partially if not completely, and that was the other use of the ‘closed sea’ instrument. When the Athenians sent a fleet in 427 B.C. to support Leontini against Syracuse, their real aim, explains Thucydides (3.86.4), ‘was to prevent corn from being exported from there to the Peloponnese’. How often and under what circumstances Athens used her fleet in this way in the course of the half-century after 478 cannot be determined from the pitiful evidence. The very existence of her navy normally made an open display of force unnecessary, and there is no reason to think that Athens blockaded other states merely for practice or sadistic amusement. In the absence of genuinely commercial and competitive motives, interference in the sailing and trading activities of other states was restricted to specific situations, as they arose *ad hoc* in the growth of the empire. Only during the Peloponnesian War (or so it seems), which radically altered the scale of operations and the stakes, did it become necessary to make massive use of the ‘closed sea’ instrument. And even then the volume of traffic in the Aegean was considerable enough for the Athenians in 413 B.C. to abandon the tribute for a five per cent harbour tax (Thuc. 7.28.4) *in an attempt to increase their revenue*.⁵¹

Obviously a steady flow of food and other materials was a benefit to many Athenians individually. But to include such a gain under the rubric, ‘other forms of economic subordination or exploitation’, would strain the sense unduly.

V

‘Athens’ is of course an abstraction. Concretely, who in Athens benefited (or suffered) from the empire, how and to what extent? In what follows, I shall remain within my narrow framework, restricting ‘benefits’, ‘profits’, to their material sense, excluding the ‘benefits’ (not unimportant) arising from glory, prestige, the sheer pleasure of power. I shall also ignore such side-benefits as the tourist attraction of every great imperial city.

⁵¹ I do not understand how some historians can seriously doubt that this tax was to be collected in all harbours within the Athenian sphere. At the end of the century, the 2% harbour-tax, in the Piraeus only, was farmed for 39 talents (Andoc. 1.133–4), and no arithmetic can raise that figure to a sum, in 413 B.C., that would warrant the measure, when, as there is reason to believe, the tribute in the period 418–414 amounted to about 900 talents a year. I should add that I am prepared to leave open the possibility of a widespread toll system in the empire even earlier, as argued by Romstedt (1914) from the still unexplained reference to a *dekate* (tithe) in the ‘Callias decree’, *IG I² 91 [IG I³ 52]*, 7. Romstedt’s analysis is not convincing, but the possibility seems to me to deserve better than the neglect in all recent works on the empire.

The traditional Greek view is well enough known, as it was ‘quantified’ by Aristotle (*Const. of Ath.* 24.3): the common people of Athens, the poorer classes, were both the driving force behind, and the beneficiaries of, the empire. Their benefits are easily enumerated. At the head of the list is the extensive land confiscated from subjects and distributed in some fashion among Athenians. Perhaps as important is the navy: Athens maintained a standing fleet of 100 triremes, with another 200 in drydock for emergencies. Even 100 required 20,000 men, and, though we do not know how many ships were kept at sea regularly on patrol duty and for practice,⁵² or how many ships campaigned for how long through all the fighting of the periods 478–431 and 431–404, there seems little doubt that thousands of Athenians earned their pay for rowing in the fleet through the sailing-season annually, and that tens of thousands (including many non-Athenians) were engaged for longer or shorter periods on campaigns in many years. Add the work in the dockyards alone and the total cash benefit to poorer Athenians was substantial though not measurable; to a large percentage of all the poor, furthermore.

To be sure, Athens maintained a navy before she had an empire, and continued to do so after the loss of the empire, but the later experience demonstrates that, without the imperial income, it was impossible to pay so large a body of crewmen regularly. Similarly with the corn supply: Athens succeeded in maintaining imports in the fourth century, too, but in the fifth century everyone knew how imperial power guaranteed those imports (as it supported the navy), even if not everyone knew the text of the Methone decree or had heard of the *Hellespontophylakes*. And it is always the poor who are most threatened by shortages and famines.

Finally, there was pay for office, on which Aristotle laid his greatest stress in his attempt at quantification. No other Greek state, so far as we know, made it a regular practice to pay for holding public office or distributed the offices so widely.⁵³ That was a radical innovation in political life, the capstone of ‘Periclean’ democracy, for which there was no precedent anywhere. Fundamental radical measures require powerful stimuli and unprecedented necessary conditions. I believe that the

⁵² I shall not become involved in the discussion about the reliability of the statement by Plutarch (*Pericles* 11.4) that 60 triremes were kept at sea annually for eight months. Meiggs (1972), 427, concludes: ‘However dubious the details in Plutarch, his source . . . is not likely to have invented the basic fact that routine patrols annually cruised in the Aegean.’ That is surely right, and it is enough for my argument.

⁵³ G.E.M. de Ste Croix, ‘Political pay outside Athens’, *CQ* XXV (1975), 48–52, has contested my argument on this point (see next note), but his evidence, that Rhodes occasionally paid for some offices in the late fourth century and perhaps in the Hellenistic period, and Hellenistic Iasos, too, and that Aristotle made some general remarks on the subject of pay in the *Politics*, completely misses the force of my argument.

empire provided both, the necessary cash and the political motivation.⁵⁴ ‘Those who drive the ships are those who possess the power in the state’, wrote Pseudo-Xenophon (1.2), and I have already indicated that this unpleasant writer did not always miss the mark with his gnomic propaganda statements.

What, then, of the more prosperous Athenians in the upper classes, the *kaloï kagathoi*? The paradox, in modern eyes, is that they both paid the bulk of the domestic taxes (in which I include the liturgies) and constituted the armed forces. Yet, as we have already seen, they also supported the imperial advance of Athens, surely not out of idealistic or political interest in the benefits to the lower classes. How did they benefit? Did they? There is total silence in the literary sources on this question, save for a remarkable passage in Thucydides (8.48.5–6).⁵⁵ During the manoeuvres leading to the oligarchic coup of 411, Phrynichus spoke against the proposal to recall Alcibiades and replace the democracy. It is false, he said (in Thucydides’ summary), to think that the subjects of Athens would welcome an oligarchy, for ‘they saw no reason to suppose that they would be any better off under the *kaloï kagathoi*, considering that when the democracy had perpetrated evils it had been under the instigation and guidance of the *kaloï kagathoi*, who were the chief beneficiaries’.

Phrynichus was a slippery character and we are not obliged to believe everything (or anything) he said in a policy debate. However, Thucydides went out of his way, to an unusual degree, to stress the acuity and correctness of Phrynichus’ judgements,⁵⁶ and that puts a different light on his assertion about upper-class benefits from the empire. It at least suggests something more than glory and power-as-such as the aims of the long line of *kaloï kagathoi* beginning with Cimon who built, defended and fought for the empire. The puzzle is that we are unable to specify how the upper classes could have been the chief beneficiaries. Apart from the acquisition of property in subject territories, I can think of nothing other than negative benefits. That is to say, the imperial income enabled the Athenians to construct splendid public buildings and to float the largest navy of the day without adding to the taxpayers’ financial

⁵⁴ See Finley (1973a), 172–4; (1973b), 48–50. Jones (1957), 5–10, tried to falsify this proposition by pointing to the survival of pay for office after the loss of empire, and he has been gleefully quoted by scores of writers. However, it is easily demonstrated that institutions often survive long after the conditions necessary for their introduction disappeared. Trial by jury is a sufficient example.

⁵⁵ For what follows, I am grateful to A. Andrewes for an advance copy of his forthcoming commentary on the passage. I am also happy to thank him for several discussions of the relevant problems and for reading the text of this essay.

⁵⁶ 8.27.5, 48.4, 64.2–5. That Thucydides did not specifically endorse this particular argument of Phrynichus does not seem to me very important.

burdens. How much of a burden the navy could impose became clear in the fourth century. That is something, but it is hardly enough to resolve the puzzle Phrynichus has left us with.

Be that as it may, the conclusion seems to me compelling that the empire directly profited the poorer half of the Athenian population to an extent unknown in the Roman empire, or in modern empires. There was a price, of course, the costs of constant warfare. Men were lost in naval engagements and sometimes in land battles, most shatteringly in the Sicilian disaster. Athenian farmers suffered from periodic Spartan raids in the first stage of the Peloponnesian War, and even more from the permanent Spartan garrison at Decelea in the final decade of the war. The connexion between those evils and the empire was obvious, but what conclusions were drawn? War was endemic: everyone accepted that as fact, and therefore no one seriously argued, or believed, that surrender of the empire would relieve Athens of the miseries of war. It would merely relieve them of certain particular wars, and the loss of empire and its benefits did not seem worth that dubious gain. Athenian morale remained buoyant to the bitter end, reflecting their calculus of the profits and the losses.

VI

No doubt the subject states would have preferred freedom from Athens to subjection, other things being equal. But the desire for freedom is often a weak weapon, and other things are rarely equal in real life. I am referring not merely to the staggering difficulties of staging a successful revolt – Naxos tried and was crushed, Thasos tried and was crushed, later Mytilene tried and was crushed – but to the more complex relationships inherent in all situations of subjection and domination. ‘The allies (or subjects)’ are as much an abstraction as ‘Athens’. Athens had friends in every subject city.⁵⁷ In 413, before the final battle at Syracuse, when the position of the Athenian army had become hopeless, the Syracusans offered the allied contingents their freedom and a safe-conduct if they deserted. They refused and accepted the Athenian fate. Two years later, the people of Samos reaffirmed their loyalty to Athens and remained faithful to the bitter end.

We do not know why the Samians reacted in this way in 411, the Mytileneans in the opposite direction in 428. We lack the necessary information. The history of empire reveals a similarly divergent pattern

⁵⁷ I see no need to enter into the debate over the ‘popularity of the Athenian empire’ initiated by de Ste Croix in *Historia* III (1954/5), 1–41 [Ch. 11]; for the bibliography and a statement of his own most recent views, see de Ste Croix (1972), 34–43.

everywhere: the view from the imperial state is more or less unitary, whereas the view from the receiving end varies from community to community, and within each community from group to group. Among some of Athens' subjects, the common people preferred democracy backed by Athenian power to oligarchy in an autonomous state. That would be one explanation of a particular reaction (though Athens did not always oppose oligarchies). In this connexion, it is worth remembering that we are never told how the tribute was collected *within the tributary state*. If the normal Greek system of taxation prevailed – and there is no reason to believe that it did not – then the tribute for Athens was paid by the rich, not by the common people. That burden would therefore not have caused the latter any concern. In sum, the material costs borne by the subjects were uneven, and by and large their weight and impact elude us.

In Thucydides' account of the debates at Sparta that ended with a declaration of war against Athens, the historian attributes the following words to an Athenian spokesman (1.76.2):

'We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human practice, in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so – honour, fear and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this way. It has already been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power.'

There is no programme of imperialism here, no theory, merely a reassertion of the universal ancient belief in the naturalness of domination. Looking back, the historian is free to make his own moral judgements; he is not free to confuse them with practical judgements. Too much of the modern literature is concerned, even obsessed, with trying to determine whether Athens 'exploited her allies in any extensive way', 'how much exploitation and oppression took place', whether or not '*Ausbeutung*' [exploitation] is an applicable epithet. Such questions are unanswerable, when they are not meaningless. Athenian imperialism employed all the forms of material exploitation that were available and possible in that society. The choices and the limits were determined by experience and by practical judgements, sometimes by miscalculations.

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PART I

*Origins, Development and
Chronology*

Introduction to Part I

The articles in this part all tackle an apparently simple question: when did Athenian imperialism begin? But answering this question requires that a number of other, often more complex, problems are also addressed. How should the ancient sources be interpreted, and how should the differences between them be resolved? How are imperialistic actions to be defined? Or are actions less important than words: will a move to empire be accompanied by a shift in the language of diplomacy? The difficulty of establishing the terms of the debate might help to explain why the question of the origins of Athenian imperialism still has no universally agreed answer.

Most historians are happy to accept that the label ‘Delian League’ can be applied to the organisation established in 478, although, as was noted in the General Introduction, there is some uncertainty as to the precise form and declared purpose of this alliance. The implication of Thucydides’ account is that the alliance was very similar in membership to that which had fought against Persia, and that its aims too were closely connected to the Persian Wars: the allies aimed ‘to compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the Persian King’s territory’ (1.96). According to the version in the Aristoteleian *Constitution of the Athenians* (23.5), however, this alliance had much less specific aims, and a much longer prospective lifespan: the participants simply swore to have ‘the same friends and enemies’ as each other, and sealed this oath by throwing iron bars into the sea (a gesture usually taken to imply that the oaths should last until the iron floated back to the surface).¹

¹ For further discussion of the relationship between the Delian League and the earlier alliances which had fought against Persia, see P. A. Brunt, ‘The Hellenic League against Persia’, *Historia* 2 (1953-4), 135-63; N. G. L. Hammond, ‘The origins and nature of the Athenian alliance of 478/7 BC’, *JHS* 87 (1967), 41-61. On the declared purpose of the League, see R. Sealey, ‘The origin of the Delian League’, in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, 233-55; A. H. Jackson, ‘The original purpose of the Delian League’, *Historia* 18 (1969), 12-16.

Whichever version is preferred, it is undeniable that the organisation underwent some serious changes over the rest of the fifth century. The alliance certainly increased in size (although the precise extent of its growth is extremely hard to pin down).² More controversial is the qualitative change between the agreements of 478 (which established a multilateral, voluntary league, with predominantly military aims) and the behaviour which becomes visible later in the century: refusal to allow allies to leave the League (as in the case of Naxos, described by Thucydides at 1.98), or coercion of cities to join (Melos, in 416, being the most notorious example); increased financial exploitation (higher tribute demands; confiscation of territory); and involvement in affairs which extend far beyond military activity (political and legal intervention, in particular).

What is much less clear, however, is how long this process of transition from 'league' to 'empire' took. There are, crudely speaking, three possibilities. The first is that the empire was already fully fledged in 478, at least in terms of Athenian ambition. The 'Delian League', on this view, was never more than propagandistic window-dressing, and Athenian actions in the 470s confirm the insincerity of their earlier promises. The second possibility is that the key period of imperial development came in the 460s and 450s, as the Athenians became less concerned with fighting Persia (possibly going so far as to make a formal peace with the Persians),³ and more interested in enhancing their own power. And a third approach places the significant transition in the last third of the century: it was the pressures of the Peloponnesian War (it is argued) which led to the most extreme forms of Athenian imperialism.

One reason why such diverse views are possible is the fact that it is extremely hard to attach definite dates to many key events and documents. The dispute over the correct dating of the inscriptions of the empire is one of the most long-running (and sometimes bad-tempered) arguments in the field, and will be explored in more detail below. But literary texts also create problems. The chronology of Thucydides' narrative of the period immediately after the formation of the Delian League is notoriously vague. Thucydides describes some significant changes (particularly the shift from military to monetary contributions

² Ancient sources are strikingly vague about both the original size and the final extent of the alliance, but it is highly unlikely that all of the cities which appear on the tribute assessment of 425 (ML 69, Fornara 136: as many as 410 cities might be listed in this decree) were among those that swore the oaths of 478. (It should also, however, be noted that this assessment of the empire's membership seems to have been very optimistic: the maximum number of cities recorded as paying tribute in any one year is 190.) For discussions of the original membership of the Delian League, see the articles listed in n. 1.

³ The so-called 'Peace of Callias', discussed further below.

from the allies: 1.99) and important events (the first rebellion from the alliance, and Athens' suppression of it; a series of campaigns against Persian possessions in and around Asia Minor: 1.98–100). It is known that these events take place at some point in the 470s and 460s, but attempts at a more precise dating rely on meticulous piecing together of scraps of evidence from various sources, together with a considerable degree of speculation.

Even where the chronology of actions and events is secure, however, there remains extensive scope for interpreting their significance. This is the problem that absorbs Rawlings in the first paper in this part. Rawlings focuses on one sentence, and one word, in Thucydides' description of Athens' actions in 478: 'their *proschêma* was to retaliate for what they had suffered by ravaging the Persian King's territory'. He argues that the word *proschêma* is always used to mean 'alleged purpose', and that Thucydides' narrative in the sections that follow is intended to show to his readers what the Athenians' *true* purpose was in forming the alliance: not fighting the Persians, but asserting and expanding their own power over the Greeks. For Thucydides, according to Rawlings, there was no slow development from mutually beneficial hegemony to exploitative empire: revenge on the Persians was not Athens' primary motivation in 478; establishment of their own personal empire was. Athenian imperialism may not have become obvious until later in the century, but it was present in Athenian hearts and minds in 478.⁴

Even if Rawlings' reading of Thucydides is correct, it need not follow that we are obliged to follow the Thucydidean analysis: this is, after all, just one man's interpretation of Athenian motives and actions in this period. In order to explore alternative perspectives on the question, however, it is necessary to digress slightly and address the bad-tempered debate which was mentioned earlier: the problem of dating inscriptions.

Inscriptions can be assigned dates in a number of ways. The ideal circumstance is that the document itself contains a dating formula of some sort: most Athenian decrees, for example, included a reference to the name of the chief archon (magistrate) for the year. Where this has not survived (as is often the case), a reference to a name or event known from some other source can allow a document to be placed in a general time period: a mention of Pericles in an inscription, for example, would allow the text to be dated with reasonable certainty to the years in which that man was politically active. Where such references are missing, or

⁴ For a response to Rawling's arguments, see A. French, 'Athenian ambitions and the Delian alliance', *Phoenix* 33 (1979), 134–41.

too ambiguous to be definitive, then an appeal has to be made to more detailed, and often subjective, criteria: the linguistic forms used in the text, the choice of vocabulary, and the type of alphabet in which the text is inscribed.

It is this last type of argument which has become most strongly associated with the debate over the dating of fifth-century Athenian inscriptions. Two letter-forms have been the subject of greatest scrutiny: the letters rho (ρ) and sigma (σ). It was once generally held that these two forms underwent a conspicuous change in appearance during the fifth century: the letter rho, which was originally written in a form quite similar to the modern letter R, lost its 'tail' and began to be written Ρ. The letter sigma, written with three 'bars' in the earlier part of the century (Ϝ), gained an extra stroke and became the 'four-barred sigma' (Σ). When inscriptions which could be securely dated by other means were studied, it emerged that no inscription later than 445 included the older, three-barred, form of sigma, and that the 'tailed' rho appeared to have died out in 437. Any inscription which contained one of the apparently older forms should therefore, it was argued, have been produced before those dates. In the 1960s, however, the first serious challenge to this consensus started to appear, championed above all by Harold Mattingly. In a series of articles Mattingly argued that these letter forms were not a reliable guide to dating and that there were in fact good reasons to think that many of the documents in which the supposedly 'old' forms of the letters appeared should instead be placed in the 420s, or even 410s.⁵

Such apparent minutiae have become particularly important in this field because letter forms, or other stylistic features, are the only criteria by which dates can be assigned to some of the most important documents of the Athenian Empire: the decree (sometimes called the Cleinias Decree) imposing a much more stringent system of tribute collection (ML 46, Fornara 98); the attempt to impose Athenian coins, weights and measures on the whole empire (ML 45, Fornara 97); a series of decrees in which the Athenians refer to their empire as 'the cities which the Athenians rule';⁶ and several documents which show Athenian responses to unsuccessfully rebellious cities (for example ML 47, Fornara 99). Placing these documents in the 440s or earlier has obvious consequences for the chronology of the development of the Athenian Empire. Similarly, moving them to the 420s allows a very different

⁵ Mattingly's articles are collected in *The Athenian Empire Restored*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

⁶ Discussed in R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, endnote 12.

picture of the empire's history to be created. The second and third articles in this part disagree over this basic question of epigraphic method, and, partly as a result, arrive at dramatically divergent conclusions about the development of Athenian imperialism.

Meiggs's article demonstrates the consequences of dating these documents earlier in the century. Meiggs argues that the transition from league to empire was complete by 446/5, a transition which is visible both in the ways Athens treats the allies and in Athenian relations with states outside the empire (particularly Sparta and Persia).

The case for a mid-century transformation from league to empire has often been connected with the so-called 'Peace of Callias', a peace agreement between Athens and Persia which is usually dated to 449 BC.⁷ The historicity of this Peace has long been disputed: it is not mentioned by Thucydides, and its authenticity is explicitly denied by the fourth-century historian Theopompus (F153).⁸ But if it was made then it is easy to see why it might be thought to represent a distinctive new phase in Athenian policy. If the Delian League was originally set up in order to fight the Persians, then signing a peace agreement with the Persians would remove the official reason for the League's existence. And if the defence of Greek freedom against Persian aggression was no longer Athens' chief motive in leading the alliance, then it seems reasonable to suspect that other, more self-interested, motives might have started to drive their actions. When the Mytileneans began to contemplate rebellion from Athens in 428, part of their justification (according to Thucydides) was the belief that, 'the object of the alliance was the liberation of the Greeks from Persia, not the enslavement of the Greeks to Athens . . . When we saw the Athenians becoming steadily less hostile to Persia, and steadily more interested in subjecting their own allies, then we began to be afraid' (3.10).

Meiggs, however, sees the Peace of Callias as being not so much a cause as a symptom of the change from league to empire, and argues that the significant developments in Athenian policy and practice should be located before the Peace, in the 460s and (above all) the 450s. It is in

⁷ The date is based above all on the testimony of Diodorus (12.4.4–6), with circumstantial supporting evidence from the tribute lists. The standard reconstruction of the stone on which the lists are inscribed creates space for only fourteen lists for the fifteen-year period from 454/3 to 440/39. The 'missing year' can plausibly be placed in 448, and explained as a reaction to the Peace of Callias: tribute collection was either suspended or became temporarily impossible once the peace was made. The 449 date is challenged by E. Badian (in *From Plataea to Potidaea*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, ch. 1), who argues that peace was originally made in 466, after the battle of Eurymedon.

⁸ The ancient evidence for (and against) the Peace of Callias is collected in Fornara 96, and in R. G. Osborne, *The Athenian Empire*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2000, nos. 50–6 (Osborne also lists, on pp. 132–3, further bibliography on the problem).

this period, according to Meiggs, that the Athenians took the most important steps in establishing imperial control over their allies: garrisons, governors and overseas settlements were put in place; sympathetic governments (that is, democracies) were installed in rebellious states; legal, financial and religious obligations were imposed on the allies. Almost all of Meiggs's evidence for these changes comes from inscribed texts: the decree which sets up democratic government in Erythrae, and imposes other regulations on the once-rebellious city (ML 40, Fornara 71) is the earliest (and, some have suggested, most moderate) in the series, followed by regulations for Miletus and Colophon. The evidence of the tribute lists is combined with these specific examples to build up a broader picture of allied discontent and Athenian repression (the disappearance of a state from these lists is usually taken to indicate rebellion from the empire; reappearance is seen as a sign of forced or voluntary readmission).⁹ The vigour, and success, with which Athens established her imperial authority in the 450s made it possible, Meiggs suggests, for Athens to execute the policy U-turn of the Peace of Callias without destroying the empire in the process.

Many of the texts on which Meiggs bases his arguments are among those whose date cannot be definitively determined, and for which the evidence of letter forms is particularly significant. If the traditional attitude to such dating is rejected, however, then it becomes possible to construct a very different picture of the development of empire. This is the approach taken by Harold Mattingly in the third article in this part.

Mattingly's article is probably the most detailed and technical in this volume, but his conclusions, if correct, are of much wider significance: it is important, therefore, not to become too lost in the close analysis of the minute features of individual texts, and to keep an eye on the broader implications of Mattingly's case. This case has two main, connected, points. The first, which dominates the early part of the article, relates to the criteria for dating inscriptions: Mattingly reiterates his doubts over the reliability of dating by letter forms: how can we be sure that apparently old-fashioned forms really belong at an earlier date, rather than reflecting the method of an unfashionable stone-carver? He outlines instead other possible stylistic criteria which might be used to supplement (or correct) those datings: a small change in of two grammatical forms (the dative plural and the imperative), an alteration in the spelling of the prefix *ksun-*, and a tendency to use a distinctive form and order of words in a clause which recurs in several decrees. All of these changes, Mattingly argues, can be located in the 420s, and

⁹ On the form and content of the tribute lists, see p. 160.

all provide a more reliable method of dating texts than the evidence of letter forms.

The consequences of these arguments become clearer in the second part of Mattingly's piece. If his dating criteria are preferred to the conventional method of dating by letter forms, then it becomes possible to place several documents of the empire at a later point in the empire's history: these documents include the regulations for Colophon and Miletus (which played an important part in Meiggs's case for a mid-century transformation), as well other examples of aggressive imperial control (the coinage decree; Cleinias' decree regulating the payment of tribute; inscriptions which refer to the empire as 'the cities which the Athenians rule'). The best epigraphic evidence for developed Athenian imperialism therefore, according to Mattingly, comes from the period of the Peloponnesian War. When this material is combined with the evidence of Thucydides – the response to the revolt of Mytilene, the attack on Melos – a picture emerges of an empire which reached its most aggressive form only under pressure of a major conflict.

Is it possible to judge which, if any, of these interpretations of imperial development is correct? One thing which is now known is that Mattingly's epigraphic arguments against the reliability of dating only by letter forms are almost certainly right. Although his claims were initially received with some scepticism, a steady flow of further epigraphic research and discoveries has revealed several documents which contain the supposedly early letter forms but which must be dated to the last quarter of the fifth century.¹⁰ It now seems, therefore, that Mattingly was right to argue that the choice of a particular style of letter might owe more to the whim of the stone-cutter than to any strict progression in fashion. But it need not, of course, follow that Mattingly's other arguments are also correct: the crucial documents *can* now be dated later in the century, but it does not follow that they *have* to be dated so late. (It is worth noting, too, how much of Mattingly's argument depends on the reliability of Thucydides' picture of the changing nature of Athenian politics in the 430s and 420s.)

¹⁰ The most famous case is the Egesta Decree (ML 37, Fornara 81). Damage to the stone has worn away the all but the last two letters (-on) of the archon's name. Three names might have filled the gap: Habron (who was archon in 458/7), Ariston (454/3) or Antiphon (418/17). Since the inscription contains both three-barred sigmas and tailed rhos, it was widely accepted that a date in the 450s must be correct. Recent research, however, has convincingly argued that the third-last letter of the archon's name is φ (ph), that the archon's name is therefore Antiphon, the date of the inscription is 418/17, and the three-barred sigma and tailed rho were used until the penultimate decade of the fifth century. (For the new reading of the stone, see M. H. Chambers, R. Galluci and P. Spanos, 'Athens' alliance with Egesta in the year of Antiphon', *ZPE* 83 (1990), 38–63; A. P. Matthaiou, 'Peri tês IG I³ 11', in A. P. Matthaiou (ed.), *Attikai Epigraphai*, Athens: Hellēnikē Epigraphikē Hetaireia, 2004, 99–121).

The success of Mattingly's epigraphic argument, therefore, only adds to the intractability of the overall problem of charting the development of the empire, and it can be tempting to conclude, with Finley, that the process of diachronic change is too poorly documented to allow for definitive conclusions. However, it is also worth asking whether, even if our sources were in perfect condition, we should ever expect to see a perfectly clear picture of imperial development. There is a tendency among historians to assume that states behave rationally, and that policy is created and applied in a consistent manner. But both the nature of Athenian politics and the size of the empire might argue against that view. Some ancient writers might have overemphasised the fickleness of Athenian political decision-making, but it does seem likely that short-term, or personally motivated, factors could have a much greater influence on the formulation of 'foreign policy' than is the case in modern political systems,¹¹ and that we might be able to detect divergent views about the nature and conduct of empire even in 'official' Athenian sources. Later chapters in this book will show how much variation there was in the enforcement of policy: the experience of empire – in political, financial and cultural terms – differed widely among the subject-states. The difficulty of charting the story of the growth of Athenian imperialism may be frustrating, but it should not be entirely surprising.

¹¹ For some reflections on the formation of policy in the Athenian assembly, see Ch. 9. For the view that an Athenian-style open democracy could not formulate a true 'foreign policy' (and for an attempt to argue against that view), see P. Harding, 'Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century', *Klio* 77 (1995), 105–25 (esp. 120–4).

2 *Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian League*^{†1}

HUNTER R. RAWLINGS III

In Book one, chapter 96 of his history Thucydides describes the formation of the Delian League. It is the only description in the historian's own words of the inception of the League, though, as we shall see, on three occasions he allows speakers in his history to recount the same events. Thucydides' own account in 1.96 is factual and straightforward. This simplicity has not, however, prevented scholars dealing with the passage from misreading the Greek. In particular, the sentence in which Thucydides expresses his own view of the original programme of the League has been consistently misinterpreted and misrepresented. 'For their *proschêma* was to retaliate for what they had suffered by ravaging the Persian King's territory' [πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν]. The syntax is simplicity itself. It is the meaning of *proschêma* [πρόσχημα] which has caused the trouble. Before examining the passage we should take a brief look at this word, which appears rarely in the fifth-century literature left to us.

In Herodotus and Thucydides, the word *proschêma* is, with one exception,² used uniformly. As its etymology (*prochein* [προέχειν]) suggests, it means (LSJ) 'that which is held before,' hence, 'that which is held before to cover, screen, cloak.' It is thus a common way of designating 'pretense, pretext.'³ In this latter sense it is sometimes clarified by the objective

[†] Originally published in *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 1–8.

¹ I should like to thank Professor W. Robert Connor and the referees of *Phoenix* for reading an earlier draft of this paper and for offering helpful criticism on its arguments. They should not, of course, be assumed to agree with its conclusions.

² Herod. 5.28. The variation is due to the other meaning of *pro* [πρό] 'above, ahead.' See LSJ *s.v.*, para. II, where the translation 'ornament' is suggested for this sense of *proschêma*.

³ Cf. Soph. *El.* 525. As Jebb points out in his commentary on this passage, '*proschêma* [πρόσχημα] here = *skêpsis*, *prophasis* [σκῆψις, πρόφασις].' In the same play, line 682 has *proschêma* in its other sense (see note 2), as Jebb explains. *Proschêma* does not appear in extant Greek literature before Sophocles and Herodotus.

genitive *tou logou* [τοῦ λόγου].⁴ Since *proschêma* refers to a ‘professed purpose’ or ‘publicly made claim’ it is always contrasted with words or phrases which designate ‘real intentions,’ ‘true aims,’ ‘private reasons.’ The historian usually makes the contrast explicitly in the syntactic and semantic construction of the sentence. Herodotus 7.157.1 is quite clear: ‘[sc. the Persian] . . . is making a *proschêma* of marching against Athens, but his intention is to make all of Greece subject to him’ [(sc. Πέρσης ἀνήρ) . . . πρόσχημα μὲν ποιούμενος ὡς ἐπ’ Ἀθήνας ἐλαύνει, ἐν νόῳ δὲ ἔχων πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὑπ’ ἐωυτῷ ποιήσασθαι]. 6.44.1 is almost identical. In 9.87.2 the contrasting word is ‘truly’ [ἀληθῶς]. In 4.167.3 the contrast is emphasized by the phrase ‘it seems to me’ [ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν]: ‘this was the *proschêma* for the reason for the expedition, but it seems to me that the expedition was sent to subdue Libya’ [αὕτη μὲν νυν αἰτίη πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο, ἐπέμπετο δὲ ἡ στρατιή, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ Λιβύων καταστροφῇ]. In the other Herodotean occurrence (6.133.1), the contrast is made by ‘but’ [ἀλλά]. Note that in all but one of these passages (9.87.2), Herodotus uses *proschêma* to designate the publicly professed purpose of an aggressor whose real intention is conquest (*katastrophê* [καταστροφή]).

There are three examples of *proschêma* in Thucydides, of which the clearest is 3.82.4: τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα. ‘Prudence (was considered) a cloak [*proschêma*] for cowardice.’ In 5.30.2 Thucydides spells out the Corinthians’ real and professed complaints and concerns:

Corinth in her answer, delivered before those of her allies who had like her refused to accept the treaty, and whom she had previously invited to attend, refrained from openly stating the injuries she complained of, such as the non-recovery of Sollium or Anactorium from the Athenians, or any other point in which she thought she had been prejudiced, but took shelter under the pretext (πρόσχημα δὲ ποιούμενοι) that she could not give up her Thracian allies, . . .

(transl. Crawley)

One may compare 8.89.3 (see note 4) where *schêma* [σχῆμα] is used in precisely the same way: ‘but this was a political *schêma* for their argument, and most of them were driven to act in this way by private ambition . . .’ [ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ’ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσέκειντο . . .]. In all these cases the contrast to *proschêma* or *schêma* is explicit and clear.

⁴ Herod. 4.167.3 and 6.133.1. Cf. Thuc. 8.89.3: ‘but this was a political *proschêma* for their argument’ [ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου]. Here *schêma* [σχῆμα] is used as a synonym for the compound word.

In Thucydides 1.96.1 the contrast is neither explicit nor clear:

Παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πausανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἅς ναῦς πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηρῶντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν.

The Athenians having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the king's country.

Thus Crawley, who, like most translators, correctly reproduces the meaning of *proschêma*. Thucydides does not immediately state the 'real object.' This has led to two kinds of misinterpretation, both serious, and to a general failure to appreciate the full importance of Thucydides' choice of words. The passage is crucial for (1) the original purpose of the Delian League and (2) Thucydides' judgment of the original purpose of the Delian League. We shall here be concerned with only the second question, but it is important initially to show how those who have been concerned with only the first have obscured the second.

The authors of *ATL* paraphrase the sentence beginning with *proschêma* in two ways: vol. 3, p. 226, 'the programme was to obtain satisfaction for their losses by spoiling the King's land'; and vol. 3, p. 230, 'for it was their intention to avenge their losses.' Another historian translates the sentence 'for the purpose was to exact vengeance for their sufferings by ravaging the king's land,' and refers to it as 'Thucydides' statement of the purpose of the Delian League.'⁵ With such translations the force of *proschêma* is entirely lost, as is Thucydides' judgment, and, worst of all, so is the fact that Thucydides does render a judgment here rather than simply state a fact.

A second kind of problem arises from a misidentification of the antithesis of *proschêma*. In an article on 'The Hellenic League against Persia,'⁶ P. A. Brunt recognized (150) the force of the word: 'The professed purpose (πρόσχημα) of the Delian League is given by Thucydides, i, 96, 1; the members were to seek reparation for the damage they had sustained by ravaging the king's territory.' Brunt pointed out that 'This statement is not complete,' but he then went on to find the completion of it two books later: 'elsewhere (in the Mytilenaeen speech) we are told that the league was formed 'to free the Greeks from Persia.' (iii, 10, 1).' It is difficult to believe that Thucydides

⁵ R. Sealey in *Ancient Society and Institutions, Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday* (Oxford 1966) 237.

⁶ *Historia* 2 (1953-54) 135-163.

waited until Book 3 to complete a statement made in Book 1. Furthermore, it makes no sense to have Thucydides say 'The professed purpose was to ravage the King's territory; the real purpose was to free the Greeks from Persia.' If the real purpose, according to Thucydides, had been to free the Greeks from Persia, there would have been no reason for him to say that the Athenians covered it up. Quite the contrary. In addition, it is very bad practice indeed to find the completion of a Thucydidean statement in a speech. Brunt also refers to 'the relation between the professed purpose of the league and the obligations of the members,' and (151) makes a similar distinction between the 'professed purpose' of the second Athenian confederacy and its 'formal character.' This is apparently his interpretation of the function of *proschêma* in Thuc. 1.96.1: it distinguishes 'professed purpose' from 'formal character,' or actual 'obligations.' But from what we have seen of *proschêma* elsewhere, this kind of distinction is not likely. A *proschêma* is always a screen for real intentions which must be concealed for one reason or another.

Philologists have generally appreciated the denotation of *proschêma* in 1.96, if not its connotation. The scholiast glosses it with *prophasis* [πρόφασις], a clear indication that he understood its force. Krüger endorses this note and compares several of the other passages containing this word in Thucydides and Herodotus which we have reviewed. Classen-Steup translates, 'the declared basis of the League was the intention of taking revenge, etc.' ['der ausgesprochene Grund des Bundes war die Absicht, sich zu rächen usw'] and Gomme, 'The "announced intention" was aggression against Persia, a continuation of the war, not only preservation of the newly won freedom.' What these scholars have *not* done, however, is to ask why Thucydides used so strongly colored a term to describe the announced purpose of the Delian League. As we have shown in a comprehensive study of the terms *prophasis* [πρόφασις] and *proschêma* [πρόσχημα],⁷ the latter is considerably more negative in tone than the former. Both words denote a 'reason' or 'claim' which one offers to explain or excuse his conduct. But while *prophasis* can designate a true as well as a false claim, a *proschêma* is always false. It describes a 'falsely alleged claim,' a 'specious pretext' used to cloak real motives. It always indicates that a true or real motive is being concealed. As we have seen, every passage in Herodotus and Thucydides containing *proschêma*, with the single exception of Thuc. 1.96, explicitly mentions the contrast to *proschêma* in the form of a statement of the 'true

⁷ *A Semantic Study of prophasis to 400 B.C.*, *Hermes Einzelschriften*, Heft 33 (Wiesbaden 1975), especially 33-34.

motive' or 'real intention.' There can be little doubt that in 1.96 as well Thucydides meant, at the very least, to imply a contrast to *proschêma*, the 'alleged purpose' of the Delian League. What that contrast was, at least in Thucydides' judgment, we now inquire. In so doing, we should keep three things in mind: the contrast to *proschêma* should come soon after the statement of the *proschêma*; in all cases, the historians use *proschêma* to designate a false pretext which covers real intentions; in all cases, the real intention is private interest or conquest (*katastrophê* [καταστροφή]).

With these thoughts in mind we turn to the passage following our sentence. After saying that the League's professed purpose was to ravage the land of the King, Thucydides speaks of the Hellenotamiai,[†] the tribute, the treasury, and the synodoi.^{††} Chapter 97, a digression and possibly a later insertion into the narrative by Thucydides,⁸ is a preface to the Pentakontaetia. It is not until chapter 98 that Thucydides returns to his narrative. Now we are able to compare the 'professed purpose' of the League with the Athenians' actual conduct as leaders of the allies. The account is direct and straightforward:

First they (*sc.* the Athenians, as is clear from the subject of 97.1 and the end of 97.2 as well) took by siege Eion, a city on the Strymon which the Medes were holding, and they sold its inhabitants into slavery. Kimon the son of Miltiades was commander. Then they sold into slavery the people of Skyros, an island in the Aegean which the Dolopians were inhabiting, and they colonized it themselves. Then, without the rest of the Euboeans, they conducted a war against the Karystians, and in time they made them surrender on conditions. And after this they warred against the Naxians who had revolted and they reduced them by siege, and this was the first allied city to be subjugated against the agreement which had been made, and later the same happened to the others who revolted, one by one. There were other causes of the revolts but the principal ones were failure to provide money and ships and sometimes desertion. For the Athenians were very severe and harsh to men who were unprepared by habit and unwilling to undergo hardship, and they used force against them.

Already, only five or six sentences into the Pentakontaetia, we feel the historian's tone. The Athenians have conducted four operations as hegemon of the League, one against Persians, one against Dolopians, two against Greeks. Thucydides' emphasis is upon Athenian aggrandizement. The position of *autoi* [αὐτοῖ] in 98.2 (they colonized

[†] Literally Treasurers of Greece; these are Athenian magistrates responsible for managing the funds of the Athenian Empire (see further discussion in Part III).

^{††} Meetings of the council (*synedrion*) of the League.

⁸ See most recently O. Lendle, 'Die Auseinandersetzung des Thukydides mit Hellanikos,' *Hermes* 92 (1964) 129–143 = *Thukydides. Wege der Forschung* 661–682, especially 678 and note 44.

it *themselves*) helps to make that clear: it was the Athenians who benefited from the expedition to Skyros, not the League as a whole. So does the insertion of the phrase ‘without the other Euboeans’ [ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοέων] after *autois* [αὐτοῖς] in the next sentence: Thucydides tells us not that the other allies assisted the Athenians (as they almost certainly did), but that the Euboeans did *not*. By his selection of facts Thucydides emphasizes Athenian responsibility for this war against a Greek state rather than League participation. In the following sentence (98.4) there is once more no mention of allied support: the suppression of Naxos, without question an action of the League as a whole, appears to be a purely Athenian operation. Furthermore, the words ‘this was the first allied city to be enslaved in contravention of the agreement’ [πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχίς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός ἐδουλώθη] convey an extremely negative tone.⁹ As Gomme points out in his *Commentary* on this passage, *edoulôthê* [ἐδουλώθη] is a ‘rhetorical word,’ whose effect on a Greek reader would have been strong. What Thucydides clearly means to stress is that *from the very first*, the Athenians used the Delian League for their own hegemonial ends.

After only a few sentences of the Pentakontaetia we are in a position to contrast the alleged purpose of the Delian League with its actual operations. What has happened to the announced programme of ‘ravaging Persian territory?’ There is not a sign of it. Furthermore, as Thucydides’ account of the 50 years between the wars continues we hear nothing of any such action on the part of the League. The word *dêioun*, ‘ravage’ [δηοῦν], occurs only once (114.2) in the Pentakontaetia and the ‘ravagers’ are not the Athenians but the Spartans! *Temnein*, ‘cut down’ [τέμνειν], never appears.¹⁰ Not once are the Athenians or their allies said to ravage *anything*. This in spite of the vast booty we know they did collect (cf. Plut. *Kimon*) during the course of their campaigns against the Persians. Thucydides is utterly silent about the ravaging of Persian land and the collection of booty therefrom. In other words, he suppresses what we know, and he must have known, to have been the results of the Delian League’s programme of taking vengeance from the Persians for what the Greeks had suffered. On the other hand, he gives a great deal of attention to Athenian campaigns against other Greek states, both those inside and those outside

⁹ One is reminded of Tacitus’ famous remark on the opening ‘event’ of the reign of Tiberius: ‘the first crime of the new emperor was the murder of Postumus Agrippa . . .’ [*Primum facinus novi principatus fuit Postumi Agrippae caedes . . .*] (*Annals* 1.6.1).

¹⁰ See the lists in A. H. Jackson, ‘The Original Purpose of the Delian League’, *Historia* 18 (1969) 12–16, on pp. 15–16. In this article Jackson shows that by *dêioun* [δηοῦν] Thucydides (or the Athenians and allies in 478) meant the ravaging of territory, not necessarily the acquisition of booty.

their empire. To take just one pair of examples. Thucydides confines the battles of the Eurymedon, great and glorious League victories, which must have resulted in the acquisition of considerable booty, to a single sentence (100.1), while devoting a long paragraph (100.2–101.3) to the revolt of Thasos and its consequences in Greece. The contrast with Plutarch's handling of these same two events (*Kimón* 12–14) is instructive: there Eurymedon receives two chapters, Thasos one sentence. Plutarch's emphasis is no less clear than Thucydides'. One stresses League achievements against Persians, the other Athenian aggression against Greeks. Thucydides' very selection of material in the Pentakontaetia exposes his historiographical point of view: he goes out of his way to draw attention to Athenian hegemonial ambition and aggressiveness, and consistently underplays League actions against the Persians. He takes pains, in other words, to stress the contrast between the League's announced programme and its actual conduct under Athenian hegemony.

Now it is perfectly true that the Delian League did evolve gradually from an original alliance under Athenian leadership to an Empire under Athenian domination. Moreover, it is quite clear that Thucydides saw it as evolving in this way. He says as much in 1.99, where he attributes at least some of the responsibility for this process to the allies themselves, and he lets the Athenians make this same point in their own account of the inception and development of the League in 1.75–76. In this respect Thucydides has been followed by almost all modern historians, who have supported and added a great deal to his picture of a gradual development of the League from alliance to Empire.¹¹ But while these scholars are in essential agreement with Thucydides about the nature of the process itself, they differ sharply, and, one might add, unwittingly, from him on the intentions of the Athenians at the beginning of this process. For while they accept, for the most part, the League's own announced programme as the genuine purpose of both the allies and the Athenians at the League's inception in 478, it seems clear that he did not. When Thucydides described the public avowal of the League in 478 as a *proschêma*, and when he contrasted that initial avowal with subsequent Athenian leadership of the 'allies' in his Pentakontaetia, he meant thereby to suggest rather ironically that, to the Athenians at least, the Delian League was not simply a crusade but also an hegemony, an opportunity to create and employ power for their own purposes.

¹¹ The most recent and complete treatment of the subject, R. Meiggs' *Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972), emphasizes this aspect of the League's history throughout the text.

We mentioned at the beginning of this paper that, in addition to his own statement, Thucydides on three occasions in his history allows speakers to describe the inception of the League. We have examined two of those passages already. The Mytilenaeans in 3.10.1 quite naturally and tendentiously claimed that the League was formed to ‘free the Greeks from Persia.’ The Athenians in 1.75–76 stressed, just as naturally and as tendentiously, the allies’ role in requesting Athenian hegemony in 478. The third such instance comes in Hermokrates’ appeal to the Kamarinaeans in Book 6. Again the speaker is pleading a case, this time a vehemently anti-Athenian one.¹² But Hermokrates’ description of Athenian intentions in 478 bears a striking resemblance to the historian’s own. After first depicting Athenian claims in Sicily as ‘pretexts’ (*prophasei* [προφάσει] in 6.76.2; Thucydides makes the same point himself in 6.6.1 and gives it to Nikias in 6.8.4) Hermokrates repeats (6.76.3) almost verbatim Thucydides’ words in 1.96 and 99:

ἡγεμόνες γὰρ γενόμενοι ἐκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ σφῶν ἦσαν ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία, τοὺς μὲν λιποστρατίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν, τοῖς δ’ ὡς ἐκάστοις τινὰ εἶχον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπῆ ἐπενεγκόντες κατεστρέψαντο.

For after they became hegemon with the consent of the Ionians and of all their own descendants who were allied with them, avowedly for vengeance against the Mede, by charging some with desertion, others with making war on one another, and others with any specious charge they had, they conquered them all (*katestrepsanto*).

Note how *hōs* [ὡς] here performs the same function which *proschēma* did in 1.96.1: it brands the claim as a pretext.¹³ In addition, the adjective *euprepē*, ‘specious’ [εὐπρεπῆ], strengthens the point that the Athenians’ openly expressed motives are at variance with their real intentions. At the very least, we may conclude that Hermokrates here comes much closer to expressing Thucydides’ view of Athenian motives in 478 than do the other speakers in the history who treat this issue.

To many historians of the fifth century this judgment will seem unduly harsh and cynical, especially for the inception of the League and the first years of its existence. It will appear to be the product of hindsight and an all too typically Thucydidean inclination to attribute what we now call Machiavellian motives to politicians, especially Athenian politicians. But before we thus condemn Thucydides’ account, it is useful to

¹² Note especially the words which introduce the speech in 6.75.4.

¹³ For this use of *hōs* [ὡς] with an *epi* [ἐπί] phrase cf. 8.108.4: ‘This Arsaces was the one who had pretended a secret quarrel and invited the leading men of Delos to join his army; after thus bringing them out on the pretense of friendship and alliance (ἐξαγαγὼν ὡς ἐπὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμμαχίᾳ), he kept watch on them while they dined, surrounded them with his own men, and shot them down.’

recall that Herodotus held an even more sceptical view of Athenian claims at that period. The historian of the Persian Wars cast considerable doubt on the 'medism' of Pausanias (5.32) and went so far as to assert that the Athenians used it (or the rumor of it) as a pretext (*prophasis* [πρόφασις]) to take the hegemony away from the Spartans (8.3.2). Strasburger has emphasized, clearly and correctly, the strong criticism of Athens in this latter passage.¹⁴ Thucydides (1.95.5 and 128-134) accepted the story of Pausanias' medism and its consequence, that the Ionians voluntarily asked the Athenians to take over the hegemony. Herodotus doubted the medism and rejected what Thucydides (and others) considered to be its effects. In so doing, he dated the beginning of Athenian imperialism and the propaganda used to mask it even earlier than his 'more cynical' successor was to do a generation later.

It is thus clear that Thucydides was not alone in thinking that the desire to control large forces and dominate considerable areas was a major unexpressed motive behind the Athenian decision to assume leadership of those Greeks eager to wreak vengeance upon the Persians in 478. Whether scholars will want to accept this picture or not is another question. But they should at least recognize that it *was* Thucydides' (and Herodotus') interpretation, and admit that, to a Greek at any rate, hegemony was not normally a selfless concept.

¹⁴ *Historia* 4 (1955) 20 with note 4.

3 *The Growth of Athenian Imperialism*[†]

RUSSELL MEIGGS

By 446/5 the Delian League had become the Athenian empire. Peace had been made with Persia, but Athens had firmly retained her hold over the allies. More important, Sparta recognised the Athenian claim in the Thirty Years' Peace. 'We will allow the cities their independence,' Pericles could say on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, 'if they were independent when we made peace.'¹ So much is clear, but the chronology and nature of the development of Athenian imperialism are both uncertain. We are coming to know or reasonably to guess considerably more of the decisive transition to empire following the Peace of Callias,² but the imperial measures of those crowded years can only be appreciated in true perspective if we have a right understanding of the preceding period. The main purpose of this study is to re-examine the development of Athenian imperialism in the fifties.

In his concise summary of Athens' rise to power, Thucydides emphasises the significance of the reduction of Naxos³: to contemporaries Athenian action may have seemed less questionable. The Persian danger was still serious, and history had shown that the largest of the Cyclades might be a menace to the Greek cause, if it got into the wrong hands. Certainly the League was still popular after the collapse of Naxos, as Cimon's Eurymedon campaign clearly shows. From Caria to Pamphylia the Greek cities welcomed freedom from Persia and gladly entered the League: only at Phaselis was the show of pressure needed.

It is difficult, however, to interpret the reduction of Thasos except as Athenian aggression. Thucydides assigns an economic background to

[†] Originally published in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 63 (1943), 21-34.

¹ Thuc., I, 144, 2.

² Meritt, in *The Greek Political Experience, Studies in Honor of William Kelly Prentice* (Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 52-6.

³ Thuc., I, 98, 4.

the quarrel, and it seems that it had nothing to do with Medism. The allies, it is true, were to share in the contemplated colony on the Strymon, but it was the purely Athenian interest in the gold-mining of Skapte Hyle and the trading stations of Thasos on the mainland that led to the revolt.⁴ It is significant that Sparta offered to support Thasos by invading Attica. By 465 then the spirit of League leadership seems to be changing, and this change we may perhaps connect with the rise of the radicals in Athens. Ephialtes had probably already been elected general: Pericles brought Cimon to trial on his return from the Thasian campaign.

It was with the eclipse of Cimon, however, that the most vital phase of the transformation of the League began; for during the fifties three new forces were at work. The reforms of 462 had introduced a radical democracy, self-conscious and, with its early successes against the Peloponnesians, increasingly self-confident. The revolution at Athens, bound up with the spectacular dismissal of Cimon's force from Ithome, must have made a deep impression in the Aegean world, and provided stimulus where stimulus was needed to political faction. Hitherto, in spite of occasional friction, Athens had lived on terms with Sparta and the Peloponnesian oligarchies: the new democracy may well have alarmed the oligarchic parties in the allied states.

More important than the reforms at home was the abrupt change in Athenian foreign policy. The alliance with Argos and Thessaly was an

⁴ This is a vexed question. Herodotus (VI, 46), describing the wealth of Thasos, says, 'Their revenue came from the mainland and from the mines. From the gold mines in Skapte Hyle they extracted for the most part eighty talents, and from the mines on Thasos itself . . .' [ἡ δὲ πρόσδοδος σφί ἐγένετο ἐκ τε τῆς ἡπείρου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετάλλων. ἐκ μὲν γε τῶν ἐκ Σκαπτῆς ὕλης τῶν χρυσοῶν μετάλλων τὸ ἐπίπαν ὀγδώκοντα τάλαντα προσήμει, ἐκ δε τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ Θασῶ . . .]. At the beginning of the fifth century Thasos controlled a gold-mining area on the mainland at Skapte Hyle. Thucydides (I, 100, 2) says the quarrel with Athens arose, 'about the trading posts on the opposite coast of Thrace and about the mine in their possession' [περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ᾧ ἐνέμοντο], presumably Skapte Hyle. The colonists sent to Ennea Hodoi were annihilated before the reduction of Thasos, and they died fighting, according to Herodotus (ix, 75), 'about the gold mines' [περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσοῶν]. With their defeat they clearly lost control of this mining area: did it include Skapte Hyle? In spite of Perdrizet's arguments (*Klio*, X, 1ff.), Thucydides (I, 101, 3) implies that it did not: 'the Thasians . . . made terms with the Athenians . . . ceding the mainland and the mine' Θάσιοι . . . ὡμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις . . . τήν τε ἡπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες]. Such terms would be ridiculous if in fact the Thracians had gained control of Skapte Hyle. Two areas should be distinguished, inland and coastal. Stephanus describes Skapte Hyle as 'a small Thracian town opposite Thasos' [πόλις Θράκης μικρὰ ἀντικρὺ Θάσου]. It should lie on or near the coast (Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria*, pp. 68–70), possibly at Eski Kavala (Davies, *Roman Mines in Europe*, p. 235). At some time between 446 and 443 the tribute of Thasos rises sharply from 3 to 30 talents. As has often been suggested, this may represent the return of the gold mine to Thasos. By the end of the century Thasos is paying her tribute in Skapte Hyle gold (Wade-Gery, *Num. Chron.*, 1930, p. 10). The Athenians succeeded in their own immediate objective; the more ambitious scheme, from which the allies also were to benefit, failed.

open challenge to the Peloponnesians, and Athens soon provoked war. This affected the allies intimately, for they were called upon to play their part in the fighting that followed. If we press Thucydides' narrative,⁵ they were not present at the raid on Halieis, nor at the battle of Cecryphaleia, but some of them fought against Aegina. Nor were their commitments limited to naval war: allied contingents were present at Tanagra.⁶ No doubt the Athenians justified their claims: if they were to continue the war against Persia – and League forces were operating in Egypt – they must be protected from the Peloponnesians. But the allies will not have seen it in this light. They were called on to fight in a war against Greeks, which had nothing to do with the original purposes of the League, and which Athens had needlessly brought on herself. The allies had good reason to feel disaffected.

The third influence which we should consider in this period is the activity of Persia. Xerxes' reign had ended, as it had begun, disastrously, and when, a few years after the annihilation of his forces at the Eurymedon, he was murdered, his son Artaxerxes had a difficult succession. The prestige of the empire had been seriously lowered, his claim to the throne was disputed, a revolt had to be faced. In a difficult situation he showed creditable energy. Within six months Artabanus, his father's murderer, had been removed, and by 462 he had crushed his brother Hystaspes in Bactria. But, while the position in Persia was still unsettled, Egypt seized the opportunity to revolt. As soon as his hands were free, Artaxerxes took action. Achaemenes was sent down with a force against Inaros, and, when he failed, more serious and lengthy preparations were set on foot for a new expedition under Megabyzus. But by now Athens had given League support to Inaros, and to minimise the strength of that support, it would be wise to occupy Athens on as wide a front as possible. So Artaxerxes seems to have decided, for he sent Megabyzus with a full purse to Sparta to purchase an invasion of Attica.⁷ For this we have the reliable evidence of Thucydides: of any action taken in Ionia we hear nothing in our literary sources. Yet it is reasonable to believe that while Artaxerxes was sending money to Greece the two western satraps were not idle. Conditions were, indeed, extremely favourable to Persian encroachment. The allies were discontented with the Peloponnesian War, the overthrow of the Areopagus had sharpened the division between democrats and oligarchs, Athens was preoccupied with war in Greece and Egypt. And in the course of the

⁵ Thuc., I, 105, 1–2.

⁶ Thuc., I, 107, 5. Paus. V, 10, 4, a dedication set up by Lacedaemonians and allies for victory over Argives, Athenians and *Ionians*.

⁷ Thuc., I, 109, 2.

fifties Medism received the substantial encouragement of Persian success against Athens and the League.

The disaster in Egypt may not have been so overwhelming as the account of Thucydides seems to suggest,⁸ but, even at the lowest estimate, the losses to the League, and especially to Athens, were heavy and the immediate results important. The victory of the Eurymedon had paved the way for a phase of vigorous aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean. Squadrons had sailed east of the Chelidonian Islands to consolidate the victory,⁹ the Greeks of Cyprus had been given encouragement and support, the coast of Phoenicia was raided.¹⁰ The first success of the Persian expeditionary force under Megabyzus in 456 seriously threatened the Greek ascendancy; the final victory was decisive. Cyprus was temporarily abandoned by the League; a Persian fleet might even be expected in the Aegean.

There are good reasons, then, for expecting disaffection in the League, and especially in Ionia, during this period; but the evidence at our disposal is fragmentary and, often, uncertain. None of the contemporary inscriptions are well preserved, few can be dated accurately. But, collectively, they provide invaluable information and justify important conclusions.

The first document which we should consider, as being probably the earliest, is the longest of the decrees regulating Athenian relations with Erythrae, copied by Fauvel.¹¹ Until recently it was commonly held that in this decree Athens dictated terms to Erythrae following an unsuccessful revolt; but such an assumption has been seriously shaken by

⁸ Thucydides (I, 104, 2) says that the Athenians received the appeal of Inaros when they happened to be campaigning in Cyprus with 200 ships: they left Cyprus, and sailed into the Nile. He does not expressly say that the whole force went to Egypt and stayed there, but that is his natural implication. Diodorus (XI, 74) and Isocrates (*de Pace*, 86) make the force 200 strong. Ctesias, however (*Persica*, 32–36), gives the Athenian total as forty only, and mentions the commander's name, Charitimides. This account receives slight confirmation from an epigram on a statue base recently discovered near the Samian Heraeum (*Klio*, XXXII, p. 289). This locates the naval battle 'on the Nile, around lovely Memphis' [*ἐπι Νείλωι | Μέμ]φοις ἄμφο' ἔρατιῆς*] (cf. Thuc., I, 104, 2: 'they sailed from the sea into the Nile and took possession of the river' [*ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες*]). 200 ships can hardly have operated in the Nile. Certainly the lower figure is easier to reconcile with Athens' aggressive policy against the Peloponnesians. Further, Adcock points out (*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 1926, pp. 3–5) that the 50 triremes 'sailing to Egypt in succession' [*διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐς Ἀίγυπτον*] should be a 'relief' or 'substitute' squadron, not 'reinforcements.' (See also Cary, *Class. Quart.*, VII, 1913, p. 198.)

⁹ Plut., *Cimon* 13. The victory of the Eurymedon was so decisive that Pericles could sail with fifty ships, Ephialtes with a mere thirty, east of the Chelidonians without meeting opposition. This context, given by Callisthenes, is the natural one for such expeditions: Ephialtes' command at least must fall before the end of 461.

¹⁰ IG i², 929 (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 26) [IG i³ 1147 (ML 33)] shows that in one year (?459) men of the Erechtheid tribe died in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia.

¹¹ IG i², 10 (Tod, No. 29). [IG i³ 14 (ML 40)].

Highby's thorough re-examination of the problem.¹² Highby emphasises the friendliness of relations implied in the document, and especially in the oath to be taken by the democratic council. Loyalty is to be shown not merely to Athens, as in the later oath imposed on Chalcis, but to the allies as well (l. 22): 'I will not revolt from the Athenian people or from the allies of the Athenians' [οὐκ ἀποσσεύσομαι Ἀθηναίων τῶ π[λ]έθοσ οὐδὲ [τῶν] χσυνμάχων τῶν Ἀθηναίων]. The Mede is still prominent in the background (l. 25): 'I will not receive back any one of the exiles . . . of those who fled to the Persians' [[οὔτε] τῶν φ[ε]υ[γ]όν (τον) [κατ]αδέχσομαι οὐδ[ὲ] ἔνα [τῶν ἐς] Μήδοσ φε[υ]γό[ν]το[ν]. Erythrae appears to preserve her judicial autonomy: penalties are prescribed, but the cases are to be heard at Erythrae (l. 29). Solidarity with the League is implied in the provision that exile from Erythrae involves exile from League territory (l. 30). The clue to the interpretation of the decree Highby finds in l. 31f. 'If any one is found betraying the city of the Erythraeans to the tyrants he shall die . . .' This, he rightly argues, is not a general provision against tyranny, but a specific safeguard against definite individuals: the democracy now being established by Athens was preceded by a tyranny. From this he concludes that Erythrae, ruled by tyrants, stood outside the League in the seventies, and became a member shortly before or shortly after the Eurymedon, when Athens championed a democratic rising and installed a garrison to protect the new democracy which she had established.

Highby has rightly emphasised aspects of the decree which other historians have neglected, but we may question his main conclusions. The fact that the new democracy was preceded by a tyranny does not prove that Erythrae had been ruled by tyrants since the battle of Mycale and before. The evidence equally admits of the view that the tyranny referred to represents a Medising movement which temporarily broke Erythrae's connection with the League: in fact the terms of the decree still make this the more natural interpretation. The friendliness of the decree has been over-emphasised by Highby. The oath of loyalty, it is true, recognises the importance of the allies, but the expulsion and recall of Erythraean citizens rests on the decision of Athens alone. Not only is the first democratic council to be established by purely Athenian officers, the *episkopoi*, 'overseers' [ἐπίσκοποι], and the *phourarchos*, 'garrison commander' [φρούραρχος], but the *phourarchos* [φρούραρχος] is also to be partly responsible for the approval of its successors (ll. 12–14). The retention of an Athenian garrison in Erythrae is not necessarily a sign of imperialism, for its primary function was to protect Erythrae from a

¹² L. I. Highby, *The Erythrae Decree* (*Klio*, beiheft 36, neuefolge 23).

return of Medism, but the political role of the commander suggests that Athens intended to maintain a close control. Further, if this decree marked the incorporation of Erythrae into the League, as Highby maintains, we might expect it to open with a clause to that effect – some such phrase as ‘there shall be an alliance between the Erythraeans and the Athenians and their allies’ [χσυμαχίαν εἶναι Ἐρυθραίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ χσσυμάχοις], as in the treaties with Phocis, Leontini, Rhegium.¹³ Instead the first section of the decree is concerned with the obligations of Erythrae to the Great Panathenaea, a purely Athenian festival. These obligations are set out in detail; the attempt to make the Great Panathenaea an empire festival is only just beginning. But we may doubt whether the Erythraeans, for whom the minimum value of the victims is strictly laid down, would have viewed the invitation to join with Athenian colonists as a privilege. I do not suggest that Athens was unduly harsh in her treatment of Erythrae; she had intervened in support of the democratic faction and had every reason to be generous to a government which was likely to remain loyal; but her control was firm.

There remains the problem of dating the decree. If we could accept Highby’s identification of *I.G.* i² 12/13a [*IG* i³ 15] as part of the document, our margin of error would be limited; for this fragment can be studied in the museum at Athens and compared with a long series of dated documents. The temptation must be resisted. The fragment is strictly stoichedon, with lines of forty-seven letters: it is almost certain that the lost decree cannot be restored on this basis.¹⁴ The rho of the fragment is angular without tail: that form rarely, if ever, appears in the lost decree. The fragment preserves part of an oath, from the bottom of the stone: it is unlikely but not impossible that the oath to be administered to the council was followed by a second oath in the same document.

Little importance can be attached to letter forms, when Fauvel’s copy, as well as the original stone, has been lost. Highby,^{14a} after rather cursory comparisons, thought that they indicated a date in the middle sixties. Meritt¹⁵ has pointed out that the early forms of beta, phi and rho all appear as late as 450/49. He has also advanced positive arguments which support a later rather than an earlier dating. The emphasis on the Athenian Boule and Demos in the oath ‘implies the democratic ascendancy of the Council of the Five Hundred, and one wonders whether it is not more appropriate after the reforms of Ephialtes than before.’

¹³ *IG* i², 26, 52, 51 (Tod, Nos. 39, 57, 58). [*IG* i³ 9, 54 (ML 64), 53 (ML 63)].

¹⁴ Epigraphic arguments are considered more fully in an appendix. [Not reprinted here. See the Introduction to this part for a discussion of issues and methods in the use of epigraphic evidence in the study of the Athenian Empire.]

^{14a} Highby, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁵ Reviewing Highby in *AJPh*, LVIII, pp. 359–361.

De Sanctis¹⁶ has drawn the same conclusion. We know perhaps too little of the spirit and formal expression of Athenian government in the period before the reforms to stress this point, but other arguments tend to the same conclusion. Meritt points out that the length of the line (c. 47 letters) implies that the letters should be relatively small and not too widely spaced, features that argue against an early dating. We may also note that, whatever the exact form of the prescript, mention is made of the *epistatês*, 'chairman' [ἐπιστάτης]. This is consistent with the full democratic formula as we know it in the fifties and later. No mention, however, is made of the *epistatês* [ἐπιστάτης] in the two prescripts that have survived from the period before the overthrow of the Areopagus¹⁷: it is tempting to believe that the full formula, mentioning the prytanising tribe, secretary, epistates and proposer, was first introduced with the radical reforms of Ephialtes.

The lost decree is not our only evidence for relations between Athens and Erythrae during this period: three surviving fragments, two in the Epigraphic Museum at Athens, one in the British Museum, call for brief discussion. Two of these fragments, I.G.i.² 11 and 12/13a, mention Erythrae or the Erythraeans and are clearly relevant to our purpose: the relevance of the third (12/13b) is, at best, uncertain. Koehler thought that both the fragments in Athens came from the same stele and formed part of the same decree: as Kirchhoff saw, he was almost certainly wrong. In spite of a general similarity in style, there are small but significant differences in some of the letter forms, and, whereas the cutter of the smaller fragment (b) used marks of punctuation, no traces of punctuation are found on the larger fragment (a). The same objections prevent the association of 12/13b with 11, and we may ignore it. Though it deals with judicial relations there is no evidence to connect it with Erythrae.[†]

There remain then two fragments, and these bear a very strong resemblance to each other. The letter forms and the size and spacing of letters correspond: it is a reasonable hypothesis that they are in fact part of a single decree. What relation in time and tendency does this decree bear to the decree that is lost? As far as letter forms are concerned, they need not be far apart: both use similar early forms of sigma, beta, phi. The reference in the London fragment to a *phrouarchos* [φρούραρχος] (l. 6) and, more particularly, to *episkopoi* [ἐπίσκοποι] (l. 4) recalls the lost decree, and suggests that the two decrees may be part of the same

¹⁶ *Riv. di Fil.*, 1937, p. 301.

¹⁷ IG i², 1 (Tod, No. 11) and 5. [IG i³ 1 (ML 14), IG i³ 5]

[†] All these fragments are now believed to be part of a single document, published as IG i³ 15.

settlement. For comparison we could point to the Chalcis settlement following the revolt of 446, for there too the terms imposed were not confined to a single decree.¹⁸ The Athens fragment comes from the very end of the decree and gives us part of an oath: 'I will not revolt from the Athenian people or from the allies of the Athenians myself, nor will I persuade others to do so, but I will obey the judgement of the Athenians . . .' [οὐκ ἀπο[στέ]σομα[ι] Ἀ[θ]εναίων τῷ πλέθῳ οὐδὲ τῷ χσυνμάχῳ|ν τῶν Ἀθην[αίων] οὔτ' ἀλ[ι]τὸς ἐγὼ οὔτε ἄλλοι πείσομαι, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ τῆ[ι] Ἀθ[ε]ναίων πείσομαι.] . . . If the two decrees are contemporaries this may represent an oath taken by the whole people, as distinct from the council; but the last clause seems to have a more imperial flavour than the oath administered to the Boule, and it is perhaps better, tentatively, to refer it to a second and later decree.

A clue to the dating may be found in the tribute lists of the late fifties. In the assessment period following 450 there is a close relation between Erythrae and the small communities on her peninsula: Polichna, Sidousa, Pteleon, Boutheia. Normally they are named individually but are listed together, as in 450/49. In the assessment period 434–430 they are listed as 'The Erythraeans and co-contributors (*sunteleis*)' [Ἐρυθραῖοι καὶ χσυντελεῖς]. In the first period, 454–450, no entry for Erythrae has survived. The only town on the peninsula which is known to have paid is Boutheia, in the first two lists; and in 453/2, where alone the quota is preserved, its tribute is 3 talents, in striking contrast to the 1000 dr. which it pays later. Wade-Gery¹⁹ has pointed the significance of these figures: 'there is little doubt that in the first period it (Boutheia) acts as the syntely-centre [co-ordinator of co-payments] for Sidousa, Pteleon, etc.' We may infer that, at least from 454 to 452, Erythrae was outside the League: its first known payment comes in 449. Kolbe,²⁰ agreeing with Highby's interpretation of the lost decree, has concluded that Erythrae first entered the League between 452 and 449. We have already seen reason to question Highby's conclusion, in the actual terms of the decree; but the case against him becomes very much stronger if we accept Kolbe's dating – Highby may well be feeling uncomfortable at the boldness of his allies. The middle sixties form a reasonable historical background for the entry of important new members to the League: it would be a strange paradox that Erythrae should have remained pro-Persian in sympathy after the Greek victory at the

¹⁸ IG i², 39 (Tod, No. 42) [IG i³ 40 (ML 52)]. 'There are indications on the stone that another slab was affixed on the left' (Tod). L. 49, *Kata ta ephsephismena* ('according to what was decreed') [κατὰ τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα] may refer to this second decree.

¹⁹ *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (A.T.L.), Vol. I, p. 487.

²⁰ *Hermes*, 1938, LXXIII, p. 254.

Eurymedon and should freely enter the League after the defeat in Egypt. It is surely easier to believe that Erythrae was a member in the sixties, but became disaffected in the fifties. The letter forms of the fragments we have studied suit admirably the date implied by the tribute lists.

A complex argument may here be briefly summarised. The tribute lists suggest that Erythrae was outside the League from 454 to 450. *I.G.* i² 11 and 12/13a [*IG* i³ 15] probably parts of a single decree, represent the restoration of Athenian control at the end of this period. The lost decree, *I.G.* i² 10 [*IG* i³ 14] also represents an Athenian settlement of affairs at Erythrae, but does not come from the same decree. As far as we can judge from its letter forms, it might be an exact contemporary, but a comparison of the oaths in the two decrees suggests that it is earlier. Until we have more evidence, two hypotheses should be left open. It is possible that Erythrae broke away in the early fifties (the sixties cannot be absolutely excluded), was recovered, but gave further trouble in the late fifties. It is more probable, perhaps, that the lost decree represents the first settlement between 452 and 449, that it did not prove completely satisfactory or sufficient, and was closely followed by our second decree.

Such a construction becomes more compelling when we consider contemporary developments in another Persian city. In turning from Erythrae to Miletus we have a firmer starting point. The report of the *sungraphais*, 'commissioners' [συγγραφεῖς], on Athenian relations with Miletus²¹ was adopted by the Assembly in 450/49; and the recent discovery of a new fragment of the stele by Oliver has thrown considerable light on the measures adopted by Athens. These suggest an imperialism more developed than that of the lost Erythrae decree. Judicial relations are set out in full. Not only are cases arising from military and tribute obligations to be heard in Athens; it seems also that certain other cases are to be referred to Athenian courts. For the oath imposed on Miletus we have no evidence, though provision is made for Athenian officials to administer it. As at Erythrae, a garrison has been installed at Miletus, but it seems that political control is given to a civil board rather than to the *phourarchos* [φρουράρχος]. The first recommendation of the commission is that five men shall be chosen at once by the assembly to go to Miletus. They are referred to several times in the document, as 'the Athenian officials, the five, the five officials' [ἑοὶ ἄρχοντες ἑοὶ Ἀθηναίων, ἑοὶ πέντε, ἑοὶ πέντε ἑοὶ ἄρχοντες], and their duties are important. They are to co-operate with the local magistrates, apparently in establishing the military and financial obligations of Miletus, they are

²¹ *IG* i², 22. Re-edited with new fragment, J. H. Oliver *TAPA*, LXVI, 1935, 177. [The whole text is now published as *IG* i³ 21.].

to administer the oath, they are to exercise some form of judicial control. They are nowhere called *episkopoi* [ἐπίσκοποι], nor does that title appear in the document: Oliver²² is surely right in regarding them as a board of Athenian political residents, as distinct from a temporary commission. Such officials we have long known, from inscriptions and literary sources, in a later phase of the empire; the dating of the decree imposing Athenian coinage and weights and measures on the allies to the early forties²³ has now shown that these ‘Athenian officials’ [ἄρχοντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων] were already a familiar institution before the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5. Their appearance at Miletus in 450/49 should be stressed, for it marks a stronger interference with local autonomy than the establishment of *phrouroi* (‘garrisons’) [φορῶροι]. One other point in this document is relevant to our purpose and demands brief discussion. In re-editing the text, on the discovery of the new fragment, Oliver restored ll. 48–50 as follows: ‘these things are to be written up on the *stele*, and the Milesians should always use Athenian decrees and should not destroy them nor contrive to render them invalid . . .’ [ταῦτα δ’ ἀναγράψαι] ἐν στέλει, [κὰ]ι τοῖς φσεφίσμασ[ι τοῖς Ἀθηναίων αἰεὶ χρῆσθαι τὸς Μιλεσιός κ][αῖ] μέ διαφθεί[ρην] μεδὲ κακοτέχν[εν ἵ]όπος με κύρια ἔσται . . .]. Oliver believes that the decrees in question were ‘special decrees issued from time to time, concerning chiefly the commercial relations between members of the empire’; but this does not seem to be the most natural meaning: reference is much more probably made to the decrees, of which the present document is one, regulating Athenian relations with Miletus. The insertion of this clause, if this is the right interpretation, suggests that the situation in Miletus was unstable and that the Athenian settlement might arouse strong opposition.

Before we reconstruct the background of this document other evidence must be considered. A mid-fifth-century Milesian decree²⁴ provides

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 188–190.

²³ Segre in *Clara Rhodos*, IX, pp. 151ff. The new fragment from Cos, unlike the other fragments of this decree known, was engraved in Attic on Pentelic marble, and may therefore be compared with a long series of datable inscriptions from Athens. It is dangerous to press arguments from letter forms too hard, but the three-bar sigma of the fragment points to a date before the middle forties. The four-bar sigma appears occasionally in the fifties: it is dominant after 446. In no later surviving decree (and several are preserved from the middle forties) is the archaic form used. The *horoi* [ῥοι] from Samos (Schede, *Ath. Mitt.*, XLIV, p. 7), which have the three-bar sigma, would be an exception to the rule, if they mark the settlement of 439; but until this date is established beyond dispute (and the letter forms seem strangely archaic for Samian or Attic inscriptions of such a date) the criterion may be used. Segre (pp. 169–171) also finds internal evidence for dating the decree to 449, but his argument, though attractive, is not conclusive. There were certainly exceptions made or taken to the Athenian decree, but Gardner had long ago pointed out a break in the coinages of the islands and most of the cities of western Asia by the middle of the century (*JHS*, XXXIII, 1913, pp. 147ff., especially pp. 150 and 181).

²⁴ Tod, No. 35. [ML 43].

for the perpetual and hereditary outlawing of two families. The motive for this drastic action, as Tod and others have suggested, is no doubt some form of treason, presumably an attempt, whether successful or not, to establish a tyranny in Miletus. As at Erythrae, the tyranny may have been supported by the Medes; probably it meant secession from the League. Of this there is perhaps again a reflection in the tribute lists. In 454/3 'the Milesians from Leros' and 'the Milesians from Teichiussa' pay separately,²⁵ the former as much as three talents. From 450 down to the assessment of 428 Leros and Teichiussa disappear from the tribute records, presumably because Miletus controls her dependencies and pays for them. When they appear again in 427/6 they are listed immediately after Miletus. Such is the natural order, but there is no entry for Miletus in this position in 454/3. We may conclude that Miletus had broken away from the League, and, perhaps, that some of the loyalists had taken refuge in Leros²⁶ and Teichiussa – in much the same manner as the anti-Persian faction in Colophon fled to Notium in 430 when their own city had fallen under Persian influence.²⁷ The Milesian loyalists continued to pay tribute from their new home, as did the Colophonians later. By 452/1 they were probably back in Miletus, for in that year the entry *Milesioi* [Μιλέσιοι],²⁸ without qualification, appears in the year's tribute list.

The constitutional history of Miletus in this period is still uncertain. In the early fourth century we find a fully developed democracy on an Athenian model, with the Attic tribes and two others, and the Athenian system of prytanies.²⁹ It is logical to believe that the Milesian government which in 441 attracted the sympathy of Samian democrats was a democracy: it is more difficult to feel confident when it was established. There is a natural temptation to believe that it was imposed by Athens at the date of the commission's report, but the document affords no evidence to support this view.³⁰ The five Athenian *archontes*, 'officials' [ἄρχοντες] are to co-operate with the existing magistrates, and not with a democratic council; and the *prutanes* [πρυτάνες] of 1.67 seem to be the long-established board of Milesian

²⁵ The best text in *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Vol. I, List I, Col. VI, 19–22.

²⁶ We may compare Hecataeus' advice to Aristagoras in the Ionian revolt to fortify Leros if driven out of Miletus (Her., V, 125).

²⁷ Thuc., III, 34.

²⁸ List 3, Col. II, 28.

²⁹ Th. Wiegand, *Sitzb. Berl. Akad.* (1901), p. 911.

³⁰ A much later copy (SIG³, 57) gives the regulations drafted by the *Molpoi* [Μόλποιοι] at Miletus for the sacred ceremonies under their charge, in the year 450/49. That the date is the year of the Athenian decree is probably not coincidence, but no conclusion can be drawn from the Milesian inscription as to the precise nature of Athenian interference in this year, or the form of government under which the Μόλποιοι issued their regulations.

magistrates rather than the standing committee of a council. Further, the Old Oligarch³¹ tells us that at one period the Athenians ‘chose the best men’ in Miletus, but that the experiment was unsuccessful: they soon revolted and cut down the demos. It is possible then that the Milesian tyranny was followed by an oligarchy, which in turn proved unsatisfactory, with the result that Athens again interfered and established a democracy. It is perhaps worth noting that in the tribute list of 448/7,³² which is particularly well preserved, Miletus does not appear, and its position in the following year suggests strongly that it had in fact defaulted. The list of 447/6 follows very closely the order of its predecessor. Miletus is listed towards the end of the first column, immediately preceded by Aenos and Thasos, which seem to have made incomplete payments in 447, and followed by Latmos, Myous, Ephesus, Iasus, Kindya which did not appear at all. There seems then to have been a renewal of disaffection at Miletus in 447, which may have led to the change of constitution.

Once again a brief summary: In 454/3 tribute is paid by Milesians in Leros and Teichiussa, and Miletus herself apparently makes no payment. The town is in revolt, and the loyalists have fled. The tribute list of 452/1 suggests that they are back by then, and the local Milesian inscription reflects the expulsion of the Medizers. In that document *epimênioi*, ‘monthly officials’ [ἐπιμήνιοι], fill the role of *prutaneis* [πρυτάνεις]; an Athenian constitution has not been introduced and we may date to this period the Athenian support of oligarchy mentioned by the Old Oligarch. In 450/49 (*I.G.i²*, 22 [*IG i³ 21*]) Athens tightened her control by measures which included the establishment of Athenian political residents, but the oligarchy was still tolerated. The experiment was

³¹ Pseudo-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 3, 11.

³² The dating of the lists of the second assessment period remains controversial. I accept the conclusions of *A.T.L.*, and consider that Lists 7 and 8 are rightly dated to 448/7 and 447/6, and that no quota list for 449/8 was recorded on the stele.

This dating has been strongly attacked by Accame (*Riv. di Fil.*, XVI (412–3). Gomme (*Class. Rev.*, LIV, pp. 65–7), Dow (*Class. Phil.*, XXXVII, pp. 371ff., and XXXVIII, pp. 20ff.). All these critics prefer to date lists 7 and 8 to 449/8 and 448/7, and consider that in 447/6 either no list was recorded (Accame) or a very short list (Gomme and Dow). They have been answered by Meritt (*Class. Phil.*, XXXVIII, pp. 223ff.) and Wade-Gery (in a paper to be published in *Hesperia*) [14 (1945), 212–29]. The two main arguments in my opinion, for retaining the *A.T.L.* dating are:

(1) The absence of a numeral, for the first and probably the last time, in the prescript of List 7 suggests irregularity.

(2) If a third list in this period was recorded it should have been inscribed on the lateral face below List 8 where there was ample room for a shortened list. It is clear, however, that the space below List 8 was left blank. It is also probable that the top of the reverse face was left blank in view of the absence of identified inscribed fragments.

I consider that Meritt has pushed the purely epigraphic evidence too far in maintaining that *hebdomes*, ‘seventh’ [ἑβδόμη], is virtually impossible in the prescript of List 8. But *ogdoes*, ‘eighth’ [ὄγδοη], is a possible reconstruction as Dow admits and Wade-Gery emphasises.

unsuccessful: stasis followed, Miletus refused tribute payment in 448/7. A new settlement was needed, and a democracy was now imposed on the Athenian model.

We have seen something of Medism in Ionia during the fifties. The Mede is also recognised as a potential danger in Aeolis, as the decree recording Athens' gratitude to Sigeum shows. A recently discovered fragment of the stone, published by Meritt,³³ dates this decree to the archonship of Antidotos, 451/0. The men of Sigeum are praised for their loyalty to the Athenian demos and, in the final clause of the decree, they are promised protection 'against anyone soever on the mainland,' an indirect reference to the Mede. Meritt has suggested that this decree marks the entry of Sigeum to the League, but such a view must rest on other premises – the inscription of 451/0 gives it no support. The length of line is short, twenty-three letters only, and the form of stele is typical of the high narrow stones used for complimentary decrees in honour of cities or individuals.³⁴ It is certain that the decree did not include elaborate provisions such as we find in the Erythraean and Milesian settlements: if Sigeum was now being enrolled as a new member we should have expected a much lengthier document. One other argument used by Meritt is more serious: Sigeum does not appear on our fragments of the tribute lists until 449. Alternative explanations may, however, be offered. It is possible that Sigeum's absence from our record is due to coincidence, for some coincidences there must surely be among the names which have not survived from 454 to 450. It is also possible that Sigeum's tribute had been remitted in return for help provided to Athens, or, less probably, that she had paid her money to Athenian forces operating in or near the district.³⁵ For it is difficult to believe that Sigeum, an Athenian colony, would have stood outside the League so long. She had certainly had closer ties with the Athenian tyrants than with the Athenian state, and Hippias had taken refuge there on his expulsion from Athens when he was looking to Persia for help; but a change of attitude in the town might be expected on the Greek victory at Mycale and the Athenian foundation of the Delian League. Even if Sigeum had remained under Persian control after Mycale, Cimon would have surely added it to the League in his Hellenistic campaign, which followed soon after the Eurymedon.³⁶ In that campaign, as we know

³³ *IG* i², 32, re-edited, with new fragment, Meritt, *Hesperia* V, 360. [Now *IG* i³ 17.]

³⁴ Cf. *IG* i², 23, 36, 56, 82. [*IG* i³ 18, 23, 156, 80]

³⁵ In the tribute lists of the Archidamian War period tribute paid to overseas officers or forces is listed separately (e.g., List 25, Col. I, 59; Col. III, 66). Such distinctions are not made in the early lists, but it is probable that Athena's quota would be recorded even when the main tribute payment was not made at Athens.

³⁶ Plut., *Cimon*, 14.

from the casualty list,³⁷ men died fighting ‘at Sigeum’ [ἐπὶ Σιγείοι], and Plutarch’s account suggests that the operations were completely successful. It is easier then to believe that our decree records the official gratitude of Athens to Sigeum for loyalty during a difficult period, when other cities were infected with Medism and had to be brought back into the League by force.

If we are right in believing that there was widespread unrest in Asia Minor at this time, it would be natural to suspect Colophon. From early days she had carried her Hellenism lightly. She did not celebrate the Apaturia,³⁸ she played no active part in the Ionian revolt. In the fifth century her coinage was minted on the Persian standard,³⁹ and in the Second Peloponnesian War she took an early opportunity to Medize, in 430.⁴⁰ Her inland position made her less accessible to Athenian sea-power than the coastal cities.

We have, in fact, some fragments of a decree regulating the affairs of Colophon.⁴¹ A commission of five Athenians is sent to the town, as to Miletus. The oath is partly preserved, but cannot be restored with certainty. The allies may or may not have been mentioned, but the restoration of l. 39: ‘and I will not overthrow the democracy which now exists’ [καὶ δημο[κρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο τέν νῦν ὄσαν]] is extremely probable. Athens, it seems, has replaced a tyranny or oligarchy by a democracy. The letter forms of this decree are notoriously irregular and difficult to date; but the years from 454 to 450 should probably be excluded, because Colophon pays her tribute regularly in the first period. In view of the developed form of phi especially, it is easier to place the decree in the early forties than in the early fifties. This again fits in well with the evidence of the tribute lists, for no Colophonian entry has been preserved in 449, 447 or 446. Earlier trouble cannot be proved, but suspicion would not be uncritical.

We may finally turn to the tribute lists for evidence of a more comprehensive character. In 449 roughly 175 cities paid tribute to Athens. During the first assessment period from 454 to 450 the numbers are considerably lower. In 454/3, the first year recorded, the maximum number of lines is 150, set out in six columns, but the bottom of the final column is missing and there may have been one or more vacant lines. In estimating the number of cities entered on the stele, however, special provision must be made for the abnormally large number of double-line

³⁷ IG i², 928, l. 32, 99 [IG i³ 1144, ll. 32, 119].

³⁸ Her., I, 147.

³⁹ Head, *Historia Numorum*, p. 569.

⁴⁰ Thuc., III, 34.

⁴¹ IG i², 14/15. A better text in Hondius, *Novae Inscriptiones Atticae*, pp. 7ff. [See now IG i³ 37.]

entries. While three cities in one place occupy two lines, no less than ten occupy two lines, and one-third of the list is missing. The maximum number of cities is 141, and the actual number was probably nearer 135. In the following three lists the count of lines gives a closer estimate, since double-line entries are much rarer (1, 4, 3 respectively) and the number of lines at the bottom of columns which may have been uninscribed is negligible. The margin of error, especially in lists 2, 3, 4 is sufficiently small for importance to be attached to the figures:

List No.	Date.	Maximum No. of Cities.	Estimated No. of Cities.
1.	454/3	141	135
2.	453/2	162	158
3.	452/1	147	145
4.	451/0	157	155

Notes. – (1) Max. no. of cities is based on the actual number of cities preserved + the number of missing lines, making no allowance for possible double-line entries.

(2) Estimated no. of cities makes allowance for double-line entries in missing parts of the list. The number of such entries in the missing lines of list 2 is assumed to be larger than in lists 3 or 4 since only one-third of list 2 is present as against two-thirds of lists 3 and 4.

The first list is the shortest of which we have evidence. It follows immediately after the Egyptian disaster⁴² and the transference of the treasury from Delos to Athens, and suggests widespread unrest in the

⁴² The chronology of the Egyptian revolt is not vital to the main thesis of this paper, but it affects some of my individual arguments. The following scheme is adopted. Inaros' first move should come before Artaxerxes has completely stabilised his position: Diodorus' date (XI, 71), 463/2, may be right. The local Persian forces in the Delta were overcome without difficulty: Achaemenes brought reinforcements. He was defeated by Inaros at Papremis (461 or early 460), and the Persians took refuge in Memphis, supported by a small force of Phoenician ships in the Nile. In 460 Inaros appealed to the Athenians in Cyprus for help (in spite of Diodorus' account, Herodotus, Thucydides and Ctesias all imply that the Athenians were not present at Papremis). The Athenians sent c. forty to eighty ships, including a Samian contingent (*Klio*, XXXII, p. 289), which defeated the Phoenicians off Memphis in the Nile, and settled down to besiege the Persian force. In 456 Megabyzus and Artabanus brought down strong reinforcements: the Greeks were thrown back on the defensive, and finally capitulated in the early summer of 454.

This chronology is based mainly on Thucydides' account. (1) It is assumed that the disaster is set by Thuc. (I, 109 and 110) in a chronological setting, after the expedition of Tolmides (455), before the Thessalian expedition and Pericles' raid on Sicyon from Pegae. Following these expeditions there was inactivity for three years – *dialipontōn etōn triōn* [διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν] – and then the five years' truce with Sparta. This truce was made in 451 after Cimon's return from ostracism (spring), before the end of the summer. Military operations had ended in 454.

(2) 'The Greeks' enterprise came to nothing after six years of fighting' [τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἐξ ἑτῆ πολεμήσαντα] (Thuc., I, 110, 1). This should mean that the Greeks were in Egypt six complete years. If the end came in the summer of 454, they will have intervened in summer 460. The offensive against the Peloponnesians began after the first success in

League. The variation of numbers in the next three years suggests that Athens is too preoccupied or too weak to enforce regular payment. When she has secured a five years' truce with Sparta in 451 and won a major victory off Cyprus in 450, she is better able to enforce her will, and the total of tribute received rises sharply in 449.

One further feature of these early lists calls for attention. A striking number of island cities do not appear in our records of the first period. Of the Euboean cities, Chalcis, Eretria, Hestiaea, Styra appear for the first time in 449 or later. Of the Cyclades Naxos, Paros, Tenos are also missing. Some of these absences from our record may be explained by the coincidence of survival, but coincidence can hardly cover all the cases. Although the early lists are still very incomplete, more than 170 cities appear one or more times, and the proportion of absentees in the

Egypt. (3) The first quota list is dated to 454/3. This suggests that the final failure in Egypt, the probable cause of the transference of the treasury from Delos, was in 454.

Wallace (*TAPA*, LXVII, 1936, p. 252) has advocated a later date. He believes that Athens intervened late in 459, that Megabyzus relieved Memphis in the summer of 454, that the Greeks capitulated at the end of 453. Thuc., he thinks, fits the failure of the Egyptian revolt into his chronological framework at the point of its climax, the decisive victory of Megabyzus before Memphis. This preceded the Thessalian campaign and Pericles' expedition, but the capitulation came later. For such a practice he compares (following de Sanctis, *Storia della Repubblica Ateniese*², pp. 483ff.) Thucydides' treatment of Ithome. The comparison, however, is not exact.

Admittedly, if we read 'in the tenth year' [δεκάτῳ ἔτει] in I, 103, 1 (as I, with Wallace, believe that we should), Thuc. proceeds in 103, 4 to events which come earlier than the fall of Ithome, described in 103, 3. But that was the natural result of describing the siege of Ithome in a single piece. It does not explain why Thuc. chose this particular point to complete the story of the Egyptian expedition. That he did so because it marked the crisis is possible, but not supported by reference to Thucydidean practice. Wallace argues that 'the alarm caused by the final, less spectacular defeat of the Athenians eighteen months later, with which the removal of the treasury is usually connected, seems not to provide so good a motive' as the relief of Memphis by Megabyzus. From the narrative of Thuc. it is clear that for the Greeks the final defeat was infinitely more spectacular than the first serious check. 'He defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a land battle, drove the Greeks out of Memphis and finally blockaded them on the island of Prosopitis' [κατὰ γῆν τοὺς τε Ἀιγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξήλασε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλησε]: the first blow fell on the Egyptian land forces, the position of the Greeks only became desperate later. The carelessness of the 'relief ships' [νῆες διαδόχοι] suggests that even at the end it was not realised in Athens how desperate it had become.

Wallace uses the Erechtheid casualty list (*IG* i², 929, Tod, No. 26 [*IG* i³ 1147 (ML 33)]) in support. The places are listed chronologically. There was fighting in Cyprus, the fleet left for Egypt, and the greater part then returned, raiding Phoenicia en route: the list covers losses at the end of 459 and in 458. Certainly it is difficult to date this list back to 460; but it need not necessarily mark the first year of the Egyptian expedition. If only part of the fleet from Cyprus (cf. note 8) had gone to Egypt in 460, it would be natural to follow up the offensive in Cyprus and on the coast of Phoenicia in 459. One last argument should be examined. 'The fact that quite a few Carian cities (including two which do not appear again) paid tribute in 453/2 perhaps suggests that an Athenian fleet was active in the neighbourhood in the summer of 453.' This is not decisive. The towns in question are mainly in the Ceramic Gulf: Athens might well have sent a small fleet here one or two years after the defeat in Egypt. We may even argue that the rise in the number of States paying from c. 141 in 154/3 to c. 159 in 453/2 would be surprising if this list immediately followed the disaster: for the year's tribute would have normally been paid not in the summer of 453 but at the Dionysia in 452.

other districts is very different. Of the Hellespontine states that appear before the end of the second assessment period only three are missing⁴³; in Ionia the Erythraean syntely (apart from Boutheia) is the sole instance, though we might add two states which appear for the first time in the third period.⁴⁴ In the Thraceward district there are only three clear cases and one of these, Sciathus, is near to Euboea; but here again we should perhaps add two states which appear first in the late forties.⁴⁵ In Caria the number is higher. Ten states that appear in the second period are absent in the first, and five more appear first in the third period. But this we should expect. The Carian district was always the most difficult to control and it was unlikely so soon after the defeat in Egypt that Athenian ships would sail regularly to Caria to enforce payment.

From these figures it is legitimate to conclude that a considerable proportion of the inland district did not bring tribute to Athens in the late fifties, a fact which needs explanation in view of the nearness of many of them to the Peiraeus. West,⁴⁶ who was the first to recognise the problem, explained it by dating the conversion of ship contributions to money payments in the last phase of Cimon's control of League forces and League policy. For this interpretation he found evidence in the literary sources. Thucydides,⁴⁷ he argues, sets an upper limit in the revolt of Naxos: for it is in a digression immediately after his account of that revolt that he explains briefly the causes and results of the many revolts which followed. 'The allies,' he says, 'brought all this upon themselves: for the majority of them disliked military service and absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute their share of the expense instead of ships.' West finds a more exact date in a passage of Plutarch's *Life of Cimon*.⁴⁸ We are there told that Cimon persuaded the allies to send money instead of crews in opposition to the other generals, who had followed a systematic policy of fines and punishments towards states which failed to contribute their full quota of ships. Though Plutarch gives no explicit indication of date, West argues that this must have been at a time when Cimon was in control of the League, but following a period when others had been in power. Such conditions are only satisfied after Cimon's return from ostracism, for, previous to his expulsion, his control had been undisputed. The change was made when the allies had been made war weary by campaigns in Peloponnesian waters and in Egypt. It was,

⁴³ Harpagianoï, Otlenoi, Sigeum.

⁴⁴ Isindioi, Pugeles.

⁴⁵ Acanthus seems absent in the first period. Othorioi and Potidaea appear for the first time certainly in 443/2 and 445/4.

⁴⁶ *Am. Hist. Rev.*, 1930, pp. 267ff.

⁴⁷ Thuc. I, 99.

⁴⁸ Plut., *Cim.*, 11.

at the time, a popular policy, adopted by Cimon to conciliate the allies before what proved to be his final campaign in eastern waters.

Thus stated, the new policy seems at first sight to have reasonable motives; but the texts have been rigorously handled. The passage in Thucydides affords no secure basis. The abandonment of ship contributions is given as the main reason for the ineffectiveness of revolt: having no fleets, the allies were unprepared for war. The revolts in question followed that of Naxos; the change to money payments may have come either before or after, but, if it came as long after as West assumes, Thucydides would surely have put the passage in a later context. Nor can we follow West in his interpretation of Plutarch. Plutarch's source may contain nothing more than light embroidery round this same chapter in Thucydides: but even assuming that it has independent value, it would suit a date in the sixties as well as the much later date proposed by West. It is an over-simplification of history to believe that Cimon's control was undisputed until his ostracism. The storm broke in 461, but it had been growing for some years. The assembly was sharply divided on the issue of sending a force to help Sparta at Ithome, Cimon had been prosecuted on his return from Thasos, Ephialtes, the leading radical, had been elected general soon after the Eurymedon.

West's thesis has no solid support in the literary sources, but it remains a possible explanation of the apparent absence of these cities from the tribute lists of the first period, especially if the emphasis of his argument is slightly shifted. West considered that the cities which paid no tribute in the first period were charter members who until 450 provided ships. Wade-Gery (in a paper not yet published)[†] argues that these West Aegean cities continued to provide ships until 450, not because they were charter members, but because they were near to the Peiraeus and convenient for the assembly of the fleet. The thesis thus restated is more persuasive, but it may still be doubted whether 450 is a plausible context for the transition from ship contributions to money payments. In 450 Cimon required a *large* fleet urgently. The extra money that would come in from the West Aegean cities would not provide ships for the Cyprian campaign. If the ships of these cities had served through the fifties they would be too useful for the Cyprian campaign to be left in home waters.

A different explanation may therefore be sought for the absence of the islanders in the first period. Nesselhauf⁴⁹ is more probably right in

[†] H. T. Wade-Gery, 'The question of tribute in 449/8 B.C.', *Hesperia* 14 (1945), 212-29 (the point is made on 219-20, n. 16).

⁴⁹ *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Delisch-Atlischen Symmachie*, pp. 11ff. (*Klio*, *bribeft* 30, 1933).

regarding it as a sign of disaffection in the district, following the Egyptian disaster. We may suspect an additional motive in the removal of the treasury from Delos to Athens in 454. The islands may have resented this step more than the other districts which were less closely associated with Delos. When the system of cleruchies was begun by Athens, it was the island district which suffered most heavily. We may, with Nesselhauf, see in this measure a penalty for their defaulting.

The dating of these settlements must next be considered, for the problem is vital to any study of the development of Athenian imperialism. Nesselhauf,⁵⁰ after a full survey of the evidence, adds his support to the general view that they fall in the period 448–6 and represent an attempt to shift the resentment caused by the maintenance of the empire after the Peace of Callias. We need feel no qualms in neglecting Diodorus⁵¹ dating of the Chersonnese cleruchy to 453/2 in face of an almost certain inference from the tribute lists. The discovery that what was formerly regarded as the tribute list of 448/7 is, in fact, part of the second year's list, of 453/2, has indeed modified the problem⁵²; but though we no longer have a secure dating to 447 we can still set the expedition of Pericles between 449⁵³ and 446. If we reject Diodorus, Plutarch is the sole literary authority who may have value for our chronology. Plutarch⁵⁴ sets the sending out of cleruchies in the struggle between Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Pericles. The emergence of Thucydides as an important political figure follows, in Plutarch's narrative, immediately after the death of Cimon. He was put up by the opposition, and concentrated his supporters in the assembly. Pericles, to keep his position, played the demagogue with such sops to the demos as festivals, annual squadrons in the Aegean providing pay for the rowers, and cleruchies. These last were sent out, Plutarch tells us, partly to alleviate poverty, partly to strengthen Athens' control of the allies – 'sending as neighbours to the allies an imposing garrison that would prevent any rebellion' [φόβον δὲ καὶ φρουρὰν τοῦ μὴ νεωτερίζειν τι παρακατοικίζων τοῖς συμμάχοις]. The upper limit suggested by Plutarch is the death of Cimon, in the summer of 450; but it is reasonable to prefer a somewhat later date, assuming that Thucydides would not have become a dangerous opponent at once.

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 120ff.

⁵¹ Diod., XI. 88.

⁵² Wade-Gery, *BSA*, XXXIII, pp. 101ff.

⁵³ In 449 (List 5, line 12) *Cherronesitai*, 'Cherronesians' [χερρονεσίται], pay a quota of 1384 dr. instead of 1800 as in the first period. This presumably represents an incomplete payment. After the settlement of the cleruchy the tribute of the peninsula drops to 2 talents and the towns pay separately.

⁵⁴ Plut., *Pericles*, p. 11.

There is, however, no hint of the Peace of Callias in this context, and it is doubtful whether we can press its chronological implications closely.

The evidence of the tribute lists points to a date before the Peace for the first settlements. The despatch of settlers to the Chersonnese was accompanied by a considerable reduction in tribute, from 18 to 2 talents; and if, as seems very probable, the settlers who went to live among the Bisaltai were established in the territory of Argilus, the settlement may account for the reduction of tribute from 10½ talents to 1 talent.⁵⁵ It is reasonable to apply this test elsewhere. Plutarch includes in his list 500 cleruchs sent to Naxos and 250 to Andros. In 450 Andros paid 12 talents, in 449 and afterwards 6 talents only. Meyer⁵⁶ inferred from this the sending out of a cleruchy in 450, and we may follow him. For Naxos the evidence is less good. Though the name and tribute are restored, in the most recent edition of the texts, in the list of 450/49,⁵⁷ the name is not certain, and there is no evidence for the amount of tribute paid. Naxos appears clearly for the first time in 447,⁵⁸ and pays then, as later, 6⅔ talents. This is a very low tribute for a state which Herodotus⁵⁹ described as the most prosperous of the islands at the close of the sixth century. It is again reasonable to infer that the cleruchy had been accompanied by a reduction, and that the cleruchy should be dated before the spring of 447. The settlement at Naxos is connected by Pausanias⁶⁰ and probably by Diodorus⁶¹ with a cleruchy in Euboea: Tolmides established the settlers, after his expedition round the Peloponnese in 455 and before the battle of Coronea in 447. This is sound evidence for a Euboean settlement, and the tribute lists may give a hint as to one of the places affected. Hestiaea is not found on any of the fragments of the first period, but pays in 449.⁶² The editors have restored a quota of 16⅔ dr., but this is an inference from the recorded payment of 446.⁶³ A tribute of 1000 dr. is surprisingly small for a city that had wide territories: and again it is reasonable to infer a reduction in compensation for land given to cleruchs. The argument in fact is cumulative and convincing: unless we can find a clear instance of a cleruchy which was not accompanied by

⁵⁵ Nesselhauf, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁵⁶ *G des A*³ (1939), IV, 672.

⁵⁷ List 5, Col. IV, 35.

⁵⁸ List 7, Col. II, 2.

⁵⁹ Her., V, 28.

⁶⁰ Paus., I, 27, 5.

⁶¹ Diod., XI, 88, 3 (a lacuna in the text).

⁶² List 5, Col. IV, 34.

⁶³ List 8, Col. II, 36.

compensation, we should accept the natural inference. Hestiaea was settled before 446, Naxos before 447, Andros in 450. It is likely that they formed part of a single expedition undertaken by Tolmides in the late summer of 450, and that they were intended as a penalty for disaffection in the late fifties.

Nesselhauf, insisting on the primacy of Plutarch's evidence, has in a measure anticipated these inferences, and rejected them, with little argument. While stressing the importance of the tribute lists for the dating of the Chersonnese cleruchy, he will not admit a necessary connection in other cases between cleruchy and reduction. The settlement of the Chersonnese was a friendly measure to protect the inhabitants of the peninsula from Thracian inroads: it was natural to offer compensation to friends for the land occupied. At Naxos and Andros the motives were different: their cleruchies were a penalty and no concessions need have been made. But, whatever the Athenian motive, the land taken from the Andrians decreased the resources on which the tribute assessment was based, and a reduction in tribute should have followed. That this was the normal practice of Athens is suggested by her treatment of Chalcis. Chalcis revolted with the rest of Euboea in 446, and was crushed. Yet in the assessment period following the revolt the tribute was reduced from 5 to 3 talents – and for a very good reason: the Athenians had confiscated the land of the Hippobotae in the Lelantine plain.⁶⁴

Nesselhauf's explanation of the low assessment of Naxos is ingenious. Pointing to the low tribute of Thasos, which pays only 3 talents after its revolt, he suggests that Naxos may have received similar treatment when the island was reduced. Athens confiscated the gold mine of Thasos: she may have seized some of the resources of Naxos and perhaps restored them on the occasion of the cleruchy. This is possible, admittedly, but once again the natural explanation is simpler and preferable, that Naxos had received compensation for her land. Moreover, Nesselhauf has not considered Euboea and Hestiaea seems to offer a clear parallel. Isolated cases carry no weight; the force of the argument lies in the accumulation of instances. We conclude that cleruchies were first established in 450 before the Peace of Callias had been made. But though they are designed to meet the disaffection of the late fifties, they may also anticipate the further disaffection that was likely to follow, for by the late summer of 450 the expedition had returned from Cyprus, and the decision to negotiate for peace had, no doubt, already been made.

⁶⁴ Plut., *Pericles*, 23.

Kolbe,⁶⁵ in his recent study of the beginnings of the Athenian empire, has drawn a sharp contrast between the periods before and after the Peace of Callias. He emphasises the argument of the Mytileneans at Olympia in 428⁶⁶: ‘when we saw them giving up their enmity towards the Persians and driving towards the subjugation of the allies, we were no longer unafraid’ [ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἤμεν] – the subjection of the allies began only when war with Persia was over. He finds confirmation in a comparison between the oath of Erythrae, which preceded the peace, and the oaths of Colophon⁶⁷ and Chalcis which followed it: in the former loyalty is sworn to the allies as well as to the Athenians, in the last two only to Athens. He therefore rejects Schäfer’s⁶⁸ view that Athens was already showing signs of imperialism in the sixties, and holds that the League retained its federal character down to the Peace. Imperialism begins in 449.

Such a view has little to commend it. Even if we could trust the arguments of the Mytileneans, who had a case to plead, their use of the present participle, *anientas* (‘giving up’) [ἀνιέντας], need imply no more than a time when Athens seemed to be more interested in reducing allies than in fighting Persia, not necessarily a time when peace had actually been made. It is unwise to lay much stress on a comparison of oaths, for the Erythraean oath is the sole certain survivor from the period before the Peace of Callias, and the allies appear later in the oath imposed on the Samians following the crushing of their revolt in 439.⁶⁹ More serious, Kolbe’s thesis is too schematic. It would have been difficult for Athens to take such decisive steps if the ground had not already been prepared. Imperialism began in the sixties, but was greatly accelerated, for reasons that we have analysed, in the fifties. During this period all the most important instruments of empire had been forged. Democracies had been encouraged and established, garrisons and political residents had been installed, the first cleruchs had already been settled on allies’ land. The summoning of cases to Athens had at least begun, and the Great Panathenaea was becoming an empire festival. Whatever lip

⁶⁵ *Hermes*, LXXIII, 1938, pp. 252ff.

⁶⁶ *Thuc.*, III, 10.

⁶⁷ The Colophonian oath is only partly preserved, but in one clause the allies are certainly not mentioned: 1. 12. ‘and I will not revolt from the Athenian people in word or in deed . . .’ [καὶ οὐκ ἀποστρέσομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίου οὐτε|λόγοι οὔτ’ ἔργοι . . .] They are restored by Hondius (*op. cit.*, p. 9) in 1. 11, but Kolbe (*op. cit.*, p. 257) is more probably right in eliminating them here also.

⁶⁸ *Hermes*, LXXI, 1936, pp. 129ff.

⁶⁹ *IG* i², 50, 1. 23. [*IG* i³ 49, l. 19]

service was paid to the allies, real control rested with the council and people of Athens.

It was because these imperial instruments had been tested by experience that Athens was able to retain her hold when peace was made with Persia, and weather the severe crisis that followed. She owed her empire above all to the imperialists of the fifties, the most vigorous and resilient generation that Athens ever produced.

4 *Periclean Imperialism*[†]

HAROLD B. MATTINGLY

Victor Ehrenberg's interest in the problems of the Athenian Empire is shown by an impressive range of contributions.¹ I therefore thought that a radical reappraisal of the evidence would be very suitable for a volume published in his honour. Many may feel, however, that nothing more can usefully be said. As the dust of recent controversy settles, everything seems to be still very much in its old place. I believe that this apparent stability is an illusion. There are some fresh lines of argument which we have all neglected. Recent work on Kallias' financial decrees has convinced me that further objective criteria exist for dating fifth-century documents. Moreover, exciting news of yet another fragment of the Coinage Decree set me off on an enquiry that has rather disturbing results.*

I A NEW FRAGMENT OF THE COINAGE DECREE

It will be best to begin with the fragment. Over a quarter of a century has passed since Segre published the fragment in Attic script from

[†] The version reprinted here was originally published in Mattingly's collected essays, *The Athenian Empire Restored*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 147–79. The appendix to the article is not included here.

Reprinted from G. Wirth, ed., *Perikles und seine Zeit* (1979), pp. 312–49 (revision of E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday* (1966), 193–223, with necessary corrections.

Note on reissue: In writing this article for the Ehrenberg volume I made a serious blunder concerning the Attic forms of the middle and passive present imperative. This was correctly pointed out by Meritt, in: *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, viii (1967), pp. 131f. He also showed conclusively that the Hestiaia Decrees (IG, i², 40 and 41) contain 'no examples of imperatives in *-esthōn* [εσθων].' With the editor's permission I have removed this bad blemish from my argument and have rewritten the section as I should have done in the first place, if only I had realised the mistakes in time. It has involved some consequential changes in ns. 31, 34, 35, 41 and 51.

¹ See items 33, 36, 40, 43 (chapters 4–6) in the Bibliography of *Ancient Society and Institutions* and also HZ clxxiii (1952), pp. 540–9 (review of *Athenian Tribute Lists*, ii and iii).

* For further discussion of the Coinage Decree, including its date, see the introduction to Part II, and Ch. 5.

Kos, which forced scholars to revise thoroughly their views on Periclean imperialism.² Now a small piece of a fifth Ionic copy has been identified in Odessa Museum. The find-place is surprising, which makes determination of provenance unusually urgent. The first editor claimed that the stone came from ancient Olbia, but another Russian scholar flatly denies this. Odessa Museum, he assures us, contains stones from all parts of the Greek world. Presumably we cannot safely assume even a generalized Black Sea origin. There would seem unfortunately small prospect of finding proof either way.³ This is most disappointing, and complete disillusion threatens, when one realizes that in script and content the fragment tells us virtually nothing new. It comprises portions of only nine lines from §§ 10 to 12 of the text in *ATL*, ii (D 14) and necessitates just one minor verbal alteration.⁴ But we must not be too discouraged. It is still worth facing squarely the possibility of a Black Sea origin. Is there anything *inherently* improbable about this? And what effect would this have on the problem of dating the decree as a whole?

There is now a general consensus in favour of putting the Coinage Decree c. 450 B.C., though some wish to return to a date within Kleon's period of ascendancy.⁵ The *ATL* editors further want to assign Perikles' Pontic expedition to the mid-century.⁶ If the new fragment really is Pontic, it may at first seem to support their position. But in fact the grounds for their dating of the expedition were never strong. Most scholars have preferred to link Perikles' new departure in policy with the rise of the Spartokid dynasty in the Crimea, which Diodoros dates 438/7

² *Clara Rhodos* ix (1938), pp. 151–78. Segre put the decree c. 450 B.C., whereas till then it had been dated c. 423 B.C., as by Tod in *GHI*, i, pp. 165f. Improved texts – put together from the six fragments – were subsequently published by Hiller in *IG*, xii, Suppl. (1939), pp. 215–17 and by Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor in *Athenian Tribute Lists* (henceforth *ATL*), i, 579 (T 69) and ii, 61–8 (D 14).

³ See P. O. Karyshkovsky, *Materiali po Arkheologii Severnogo Prychernomor'ya*, iii (1961), pp. 64–70 (with fig. 2) and J. B. Brashinsky, *Athini i Severnoe Prychernomor'ye . . .* (1963), pp. 74f., n. 72.

⁴ For the text see *SEG*, xxi, 18 (*kai* [καί] for the *ATL* ἐ [ἦ] in line 9). I am very grateful to A. G. Woodhead for information about this new fragment and for supplying me with a photostat copy of Karyshkovsky's drawing and the proofs of *SEG*, xxi, 18. So far there are no details of the stone, whether marble or limestone. Tests and comparisons could perhaps be made, to determine whether it was a stone local to Olbia or to some other Black Sea Greek colony. But this could easily prove an inconclusive enquiry.

⁵ Meritt and Wade-Gery have restated the orthodox case, in: *JHS* lxxxii (1962), pp. 62–74 and lxxxiii (1963), pp. 100–4. My 425/4 B.C. dating (*Historia* x [1961], pp. [148–88]) has been supported by W. K. Pritchett, in: *BCH* lxxxvii (1963), pp. 20–3 and *AJP* lxxxv (1964), p. 46 and accepted without argument by R. Bogaert, in: *AC* xxxii (1963), p. 109. G. Klaffenbach (in: U. Wilcken, *Griech. Gesch.*⁹ [1962], p. 346) and A. French (*Growth of the Athenian Economy* [1964], p. 121) allow the possibility of the later date, without committing themselves; the former seems impressed by the strength of some of the arguments for it.

⁶ *ATL*, iii, 114–17.

B.C.⁷ Plutarch tells us that Lamachos served as a general with Perikles on this occasion and it is very hard to square the facts of his career with the 450 B.C. dating. However much we discount Aristophanes' term 'young man' [νεανίας] in 425 B.C. (*Ach.*, 601), the context in the *Acharnians* implies that Lamachos was still an emergent, ambitious aspirant for the highest military command.⁸ It is the same with Plutarch, *Alcib.*, 18, 2, where he is characterized as 'advanced in years' [ἡλικία προήκων]. We need to note the context equally carefully. Lamachos would appear from this to be roughly the same age as Nikias, whose first generalship probably fell in 428/7 B.C. and who is significantly described by Plutarch in the same phrase during the year 418 B.C.⁹ One can maintain the 450 B.C. dating for the expedition only by dissociating from it Plutarch's story about Lamachos and assuming confusion with 424 B.C., when Lamachos certainly sailed into the Black Sea as a general. But such scepticism is surely groundless. Lamachos may well have been chosen for this tricky assignment in 424 B.C. precisely because of his earlier experience of the area under Perikles.¹⁰ I have just one argument of my own to add to the discussion. Plutarch describes the effect of Perikles' exploit on the barbarian world in language with intriguing overtones (*Per.*, 20, 1–2):

... to the neighbouring barbarian tribes and their kings and rulers he demonstrated the size of his force, and the fearlessness and courage – with which they sailed wherever they wanted and brought the whole sea under their control . . . †

Where have we heard this before? Surely there is a reminiscence of the famous last speech of Perikles, as reported by Thucydides (ii, 62, 2):

I shall show you that there are two visible fields of action, land and sea; you are supremely powerful over the latter, both as far as you use it at the moment and also to any further extent you see fit. Your current naval resources are such

⁷ See K. Beloch, *Attische Politik*, p. 325 and *Griech. Gesch.*, ii², 2, 216; M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (1922); p. 67; F. E. Adcock, in: *CAH* v, p. 174; A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (henceforth 'Gomme') i (1945), pp. 367f.

⁸ Lamachos seems to have been a taxiarch in 426/3 B.C., openly aiming higher. See *Acharnians*, 569, 593 and 1073ff. with van Leeuwen's good notes on pp. 99 and 104 of his edition.

⁹ See the fair discussion of all the literary evidence in: *ATL*, iii, 115, where the editors themselves invoke *Alcib.*, 13, 1 (Nikias 'already advanced in age' [ἤδη καὶ ἡλικίαν προήκοντα]). For Nikias' age (born c. 470 B.C.) see *RE*, xii, col. 323 (Reincke). U. Kahrstedt (*RE*, x, col. 537f.) also adopts Beloch's view of Lamachos and its consequences for the date of the Pontic expedition.

¹⁰ Lamachos was one of three generals with the tribute-collecting squadron in 425/4 B.C. Aristides alone is found at work on the Thracian coast and with his colleague Demodokos he later recaptured Antandros from the Mytilenean exiles. Meanwhile Lamachos had taken his share of the fleet into the Black Sea. There was clearly a deliberate division of spheres of activity. See *Thuc.*, iv, 50, 1 and 75.

† . . . τοῖς δὲ περιουκοῦσι βαρβάρους ἔθνεσι καὶ βασιλεῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάσταις ἐπεδείξατο μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἀδειαν καὶ τὸ θάρσος, ἢ βούλοιντο πλεόντων καὶ πᾶσαν ὑφ' αὐτοῖς πεπονημένων τὴν θάλασσαν . . .

that there is no one, neither king nor any other people, who is able to restrict you from sailing at the present time. [ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ' ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πλέον βουλευθῆτε· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας ὑμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει.]

The same boast underlies the familiar phrase of the Funeral Speech (ii, 41, 4): 'but we have forced every sea and land to be a highway for our daring' [ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι]. Both Thucydidean passages gain immeasurably in effect, if we can assume that the Pontic expedition lay only a few years before – a recent exploit of that present generation of empire-builders, to whom Perikles explicitly addresses himself in ch. 36, 3. That fleet had proved Perikles' boasts sober reality: it had shown the flag in the furthest reaches of the Black Sea, despite any pretensions of the Great King to control the right of passage.¹¹

No copy of the Coinage Decree from the Pontic area is likely to be earlier than c. 435 B.C. Indeed would it even be as early as that? The Pontic cities were not brought into formal alliance by Perikles and paid no tribute as late as the early years of the Archidamian War. It was only in 425/4 B.C. indeed that the Pontic panel was added as an appendix to the Thracian district and in the following summer, as we have seen, a small fleet operated in the Black Sea, doubtless harrying the recalctrant.¹² Plutarch specifically notes Perikles' tactful and disinterested handling of Athens's new Greek friends. He showed great readiness to help them in whatever way he could. (*Per.*, 20, 1): 'he treated the Greek cities as they wanted and dealt with them humanely' [ταῖς μὲν Ἑλληνίσιν πόλεσιν ὧν ἐδέοντο διεπράξατο καὶ προσηνέχθη φιλανθρώπως]. Once more we can detect a significant echo. In 431 B.C. Perikles was proudly stressing Athens's policy of winning friends by conferring benefits without expectation of return.¹³ It seems incredible then

¹¹ Gomme (ii, 129) associates Thuc., ii, 41, 4 primarily with the Egyptian expedition. No doubt Perikles' hearers would also think of this, but it lay further back and its failure would make it less suitable as a symbol of Athens's invincible daring. The 'king' [βασιλεὺς] of ii, 62, 2, as Gomme showed (ii, 170f.), must be the Great King, though Plutarch (or his source) seems to have understood it of 'kings' generically. Lamachos' armed intervention at Sinope is regarded by the *ATL* editors as a violation of the 'Peace of Kallias' (iii, 115), but they do not therefore insist on the 450 B.C. dating, unlike J. H. Oliver, in: *Historia* vi (1957), pp. 254f. They allow that Perikles' voyage *could* be placed 'at some decent interval after the peace.'

¹² See *ATL*, i, 539 and iii, 116f. and 224.

¹³ Thuc., ii, 40, 4–5. Gomme is scathing about this claim (ii, 123f.), quoting Perikles' words in ii, 63, 2–3 against himself. But there was some other justification for it. The special rubrics that appear in the Quota Lists in 434/3 B.C. seem to imply preferential treatment for certain 'associate members' of the empire (see further my nn. 16 and 18). Similarly the Sicilian alliances to some extent satisfy Perikles' formula, as Nikias, Alkibiades and Euphemos recognize in their different ways (Thuc., vi, 13; 18, 2–3 and 87, 3–4).

that Athens would have required these Pontic cities to accept such an ordinance as the Coinage Decree as early as c. 435 B.C., to set up a copy in their market-places and bind themselves to the stringent penalties prescribed for all breaches of its regulations. In brief, a Pontic copy could hardly have been put up before 425/4 B.C.¹⁴

This need not involve abandoning the c. 450 B.C. dating for the decree itself, but it would certainly be rather disturbing. Meanwhile it may seem both easier and more scholarly to discount the Odessa fragment altogether, since its provenance is doubtful. There still remains, however, another fragmentary copy, whose provenance is certain, which faces us with the same challenge as a Pontic copy would present. Only when I was frustrated over the Odessa fragment did its significance suddenly dawn on me. The island of Syme, where two fragments were found, first appears in the Quota Lists in 434/3 B.C. under the rubric 'cities in which the private citizens [*idiotai*] registered to pay tribute' [πόλεις ἃς οἱ ἰδιῶται ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν]. The *ATL* editors believe that the *idiotai* were private Athenian citizens and that, on their motion in the Assembly, Syme was separated by *apotaxis* [separate assessment for tribute] from the Karian Chersonese.¹⁵ Lepper has recently developed a number of telling objections to this view. He doubts whether plausible syntely-heads can be discovered for all the new cities that suddenly appear under this rubric and can find little evidence in the tribute-record to support the *apotaxis* theory. Indeed the *ATL* editors themselves came to allow some exceptions to it. Lepper goes further and restates with detailed argument and minor modification the view that Nesselhauf formulated long ago. Nesselhauf argued that the *idiotai* were citizens of the communities in question (most probably merchants), who negotiated with Athens to pay a fixed sum annually in return for the material advantages of association with the empire.¹⁶ On this view Syme would not have been a member at all before 434 B.C. despite its geographical position, close to the Karian

¹⁴ As I have stressed elsewhere (*Historia* x [1961], pp. [157]f.), the Coinage Decree and the Decree of Kleinias (*IG*, i², 66+ = *ATL*, ii, D 7 [*IG* i³ 34]) share 'a certain toughness of phrase and outlook.' The latter explicitly applies only to the *tributary* allies (lines 5–14) and this is almost certainly true of the Coinage Decree also. See E. S. G. Robinson, in: *Hesperia*, Suppl. viii (1949), pp. 324f. on Samos and Chios. Apart from anything else its language could hardly be addressed to an ally like Chios without causing dangerous offence. Chios was touchy, as is shown by the need for firm Athenian assurances, when Athens had temporarily to take a strong line (*Thuc.*, iv, 51). On this see Gomme, iii, 499f. and Meritt, in: *Hesperia* xiv (1945), pp. 115–19.

¹⁵ *ATL*, i, 562f. and iii, 8of. J. M. Cook (*JHS* lxxxi [1961], pp. 59f.) agrees that Syme must long have been in the empire, but believes that Knidos was its syntely-head [larger cities under whose name the tribute for several smaller settlements in the region was paid].

¹⁶ See H. Nesselhauf, in: *Klio* Beiheft xxx (1933), pp. 58ff. and 73; F. A. Lepper, in: *JHS*, 1962, pp. 25–55 (especially 38–43 on *apotaxis* and 31–3 on the *idiotai*).

coast. This may seem surprising, but that is no good reason for rejecting the proposition outright. Lepper has dealt effectively with the idea that Athens must early on have imposed tribute on everyone within her reach, however insignificant.¹⁷

As restated by Lepper the Nesselhauf view of the *idiotai* rubric carries conviction. The Syme copy of the Coinage Decree could not then have been set up until the city's accession in 434 B.C. Indeed even this may be too early a limit. Private individuals after all could hardly commit their community publicly. Where a community as a whole acceded in 434 B.C. it was put into the category of 'cities negotiating their own terms for tribute' [πόλεις αὐτὰι φόρον ταξάμεναι] – cities which had negotiated terms with the Athenian Assessors.¹⁸ The Coinage Decree was specifically directed at the city authorities in the empire. Lepper would therefore seem right in suggesting that states listed in the *idiotai* rubric would be exempt from its operation, as from other imperial regulations of similar scope.¹⁹ Some time in the first half of the Archidamian War the remaining cities in the two special rubrics were absorbed into the general body of tributaries and from then on certainly Syme would have to obey with the rest when Athens commanded.²⁰ If the argument is sound there appear to be three possible solutions. Two would leave the Coinage Decree itself c. 450 B.C. Then we should assume either that all new members henceforth were required to set up copies on their accession to the empire or that the decree languished and was later reinvigorated – perhaps with modifications – in the time of Kleon's ascendancy.²¹ The third possibility is the simplest, but will not yet command ready assent. The Coinage Decree, I submit, was devised and promulgated precisely in 425/4 B.C.

¹⁷ Op. cit., pp. 44–6. He adduces clear examples of new tributaries after 430 B.C., whose appearance is not due to *apotaxis*. Not all these have 'isolated or peripheral locations' – the criterion employed by the *ATL* editors in allowing a few exceptions to their *apotaxis* theory of the *idiotai* (see iii, 83). Syme certainly cannot be so described, but, though it is not very small, it is mainly barren and must have been insignificant economically and politically. It paid a mere 1800 drachmai tribute before 425 B.C. (*ATL*, i, 'Register', 416f.). Athens could well have afforded to leave it alone.

¹⁸ For this view of the 'cities negotiating their own terms for tribute' [πόλεις αὐτὰι φόρον ταξάμεναι] rubric see Nesselhauf, op. cit., pp. 58ff. and Lepper, op. cit., pp. 28f.; for a rival version (excluding 'volunteer members') see *ATL*, iii, 83–8. For my present purpose it is enough to note the contrast that seems to be implied in the rubrics between *poleis* [πόλεις] and *idiotai* [ιδιώται] (see Lepper, op. cit., p. 33 and n. 28).

¹⁹ See *ATL*, ii, D 14, § 4 and Lepper, op. cit., pp. 47f.

²⁰ Certainly by 425/4 B.C. all special rubrics concerned with assessment disappear; see *ATL*, iii, 80 and 88 and Lepper, op. cit., pp. 27f. I have no wish or need here to argue about the exact date when Syme was absorbed.

²¹ The theory of renewal seems already to be gaining ground. Meritt stated it tentatively, in: *Hesperia* xiv (1945), pp. 119–22, Gomme took it up (iii, 626f.) and Meritt and Wade-Gery again touched on it, in: *JHS* lxxxiii (1963), p. 104. It often comes up in private discussion.

2 FORMAL CRITERIA FOR EPIGRAPHIC DATING

We come straight up against the fundamental objection to this dating – the script of the Kos fragment. Essentially its lettering is developed Attic, but there is a sloping lambda in line 6 and the sigma is three-barred throughout. In the Quota Lists the sigmas are consistently four-barred from 445 B.C.²² Now the Coinage Decree cannot be separated from the Decree of Kleinias, which admittedly has the four-barred sigma, but also presents the older, leaning, form of nu and the upsilon with curving top-strokes. Some epigraphists would perhaps be prepared to bring down such transitional lettering as late as the 430s, though virtually all seem agreed that it is quite compatible with the 448/7 B.C. dating recommended for this particular decree.²³ In all this discussion I think that there has been too much reliance on the single criterion of letter-forms, to the neglect of other equally valid and perhaps more objective factors. After all a stonemason's own training and predilections may lead him to continue using old forms long after a general shift of fashion. The older craftsmen would hardly have been forced to comply on penalty of losing all commissions. The Council Secretary or the *poletai* may indeed sometimes have deliberately opted for an old-fashioned job.²⁴ We need criteria with rather less of the personal, variable element. I think that one can be found in the evolution of spelling in public documents. This was surely determined by the official who supplied the draft and not by the individual mason.²⁵

There may, of course, still be a personal element – a disturbing vagary of private taste, to which even official personages have sometimes been prone. But it is worth trying to discover whether there are any clear *general* patterns and, if so, what they seem to tell us about the dating of Athenian decrees. The correct method is surely to start from reliably-dated documents and tabulate variant spellings. Then one can proceed to deal with the uncertainties. Wade-Gery showed the way a generation back with his careful tabulation of the variant forms of the first declension dative plural: *-asi* [-ασι], *-aisi* [-αισι], *-esi* [-εσι] and *-ais* [-αις].

²² See *ATL*, ii, Pl. V (Kos); i, Plates III–XXI (Quota Lists: facsimiles).

²³ For *ATL*, ii, D 7 (= *IG*, i², 66 + [*IG* i³ 34]) and the Coinage Decree see Meritt and Wade-Gery, in: *JHS* lxxxii (1962), pp. 67f. and Meiggs, in: *HSCP* lxxvii (1963), pp. 19ff. and 28ff. For its lettering see *ATL*, i, 121f. and ii, Pl. II. I am very grateful to Mr. Meiggs for letting me study in typescript his thorough survey of the evolution of letter-forms in fifth-century Attic inscriptions. His collation of material has been invaluable and I have gained much help also from our frank discussions.

²⁴ See the similar points made less radically by Tod (*JHS* lxxix [1949], p. 105) and D. M. Lewis (*BSA* xlix [1954], pp. 22f.).

²⁵ Only so perhaps can one explain the old Attic spellings (*epimelosthôn* [ἐπιμελόσθων] *en taisi polesi* [ἐν ταῖσι πόλεσι]) in the *Ionic* texts of the Eretria Decree (*IG*, i², 17, 6) [*IG* i³ 39, 6] and the Siphnian copy of the Coinage Decree (*ATL*, ii, 65 = *IG*, xii, Suppl. 217).

The 420s appeared as a transitional period, with the older disyllabic forms virtually going out of use c. 420 B.C.²⁶ It is true that the dating of *ATL*, ii, Lists 25 and 26, if correct, ‘makes the rule look less absolute than it once seemed,’ but they alone would take the first occurrence of *-ais* [-αις] no further back than 429 B.C.²⁷ More serious is the current view that the Kallias Decrees can perfectly well have been inscribed in 434/3 B.C. despite *tamiais* [ταμίαις] in *IG*, i², 91 [*IG* i³ 52], 18.²⁸ We have only to add that the short form occurs also in the Praxiergidai and Phaselis Decrees, which most scholars would date no later than c. 450 B.C., and ‘the supposed law about datives in *-ais* [-αις]’ may seem to have been finally discounted. But this feeling is premature. Perhaps we must accept these two decrees as curious ‘sports,’ for which explanations can be found. They do not necessarily invalidate the general rule.²⁹

Another criterion in fact virtually proves that the Kallias Decrees were inscribed in the late 420s and thus destroys the flimsy bridge to the 440s. In *IG*, i², 91 [*IG* i³ 52] *sun-* [συν-] occurs in compounds no less than five times, while the older Attic *chsun-* [χσυν-] is not used once. I know that this is generally regarded as having no chronological significance.³⁰ The statistics, however, are most revealing, as can be seen from the following table.³¹ Though *sun-* [συν-] occurs sporadically as early as the 450s, no text where it replaces *chsun-* [χσυν-] throughout can have been

²⁶ See *JHS* li (1931), pp. 78–82.

²⁷ Wade-Gery was a little worried by them (p. 79: my quotation), but perhaps needlessly. See my attempt in *CQ*, n.s. xvi (1966), pp. [179–83] to prove that they should really be dated 426/5 and 427/6 B.C. respectively.

²⁸ See W. S. Ferguson, *Treasurers of Athena* (1932), p. 185; Meritt, *Studies presented to David M. Robinson*, ii (1953), p. 301.

²⁹ In *PACA* vii (1964), pp. 37–9 I proposed later datings for both exceptions. D. M. Lewis (from whose article in *BSA* xlix [1954], p. 19 my quotation comes) has urged by letter that *IG*, i², 80 [*IG* i³ 7] cannot be considered apart from: *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis*, no. 299; few would date the relief of that at all late. Raubitschek (ibid., p. 323) put both c. 460 B.C. Perhaps I was wrong then, but the Praxiergidai Decree remains an anomalous law unto itself – with its odd lambdas, nus and erratic omegas. If the four-barred sigmas are an ‘Ionicism,’ as Lewis argues, why not so regard the short datives also? I still incline to put the Phaselis Decree late, but if *IG*, i², 16 [*IG* i³ 10] should be proved early after all, I would follow Wade-Gery (op. cit. [n. 26], 79) in treating its short dative as an ‘Ionicism’; the mason for once will have slipped into his own natural style of spelling.

³⁰ So Tod judged in *GHI*, i, p. 107, relying on Meisterhans-Schwyzler, *Gramm[atik] d[er] Att[ischen] Inschr[iften]*³ (1900), pp. 220f.

³¹ I ignore the Perdikkas Treaty (*IG*, i², 71 [*IG* i³ 89]) as so much depends on restoration, with an uncertain line-length. It seems, however, to have *chsun* [χσυν] throughout. For its date – 423/2 B.C. – see the convincing points made by H. Bengtson, in: *Staatsverträge* II (1962), p. 113 against *ATL*, iii, 313f. n. 61. For *IG*, i², 76 [*IG* i³ 78] (found at Eleusis: E) see P. Guillon, in: *BCH* lxxxvi (1962) pp. 467–75 and pp. 53–5 of my article (n. 29). For the Athens fragment (A) see Tod, *GHI*, i, pp. 181 and 184f. In no. vii of the Hermokopidai Stelai Pritchett restored *chsumpan* [χσ]ύμπαν in line 85 (*SEG*, xiii, 18), but as the list is not arranged in a stoichedon pattern (see *Hesperia* xxii [1953], p. 280) we cannot be quite sure of the form. I have taken account only of forms surviving in the texts or certainly to be restored in lacunae of known length.

inscribed much earlier than 420 B.C. That would seem to settle this particular question about *IG*, i², 91/92.³²

	<i>chsun-</i> [χσυν-]	<i>sun-</i> [συν-]
425/4 B.C.	<i>ATL</i> , ii, A 9 (<i>IG</i> , i ² , 63 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 71]), passim	<i>ATL</i> , ii, A 9, col. i, 118
424/3 B.C.	<i>SEG</i> , x, 80 (<i>IG</i> , i ² , 87 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 75]), passim <i>IG</i> , i ² , 57 + (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 61 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 61, ML 65]), 24 and 42	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 57 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 61], 54
423/2 B.C.?	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 76 + (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 74 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 78, ML 73]), passim	
422/1 B.C.?	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 90 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 68] (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 68), passim	
422/1 B.C.	<i>SEG</i> , x, 227 (<i>IG</i> , i ² , 324 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 369]), passim	
420/19 B.C.	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 86 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 83] (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 72), passim	
418/7 B.C.	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 94 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 84] 7, 13 and 31	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 94 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 84] 5
418/7 to 415/4 B.C.	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 302 + (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 75 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 287, ML 77]), seven times	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 302 + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 287], twice
415/4 to 414/3 B.C.		<i>SEG</i> , xiii, 12–22, passim
410/09 B.C.	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 304 A + (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 83 [<i>IG</i> i ³ 375, ML 84]), 2	<i>IG</i> , i ² , 304 A + [<i>IG</i> i ³ 375], passim
407/6 B.C.		<i>IG</i> , i ² , 304 B [<i>IG</i> i ³ 377], passim

The two phenomena examined are not then haphazard or capricious. The newer forms came in gradually alongside the old and the 420s prove to be the period of transition. With rather more confidence we may now turn to a third criterion of spelling. In Attic fifth-century inscriptions the older form of the plural present middle and passive imperative (*-osthôn* [-οσθῶν]) is found together with the newer form

³² For early examples of *sun-* [συν-] see *IG*, i², 6+, Face A, 51 (Meritt, in: *Hesperia* xiv, p. 80) [*IG* i³ 6 prints *chsymbolon* at this point (line 44 in the new text).], *ATL*, ii, List 1, post-script, line 10; List 9, iii, 34 and 10, ii, 25; List 13, 2 (heading). Meritt regards it as a matter of stonecutters' habit. He may be right about this particular spelling variation. It would be parallel to the occasional use of Ionic 'ksi' [ξ] and 'psi' [ψ] – convenient shorthand for 'chi + sigma' [χσ] and 'phi + sigma' [φσ]. *IG*, i², 297 + [*IG* i³ 371] (414/3 B.C.?) was restored by Meritt (*Ath. Fin. Doc.*, p. 89) with *sun-* [συν-] throughout, 'after the usual fashion of the later (*IG*, i², 304) as distinct from the earlier . . . documents.' As late as 408/7 B.C., however, *chsun-* [χσυν-] occurs frequently in the Selymbria Decree (4: 2), with its curious mixture of Ionic and Attic lettering (*IG*, i², 116+ = Tod, *GHI*, 88 [*IG* i³ 118, ML 87]). In the fourth century *xun-* [ξυν-] survives virtually only in the fixed formula 'to communicate [*xumballesthai*] the opinion of the Council' [γνώμην δὲ ξυμβάλλεσθαι τῆς βουλῆς], which was introduced in 378/7 B.C. See Tod, *GHI*, ii, Index iii, p. 340.

-*esthôn* [-εσθῶν].³³ Once again I would start with closely dated examples and proceed to the uncertain. My table (following) shows the evidence for 431 to 418 B.C.³⁴ The 420s once more are the period of transition. The Kallias Decrees fit snugly there with *sussemainosthon* [συσσεμαινόςθον] in *IG*, i², 91 [*IG* i³ 52], 17f. Uncertainly dated decrees with the *-esthôn* [-εσθῶν] form can quite legitimately be put within the same dating-bracket or will fall comfortably between 418 and 403 B.C.³⁵ I personally doubt whether the old form survived beyond 418 B.C., though two later occurrences are still widely accepted. In *SEG*, x, 131 (*IG*, i², 122+ [*IG* i³ 182]) of ?410/09 B.C. we find *hoi strategoi chrosthon*, 'the generals should use' [[*hoi στ*]ρατεγοὶ χρόςθο-
[v]], in line 11. This dating needs close scrutiny. The decree honours two men who served Athens well by securing a supply of oars. One is called Phanosthenes and he is assumed to be the Andrian who was made a citizen and subsequently became a general. With the further assumption that the general, active off Andros in 408/7 B.C., was the same man the decree seemed anchored historically around 410 B.C.³⁶ In fact none of this is very cogent and Meritt's attempt to find a final argument has quite a contrary result. Reading *hekatosto* [[*heka*]τοστῶ] in line 8 he justly recognized that a *telos hekatoston*, 'one percent tax' [τέλος ἑκατοστῶν], could hardly coexist with the 5 per cent harbour-tax which the Athenians imposed throughout the empire in 414 B.C.

³³ Meisterhans-Schwyzler, *Gramm. d. Att. Inschr.*³ (1900), p. 168, is now badly out of date. [See now L. Threatte, *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions* (Berlin 1996), vol. 2, 465–6.] The 'fourth-century' example of *-osthôn* [-οσθῶν] comes in fact from the Eretria Decree (*IG*, i², 17 [*IG* i³ 39]). See n. 25.

³⁴ The Anakes Decree (*IG*, i², 127 [*IG* i³ 133]) mentions Treasures of the Other Gods in line 13f.; they certainly already existed in 430/29 B.C. (see *IG*, i², 310, 88–98 [*IG* i³ 383, 1–11]). Raubitschek's proposed rearrangement of frg. e in relation to c, d and a – though still unpublished – satisfies all requirements and the *SEG*, x, 59 scheme has been rightly adopted in the Epigraphic Museum setting of the pieces. It confirms a line-length of c. 56 letters and proves that there was no archon-dating in the preamble (lines 1f.). This was virtually *de rigueur* from 421/0 B.C. on; see my argument in: *Historia* xii (1963), p. [272] n. 73. *IG*, i², 88 [*IG* i³ 64] is a building-decree for the Athena Nike temple (erected c. 427–424 B.C.): the final accounts are on its back. For the date of the temple see G. Welter, in: *Jahrb.* liv 1939, Anzeiger, 1–22; Meritt and Davidson, in: *AJP* lvi (1935), p. 71; D. S. Robertson, *Greek Architecture*, pp. 125 and 332. For *IG*, i², 149 [*IG* i³ 167] see Meritt, in: *Hesperia* xxi (1952), pp. 345ff. and my attempt at precision in: *Historia* xii (1963), p. [272] n. 73.

³⁵ For the rest see *IG*, i², 130, 13 [*IG* i³ 139] (*euthunesthon* [[*eu*]θὺνῆσθο[v]?)]; 139, 12 [*IG* i³ 207, 10] (*enechesthon* [ἐνεχέσθο[v]]); 141/2a, 9 [*IG* i³ 157, 14] (*dechesthon* [δεχέσθο[v])). No. 130 was found in the excavations of the Phorbanteion: in *SEG*, x, 62 it is put c. 430 B.C., but might well be later – though Andoc. 1, 62 makes 415 B.C. a fairly firm *terminus ante quem*. No. 139 mentions the Opisthodomos and was dated c. 430 B.C. by W. Kolbe (in: *Phil. Woch.* li [1931], pp. 80f.) and Wade-Gery (in: *JHS* li [1931], pp. 77 and 82), for both of whom the Opisthodomos was the west end of the Parthenon. For 141/2a Meritt has proposed a date c. 425 B.C. (in: *Hesperia* xiv [1945], pp. 97ff.).

³⁶ See Meritt, in: *Hesperia* xiv (1945), pp. 129–32 (photograph on p. 131), who published an important new fragment. For Phanosthenes the Andrian see: Plato, *Ion*, 541 d and A. E. Raubitschek, in: *RE*, xix, col. 1786.

instead of tribute. Xenophon (*Hell.*, i, 3, 9), however, shows that in 410 B.C. Alkibiades reimposed tribute on Kalchedon and demanded arrears.

	- <i>osthôn</i> [-οσθων]	- <i>esthôn</i> [-εσθων]
c. 430–421 B.C.	IG, i ² , 127 [IG i ³ 133], 18: <i>euthunosthon</i> [εὐθυνόςθων]	
c. 427 B.C.	IG, i ² , 88 [IG i ³ 64], 20: <i>epimelosthon</i> [[ἐπι]μελόςθων]	
424/3 B.C.	SEG, x, 80 (IG, i ² , 87+ [IG i ³ 75]), 20: <i>heuriskosthon</i> [[ἡε]υρισκόσθων] SEG, x, 81 (IG, i ² , 68/9+ [IG i ³ 72]), 13: <i>epimelosthon</i> [ἐπιμελόςθων]	SEG, x, 80, 26: <i>eparasthon</i> [[ἐ]παράσθων]
423/2 B.C.?	IG, i ² , 76+ (Tod, <i>GHI</i> , 74 [IG i ³ 78, ML 73]), 20 (E): <i>euthunosthon</i> [εὐθυνόςθων]	IG, i ² , 76+ [IG i ³ 78], 20 (A): <i>euthunesthon</i> [εὐθυνέσθων]
421/0 B.C.	IG, i ² , 84 [IG i ³ 82], 27 and 38: <i>epimelosthon</i> [ἐπιμελόςθων], <i>proshelosthon</i> [[πρ]οσθελόςθων]	
420/19 B.C.?		SEG, xii, 29 (IG, i ² , 149 [IG i ³ 167]) 20: <i>epimelesthon</i> [ἐ[πι]μελέσθων]

Was this the consequence of a general reassessment of the empire? Already some years earlier Meritt had published fragments of an Assessment List, which he claimed confidently as the list of 410 B.C. With the abolition of the 5 per cent tax the old rate of 1 per cent will have come back.³⁷ There is in fact no good evidence for a wholesale return to tribute in 410 B.C. Kalchedon may have been given special treatment, perhaps to be explained by the reorganization of the Bosphoros tithe at nearby Chrysopolis.³⁸ From Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 363 we should probably deduce that *eikostologoi* [collectors of the 5 per cent harbour tax] were still active in the Aegaeon in 405 B.C.³⁹ The dating of the fragments published as *ATL*, ii, A 13 must be regarded as doubtful and it is possible

³⁷ *Hesperia* v (1936), pp. 386–9 (with a good photograph).

³⁸ See Xen., *Hell.*, i, 1, 22 and my treatment of the *dekate* in: *PACA* vii (1964), pp. 45f.

³⁹ Meritt, loc. cit. (n. 36), and Lepper (*JHS* lxxxii [1962], p. 50, n. 77) regard *Frogs*, 363 as irrelevant – the former because an imperial 5 per cent tax would not be levied at non-tributary Aigina. But, as van Leeuwen suggested (pp. 66f. of his edition), Aristophanes' victim may have been collecting the tax somewhere else in the Aegaeon; Aigina would simply be the base from which he was smuggling contraband to the Peloponnese.

that they should be reattributed to the missing, but certain, Assessment of 418/7 B.C. (A 11).⁴⁰ The period in which we can be sure that a 1 per cent harbour-tax was imposed in the Aegaeon is c. 424–414 B.C. In *Wasps*, 658 Aristophanes reveals that it was a widespread general rate among the allies, while pseudo-Xenophon, *Ath. pol.*, i, 17 proves its levy at Peiraeus. After the loss of Amphipolis and the continued failure to recover Chalkidike shortage of timber must have become a permanent preoccupation for Athens. Perdikkas in 423/2 B.C. promised to prevent export of oars from Macedonia to anywhere but Athens, unless Athens authorized him. In view of his untrustworthiness, however, Athens did not really secure the Macedonian supply until 415/4 B.C., when he returned once more to the Athenian alliance after a period of open hostility.⁴¹ I would therefore suggest that SEG, x, 131 could properly be dated somewhere around 420 B.C., when the services of Phanosthenes and Antiochides would have been much appreciated.

The second generally accepted late occurrence of the *-osthôn* [-οσθών] form depends on restoration. In SEG, x, 138 (*IG*, i², 105 [*IG* i³ 117]) lines 9ff. read:

Those assigned to sail to man the ships shall be dispatched by the generals as quickly as possible. If not, they should be taken to court (*esagosthon*) on a charge of treason. The generals are to bring to court those who are unwilling to depart. The conveyance of the ships . . . †

This is Meritt's text, but ἐσαγό[σθον] was taken over from *IG*, i². He redated the decree 407/6 B.C.⁴² With so much text lost there can be little certainty about the readings. Epigraphically *esagonton*, 'to bring to

⁴⁰ I plan to argue elsewhere this date for the list.

⁴¹ For Amphipolis see Thuc., iv, 108, 1. For Chalkidian recalcitrance see Thuc., v, 21, 2; 31, 6; 82, 1 and 83, 4; vi, 7, 4 and 10, 5. P. A. Davis argued (in: *AJA* xxx [1926], p. 187) that fragment b¹ of *IG*, i², 71 [*IG* i³ 89] – now lost – belonged to a later renewal, not to the treaty of 423/2 B.C.; Arrabaios was still fighting Archelaos c. 413 B.C. (*Arist., Pol.*, viii. 1311b). The 423/2 B.C. treaty broke down within a few years. From winter 417/6 B.C. Athens and Perdikkas were openly at war (Thuc. v, 80, 2 and 84, 3; vi, 7, 3). But in late summer 414 B.C. we find Perdikkas helping an Athenian general against Amphipolis (Thuc. vii, 9). In spring 414 B.C. a general was active in the Thermaic gulf (*IG*, i², 302+ = Tod, *GHI*, 75, 72 [*IG* i³ 370, ML 77]) – this may mark the moment when Perdikkas was again forced to terms. Athens's monopoly of the timber supplies is taken for granted in pseudo-Xenophon, *Ath. pol.*, ii, 11–12, which I have elsewhere dated 415/4 B.C. See *Historia* x (1961), p. [179] and compare Gomme's view in: *HSCP*, Suppl. 1 (1940), pp. 224ff. and 244f.

† [—————]τός δὲ τεταγ]μένος πλὴν ἐπὶ τ
[ἐν πλέροσιν τὸν νεὸν ἡ]ος τάχιστα ἀποσ
[τελάντων ἡοι στρατεγ]οί. εἰ δὲ μὲ, ἐσαγό
[σθον προδοσίας ἐς τὸ δ]ικαστέριον ἡο[ι
[δὲ στρατεγοὶ περὶ τὸ μ]ὲ ἐθέλοντος ἀπι
[ἐναι ἐσαγόντων τῆς δὲ] κοιμίδε[ς τὸν νε[ῶ]
[v—————]

⁴² *Ath. Fin. Doc.*, 109–15; *Classical Studies presented to E. Capps* (1936), pp. 246–52 (the SEG text). The old date was 412/1 B.C.

court' [ἐσσαγό[ντων]], is a perfectly possible alternative in lines 11f. Certain officials would be instructed to bring the generals into court, if they fail to despatch the ship-building mission to Macedonia promptly. I would provisionally suggest reading 'the eleven' [ἄνδρα ἑνδεκά] for 'treason' [προδοσίας]. The generals might counter by arguing that their orders were disobeyed and so the next clause provides for the trial of such recalcitrant individuals.⁴³

The pattern now seems clear. It is rather like that presented by the first declension dative plurals, except that here we have no check from documents other than decrees.⁴⁴ We may obviously date decrees with the older imperative form as late as the late 420s. This is important for some key documents which many still put in the early 440s. It will be easiest to present the material in a simple table.⁴⁵

Imperatives in *-osthōn* [-οσθων]

ATL ii, D 11 (IG, i², 22 + [IG i³ 21]), 44: *epimelosthon* [ἐπιμελόσθων]
 ATL ii, D 14, Siphnos copy, 1 (p. 65): *euthunosthōm* [[εὐθύ]νόσθωμ]
 IG, i², 39 [IG i³ 40] (Chalkis), 19f., 44, 68: *epimelosthon* [ἐπιμελόσθων],
sunepimelosthon [συνεπιμελόσθων]
 IG i², 17 [IG i³ 39] (Eretria), 6: *epimelosthōn* [ἐπιμελόσθ[ω]ν]

Some years ago I tried to dissociate the Chalkis and Eretria Decrees from the settlement of 446/5 B.C., with which they had always very naturally been connected. I urged that they should be assigned to the 420s instead.⁴⁶ The historical arguments were inevitably far from cogent. Euboea was clearly long regarded by Athens as a major 'security risk.' Stringent control and a special relationship with Athens could well have been imposed on these allies as early as 446 B.C., especially after revolt. Thucydides' silence is surprising, if indeed there was any serious trouble in the 420s. Yet we do know from Philochoros that Athens took *some* kind of military action against Euboea in 424/3 B.C.⁴⁷ The balance may seem to incline firmly to the 440s. Nevertheless I still believe that I was right. One fairly objective criterion could well prove decisive. The

⁴³ In lines 13f. I would revert to the readings *beliastai* [βελιασταί] and *krinonton* [κρινόντων] (see also Tod, *GHI*, i, pp. 222f.). Meritt's transition is awkwardly abrupt. The same court which tried the generals could investigate any countercharges of disobedience.

⁴⁴ For the datives from 434 to 418 B.C. Wade-Gery had reliable statistics based on accounts and *traditiones* (in: *JHS* li [1931], pp. 79f.).

⁴⁵ The crucial vowel is missing in lines 40 and 76 of the Miletos Decree (D 11). For its date see pp. 329ff.

⁴⁶ *JHS* lxxxi (1961), pp. [124–32].

⁴⁷ For Philochoros see the scholiast on *Wasps*, 718 (716 D) and my n. 8, op. cit., p. [125]. Meritt and Wade-Gery dealt very briefly with my case in *JHS* lxxxi (1963), p. 104 with n. 32. I make their main point in my text.

Chalkis Decree shares four rather unusual turns of phrase with decrees of the 420s. Here I would concentrate attention on the most striking.⁴⁸

In lines 45ff. the text runs as follows: ‘as oath-commissioners to go to Chalkis the people will select five men straight away. As to the hostages . . .’ [βοίτινες δὲ ἐχσορκόσοσι ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Χαλκίδα ἐλέσθαι τὸν δῆμον πέντε ἄνδρας αὐτίκα μάλα. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἡομερον—]. The closest parallel anywhere is in lines 30ff. of the Bottiaian Treaty (422/1 B.C.), where the restorations are virtually certain: ‘as those who are to take the oath from the Bottiaians the people will elect five men straight away from all the Athenians. As to the hostages which they have . . .’ [τὸς δὲ [ὄρκος] βοίτινες λέ[φσονται παρὰ Βοττιαίων ἐλέσθαι τὸν δῆ]μον πέντε ἄν[δρας αὐτίκα μάλα ἐκ πάντων Ἀθηναίων. τὸ]ς δὲ ὁμέρος ἡ[ὸς ἔχουσι—]. The construction is tortuous and otherwise found only in the Hephaistea Decree of 421/0 B.C.⁴⁹ Not surprisingly all later clauses of this type follow the normal pattern shown in *IG*, i², 110+ (Tod, *GHI*, 86 [*IG* i³ 102, ML 85]), 22–5: ‘five men are to be chosen straight away from the Council who will judge what Thrasyboulos’ portion shall be’ [ἡελέσθαι δι[ὲ ἐκ βολῆς πέντε ἄνδρας αὐτί]κα μάλα βοίτινε[ς] δι[κ]άσοσι Θρασυβόλοι τὸ μέρος τὸ γιγνόμενον].⁵⁰ This pattern is already found in the second Leonidas Decree of c. 430 B.C. (*IG*, i², 56 [*IG* i³ 156], 27–9): ‘Leonidas will choose a man to convey and set up the *stèle*’ [ἄνδρα δὲ προσελέσθω Λεονίδης ἡόστις ἄχσει τῆστέλεν καὶ στέσει].⁵¹ The problem then is this. Was an isolated stylistic vagary of the mid-440s suddenly revived in the years 423–421 B.C.? Or should we regard it rather as simply a short-lived fashion of the late 420s?

⁴⁸ See op. cit., (n. 46), p. 126f. On the use of *empedoun*, ‘confirm, ratify’ [ἐμπεδοῦν], (lines 14f.) there is now more to say. It is used technically in relation to oaths and treaties in *IG*, i², 71, 33 [*IG* i³ 89, 41], Pseudo-Xen., *Ath. pol.*, ii, 17; Euripid., *Iphig. Taur.*, 780 (cf. 758); Aristoph., *Lysist.*, 211 and 233. Yet it is *not* found in the Bottiaian Treaty where one would expect it (*IG*, i², 90+ [*IG* i³ 76] = Tod, *GHI*, 68, 14): the restoration would be too long by a letter and *phylachso* [φυλάχσο] must be right. For 415/4 B.C. as the date of the *Ath. pol.* see n. 41. The *Iphigeneia* must be put c. 414 B.C.: see L. Parmentier and H. Grégoire, *Euripide*, iv (1959), p. 106. Though common in the period 425–410 B.C., the technical term *empedoun* [ἐμπεδοῦν] was not yet stereotyped near its beginning, as the Bottiaian Treaty shows. The evidence in fact slightly favours the later date for *IG*, i², 39 [*IG* i³ 40] quite apart from any special argument from *IG*, i², 71, 33ff. [*IG* i³ 89, 41ff.]

⁴⁹ *IG*, i², 84, 31f. [*IG* i³ 82, 29f.] ‘as those ephebes who are to plough the bulls the priests are to choose two hundred from the Athenians. As for the lamp . . .’ [βοίτιν[ε]ς δὲ ἄρονται [τὸς βοῦς ἐφέβος βοι] ἡιεροποιο[ὶ] ἡαιρέσθων] διακοσιος ἔχ[ς Ἀθε[ν]αίων τῶν δὲ λαμ[πά]δα—]. The construction in lines 19f. [17f. in the new edition] is rather similar.

⁵⁰ See for instance *IG*, ii², 16+, 17–20 (Tod, *GHI*, ii, 103: 394 B.C.); 31+, 17–19 (Tod, 117: 386/5 B.C.); Tod, 118 [RO 20], 34f. (384/3 B.C.); *IG*, ii², 43+, 72–75 (Tod, 123 [RO 22], 378/7 B.C.); 102+, 1–4 [TO 129: c. 375 B.C.); Tod, 137 [RO 35], 14–18 (367/6 B.C.); Tod, 147 [RO 44], 21–25 (361/0 B.C.); *IG*, ii², 124+, 4–6 (Tod, 153 [RO 48], 357/6 B.C.); 128+, 17 (Tod, 159: 356/5 B.C.).

⁵¹ For the date note Charoiades in I. II (Thuc. 111, 90, 2).

Can there be any real doubt which is the more likely answer? It is hard to resist the logic of this one formal criterion, however unpalatable the consequences may seem. The Chalkis and Eretria Decrees will be firmly fixed in 424/3 B.C. The Hestiaia Decrees, moreover, should also probably be assigned to roughly the same date. *IG*, i², 40 and 42 both have the rather rare form of rounded rho with a tail, whilst 41 exhibits the normal rounded rho without tail.[†] Both forms occur in the Chalkis Decree. The sloping nus of *IG*, i², 40, etc., can also be paralleled in this document. Epigraphically then there can now be no objection to bringing the Hestiaia 'dossier' down into the 420s.⁵² There was always one good reason for wishing to do this, as Cary acutely pointed out many years ago. The mysterious passage in *IG*, i², 42 about *eisphora* (lines 20–4) presupposes its familiarity at Athens and a regulation there against too ready recourse to it. Our earliest evidence on these points is *IG*, i², 92, 46–50 [*IG* i³ 52, B 15–19], if the Kallias Decrees really were passed in 434/3 B.C. Otherwise we can trace *eisphora* no further back than 428/7 B.C., when Thucydides records its first levy in the war.⁵³

Is there any such formal reason for down-dating the Coinage Decree likewise? I would approach this problem by way of a parallel measure, the Tribute Decree of Kleinias. I have elsewhere proposed dating that 425/4 B.C. against a general *consensus* for the early 440s, but have won very little assent. So I will not develop my previous arguments here nor try to answer the criticisms levelled against me. The subjective element is too great.⁵⁴ Yet on an impartial view the debate on this decree might well be judged finely balanced. It should not need very much to turn the scales. Only it must be something hard and objective. Now there is one small formal clue to dating in the Kleinias Decree itself and another in the Coinage Decree, which can less easily be explained away. Together with the fact that the Syme copy of the latter was inscribed in the 420s they make a formidable case.

The Kleinias Decree shares a minor peculiarity of idiom with that of Kleonymos and, as far as I know, with no other fifth-century Attic

[†] All three inscriptions are now published as a single document: *IG* i³ 41.

⁵² For the bibliography and partial texts of the Hestiaia stele see *SEG*, x, 37 and Hill, *Sources for Greek History*², pp. 302f., B 54. E. Vanderpool published a new fragment with the rounded rhos: this is not opisthographic, though it certainly belongs to the stele. The text on this side must have continued down below that on the other. See *Hesperia* xxxi (1962), pp. 399–401 (with a photograph: Pl. 118). Vanderpool dates the decrees c. 445 B.C. with *SEG* and Hill². For a photograph of *IG*, i², 42 [*IG* i³ 41] (two fragments) see *Hesperia* vi (1937), p. 320, Fig. 2a. For *IG*, i², 39 [*IG* i³ 40], see *ATL*, ii, Pl. X (D 17).

⁵³ See M. Cary, in: *JHS* xlv (1925), p. 248 and Thuc., iii, 19. R. Thomsen (*Eisphora* [1964], pp. 119–46) argues unconvincingly that Themistokles introduced *eisphora*.

⁵⁴ See *Historia* x (1961), pp. [150–69]; Meritt and Wade-Gery, in: *JHS*, lxxxii (1962), pp. 67–74; R. Meiggs, *HSCP* lxxvii (1963), pp. 19ff. and 28ff. I have been much encouraged to hear (by letter) that Pritchett believes in the 420s dating.

decree. Both phrases are much restored, but there is no likely alternative. I quote the passages from the *ATL*, ii texts (D 7, 20ff. and D 8, 52ff.) and indicate the relevant words. Kleinias instructs the prytanies to summon an Assembly for the annual report by the Hellenotamiai on tribute payment: 'let them show to the Athenians which of the cities paid the tribute in full and which fell short, separately, as many as there are; let the Athenians . . .' [[ἀ]ποδειῖχσαι Ἀθηναίοις τῶμ πόλεον τὰς ἀποδόσα[ς τὸμ φόρον ἐ]ντελῆ καὶ τὰς ἐλλιπόσας χορίς, ἡόσαι [ἄν τινες ὄσιν· Ἀθ]εναίος δὲ—]. The amendment to Kleonymos' Decree ends by arranging the despatch of as many heralds as the Council sees fit to choose: 'let them send heralds, as many there are, whom the *prytaneis* and the Council choose' [τὸς δὲ κέ[ρυκας ἡόσοι ἄν τιν]ες [ὄ]σι ὃς ἄν ἡοι πρυτάνες με[τὰ τῆς βολῆς ἡέλοντα]ι πέμφοσαι—]. The variation from normal idiom, though slight, is unmistakable. It *could* be a passing fashion of the 420s.⁵⁵

In the Coinage Decree Klearchos enumerates the tribute-districts in the order first established in 425/4 B.C. He names them one by one (one herald to each), so that there can be no question of geographical factors determining his choice. He either settled by pure accident on the order of the Reassessment of 425/4 B.C. or else deliberately followed it. In 1949 Tod sensed the importance of this criterion and Victor Ehrenberg himself went rather further a decade ago. But whereas he modestly left the decision to the 'experts,' I would urge again that historians can and must decide this for themselves. Can the answer really be in serious doubt?⁵⁶ If this criterion stood alone, one might dismiss it as a curious coincidence. But it is supported by others, as we have just seen, and by two arguments concerning the Kleinias Decree which I have expounded elsewhere. This *appears* by its very wording to be dependent on the decrees of Kleonymos and Thoudippos, which are, of course, firmly fixed in 426/5 and 425/4 B.C.⁵⁷

3 THE HEYDAY OF ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM

The Coinage Decree and the Decree of Kleinias can now confidently be seen as measures of the 420s, in which context they make excellent sense. The mysterious allusion to Athena and Hephaistos in the former

⁵⁵ The addition of *tines*, 'whoever' [τινες], gives the phrase a distinctive flavour – an almost personal trick of style.

⁵⁶ See Tod, *JHS* lxi (1949), p. 105; Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (1954), p. 121, with nn. 2 and 4. For my fuller answer to the objections of Meritt and Wade-Gery (*JHS* lxxxii [1962], pp. 72–4), see *CQ*, n.s. xvi (1966), pp. [187]f.

⁵⁷ For the relation of *ATL*, ii, D 7, 58ff. and 41ff. to D 8, 18ff. and A 9, 55ff. respectively see *CQ*, n.s.: xvi (1966), pp. [188]f., with *Historia* x (1961), p. [153].

(§7) may no longer be connected with the start of work on their joint temple.⁵⁸ But we must remember that their festival was thoroughly reorganized in 421/0 B.C., when the cult-statues were begun, and that the pediment sculptures and acroteria were finally added to the temple about the same period: there may well have been some work left uncompleted on the temple structure itself.⁵⁹ Now the fragmentary decree *IG*, i², 111 [*IG* i³ 132] has in the past been associated with the Athena Nike temple and dated 427/6 B.C.⁶⁰ It was passed on the same day as *IG*, i², 60 [*IG* i³ 66] the conciliatory measure which regulated affairs between Mytilene and Athens. Elsewhere I have followed Gomme and Victor Ehrenberg in dating this 425/4 B.C., when passions roused by the Lesbian revolt had had time to cool.⁶¹ If this should in fact be the date for *IG*, i², 111 [*IG* i³ 132] it is hard to associate it any longer with the Nike temple, which was completed the following year. Moreover the little that survives of the decree suggests that it marks the resumption of work on an unfinished temple project. For this reason it was once thought to provide for the second start on the Erechtheion in 410 B.C.⁶² I would now suggest that the Hephaisteion was the temple in question and that the decision to resume building was taken a few years earlier than we had so far tended to think.⁶³

The Coinage Decree, as redated, throws a little light on this. It can also help to explain a curious incident that arose in the late winter of 425/4 B.C. between Athens and the remaining 'autonomous' ally Chios. The Chians had begun to build a new wall, which understandably roused Athenian suspicions. Athens therefore firmly demanded that it should be pulled down and Chios complied, but only after securing strong guarantees of

⁵⁸ As it was by W. B. Dinsmoor, *Hesperia*, Suppl. v (1941), pp. 152f.

⁵⁹ See *IG*, i², 84 [*IG* i³ 82] and 370/371 [*IG* i³ 472], H. A. Thompson, *AJA*, lxvi (1962), p. 344, n. 22; C. H. Morgan, *Hesperia* xxxii (1963), pp. 91–108. The mouldings on the raking cornice (geison) are to be dated c. 420 B.C. See Lucy Shoe, *Profiles of Greek Mouldings* (1936), p. 108 and Pl. LIII, pp. 21–2.

⁶⁰ W. B. Dinsmoor, *TAPA* lxxx (1939), p. 125; H. B. Mattingly, *Historia* x (1961), p. [170]; Iona M. Shear, *Hesperia* xxxii (1963), p. 388; A. B. West, in: J. M. Paton and G. P. Stevens, *The Erechtheum* (1927), pp. 647f. (the date).

⁶¹ See *PACA* vii (1964), p. 39, n. 27; Gomme, ii, pp. 328ff.; Ehrenberg, *Historia* vii (1958), p. 25 (review of Gomme, ii–iii).

⁶² See Paton-Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 279f. and 647f. for rejection of the Erechtheion theory. Broken phrases in *IG*, i², 111 [*IG* i³ 132] clearly prompted it. Thus Kirchoff offered 'the construction' [τὸ μὲν κ[α]τεσκευασμένον] in *IG*, i, 60.8 and I suggest for 6f. 'the architect is to look after the work' [τῆς δὲ ἔργα] | σίας *ho* ἀρχιτέκτων ἐπιμέλεισθου-] and for 8f. 'the work, as much as needs to be completed . . .' [τὸ] | ν ἔργον ὅσα δ[εῖ ἐκτεῖσθαι . . .].

⁶³ Morgan has argued a detailed case for dating the Hephaisteion friezes *after* the Parthenon sculptures: see *Hesperia* xxxi (1962), pp. 221 to 235. If he should prove right in this, we should probably assume that when work recommenced in 425/4 B.C. the friezes were taken in hand straight away. But most scholars still seem to prefer a date in the 440s (so Meritt and Wade-Gery, *JHS* lxxxiii [1963], p. 106 and Thompson, *loc. cit.* [n. 59]).

her favoured position.⁶⁴ Now what had made the normally loyal and sensible Chians afraid of a change for the worse in Athenian policy?⁶⁵ I submit that it was nothing less than the Coinage Decree. Though the ban on coinage did not apply directly to Chios, whose silver continues, no other allied state could henceforth use Chian silver in normal trade. Attic silver alone might be used under pain of severe penalties.⁶⁶ Even though it is true that most Greek silver had only very restricted circulation, the Chians may have resented this ‘outlawing’ of their money. They certainly continued striking on their own standard, refusing to be forced over to the Attic. And when they headed the revolt against Athens in 412 B.C. their standard spread to Ephesos, Rhodes and other communities in the east.⁶⁷ Such a measure as the Coinage Decree inevitably impinged on Chian interests. It showed Athens carrying still further the process of control among the tributary allies. Now the privileges of Chios and Methymna might be progressively eroded. Such fears, I submit, caused the Chian lapse of judgment in 425/4 B.C.

The two key documents which we are considering both reveal mature Athenian imperialism at work. Local Athenian *archontes* [officials] were widespread in the empire when they were voted. Significantly enough all our other evidence on this point comes from after 431 B.C.⁶⁸ This must be true of a tantalizing new fragment of a proxeny decree, which mentions Athenian *archontes* in Ionia. I give the whole of Meritt’s text, in which the restorations must be judged extremely plausible:

. . . and . . . the Council of the Athenians will look after him, and the generals who are currently serving, and the *archontes* from the cities and those in Ionia. The secretary of the Council is to write up this decree on a stone *stèle* . . . †

⁶⁴ See Thuc., iv, 51 with Gomme’s good note in iii, 499f.; Meritt, *Hesperia* xiv (1945), pp. 115–19 (publishing a new inscription – see *SEG*, x, 76 [IG i³ 70] – which may well belong here). Both Gomme and Meritt (p. 118) take *pisteis* [πίστεις] in Thucydides as ‘guarantees to be provided by Athens.’

⁶⁵ Gomme rightly emphasizes Chian moderation, quoting Thuc., viii, 24, 4.

⁶⁶ See *ATL*, ii, D 14, § 12. The ban applied ‘in the cities’ [ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι] – all Athenian naval allies or only those ‘which the Athenians control’ [ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι]? This qualifying phrase may well have occurred in the first clause(s) of the Coinage Decree. Neither Chios nor Methymna could properly be included in such a formulation (see Thuc., vi, 85, 2), which is clearly presupposed in the title ‘officials in the cities’ [ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι]. In the Leonidas Decree, as we shall see (p. 99), the two phrases actually occur side by side.

⁶⁷ See E. G. Gardiner, *JHS* xxxiii (1913), pp. 182–5; E. S. G. Robinson, *Hesperia*, Suppl. viii (1949), p. 324; C. T. Seltman, *Greek Coins*² (1954), pp. 148–52. For the local nature of most Greek coinage see C. M. Kraay, *JHS* lxxxiv (1964), pp. 76–85.

⁶⁸ As I argued in *Historia* x (1961), pp. [157]f., following Gomme, i, pp. 381f. I will not repeat the detailed evidence here.

† [————] ον καὶ ἰ [—]
[————] ἐπιμέλεισθα[ι]
[δὲ αὐτὸ τὲν τε βολὲν] τὲν Ἀθηναί

The spelling *boules*, ‘of the Council’ [[βουλ]ῆς], in line 8 provides a very valuable clue.⁶⁹ Even in Ionic script at Athens in the 420s and the next two decades the word is normally spelt *boles* [βολῆς]. The earliest example that I have found of ου where Attic regularly has ο occurs in *IG*, i², 71, 59 [*IG* i³ 89, 5] (*ananeousthai* [[ἀναν]εοῦσθαι]). This fragment (b’) belongs to a treaty with Perdikkas later than the main text and I have already tried to date it 415/4 B.C.⁷⁰ From 410/09 B.C. the phenomenon is not uncommon. Thus the new decree should most probably be dated c. 415–410 B.C., when its band of Athenian officials in Ionia need cause us no surprise at all.⁷¹

In the first Leonidas Decree of c. 430 B.C. the ‘officials in the cities’ [ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι] appear in the periphrasis ‘in whichever other cities the Athenians rule overseas’ [ἐν δὲ τῆσι ἄλλεσι πόλεσι βοίτινες Ἀθηναίων ἄρχοσι ἐν τῆι ὑπερορίαι] (*IG*, i², 56 [*IG* i³ 156], 5ff.). Perhaps this in itself is a good indication that the shorthand description was not yet current. Shortly before we find the phrase ‘which the Athenians control’ [ἡόσεσ Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι], which has its counterpart in ‘in the cities which the Athenians control’ [ἐν τῶν πόλεον ἡῶν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι] in the second decree (lines 2 and 14f.). These phrases too, I submit, reflect the language of Kleon rather than of the earlier Perikles. Most of the evidence once more comes quite certainly from after 431 B.C. The first phrase recurs in the proxeny decree for Lykon the Achaian, while the second seems closely paralleled in two decrees which should also most probably be put c. 420 B.C.⁷² One of these has been so restored as to include mention of a five-talent fine payable by communities held responsible in some way for the death of people protected by Athens. This is likely enough, since *Peace*, 169ff. clearly shows that such a fine was a real hazard for

[ον καὶ τὸς στρατηγὸς] τὸς ἀεὶ στ
ρατηγόντας καὶ τὸς ἀρχοντας τ
[ος ἐκ τῶν πόλεον τῶν ἐν] Ἰονίαι τ
[ὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τόδε ἀνα]γράφσαι
[τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλ]ῆς ἐ[ν στ]
[ἔλει λιθίνει—————]

⁶⁹ See *Hesperia* xxxii (1963), p. 39, no. 38 (Pl. 2). The line-length is determined by the restorations imposed in lines 4f. and 6f.

⁷⁰ See n. 41 and P. A. Davis, *AJA* xxx (1926), p. 187.

⁷¹ For later infiltration of Ionic *ou* [ου] see *IG*, i² 108 (*SEG*, xii, 37 [*IG* i³ 101], 410/09 B.C.) 1–46 passim; 115+ (Tod, *GHI*, 87 [*IG* i³ 104, ML 86], 409/8 B.C.), 3; 157, 5 [*IG* i³ 163, 4] (*boules* [βουλῆς]). Meritt’s fragment has the Ionic form *aei* [ἄει] in line 4, whereas *aei* [ἄει] seems to be correct older Attic – as in *IG*, i², 91 [*IG* i³ 52], 25 and 110+ (Tod, *GHI*, 86 [*IG* i³ 102, ML 85] 410/09 B.C.), 33. See on this Wade-Gery, *JHS* li (1931), p. 81. It is worth noting that the Ionic decree for Oiniades (*IG*, i², 118+ = Tod, *GHI*, 90 [*IG* i³ 110, ML 90], 408/7 B.C.) has *ou* [ου] for Attic *o* [ο] three times and *aei* [ἄει] in line 17. This seems another pointer to a fairly late date for the new decree.

⁷² See *IG*, i², 93, 13–15 [*IG* i³ 175, 6–8] *IG*, i², 72 [*IG* i³ 162], 10f. and ii², 38, 1f. as emended by A. Wilhelm (*SEG*, x, 88 and 99).

allied cities in the late 420s.⁷³ Now in the proxeny decree for Acheloion (*IG*, i², 28a [*IG* i³ 19]) both the fine and the ‘they control’ [κράτουσι] phrase certainly occur. But on letter-forms this inscription, we are told, cannot be later than the mid-440s, with its three-barred sigma and slanting nu.⁷⁴ This criterion, however, has in itself little force. Other objective criteria have shown that the Coinage Decree, the Chalkis Decree and the Kleinias Decree all belong to the 420s. It is surely now permissible to range the decree for Acheloion in the same context. One other proxeny decree (*IG*, i², 27 = *SEG*, xii, 9 [*IG* i³ 27]) normally assigned to the early 440s also seems framed in the language of mature imperialism. The proxenos, like the Athenian, is protected against assassination in the cities ‘which the Athenians control.’⁷⁵ I have already elsewhere urged that this decree too belongs to the 420s and see no reason to change my view. Its contacts are all with men and measures of that period.⁷⁶

At this point I would like to stress the significance of what I have tried to demonstrate so far in this paper. If I am right in my proposed redatings, we must recognize that all the evidence for a general and developed system of Athenian imperialism relates to the Peloponnesian War. Naturally I am not suggesting that it was born fully-grown and armed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Confederacy had been tending towards empire almost from its beginning. But it is now arguable that the Samian War was the precipitating factor, not the transference of the Treasury to Athens or the calling off of the final offensive against Persia in 449 B.C.⁷⁷ From 441 B.C. the drift set in towards ‘tyranny’ and a war, in which Sparta could pose as the liberator of Athens’s allies. It is worth noting, I think, that that had *not* been Sparta’s slogan in the brief struggles of 446 B.C. Indeed the Thirty Years’ Peace implicitly recognized

⁷³ For Wilhelm’s restoration of *IG*, ii², 38 see *SAWW* ccxvii, 5 (1939), pp. 23f. and *SEG*, x, 99. For the fine see Meiggs, *CR* lxiii (1949), pp. 9–12 and G. de Ste Croix, *CQ*, n.s. xi (1961), pp. 268 and 275.

⁷⁴ *SEG*, x, 23 gives Wilhelm’s text under the date c. 450/49 B.C. Wilhelm (op. cit., 17–23) restored both decrees on the same pattern despite the quarter-century lapse between them on his view. He was surely right in his instinct about the restoration.

⁷⁵ There can be little doubt about the restoration of lines 13–17: with de Ste Croix (op. cit., 275 and n. 4) I prefer Meiggs’s version of 16f. – ‘as in the case of anyone killing an Athenian’ [καθάπερ Ἀθηναίο ἀποθάνοντες] (op. cit., 11) – to that printed in *SEG*.

⁷⁶ See *Historia* xii (1963), pp. [263–5], where I also put Acheloion’s decree late. For Nikostratos the general (epistates of Leontis in *IG*, i², 27 [*IG* i³ 27]?) see now D. MacDowell, *CQ*, n.s. xv (1965), pp. 41–51, with convincing arguments for his identification with ‘the man from Skambonidae’ [ὁ Σκαμβωνίδης] (*Wasps*, 81). In *Historia*, xii I missed the evidence that the general’s grandfather was also called Nikostratos – the ostrakon of c. 450 B.C. discussed by A. E. Raubitschek in *Hesperia*, Suppl. v. (1941), pp. 163f.

⁷⁷ For 454 B.C. see R. Sealey, *PACA* i (1958), p. 63; for 449/8 B.C. see Wade-Gery, *Hesperia* xiv (1945), pp. 212–29 and *ATL*, iii, 275–81. On the supposed ‘Peace of Kallias’ see my article in *Historia* xiv (1965), pp. [273–81].

Athens's freedom of action within her alliance, underwriting autonomy only for Aigina.⁷⁸

Already Athens had dealt toughly with a number of recalcitrant allies. Revolt meant at the least firm temporary control and permanent loss of any independence in external affairs. The fate of Hestiaia, however, was to remain unique for many years ahead.⁷⁹ No doubt Chalkis and Eretria were strictly handled on the same occasion, though *IG*, i², 39 and 17 [*IG* i³ 40, 39] can no longer be used for detailed evidence on the settlement. (As we have seen, they were passed in 424/3 B.C. after further incipient disloyalty.) Nevertheless we still possess some inscriptional records which may reveal Athenian methods in the period before the Thirty Years' Peace. I propose now to review in turn the decrees for Erythrai, Miletos and the Kolophonians.

The lettering of the first is distinctly early, with angular betas and rhos, phis without projecting stroke and three-barred sigmas. The closest parallels are found in the famous Erechtheid casualty-list (winter 458/7 B.C.?) and Quota Lists 1, 2 and 4. There is no good reason for bringing the decree below 450 B.C., as in a rash moment I suggested some years ago.⁸⁰ This was the less excusable, since the Quota Lists provide suggestive evidence about Erythrai's behaviour in the late 450s. In 453/2 B.C. the community of Boutheia paid no less than three talents tribute. Now later they normally pay as little as a sixth of a talent. Why then did they just once contribute such an unusually large sum? The *ATL* editors plausibly suggest that the loyal Erythraians had temporarily rallied at Boutheia, while Erythrai itself was in revolt under a pro-Persian tyranny. The decree would mark its recovery, possibly still in 453/2 B.C. Democracy was imposed, a garrison was installed on the Acropolis under an Athenian commander and Athenian 'overseers' were sent for the difficult period of transition. The pattern followed later in dealing with Samos in 441/0 B.C. is already clear.⁸¹ The oath of loyalty laid on Erythrai explicitly includes the Confederacy which is also mentioned in the clause about criminal jurisdiction. This is certainly significant and it is important to notice that the allies are still specifically included in the loyalty-oath imposed on

⁷⁸ I am glad to agree here wholeheartedly with the point of view expressed in *ATL*, iii, 301-4.

⁷⁹ It was justified by Athens on the grounds that the Hestiaians had committed a serious breach of the rules of war; for this they were expelled *en masse*. See Plut., *Per.*, 23, 4.

⁸⁰ See *ATL*, ii, Pl. III (*IG*, i², 11 and 12/13 [*IG* i³ 15]) and i, Pls. III-V (facsimiles of early Quota Lists); *IG*, i² 929+ (Tod, *GHI*, 26 [*IG* i³ 1147, ML 33]). For my attempt at redating (the 430s!) see *Historia* xii (1963), p. 271, n. 69.

⁸¹ *ATL*, iii, 252-5. I am still very doubtful about reading 'Λυσικράτης ἄρχων' [Λυσικράτης ἄρχων] in *IG*, i², 10+ (D 10), 2 [*IG* i³ 14] see on this *Historia* x (1961), p. [150], n. 12. For Samos see Thuc., i, 115, where we find the new democracy guaranteed by a garrison and Athenian *archontes*. This action precipitated the open revolt.

Samos in 439 B.C. In principle at least Athens had acted against both rebels in the name of the whole Confederacy and with confederate backing – just as Kimon had dealt with Naxos and Thasos in the 460s.⁸²

4 MILETOS AND THE KOLOPHONIANS

Let us now turn to the problem of Miletos. The lettering of *IG*, i², 22 + [*IG* i³ 21] (*ATL*, ii, D 111) can be mostly paralleled in the first nine Quota Lists and might well be as early as they, even if the main thesis of my paper is granted.⁸³ The archon Euthynos, who dates this document, clearly could be the man whom Diodoros calls Euthydemos. He often makes this kind of mistake. On this assumption the decree has been firmly fixed in 450/49 B.C. Supporting evidence is adduced from the Quota Lists, but this is less satisfactory than for Erythrai. If Miletos *did* revolt in the mid-450s it was recovered by summer 452 B.C., since it is found paying tribute in List 3. This is two full years before the accepted date of the surviving settlement. Admittedly this contains no oath of loyalty and could be regarded as embodying supplements or adjustments to the settlement imposed immediately after the revolt. But the discrepancy in date remains remarkable. Are we to assume that the Athenian garrison stayed at Miletos continuously from 452 to 449 B.C.? Or was it recalled in 450/49 B.C. because of renewed difficulties in the city? Or should we believe that it was *first* sent in that year, contrary to what one would expect and to recent Athenian policy at Erythrai?⁸⁴ If we are to accept the date 450/49 B.C. for *IG*, i², 22 + [*IG* i³ 21], I would prefer to ignore the rather dubious evidence for revolt in the 450s and assume that it was *stasis* in Miletos, and not open disloyalty, that impelled Athenian intervention in this year.⁸⁵ For what

⁸² See *IG*, i², 10 + (D 10) [*IG* i³ 14] 23ff., ‘I will not revolt from the Athenian people or from the allies of the Athenians’ [— οὐκ[ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθηναίων τῷ π[λ]έθροσ οὐδὲ τῶν χσσυμάχων τῶν Ἀθηναίων] and 31, ‘he shall be exiled from all the Athenian alliance’ [φευγέτο ἡπάσαν τὴν Ἀθηναίων χσσυμαχίδα —]: *IG*, i², 50 + (*ATL*, ii, D 18) [*IG* i³ 48], 17–20, ‘I will not revolt from the Athenian people in word or in deed, nor from the allies of the Athenians’ [[οὐδὲ ἀποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε λόγοι οὔτε ἔργοι οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν χσσυμάχων τῶν Ἀθηναίων —]].

⁸³ See *ATL*, ii, Pl. IV and i, Plates IV and IX (facsimiles of Lists 3 and 9: the latter has Σ, not Ϝ). The consistently upright nus of *IG*, i², 22 + are more developed than the majority of nus in the first two stelai of the Quota Lists, where sloping specimens are not infrequent even in the texts of the 430s (see *ATL*, i, Plates III–XXI).

⁸⁴ See Meiggs, *JHS* lxiii (1943), pp. 26f. [pp. 67–9, this volume] and *HSCP* lxxviii (1963), pp. 24f.; *ATL*, iii, 253–6; J. Barron, *JHS* lxxxii (1962), pp. 1f. and 5.

⁸⁵ For the tribute evidence see *ATL*, i, ‘Register’, 342f. In List 1 ‘Milesians from Leros’ pay 3 talents and ‘Milesians in Teichoussa’ an unknown sum. The places were Milesian dependencies and are next recorded in List 27 in a Milesian syntely (which pays 10 talents, as Miletos alone in 450/49 B.C.). Does List 1 record loyalists paying when Miletos was in revolt? All that we can safely say is that the dependencies paid at a time of Milesian non-payment. The *ATL* editors (iii, 253) argue that Miletos contributed ships until c. 460 B.C. May this not have continued in fact until 452/1 B.C., when Miletos commuted the obligation into money?

follows I would be content to accept Barron's plausible reconstruction. Uncharacteristically Athens chose to support the Neileid oligarchy in this faction-struggle. Within a few years they broke loose and virtually wiped out the leaders of the democratic party. Their revolt was quelled c. 443 B.C., Miletos re-entered the empire and the Neileids were condemned to perpetual banishment. Democracy was introduced at Miletos and some two years later Athens readily supported the now loyal ally against oligarchic Samos.⁸⁶

It makes a consistent story and some of it might well stand, even if *IG*, i², 22+ [*IG* i³ 21] *should* prove considerably later than is normally assumed. I have little to add to my previous advocacy of 426/5 B.C. But perhaps it may be useful to list the main points rapidly. The archon of that year was quite certainly Euthynos. *Epimeletai* were elected in 426/5 B.C. with functions similar to those apparently envisaged in *IG*, i², 22+ [*IG* i³ 21], 42 and 51f. The mention of *epigraphai*, 'registrations' [ἐπιγραφαί], and *chrêmatôn eisphora*, 'property tax' [χρημάτων εἰσφορά], in lines 57f. recalls the first Athenian *eisphora* [tax] of the war in 428/7 B.C. and the establishment of the 'tribute collectors' [φόρου ἐκλογεῖς] in allied cities two years later. Lines 10–20 seem to arrange for provision of troops by Miletos for service in Greece and, while this would be surprising in 450/49 B.C. (during the Five Years' Truce), we know from Thucydides that Milesian hoplites fought in Nikias' Corinthian campaign of late summer 425 B.C.⁸⁷ Cumulatively these points must be allowed to have some weight. The lettering of the decree can no longer be considered incompatible with the 420s, since it has close affinities with the Kos fragment of the Coinage Decree and its curving upsilons can be matched by those in the Decree of Kleinias.⁸⁸ Two kinds of triremes are mentioned in *IG*, i², 22+ [*IG* i³ 21] – *stratiôtides*, 'troop carrying' [στρατιώτιδες], and *phrourides*, 'blockading' [φρουρίδες] (lines 10 and 87). The latter name otherwise occurs only in Thuc., iv, 13, 2, Xen., *Hell.*, i, 3, 17 and Arist., *Ath. pol.*, 24, 3: all three passages refer to the Peloponnesian War, when both sides

⁸⁶ See Barron, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–6. It is worth noting the full context of pseudo-Xen., *Ath. pol.*, iii, 11, which he applies to this time. The writer meets the criticism 'that the Athenians select the worse side in cities where there is civil conflict' [ὅτι τοὺς χεῖρους αἰροῦνται (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς στασιαζούσαις] (§10). Friendship with oligarchs had never paid off – he cites Boiotia, Sparta and Miletos.

⁸⁷ For my detailed argument with all the evidence see *Historia* x (1961), pp. [174–81] and *CQ*, n.s. xvi (1966), pp. [189]f. One of my *CQ* arguments is untenable. Men of over fifty were stipulated as envoys in the Congress Decree (Plut., *Per.*, 17, 2), which perhaps does belong to the late 440s, as well as in the first Methone Decree. I withdraw my 438/7 B.C. dating for the Congress Decree (*Historia* x [1961], pp. [159–66]). For texts of *IG*, i², 22+ see *SEG*, x, 14; *ATL*, ii, D 11. [see now *IG* i³ 21]

⁸⁸ Compare *ATL*, ii, Pl. IV, with V and II.

intermittently practised naval blockade. Aristotle seems to imply that Athens first created a special squadron of ‘blockading ships’ [νήες φρουρίδες] only after the outbreak of war. Use of triremes for blockade and troop-carrying, however, was obviously familiar to the Athenians long before 431 B.C.⁸⁹ What must be considered less certain is that these technical terms were current as early as 450 B.C. The fact that Thucydides uses the terms *hoplitagōgoi* [ὀπλιταγωγοί] and *stratiôtides* [στρατιώτιδες] interchangeably could show that the latter had not been long established as technical jargon when Thucydides left Athens for exile in 424 B.C. While I would not wish to push this argument very far, I would claim that this further scrap of evidence from *IG*, i², 22 + [*IG* i³ 21] fits 426/5 B.C. admirably.⁹⁰

Why then is this later dating ruled out of court? The main reason is Thucydides’ silence. This is hard to explain away. Surely he should have mentioned serious *stasis* in an Ionian city like Miletos – so soon after the revolt of Lesbos, Alkidas’ voyage and intrigues in eastern waters and the *stasis* at Corcyra. Yet he does omit many episodes that had little bearing on the main course of the war and in his full-scale treatment of *stasis* in the Corcyrean context he seems to excuse himself from particularizing about later outbreaks. Miletos was to play a crucial part in the war after the Sicilian débâcle, but Thucydides could be forgiven for passing over an earlier abortive attempt at revolt – especially if it was swiftly crushed by a routine operation involving only a few ships. No Athenian in the 420s could ignore the danger facing Athens if the Euboian cities fell away. Yet Thucydides says nothing of the intervention in 424/3 B.C., which crushed incipient disloyalty at Chalkis and Eretria.⁹¹ The second weighty objection to dating the Milesian settlement in the 420s is based on a widely-shared view of its nature. Some broken phrases seem to suggest that it left an oligarchic government in power – a hardly credible proceeding after *stasis* in the Archidamian War. The decree certainly did not in itself establish democracy, but I am prepared to believe that it was designed to create conditions in which a democratic system could

⁸⁹ For the *Ath. pol.* passage see the excellent discussion by Meritt, in: *Studies presented to David M. Robinson*, ii (1953), pp. 302f., who applies it firmly to the early years of the Archidamian War. Kimon at the Eurymedon and the Samians against Miletos in 440 B.C. apparently employed ‘troop-carrying’ [στρατιώτιδες] (Plut., *Kim.*, 12, 2; Thuc., i, 116, 1).

⁹⁰ See Thuc., vi, 25, 2 and 31, 3 with 43 – and compare viii, 25, 1 and 62, 2.

⁹¹ Meritt and Wade-Gery stressed the *argumentum e silentio* strongly (*JHS* lxxxiii [1963], p. 104) and applied it to *IG*, i², 39 [*IG* i³ 40] also; but we have seen (pp. 322f.) that that must really be dated as in my text. Thuc., iii, 82, 1–3 emphasizes that the Corcyra massacre of 427/6 B.C. was the first and in some ways the most shocking revelation of the bitterness and violence which war breeds in cities. Such things would not happen in peacetime. But on Barron’s view of pseudo-Xen., *Ath. pol.*, iii, 11 they did at Miletos c. 445 B.C. (‘they cut down the people’ [τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν]). The discrepancy with the whole tenor of Thuc., iii, 82–3 has not been sufficiently noticed.

be evolved. This was the main task of the five Athenian officers, in cooperation with the Aisymnetes.⁹²

Many, I am sure, will not be satisfied with these answers and prefer to reject all pointers to the 420s. But if we do this can we argue that lines 10–20 provide for Milesian hoplites in Greece? This is plausible only in the later context. With Lewis we should probably refer the passage to the Athenian garrison.⁹³ Similarly no reason remains for restoring lines 51–3 on the pattern of lines 43–9 of Kleonimos' Decree. The *epimeletai* [overseers] of IG, i², 22+, 42 [IG i³ 21] may not even be the same officials and, if they are, we can assert nothing about their functions c. 450.⁹⁴ Whenever it was passed, moreover, the arrangements of the Miletos Decree are all surely of a temporary and limited nature, as with Erythrai. The five *archontes* are not in any sense regular Athenian officials in the empire nor does their presence in itself imply the consolidated system of supervision that we find in the Coinage Decree and the Decree of Kleinias. They are like the *archontes* left to watch over the new democracy at Samos in 441/0 B.C. Once they had settled Miletos they would leave the city, as would the Athenian garrison-commander and his men.⁹⁵ The same is presumably true of the five *Oikistai* [settlers] who settled the Kolophonians under the terms of IG, i², 14/15+ [IG i³ 37] (ATL, ii, D 15), which now demands attention.

Unfortunately this text is about as full of lacunae as the Miletos Decree. A few more fragments of either could very well answer the crucial question of when it was passed. Without that help we must just do the best that we can. The ATL editors and many others want to date the Kolophonian Decree c. 447 B.C. Historically there can be little objection, as far as its pitiful remains allow us to judge – except for one point to which I shall return. But it is fair to ask what good grounds there are for the early dating. The evidence from the tribute-records is less satisfactory even than for Miletos. Kolophon does not appear in Lists 5, 7 and 8 and when it reappears in List 9 it is found paying only half its pre-450 B.C. tribute: Lebedos likewise has its tribute reduced from three

⁹² The usual view is well expounded by Meritt and Wade-Gery, in: *JHS* lxxxiii (1963), p. 101 and n. 7. For my view see *Historia* x (1961), pp. [180]f. with n. 144; I would now wish to associate Tod, *GHI*, 35 [ML 43] with the expulsion of the Neileids in the 440s, as Barron argued.

⁹³ For Lewis's view see *BSA* xlix (1954), p. 24, n. 19. Meritt and Wade-Gery (op. cit., 101 and n. 13) apply it to Milesian hoplites.

⁹⁴ Meritt and Wade-Gery (op. cit., 102) seem inclined to accept my restoration (*Historia* x [1961], p. 177). Unless IG, i², 22+ [IG i³ 21] is to be dated 426/5 B.C. it has no kind of cogency and I would be the first to abandon it.

⁹⁵ For effective rebuttal of J. H. Oliver's contrary view (*TAPA* lxvi [1935], pp. 188ff.) see Gomme, [*Historical Commentary on Thucydides*,], pp. 350 and 381f. For Samos see *Thuc.*, i, 112, 4.

talents to one. The *ATL* editors argue for a revolt at Kolophon, followed by a colony which took land from both cities and thus justified a lowering of tribute.⁹⁶ All this must be regarded as precarious. We cannot even be sure that Kolophon's absence in the second period is not due to the incompleteness of the preserved lists – a possibility which the editors have to admit themselves.⁹⁷ The epigraphic evidence may seem more impressive. The decree is carelessly, almost chaotically, cut and shows several early letter-forms. There are in fact two distinct hands. The first (lines 1–27) uses the forms **N**, **Y** and **Y**̄; the second (27 to end) uses **N**, **L** and **Y**. Both employ **L** and **S**. It has an altogether more old-fashioned look than the Coinage Decree or the Decree of Kleinias.⁹⁸

Before discussing the epigraphic facts I want to examine closely the one historical point which bears against the early dating. Unfortunately even this is not possible without balancing alternative epigraphic restorations. In lines 42ff. we have the oath imposed on the Kolophonians by the settlement and the *ATL*, ii text (D 15) reads as follows:

I will do and say and counsel as far as I am able good and fine things concerning the Athenian people and concerning their allies, and I will not revolt from the Athenian people in word or in deed, not on my own nor shall I be persuaded by another, and I will be the friend of the Athenian people.[†]

With this we must closely compare passages in the Erythrai and Samos Decrees. In the first (*IG*, i², 10) the *ATL* text gives us for lines 21–5:

I will counsel as far as I am able the best and most just things for the people of Erythrae and of the Athenians and the allies and I will not revolt from the Athenian people nor from the allies of the Athenians, not on my own nor shall I be persuaded by another, and I will not desert . . .[‡]

In the second the *ATL* text reads after a lacuna (D 18, 15–21):

I will do and say and counsel as far as I am able good and fine things for the Athenian people and I will not revolt from the Athenian people in word or

⁹⁶ *ATL*, iii, 282–4.

⁹⁷ Even in the passage cited in n. 96. On pp. 58–61 (part of a detailed study of Lists 5, 7 and 8) they allow this chance in relation to several other 'absentees.'

⁹⁸ For good remarks on the script see Hondius, *Novae Inscriptiones Atticae* (1925), pp. 7 and 10 (photographs between pp. 6 and 7). All three fragments are shown on *ATL*, ii, Pl. VIII.

[†] ρῶ καὶ βουλευσο [ὄ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]

ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ περὶ τὸς συμμάχος αὐτ]

[ὄν] καὶ οὐκ ἀποστ[έ]σομαι τὸ δέμο τὸ Ἀθηναίων οὐτε]

[λ]ῴγοι οὐτ' ἔργ[οι οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἄλλοι πείσομαι]

[κ]αὶ φιλέσο τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων—

[‡] βουλευσο ἅς ἂν [δύ]νο[μ]α[ι] ἄριστ[α καὶ] δικα[ι]ότ[α]τα Ἐρυθραίων τῷ πλέθει καὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν [χ]συνμά[χ]ον [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀ]ποστ[έ]σομαι Ἀθηναίων τὸ π[λ]έθος οὐδὲ [τὸν] χσυνμάχον τὸν Ἀθηναίων οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ο[ὐ]τ' ἄ[λ]λοι πει[ί]σομαι οὐ-δ' αὐτομολ[έ]σο—.

in deed, nor from the allies of the Athenians, and I will be faithful to the Athenian people . . .[†]

The Samian oath could plainly be brought into even closer correspondence with the Erythraian. There is room for specific mention of the Samian demos in its first clause, though it perhaps omitted the allies, unlike the considerably earlier Erythraian oath. Kolbe was probably right in restoring the Kolophonian oath also on this same pattern, especially as there is no room for the allies where the oath touches on actual revolt. I give his version in full, so that it can be fairly compared with the *ATL* readings:

I will declare and counsel as far as I am able just and good things concerning the Kolophonian people and the Athenian people and I will not revolt from the Athenian people in word or in deed, not on my own nor shall I be persuaded by another . . .[‡]

Now even with the *ATL* version the Kolophonian oath seems rather later than the Samian: with Kolbe's the complete omission of the allies virtually compels this conclusion.⁹⁹

What becomes then of the evidence from the letter-forms? We have found already several examples of three-barred sigma from the 420s. Slanting lambdas are found in the Chalkis Decree of 424/3 B.C., sporadically in other documents of the next ten years or so and regularly in *IG*, i², 109 of 410/09 B.C.¹⁰⁰ Sloping nus are found in the Chalkis Decree and the Decree of Kleinias, as well as the Hestiaian Decrees (*IG*, i², 40+ [*IG* i³ 41], 42), and are thus now well authenticated for the 420s. Uppercase Ys with curved top branches occur in the Kleinias Decree and there are exact parallels to the form of the second Kolophon hand (Υ) in *IG*, i², 42 [*IG* i³ 41]¹⁰¹ Σ, Λ and Υ are found

[†] [—δράσο καὶ ἐρῶ καὶ βολεύσο τῷ δέμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ ἡὸ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν κ]αὶ ἀ[γ]αθὸν [οὐδὲ ἀποστέσσομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ δέμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίου οὔτε λ[ό]γοι οὔτε ἔργοι οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν] χυσμμάχων τῶν Ἀ[θηναίων καὶ ἔσομαι πιστὸς τ]ῷ δέμῳ τῷ Ἀθ[ηναίῳ—].

[‡] κατε]
 ρῶ καὶ βολεύσο [ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]
 ρὶ τὸν δέμον τ[ὸν Κολοφονίον καὶ τὸν δέμον τὸν Ἀθηναί]
 [ο]ν καὶ οὐκ ἀποσ [στέσσομαι Ἀθηναίον τὸ πλέθος οὔτε]
 [λ]όγοι οὔτ' ἔργ[οι οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄλλοι πείσομαι]

⁹⁹ See *Hermes* lxxiii (1938), p. 257. The Chalkis oath also omits the allies entirely (*IG*, i², 39 [*IG* i³ 40], 21–32) and, as we have seen, that is also late.

¹⁰⁰ See *ATL*, ii, Pl. X (*IG*, i², 39 [*IG* i³ 40]) and i, 213f. (*IG*, i², 109 [*IG* i³ 99]); *ATL*, List 33, fig. 3 (i, 100f.); *Hesperia* vii (1938), p. 81 (fig. of Hermokopidai Stele).

¹⁰¹ See *ATL*, ii, Plates X and II (Kleinias); *Hesperia*, vii (1937), p. 320, fig. 2a (*IG*, i², 42, frags: note Υ in line 24). For the date of the Hestiaia stele see p. 95. [These fragments are now all thought to belong to the same text, *IG* i³ 41.]

together in the Hermione Treaty (*SEG*, x, 15), which Oliver dated c. 450 B.C., but with no very convincing arguments.¹⁰² Its sigma is very like that of the Kos fragment of the Coinage Decree and I have elsewhere tried to date the Hermione document in summer 425 B.C.¹⁰³ Meritt and Wade-Gery countered with formal and historical arguments in favour of Oliver's date. The first, as they admit themselves, are inconclusive.¹⁰⁴ The latter on examination appear no more cogent. They argue that prudence may have dictated Athens' abstention from raiding Hermione's territory from Methana and sum up, 'we do not have to posit a separate agreement with her, c. 425, of which Thucydides says nothing.' Thucydides' silence may seem a weighty argument, until we realize that he in fact says nothing of the compact with Halieis in 424/3 B.C. For this very reason it was long difficult to date the inscription that carries its terms.¹⁰⁵ Nor does Thucydides' narrative inform us of how or when Troizen made a treaty with Athens. We hear of this only because it was mentioned in a clause of the One Year Truce and he chose to give the full text of this document.¹⁰⁶ Hermione may well have come to an agreement with Athens also. Thucydides would hardly have thought it worth mentioning. Nikias may even have made approaches to Hermione before the capture of Methana. He certainly used these tactics successfully with Kythera in 424 B.C. Thanks to this the island surrendered fairly promptly under honourable terms, when he launched his attack. Hermione anyway was spared by the force based on Methana and, though this can obviously be explained otherwise, the most natural assumption is that it

¹⁰² *Hesperia* ii (1933), pp. 494–7 (with plate).

¹⁰³ For the sigma (with top stroke longer than others) see C. P. Loughram and A. E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia* xvi (1947), pp. 8of. For the date see *Historia* x (1961), p. [173].

¹⁰⁴ *JHS* lxxxiii (1963), pp. 103f. Three-point punctuation is found also in the Samian Treaty of 439/8 B.C. (*IG*, i², 50+ [*IG* i³ 48]), the Hestiaia Decrees of the 420s (*IG*, i², 42 [*IG* i³ 41]), the second Neapolis Decree of 407/6 B.C. (*IG*, i², 108+ = *SEG*, xii, 37, 48–64 [*IG* i³ 101]). Miss Shoe's judgment on the moulding seems too guarded to permit the assertion that it 'strongly suggests the mid fifth century' (p. 104: my italics). In any case it is instructive to consider a parallel provided by Meritt and Wade-Gery on pp. 115–17. The moulding of *IG*, i², 37 [*IG* i³ 148] is also, in Miss Shoe's opinion, likely to be of the mid-fifth century; but sculptural experts agree on putting the relief above it after the Parthenon frieze – perhaps as late as the 420s. In *CQ*, n.s. xvi (1966), pp. [186]f., I have added a historical argument which supports the latter date.

¹⁰⁵ See Meritt and Davidson, *AJP* lvi (1935), pp. 65–71.

¹⁰⁶ See Thuc., iv, 118, 4 and Gomme, [*Historical Commentary on Thucydides*,] iii, 600. In view of its very close similarity in wording to the Halieis Treaty (Meritt, *AJP* lxxviii [1947], pp. 312–15 and lxxv [1954], pp. 359–61) could *IG*, i², 53 [*IG* i³ 67] in fact be the treaty with Troizen? Lewis (*BSA* xlix [1954], p. 25, n. 27) correctly observed against Meritt's *Mutilenaion*, 'of the Myrlineans' [*Μυτιλεναίων*], that such *sunthêkai*, 'agreements' [*συνθήκαι*], only fitted independent states – not a defeated ally. I must admit that the ethnic *Troizenioi*, 'people of Troizen' [*Τροζένιοι*], does not easily fit, in the required case, into the gaps of the decree, where it must be assumed to occur (see *SEG*, xiii, 9).

was covered by an early agreement of the type which Halieis later secured.¹⁰⁷

If the Hermione Treaty really is to be dated 425 B.C. there can be no epigraphic objection at all to putting the Kolophonian Decree late also, as its oath formula seems to demand. Even without the Hermione Treaty the evidence for the crucial early letters surviving into the 420s is probably strong enough. Once the epigraphic objection is overcome we can give proper weight to the clear correspondence between the decree and Thucydides' account of the recovery of Notion in 427 B.C. The *oikistai* of line 41 will be the men who settled the scattered loyal Kolophonians in a new community at Notion, a safe democracy on the Athenian pattern. If elsewhere the silence of Thucydides tells against an attempt at later dating, here surely his narrative should be seen to reinforce it powerfully.¹⁰⁸ Once *IG*, i², 14/15+ [*IG* i³ 37] is firmly linked with the Kolophonian remnant at Notion, it seems logical to connect *IG*, i², 34 and 35 [*IG* i³ 42 and 43] with the capture of Kolophon itself by the Persians three years previously. The former has a three-barred sigma of the same type as the Hermione Decree and the Kos fragment of the Coinage Decree. Epigraphically then there can be no objection, especially as it has a developed alpha closely similar to those in the Decree of Kleinias. The very fact that no less than four inscriptions concern Kolophon or Kolophonians becomes less surprising once it is recognized that they all belong to this particular context.¹⁰⁹

It is time to sum up the conclusions of this long enquiry. None of the inscriptional evidence for fully organized Athenian imperialism can be dated before 431 B.C. Even the very language of imperialism does not seem to have been current until the last years of Perikles' ascendancy. For Athens' treatment of troublesome allies before the Samian War we can cite only one inscription – the Erythrai Decree – with complete confidence. The Miletos Decree should surely be regarded as at least of doubtful date. My conclusions are necessarily destructive and negative, whereas my title may have promised an adventurous new study of the aims and methods of Periclean imperialism, the policies for which he and the 'opposition' respectively stood. I have deliberately denied myself and my readers this pleasure. Unless we can be sure that our basic documents are properly dated it is premature to reconstruct this aspect of

¹⁰⁷ For Kythera see Thuc., iv, 54, 3 and 57, 4.

¹⁰⁸ See Thuc., iii, 34 and my arguments in *Historia* x (1961), p. [175]; xii (1963), pp. [266]f.; xiv (1965), p. [279], n. 26.

¹⁰⁹ For the sigma see Loughram and Raubitschek, *Hesperia* xvi (1947), pp. 8of. For the alpha see Raubitschek's remarks in *AJP* lxi (1940), p. 479. *IG*, i², 59 [*IG* i³ 65] (Apollonophanes) also concerns Kolophonian affairs.

the Periclean achievement.¹¹⁰ When the chronological problems have been solved the history of the Athenian Empire that emerges will be more soundly based and, let us hope, no less enthralling than the version which some of us have felt impelled to challenge.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ As Meiggs frankly recognized in *HSCP* lxxviii (1963), pp. 24 and 30.

¹¹¹ The important joint article by A. Geogiadès and W. K. Pritchett in *BCH* lxxxix (1965), pp. 400–40, reached me when my article was already in proof. Pritchett argues that the Koan copy of the Coinage Decree was cut on Kos, the marble being Parian, as Geogiadès seems to demonstrate by petrological analysis; its lettering *could* be slightly old-fashioned compared with the script used at Athens in the 420s. At the same time he strongly attacks the dogma that three-barred sigma was abandoned at Athens in 445 B.C., urging the need to consider the overall style of an inscription, not just an isolated letter-form, and calling for a reliable tabulation of dated examples of *all crucial* letters – lambda, nu, rho and upsilon as well as sigma.

PART II

Controlling the Empire

Introduction to Part II

How can an empire exercise control over its subjects, and what sorts of activities might it seek to control? Such questions are important for understanding the practicalities of Athenian imperialism. How many Athenians were involved in the running of empire? How much impact did the empire have on the regular pattern of life in the allied states?

But exploring the question of imperial control also allows for a better appreciation of the nature of the Athenian Empire. In the articles in previous part, the presence or absence of certain features of control was repeatedly used as a means of charting the growth of empire: the imposition of garrisons, for example, or the passing of certain forms of regulation, were argued to be indicative of a shift away from hegemony to a more developed imperialism. It is important, therefore, to understand the parameters of those developments: how much control was it possible for the empire to exert, and how much might be considered excessive? Investigating the balance between the adaptation of existing methods of control and the introduction of innovative new techniques can provide an insight into the differences, or similarities, between Athenian imperialism and other more conventional forms of foreign politics in this period: how revolutionary would this form of interstate politics have seemed to those affected by it?

The subject can also, finally, allow for productive comparisons on a larger scale. Empires vary considerably in the modes of control which they employ, which might range from annexation of territory to collaboration with friendly local powers, or from open displays of coercive force to more persuasive attempts to win hearts and minds. Investigating the methods used by the Athenians can help to build up a clearer picture of the ways in which their style of imperialism compares to that of other empires, ancient and modern.

Each article in this part explores a different aspect of the control of the empire: Athens' attempts to regulate the affairs, and particularly the

domestic affairs, of the allies; the personnel by whom those regulations were enforced; and the non-coercive (or at least, less overtly coercive) measures by which co-operation with the empire was encouraged.

A distinctive feature of Athens' empire, and one that marks it out from other multilateral alliances in the classical Greek world, is the Athenians' willingness to interfere, often by formal decree, in the domestic activities of the subject-states. Some prominent instances of this interventionist approach have already been seen: the settlement imposed on Erythrae (ML 40, Fornara 71) is a particularly clear example of an attempt to control the domestic political activity of an allied state, as well as some aspects of legal and religious behaviour. Both epigraphic and literary evidence reveals that such measures were repeated in relation to other states in the empire.¹ Much of this evidence shows Athens dealing with cities individually and, often, reacting to an action by that state (such as a rebellion). But there is also material which shows a more generalising, and proactive, approach to imperial regulation.

Lewis's article focuses on perhaps the most famous case of this sort: the decree imposing a uniform, Athenian, system of coins, weights and measures on the subject-cities (often referred to, somewhat inexactly as the 'Coinage Decree', or, more accurately, as the 'Standards Decree').² This decree is preserved in inscribed form (although there are, as Lewis describes, some possible literary references to its existence), and its analysis involves many of the methodological challenges which will be familiar from the discussions in Part I. There is no objective way of dating the decree, and dating by letter forms is made more complicated by the circumstances of the text's preservation. The text we have does not come from a single monument erected in Athens but is a composite version, assembled from fragments discovered in various locations around the Aegean: the decree includes instructions that it should be set up in all the cities of the empire, and these fragments are (it is usually assumed) the remnants of those monuments.³

¹ On Athens' support of democratic governments, see Part IV (and especially Ch. 11). Athenian legal intervention in allied affairs is discussed by de Ste Croix, 'Notes on jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire', *CQ* 11 (1961), 94–112, 268–80. Ancient evidence for Athenian interference in the subject states is collected in R. G. Osborne, *The Athenian Empire*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2000, nos. 207–34.

² ML 45. Translations in Fornara 97, Osborne, *Athenian Empire*, no. 198. The fullest recent study of the decree is T. J. Figueira, *The Power of Money*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. His arguments about the intention of the decree have not been accepted (and have now been largely disproved by further epigraphic discoveries), but his survey of the evidence (both epigraphic and numismatic) remains useful.

³ One more fragment has been found since Lewis's article was written: it is published in M. Hatzopoulos, 'Neo apotmêma apo tèn Aphuti tou attikou psêphismatos peri nomismatos, stathmôn kai metrôn', *Horos* 14–16 (2000–3), 31–43.

The fragment which is often thought to be most crucial in determining the date of the decree was found on the island of Cos. This fragment uses the more traditional ('three-barred') form of the letter sigma which was traditionally thought to indicate a date before 440 BC. Other pieces of evidence connected with the decree – the findspots of some of the fragments, literary testimonia – point to a later date, however, and (as was discussed in the introduction to Part I) the belief that the presence of the three-barred sigma guarantees an early date has become less secure in recent years. The problem remains unsolved, and recent discoveries have only added to the uncertainties that surround the text. It now seems, for example, that the preserved fragments must record at least two different versions of the decree. This variation might be due to geographical differences (perhaps some regions of the empire were sent a revised version of the decree?), but could also reflect a development over time (perhaps there was more than one decree?).

Much of Lewis's article, therefore, is justifiably devoted to surveying the practical challenges of studying this text, a process which also provokes some useful reflections on the appropriate methodologies for combining different sorts of ancient evidence (epigraphic, literary and numismatic), particularly when those sources seem to offer incompatible versions of events. But he also raises important questions about the implications of this decree for our understanding of Athens' approach to the empire. What was the motivation for this decree? Was it intended to enable smoother running of the machinery of empire (and the payment of tribute, in particular)? Did it have an economic motivation? Or should it be seen above all as an exercise in muscle-flexing? By insisting that the allies conform to Athenian demands in some of the smallest details of their daily life (the coins they used, the way in which produce was measured) the Athenians could demonstrate the reach and strength of their imperial power.

For such regulations to function effectively as symbols of power, however, they need to be enforced. Enforcement of the Standards Decree seems, in fact, to have been generally unsuccessful: there is little sign, for example, of the increase in the use of Athenian coinage which should have resulted from such a measure. But other methods of control did have more impact, even if our knowledge of some of them remains very sketchy. Military force might seem to be the most obvious way to exercise power, and there are well-attested examples of the use of this method to bring disobedient allies back in to line (the siege of Potidaea 432–430 being a good example of the lengths to which the Athenians might be prepared to go to maintain control). Use of military measures as a deterrent against disobedience is also likely, although rather harder

to locate in the sources: the presence of Athenian garrisons is attested in some allied cities, although it is unclear how universal this policy was.⁴ It is likely, too, that Athenian settlers on confiscated allied territory (cleruchs) could function as an unofficial garrison when necessary.⁵

Athenians were also present in the allied cities in non-military roles: the Aristoteleian *Constitution of the Athenians* claims that 700 Athenian citizens acted as officials (*archontes*) in the cities of the empire (24.3). This number cannot be confirmed from surviving sources, but it is not absolutely implausible: scattered references in other texts reveal the existence of officials with specific duties (administering the collection of tribute, for example) and magistrates assigned to oversee the activities of particular cities.⁶

The Athenians were also willing to use local manpower to help in the task of maintaining control over the empire, most obviously in the form of the *proxenos*. It is this position (the *proxenia*) which is the focus of the short discussions by Walbank and Meiggs. The role of *proxenos* was, as Walbank emphasises, not an invention of the Athenian Empire but a longstanding feature of Greek interstate interaction, closely connected with the institution of ritualised, reciprocal guest-friendship which is visible from the Homeric epics onwards.⁷ But while the granting of *proxenia* was not restricted to Athens (or to the Athenian Empire), the Athenians of this period did adapt the role to distinctive imperial ends, a tendency explored by Meiggs in his note on the subject. Meiggs also investigates the possible consequences of such co-operation (or collaboration) with the Athenians: this is something which is worth bearing in mind when considering arguments about the popularity of the empire (see Part IV). Finally, returning to the theme of imperial regulations, he identifies a further way in which the Athenians imposed specific rules on the subject-cities: in this case, special penalties for killing Athenians or those who came under Athens' protection.

⁴ The evidence is discussed by A. S. Nease, 'Garrisons in the Athenian Empire', *Phoenix* 3 (1949), 102–11.

⁵ On cleruchies in general, see P. A. Brunt, 'Athenian settlements abroad in the fifth century BC', in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, 71–92. On their use as ad-hoc garrisons, R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, 260–1.

⁶ For analysis of the evidence for imperial officials, see J. M. Balcer, 'Imperial magistrates in the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 25 (1976), 257–87 (he finds evidence for '81 noted magistrates and 416 conjectured'). A selection of the ancient evidence is collected in Osborne, *Athenian Empire*, nos. 221–225.

⁷ On ritualised friendship in the Greek world, see G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 (esp. 130–42 for the connection between *xenia* and *proxenia*). On *proxenia* and other forms of friendship in Greek interstate politics, see L. G. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, esp. 28–37.

The examples of control discussed so far have been primarily political, military and economic. But it is important to be aware of a further strand in Athens' approach to the regulation of empire: the religious.⁸ Parker's discussion explores the various ways in which religious activity permeated the affairs of the empire and analyses the motivations for and consequences of Athens' intervention in the religious life of the allies. These measures again demonstrate the degree of co-operation which Athens felt able to demand of the subject-states. Compulsory participation in major festivals at Athens is well attested from a relatively early stage in the empire's history, and, while the evidence for the export of Athenian cult to the empire is uncertain (contrast, for example, the practice of the Roman Empire⁹), Athenian activities on Delos (and perhaps also at Oropus) reveal both the will and the ability to use major cult sites outside Athens as sites of imperial power and prestige. These religious practices could also have functioned as mechanisms of control. By forcing the allies to participate in their festivals the Athenians created a clear demonstration of their own power and of the allies' subservience, and by invoking the support of the gods for their control of the empire they created scope for further justification of their suppression of allied independence (most strikingly in the motivation alleged by Diodorus, 12.73.4, for the purification of Delos).

Finally, it should be noted that such measures might perform persuasive as well as coercive functions – that 'religious propaganda' could also be a significant factor in Athens' control of the empire. Inclusion of the allies in the major festivals of the city could be claimed to be a privilege rather than a burden, particularly since such participation could be seen to demonstrate a 'special relationship' between Athens and the allied city. Fostering this relationship in such a way, moreover, might be suggestive not so much of imperial subjugation as of the mutually beneficial links that tied colony and mother city or states of shared kinship and ethnicity.¹⁰

⁸ The fullest study of the role of religion in the Athenian Empire is B. Smarczyk, *Untersuchungen zur Religionspolitik und politischen Propaganda Athens im Delisch-Attischen Seebund*, Munich: Tuduv, 1990. More specific, but still important, studies can be found in J. P. Barron, 'Religious propaganda of the Delian League', *JHS* 84 (1964), 35–48; H. A. Shapiro, 'Athena, Apollo, and the religious propaganda of the Athenian Empire', in P. Hellström and B. Alroth (eds.), *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World*, Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1996, 101–13.

⁹ See M. Beard, J. North and S. Price, *Religions of Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, Ch. 13.

¹⁰ On the role of ethnic identity in the empire, see J. M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 51–6; S. Hornblower, 'The religious dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or, what Thucydides does not tell us', *HSCP* 94 (1992), 169–97.

5 *The Athenian Coinage Decree*[†]

DAVID LEWIS

The organisers have marked the importance of the Athenian Coinage Decree for our subject by calling for two papers on it. I detect a suggestion that they hope for some degree of confrontation and that Lewis in 1986 is expected to hold the same views as Meiggs and Lewis in 1969. I shall say at once that I have no confidence that I know the truth about the problems and am merely trying to look at those facts with which I think I have some competence as straightforwardly as I can. I intend, if I can, to pretend that I know nothing about the coins.

In the *Birds* of Aristophanes, produced in spring 414, a Decree-Seller offers the inhabitants of Cloud-Cuckooland a clause providing that they should use the same measures, weights and decrees as the Olophyxioi. What their relevance is no one knows, but the literal-minded, starting with Bergk,¹ had long hankered after changing the decrees (*psêphismasi* [ψηφίσμασι]) into coins (*nomismasi* [νομίσμασι]). Amending what may be a joke is never safe procedure, but the joke has to have some foundation, and Wilamowitz in 1877² suggested that there might have been an Athenian law enforcing uniformity of coinage, weights and measures in the empire. He tells us that he was laughed at for the idea, but, totally unrecognised by anybody, a substantial fragment of such a law was already known, copied at Smyrna in 1855; no one has seen it since, and doubtless it perished in the burning of Smyrna in 1922. It was

[†] Reprinted from Lewis's *Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History*, ed. P. J. Rhodes, Cambridge, 1997, 116–30.

* Published in Carradice (ed.), *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires* (1987), 53–63. H. B. Mattingly's paper was published on pp. 65–71. Discussion of the decree continues; in *CAH* v² 130–1, Lewis inclines to an early date; at *IG* i³ 1453 he re-credits the fragments.

¹ In his Teubner edition of 1857, but I am not sure that he meant that the text was faulty; Blaydes and Van Leeuwen made the emendation.

² U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aus Kydathen* 30, *Reden und Vorträge*³ 52.

not until 1894, when a second fragment turned up on Siphnos, that Adolf Wilhelm confirmed Wilamowitz's suggestion, and even then no full publication followed until 1903.

It was on the ground of this publication that discussion began and that R. Weil³ and Percy Gardner⁴ started to contemplate the numismatic record in the light of the epigraphic text. They were fairly clear that at least two decrees were involved, since the text appeared to refer to 'the previous decree of Klearchos' (τὸ πρότε]ρον ψήφισμα ὃ Κλέαρχ[ος εἶπεν). They agreed that these decrees were late and that one of them at least was news at the time of the *Birds*, though their general impression of the coinage was that Athens had in fact tried to impose uniformity since the middle of the century. The epigraphists were not altogether happy with a late date for the decree, and wanted to move it back at least a little to accommodate the more archaic form of the dative feminine plural, which appeared in the text and was held to disappear around 420; the epigraphic consensus tended towards putting the first decree early in the Peloponnesian War and the surviving texts around 422. Relatively little was added to the argument, as it stood then, by the recognition in 1924 of two fragments from Syme first published in 1922.

No question of epigraphic lettering had so far entered the argument. All the copies were in the Ionic alphabet, and did not seem to be at all closely datable. The situation changed in the late 1930s. A large fragment from Aphytis, in a competent, though rather anonymous, Ionic hand, was published in 1935, but very little progress had been made in assessing its contribution to the text when it was overtaken by a much more sensational discovery, a large fragment from Cos, first published in 1938. Unlike all the other copies, it was in Attic script, and Segre, who published it,⁵ thought it was on Pentelic marble. Segre pointed out that the decree ordered each ally to publish it on stone and appeared to say that the Athenians would do it if they didn't. The Cos fragment was, he thought, imported from Athens and could be judged stylistically as an Attic text. It was therefore of the utmost significance that it used the three-bar *sigma*, of which there is no dated Athenian example after 446. By fairly general consensus, the whole decree was then moved to the early 440s and seen as a manifestation of Athenian imperialism in the period immediately after the Peace of Kallias. Stanley Robinson,⁶ at least, saw very little difficulty in this from the numismatic point of view. Since we have already seen Weil and Gardner operating in the same

³ R. Weil, *ZfN* 25 (1906), 52-62, 28 (1910), 351-64.

⁴ P. Gardner, *JHS* 33 (1913), 147-88.

⁵ M. Segre, *Cl.Rh.* 9 (1938), 151-78.

⁶ E. S. G. Robinson, *Hesperia* Supp. 8 (1949), 324-40.

direction, it would not be fair, even if we were talking of someone of lesser stature, to say that the numismatist was falling into line with the epigraphic orthodoxy.

The Cos fragment has not marked the end of new acquisitions. In 1933 the Odessa Archaeological Museum acquired a tiny fragment which it unloaded on to Odessa University. No one seems to have thought much of it, and, although its text was published in 1959 and it was recognised as a fragment of the Coinage Decree in 1960, the university seems to have lost it. There can be no certainty about its provenance. The only positive evidence is for Olbia, but this has been disputed, and, if I read the description of the stone, in Ukrainian, accurately, it was on finely granulated bluish marble, which doesn't seem normal for Olbia.

In 1961, Harold Mattingly opened his counter-attack,⁷ and so we are celebrating, not merely the new hoard, but also the silver jubilee of the first of a long series of ingenious articles. Of course, although the first article was called 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', study of this decree is only one facet of a much broader approach to the Athenian empire on two levels. There is the technical level, in which challenge to the dogma about the date of three-bar *sigma* has been strengthened by careful investigations of epigraphic language and forms, and the historical level, which, roughly speaking, tends to the demonstration that much of what we think of as Athenian imperialism was a creation of the period of the Peloponnesian War and not of an earlier period. I am not sure that the arguments, on this level, have cumulative force, and I think I could find myself accepting a late date for, say, the Coinage Decree without changing my mind very much about the imperialism I see in the late 450s and early 440s.

Let me remind you briefly of what we have,⁸ on the assumption that our fragments all go together to make a continuous text. Nothing useful survives of clause 1. Clause 2, very fragmentary, seems to provide that the *hellenotamiai* shall write up names of cities; if they don't do this correctly, they will be prosecuted. 3 provides that if any of the magistrates in the cities, citizen or foreigner, does not act according to what has been voted, he shall suffer heavy penalties. 4 provides that, if there are no resident Athenian magistrates, the local magistrates shall act. 5 would be crucial, but is in the worst condition. It is generally assumed that it describes what is to happen in the mint; references to 'not less than half',

⁷ H. B. Mattingly, *Historia* 10 (1961), 148–88.

⁸ For the text and its history, see *Athenian Tribute Lists* ii. 61–8 D14, ML 45, E. Erxleben, *APF* 19 (1969), 91–139, 212 (with commentary on the coins and the dating, *ibid.* 20 (1970), 66–132, 21 (1971), 145–62).

‘x drachmae in the mina’, and to ‘changing’ are all that is preserved, though some quite elegant Greek has been filled in in the gaps. There have been recent changes⁹ in the interpretation of what I would now call 6, covering what has recently been 6, 7 and 8. To my mind, what is being said is that the surplus from the minting operations is to go into a special fund, which may have something to do with Hephaistos, and that any attempt or proposal to use it for anything else makes the offender liable to the death penalty. I am sure that the traditional interpretation, which makes proposals for the use of foreign money liable to the death penalty, is wrong. 7 (old 9) provides for the appointment of four heralds to announce what has been voted. One is to go to the Islands, one to the Hellespont, one to the Thraceward area; presumably the fourth is to go to Ionia. More was said about the method of their despatch, but we have lost a good deal. 8 (old 10) is the publication clause we have already referred to. 9 (old 11) seems to be an afterthought about what the heralds are to say. 10 (old 12) is fortunately very well preserved. The secretary of the Athenian council is to add the following to the bouletic oath: ‘If anyone mints silver coin in the cities and does not use Athenian coins or weights or measures but [foreign coins], weights and measures, [I shall punish him and fine him according to the previous] decree which Klearchos [proposed].’ 11 (old 13) is quite hopeless, and about 12 we can really only say that the *epistatai* of the mint are to publish lists of something, for anyone who wishes to look at them. How far the text extended on either side of all this is anybody’s guess; the small fragment from Syme could take us into ground otherwise not covered, and Mattingly has considered adding a large fragment of related subject-matter from Athens itself (*IG* i³ 90).

How do the epigraphic and historical arguments about the date stand? First, the find-spots. Smyrna was never a tribute-paying member of the empire, and it is in any case clear that the fragment formed part of a collection assembled from various places. Odessa is also a place to which wandering stones have come, and the rather confused evidence that its fragment may have come from Olbia is matched not only by my doubts about the marble but by the absence of any other evidence that Olbia was ever subject to Athens; it will hardly do much to prove that the Decree postdates 425, the first year in which we know that Athens claimed tribute from the Black Sea area. Aphytis, paying tribute from at least 451, presents no problem. Siphnos starts appearing in the tribute lists from 449; it is to my mind overwhelmingly probable that this is her

⁹ D. M. Lewis, in φόρος: *Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* 83–5 = D. M. Lewis, *Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History*, Cambridge 1997, 139–42; H. B. Mattingly, *AJP* 95 (1974), 280–5; cf. R. S. Stroud, *CSCA* 7 (1974), 280–2.

first appearance, whether because she had been contributing ships up to this point or because she had been through a period of disaffection.

As far as the Cos fragment is concerned, there is an initial doubt, since it was found in the modern city, which, on all reasonable evidence, was not the state centre of Cos until 366. Segre challenged that date, but there are preferable solutions. Cook and Bean¹⁰ came down for the hypothesis that there was an Athenian naval base, at which this Attic copy was set up, but allowed the possibility that the stone had come from somewhere else. If that is so, the stone may not have been originally set up in Cos at all. Cos first appears in the tribute lists in 450. Again, it is unlikely that she had paid tribute earlier. Her tribute record for the next four years is chaotic, with many partial payments, and for 445 to 443 she is not attested at all. This provides an admirable context for us to set a city so uncooperative that she had to have a copy of the decree set up for her, but of course this is no more than suggestive; she has an unexplained short payment in 431 as well.

Finally, I come to Syme. It does not appear in the tribute lists until 433, and, when it does, it appears in a way which more or less proves it is a new arrival, under the heading of cities inscribed to pay by individuals, that is, on the best view,¹¹ by a party in Syme who were prepared to pay 1,800 dr. a year to establish some claim to Athenian protection. It only gradually acquires a less anomalous status in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. Does this prove that 433 is the earliest possible date for the Coinage Decree?¹² One could weaken the force of the *terminus post quem* by saying that Syme might have up to that time paid through a larger group, and that she was in the empire enough to feel she had to exhibit the Decree. The alternative escape route is to suppose that a new member of the empire was required on its accession to exhibit a copy of the pre-existing Decree. These are possibilities, but clearly the argument that the Syme fragments prove a date after 433 is very strong and deserves a more prominent place in the argument than it generally gets; Mattingly did not produce it until 1966;¹³ it is not mentioned in Meiggs and Lewis, Erxleben, Meiggs¹⁴ or Schuller.¹⁵

¹⁰ G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA* 52 (1957), 124–5.

¹¹ W. Schuller, *ZPE* 42 (1981), 141–51.

¹² I now withdraw my early suggestion ('Towards a Historian's Text of Thucydides', 44–6) that these *Sumaioi* [Συμαῖοι] were not from our Syme at all, but represented the fifth-century name, appearing in Diodorus, of the Thracian city of Oisyme; Martin Price has obtained for me a photograph of the unique coin of Oisyme in Paris, and the full name is clear there.

¹³ H. B. Mattingly, in *Ancient Society and Institutions* . . . Ehrenberg 195–6 [pp. 85–6, this volume].

¹⁴ Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* 167–71.

¹⁵ Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund* 211–17.

Next, the letter forms. All the fragments except for Cos are in Ionic[†] I must say, as a preliminary, that epigraphists are extraordinarily bad at dating classical Ionic texts and that the wildest differences of opinion are current. This may go back to a time when everybody's views were coloured by the belief that there were no Ionic inscriptions at Athens before 403/2, and there can still be considerable disagreement and muddle even as to whether a text is fifth- or fourth-century. This can happen even at Athens, where there is plentiful dated material. There has just been the extraordinarily embarrassing case of the Thorikos Calendar in Malibu, which Georges Daux has dated to 385–370, overlooking, I may say, one of those early feminine dative plurals. About this, I am only prepared to repeat what I have said in print,¹⁶ that, had it not been for the authority of the editor, I would have unhesitatingly ascribed it to the decade 440–430. And, once one gets outside Athens, precisely dated material hardly exists anywhere, certainly not at Aphytis, Siphnos, or Syme. In the circumstances, it is folly, though it has been done, to worry at all about the fact that three Russians, inexperienced as epigraphists, two of whom do not appear even to have seen the stone, thought that the Odessa fragment looked fourth-century. No real argument, over the period 450–413, is going to come out of looking at the Ionic fragments, two of which are lost and two only available in terrible photographs. Smyrna was said to have shown the 'beautiful simple traits of the Attic period', Siphnos was certainly a fairly sloppy job, Syme not much better. Aphytis alone exhibits a decently professional, though rather anonymous, hand; if it had been an Athenian text, only some tendency to angularity in the rhos would cast doubt on the dating 430–410, and, to go outside Athens, it looks a shade later than a Milesian text which probably belongs to 435. If there were any justification for matching the texts against each other, it is the Syme text which one might have said looked earlier than Siphnos or Aphytis. All this is impressionistic; we cannot say that Ionic lettering moved at the same pace everywhere.

I now turn to the Cos fragment. Let me say at once that, after the work of Meiggs¹⁷ and Walbank¹⁸ stimulated by Mattingly's assault, I remain more than ever convinced of the essential correctness of conventional Attic epigraphic dating. I haven't yet discussed it with him, but

[†] The Ionic alphabet differed in some details from the Attic alphabet. Although Attic script is used in most official Athenian documents until 403, the Ionic alphabet does appear in some texts from the early fifth century; it is also widely used in cities outside Athens, and, by the fourth century, becomes the standard alphabet for inscribed texts throughout the Greek world.

¹⁶ D. M. Lewis, *ZPE* 60 (1985), 108 n. 3.

¹⁷ R. Meiggs, *JHS* 86 (1966), 86–98.

¹⁸ M. B. Walbank, in *φόρος* (see n. 9), 161–9 (= id., *Athenian Proxeny of the Fifth Century BC* 31–51).

one of his better cases has just taken a hard knock. Just after the best demonstration he has yet given¹⁹ that the first decree for the priestess of Athena Nike (ML 44) should belong to the 420s and not the early 440s, it has been shown²⁰ that its stonecutter was the same man who cut the accounts for Pheidias' statue of Athena Promachos. I don't know whether he will argue that the Promachos is later than we had supposed or that the accounts are for something else or that a fifth-century Athenian stonecutter might be recognisable over a twenty-five year period. I remain convinced that, for public inscriptions, any attempt to date a well-attested letter form like three-bar *sigma* outside its attested range starts with a serious handicap.

All this could of course be described as a malicious digression, only tangentially relevant to the Cos fragment. Segre's original observation, that the marble was Pentelic and the stone was therefore imported already carved from Athens, cannot survive the petrographic analysis given by Georgiadis.²¹ The marble was not Pentelic, although inspection of Georgiadis' data by Jack Zussman, Professor of Geology at Manchester, confirms my suspicion that he has not shown that it was Parian, merely that it was more like Parian than any of the other samples scrutinized in that particular article. Parian marble was of course available at Athens, but it is not likely that it would be thought economical to use it. If the stone was not carved at Athens, it can be and has been maintained²² that the script, Attic though it is, need not be judged in the same way as one would judge a text from Athens. On this, Meiggs and Lewis commented: 'But why should a mason, whether Coan or Athenian, working in Cos use an Attic sigma that had been obsolete for more than twenty years, when none of his other letters suggests that he was old-fashioned? The epigraphic argument may be a little weakened, but it remains strong.'

I can think of various possible answers to our question, notably one arising from the fact that Athens had, for a considerable time, been virtually unique in the Attic-Ionian world in using three-bar *sigma*; even Cos, not technically part of that world, had the fourth bar. Even some time after Athens had abandoned it, a foreigner might think that he was giving the proper flavour by using it; the Spartan text from Delos of 402-400 (Tod 99) is very unlike anything we know of from contemporary Laconia. I can only say that our text does not strike me as the work of a non-Athenian or even an amateur. To put the matter in its context, it is worth looking at some other Athenian public or semi-public texts

¹⁹ H. B. Mattingly, *AJA* 86 (1982), 381-5.

²⁰ S. V. Tracy, in *Studies Presented to Sterling Dow* 281-2.

²¹ A. Georgiadis, *BCH* 89 (1965), 400-22.

²² W. K. Pritchett, *ibid.* 425.

carved or exhibited abroad in the fifth century. There are two other decrees, both in Ionic. I have not seen the Delos text (*ZPE* 60 (1985), 108); presumably its script was like the fifth-century accounts from Delos, which are straightforwardly Ionic and were surely carved there. Squeezes of a lost decree from Karpathos (Tod 110), long thought to be fourth-century, have now turned up in Berlin; it turns out, Ionic though it is, to be carved by a respectable Athenian professional, probably in the 430s; taking the script together with the fact that an epigraphist with far broader experience than Segre thought the stone Pentelic suggests that we have one case here of an Athenian text being shipped a very long way. Of the two inventories drawn up by Athenian cleruchs on Aegina, one (*IG* iv 1588) is an amateurish mess in mixed script and the other (*IG* iv 39) fairly straightforwardly Ionic. There are public dedications from Delphi (*Fouilles de Delphes* iii. 4190) and Dodona (*SIG*³ 73) which use four-bar *sigma* unexpectedly early. Only a group of rather mysterious *leges sacrae* from mid-century Delphi (Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques, Supplément* 40) are anything like pure Attic of their period. All this suggests to me that, if whoever was responsible for putting up the Cos text had to get it done locally, he was unusual in stipulating for an Attic text and fortunate to find someone who was capable of turning out so good an imitation of an Athenian text. It cannot of course be determined whether this cutter was still in the main stream.

I shall say little about the other dating points which have been adduced. The argument about the long plural datives still holds up more or less. It may be interesting to observe that there are two in texts which almost certainly belong to the Athenian recodification of the laws in 410–404 (*IG* i³ 236.37, 237 *bis*.4); I have attributed that to their appearance in the originals which were being recopied. On the extremely copious literature on the heralds' journeys, I propose to say next to nothing. The argument was originally tied up with Pericles' Congress Decree, which is no longer a respectable text; I have never seen any necessary connection between the journeys and the way that tribute lists and assessments are organised; I am perfectly prepared to contemplate the possibility that the Athenians varied their procedures and word-order without there being any particular significance to the variations.

Before I come on to more general matters, there is one tiresome point to mention, the 'previous' decree of Klearchos. The restoration depends only on Baumeister's copy of the Smyrna fragment; he read *-ron* [ρον]; *proteron*, 'previous' [πρότερον], goes back to Wilhelm; *deuteron*, 'second' [δεύτερον], and *husteron*, 'last' [ὑστερον], suggested by Segre, would not alter the implication that Klearchos proposed two decrees. The authors of *ATL* denied that implication,

saying,²³ not very convincingly: ‘There was, we hold, no other such decree, for the provisions and penalties which each councillor swore to enforce must have been those of the present text. It is just possible that Klearchos, in phrasing the oath, called his own decree *proteron* [πρότερον], because for the future swearer the decree would be “earlier” than his oath.’ They did not really like that themselves, perhaps wrongly, as we shall see, and continued ‘but we note the possibility that the letter read by Baumeister as R [P] was really N [N]; this would allow the restoration *genomenon*, ‘which is’ [[γενόμε]νον]; the advantage of that restoration would seem to be that it means nothing. I would also reject the other attempt to break away from the two decrees. Erxleben suggests *hêmeteron* [ἡμέτε]ρον], ‘our’, but I doubt whether the Athenian Council would describe a decree of the Athenian Assembly as ‘our decree’.

I will leave it to Mattingly to expound his ideas about *IG* i³ 90, which may or may not be relevant, but, of course, if Klearchos moved two decrees about coinage and related matters, most of our effort in trying to date our fragments has been a waste of time. It would remain perfectly possible to hypothesise an earlier attempt to enact these or similar provisions and date this whenever your view of the coins suggests. Empires, as a short look at the Roman *Digest* will show, sometimes have to repeat themselves when measures do not work, and the Athenians, who certainly made more than one attempt to regularise the delivery of tribute, can have made more than one to tidy up this question. I have in the past considered distributing our fragments between two decrees. If the second decree incorporated large parts of the first, it would, I think, be just possible to keep Cos in the early 440s, to keep us orthodox epigraphists happy, and make everything else later, but I am not recommending this line very strongly.

There is also the other possibility, suggested by Tod,²⁴ that ‘Klearchos’ earlier decree’ was not about these matters at all, but about legal procedures to be followed in imperial offences. If you are used to looking at combined texts, you may think that that would be a rather cryptic reference, but there probably was room on the Smyrna fragment to add a word or two to define the content of the decree, and that would certainly make things easier. Compare the closest parallel, *IG* i³ 107.6–8:

other things are to be arranged for them according to the previous decree which . . . ippos proposed concerning previous benefactors of the people who have been exiled from the cities.[†]

²³ *ATL* ii. 67.

²⁴ *Tod* i, p. 166.

[†] καὶ τ]ἄλλα α[ὐτ]οῖν ἔναι κατὰ [τὸ πρότερον ψήφ]-
[ισμα δ . . . ιπ]πος ε[ἰ]πε περὶ τῶν εὐεργ[ετῶν τὸ δῆμο τ]-
[ῶν πρότερον] ἐξεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν πό[λεων].

It is maddening that *proteron*, 'previous' [πρότερον] is even more restored here than it is in our text, since it looks as if it would provide a much needed parallel for *ATL*'s suggestion that it need mean no more than 'previous to the present time'. Perhaps the evidence for there having been two Coinage Decrees is not all that strong.

It is more than time to assess the general motivation of the Decree. Wilamowitz, who started it all, was giving a ceremonial lecture on the Athenian Empire to celebrate the Kaiser's birthday in 1877, and saw the Athenian Empire as an enlightened forerunner of the new German Empire. In making the suggestion that there was a Coinage Decree, he saw Athens as stimulating general economic progress, as well as profiting herself from the gain involved in reminting a multitude of strange currencies into her own. The two strands of this have had numerous successors. On the one side, some have almost thought of the Decree as part of Athens' attempt to create a sort of free trade area. On the other, there has always been a school of thought with a keen eye on the profits to be made by reminting and in other ways; there has been a very recent article²⁵ arguing that hardheaded calculations about economic advantage always played an essential role in Greek coinage. Both strands, of course, tie in to the major division among modern scholars about ancient economics, that between modernists and primitivists. Those who hold that the ancients did not necessarily think about economic matters in modern capitalist ways have poured scorn on the idea that the main motive to the Coinage Decree can have been anything which we would call either macro- or micro-economic. Moses Finley, of course, has been the main exponent of this view, and we can consider one of his statements of it in full:²⁶

Equally political was the fifth-century BC Athenian decree which laid down the rule that Athenian coins alone were to be current for all purposes within the Athenian empire . . . The political element is unmistakable: the unprecedented volume of Athenian military and administrative payments, at a time when foreign tribute was the largest source of public revenue, was much facilitated by a uniform coinage, and Athens was now able and willing to demonstrate who was master within the empire by denying the subject-states the traditional symbol of autonomy, their own coins. The Athenians may also have aimed at mint profits, but we shall not know until the missing bit of the text stating the mint charge for re-coining is found.

It is also held that there was a commercial motive, a desire to give Athenian merchants the advantage over others.²⁷ The logic escapes me. Everyone had

²⁵ H. Engelmann, *ZPE* 60 (1985), 165–76.

²⁶ M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, 168–9; see also *2nd International Conference of Economic History* i. 22–5.

²⁷ I think the allusion may be to C. H. V. Sutherland, *AJP* 64 (1943), 145 with n. 3, which does not mention the Decree at all.

been equally the victim of a profusion of mints; had the Athenians been able to enforce their decree for a sufficient number of years, everyone within the empire would have benefited slightly but equally, the Athenians no more than the others, questions of pride and patriotism apart. Only the money-changers would have been the losers, and no one has yet suggested that such a powerful decree was passed just to hurt them.

I do not think that anyone seriously holds now, if they ever did, that the Athenians were trying to benefit their merchants,²⁸ but the tide certainly seems to be turning against this fairly pure political explanation. The political explanation, of course, does not explain the apparent exclusion of electrum; one could only suggest that the value of electrum coinages to Athens in the Black Sea trade forced their exclusion. What is far more serious is that the political explanation, however it might work for coins (and Robinson too²⁹ speaks of the mass of Aeginetan money still circulating being a continual reminder of Aegina's former greatness and a continual irritation to Athens), becomes progressively weaker when applied to the weights and measures, which are after all in the decree, though they may not interest numismatists very much.

There is surely much in what Finley himself says about the unprecedented volume of military and administrative payments being much facilitated by a uniform coinage. The point was taken up by Starr,³⁰ who found reason to suppose that Athens recoined the treasury of the Delian League when it arrived in Athens, by Will³¹ and by Schuller.³² The great advantage of this line of thinking, it seems to me, is that it will readily accommodate the weights and measures as well. I had written a short piece along these lines for *CAH* v², but I have now been overtaken by Thomas R. Martin.³³ Martin's main concern, of course, is to debunk the link between coinage and sovereignty, but he has a good treatment of this point too. I am not suggesting that anyone responsible for Athenian legislation knew or cared what length of foot the builders used on Samos, to take our well-known local example. Martin concentrates on the revenue aspect of the measures, the need to have an agreed standard for taxing the imports of, say, Thasian wine. I am more concerned with the needs of Athens' administrative and military machine. Twice in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (*IG* i³ 61.34-41, 62.1-5), states are given the privilege of drawing *x* thousand *medimnoi* of corn directly from Byzantium. The type of *medimnoi* does not need to be stated (contrast Tod 140.8off.,

²⁸ Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* 172, rather vaguely, comes close to it.

²⁹ *Hesperia* Supp. 8 (1949), 325.

³⁰ Starr, *Athenian Coinage 480-449 BC* 69f.

³¹ E. Will, *Le Monde grec et l'orient* i. 207f., 209f.

³² *Die Herrschaft* (n. 15), 216.

³³ Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* 203-4.

where the Delphic *naoioi* have to convert from Pheidoneian to Delphic *medimnoi* before putting a cash value on a gift of barley); something must have been done to make sure that everyone knew that they were talking about the same measure. And what about the needs of the Athenian fleet, by far the greatest economic complex of ancient Greece? Quite apart from the imports for original construction, it must constantly have been buying supplies of all kinds of commodities, from nails to paint, all over the place. Would it not make life a great deal easier if some kind of standards could be arrived at, so that haggling could be done about mutually understood quantities? That it would make life a great deal easier all round if coinage was uniform and of clear value is of course common ground, though surely our emphasis should be on state, not private, transactions.

If we continue to think along these lines, there are perhaps a few more chronological pointers to be gleaned by looking around. We have already seen that *medimnoi* of corn needed no definition by 426. Weights of bronze, certainly, and perhaps tin were qualified in some way in the 450s (*IG* i³ 435.69–71, 101–5), not in the years after 421 (*IG* i³ 472.139ff.). That does not get us far. Let us return to coinage.

It is well known that electrum was, at any rate originally, an acceptable way of paying Athenian tribute. The first Athenian list, of 453, had a postscript which divided Athena's sixtieth into silver and Cyzicene staters (*IG* i³ 259. postscript 6–13), though the total tribute paid in Cyzicenes cannot have been even as much as 10 per cent of the whole and was probably a good deal less. The lists contain various odd amounts of tribute. Some of them appear to be official, that is to say, with tributes actually assessed in terms of electrum and showing a fair amount of consistency. Others do not. For many years I kept notes on these, wondering whether the odd sums recorded might represent situations where the allied state was tendering coinage in the belief that it had a particular value, but the Athenian *hellenotamiai* were only prepared to tariff them at a lower value. I made periodic attempts to write them up, but repeatedly came to the conclusion that my arithmetic was getting fancier and fancier, that I could not myself draw the line between plausible and implausible cases, and that other people were likely to draw the line far less charitably. But an article was needed and was eventually produced by Eddy in 1973.³⁴ It is certainly vulnerable in some of the ways which I feared, but it is nevertheless interesting reading. The most solid result seems to be that the irregular amounts more or less disappear between 446 and 430, only starting up again during the Peloponnesian War. Eddy suggests that this was the period when Athens really was insisting on

³⁴ S. K. Eddy, *AJP* 94 (1973), 47–70.

uniformity of coinage, brought it into line with Robinson's chronology for allied coinages, and arrived at a date for the Coinage Decree. 'If we apply the evidence in the quota lists strictly, and if we can believe that the Athenian ban on minting silver coins discouraged the use of electrum, then we might date the decree exactly to 446 BC.'

As stated, this is not likely to convince any one, I fear. The Decree does not mention electrum. My suspicion, however, is that Eddy may still be on the right track, but is paying the penalty for explaining too many of his anomalous payments in electrum. Some of my fancier unpublished arithmetic involves silver coinages instead. And there is this to be said. It is not only these uncertain sums in the quota lists which suggest that Athens went through a long period of avoiding the official use of electrum. It is a well-known fact that in 447 someone succeeded in unloading on the Parthenon commissioners 74 Lampsacene staters and 27 Cyzicenes (plus a *hekte* ['sixth']) and that this electrum remained unspent for the next fifteen years. If we leave out some odd bits of foreign money owned by various gods in 429/8 (*IG* i³ 383 *passim*), it is not until 418/7 that we find electrum playing any part in official Athenian accounts.³⁵ Of course, it can very simply be said that they will use Attic coin for convenience as long as they have it and only draw on other coinages when they do not. Eddy's line of thought, by which it is the period 446–430 in which uniformity is aimed at, could, I suppose, be matched by a supporter of a late dating for the Decree. It could be maintained that a purpose of the Decree was to restore the circulation of Attic owls and to bring back into the system supplies which had been draining from it.

I conclude by considering the principles on which the epigraphic and numismatic evidence should be brought together. As a result of the conference, I accept that there could be numismatic evidence which might date the Decree, though the apparent continuity of northern coinages points in a different direction from the unexpected appearance of electrum at Chios. What I remain very doubtful about is whether an independent dating of the Decree would or should make any serious difference to correct numismatic operations. You will have gathered that I find it helpful sometimes to go back to the history of a question, and in this case I did look to see how the great historians of the first part of the century had reacted to the discovery that Wilamowitz's suggestion had been correct. I have not yet discovered that the greatest of them all, Eduard Meyer, took any note of the matter at all, but it is, I think, well worth looking at the 1908 treatment by Cavaignac,³⁶ largely independent of

³⁵ *IG* i³ 370.13; several instances thereafter.

³⁶ Cavaignac, *Études sur l'histoire financière d'Athènes au Ve siècle* 177–87; Beloch, *GG*² ii. 1, 92 is dependent on this.

Weil. For Cavaignac, it was merely the position of Athens and its administrators in the Delian League after 478 which inevitably reduced the need, as well as the utility, of coinage for the allied states. The reduction and disappearance of their coinages which he saw rested, he thought, on the facts of the situation. That the Athenians eventually attempted to regulate the matter by decree was a sign of weakness, not of strength, as rival coinages, starting from the successful revolt of the Chalcidian confederacy, began to challenge the primacy of Athenian coinage. It is not totally clear to me what Cavaignac, who had laid proper emphasis on administrative considerations, meant by saying that Athens wanted to preserve her *privilège monétaire*, but I think I do want to know how a numismatist studying a particular coinage is to distinguish between a cessation of coinage imposed from outside and a simple stop because there is no need to coin. That, incidentally, is what Martin's book is about, in relation to fourth-century Thessaly. The cities, he thinks, stopped, not because Philip destroyed their autonomy, but because they could not afford to coin and had no need to. The difference in our case is that we do have evidence for external action, but I am not sure how, in the circumstances, we really expect that the Decree can do anything to date any coinage.

6a *Proxeny and Proxenos in Fifth-Century Athens*[†]

MICHAEL WALBANK

There is no exact modern equivalent to the ancient proxenos: although the concept of permanent official representation abroad was not known in the Greek city-states, proxenoi gradually assumed some of the functions that today would be performed by embassies, consulates, or trade-missions.

The exclusiveness of Greek city-life appears to have given rise to most of the functions of the proxenoi. There was, at first, no code of international law, and in very few cases, at least during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., did a citizen of one state possess vested rights in any other state (such as double-citizenship, for instance). Intercourse among cities was carried on by individuals, for reasons of friendship, religion, trade, or athletics, or by official delegations appointed for specific reasons.

Because each state reserved to its own citizens the privilege and the protection of its laws, its courts, and its gods, foreigners were forced to make use of citizens of the host-city to plead their causes before the courts or the Assembly, to sponsor them at religious observances, to witness locuments, or to act as agents, commercial or otherwise.

It is not clear at what point these duties owed by an individual to some citizens of a specific state became duties owed to all the citizens of that state. However, as certain cities developed as trade-emporia, others as centres of religion, catering to the religious, athletic, or medical needs of pilgrims, the flow of visitors became so large and so regular that in such cities individual citizens began to be known for ministering to the needs of specific groups of foreign nationals: what began as private ties of hospitality gradually evolved into public ties. Finally, these relationships were regularized in the grant of *proxenia* by the client-city.

[†] Originally published in *Athenian Proxemies of the Fifth Century BC*, Toronto and Sarasota 1978, 2–9. Numbers preceded by # refer to entries in Walbank's catalogue of proxemies.

While the office originated as an instrument or as the result of trade or religious intercourse, the proxenoi almost as soon must have been employed to introduce official delegations to the governing bodies of their own cities. Their success to a large extent depended upon their influence, so that naturally the most prominent individuals would be chosen as proxenoi; wealth and prestige were no hindrance to the performance of their other duties. The standing of the individual was enhanced by his selection, and he probably derived financial benefit from the commercial side of his duties as proxenos. Thus, there was considerable incentive for wealthy men to put themselves forward as candidates for the *proxenia*, particularly that of important states such as Athens.

In return for their services, the proxenoi might also receive benefits within the client-city; the basic privileges could be granted to especially deserving individuals. The more important the client-state, the fewer the privileges it needed to offer in order to attract would-be proxenoi, and the more privileges it had at its disposal as rewards for continuing or special services.

In Attic proxenies one can detect three stages: *euergesia* [benefaction] and canvass on the part of the candidate; formal award of the title proxenos (and, usually, *euergetes*); finally, the grant of privileges over and above those normally awarded, or at a later date as an addition to an earlier grant. It is possible that the erection of a stone stele on the Akropolis bearing a record of the decree that granted the *proxenia* and its privileges was itself one of these extra privileges; this might explain the discrepancy between the number of known Athenian proxeny-decrees of the fifth century and the number of Athens' allies in the Confederacy of Delos and the later Empire: one might expect that Athens would have appointed a proxenos to serve her interests in each of the allied states as a matter of basic policy, despite the imposition upon several of these states of Athenian archons, *episkopoi* ['overseers'] or other officials.¹

The office of proxenos was an ancient one, found throughout the Greek world. The word seems from the beginning to be associated with the concept of the *prostatês* [προστάτης], 'one who stands before or

¹ At its height, the Empire had perhaps as many as 350 members, counting even the smallest: the Register of *ATL* lists 343 states, but in a good year only ca 160 actually paid tribute (see *ATL*, I, 215–460). However, the most generous count produces only 94 proxenies for the whole of the fifth century. I believe, nevertheless, that the proxenoi were a necessary part of Athens' control over her allies: despite the imposition upon many states of Athenian magistrates, such as archons and *episkopoi* (see *ATL*, III, 142–148), not only would the proxenoi have served in the political arena to disguise the grosser aspects of Athenian rule, but they would also have been needed to carry on those duties more usually expected of proxenoi throughout the Greek world.

protects,² the prefix *pro-* [πρo-] apparently indicating that the proxenos stood in place of, as well as on behalf of, his client, the *xenos* [ξένος] [‘foreigner’, ‘guest-friend’]. Although the earliest literary references derive from the fifth century B.C., when, it is clear, the meaning of the word was already well-established, some late and unreliable sources date the office back to the period of the Trojan War.³ The earliest records on stone or bronze belong to the late seventh or early sixth centuries B.C.⁴

The earliest Athenian proxenoi known date to the time of the Persian Wars,⁵ but the surviving proxeny-inscriptions at Athens can be placed no earlier than the middle of the fifth century B.C.⁶

In fifth-century Athens, it is clear, there was no set form for proxeny-decrees: at one end of the scale is a simple grant (or publication) of *proxenia* (and *euergesia*), with or without praise of the honorand; at the other end, a complicated series of decrees and amendments involving general and specific praise, safeguards, grants, indemnities, special privileges, right of access to the organs of state, instructions for publication, and invitation to public entertainment. I have listed these, as they relate to each individual proxeny, in the Catalogue that is found at the end of this chapter (Table One).[†]

The title of *euergetes* is seldom found by itself;⁷ throughout the period of Athens’ independence, and well into Hellenistic times, the two titles, proxenos and *euergetes*, are usually applied to the same honorand,

² Etymological references are very late: see LSJ⁹ (1940) 1491–1492, s.v. πρῶξενος; Monceaux, s.v. *Proxenia*, in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire*, 4.1 (1907) 732–740; Wallace, *Phoenix*, 24 (1970) 189–208; Gschnitzer, s.v. *Proxenos*, in RE, *Supplement*, 13 (1973) 629–730.

³ Livy, 1, 1; Pliny, *NH*, 35, 9; Eustathios, *ad Iliadem*, 3, 204; 4, 377.

⁴ *IG*, IX, i, 868 (dated by Jeffery, *LSAG*, 232 and 234, #9, to ca 625–600 B.C.?) is a Kerkyrean record of proxenoi as witnesses to wills. An inscription from Olympia records a proxenos of Elis (*SEG*, XI, 1180a, dated by Jeffery, 190 and 199, #15, to ca 600–550 B.C.?).

⁵ #1, Alexandros son of Amyntas of Makedonia; #2, Arthmios son of Pythonax of Zeleia; #5, Pindaros of Thebes.

⁶ While the earliest is probably #9, the gravestone of Pythagoras of Salybria, who died at Athens and was buried there at public expense, this document also mentions the proxenial services of his *progonoi* [ancestors]: assuming that the plural implies at least two generations, the inception of this proxeny may belong in the 480’s, or even earlier, depending on how long one considers a generation to be (see ##3 and 6). I have used the figure of ca 20–25 years throughout this study. Other documents that probably date before 445 B.C. are ##10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16.

[†] Not reprinted here; see *Athenian Proxenies*, 10–23.

⁷ *IG*, II², 110 [*IG* i³ 102] bestows the title of *euergetes* on six persons who were involved in the assassination of the oligarch Phrynichos in 411/0 B.C.; *IG*, II², 174 (= *Hesperia*, 38, 1970, 111–114) is apparently the bestowal of *euergesia* without *proxenia* upon Epikerdes of Kyrene, at the end of the fifth century; his services were so outstanding that there is cause to wonder why he did not receive the *proxenia* as well; the decree makes no mention of a previous grant of *proxenia*. Epikerdes, of course, may not have wished to become an Athenian proxenos, or there may already have been one in Kyrene.

implying that the proxeny was not awarded unless it had been earned through *euergesia*.⁸ In the fifth century, where a clause relating to services performed by the candidate is preserved on stone, only in about half the number of decrees is the service specified.⁹

One would expect privileges to be enumerated with care. However, the majority of proxeny-decrees are mutilated: wherever complete examples survive, they are quite short, lacking the full roster of privileges, and thus unsatisfactory as illustrations. Furthermore, no complete decree is earlier than the end of the Archidamian War.¹⁰ However, some idea of the normal order of privileges can be gained from the several decrees whose opening clauses survive.¹¹

Virtually all decrees in which the opening clauses are preserved begin with the eulogy: praise of the honorand (sometimes replaced by the publication-clause, or by the grant of *proxenia* and *euergesia*), followed by enumeration of the services performed; or services, followed by praise; the latter order seems to be a late feature.¹² Very probably, the same rule was followed in these decrees whose opening clauses have perished.

The other privileges awarded in the fifth century to Athenian proxenoi follow no particular order, except that, generally, the invitation to the Prytaneion for dinner, issued if the proxenos is in Athens at the time of passage of the decree, is set at the end.¹³

One very common clause is the harm-clause, safeguarding the proxenos, often his family also, from civil wrong;¹⁴ it is usually coupled with

⁸ Alexandros of Makedonia was proxenos and euergetes (#1; see note 5, *supra*); the latest example known to me of both titles combined is IG, II², 892 (188/7 B.C.).

⁹ Clause relating to services of non-specific nature: ##1, 3, 6, 9, 13, 17?, 21, 22, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44?, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91. Specific services: as a poet: #5; as a soothsayer: #78?; in medicine: #68?; in forging an alliance: ##30, 47, 70?; to visiting Athenian embassies: ##44?, 47, 48?, 49?; to the army or fleet: ##12, 16?, 39?, 40, 44, 45?, 47?, 55, 60, 65?, 73, 78?, 85, 86?, 90; in shipbuilding: ##60, 90; to visiting Athenian citizens: ##49, 63, 87. Past services of ancestors as proxenoi: ##9, 72, 73, 78, 81, 82, 83. Erasure of stele by the Thirty: ##26, 61, 72, 79. Reason for honours not known: ##2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 44, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 67, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 88, 92, 93, 94.

¹⁰ Complete decrees are ##49, 87 and 91; #87 is the best illustration of the form that we possess. In ##33 and 64 the decree is virtually complete, but the rider following it is incomplete; #37 has a *lacuna* in the text, but is otherwise complete.

¹¹ The opening clauses survive in ##9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 24, 33, 37, 40?, 42, 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 63, 64, 65, 69, 73, 75, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91 and 92.

¹² Praise followed by services: ##13, 16, 37, 42, 44, 49, 55, 65, 84 and 89. Publication-clause substituted for praise: ##11, 24, 33 and 52. Invitation to Prytaneion precedes praise and services: #43. Services followed by praise: ##50, 51, 64, 69, 73, 87 and 90.

¹³ ##11, 28, 31, 35, 43, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93 and 94. In #43 this clause precedes all other clauses.

¹⁴ ##10, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 28?, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 64, 66, 67, 71?, 76?, 77?, 84?, 87, 92 and 93.

an injunction to the officials of the state to watch over the proxenos' interests (*epimeleia*),¹⁵ or with a clause enabling the proxenos to seek redress in Athens at the court of the Polemarch.¹⁶ Sometimes the state-officials are given a separate injunction to watch over the interests of the proxenos, without any specification of the area of concern.¹⁷

The proxenos is placed, in short, on a par with Athenian citizens, and, often, generals and other state-officials are instructed to ensure that he be protected, with his family, from murder or other violence, and severe penalties are laid down against those who harm him, with compensation to be paid by the malefactors.¹⁸ This protection applies not only in Athens but throughout the Empire.¹⁹

A clause frequently included in these decrees is one that assures the proxenos that, if he needs assistance from the state, he will receive *prosodon*: the right to present his case to the governing bodies of the state, *viz.*, the Boule and the Ekklesia, without intermediaries; often the Boule and the Prytaneis are instructed to forward his requests, and sometimes are threatened with a fine if they delay this.²⁰ Frequently attached to these clauses is one that lays down that the honorand's business is to take precedence over all other concerns, except the usual initial sacrifices.²¹

These are the privileges most commonly awarded. Sometimes others are enumerated, such as exemptions from all or specific taxes (*ateleia*).²² The right to own real property at Athens (*enktesis*) is rare in the fifth century, and is not found in proxeny-decrees before 425 B.C., at the earliest.²³ Inviolability of goods and person (*asylia*) is granted once in the fifth century.²⁴

Certain decrees contain privileges of a highly specialized nature, designed for a specific honorand: the right to sail and carry on trade in

¹⁵ ##21, 22, 24?, 28, 29?, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 48, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 66, 67, 71, 73?, 75, 77?, 84?, 85, 87, 90? and 93.

¹⁶ ##10?, 12?, 14, 23, 29, 31?, 64 and 68. In #68 access to Athenian courts is apparently granted as a separate privilege.

¹⁷ This appears to be the case in #39; in #24 the generals and the Boule are to swear an oath, possibly to safeguard the honorand.

¹⁸ ##13, 14, 19?, 20, 21?, 22, 29, 31, 34, 36?, 39, 41, 44, 47, 55, 64, 66, 76? and 92. In #14 the city in which the murder takes place is also to be fined.

¹⁹ #55 apparently contains no reference to the Empire.

²⁰ ##10?, 12?, 29?, 35, 37, 43, 45, 60, 67, 68, 81, 82 and 86? In #29 a penalty is laid down if no action is taken to meet the proxenos' claims; in ##37 and 45 the compulsory nature of this service to the proxenos is emphasized.

²¹ ##10?, 34, 35, 37, 39, 60 and 68.

²² General *ateleia* [exemption from taxes]: ##1?, 23, 45, 64, 73?, 77? and 93?; exemption from the *metoikion* [tax on resident aliens]: ##34, 55, 85 and 93?; from military service (*stratia*) and garrison-duties (*pbroura*): ##33?, 34, 37 and 55; of 'the sort granted to proxenoi': #47; of 'the sort granted to euergetai': #45?

²³ ##21?, 45?, 47, 48?, 77?, 85? and 93?

²⁴ #75.

certain areas under Athenian blockade;²⁵ compensation for losses, or special payments;²⁶ exemption from taxes on the import of ship-building materials;²⁷ the establishment of a special commission to examine a case brought by the proxenos;²⁸ guarantees that land or moneys will be inviolable.²⁹ These are obviously exceptional cases, the result of special pleading, or of specific Athenian needs, and not of the sort available to the general run of proxenoi.

There are also occasional grants of Athenian citizenship.³⁰ Their rarity is not just an accident of preservation: citizenship was the ultimate accolade and seldom awarded in the fifth century, while Athens was at the height of her power. Only those states whose citizenship was of little or no value to outsiders were prodigal in granting it.

The *proxenia* and its attendant privileges were sometimes granted to several members of one family, or to several individuals, at one and the same time.³¹ Whether all these persons performed the same duties, or whether one of them was regarded as the senior proxenos, is not made clear. Sometimes, but not regularly, the *proxenia* is hereditary,³² though whether the grant of a proxeny to a man and his sons falls into this category, or whether a specific grant 'to his descendants' is also necessary is unclear. It is possible that, in the case of extremely important states, such multiple proxenies, whether or not hereditary, indicate the existence of two, or more, separate grants of *proxenia*, in force concurrently. The texts give no indication of this, however.

²⁵ ##50, 51 and 75.

²⁶ ##28(?), 36(?), 45, 48(?), 63, 67(?), 76(?) and 88(?).

²⁷ #60.

²⁸ #55(?).

²⁹ ##28 and 39(?).

³⁰ In *IG, I², I13* [*IG i³ I13*], Euagoras of Salamis, king in his own right and perhaps already an Athenian proxenos, is granted full citizenship. In *IG, I², I60* [*IG i³ I58*], the honorand is apparently granted citizenship; his previous status is not known. In *IG, I², I10* [*IG i³ I02*], Thrasyboulos of Kalydon is given citizenship and other rights for his part in the murder of the oligarch Phrynichos; no proxeny is involved. Apollodoros of Megara may also have acquired citizenship by an associated decree, now lost. Phanosthenes, the honorand of #60, is probably the Andrian of that name who became a citizen and held the *strategeia* in 407/6 B.C. Sthorys the Thasian (?) was granted citizenship in 394/3 B.C. for his services as a *mantis* ['seer'], and may have held a proxeny before this time, as did his *progonoi* (see ##15, 25, and 78). For a complete list of all grants of Athenian citizenship in the fifth century, see Osborne, *BSA*, 67 (1972) 146, n. 67, and 156–158.

³¹ ##10, 11, 12, 13, 14(?), 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22(?), 24, 29(?), 33, 34, 35, 36(?), 37, 38, 39(?), 40, 41(?), 42(?), 43, 44, 45, 46, 48(?), 52(?), 53(?), 55, 58(?), 59, 60(?), 61, 62(?), 65, 66, 67, 69, 71(?), 73, 76(?), 79, 85, 86, 87(?), 88, 90 and 93. Multiple proxenies not involving members of the same family are ##11, 16, 20, 21, 37, 38, 40, 58, 60, 76, 85, 86 and 88; ##24, 44(?), 45, 55(?), 60 and 66 apparently involve members of two or more families.

³² Rights granted to son(s): ##10(?), 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22(?), 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 43(?), 44, 45, 46, 52, 53(?), 55, 59(?), 60(?), 62(?), 65, 66, 69, 87 and 90. Rights granted to descendants (*ekgonoi*): ##34(?), 39, 43(?), 46, 55, 64(?), 66, 78, 82(?), 87 and 90(?). Inherited: ##9, 61(?), 64(?), 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 86.

Publication was usually at the expense of the state; sometimes the method of disbursement is indicated, sometimes not.³³ In a few cases the proxenos is expected to pay for the stele;³⁴ if I am correct in believing that publication was itself regarded as an extra privilege, this provision would indicate, perhaps, that the state did not think so highly of the proxenos' claims as he himself did. In some cases, too, publication is specifically stated to be that of an already existing proxeny-decree, to which new privileges are to be added.³⁵ In certain documents the formula 'write up this decree' is used, instead of 'write up . . . as proxenos.'³⁶ I do not know whether this has any significance.

In several cases a stele carries a decree and one or more riders; on occasion, even, two decrees, with or without riders.³⁷ Since the same hand has engraved the whole stele, it must be assumed that these riders merely reflect fresh consideration of the honorand's worth, or, perhaps, an agreement among several orators in the Ekklesia to share among themselves praise of the honorand.

A few documents, engraved in the early fourth century, are copies of fifth-century decrees: in some cases the originals are stated to have been erased by the Thirty Tyrants in 404/3 B.C.; such stelai merely record the restoration of the original proxenies.³⁸ Other documents are fourth-century decrees that include fifth-century texts;³⁹ yet others are fifth-century decrees inscribed throughout in Ionic script that appears to be of fourth-century character;⁴⁰ the reasons for inscription, or re-inscription, are not made clear in the surviving texts. There is a further class of decrees, both of the fifth and of the fourth centuries, that mentions proxenies held by ancestors (*progonoi*) in the fifth century.⁴¹

Publication of a proxeny-decree involved the erection of a marble stele upon the Akropolis; occasionally a *sanis* [temporary noticeboard]

³³ ##9, 11, 13, 20, 21(?), 23, 24, 28(?), 29, 31(?), 36, 39, 40(?), 42, 43, 45(?), 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 75, 77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 and 94 (also, the fourth-century renewals ##26, 61, 63, 72 and 79 refer specifically to earlier stelai). In ##11, 35, 39, 49, 57, 60, 81 and 89 the means of payment is specified.

³⁴ ##12, 19, 22, 24, 33(?), 47(?), 48(?), 54, 61, 69, 72, 78, 86 and 93; in #86 the city of Selymbria is to pay for the stele.

³⁵ ##47, 86 and 92; ##47, 75 and 92 are republications of older decrees as parts of new ones.

³⁶ ##39 and 88.

³⁷ ##12, 19, 22, 28, 31, 33, 37, 39, 45, 47, 48, 54, 58, 60, 64, 66, 68, 75, 86, 87 and 88; #22 contains two decrees, as do ##45 and 60; #75 contains three decrees, each of a different date.

³⁸ ##26, 61, 63, 72 and 79.

³⁹ ##47, 66 and 75.

⁴⁰ ##65, 92, 93 and 94; the date of the re-inscription of #66 is known from the decree itself (385/4 B.C.).

⁴¹ ##9, 61(?), 64(?), 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 86.

is also specified, to be set up in the Bouleuterion.⁴² The exact location of these stelai is never specified, but there is some evidence to suggest that the site of most, if not all, fifth-century proxeny-stelai was in the neighbourhood of the Erechtheion;⁴³ this building contained the shrine of Athena Polias, who would naturally be concerned in the dealings of Athens with other cities. In other states, the temple of the tutelary deity of the city is often specified as the place where proxeny-decrees are to be recorded.⁴⁴ Presumably, another copy of each decree was kept in the state-archives, on a wooden board, or in some other, more perishable medium, perhaps in the Bouleuterion, where the stele of #33 and the *sanides* [temporary noticeboards] of ##13, 24, and 35 were set up.

⁴² ##13, 24, 33 and 35; #33 seems to be unique, in that it is apparently to be published only in the Bouleuterion.

⁴³ 133 marble fragments survive and are included in this study. Of these, the find-spots of 96 are known: 18 are merely stated to have been found on the Akropolis, while 4 more come from the area west of the Parthenon. Of the rest, by far the largest number, 43, seem to derive from the vicinity of the Erechtheion: 15 were found in or near it; 6 were extracted from the foundations of the Temple of Roma and Augustus, in which materials from the Erechtheion, discarded in the course of repair-work in Roman times, were included; from the same general area, east of the Parthenon, came 4 more fragments, while 2 more were found between the Parthenon and the Erechtheion; 16 fragments were found in the debris scattered over the north slope of the Akropolis, below the Erechtheion. The next largest concentration of fragments derives from the south slope of the Akropolis, 17 in all, half of these from the vicinity of the Asklepion and the Theatres of Dionysos and Herodes Atticus to either side of it. The Agora has produced 10 fragments, and other localities have yielded 4.

⁴⁴ For instance, Anaphia, Arkadian Kleitor, Delphoi, Ephesos, Kalymnos, Kos, Paros, Rhodes, Thera, and Tralles.

6b A Note on Athenian Imperialism^{† 1}

RUSSELL MEIGGS

In the fifth-century Attic decrees that have come down to us there is a long series honouring Proxenoι of Athens. The large number of such decrees is not due merely to the accidents of survival; it is a fair index of the importance of the Proxenos to Athens. For the Proxenos, useful to all states, was particularly useful as an instrument of Athenian empire. Potentially recalcitrant allies could be watched by Athenian *archontes*, ‘officials’ [ἄρχοντες], *phrouroi*, ‘garrisons’ [φρουροί], *episkopoi*, ‘overseers’ [ἐπισκόποι], *klêrouchoi*, ‘settlers’ [κληροῦχοι]; they could be even better watched by pro-Athenians among the allies.²

One of the commonest privileges recorded in these decrees is the guarantee of protection to the Proxenos. Sometimes this is granted in general terms: the generals and Athenian resident magistrates overseas are to see that no harm comes to him, or the Boule and prytanes are to safeguard his interests. In many instances protection takes a more specific form and implies a more sinister undercurrent. If a Proxenos is killed in any state of the empire the same penalty shall apply as in the case of the killing of an Athenian citizen. *IG*. i². 56. [*IG* i³ 156] 14–17 affords a typical example, involving no restoration:

if anyone kills him in the cities which the Athenians control, the penalty shall be the same as if one of the Athenians had died.[‡]

[†] Originally published in *Classical Review* 63 (1949), 9–12.

¹ This study is founded on Wilhelm’s discussion of a group of Attic fifth-century inscriptions in *Sitzb. Wien* cxxvii (5), here cited as Wilhelm. For convenience the corresponding numbers in *S.E.G.* x for the references to *IG*. are given at the end.

² Cf. Thuc. iii. 2. 3. For a rather different political use of Proxenoι, Thuc. ii. 29. 1.

[‡] εἴαν τις ἀποκτείνει ἐν τῶν πόλ
εὐν ἡδὲν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι, τε
ν τιμορίαν εἶναι καθάπερ εἴαν
τις Ἀθηναῖον ἀποθάνει.

The area in which the protection and penalty apply is defined in terms which differ slightly in form but have the same content. With ‘in the cities which the Athenians control’ [ἐν τῶν πόλῃων ἡῶν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι] from the example cited we may compare *IG. ii*². 32. [*IG i*³ 228] 10–11: ‘in those cities which the Athenians control . . .’ [ἐν τῶν πόλῃων ὄσων Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι]ν . . .]. Such formulae, a sure mark of the Athenian empire, no longer valid in the fourth century, have helped scholars to rescue decrees published among fourth-century Attic inscriptions and to place them in their right chronological context, in the fifth century, before the collapse of the Athenian empire.³

Wilhelm has thrown further light on this important aspect of Athenian imperialism by attractive restorations in two inscriptions of the series.⁴ In *IG. i*². 28. [*IG i*³ 19] 7–13 he suggests:

If anyone kills Acheloion or any of his children in the cities which the Athenians control, the city is to owe five talents as if an Athenian had died, the punishments shall be on the same terms as if an Athenian had died.[†]

This restoration, implying that Athens fixed collective responsibility on the allied state concerned when an Athenian was killed and imposed a standard penalty of 5 talents, might seem to be confirmed by Wilhelm’s similar restoration of *IG. ii*². 38. [*IG i*³ 161] 1–5:⁵

. . . in the cities which the Athenians control, he city is to owe five talents to the Athenians, as if an Athenian had died.[‡]

Wilhelm found no direct evidence that Athens imposed a fine of 5 talents on allied cities in such cases, but he adduced a useful parallel from Diodorus (xiv. 16. 1). The Spartans, after the overthrow of Athens, ‘decreed that the Athenian exiles throughout Greece should be

³ See especially Eleanor Weston, *A.J.P.* lxi (1940), 345.

⁴ Wilhelm, 17–24.

[†] ἐάν δέ τις ἀποκτένει Ἀχελοῖον
[α ἔ τ]ὸν παῖδον τιν[ά ἐν τῶν πόλῃων πο]
[ὀπό]σον Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσιν, τὴν πόλ]
[ιν π]έντε τάλαντ[α ὀφέ]λεν ὅς ἐάν Ἀθε]
[ναῖ]ον τις ἀποθά[ν]ει, καὶ τὰς τιμορί]
[ας ἐ]ῖναι κατὰ τ[ο]ῦτο καθάπερ Ἀθηναῖ]
[ο ἀπο]θανόν[τος].

⁵ Wilhelm, 23. Eleanor Weston, l.c. 347f., associated *IG. ii*². 71 with *IG. ii*². 38 as two fragments from the same decree. If this association were valid, Wilhelm’s restoration, based on a line of 32 letters, would need drastic revision, for *IG. ii*². 71 demands a line of only 28 letters. The argument for associating the fragments, however, is based on the general appearance of letter forms and the supposed length of line. There is no join. Meritt, *Hesperia*, x (1941), rejects the association and accepts Wilhelm’s restorations.

[‡] . . . [ἐν τῶν πόλῃων ὦν]
[Ἀθηναῖ]οι κρατοῦσιν, τὴν πόλιν πέντε τάλ]
[λαντα ὀ]φείλεν Ἀθηναίους ὡς ἐάν Ἀθηναῖ]
[ων τις ἀπ]οθάνῃ

surrendered to the Thirty and that anyone who hindered such surrender should be liable to a penalty of 5 talents’.

It is probable that a more direct reference to this penalty should be seen in a passage of Aristophanes’ *Peace* (164–72) which has puzzled the commentators.

Hey, you, what are you doing – you, taking a dump by the brothels in the Piraeus! Do you want to get me killed? Won’t you bury that right away and pile a great heap of earth on it and plant wild thyme on top, and pour perfume on it? If I were to fall from up here and suffer some misfortune, the city of Chios would owe five talents for my death, all because of your arse.[†]

The humour of this passage is not refined, but the sense is clear enough. Trygaeus is off on his dung-beetle to interview the gods on important business. In the Piraeus a man eases himself. The beetle plunges towards such an unexpected meal. Trygaeus faces a sudden and inglorious death. But why, if he is killed, should the state of Chios pay 5 talents? The answer is given by, and in turn confirms, Wilhelm’s restoration. It was the penalty to be paid by an allied city for the death of an Athenian citizen. It remains to explain the specific allusion to Chios, though that is of secondary importance. The suggestion⁶ that a pun is intended we may discount: Aristophanes used puns freely, but he had a surer touch than to associate *chezôn*, ‘taking a dump’ [χέζων], and *Chiôn*, ‘of the Chians’ [Χίων]. That he chose Chios merely to particularize without further motive is less than we should expect from him. More probably we should see here a topical reference to a recent case in which Chios was held responsible for an Athenian citizen’s death. That Chios had recently been under suspicion we know from other evidence. In 427 friends of the Spartans in Chios made a contribution to the half-hearted naval expedition of Alcidas.⁷ In the winter of 425/4 the Chians were ordered to dismantle their new wall by the Athenians, who suspected that they meant to rebel.⁸ A recently recovered fragment of a decree, possibly of the same year, refers to pledges exacted from the island.⁹

† ἄνθρωπε, τί δρᾷς, οὗτος ὁ χέζων
ἐν Πειραιεὶ παρὰ ταῖς πόρναις ;
ἀπολεῖς μ’, ἀπολεῖς, οὐ κατορύξεις
κάπιφορήσεις τῆς γῆς πολλήν,
κάπιφυτεύσεις ἐρπυλλον ἄνω
καὶ μύρον ἐπιχεις ; ὡς ἦν τι πεσῶν
ἐνθένδε πάθω, τοῦμοῦ θανάτου
πέντε τάλανθ’ ἢ πόλις ἢ Χίων
διὰ τὸν σὸν προκτὸν ὀφλήσει.

⁶ Budé edition, vol. ii, p. 104, n. 2.

⁷ Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 62. 9.

⁸ Thuc. iv. 51.

⁹ Meritt, *Hesperia*, xiv (1945), 115–19; S.E.G. x. 76.

Against such a background the assassination of an Athenian in Chios or by a Chian shortly before the production of the *Peace* in 421 can readily be imagined.

At some point in the development of the empire Athens imposed this principle of collective responsibility on her allies to protect Athenian citizens. This is a sure sign of developed imperialism: why and when was it introduced? The natural assumption is that the penalty was imposed at a time of unrest in view of actual assassinations of Athenians in the empire. None of the decrees concerned carries a date, but letter-forms provide a probable *terminus ante quem*. For two decrees of the series (*IG. i². 27* and *28* [*IG i³ 27, 19*]¹⁰ have the three-barred sigma which is not found in any Attic inscription which can be securely dated after 445. The crisis that followed the Peace of Callias in the early forties, during which widespread disaffection among the allies is most convincingly mirrored in the tribute quota lists, provides an admirable historical setting.¹¹ The possibility, however, of a date in the fifties cannot, in our present state of knowledge, be ruled out.¹²

The new safeguard for the protection of Athenian citizens in the empire was presumably embodied in a decree. We should very much like to know its content. Did the principle of collective responsibility apply only where the murderer was undetected or was the state held responsible even where the murderer was known? Common sense favours the former view, but the terms of the formula might seem to imply the latter. Was the state held responsible only if an Athenian was killed in its own territory, or was the penalty also applied to the state if an Athenian was killed by one of its citizens in any part of the empire? Again common sense favours the first interpretation; but the passage from the *Peace* would have more point under the second interpretation. Until we have more evidence the precise content of the decree must remain uncertain.

The protection afforded to Athenian citizens could be extended to Proxenoï. In his restoration¹³ of *IG. i². 27*. [*IG i³ 27*] 113-17 Wilhelm implies that it was extended to all Proxenoï.

and if anyone kills any of them in the cities which the Athenians control, the punishment for him is to be as is set up for killing *proxenoï*.†

¹⁰ A photograph of *IG. i². 27* in Wilhelm, plate 1.

¹¹ For the crisis of the early forties, Wade-Gery, *Hesperia*, xiv (1945), 212.

¹² For Athenian imperialism in the fifties, Meiggs, *J.H.S.* lxiii (1943), 21. [Ch. 3.]

¹³ Wilhelm, 27.

† . . . καὶ ἄν τις ἀποκτείνει τ]
1ν' αὐτὸν ἐν [τὸν πόλεον ὅσον 'A]
θENAIO[ι ΚΡΑΤΩCΙΝ. ΤΙΜΟΡΙΑΝ]
ἔΝΑΙ [αὐτῷ ἔΠΕΡ ΤΟΙC ΠΡΟΧΣΕ]
ΝΟ[ιC ἔΦΣΕΦΙCΤΑΙ].

That this protection, however, did not follow automatically from the grant of Proxenia is strongly suggested by the decrees in honour of Leonidas of Halicarnassus (*IG. i². 56* [*IG i³ 156*]). On that part of the stone which has been preserved Leonidas is not described as a Proxenos, but the general content of the decrees makes that assumption reasonable. It is only in the second decree that his life is protected with the same sanctions as an Athenian. A better restoration may be inferred from a formula in *IG. i². 28* [*IG i³ 28*] 11–13:

and the punishments shall be on the same terms as if an Athenian had died.[†]

A similar formula may be supplied in this case:

and the punishment shall be as if an Athenian had died.[‡]

In some inscriptions of our series the crime is defined simply as killing – ‘if anyone kills’ [ἐάν τις ἀποκτένει]; in others it is more closely defined as violent killing – ‘if anyone kills by violent homicide’ [ἐάν τις ἀποκτένει βιαίῳι θανάτῳι]. Until the series can be arranged in approximately chronological order it cannot be decided whether the introduction of an explicit reference to violence represents a modification in the terms of the decree which first formulated the policy. We can be more confident that the extended formula of three of the decrees represents a change in substance and not merely in form:

IG. ii.² 32. [*IG i³ 228*] 9.

and if anyone in the cities which the Athenians control imprisons or captures or kills him by violent homicide, the punishment for him shall be as if one of the Athenians had suffered these things.[§]

A similar formula recurs in *IG. i². 154.* [*IG i³ 164*] 10–11 and *ii². 73.* [*IG i³ 179*] 7–8. The decree that has been quoted has been dated by Wilhelm¹⁴ to the period of the Sicilian expedition. Neither of the other two examples of the extended formula seems to be early in the series. The natural inference is that some time after the original regulation had

† [καὶ τὰς τιμορί]
[αὐξ ἔ]ναι κατὰ τ[ούτο καθάπερ Ἀθηναί]
[ο ἀπο]θανόν[τος.

‡ [τιμορίαν]
ἔναι καθάπερ Ἀθηναίῳ ἀποθα]
νό[ντος.

§ καὶ ἐάν [τις]
[αὐτὸ]ν ἐν τῶμ πόλε[ων ὅσων Ἀ]θην[αίῳ]
[ι κρατ]ῶσ[ι]ν δ[ι]ή[ση] [ἢ ἄγῃ ἢ ἀποκτεί]
[νη βι]αίῳι θανά[τῳι, τὴν τιμορίαν]
[εἶν]αι α[ὐτ]ῶι καθά[περ] ἐάν τις Ἀθην]
[αίῳν] τοιοῦτό[ν] τι [πάθη]

¹⁴ *Anz. Wien*, xiv. 6 (1911), p. 180f.

been introduced the Athenians extended the principle to cover arrest and imprisonment.

A more detailed study of this series of decrees might throw further light on the development of Athenian imperialism.¹⁵

¹⁵ Correspondences with *S.E.G.* x

<i>IG.</i> i ² .	27 =	<i>S.E.G.</i> x.	19
”	28 =	”	23
”	56 =	”	55
”	154 =	”	98
<i>IG.</i> ii ² .	38 =	”	99
”	73 =	”	117

I am grateful to Dr. J. J. E. Hondius for enabling me to use proofs of *S.E.G.* x before publication.

7 Religion and the Athenian Empire^{† 1}

ROBERT PARKER

Two aspects of the Athenians' religious relations with their 'allies' are commonly recognized: on the one hand, it is said, the Athenians introduced some of their own cults to subject territory; conversely, they required subject cities to participate in the most important festivals at Athens itself. The second of these points is uncontroversial. From, perhaps, the 440s, the allies were required to send 'a cow and a panoply' to the *Greater Panathenaea*, which they were to escort in the procession (if a supplement is sound) 'like' or 'as' 'colonists'.² The requirement is certainly likely to have been justified by the traditional ritual obligations of colonies to mother-cities: the settlers at Brea, true and recent colonists these, were asked to send home both the cow and panoply, and also a phallus for the *Dionysia*. In regard to the allies, this appeal to an established model was partly justified, more largely tendentious. Many Ionian cities did, indeed, freely acknowledge that they had been founded from

[†] Originally published in *Athenian Religion: A History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996, 142–51.

¹ Cf. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 291–305; and now the thoughtful and immensely thorough study of Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, *passim*. I discuss a further set of questions, concerning the religious life of Athenian settlements within the empire, in 'Athenian Religion Abroad', in *Ritual, Finance, Politics*, 339–46.

² See IG I³.34 (M/L 46) 41–42 ('?447–446': M/L); IG I³.71 (M/L 69) 56–58; IG I³.46.15–17 (M/L 49.11–13) (Brea); Σ Ar. Nub. 386 (where the obligation is specifically referred to colonists); in a text of the 370s (SEG XXXI 67: cf. Ch. 11, n. 13) the Parians are similarly required to send offerings 'as colonists'. In IG I³.14 (M/L 40) 3–5 the Erythraeans are required to send (?) corn to the *Greater Panathenaea*; it is commonly inferred from this specific requirement that at this date (? 453/2) the general obligation did not yet exist. Cf. B. D. Meritt and H. T. Wade-Gery, *JHS* 82 (1962), 69–71 (the basic discussion); Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 292–94; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 525–91, who revives the case (cf. M/L, p. 121) for a dating of the Kleinias decree IG I³.34 = M/L 46 ('?447–6': M/L), and thus of the institution in its general form, to 425/4. There is no sign that the request for a phallus for the *Dionysia* (made to the new foundation Brea, and later to Paros) was ever extended to the empire at large: see Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 158–61. For a supposed archaic instance of religious tribute paid to Athena Polias, for different reasons, see Hdt. 5.82–83.

Athens;³ but we have no evidence that before the establishment of the empire they dispatched the cow of gratitude to their mother-city (in the fourth century, however, a few voluntary instances must be allowed⁴); and many subject states were in no sense Athenian colonies. Athens' self-presentation as the 'mother-city' of the whole empire was a potent imperial fiction.⁵ Through the offerings, the *Panathenaea* was transformed into an imperial festival, which displayed the splendours of empire not just to the Athenians and the Greeks at large but also to the allies. About the reactions of these 'colonists' themselves we can only speculate. As they escorted the tributary beasts, they may have been impressed by a festival and a city and a complex of temples so much more magnificent than their own, in which they had none the less some share. But it was under compulsion that they sent the expensive offerings; and the suit of armour that Athena received from each allied city could have served as a bitter symbol of the Athenian military might which created that compulsion.⁶

We find a similar extension of tradition in the cause of Athenian magnificence in the famous decree (perhaps of the 420s) in which the Athenians require their allies, and invite the Greek cities at large, to dispatch 'first fruits' of corn and barley each year to Eleusis, in gratitude, we must understand, for the city's ancient gift of corn to mankind.⁷ The myth of Triptolemus' mission on which this claim was based had existed since the sixth century; and the decree insists three times that the dispatch

³ See e.g. Pindar, fr. 52b = *Paean* II.29–30 Snell/Maehler; Hdt. I.146–47, 5.97.2; Thuc. I.95.1, 6.82.3, 7.57.4; Ar. Lys. 582 (the Athenians' own view). Cf. J. P. Barron, *JHS* 82 (1962), 6, n. 40; id., *JHS* 84 (1964), 46; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 294; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 318–84, who discusses the relevant colonization myths (cf. [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 6, n. 84).

⁴ See [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 11, n. 14.

⁵ Cf. W. Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im ersten Attischen Seebund* (Berlin 1974), 112–17; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 590–91; S. Hornblower, *HSCP* 94 (1992), 197.

⁶ See Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 549–69, for a good discussion of the *Panathenaea* as 'Reichsfest'; *ibid.* 592–611 on possible allied reactions.

⁷ *IG* I³.78 = *M/L* 73. For the justification see [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] p. 99 and e.g. Pl. *Menex.* 237e–238a; Dem. 60.5; Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.6; and above all Isoc. *Paneg.* 28–31. Note too the presence of Triptolemus scenes on fourth-cent. Panathenaic vases (Schwarz, *Triptolemos*, nos. V 23–30). *M/L* favour 'c. 422' for the decree, while keeping open the possibility of dates throughout the period c.435–415; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 224–52, argues for 416/5. The identity of the Eleusinian festival with which the *aparchai* ['first-fruits'] must have been associated is discussed by Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 184–216 [+]. He dismisses as a secondary elaboration the link with the *Proerosia* found in lexicographers (*Suda ei* [ε] 184, *eiresiōnē* [εἰρεσιώνη], with Adler's parallels), since the primary justification for the tribute must have lain not in these pre-ploughing sacrifices offered 'on behalf of the Greeks' by the Athenians, but in the mission of Triptolemus. Accordingly he links the tribute with the Mysteries. Note, however, that a *lex sacra* of the deme Paeania, probably prior to the first-fruits decree (*IG* I³.250: '450–430' *IG* I³), refers (A 22, B 4), darkly, to *perrosiaddon krithon*, 'corn for the *Proerosia* (?)' [πρροσιάδων κριθόν]; note too the association of *Proerosia* with 'first corn' in Eur. *Suppl.* 29–31.

of such offerings will be ‘in accord with ancestral tradition and the oracle’ (of date and content unknown) ‘from Delphi’. It may well have been traditional for a tithe of crops to be sent to Eleusis by the Attic demes, who remain prominent in the decree;⁸ but it was doubtless only at the height of her political and cultic hegemony that Athens, with the support of the Delphic oracle, could press her claims on the rest of the Greek world – and, it seems, find a hearing.⁹ At the same meeting of the assembly that passed the ‘first-fruits’ decree, the seer Lampon was invited – or at least allowed – to report to the council on a scheme for a similar tithe on olive-oil (the olive being another Athenian gift to mankind).¹⁰ That proposal came to nothing, apparently, but it is revealing that it was made.

Thus tribute was certainly summoned inwards to the gods of the city. We should remember indeed that a sixtieth part of the tribute in the literal sense was claimed for Athena, and had to be paid even when the main sum was remitted.¹¹ In the 440s or 430s, a community on the little island of Carpathus even won political privileges by providing cypress-wood – probably a single magnificent tree – ‘for the temple of Athena who rules Athens’ (which temple is unclear) on the acropolis.¹² It is less clear that Athenian cults were propagated outwards, neatly though the one process would balance the other. (Nor is there any specific evidence that ‘Theseus the Ionian’ was exploited as a unifying symbol.¹³) The argument that they were is based on a group of boundary-markers of sacred precincts, found in subject states but inscribed in Attic script or dialect or both (sometimes with some admixture of local forms). A group from Samos marks precincts of ‘Athena who rules Athens’, ‘the eponymous heroes at Athens’, and ‘Ion at Athens’; Aeginetan examples are of ‘Apollo and Poseidon’ and ‘Athena’; and specimens from Chalkis

⁸ For a possible trace of this institution see the previous note, *ad fin.*

⁹ Isoc. *Paneg.* 31 claims that ‘most’ cities send the tribute, and that defaulters are reminded by the Pythia of their ancient duty. Cf. Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 266–98; and on the further fortunes of the *aparche*, [Parker, *Athenian Religion*]. Ch. 11, n. 16. The Athenian pretension to be the source of corn was, however, rejected by many states: F. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium* (Berlin 1904), 62. C. Auffarth thus suggests that the ridicule of the Mysteries by Diagoras of Melos (Ch. 10, n. 37) can be seen as a political protest against ideological, and actual, imperialism (in W. Eder ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im vierten Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 1994; approved by J. N. Bremmer, ‘Religious Secrets and Secrecy in Classical Greece’, in H. G. Kippenberg and G. Stroumsa eds., *Secrecy and Concealment*, Leiden 1995, 59–78).

¹⁰ IG I³.78 = ML 73.59–61; a reader for the Oxford Press points out, however, that passing a proposal to a further body for consideration is not necessarily a way of expressing enthusiasm for it. On the olive see e.g. Hdt. 5.82.2, Soph. OC 694–706, Pl. *Menex.* 238a with M. Detienne, *RHR* 178 (1970), 5–11 = M. Finley, *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1973), 293–97; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 216–24.

¹¹ See IG I³.61 (ML 65) 5–9, with ML p. 179.

¹² IG I³.1454 [+]; the tree was to become ‘a splendid ridge-beam for the main *cella* of the Parthenon’, suggests Meiggs as there cited.

¹³ As K. Tausend suggests, *RbM* 132 (1989), 225–35.

and Cos are of 'Athena' and 'Athena who rules Athens'.¹⁴ The question has of course been asked whether the cults apparently attested by these stones were introduced by natives or Athenians. But a prior question must be whether the markers in fact have anything to do with locally celebrated cults at all. The term *temenos*, sacred precinct, is ambiguous in Greek: it is used indifferently both for the actual temple-precinct and also for revenue-earning estates, which could be at a great distance from the temple itself. Athenian gods and heroes are known to have owned *temene* of the second type outside Attica.¹⁵ Perhaps then these stories attest no conciliatory attempt to create a spirit of unity within the empire by the propagation of common cults; they may rather record the most abhorred of all imperial practices, appropriation of allied land for the benefit of absentee landlords, in this case the gods and heroes of Athens.¹⁶ All are found in territories where land-seizures are known, or are very likely, to have occurred.

But what about Ion? Surely this, if any, was a cult which the Athenians had good reason to propagate within the empire; for it was of course on the myth of Ion and his descendants that their claim to be motherland of their Ionian colonies in good part depended.¹⁷ But the exaltation of the hero was still timely, even if it occurred in Athens itself; and this is surely the more ready interpretation of a 'boundary-marker of the sacred precinct belonging to Ion at Athens'.¹⁸ There would have been a grim propriety in dedicating land that had been punitively confiscated from rebellious 'colonists' to the hero who symbolized their duties to the native city. Seizure of allied land is an attested practice; so too is the

¹⁴ See the fundamental studies of J. P. Barron, *JHS* 84 (1964), 35–48; 103 (1983), 1–12; cf. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 295–98; Shipley, *Samos*, 114–16; T. J. Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization* (Baltimore 1991), 115–20 (who all in broad outline follow Barron). The texts are now *IG* I³.1481–99, 1502.

¹⁵ See *IG* I³.386.147; 394 B 7, 10; 418; (?) *Thuc.* 3.50.2; *SEG* III 117 (303–302: = Moretti 8). *AM* 51 (1926), 36, no. 5 attests a tribe (Athenian? or a local branch within the cleruchy? – see *Ritual, Finance, Politics*, 343, n. 19) with funds on loan in Samos.

¹⁶ For a thorough argument for this conclusion (which I had reached independently, but on skimpier grounds) see Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 58–153 (who contests several high datings, based on epigraphical arguments, that are fundamental to Barron's case). The 'eponymous heroes from Athens' will therefore not be the four sons of Ion (so Barron, *JHS* 1964, 39–40), but the Clisthenic ten. The pair 'Apollo and Poseidon' is a puzzle, since they had no important joint cult in Athens; their presumptive patronage of the Delian league while this was still based on Delos (see Barron, *JHS* 1983, 11) will scarcely help, on the view of the *boroi* ['boundary stones'] taken here. Smarczyk, 126–29, thinks of an Aeginetan cult taken over by Athenian cleruchs.

¹⁷ Cf. 'Myths', 205–207; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 360–71, 615–18. On the initially surprising absence of Ion from the *epitaphioi* ['funeral orations'] cf. Loraux, *L'invention*, 84.

¹⁸ 'boundary of the *temenos* of Ion at Athens' [ἵορος τεμένους Ἴονος Ἀθένεθεν] *IG* I³.1496. For *Athenethen*, 'at Athens' [Ἀθένεθεν] (similarly in *IG* I³.1497–99), cf. e.g. *IG* II².2604, 'boundary of the *temenos* of Aphrodite at Cephale' [ἵορος τεμένους Ἀφροδίτης Κεφαλῆθεν]; the suggestion sometimes made that in our case it indicates the cult's origin ('Ion <imported to Samos> from Athens') neglects ordinary usage.

ownership by Athenian cults of revenue-earning land abroad. The practice of exporting 'unifying' cults is by contrast wholly hypothetical. The burden of proof must lie with those who suppose that it occurred.¹⁹ We can mention here an intriguing but mysterious cult-foundation that seems to have taken place in the second half of the fifth century, in territory under Athenian control.²⁰ Oropus, the coastal region, facing Euboea, that divides north-east Attica from Boeotia, was first settled by Eretria, from just across the water in Euboea. In the fourth century it suffered the familiar fate of a tactically important enclave perched between powerful neighbours, and repeatedly changed hands. The first firm date in its history is 430, at which time it was, in Thucydides' rather vague phrase, 'subject to Athens'. An earlier period of Boeotian domination has often been postulated, but on the basis of no positive evidence except an imprecise claim in Pausanias; Oropus had perhaps remained Eretrian in allegiance, as it did in dialect, until it was swallowed up by Athens, at a date not later than her thrust into Euboea in the mid-fifth century.²¹

In later antiquity, Oropus was, of course, famous for the incubation-shrine of Amphiaraus that it contained, a few miles from the town itself. This was much the most celebrated of the five or so cult places of Amphiaraus that can be named in all, and Pausanias says that 'it was the Oropians who first honoured Amphiaraus as a god. Subsequently the rest of the Greeks have come to consider him so too.'²² Traces of earlier use of the site, however, are so slight that archaeologists agree, it seems, that the present sanctuary was not founded until the last quarter of the fifth century or thereabouts. (Aristophanes' *Amphiaraus* gives a *terminus ante quem* of 414, and two reliefs apparently commemorating victory in the *apobates* competition attest games around 400, unless they have been misdated by a long way.) That puts the foundation squarely into the Athenian period; and it will remain there, if less squarely, even if a herm

¹⁹ This point retains its force even if one allows that many chronological and thus historical problems concerning these stones remain open, because of the continuing controversies concerning dating by letter-forms.

²⁰ On the foundation see esp. C. Bearzot, 'Problemi del confine attico-beotico: La rivendicazione tebana di Oropo', in M. Sordi ed., *Il confine nel mondo classico* (Milan 1987), 80–99 (and on the political context, ead. in H. Beister and J. Buckler eds., *Boiotika*, Munich 1989, 113–22); on the cult in general, Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiaraou* (and id., *Epigraphika tou Orōpou*, Athens 1980 = *SEG XXXI* 424–92), and the refs. in Schachter, *Cults*, I.19–21.

²¹ Thuc. 2.23.3; Paus. 1.34.1 'the territory of Oropus . . . was Boeotian from the beginning' [τὴν γῆν τὴν Ὠρωπίαν . . . βοιωτίαν τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὖσαν] – but this yields to the statement of Nicocrates in his *On Boeotia* that Oropus was an Eretrian foundation (*FGrH* 376 F 1: this testimonium was rescued from neglect by D. Knoepfler, 'Oropos, Colonie d'Érétrie', *Les Dossiers: Histoire et archéologie* 94, 1985, 50–55). *IG I³*.41.67–71, a tariff for ferry fees, seems to provide *c.*446/5 as a *terminus ante quem* for Athenian control; Knoepfler thinks of *c.*470, and earlier dates can scarcely be excluded.

²² Paus. 1.34.2; on cults elsewhere see E. Bethe in *RE* s.v. *Amphiaraos*, cols. 1887–88, or L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality* (Oxford 1921), 406, no. 31.

found at the site and recently ascribed to '470–450' is allowed to raise the date by twenty-five years or so.²³ Little though we know of the mechanisms of Athenian control of Oropus, it seems obvious that the sovereign power would have taken an interest in such an event,²⁴ and probably in fact lay behind it. But what were the circumstances?

Strabo says that the cult of Amphiaraus was 'transferred to Oropus from Knopia' (an unidentified place, probably near Thebes) 'in accordance with an oracle'. He does not say when, and he might of course be reporting a myth, not a historical occurrence. But two well-known passages of Herodotus attest an oracular shrine of Amphiaraus, apparently at Thebes, famous enough in the sixth century to be consulted by Croesus and in 479 by Mardonius' agent Mys; and Aeschylus too probably alludes to it. This shrine had one remarkable characteristic: 'Amphiaraus instructed the Thebans', says Herodotus, 'by an oracular message to choose whichever they pleased of two things, to make use of him either as an ally or as a prophet, but to refrain from the other.' The Thebans chose an ally, and were accordingly debarred from consulting their own oracle. Subsequently – perhaps because of this restriction – nothing is reported of the Theban shrine, and it had conceivably gone into decline by the time of Herodotus: for he says that the offerings sent by Croesus to Amphiaraus were still visible not in the hero's own precinct but in that of Ismenian Apollo.²⁵

An obvious hypothesis to account for almost all these data is that the shrine of Amphiaraus was transferred from near Thebes to Oropus in the second half of the fifth century.²⁶ Difficulties arise at once, however. We should, perhaps, not insist too strongly on the oddity of Amphiaraus

²³ Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiaraou*, 18, 22, 66–67; Travlos, *Bildlexikon*, 301. The frs. of Aristophanes' play (frs. 17–40 K/A, where Bergk's bold speculations are rightly not endorsed) reveal little, but it seems safe to assume that the Amphiareion envisaged in the Athenian play is not that of Thebes. A herm: Petrakos *Hieron tou Amphiaraou*, 121, no. 15; *IG I³*.1476; before *IG I³* this was commonly dated to the sixth cent. and judged a stray. There appears to be very little precise archaeological evidence for use even in the late fifth cent.: two small altars and the adjacent 'theatre' are conventionally so dated (Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiaraou*, 67–68). The dedication to an unidentified god in Attic script of '? c. 550' recently found at Skala Oropou (*IG I³*.1475) introduces another uncertainty. *Apobatai* dedications (uninscribed but so identified iconographically): E. Berlin ex Saburoff 725 (Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiaraou*, 121, no. 16, *LIMC* s.v. *Amphiaraos*, 702, no. 67), 'early 4th c.:' Ath. Nat. Mus. 1391 (Petrakos no. 17), 'c. 400'. One would prefer to date them to a period of Athenian control, since the *apobates* competition may have been distinctively Attic (Harpocration's reference s.v. *apobatês* [ἀποβάτης] to Boeotia may refer precisely to Oropus): see N. B. Crowther, *JHS* 111 (1991), 174–76.

²⁴ This point is not considered by Bearzot, 'Problemi del confine attico-beotico', who ascribes the introduction to a Theban desire to 'Boeotianize' Oropus. But Oropus had an Attic garrison (Thuc. 8.60) and archon of some kind (Lys. 20.6).

²⁵ Strabo 9.2.10 (404); Hdt. 1.46–52 (esp. 52), 8.133–34; Aesch. *Sept.* 587–88 (cf. Soph. fr. 958 Radt). On all this see Bearzot, 'Problemi del confine attico-beotico', 89–93.

²⁶ So e.g. Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiaraou*, 66–67; Bearzot, 'Problemi del confine attico-beotico'; D. Musti and L. Beschi in their note on Paus. 1.34.1.

being moved from Thebes, the site of his death, to Oropus, a place with which he had no mythical association: a myth arose that, though he vanished into the earth at Thebes, he re-emerged from the sacred spring at Oropus, and the parallel case of Asclepius anyway shows how a mythical healer could shake off the geographical restrictions normally set on a hero and acquire, in effect, the ubiquitous powers of a god. In due course he also appears in Attica proper, and in the Peloponnese.²⁷ But it was certainly not normal for a cult, as it were, to hang a notice on the door and ‘transfer to new premises’, when the premises were in territory controlled by a different state. It would be much easier to ascribe the foundation to a period when Thebes controlled Oropus; but chronologically that is difficult, if not impossible.²⁸ This is one reason why many have urged that Herodotus does not explicitly locate his Amphiaraus in Thebes, and suppose that he is referring instead to the famous shrine at Oropus.²⁹ Just possibly they are right; but theirs is not the easiest way to read Herodotus, and, as we have seen, the archaic cult at Oropus which they postulate has quite failed to leave archaeological traces.

Perhaps we should abandon the idea of a cult ‘transfer’, and suppose that Amphiaraus was introduced to Oropus, as was Asclepius to Athens, without any expectation that the original cult would then cease. But can we guess the motives for the introduction? If it occurred about 425, the great plague might have provided an impulse. But it is hard not to wonder also about factors of imperial policy. In 411 Athens lost control of Oropus to Thebes; when she recovered it, by at the latest 374, we soon find (as we learn from a recently redated decree) the Athenian assembly actively involved with the affairs of the shrine, and an Athenian holding the priesthood;³⁰ when it was reassigned to her,

²⁷ Sacred spring: Paus. 1.34.4. Peloponnese: n. 100 above. Attica: for Rhamnus see [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 9, n. 83. A cult at Athens itself is commonly taken to be attested by IG II².171 and its associated relief (Ath[ens] Nat[ional] Mus[eum] 1396), which shows Amphiaraus and Hygieia honouring one Artikleides; but since the relief is now dated by art historians to ‘after 330’ (see LIMC s.v. *Amphiaraos*, 702, no. 65), Artikleides’ services might have concerned the cult at Oropus. The first firm evidence is therefore *Hesperia* 51 (1982), 53, no. 10 from the *agora* (cf. *Bull. Ép.* 1982, no. 138 for a correction; SEG XXXII 110), which honours the priest in 273/2 (cf. IG II².4441, a dedication by the priest later in the century). IG II².1282 (262/1, Piraeus) is a resolution by a college of worshippers of Ammon that honours for a member be proclaimed ‘at the [sacrifice] of Amphiaraus’. This perhaps does not prove an association between the college and Amphiaraus (cf. Aeschin. 3.41), but probably implies a festival of Amphiaraus in the Piraeus. An unexplained small payment ‘to Amphiaraus’ appears in the Eleusinian accounts of 329/8 (IG II².1672.305). (Note too IG II².1344, near Acharnae, AD 28.)

²⁸ It becomes just possible if we both raise the foundation to the early part of the century on the basis of IG I³.1476 and postulate a period of Theban control before the Attic take-over: see ns. 99 and 101 above.

²⁹ See Schachter, *Cults*, 1.22, n. 2. But Aeschylus too (*Sept.* 588) seems to point to the vicinity of Thebes.

³⁰ See D. Knoepfler, *Chiron* 16 (1986), 71–98 (summarized in SEG XXXVI 442), on *ArchEph* 1923, 36–42, no. 123. This brilliant study is now fundamental for Oropus’ history

after another loss in 366, by Philip or Alexander in the 330s, numerous decrees attest intense interest at the highest level, expressed most notably in the reorganization of the *Amphiaraea* as a prestigious penteteric festival.³¹ In the fourth century, therefore, the Athenians celebrated their recovery of the eagerly desired territory by heaping attentions on the god of the shrine; it may be that in the fifth they had founded a shrine partly in order to assert their presence in a territory which they had recently acquired or (on a lower chronology) their grip on which was threatened by the Peloponnesian war. If this is so, the decision to introduce not an Attic but a Theban cult is, perhaps, a little surprising. But originally, of course, Amphiarus had been an enemy of Thebes.³²

All this is speculation; and all would be changed if evidence emerged (as it easily might) that Amphiarus had been worshipped in Oropus earlier, at a different site.³³ For a clearer instance of the imperial city's religious policy we must look elsewhere. Athens had become 'the tyrant-city'; and her treatment of Delos curiously echoes that by the actual tyrant Pisistratus in the sixth century.³⁴ Where, however, under Pisistratus the fiction of Delian independence was perhaps preserved, the sacred island is now quite unmistakably under partial control by Athenian functionaries.

in the fourth cent. The two surviving sacred laws (*LSS* 35 and *LSCG* 69) date from non-Attic periods: see A. Petropoulou, *GRBS* 22 (1981), 39–63 (= *SEG XXXI* 415–16; but on the order of these texts contrast Knoepfler, *Chiron* 16, 1986, 96, n. 116).

³¹ *IG VII*.3499 (cf. C. Habicht, *ZPE* 77, 1989, 83–87), 4252–54 (= Schwenk 28, 40–41, 50), 4255 (*SIG*³ 973); Schwenk 56 and Michel 1704 (= Reinmuth, *Ephebic Inscriptions*, no. 15); probably Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 54.7 (see Rhodes's note ad loc., Knoepfler as cited below, and [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 11, n. 100). Cf. Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiarou*, 26–29; Mitchel, 'Lykourgan Athens', [in *Lectures of Memory of Louis Taft Semple*, Cincinnati, 1973] 208–209; Humphreys, 'Lycurgus [of Boutadae: an Athenian Aristocrat' in J. W. Eadie and J. Ober eds. *The Craft of the Ancient Historian*, Lanham MD, 1985], 224, n. 16. For dedications by individual Athenians in the Lycurgan period see *SEG XV* 284–85, (?) 291. D. Knoepfler in M. Piérart ed., *Aristote et Athènes* (Paris 1993), 279–302, argues wholly convincingly that the penteteric games were proposed in 331 (see Schwenk 41.13) but first celebrated only in 329, by the illustrious board attested in Schwenk 50 (much too distinguished to be in charge of 'lesser' Amphiaric games, as has often been supposed merely because the insignificant musical competition is not explicitly mentioned); to this celebration, or less probably that of 325, belongs the victory list *ArchEph* 1923, 46, no. 125 = Petrakos, *Hieron tou Amphiarou*, 196, no. 47 (certainly from the Athenian period, despite the 'Panhellenic' identification of Athenian victors by *ethnikon*, not *demotikon* [i.e. identified as Athenians rather than by the name of their deme]). On earlier games see n. 101.

³² Note his own prophecy in Aesch. *Sept.* 588 that he will lie in Thebes 'a seer buried beneath enemy soil' [μάντις κεκευθῶς πολεμίας ὑπὸ χθονός]. On the 'enemy hero' cf. [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 9, n. 18.

³³ But even so, a reorganization or extension of the cult under Athenian auspices in the fifth cent. would remain plausible. Schachter, *Cults*, I.23, notes that it might have been at this stage that the cult came to specialize in healing (in the two Herodotean refs. it seems to provide 'general purpose incubation').

³⁴ Cf. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 300–302; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 504–25; Hornblower, *Commentary*, 517–25 and *HSCP* 94 (1992), 186–97; on Pisistratus, [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 6.

A large new temple begun for Apollo in the mid-century was probably planned and paid for by the Delian League, under the auspices of Athens.³⁵ The league treasury was removed and the temple was not completed, but Athenian interest in the island was not at an end. The Athena Parthenos of Phidias, it has been suggested, was conceived as an Attic equivalent to the famous sixth-century cult statue of Apollo on Delos, which in scale, materials, and certain details of iconography, it recalls. The assembly apparently also voted in the 430s to build Apollo Delios a modest new temple in Phaleron.³⁶ In the 420s, probably in response, as Diodorus says, to the plague – but the novel presence of Spartan ships in Aegean waters has also been noted – interest in the island itself became intense. ‘In accord with a certain oracle’, the Athenians now transformed it, a home of men as well as a birthplace of gods though it was, into an uncomfortably sacred place. Where Pisistratus had purified only the region in sight of the temple, all graves were now dug up, and no birth or death was henceforth to be permitted anywhere on the island (with the consequence, it was noted, that no Delian henceforth had a native land).³⁷

At the same time, in yet another example of very untraditional imperial traditionalism, the Ionian *panegyris* on Delos, an ancient but faded institution, was revived with novel splendour as a quinquennial festival. The surviving core of the festival – competition between choruses sent by the participating states – was retained, the athletic competitions known from the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* were restored, and horse-racing was added for the first time. In this form the *Delia* could be an Ionian substitute for the great Panhellenic games, which cannot have been very attractive to the Athenians and their allies during the war, even if they were not formally excluded from them. Before the allies, private munificence could be usefully exploited, and the opulence and good discipline of the Attic chorus trained by that great gentleman Nicias made a sensation. Another early delegation to the festival was led by the

³⁵ See Bruneau/Ducat, *Guide de Délos*, 130–31; Boersma, *Building Policy*, 170. Functionaries: IG I³.402 = M/L 62, with their notes; *ibid.* 1457–61 (on ‘Amphictyons’ cf. [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 6, n. 87).

³⁶ Athena Parthenos: so B. Fehr, *Hephaistos* I (1979), 71–91. Temple in Phaleron: Lewis, [Parker, *Athenian Religion*], n. 15 on IG I³.130 (who suspects a connection with the Delian earthquake, Thuc. 2.8.3).

³⁷ Link with plague: Diod. 12.58.6–7 (cf. Thuc. 3.87; Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 506, n. 17; Hornblower, *Commentary*, 519). Diodorus’ explanation receives strong support from Lewis’s redating to the fifth cent. of IG I³.1468 bis = CEG 742, an altar on the island dedicated by ‘Athens’ (*sic*) to Apollo Paion and Athena. Spartan ships: so Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 508–12. Purification and oracle: Thuc. 3.104, with Hornblower’s discussion of the source of the oracle (respectable enough to motivate public action, but probably not, given Thucydides’ silence, fresh from Delphi); for a scrap of an Athenian decree perhaps of this date, proposed by Cleonymus and concerning Delos, see D. M. Lewis, *ZPE* 60 (1985), 108, on *Inscr. Dél.* 80 = IG I³.1454 bis, with Hornblower, *Commentary*, 518. No native land: Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 230c–d.

immensely rich Kallias. A new temple of Attic decoration and design, small but fine, dates from this period.³⁸

But the most startling intervention was the wholesale expulsion of the islanders from their home in 422, followed by their restoration a year later. According to Thucydides the motive was religious in both cases: the Athenians drove the Delians out ‘in the belief that they had been consecrated although they were impure because of an ancient offence, and that this was an omission in their former purification of the island’, and restored them later because they ‘took to heart their set-backs in the war, and because the god of Delphi so instructed them’. According to Diodorus, by contrast, it was believed that the islanders were engaged in secret negotiations with the Spartans (a fear that would of course have been removed by the signing of the Treaty of Nicias in 421).³⁹ Either Diodorus’ (i.e. Ephorus’ account) is a rationalizing invention, or Thucydides has been culpably economical with the truth. However that may be, modern scholars have suggested an underlying urge distinct from either of these motives: the desire to have unfettered control (not that the fetters that the Delians could impose were at all tight) of the sacred place.⁴⁰ Certainly, the Oropians met a very similar fate when their territory, home of Amphiaras’ oracle, fell back into Athenian hands in the fourth century.⁴¹ Shrines and festivals and gods were among the most precious spoils of empire.

³⁸ Restored festival: Thuc. 3.104; IG I³.1468 is a dedication by the ‘leaders of the sacred embassy’ [ἀρχεθέοροι] of the first *pentetêris*, ‘five-year period’ [πεντετηρίς]. Ionian substitute: Hornblower, *Commentary*, 521–22 (though note with him that some Dorian islanders frequented Delos) and (no formal exclusion) 390; id., *HSCP* 94 (1992), 191–94. Nicias: Plut. *Nic.* 3.5–8, cf. IG I³.1474 (for the debate about the date see Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 517, n. 54; Hornblower, *Commentary*, 518). Kallias: dedications associated with his delegation are mentioned in (e.g.). *Inscr. Dél.* 104.115–16 (cf. J. Coupry’s note ad loc. in *Inscr. Dél.*, 43, 45, and Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 519, n. 59 on other Athenian dedications). Small Delian temple (the ‘temple of the Athenians’ of inscriptions): see Bruneau/Ducat, *Guide de Délos*, 129–30; Boersma, *Building Policy*, 171. An up-to-date study of the *Delia* is a desideratum (Deubner, *Attische Feste*, is inadequate on this): see still T. Homolle in *DarSag* s.v. *Delia* (1892), with the modification of Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, 144–49, itself modified by Bruneau, *Recherches*, 85–86. *Inscr. Dél.* 98.31–40 (= Tod II.125) attests the scale: 109 sacrificial oxen. On the festival before 426 see Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 472, n. 184, who cites the poems of Bacchylides (17: note line 130) and Pindar (several *paean*s, and cf. *Isth.* 1.4–8) probably written for it.

³⁹ Thuc. 5.1, 5.32.1; Diod. 12.73.1 (accepted by Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 302, who, however, notes that ‘Ephorus is quite capable of adding such an explanation from his own imagination’). On the ‘ancient offence’ see [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 11, n. 31.

⁴⁰ So Homolle in *DarSag* 56, followed by Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 521. Fetters: cf. *M/L*, p. 170, Smarczyk, *Religionspolitik*, 521–25.

⁴¹ See Knoepfler, *Chiron* 16 (1986), 71–98. For the Delians’ resentment of Athenian control in the fourth cent. see [Parker, *Athenian Religion*] Ch. 11.

PART III

Costs and Benefits

Introduction to Part III

The claim that the Athenian Empire made Athens and individual Athenians wealthy may seem to be uncontroversial. Evidence to support this belief can be found in a number of ancient sources, which also connect the profits of empire with various different sorts of imperial behaviour. The ‘Old Oligarch’, for example, bases his claim that the Athenians ‘alone of the Greek and barbarians are capable of possessing wealth’ (Ps. Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 2.11) on Athens’ ability to control trade in the Aegean. Epigraphic evidence reveals that Athenians owned massive amounts of valuable property in the territory of the allied states.¹ The accumulation of booty from campaigns undertaken by the empire is also a likely source of profit.² But the activity which is most commonly associated with Athens’ imperial enrichment is one which is central to the Athenian Empire from the moment of its creation: the collection of tribute (*phoros*).³

Tribute is not an absolute novelty in the interstate politics of the period, although before its employment by the Delian League it had been primarily associated with the Persian Empire.⁴ It does, however, become

¹ The evidence comes above all in the ‘Attic Stelae’: documents recording property confiscated from wealthy Athenians after the scandals surrounding the mutilation of the Hermae and profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415 BC. For a selection of the texts, see R. G. Osborne, *The Athenian Empire*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2000, nos. 239–43, and for further discussion D. M. Lewis, ‘After the profanation of the Mysteries’, in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, 177–91. Poorer Athenians also benefited from the opportunity to take over confiscated or conquered allied territory: participation in the settlement at Brea, for example, was restricted to the two lowest socio-economic classes in Athens (ML 49, Fornara 100, lines 39–42).

² On the role of booty in Greek warfare, see W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, vol. 5, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, 363–401.

³ See Ch. 1 for further discussion of the sources of profit available to the empire.

⁴ See L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1–5.24*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 47–8; O. Murray, ‘*Ho archaios dasmos*’, *Historia* 15 (1966), 142–56 (esp. 149–50).

a particularly potent symbol of Athenian imperialism. Thucydides argues that it was the allies' willingness to make financial rather than military contributions to the Delian League which accelerated the process of transition from alliance to empire (1.99). Later commentators suggest that payment of tribute was among the most unpopular aspects of Athenian imperialism: 'the Athenians worked out so carefully how best to get men to hate them, that they decided to divide the surplus of the funds derived from the allied tribute into talents and to bring it on the stage, when the theatre was full, at the festival of Dionysus' (Isocrates 8.82).⁵

The nature of the surviving evidence also puts modern scholars of the empire in an unusually good position to explore not just the ideology but also the detail of tribute collection. Each year, from 454/3 until the final abolition of tribute in 406/5, the Athenians recorded the proportion (1/60th) of each ally's tribute which was dedicated to Athena.⁶ These lists were inscribed on large stone slabs, erected on the Acropolis. The lists were not preserved intact, but were gradually rediscovered (in extremely fragmentary form) from the late eighteenth century onwards (the bulk of discoveries took place in the early nineteenth century). The lists (known as 'Tribute Quota Lists', or often just 'Tribute Lists') can be used to chart the changing membership of the empire and the shifting relationship between Athens and the allies (increases in tribute are often explained as punishments for some misdemeanour; decreases, conversely, as rewards for some service rendered). And the emergence of these documents also enabled historians to build up a detailed picture of Athens' financial dealings with the allied states.

The first article in this part takes advantage of the financial records preserved in the Tribute Quota Lists, and in other Athenian documents, to challenge some widely held beliefs about Athens' use of their tribute revenue, namely, that Athens accumulated a massive surplus of tribute, and then used that surplus to fund projects which had nothing to do with the official aims of the Delian League: 'the Athenians seemed to be showing great insolence to Greece, and to be openly acting like tyrants, if those who were forced by Athens to contribute to the war saw them gilding and decking out the city like a loose woman, applying expensive

⁵ For some other fourth-century responses to tribute, see the Postscript.

⁶ The lists start in 454, which is thought to be the date when the treasury of the Delian League was moved from Delos to Athens. Lists are not preserved for every year (the last extant example dates to 419/18, and several earlier years are also lost), but it is assumed that the Athenians did continue to inscribe the records until the end of the empire, in those years when tribute was collected. (The tribute was replaced with a harbour tax in the period 414 to 410.) See Osborne, *Athenian Empire*, note F, for a survey of the list's physical arrangement, including some useful illustrations.

stones and statues of gods and temples costing a thousand talents' (Plutarch, *Pericles* 12.2, tr. Osborne).

Giovannini argues that such allegations have little basis in reality, an argument based on an investigation of the ways in which the Athenians (and other Greeks) organised their finances. The Athenians, like other Greek states, were careful to distinguish the money in their secular treasuries from those funds which had been dedicated to the gods (and were therefore seen as being the property of the gods). In fifth-century Athens the secular treasury was further subdivided into imperial funds (controlled by a board of magistrates known as *hellenotamiai*, 'treasurers of the Greeks') and the Athenians' own money (administered by a board of *kolakretai*). By examining the origins of the funds which were used to pay for the Parthenon and other building projects of the imperial period, Giovannini concludes that the vast majority of this money came not from the allies' tribute (that is, from the *hellenotamiai*) but from the sacred treasuries. The small proportion of the tribute which was dedicated to Athena (the *aparche*, or first fruit, which is listed on the Tribute Quota Lists) did contribute (in very small part) to the cost of building, but the idea that the rest of the tribute – the other 59/60ths – was also frittered away on such projects cannot be supported. In fact, the flow of funds between empire and treasury seems to run in the opposite direction: while the tribute provided enough money to cover the costs of regular military operations, larger expeditions had to be funded by loans from the Treasury of Athena. The goddess, that is, subsidised the empire, rather than the other way round.

Giovannini's conclusions are persuasive, but provoke a further question: if the Athenians did not use the allies' tribute to enrich their own city, why do so many ancient sources insist that they did? The ancient perception that the tribute bought Athens great wealth might be false, but false perceptions are also, often, historically interesting. It is the question of perceptions of Athenian imperial finance that exercises Kallet-Marx.⁷ Her article starts by exploring the question of how much financial knowledge an average Athenian citizen might be expected to have – would they be able to perform the same sort of detailed research as Giovannini, and, even if they were able, would they be interested in doing so? Kallet-Marx suggests that most financial information would be acquired not from the (relatively) objective source of the inscribed accounts, but in the more charged environment of the assembly. And it was in the assembly, she argues, that the Athenians were encouraged to

⁷ Kallet-Marx reaches similar conclusions to Giovannini in her own study of the finances of the building of the Parthenon: 'Did tribute fund the Parthenon?', *CA* 8 (1989), 252–66.

equate their imperial power with imperial revenue, and imperial revenue, in turn, with the safety of the democratic city. This second equation is, again, factually incorrect: pay for democratic office was not directly dependent on revenue from the allies, but – as in the case of the Periclean building programme – economic realities do not seem always to have coincided with popular beliefs.

Kallet suggests that this widespread, if mistaken, belief that the empire made the city and its citizens rich can help to explain why imperialism was so widely supported within Athens. Attempting to assess whether the opposite is also true – whether a perception of financial exploitation led to hostility to the empire among the subject states – is a much harder task. The Tribute Quota Lists reveal some details about the absolute financial burden which the Athenian Empire placed on the allies, and also make it clear how much that burden could vary between states: some cities paid as much as 30 talents per year; many more paid less than 1 talent; the amounts paid also vary over time.⁸ There is some evidence to suggest that tribute assessments bore some relation to the resources of cities – the largest states, and those with access to rich natural resources (such as silver mines), paid the highest levels of tribute.

Even if the tribute was affordable, though, it might still have formed an actual or perceived financial burden, and this is the problem addressed by Osborne's article: how far did the payments to Athens act as a drain on the resources of the subject cities? Osborne focuses on archaeological evidence in attempting to answer this question (and his article provides a useful insight into the problems of using such evidence to study the history of the Athenian Empire), and above all on the pattern of monumental building in the cities of the empire. His conclusion in some ways echoes that of Giovannini: just as payment of tribute did not, strictly speaking, enable the Athenians to build the Parthenon, neither, insofar as it is possible to tell, did it impoverish the allies to the extent that it would have been impossible for them to create magnificent temples of their own. Osborne's explanation for the lack of monumental building outside Athens does not therefore rely on economic factors, but does give an important role to the broader impact of the Athenian Empire: the existence of the empire did not make competition with Athens impossible, but did make it seem unnecessary. One consequence of the growth of Athens' empire was the focus of all attention – political, military, cultural and religious – on the imperial state; cities in the imperial margins no longer felt the need, or ability, to compete with such

⁸ See the analysis in L. Nixon and S. Price, 'The size and resources of greek Cities', in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 137–70.

a dominant force. Evidence for financial exploitation of the allies remains, therefore, elusive, but the case for political and cultural subordination is strengthened.

The studies in this part leave one question unanswered: was financial exploitation ever a conscious aim of the Athenian Empire? It has already been seen (in Ch. 1) that problems of aims and intentions are particularly hard to deal with in this field. Any answer to that question is therefore likely to owe more to theories of ancient economic practice than specific proof: did any ancient state base its decisions on this sort of rational financial consideration?⁹ What is clear, however, is that whether or not the Athenians intended it at the outset, the acquisition and preservation of tangible gains became a dominant theme in the activities of the empire. In fact, recent studies have argued that the role played by economic power in the Athenian Empire should be seen as one of the institution's most distinctive and innovative features. Traditional diplomacy, it is argued, exercised power through the accumulation of honour and prestige; the Athenians, by contrast, developed a mode of power that was based above all on the acquisition of wealth. In doing so, they brought about a fundamental change in Greek interstate relations: 'now, for the first time, the polis itself adopted the . . . approach of achieving *dunamis* [power] through expenditure of money'.¹⁰

⁹ The argument against the existence of this sort of economic thinking is most closely associated with Moses Finley's *The Ancient Economy*, originally published 1973, but now available in an updated edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), with an introduction by Ian Morris which usefully sets out developments in the debate since then.

¹⁰ Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power*, 13. See also L. Kallet, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; G. Crane, *Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, ch. 6.

8 *The Parthenon, the Treasury of Athena and the Tribute of the Allies*^{†*}

ADALBERTO GIOVANNINI

In a well-known passage from his *Life of Pericles* (ch. 12–14), Plutarch recounts how the Athenian statesman was attacked by his political enemies when he made the decision to build the Parthenon. According to Plutarch, they reproached Pericles for the improper use of the tribute paid by their allies as their financial contribution to the war against the Persians. Pericles responded that, as long as they shouldered the burden of the campaign against the Barbarians, the Athenians were under no obligation to explain their conduct to their allies; that they were within their rights to spend any surplus tribute as they saw fit; and finally, that it was only fair that those who risked their lives protecting the liberty of the Greeks should receive some benefit in return, in the form of work and pay for the poor as well as the embellishment of their city.

Recently in [*Historia*], W. Ameling analysed Plutarch's account, highlighting implausibilities and anachronisms.¹ He concluded that this anecdote about the financing of the Parthenon was invented by Plutarch, even going so far as to question the leading role attributed to Pericles and Phidias in the conception and construction of the monument. Ameling's observations are not lacking in relevance, and merit the attention of historians and archaeologists; nevertheless this story cannot be entirely Plutarch's invention because Diodorus, drawing directly from Ephorus, also says that the Propylaea, as well as other buildings on the

[†] Originally published as 'Le Parthénon, le Trésor d'Athéna et le Tribut des Alliés', *Historia* 39 (1990), 129–48. Translated by Giselle Glasman.

* The idea developed in this article came to me when I was preparing my paper 'Symbols and rituals in classical Athens', presented at the colloquy 'Athens and Rome – Florence and Venice: City-states in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy', held in Providence (RI) from 7 May to 9 May 1989 [= A. Molho, K. Raaflaub and J. Emlen (eds.), *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, Stuttgart 1991]. The contribution of Franco Cardini (Bari) on Venice and the conversations that I was able to have with Patricia Fortini Brown (Princeton) and Tonio Hölscher (Heidelberg) were most valuable to me.

¹ Plutarch, *Perikles* 12–14. *Historia* 34 (1985) 47–63.

Acropolis, were financed by surplus tribute (XII, 40, 2). This version seems to have been known by Demetrius of Phaleron, who reproached Pericles for the amount of money spent on the Propylaea (Cicero, *De Officiis* II, 17, 60). Elsewhere, still following Ephorus, Diodorus makes it clear that in 454 the treasury of the maritime league was transferred to Athens from Delos, that the Athenians placed it under the control of Pericles, and that he found himself very embarrassed when he had to account for its management (XII, 38, 2). At the time the treasury was moved, its reserves would have risen to 10,000 talents, of which 4,000 would later be spent on building work on the Acropolis and the siege of Potidaea in 432. A severely damaged papyrus from the imperial period reports the sum of 5,000 talents and seems to refer to a Periclean decree ordering the use of this amount for the building work on the Acropolis.²

For the most part, the information provided by Ephorus can be found in Thucydides, in the speech that the historian 'gives' to Pericles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (II, 13). In order to encourage his fellow citizens, Pericles lists the revenues provided each year by the tribute, that is 600 talents, and the reserves accumulated in Athena's sanctuary and other temples, amounting to 6,000 talents, as well as offerings and sacred objects, the belongings of the other gods and the golden robe of Phidias' chryselephantine statue of Athena. Like Ephorus, Thucydides specifies that at one point these reserves had risen to 9,700 talents and that the difference had been used for the Propylaea and other buildings, and for the siege of Potidaea. However, he does not comment on the origin of these funds, or on the transfer of the treasury from Delos to Athens. He simply has Pericles say, at the end of his catalogue, that the Athenians could turn to these reserves for the security of the city, but that they should subsequently make up whatever they had spent.³ However, it is not possible to confirm, at first sight, if this remark concerned the whole of the itemised reserves, including the 6,000 talents in the treasury of Athena, or only sacred objects and offerings.⁴

Where did Ephorus get his information on the provenance of these 10,000 talents, of which part was used for the Parthenon? He might have extracted it from a source independent of Thucydides, but he might also have interpreted the speech attributed to Pericles by the historian of the Peloponnesian War in his own way and inferred from it that the

² Cf. *ATL* II (Princeton 1949) p. 61, D 13.

³ II, 13, 5: 'he said that this might be used for self-preservation, and should be paid back in full' (χρησαμένων τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν).

⁴ Gomme, *HCT* II, 26 categorically backs the second interpretation, but with no other justification than his belief that the 6,000 talents in question were a deposit and not that property of the goddess.

9,700 talents, (the rounding to 10,000 talents is an insignificant detail) must have come from the allies' funds. At this point, it is useful to remember that Demosthenes reports another version that was circulating in Athens, according to which the constructions on the Acropolis had been financed by booty taken from the Barbarians.⁵

We are lucky to have some significant fragments of the accounts and inventories of the Acropolis from the second half of the fifth century. Notable amongst these accounts are those of the Parthenon construction, from the start of work in 448/7 until its completion in 433/2, those of the Propylaea from 438/7 to 433/2, plus those of the chryselephantine statue, and of other projects. We also have several annual accounts from the treasurers of Athena, as well as a very important decree, proposed by a certain Callias, which experts date to 434/3. These documents show us that in 434/3, thus even before the siege of Potidaea, the Opisthodomus [treasury] contained at least 5,500 talents in total, of which 4,500 belonged to Athena Parthenos and the rest to the other gods. These funds, managed by Athena's treasurers, contributed a part, but only a part, to the financing of the building work. They were also used to pay for the siege of Potidaea and other military operations during the Peloponnesian War. The reckoning of these resources in Thucydides and Ephorus corresponds exactly to that which is found in the inscriptions, which proves that Thucydides drew his information from official documents, perhaps from the inscriptions themselves. Up to this point, the inscriptions and the historical sources are in complete agreement.

The fundamental divergence concerns the origin and ownership of the gold and silver reserves in the Opisthodomus. If Ephorus and Plutarch are to be believed, the 6,000 talents were a reserve belonging to the league, which should normally have been managed by the Hellenotamiai, yet the inscriptions show that these funds were administered by the treasurers of Athena and were expressly described as sacred goods (*hiera khrêmata* [ἱερὰ χρήματα]) belonging to Athena and the other gods. Moreover, the sums drawn from these reserves by Athena's treasurers to be put at the disposition of the Hellenotamiai or the Athenian generals are registered in the accounts as interest-bearing loans. In order to reconcile the version of Ephorus and Plutarch with the evidence of the inscriptions, it is necessary to allow that the league's assets and the *hiera khrêmata* of Athena were one and the same thing and that the Athenians in 454 had consecrated to Athena and put into the hands of her treasurers monies which were actually the property of the allies and should have been managed by

⁵ Dem. XXII (*Against Androtion*) 13: 'those men built the Propylaea and the Parthenon, and adorned our other shrines with Barbarian spoils' (οἱ τὰ προπύλαια καὶ τὸν παρθενῶν οἰκοδομήσαντες ἐκέينوι καὶ τᾶλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱερὰ κοσμήσαντες).

the Hellenotamiai. This is what historians since A. Boeckh have done;⁶ they agree, implicitly or explicitly, that the funds managed by the treasurers of Athena were *on deposit*, without wasting time on the fact that when they made withdrawals from this deposit, the Athenians paid the goddess interest.⁷

Could it be that the Athenians had thus merged Athena's funds with those of the league and had muddled up sacred and profane property? The Greeks always took great care to separate rigorously what belonged to the gods and what belonged to man. For them, that which had been given to the divinities was henceforward their sacred and inalienable property. They believed the taking of sacred possessions to be an act of impiety, a sacrilege that the gods would sooner or later avenge. To quote the most famous example, the Phocians were cruelly punished by the Greeks for having laid hands on the Delphic treasury.⁸ The Phocians themselves held an enquiry into the sums taken by their leaders and demanded an exact account from them of the *hiera khremata* (Diod. XVI, 56, 3). We have a good number of accounts and inventories of sacred precincts which show how meticulously the gods' treasurers registered the smallest of donations, the most insignificant receipts or expenditure, precisely because they wished to avoid any accusation of impiety. It would be truly astonishing if the Athenians, whose piety was legendary (cf. Paus. I, 17, 1, and I, 24, 3), acted differently from other Greeks.

I SACRED FUNDS AND PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE GREEK WORLD

(a) *The assets of the sanctuaries*

As violating sacred assets was seen as sacrilegious, many Greek cities went to the trouble of inscribing on stone or bronze the accounts and inventories of their sanctuaries, to such an extent that the inscriptions

⁶ A. Boeckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (Berlin 1817) 219 ff. (= p. 178 ff. of the English translation of 1842) maintains that the surplus tribute was simply paid over by the Hellenotamiai to the treasurers of Athena. He goes further, p. 252 ff. (= p. 201 ff. in the English edition), claiming that without the tribute, the construction work on the Acropolis would never have been possible.

⁷ Cf. in particular Gomme, *HCT* II, 26 ('the reserve fund . . . was only deposited with Athena') and 31; R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cites grecques* (Leyde 1968) 282 ('confier le tresor publique' ['entrust to the public treasury']); R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1968), 164 ('in the keeping of Athena'). See also *ATL* III, 327; R. K. Unz, 'The surplus of the Athenian phoros', *GRBS* 26 (1985) 21-42; C. G. Starr, 'Athens and its empire' (*Cl.J.* 83, 1988, 114-123), 119 f.

⁸ After a battle, the Locrians refused to return their dead to the Phocians because, they said, the sacrilegious were denied the right of burial (Diod. XVI, 25, 2). For the same reason, Philip II threw Phocian prisoners in the sea (Diod. XVI, 35, 6).

could cost more than the value of the inventories themselves. Those of Delos, which are by far the most valuable and the best conserved, are very characteristic in this regard.⁹ The accounts from Cyrene,¹⁰ as well as those of Epizephyrian Locris¹¹ and Didyma,¹² are also of particular interest for this study. These various accounts and inventories give us a fairly precise idea of the incomes and expenses of the sanctuaries, as well as the manner in which they were managed.

All the sanctuaries had their own revenues that must have allowed them to care for the buildings and sacred personnel, as well as provide for sacrifices, without having to call on the resources of the city. This revenue came principally from the sacred lands of the god, plots and buildings that the treasurers rented out. To this was added the various taxes that the sanctuaries could impose during religious festivals.¹³ The sanctuaries were also enriched by public and private offerings – statues, cups, crowns, gold and silver coins etc. A sizeable chunk of the offerings given to sanctuaries came from the *dekatê* (δεκάτη), that is to say the tithe that the Greeks unfailingly set apart from their spoils of war to dedicate to the gods. Over time, the Greek sanctuaries accumulated considerable wealth: in the middle of the second century, the total fortune of Delian Apollo amounted to something like 60 talents;¹⁴ that of the temple of Zeus at Epizephyrian Locris seems to have been a little more modest.¹⁵ That of the great sanctuaries could be very substantial: for example, the Phocians ‘borrowed’ no less than 10,000 talents from Apollo’s temple at Delphi. Depending on how much of the wealth was made up of money, it could be invested by the treasurers in loans to individuals or to communities – a regular activity of the temple of Apollo on Delos.¹⁶

⁹ Cf. above all J. A. O. Larsen, ‘Roman Greece’, in T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* IV (Baltimore 1938), 334–49; R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers* 126–69; J. Treheux et al., ‘Comptes et inventaires de Délos’, in D. Knoepfler (ed.), *Comptes et inventaires dans la cité grecque, Actes du Colloque en l’honneur de Jacques Tréheux* (Neuchâtel and Geneva 1988), 27–69.

¹⁰ SEG IX (1944) nos. 11–44; cf. Fr. Chamoux, ‘Les comptes des démiurges à Cyrene’, in D. Knoepfler, *Comptes et inventaires*, 143–54.

¹¹ A. De Franciscis, *Stato e società in Locri Epizefiri (L’Archivio dell’Olimpieion locrese)*, Naples 1972; L. Migeotte, ‘Sur les rapports financiers entre le sanctuaire et la cité de Locres’, in D. Knoepfler, *Comptes et inventaires*, 191–203.

¹² *Inscr. Didyma*, nos. 429–78; cf. W. Gunther, “Vieux et inutilisable” dans un inventaire inédit de Miler’, in D. Knoepfler, *Comptes et inventaires*, 215–37.

¹³ See in particular the very fine convention signed between the Acarnanians and the city of Anactorion on the subject of the temple of Apollo at Actium (*IG IX²1,583*, 26–34), which stipulates, among other things, that the Acarnanians will take on the expenses for sacrifices and competitions but that in compensation they will receive half of the revenues from the various taxes imposed during the panegyrics.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Giovannini, *Rome et la circulation monétaire en Grèce au III^{ème} siècle avant Jésus-Christ* (Bale 1978), 52–7.

¹⁵ cf. L. Migeotte, art. cit. (supra, n. 11).

¹⁶ On loans made by the sanctuaries, cf. R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers*, 288 ff.

(b) Public finances

Our knowledge of the finances of the Greek cities is unfortunately far less satisfactory. We do not possess accounts for public finances that are in any way comparable to those of the sanctuaries.¹⁷ Judging by the available evidence, the Greeks did not seem to feel it necessary to inscribe for all time their annual accounts, as these had no sacred importance; for public financial affairs, it was deemed sufficient that accounts were reported to the assembly or the council and then recorded in the official archives. The fundamental distinction seems absolutely clear here between sacred property, which was inalienable and protected by divine law, and public wealth, which was intended to be spent.

There is one happy exception: Delos. At the beginning of the second century, doubtless for security reasons, the Delians turned their public treasury over to the safekeeping of the temple of Apollo. This is revealed by the annual accounts of the temple for this period, which record not only the receipts and expenditure of the sacred treasury but also the operations of the public treasury of the city of Delos.¹⁸ We can conclude from this that the sacred (*hiera kibôtos* [ἱερά κιβωτός]) and the public (*dêmosia kibôtos* [δημοσία κιβωτός]) coffers were scrupulously kept separate. The two funds functioned as current accounts consisting of jars inscribed with the amount they contained, where it came from or where it was going, the names of the city magistrates who placed it in the temple and the names of the bankers who acted as intermediaries in the transaction. We can see from this that the amounts deposited by the city in the temple's stronghold were relatively modest and that, most significantly, they did not remain there for long. They were always allocated to cover specific and pressing expenses; repair work, the purchase of wheat or salaries paid to artists entered in competitions, the purchase of wheat representing by far the largest expenditure from the city's everyday budget. These inventories show that the Delians did not build up capital with a view to long-term expenditure but that they ran their finances on a day-to-day basis and did not collect large sums except when faced with imminent outgoings. In the main, the city's income seems to have been modest, sufficient to cover the ordinary needs of the community, themselves fairly small. When they were faced with extraordinary expenditure, the purchase of wheat or prize crowns of a certain

¹⁷ The financial tables of Tauromenion (*IG XIV 423-30*; cf. G. Manganaro, 'Le tavole finanziarie di Tauromenion', in D. Knoepfler, *Comptes et inventaires*, 155-90) are an exception which dates from the Roman period.

¹⁸ *I. Délos* 399 A, 1-73; 442 A, 1-140; 461 Aa, 1-92. cf. P. Roussel, *Délos colonie athenienne* (Paris 1916), 171; J. A. O. Larsen, *Roman Greece*, 340-4; R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers*, 163-5.

value, the city turned to loans, principally from the sanctuary of Apollo, which it generally undertook to repay as soon as possible.¹⁹

The public finances of other Greek cities are known to us only indirectly, from decrees or contracts referring to isolated transactions, or from literary texts focused in the main on exceptional situations. Nevertheless, from this sparse and disparate documentation, a fairly coherent general picture emerges. The Greek cities had a small everyday budget and their income came mainly from customs dues and other taxes, as well as from renting out public property – buildings and agricultural or pastoral land. With this revenue, the cities covered their ongoing expenses, mainly salaries and the upkeep of public buildings. For major expenditure, such as the management of the gymnasium, the purchase of wheat or military expenses, they turned to the generosity of the richest citizens (liturgies) or foreign rulers (euergetism), to special contributions (eisphorai) or again to borrowing from individuals, from other cities or from sanctuaries.²⁰ R. Bogaert notes some twenty sanctuaries as having made loans to individuals or to communities.²¹ To his list must be added the temple of Zeus at Epizephyrian Locris, which made numerous loans to the city of Locris²² and the ‘loan’ made by the temple of Apollo in Delphi to Sulla (Plutarch, *Sulla* 12, 5–6). In all the financial transactions between a city and a sanctuary, even a sanctuary that belonged to them, the separation of sacred assets and public funds was meticulously respected. Withdrawals from the sacred funds, whether in the form of money, sacred objects or offerings, were defined as loans that incurred interest and were to be repaid in their entirety (which does not necessarily mean that the city was always able, or intended, to do so). Even the Phocians, even Sulla, ensured that the objects and offerings they removed from the Delphic temple were weighed exactly, demonstrating that they considered them to be loans which they intended to repay.²³ In Greece, the inalienability of sacred assets was a principle that was always respected, in appearance at least.

¹⁹ cf. R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers*, 131–4, which gives the amount and the destination of each loan.

²⁰ Cf. L. Migéotte, *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques: Recueil des documents et analyse critique* (Québec and Paris 1984), who gives, in his introduction (pp. 1–2) an excellent presentation of the public finances of the Greek cities (see also the review of this book by Ed. Will in *Rev. Et. Gr.* 60, 1986, 296–301).

²¹ R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers*, 288–94.

²² Cf. L. Migéotte, art. cit. (supra, n. 11)

²³ Plut. *Sulla* 12, 4: ‘he wrote . . . that he would restore [the treasures] in full; and he sent Caphis the Phocian, one of his friends, with orders to receive each item by weight’ (ἔγραψε . . . ἀποχρησάμενος ἀποδώσειν οὐκ ἐλάττω καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπέστειλε Κάφιν τὸν Φωκῆα κελεύσας σταθμῶ παραλαβεῖν ἕκαστον).

II THE TREASURY OF ATHENA POLIAS

The management of the treasury of Athena Polias is known to us mainly from three types of documents: the withdrawals made by Athena's treasurers on behalf of the Hellenotamiai or the Athenian generals; the deposits into the treasury by the Hellenotamiai; and the payments made by the treasurers to the commissions responsible for building work.

(a) Withdrawals (IG I³ 363–82)

During the second half of the fifth century, the Athenians requisitioned large sums of money from the treasurers of Athena. They took at least 1,500 talents in 441/0 and 440/39 for the campaign against Samos (IG I³ 363), some tens of talents in 433 for the Corcyrean expedition (IG I³ 364) and, between 433 and 423, amounts totalling more than 5,500 talents (IG I³ 369). Each time, it was Athena's treasurers (IG I³ 370, 8: *tamiai tes theo* [ταμίαι τῆς θεᾶς]) who handed over the money, which was sometimes intended for the Hellenotamiai and sometimes for the generals overseeing a particular operation. It was specified that the funds were *hiera khrêmata* (e.g. IG I³ 370, 61: 'treasurers of the *hierai khrêmatai*' [ταμίαι ἱερῶν χρημάτων]). Essentially, the funds they controlled were the property of Athena Polias, but they also controlled the assets of other gods – of the 5,600 talents they lent between 433 and 423, 4,750 came from Athena and 850 from the treasuries of other gods (IG I³ 369, 112–23).

The breakdown of the years 433–423 records for each year the interest due to Athena and the other gods. This interest, at the rate of just over 1 per cent, is more symbolic than real, but it proves nevertheless that legally and technically, the transactions were proper loans made by Athena and the other gods to the Athenian state or the maritime league, with the treasurers of Athena acting as intermediaries on one side and the Hellenotamiai and generals on the other. Legally and financially, the relationship between Athena and the league on the one hand and the sanctuary treasurers on the other is precisely the same as that which we can see at Delos, Epizephyrian Locris and elsewhere; it is the legal relationship of a fund-holding bank with a client to whom it extends loans, loans which incur interest and which are of course expected to be repaid. The Athenians were therefore no more the owners of these funds than the allies, as the funds belonged to Athena and the other gods and to them alone. They were sacred, inalienable funds, which, as Thucydides has Pericles say, could be borrowed in case of need, but which must then be wholly repaid, as failure to do so would be sacrilege.

There is no question of considering these funds as a depository that the Athenians created when the league's treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens, because a depository would have had to be, like the 'public coffers' (δημοσία κιβωτός) of the Delians, rigorously separated from the sacred treasure itself. If these funds actually came from the coffers of the allies, this signifies that the Athenians did not simply *deposit* these funds in the temple of Athena, but that they *dedicated* them to the divinity to boot, which is, from a legal point of view, fundamentally different.

(b) *Repayments (IG I³ 52)*

The Athenians did not have time to repay the 6,000 or so talents that they borrowed between 433 and 423. The Peace of Nicias, concluded in 421, barely lasted and from 418 the Athenians had to resort once again to loans from the sanctuaries (IG I³ 370).

All the same, in the years preceding the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians transferred large sums of money to the sacred treasury of Athena and other gods. We learn this from a decree proposed by Callias, which scholars date, undoubtedly with good reason, to the year 434/3 (IG I³ 52A = ML 58A). It refers to a previous decree, concerning the transfer of 3,000 talents to Athena, and commands that, this transfer being duly made, the money due to the other gods should be repaid (1.2–4: 'they are to give back to the gods the funds which are owed, since Athena's 3,000 talents, which were voted, have been brought up to the Acropolis' (ἀποδῶναι τοῖς θεοῖς [τ]ὰ χρέματα τὰ ὀφελόμενα, ἐπειδὴ τῆι Ἀθηναίαι τὰ τρισχίλια τάλαντ[α] ἀνεβένεγκεται ἐς πόλιν, ἢ ἐφσέφιστο)). The magistrates involved should set out an exact balance of the debt, which would be repaid from the funds controlled by the Hellenotamiai and from the tithe (δεκάτη). When the sums were entirely repaid, the balance should be used to rebuild the arsenals and the walls. It appears that the same day, Callias proposed another decree also focused on the question of repayments (IG I³ 52B). This decree, which was principally concerned with the annual allocation of ten talents to the construction work on the Acropolis and which prohibited the use of Athena's funds for other purposes, also stipulated that the Hellenotamiai should hand over to Athena's treasurers the money due to the gods and that the sum set aside for this was 200 talents. When this debt was repaid, Athena's treasurers should place the sacred funds of the goddess on the right-hand side of the Opisthodomus, and that of the other gods on the left.

It is therefore clear that, well before the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had taken out various loans from the 'other gods' that they

had, to all intents and purposes, undertaken to repay as soon as they were able to do so. As for the payment of 3,000 talents to Athena Polias, the word used (*anapheresthai*, ἀναφέρεισθαι) makes it unclear whether this was first and foremost a repayment or a gift to the goddess. For Beloch (*GG* II² 2, 346), it was evident that it referred to a repayment, whereas the editors of *ATL* state equally categorically that it could only have been a gift (*ATL* III, 328, followed by *ML*, p. 159). However, Beloch put forward some very convincing arguments²⁴ whilst the editors of *ATL* could call only on the uncertain meaning of the verb *anapheresthai* (ἀναφέρεισθαι). As a substantial part of the finance for the Samian campaign came from the treasury of Athena, everything points towards the 3,000 talents paid to Athena as the repayment of both this loan and other loans about which we have no information.²⁵

(c) Constructions

The Parthenon

The Parthenon accounts are relatively well preserved (*IG* I³ 436–431; cf. *ML* 59). These accounts, drawn up yearly by the *epistatai* overseeing construction, are made up of three sections for each year: balances which the *epistatai* received from their predecessors when they took over control; amounts which were allocated to them during the course of the year; and payments for work carried out during their term of office. In the early years, the sum transferred from one group of *epistatai* to another was relatively large, at least 33 talents (*IG* I³ 437, 40 f.), which suggests that at the beginning of work the *epistatai* received an initial capital of several dozen talents. The balance amounted to at least 33 talents in 441/0 (*IG* I³ 442, 173) but was subsequently entirely used up; by 434/3, only 1,470 drachmas (*IG* I³ 449, 378 f.) remained from this initial reserve. As well as this, the *Epistates* received, during the course of the year, funds from diverse other sources, principally the treasurers of Athena (at least 3 talents in 441/0 and 4 talents in 434/3) and the *Hellenotamiai* (at least 3 talents in 441/0). In 434/3, a year for which the accounts have been well preserved, there was no contribution

²⁴ *GG* II² 2, 326: 'It is not clear on what basis this amount would have been dedicated to Athena, as long as debts were still owing to the other gods, and even less clear why one should have paid off debts only to the treasuries of other gods and not to the treasury of Athena' ('Es is nicht abzusehen, aus welchem Grunde man der Athena diese Summe hätte weihen sollen, solange es noch Schulden an andere Götter abzahlen gab, und noch weniger, warum man Schulden nur bei den Schätzen der anderen Götter aufgenommen haben sollte und nicht bei dem Schatz der Athena').

²⁵ According to *Thuc.* I, 117, 3 the Athenians forced the Samians to reimburse their military costs. It is therefore very possible that the payments mentioned by the decree of *Callias* were made in part from the compensation paid by the Samians.

from the Hellenotamiai, but the treasurers of Athena and the sale of precious metals and ivory financed the completion of work. It seems that over the years, the annual contribution of Athena's treasurers stayed more or less constant whilst that of the Hellenotamiai diminished as the level of the initial capital was progressively reduced. From the evidence it appears that the funding was perfectly planned from the beginning.

The Propylaea

The accounts for the Propylaea (*IG I³ 462–6*; cf. *ML 60*) are set out in the same way as those for the Parthenon; that is to say, the transfer of balances from one group to the next, receipts during the year and expenditure for construction. In 435/4, the balance from the previous year amounted to at least 20,000 drachmas. The Propylaea accounts reveal precious additional information about transactions during the year; sums paid by the Hellenotamiai came from the *aparche*, that is to say the contribution from the allies to Athena equivalent to 1/60th of the tribute (*IG I³ 462, 15–17; 463, 71–3; 464, 109–11; 465, 123–5*). Besides this, the Hellenotamiai paid over to the *epistatai* several sums 'from the army' [*ἀπὸ στρατιᾶς*] that must have been part of the booty seized during military operations (464, 105–7; 465, 128–9; 466, 144–5). Of course, year after year there are payments from the treasurers of Athena.

The statue of Phidias

The accounts concerning the chryselephantine statue (*IG I³ 453–60*; cf. *ML 54*) specify only that the commission responsible for its realisation had received large amounts, several hundred talents in total, 'from the treasurers of the Acropolis' (*IG I³ 455, 7 ff.: παρὰ ταμιῶν ἐκ πόλεως*), which can only mean the treasurers of Athena. Obviously, the purchase of gold and ivory represented the main part of the expenditure.

Thus it appears that, to a very great extent, the treasury of Athena financed all the constructions on the Acropolis. To the Parthenon, the Propylaea and the chryselephantine statue, it is appropriate to add the Erechtheum, which seems to have been paid for in its entirety by the treasurers of Athena (*IG I³ 475, 94 and 476, 282 f.*). At the time that work commenced, therefore, the goddess' coffers contained considerable reserves that were directly intended for the building programme. The treasurers allocated an initial capital sum to the different commissions and then, each year, gave them several talents, to which came to be added the *aparche* and the share of the booty brought by the Hellenotamiai.

(d) *The income of Athena Polias*

It is clear that Athena Polias was rich, even extremely rich. The goddess' treasurers could withdraw from the *hiera khrêmata* the wherewithal to pay for the bulk of the construction work on the Acropolis, buy the gold and ivory for the statue of Phidias and, in spite of these considerable expenses, still be able to advance thousands of talents to the Athenians to cover the costs of war. Where did all this wealth come from?

Until now this question has hardly even been asked because it has always been taken as read that this sacred wealth was none other than the gold and silver reserves of the maritime league. It is certain, however, that Athena Polias must have had, like all the other sanctuaries in the Greek world, her own income, and therefore a 'personal fortune'. For the Athenians, like all other Greeks, set aside for their sanctuaries, whether those of the demes or of the city, sufficient funds to enable them to be financially independent of the public purse and even to accumulate some capital. This is proved by the fact that at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the 'other gods' possessed a global fortune of many hundreds of talents which certainly did not come from the treasury of the maritime league. The deme sanctuaries owned real estate that they rented out;²⁶ some disposed of liquid funds that they used to make loans.²⁷ The Athenians would certainly not have refused their city goddess that which they allowed to other divinities – they must have reserved for her 'sacred land' (ἱερὰ χώρα), property whose income covered the maintenance and the regular running costs of the sanctuary.²⁸ To this ordinary income, the *aparche* paid by the allies was subsequently added.

Clearly, it was neither these ordinary revenues from real estate nor the *aparche* that made possible the establishment of a capital base of several thousand talents. Usually, as we have seen, the fortune of a sanctuary was scarcely larger than some dozens of talents but the *dekatê*, the tithe drawn from war booty as an offering to the gods, should not be forgotten. The Persian Wars brought the Greeks considerable plunder, which was shared among the cities according to what they each merited. Even allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, the haul of Salamis, and

²⁶ Cf. B. Haussoullier, *La vie municipale en Attique: Essai sur l'organisation des demes du quatrième siècle* (Paris 1883), 147–50; D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica, 508-ca. 250 B.C.* (Princeton 1986), 178 ff.

²⁷ This is the case with Eleusis (SEG III, 35), of Myrrhinous (IG II² 1183, 27–32) and of Rhamnous (SEG X, 210). Cf. R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers*, 92–4.

²⁸ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1330a9 ff.: 'It is necessary therefore for the land to be divided into two parts . . . Of the common land one portion should be assigned to the service of the gods' (ἀναγκαῖον τοῖνυν εἰς δύο μέρη διηρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν . . . τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας).

still more that of Plataea, was far greater than anything the Greeks could have dreamt of (Herodotus VIII, 121; IX, 70 and 81). To this must be added the abundant spoils that the Athenians and the allies won later, not only in the major battles of Mycale, Eurymedon and others, but also from the raids on Persian territory which were the avowed goal of the coalition (Thuc. I, 96, 1). The ransoms received for prisoners of war should also be taken into account, from which a tithe was also paid to the gods.²⁹ The usual ransoms were in the region of one or two minas per prisoner,³⁰ but this figure could be much higher in the case of important captives. According to an anecdote of Plutarch (*Cim.* 9, 3–6), after the capture of Sestos and Byzantium, Cimon gave the allies the jewels and other valuables seized from barbarian prisoners and made so much money from the ransoms paid by the prisoners' friends and families that he was able to maintain the fleet for several months and still send the Athenian treasury a large amount of gold. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians freed some Corcryan prisoners, who must have been eminent persons, for the exorbitant sum of 800 talents (Thuc. III, 70, 1). From all this plunder, from ransoms, raids and the pillaging of cities, the Athenians, as leaders, received a substantial portion,³¹ from which, as was their duty, they dedicated one tenth to their gods, in particular to Athena Polias. By way of comparison, King Agesilaus offered Delphi a tithe of 100 talents after his two-year campaign in Asia, showing that the booty amounted to 1000 talents (Xen. *Ages.* I, 34).

This tithe was dedicated to the godhead in the form of statues or monuments of varying importance – the sacred precincts at Delphi were literally overflowing with such offerings (Paus. X, 9 and 11). On the Athenian Acropolis stood Phidias' celebrated statue of Athena, paid for from the spoils of Marathon (Paus. I, 28, 2). With their portion of the same booty, the Plataeans raised a sanctuary in honour of Athena, where the Athenians dedicated another of Phidias' statues (Paus. IX, 4, 1). With the spoils of Plataea, the Greeks together offered the famous tripod to Delphi, a colossal statue to Zeus at Olympia and another at the Isthmus in honour of Poseidon (Her. IX, 81). Moreover from their share, the Spartans constructed a portico decorated with

²⁹ For example, this is what the Athenians did at the end of the sixth century following a victory over the Chalcidians and the Boeotians (Her. V, 77).

³⁰ Cf. Her. VI, 79 = 2 minas in the Peloponnese and Diod. XIV, 192, 2 = 1 mina in southern Italy.

³¹ As in the Homeric period, booty was divided between the allies according to what each merited (Her. VIII, 121; IX, 81), the leader naturally receiving a more substantial share than the others; after the battle of Ambracia in 426, the Athenians set aside for themselves a third of the booty and shared out the rest amongst the allies (Thuc. III, 114, 1).

statues representing Persians (Paus. III, 11, 3; cf. Vitruvius I, 1, 6). After the battle of Himera, the Agrigentians forced the prisoners of war, who were their share of the booty, to work on the construction of sanctuaries and other buildings (Diod. XI, 25). We know of several porticos built between the sixth and fourth centuries from war booty, at Megalopolis (Paus. VIII, 30, 7), at Thebes (Diod. XII, 70, 5), at Sicyone (Paus. II, 9, 6) and at Olympia (Paus. VI, 24, 4). With the title on the sale of prisoners captured by the Ten Thousand, Xenophon acquired a piece of land at Scillous where he built a temple to Artemis (Xen. *Anab.* V, 3, 7–13). The construction of temples from the spoils of war was, as we know, very common in Rome,³² as it was in medieval Italy³³ and doubtless elsewhere.

It would seem logical that the Athenians acted in the same way and that they dedicated a share of the booty that they had seized, and were continuing to seize from the Persians, for the reconstruction of the temple of Athena, which the Persians had destroyed. It is easy to believe that after the Persian Wars, they put aside a tenth or more of their plunder, and continued to save on Athena's behalf until the accumulated reserves reached a level which permitted the realisation of the ambitious building programme on the Acropolis. This is entirely feasible, because from the spoils of Himera alone, the Agrigentians were able to erect several buildings, both religious and secular. It is even more probable that after the battle of Eurymedon in 470, the Athenians used their share of the booty to rebuild the southern wall of the Acropolis and for other works (Plut. *Cim.* 13, 5).

The accounts show that the Athenians demanded that their allies contribute to this reconstruction through the *aparche*. We do not know when they began to collect the *aparche*, or if the allies accepted it willingly. In any case, it was more symbolic than anything, less than seven talents in total, although not entirely negligible. However, the *aparche* leads one to think that the Athenians clearly distinguished this contribution of 1/60th, intended for Athena, from the tribute intended to cover the costs of war. It is difficult to see why the Athenians would have meticulously engraved on stone, year after year to the nearest obol, the *aparche* dedicated to Athena if they had already given to the goddess all the reserves accumulated by the league and used these funds as they

³² Cf. the thesis (to be published) of Michel Aberson, *Temples votifs et butin de guerre dans la Rome republicaine* [Rome 1994].

³³ The cathedral of Pisa was financed by the booty seized from the Muslims during the battle of Palermo, 18 August 1063 (information for which I am indebted to P. Fortini Brown). For the dedicatory text, see *Storia de'Normanni di Amato di Montecassino volgarizzata in antico francese, a cura di Vincenzo de Bartholomaeis* (Roma 1935), p. CXVII f. (This reference was given to me by Mario Turchetti from the University of Geneva.)

wished for the reconstruction of her temple. These painstakingly carved lists of the *aparche*, and the accounts from the Propylaea, in which the *aparche* is explicitly designated as one of the sources of finance for its construction, point to the conclusion that the *aparche* was the only contribution the allies made to the buildings on the Acropolis.

However, we must nevertheless verify this by examining whether it is realistically possible that, in the first twenty-five years of its existence, the maritime alliance could have built up a reserve of several thousand talents. This question lies at the heart of the matter.

III THE TREASURY OF THE HELLENIC LEAGUE³⁴

The fifth-century inventories and accounts discovered on the Acropolis are without exception inventories and accounts of sacred assets or documents relating to the sacred belongings of Athena Polias and the other gods. Even those lists that, in research literature, are referred to as lists of Attic tribute are in reality lists of the *aparche* dedicated to the goddess. That is to say, these accounts correspond to those that the treasurers at Delos designated as sacred goods, *hiera kibôtos*, which must not under any circumstances be confused with the public accounts of the Athenian state or the Hellenic League, which would be the equivalent of the *dêmosia kibôtos* in Delos. Such accounts must have once existed but they have not survived. Like other Greek cities, the Athenians did not see the necessity of inscribing accounts of their public finances in stone or bronze. Thus it is only indirectly, through the transactions conducted with the treasurers of Athena, that we can get an idea of the financial management of the federal treasury up to and during the Peloponnesian War.

In 441/0 and from 433/2 onwards, the treasurers of Athena advanced thousands of talents to the Hellenotamiai and the Athenian generals to finance military operations. Clearly, the league had no reserves at its disposal.³⁵ The sums borrowed, more than 1,000 talents over two years for the Samian campaign, demonstrate that the cost of a largish naval operation greatly exceeded the 400 or so talents that the Hellenotamiai collected each year from the allies. The repayments revealed by the Callias

³⁴ In partnership with G. Gottlieb, I have tried to demonstrate that that which is called the Delian League in scholarly literature was not a new alliance founded at Delos as is always stated, but was in fact the Hellenic League of 481, with the leadership simply transferred to Athens at the same time as it was decided to implement the *phoros* (cf. A. Giovannini and G. Gottlieb, 'Thukydides und die Anfänge der athenischen Arche', *SB Heid. Ak. d. Wiss.* 1980, 7.Abh.). This is why I will call this alliance the Hellenic League from now on.

³⁵ Cf. for this interpretation *ATL* III, 327 and 337 (other references in *ML*, p. 151). Against: Gomme, *HCT* II, 31–32.

decree show that in the absence of major operations there was in fact some surplus left from the *phoros*. The financial affairs of the confederation at this point were the same as those that characterised the public finances of Greek cities in general – income which was sufficient to cover everyday needs with recourse to special contributions, the generosity of the rich or loans to cope with extraordinary expenses. From the tribute, the allies were able to assure the policing of the seas by permanently maintaining a fleet of several dozen triremes, and they could allow themselves a large-scale operation from time to time, but a succession of major campaigns exceeded their financial resources and forced them to resort to borrowing.

It is difficult to see how, in these circumstances, the Hellenic League, in the first twenty-five years of its existence, could have accumulated a reserve of several thousand talents. Recently, R. V. Unz estimated that the league's total expenditure between 478/7 and 450 was at least 10,000 talents, which represents an annual average of around 350 talents.³⁶ If one accepts Thucydides' assertion that the tribute originally amounted to 460 talents,³⁷ and assuming that the tribute was not reduced during this period, the annual surplus appears to average 110 talents, which represents a total of 3,000 talents in 450. On the surviving tribute lists, the yearly tribute never exceeds 400 talents, leaving a surplus of no more than 1,500 talents.³⁸ To reconcile these facts with tradition, Unz is forced to assume that, from 477, the annual tribute increased progressively, reaching 560 talents in 450, a totally unsubstantiated hypothesis.³⁹ Even so, he still arrives at a surplus of only 5,000 talents. Nor can one assume that the accumulated reserves were the fruit of the spoils of war because, as far as we know, booty was always immediately shared out between the allies.

The calculation can be done quickly. In the most optimistic assessment, the league's coffers contained an accumulated reserve of at most 5,000 talents in 450. This means that of the 9,700 talents that the Acropolis treasury, according to Thucydides, contained before the start of construction and the siege of Potidaea, only 5,000 could possibly have come from the treasury of the league. In other words, at the time of the treasury's transfer from Delos to Athens, the goddess Athena

³⁶ Ron K. Unz, 'The Surplus of the Athenian Phoros', *GRBS* 26 (1985), 21–42.

³⁷ Thuc. I, 96, 2; cf. Gomme, *HCT* I, 273–80.

³⁸ For the period from 450 to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, it is accepted that the tribute was always less than 400 talents. For the period from 454 to 451, however, opinions are divided; 500 talents maximum according to the editors of *ATL* (III, 19–28), 400 maximum in the view of Gomme, *HCT* I, 273 f. and *ML*, p. 87 f.

³⁹ Art. cit. (*supra*, n. 36), 25 f. But the editors of *ATL* (III, 239–43), to whom he refers, estimate the *total* contribution of the allies at a little less than 600 talents, ships included.

already possessed a 'personal fortune' of at least 4,700 talents, much more than was needed to finance the building project. That being the case, it is inconceivable that the Athenians would have consecrated to the goddess very considerable sums of which she had no need at all. In so doing, not only would they have needlessly irritated their allies by stripping them of their property but they would have also deprived themselves of the free disposition of these funds since, by dedicating them to the goddess, they would have been obliged to repay all the sums which they borrowed from her. It was much more advantageous for them to deposit these funds in the temple under a separate account, as the Delians did at the start of the second century.

In any case, it is extremely doubtful that the allies would have permitted such an accumulation of reserves. Ancient authors are unanimous in recognising that the tribute fixed by Aristides was fair and that the allies voluntarily accepted this financial obligation. They would certainly not have done so if the total tribute had greatly exceeded the actual needs of the league. Thucydides (I, 97, 1 and III, 10, 4-5) also tells us that at the start the league was, to all intents and purposes, run by the Athenians and their allies together, which implies primarily a genuine control of the finances. If, after a few years, the allies had noticed that the league's financial requirements had been overestimated, they would certainly have demanded and obtained a reduction in the tribute, because it must be remembered that an accumulation of surplus was contrary to the financial practices of the Greeks.

However the problem is approached, no matter from which perspective it is viewed, it is more than improbable, not to say impossible, that the reserve of 10,000 talents in the temple of Athena came from the treasury of the Hellenic League. Everything points to the idea that the *phoros* was calculated in such a way that it would be sufficient to cover the military expenditure of the league in both good and bad years, but never to build up a large reserve. The surviving accounts of Athena's treasurers show that on the contrary, the Hellenotamiai had to rely on loans to finance expeditions of any scale. It was not with the allies' tribute that the Athenians were able to finance the building work on the Acropolis.

IV THE PARTHENON AND THE HELLENIC LEAGUE

The construction of the Parthenon commenced in 448/7. The start of work followed soon after Cimon's death in Cyprus in 449. It was also in 449, according to Diodorus, that the Athenians put an end to their

hostilities with the Persians by concluding the famous Peace of Callias (Diod. XII, 4, 4). With this treaty, the Great King renounced his claims to the cities of Asia Minor and undertook not to send his war fleet into the Aegean Sea; on their side, the Athenians agreed to end their operations against the Persians.

Scholars see a causal relationship between these different events. For them, the death of Cimon and the Peace of Callias marked a decisive turning point in Athenian politics, with regard to Persia on one hand and their allies on the other. It is within this context that they interpret Plutarch's anecdote regarding the financing of the Parthenon, from which they conclude, implicitly or explicitly, that its construction was made possible by the end of hostilities with Persia. Some go so far as to view this temple as a symbol of the triumphant imperialism of Athens, as a manifestation of its hegemony over its former allies, now its subjects.⁴⁰

The death of Cimon and the growing influence of Pericles effectively steered Athenian politics in a new direction. Until Cimon's death, and even during his years of exile, Athens ran an extremely dynamic foreign policy on all fronts, both on land and at sea. Brutally interrupted by the disastrous results of the Egyptian expedition, this policy was resumed with even greater determination in 451, spurred on by Cimon, now returned from exile. After his death in 449, Athenian foreign policy became much more cautious, and there is no doubt that the increasing prominence of Pericles played a significant part in this. The great statesman understood that Athens had reached the limits of its strength and needed to devote its energies and resources to the consolidation of its gains. He wanted Athens to be great and powerful, but wanted that power to be enduring, and therefore within the scope of its actual capabilities. It was a wise policy that Thucydides praised, contrasting it with the reckless expansionism of his successors.⁴¹ It is also clear that, in Pericles' time, Athens tightened its grip on the allied cities. Increasingly, Athens was perceived by the Greeks and saw herself, with a certain amount of pride, as an imperialist power, a 'tyrant city' (πόλις τύραννος).⁴²

Nevertheless it seems to me wrong to interpret this change of direction as a fundamental alteration of the relationship between Athens and

⁴⁰ Cf. particularly R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972), 152 ff. and 289 f.; W. Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund* (Berlin and New York 1974), 70 f.; S. Eddy, 'The Gold in the Athena Parthenos' (*AJA* 81, 1977, 107-11), 11, on the subject of Phidias' statue: 'a literal monument to Athenian imperialism'; E. Berger (ed.), *Parthenon-Kongress Basel* (Mainz 1984), 19 (A. E. Raubitschek) and 21 f. (W. Schuller).

⁴¹ I, 144, 1 and II, 65, 5-7, with Gomme's excellent commentary, *HCT* II, 189. See also *Plut. Per.* 20, 3-21, 1.

⁴² Cf. particularly the Corinthian dialogue in *Thuc. I*, 120-4.

its allies. Even if Athens had concluded a peace treaty with Persia, even if the Great King had formally renounced his claims to the cities of Asia Minor, which I believe to be completely out of the question,⁴³ the Athenians and their allies would have been extremely naïve and very imprudent to rely blindly on a piece of paper and dismantle their war fleet. The economic, strategic and military importance of the cities of Asia Minor was such that only a powerful navy, well maintained and well trained, could guarantee their independence from Persia. Furthermore, everyone in Greece was well aware that Persia was deeply hostile to democratic regimes, so that Athens and the democratic parties in its allied cities knew that only strength could protect them from the oligarchies and tyrannies that Persia could encourage. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the maritime alliance also had the role of maintaining security at sea, particularly against pirates, thereby facilitating commercial trade in the Aegean, towards the Black Sea and towards Egypt.

In fact, during the fifth century, Athens never ceased to emphasise its role as the champion of Greek liberty against the Barbarians: firstly, liberty at home through its defence of democracy; and then liberty overseas, through its battle against any Persian interference in Greek affairs. These two liberties had been inextricably linked in the Athenian mind since Persia had attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to put Hippias in power. It was the fundamental antithesis between the Greeks, born to be free, and the Barbarians, destined to be slaves, which inspired the work of Herodotus as it inspired many of Euripides' plays. In *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Agamemnon explains to his daughter that she must die so that the Greeks can remain free and not fall under the yoke of the Barbarians (lines 1270–5) – Iphigenia finally freely accepts her sacrifice because, *zas* she says, it is natural that Greeks rule Barbarians and not the reverse (v. 1368–1401).⁴⁴ For Pindar, Athens was the 'bastion of Greece' (F 76 Snell: Ἐλλάδος ἔρεισμα), whilst Aristophanes considered any negotiations with the Great King to be an act of treason (*Knights* 478; *Peace* 107 f. and 408). This anti-Barbarian ideology was, at the same time,

⁴³ In the never-ending controversy about the historicity of the Peace of Callias, Thucydides' silence remains, for me, a damning objection (cf. A. Giovannini and G. Gottlieb, *op.cit.*, supra, n. 34, p. 37, n. 122). Moreover, it seems that fourth-century authors located this peace not in 449/8, but much earlier, after the battle of Eurymedon, which, in my view, would settle this argument once and for all: cf. K. Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen* (Wiesbaden 1982), and E. Badian, 'The Peace of Callias', *JHS* 107 (1987), 1–39 (who accepts Meister's dating but defends nevertheless the historicity of the treaty).

⁴⁴ Cf. also *Medea* 536 ff.; *Heracleidae* 423; *Andromache*. 169 ff. and 665 ff.; *Hecuba* 119–20: 'how could the Barbarian ever be a friend to the Greek race?' (ποῦ ποτ' ἄν φίλον τὸ βάρβαρον γένοιτ' ἄν Ἕλλησιν γένος).

directed against Sparta and the other Peloponnesians whose attitude towards Persia was far more ambivalent, not to say frankly favourable – this is what Herodotus claims anyway (VIII, 73). In truth, the Spartans seriously considered allying themselves with Persia against the Athenians at the start of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. II, 7, 1). The Athenians truly were the heart of Greek opposition to the Barbarians.

The victorious struggle against the Barbarians is similarly the central theme of the iconography of the Parthenon, to such a degree that this temple, dedicated to Athena, can be seen as the concrete realisation of the ideology expressed by Herodotus, Euripides and Aristophanes. There are battles against Giants and Amazons on the shield of Phidias' statue, combats with Centaurs on its sandals (Pliny, *Natural History* XXXVI, 18); as far as one can recognise, the scenes which are represented on the metopes show battles with Centaurs at the south, with the Amazons or the battle at Marathon at the west, with Giants to the east and the Trojan War to the north.⁴⁵ The principal character of the Amazon and Centaur scenes, Theseus, was the hero who, according to veterans of the battle of Marathon, suddenly rose up from the Underworld during the fighting, to come to the aid of the Athenians.⁴⁶ Theseus had already been depicted battling besides the Athenians at Marathon on one of the frescoes of the Stoa Poikile, whilst a second fresco shows Theseus and the Athenians against the Amazons and a third, the Trojan War (Paus. I, 15). It is certainly Theseus fighting Centaurs and Amazons in the frescoes decorating the Theseion, built during the same period (Paus. I, 15). Theseus' battles with Centaurs and the Amazons, together with the Trojan War, thus became the mythical antecedents of the battle of Marathon, which would remain, for the Athenians, the most important event in their history. What the scenes portrayed on the metopes of the Parthenon and on Phidias' statue evoke, above all, is the victory at Marathon; they fall within an ideological and iconographical tradition which long predates both the transfer of the Hellenic League's treasury and the rise of Pericles. These scenes are not propaganda tools or justifications of imperialism thought up by Pericles;⁴⁷ on the contrary, they express the fundamental, one might say primeval, opposition between the Greeks and the Barbarians. The message represented by the Parthenon was not that the war between the

⁴⁵ On the identification of the scenes on the metopes cf. principally F. Brommer, *Die Metopen des Parthenon* (Mainx 1967); B. Wesenberg, 'Perser oder Amazonen?', *Arch.Anz.* 1983, 203–8; J. Borig, 'Les metopes Nord du Parthénon', in E. Berger (ed.), *Parthenon-Kongress Basel*, 202–5, and M. Robertson, 'The South Metopes', *ibid.*, 206–8.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Thes.* 35,8; cf. F. Brommer, *Theseus* (Darmstadt 1982).

⁴⁷ Cf. supporting this B. Wesenberg, art. cit. (supra, n. 45), 207 f.

Greeks and the Barbarians was now finished, but rather that it would last forever and would never end. That, at least, is what a visitor without preconceptions, who came to admire Phidias' statue and the sculptures of Athena's temple, would have understood. It was certainly Alexander the Great's understanding when, after the battle of Granicus, he sent the Athenians 300 Persian coats of armour to be dedicated to Athena (Arrian, *Anabasis* I, 16, 7). I believe that because of Ephorus and Plutarch, we have entirely misconstrued the symbolic meaning of the Parthenon.

I believe even more strongly that because of them we have overemphasised the importance of the transfer of the league's treasury, the death of Cimon and the rise of Pericles. We have located Plutarch's story of the financing of the Parthenon in a causal relationship with these events, by concluding that the years 449/8 marked a radical and dramatic turning point in the transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire. Thucydides claimed nothing of the sort, and the preceding exploration leads me to conclude once again that, for the Pentakontaetia, Thucydides' account is incomparably more reliable than those relayed by fourth-century orators and historians. It was little by little, one after another, and through their own fault because they refused to take part in the war effort against Persia, that the allies fell under the yoke of the Athenians (Thuc. I, 99).

9 Money Talks: Rhetor, Demos, and the Resources of the Athenian Empire[†]

LISA KALLET-MARX

The pervasiveness of finance in the life of the Athenian *polis* in the mid-to-late fifth century is patent when one looks at evidence as diverse as comedy and inscriptions concerned with the financial resources of the city and its empire. From the ubiquity of reference in Aristophanes to tribute, bribery, and pay,¹ from the *emmisthos polis* [city on the pay-roll] at home and the extraction and accumulation of revenue from the empire, to the published records of expenditures, loans, and tribute quota to Athena, the degree of ‘fiscality’ in the public realm, and of public consciousness about money, is remarkable. At the same time, the cohesion of the democracy depended on the stability of its institutions, but, as has become clear as well, it also relied greatly on rhetoric.² In rhetoric lies a crucial key to understanding the relationship between leader/*rhetor* and the *demos*, as it was the means by which their respective claims to power in the democracy were negotiated. But it also reveals how the Athenians collectively thought about the democracy and the empire, and illuminates the collective values, norms, and identity of the *polis*.

The realms of finance and rhetoric are indeed central to the public life of Periclean and post-Periclean fifth-century Athens; but their

[†] Originally published in S. Hornblower and R. G. Osborne (eds.), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts presented to David Lewis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994, 227–52.

It is a pleasure and an honour to dedicate this paper to David Lewis. I am grateful to Robin Osborne and Simon Hornblower for their stimulating comments on an earlier draft.

¹ The extraordinary prevalence of money as an explicit subject in the popular consciousness is implied by the overwhelming concentration on this area in many of Aristophanes’ plays. In the *Acharnians*, e.g., in the course of the first 100 lines or so, talk about money comes up in the realms of private transactions (its ubiquity is at issue), public service, bribery, theft, foreign embassies, pay for soldiers and rowers, and empire.

² See esp. N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass., 1986); J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton, NJ, 1989).

intersection has not been examined.³ I would like to show how their linkage enhances our understanding of such fundamental issues as consensus about the empire, and the relationship between financial knowledge and political power. There is a larger issue at hand here, and that is the nature of democratic leadership. Josiah Ober has argued that the Athenian *demos* was in reality a unified political entity, which dictated its collective will to aristocratic individuals, whom it allowed to be *rhetores*, and who in turn reflected the (unspoken) will of the masses.⁴ This thesis, while highly problematic, in my view, chiefly because of its presumption of a unified and like-thinking *demos* and its notion of the way rhetoric works,⁵ nevertheless redefines the nature of democratic leadership and thus demands a response. One way to approach this broader issue is to consider a concrete and specific area of public discourse and knowledge, namely finances of the *polis*. I claim no definitive answers; this paper is a preliminary study intended to suggest a different direction that in my view can be particularly instructive in understanding the relationship between *rhetor* and *demos* in Athens and the way that social consensus about the empire and political cohesion in the democracy were achieved during the period of Athens' empire.

THE EXTENT OF FINANCIAL KNOWLEDGE AMONG THE CITIZENRY

A useful starting-point is to ask how much the average male citizen in Athens knew about Athenian public and imperial finance, and what was the nature of his knowledge. The student of Athenian democracy is rightly impressed by the level of general knowledge about the administration of the *polis* and empire that the average citizen must have had. From service in one of the hundreds of annual magistracies, in addition to the annually selected Council of 500, attendance in the Assembly and courts,⁶ to the presence of countless inscriptions on stone scattered throughout the Agora and Acropolis concerned with the public life of

³ The study of F. Vannier, *Finances publiques et richesses privées dans les discours athénien aux v^e et iv^e siècles* (Paris, 1988) is related, though does not overlap with the approach taken here; for rhetoric and wealth in the 4th cent. cf. also Ober, 205–47. Neither is concerned specifically with the rhetorical use of financial knowledge in the construction of ideology.

⁴ e.g. *Mass and Elite*, 168.

⁵ I examine his thesis more fully in 'Institutions, Ideology, and Political Consciousness: Some Recent Books on Athenian Democracy', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55 (1994) 307–335.

⁶ For a convenient summary of the number of active participants annually see M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 313 (= ADAD).

Athens, the degree of awareness of the intimate workings of the democracy among the mass populace and of involvement in the political life of the city is, as has often been noted, one of the most extraordinary and singular features of classical Athens.⁷ Yet when we come to consider the extent and nature of public knowledge about finances among the mass of the Athenian male citizenry, some important qualifications emerge. The first place one thinks to look is the Assembly. But much of what the ordinary citizen learned there was filtered through the orator, whose political power through shaping public thought is precisely at issue here. Apart from the Assembly, what opportunities were there for citizens to acquire independent knowledge about finances? A brief survey of the means of obtaining accurate, detailed knowledge about the city's domestic and imperial, public and sacred finances will be instructive.

First, of the large number of annual magistracies in the fifth century, only a few, relatively speaking, were financial in function and scope, and the most important of these, for example, the Treasurers of Athena, or the Logistai, normally – and certainly in the fifth century – were filled by citizens of the highest census group.⁸ Even if restrictions against iteration were in effect in this period, still the percentage of the citizen population with direct experience as a treasurer on an important financial board was insignificant. Other magistracies which controlled funds or dealt with financial matters as part of their function, for example, the *apodektai*, the *kolakretai*, or *poletai*, were less restricted in property qualifications, but likely did not include *thetes* [the poorest citizens].⁹

Service in the Council offered the best chance to acquire knowledge about the public finances, given the Council's oversight of all important financial administration,¹⁰ including its supervision of the receipt of the annual tribute from the empire.¹¹ *Bouleutai* [councillors] would have heard the amounts of tribute paid by each city read out as it was brought into the Bouleuterion,¹² and also had a considerable role in determining

⁷ See e.g. Hansen, *ADAD* 232, 312; R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 31–4, 75–6; R. G. A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1982), 15.

⁸ See the list in R. Develin, *Athenian Officials 684–321 B.C.* (Cambridge, 1989), 7 ff.

⁹ Cf. Hansen, *ADAD* 249, who thinks the formal ban was a 'dead letter'. But even if true in the late 4th cent., it is unlikely to have been the case in the 5th. Relevant are vacancies on some boards in the 4th cent, which suggests, as Hansen notes (233), that the Athenians neither used compulsion on the top three property groups, nor necessary recourse to the *thetes* in the case of such deficiencies. Moreover, one could deny one's thetic status: but if an individual also owned no property, he would have to dissemble to a far greater extent in response to the questions asked him at his *dokimasia* [scrutiny hearing] (Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 55. 3). Also see n. 18, below.

¹⁰ See P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford, 1972), 88–113 (= AB).

¹¹ [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3. 2; *IG* i³ 34. 5 ff.

¹² *IG* i³ 34. 11–18.

tribute assessments, as they checked the amounts made by the *taktai* [tribute assessors].¹³ The Council's purview over finances is well illustrated by its role in drafting decrees dealing with complex financial matters such as the tribute-reassessment decree of 425, which then moved on to the *ekklesia* [assembly] for discussion and a vote.¹⁴ Unlike service on a specific, individual financial board, it was as a *bouleutes* that a citizen had the opportunity to get a good, general impression of the fiscal management of *polis* and empire, and in particular was in a position to know precise amounts of moneys in the sacred treasuries and in the Delian League coffers.¹⁵

What percentage of the male citizenry in the mid-to-late fifth century would have already been *bouleutai* in a given year?¹⁶ Athenians had to be 30 years old (or have reached their 30th year¹⁷), and there seems to have been a formal restriction prohibiting *thetes* from serving.¹⁸ Let us suppose as a working estimate a minimum figure of 40,000 for the number of male citizens at this time (larger estimates will strengthen my argument):¹⁹ if we assume an average age of 40 years for service on the Council,²⁰ with 20 more years in an average life expectancy, no more than 1/4 of the male citizenry would have been *bouleutai* during one previous year;²¹ higher estimates are likely, making it most probable that the proportion is nearer to 1/5. The additional question of the social background of the majority of *bouleutai* certainly bears on the issue, since if the élite were over-represented, then even fewer of the ordinary mass of citizens will have had experience of this vital administrative organ;²² and in any case, we can safely say that in the fifth century, *thetes* were not represented on the Council. Nevertheless, I am willing to suppose for the sake of argument the lowest population estimates,

¹³ IG i³ 71. 12–26.

¹⁴ [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3. 2; IG i³ 71. 4–7, 12–26, 44–50 (drafted in the Boule); see Rhodes, *AB* 88–113.

¹⁵ I have argued elsewhere that Delian League moneys were kept separate from the Treasury of Athena; see 'Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?', *CA* 8 (1989), 252–66.

¹⁶ Irrelevant for my purposes are estimates of service at any point in one's life, since what matters is financial knowledge already acquired by a citizen.

¹⁷ Rhodes, *AB* 1 n. 7.

¹⁸ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 7. 4. See Rhodes, *AB* 4–6. Hansen, *ADAD* 108, thinks that a 'large slice' of the membership of the Boule came from the *thetes* (erroneously citing Rhodes, *AB* 4–6, in support); cf. also *ADAD* 249, and, on the basis of Aristotle, that the formal bar was not observed: *thetes* simply did not note their property status.

¹⁹ For a useful collection of bibliography see Sinclair (n. 7), appendix Ia–c, and add P. J. Rhodes, *Thucydides. History II* (Warminster, 1988), 271–7.

²⁰ M. H. Hansen, *Demography and Democracy* (Herning, 1985), 55–6; *LCM* 13 (1988), 67–9; *ADAD* 249; cf. R. Osborne's comments in *JHS* 107 (1987), 233.

²¹ It is not likely that citizens could serve an additional term in the 5th cent.; see Rhodes, *AB* 3.

²² See Rhodes, *AB* 4–6; Hansen; *ADAD* 249; Sinclair (n. 7), 66.

and vigilant, informed bouletic service as broadly spread among the citizenry as possible; even so, how much continuing, up-to-date, and comprehensive knowledge would this have brought to a former *bouleutes*? He would undeniably have been in a better position than non-*bouleutai* to assess financial information with which he was provided in the future, but as for knowledge of the city's finances for all but one year, my answer would be 'not very much'.

Inscriptions concerned with finances that were published on stone and readily accessible for reading dotted the Athenian landscape, especially conspicuous and numerous in the Agora and on the Acropolis. They included the tribute quota lists, reassessments of tribute, loans from the sacred treasuries, expenses of military expeditions, inventories, and the like. But inventories did not record 'cash', and documents recording expenses and loans are silent on overall income, expenditure, and reserve. The question of who actually read these documents is important, and ultimately impossible to answer in any comprehensive way. We certainly cannot *assume* that their existence presupposes wide readership; their functional value was symbolic as well as practical as signifiers of democracy, and the former role is undiminished if the inscriptions were mostly looked at rather than read.²³ But it is clear that the precise contents of inscriptions were a matter of concern as documents to be consulted,²⁴ a fact that precludes a purely symbolic function. Still, the extent of readership is uncertain. Nevertheless, let us suppose substantial perusal of inventories, building accounts, lists of loans, and the like, even so a forest of stelai can hardly have facilitated broad comprehension of the city's finances; and to reiterate, since these stones are mute on totals of money in the forms of revenue, comprehensive expenditures, and reserves, neither their nature nor their overwhelming number would have facilitated a good working knowledge of the city's overall fiscal status.

Two conclusions emerge from reviewing the various means by which male citizens in Athens could learn about finances thus far. First, there was ample opportunity for them to acquire details about specific fiscal areas, from assiduous perusal of inscriptions and, with the (major) exception of *thetes* and all others under 30, from serving on the Council. But the second point is the one that needs to be stressed: however many pieces of financial information were either circulating in Athens, or accessible to one with a little more diligence, overall fiscal understanding not only of the amounts of money entering and leaving the city, or

²³ As R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989), 61, has recently pointed out.

²⁴ Cf. e.g. [Dem.] XLVII. 71; implicit in *SEG* XXVI. 72, 55–6; *Ar. Birds* 1050.

remaining in reserve, but also of the uses to which the city's money was and should be put, was not within his own grasp. Though rudimentary and meagre by modern western standards, the diverse nature and sources of revenue, domestic and imperial, the various repositories of money, temporary and long-term, and the fiscal decisions involving both the domestic and imperial affairs of the *polis* all attest to and underscore the complexity, in its context, of Athenian public finance. It may appear somewhat paradoxical that, as I am suggesting, the sheer abundance of publicly accessible information may have impeded knowledge and understanding about the city's finances.

And so we return to the Assembly. For it was there that citizens would receive a barrage of financial details concerned with the *polis* and the empire, sometimes as a matter simply of being informed, but usually when presented with a proposal on the spot or a *probouleuma* [provisional decree of the Council] on which a vote was required. These decisions could be of the utmost importance to the welfare of the *polis*. For example, Athenians could be faced with making decisions such as that at Assembly meetings some time before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: should they concentrate the treasure of the gods of Athens and Attica on the Acropolis? Should they deposit 3,000 talents in the treasury of Athena? Should they repay debts to the gods, and, if so, out of what funds?²⁵ Or they confronted on a regular or semi-regular basis questions such as these: do we accept this tribute assessment? Should we do something about the tribute shortfall, and if so, what? In order to maintain our revenue, should we impose tribute or an indemnity on this ally which has revolted, or send out a clerouchy?

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RHETOR AND DEMOS

Financial information preliminary and necessary to making not only specifically financial decisions, but also decisions about the empire or the *polis* on which financial issues had bearing, had to be disseminated in a comprehensible way that enabled the average citizen to make a decision. Even in the case of specific *probouleumata*, we should by no means assume that the Assembly's function was to rubber-stamp: the presence of riders in probouleumatic decrees presupposes discussion,²⁶ which, it is reasonable to suggest, might often be far more wide-ranging than the limited issue with which the rider dealt. But even without much debate,

²⁵ These are questions that are presupposed in the first Kallias Decree, *IG* i³ 52 (Fornara 119).

²⁶ e.g. *IG* i³ 71. 51.

or argument over specific financial details, still the Assembly had to have the basic competence to judge. It is worth stressing that those attending the Assembly between the ages of 18 and 30 will neither have held any magistracy nor served on the Council of 500, and a minority will have seen service in the Boule for a single year, and an even smaller minority would have been magistrates with a financial function. The majority of Assembly-goers, then, would be armed with little knowledge outside what they learned in the Pnyx, or with some details, but comprising only bits and pieces, of the *polis*' fiscal picture. Thus they would need instruction as well as advice on this critical area of public life; for this they depended on the *rhetor* in assembly, who had, correspondingly, to be increasingly specialized in his knowledge, and whose experience as a *bouleutes*, for example, could be particularly valuable.²⁷ The need for instruction holds true even if, in general, specific financial details were not debated in the Assembly itself. For example, a speaker who dealt with some of the items that preceded the Kallias decree A will have had to know which specific sources of revenue had sufficient amounts not designated for other purposes with which to repay the gods of Athens and Attica.²⁸

Now the general expertise of the *rhetor* may be uncontroversial, and the relative ignorance of the ordinary citizen no revelation. But it is important to illustrate ancient attitudes toward and reflections of this relationship in order to be able to go beyond mere recognition of the knowledge gap between political leader and the *demos*: we need to confront the implications of the fact that, when a *rhetor* spoke on an issue with which the city's finances were in any way concerned, he was not as a rule telling the majority of listeners what they already knew, except in so far as he was building on, reinforcing, or reiterating that on which he or another *rhetor* had instructed them previously, or elucidating and pulling together those bits and pieces gleaned outside the Assembly. Just how much knowledge or expertise is at issue must be explored more fully elsewhere. Here I wish simply to establish the general structure of the relationship between *rhetor* as teacher and audience as student, and then pursue its implications.

The rhetor as instructor

An important piece of evidence that illustrates the contrast between public ignorance of the city's overall fiscal status and an orator's

²⁷ Cf. Ar. *Knights* 772 ff., which is usually taken as a reference to Cleon's role as a *bouleutes*, and in any case attests to the recognition of the need for expert guidance.

²⁸ IG I³ 52. 5-7.

command of such knowledge is the famous accounting of Athens' financial resources by Pericles on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2. 13), in which the statesman refers to the annual total of imperial revenue, and the quantity and nature of Athens' reserves. This speech has received enormous attention in the scholarship on Thucydides, the Athenian empire, and Athenian finance. We need not engage at all in the traditional controversies, for what matters here is the very existence of a combination of detail and of comprehensive knowledge about the amounts of revenue entering the city, amounts of reserve, and their origin. The contents of the passage, given its nature, while not the statesman's actual words – after all it is not even related as a direct speech, but is given in *oratio obliqua* [reported speech] – do, in my view, reflect what Pericles actually said.²⁹ But the particular value of the passage for my purposes here, as that of other speeches in Thucydides, does not depend on the 'authenticity' of the speech. For if it, like others, was not written with the orator's original as a guide, then it still was composed with the aim of persuasion of which an essential factor was appropriateness. In this case, the passage illustrates what Pericles the orator would be expected to know and to say.

Significantly, the wealth of detailed information, but also its nature, makes clear that the statesman was not rehearsing before his fellow-citizens well-known information, information they all knew from their experience in the administration of the city; on the contrary he was instructing them.³⁰ In particular, information about totals of cash in income and reserve would not have been widely known unless an orator researched and provided it, especially as public funds were not housed in one location, but in several, and, with the exception of the annual quota to Athena, were not inscribed on stone.

Confirmation of the implications of Thucydides 2. 13 and a further illustration of the distance between orator and the mass of the male

²⁹ An indication of Thucydides' careful reporting of the precise details of Pericles' speech is his parenthetical exegesis in the midst of relating the financial account. Thuc.'s decision to render it in *oratio obliqua* is obviously deliberate; but what was the reason? As written, it is virtually fused with the narrative, thus raising the possibility that it is near-governed by the principles guiding Thucydides in his composition of the narrative as opposed to the speeches, that is, giving it a higher status of authority. But it is also the case that the use of *oratio obliqua* allows Thucydides to step in and gloss the speech as he does, which would be impossible in *oratio recta*.

³⁰ Cf. Plut. *Per.* 15. 3: Pericles as someone 'persuading and teaching' [πείθων καὶ διδάσκων]. I find support for the argument that Pericles was instructing his audience in 2. 13. 3–5 in the way that Thucydides ends his report of the speech: 'Pericles also put forward his usual arguments to show how they would win through in the war' [ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐξ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ] (2. 13. 9). The phrasing implies that what Thucydides has included in 2.13 was out of the ordinary, i.e. not typical of an exhortation, but that the rest of his speech was traditional.

citizenry comes from the fourth century. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1359^b8) names finances (strictly, *poroi*, ‘revenues’ [πόροι]) as the first of five general subjects on which people deliberate and on which deliberative orators give advice in public. ‘Orators should know’, he writes, ‘what and how extensive the revenues of the city are . . . and all the expenses as well.’³¹ Moreover he stresses the importance of research even into practices in other cities, making clear that the skilled orator was someone expected to possess knowledge unknown to his audience.³² Another useful example comes from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (3. 6. 5–6), where we meet Glaukon, an aspiring orator and leader of the *polis* whose ambition so exceeded his ability that he made a complete laughing-stock out of himself and had to be dragged off the *bema* [speaker’s platform]. Enter Socrates, who sets out to dampen Glaukon’s political aspirations. He questions Glaukon to discover whether he has the knowledge required in an orator. He begins with finances. ‘Tell me the sources of revenue (*hai prosodoi* [αἱ πρόσοδοι]); for no doubt you’ve looked into this (*eskepsai* [ἔσκεψαι]), in order to eliminate deficiencies.’ ‘Good god, no!’, replies Glaukon. ‘Well, then, what about the expenditures (*tas dapanas* [τὰς δαπάνας]) of the city?’ ‘Fact is, Socrates, I haven’t had time for that either.’ After running through other areas of expertise in which Glaukon is painfully deficient, Socrates wonders how his young friend will ever be able to persuade his fellow citizens. This amusing anecdote is useful for our purposes in its presumption that an orator had specialist knowledge and, as important, that the general populace lacked a good grasp of knowledge about finances. Of particular importance, moreover, is that it links specialist knowledge with the orator’s capacity to persuade.³³

We can appreciate already the connection between financial knowledge, advice, and persuasion from these examples, and they are closely related to the common democratic image of the orator as teacher, against which Plato polemicizes at length.³⁴ But what needs special emphasis is that the conception of the orator as teacher (*didaskalos* [διδάσκαλος]) has implications rather different from his other common metaphorical guise, that of its adviser (*sumboulos* [σύμβουλος]). For whereas the role

³¹ Ὄστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν δεοὶ ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι . . . ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἀπάσας.

³² ‘it is also necessary to be informed about things discovered among others in order to give advice on these matters’ [ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλίην], 1359^b8.

³³ The question of how much expertise an orator might normally have is one that requires more attention than is possible here. For now, however, it is sufficient to recognize assumptions about the orator’s superior knowledge in order to establish the disparity between orator and average citizen.

³⁴ e.g. *Gorgias* 447c3, 453d7–10, 454c–455 ff.; cf. also *Arist. Rhet.* 1404^a6.

of the *rhetor* as adviser can be construed as evidence of the power of the *demos*, in his capacity as instructor the table turns, for as teacher instructing students, the orator is endowed with enormous power. Now the professionalism required in *rhetoires* by the mid-fifth century alone confirms that the distance between political leader and the mass of the citizenry would have been growing through the disparity in knowledge and thus power. But the question I want to raise is how this knowledge was used. How specifically did orators talk about money? How did they maintain their power and reinforce democratic cohesion at the same time? What are the implications of this power?

Financial knowledge as an instrument of power

Let me return to Thucydides 2. 13. Pericles' grasp of finances and his instruction to the Athenians concentrates power in him and enables him to produce a certain response in his listeners. As Thucydides presents it, Pericles begins by advising the Athenians on the best strategy to adopt in the coming struggle, including keeping firm control of the empire. For the Athenians' strength, he asserts, lay in the revenue of money from the allies, and by means of a combination of *gnomê*, 'intelligence' [γνώμη], and *periousia chrêmatôn*, 'financial surplus' [περιουσία χρημάτων], Athens would win. Then follows a detailed catalogue of the city's finances. What effect would it have had? First, we need to appreciate the fundamental emotional or psychological component of this financial list: the purpose of Pericles' account record is not deliberative; rather it is designed to produce a psychological state, *tharsos*, 'boldness' [θάρσος], one of the emotions Pericles was apparently particularly adept at arousing – and crushing – in the *demos*.³⁵

How would this result have been achieved? Modern work on rhetoric and communication has elucidated the ways in which the pre-existing authority of a speaker is instrumental to the success and interpretation of a speech, and is inseparable from the set of social relations, or the *institution*.³⁶ We can see from Thucydides how Pericles' financial mastery was central to building up his authority as instructor. The same financial list produced by someone other than Pericles might not have produced acceptance and *tharsos* [θάρσος]. But his authority was built on the basis of his rhetorical ability, financial knowledge,

³⁵ Thuc. 2. 65. 9.

³⁶ Speech-act theory developed by J. L. Austin is particularly useful as a starting point; see *How to Do Things With Words*, 2nd edn., ed. J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà (Oxford, 1975); see also P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), esp. 107–59.

generalship, and role as instructor in the milieu of the Assembly, constituted and reinforced previously. Indeed, this passage is instrumental for showing precisely how Pericles, by displaying his control over financial information, might thus keep the *demos* behind his policy and consequently continue to maintain his own power. This display of what, by practice and repetition, was elevated to specialist knowledge would have confirmed his role as instructor – and thus superior – and that of the *demos* in assembly as student, and fostered acceptance of this unequal relationship as a normal part of the status quo.

The effect of Pericles' authority as financial expert, then, means that his word on financial matters would have been accepted. A good illustration of this point comes from Plutarch (*Per.* 23. 1), who records an anecdote of which the authenticity is confirmed by a parody in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (858–9), in which the *demos* approved without question or debate an unspecified expenditure ('for necessities' [εἰς τὸ δέον]) of ten talents submitted by Pericles for the Euboean campaign in 446.³⁷ This passage illuminates the potential power over both the city's finances and the *demos* that a successful orator possessed: his word on financial matters could be accepted without discussion; thus it also implicitly acknowledges that it was acceptable to the *demos* not to know and judge all financial matters involving its own money. A final illustration of the association made between financial expertise and power comes from Aristophanes' *Knights* (772 ff.), where Paphlagon tries to edge ahead of Sausage-Seller in the contest to lead Demos by citing his success in producing 'money to fill the public treasury' [χρήματα πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ] when he advised the Athenians. Whether or not this passage refers specifically to Cleon's capacity as *rhetor*/adviser while he was a *bouleutes*,³⁸ it implicitly demonstrates that a *rhetor*'s mastery over finances, which underlies an ability to increase the treasury, should be cashed in for personal political power.

These passages, combined with evidence pointing to an increasing tendency of the city's political leaders to be financial experts throughout the late fifth and fourth century, reveal the critical role of the *rhetor* as financial specialist and teacher.³⁹ Moreover, inasmuch as an individual leader's fiscal knowledge shapes an expectation of *rhetoires* necessarily

³⁷ Ephoros 70 F193 at schol. Ar. *Clouds* 859 puts it at 20 talents; see P. A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989), ad loc.

³⁸ The verb used for Paphlagon's advising is *bouleuō* [βουλευῶ]. Rhodes. *AB* 88, takes it as certain that this passage in *Knights* refers to Cleon's activity as a *bouleutes*.

³⁹ Hansen, *ADAD*, makes a dividing line between the 5th cent, and the 4th, giving special weight to the fact that *rhetoires* in the 4th cent, were increasingly elected financial officials (270). But the combination of financial expert and *rhetor*, while not institutionalized in the same way that it was in the 4th cent., begins in the 5th.

as financial experts, his rivals and successors – such as Thucydides, son of Melesias, or Cleon – would claim and demonstrate their financial skills as well.⁴⁰ This is significant, for the conception of the orator as financial expert makes him the central focus of instruction and advice on financial matters, not, ultimately, the Council, or some financial magistrate. Likewise, it reinforces the notion that it is in the Assembly that one can expect to learn about finances.

What are the implications of this role for understanding the relationship between leader and *demos* as well as the broader function of financial knowledge in the hands of the *rhetor*? First, if the orator is regarded as someone with specialist knowledge and is authorized to instruct, then this gives him potentially enormous influence. For not only does he have the opportunity to convert financial knowledge into political power in democratic Athens, he does much more than simply disseminate information and give specific advice: he is also in a position to shape public opinion about Athens' finances and the uses to which they should be put,⁴¹ in short, to set the boundaries and the context within which the *demos* judges the information and advice he gives. Plato's gibe (*Gorg.* 515e) that Pericles made the Athenians 'money-grubbers' (*philargurous* [φιλαργύρους]), notwithstanding its tendentiousness, is useful in illustrating the power – and recognition of the power – of the orator not just to affect what people do but their attitudes as well. What precisely these attitudes are and how they are shaped and reflected in popular consciousness is our next step.

SHAPING ATTITUDES ABOUT FINANCES, EMPIRE AND THE DEMOCRACY

When we come to consider the role of the *rhetor* and his ability to constitute collective attitudes about and responses to Athens' financial wealth, in addition to appreciating the pre-existing authority of the orator that would affect the reception to his words, we need to recognize a further factor, namely, the way in which the effect of a particular speech is intimately bound up with the ways that a society collectively is preconditioned to receive and interpret a speech, by means of associations with words and ideas, of ideology, and of expectations.⁴² In what I am concerned with here, specifically the realm of public finance. Athenian listeners would have been predisposed to respond in a certain

⁴⁰ Cf. Ar. *Knights* 772 ff.

⁴¹ Sinclair (n. 7), 66, though he puts it in terms of policy-shaping.

⁴² See the useful discussion by J. B. Thompson in his introduction to Bourdieu (n. 36), esp. 6–14.

predictable way to financial information because their attitude toward Athens' public finances had already been shaped and was constantly being reinforced through a complex interaction between speakers and listeners.

Once again, Pericles' speech in Thucydides 2. 13 is a valuable source for our purposes, for in addition to demonstrating the specialist knowledge of the *rhetor*, and his role as instructor, it also shows how a new public discourse about power had developed, at the centre of which was money. Pericles' speech was produced in such a way as to recreate and reinforce a context within which the *demos* would understand and interpret his remarks. That the statesman used as a chief means of producing the desired emotional response of confidence, *tharsos* [θάρσος], a list of Athenian resources, virtually a catalogue of money – much like a catalogue of ships – illustrates neatly the predisposition of collective Athenian attitudes. The Athenian audience had to have been *conditioned* to think of Athens' strength as lying in its money in order to be emboldened by a financial list. By contrast, consider the ephor Sthenelaidas' argument before his Spartan audience to vote for war against Athens: 'the Athenians may have money and ships and horses, but we have brave men' (*summachoi agathoi*, 'brave allies' [ξύμμαχοι ἄγαθοί], 1. 86. 3). Sthenelaidas' audience, conditioned to think of its strength as lying in strong and brave manpower, and responding predictably to this traditional and typical formulation, would have had a very different reaction to such a financial list: it may have found it appealing to the ear,⁴³ but there is no reason why it would have been encouraged and emboldened; rather it might have been perplexed. How then had Athenians been predisposed in this way? We need to consider more closely the nature of the Athenians' collective attitude toward financial resources suggested by the opening of Pericles' remarks.⁴⁴

The necessity of money and empire for power

There are two formulations that emerge as givens and that have in turn logical and identical corollaries: the first is that money from the empire is necessary for Athens' strength and survival – and so the empire is necessary – and the second is that money from the empire is essential for

⁴³ Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1383^a20. We can speculate that it would have had a pleasurable effect as well, given the fondness, typical of oral cultures, for listening to catalogues and lists of various kinds. Cf. the Boeotian school of catalogue poetry; and Plato, *Hipp. Maior* 285d, on the Spartans' preference for hearing genealogical lists.

⁴⁴ Thuc. makes this sort of analysis very easy because of his decision to concentrate attention on Athens' financial resources to the exclusion of other traditional exhortatory arguments that Pericles apparently used (2. 13. 9).

the workings of the democracy – and so the empire is necessary. The first is well illustrated by Thucydides in several different contexts in which a key formulaic phrase occurs, namely ‘the revenue from the allies from which our strength derives’ [ἡ πρόσοδος ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων δι’ ἣν ἰσχύομεν] or variants. According to Thucydides, Pericles introduced his exhortation on the eve of war by noting that Athens’ strength lay in the revenue of money from the allies (‘the strength which came to them [from the allies] derived from the influx of money’ [τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων [τῶν ξυμμάχων] εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου], 2. 13. 2), and that the Athenians would win the war by a combination of good judgement (*gnomê* [γνώμη]) and financial resources (*periousia chrêmatôn* [περιουσία χρημάτων]). It is important to underscore that Athens’ strength was put in these terms, not in reference to manpower or individual prowess or the like. Thus, implicit in what follows is the understanding that all of the revenue from the empire flowing into the city’s public coffers had enhanced value through its intimate link with power; this applied as well to the city’s reserve and other revenue.

In the Mytilenean debate, similar phrases appear in both Cleon’s and Diodotus’ speeches: Cleon insists that the Athenians maintain their decision to exact severe penalties for the Mytileneans’ revolt, and when he comes to the rationale behind his view, the larger context is the link between imperial revenue and power: we need a strong deterrent because *poleis* weakened by lengthy sieges will be unable to provide ‘future revenue by which we are strong’ (τῆς ἔπειτα προσόδου, δι’ ἣν ἰσχύομεν, 3. 39. 8). Diodotus, in his turn, champions more lenient punishment, rejecting the view that harsh measures were successful deterrents: *poleis* will revolt anyway; but if they know they will not suffer grievously by coming to terms, they will surrender before their resources are severely impaired. But if they know that the punishment will be harsh no matter what, they will keep resisting until their resources have been exhausted; and then we shall be deprived ‘of its revenue for the future, the cause of our strength against our enemies’ (τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς στéρεσθαι; ἰσχύομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε, 3. 46. 3). Significantly, though Cleon and Diodotus are at loggerheads in their recommendations to the assembly, the same assumption underlies and informs both positions, one that presupposes the equation of power with expense, and power with imperial revenue. They both present as a given the necessity of imperial revenue for the city’s strength, that is, they too presume, and reinforce, the equation of money and power. Listeners are forced to judge the strengths and weaknesses of the different proposals; but just as in Pericles’ speech, the expense/power link is presented in such a way as to engender acceptance, indeed complicity.

If the nature of the evidence in Thucydides explored thus far – repeated phrases in speeches by different individuals and especially the unspoken assumptions that underlie the text – has been understood properly here, then the idea of the necessity of money and empire is not restricted to that author, but rather should be seen as a reflection of fifth-century attitudes more generally.⁴⁵ Consideration of the famous building debate in Plutarch, *Pericles* 12, in which Thucydides, son of Melesias, reportedly assailed Pericles for the (mis)use of allied money on beautifying the *polis* with costly temples and the like, is instructive.⁴⁶ Both the attack and Pericles' response, in which he is said to have insisted on the validity of using imperial revenues for such expenditures, like the previous example from the Mytilenean debate, reveal an unquestioned, underlying assumption about the empire, namely, that taking money from the allies is normal, and, most important, that taking money in *excess of* what the military needs of the Delian League demanded was normal as well. Disagreement could arise over the proper use of imperial funds beyond the military demands of the *polis*; but the exploitation and appropriation of the resources of the allies is treated as a given. The pervasive acceptance of this assumption may find reflection in the apparent absence of any argument by Pericles' rivals which might question the need or the validity of taking money over and above what was required for the military needs of the *polis*.

It is essential to appreciate that *rhetores* were choosing to express Athens' power in these terms – not, for example, that Athens' strength lay in its men, or in individual bravery and collective training; rather, they were privileging money, more specifically the expenditure of money. In this context a word like *dapanê* [δαπάνη], expenditure, or expense, when used in reference to the *polis* and its power is culture-specific and endowed with pregnant associations particular to Athens (though by no means unique to Athens) – expenditure signified power and superiority, for it was Athens whose power was linked through rhetoric as well as in reality to the idea of expenditure. *Dapanê* [δαπάνη] is what Michael McGee would call an 'ideograph', a term which in a particular context is a sort of 'building block' of ideology, or collective consciousness.⁴⁷ The ideograph 'expenditure', expanded explicitly into the formula 'Athens'

⁴⁵ This is not to deny that certain aspects of Thuc.'s treatment of power and empire may be unusual or unique, as J. Allison, in *Power and Preparedness in Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1989), has argued in the case of *paraskēue* [preparation] in Thucydides.

⁴⁶ Of course not all scholars accept this debate either as genuine or reflective or a genuine debate, e.g. A. Andrewes, 'The Opposition to Perikles', *JHS* 98 (1978), 1–8 (on which cf. P. A. Brunt's comments in 'Free Labour and Public Works at Rome'. *JRS* 70 (1980), 97 n. 87): for discussion of the passage cf. also Stadter (n. 37), ad loc; L. Kallet-Marx, 'Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?', *CA* 8 (1989), 260–2.

⁴⁷ M. C. McGee, 'The "Ideograph": A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66 (1980), 1–16.

strength lay in the expenditure of money’, has the apparent authority of a given – but it is in fact a rhetorical formulation that became a collective democratic belief.

Additional insight into the shaping of assumptions about money, power, and empire comes from Pseudo-Xenophon, whose *Old Oligarch* puts the basis of Athenian strength in a familiar way: ‘Someone might say that the strength of the Athenians lies in the ability of their allies to pay tribute’ (εἶποι δέ τις ἂν ὅτι ἰσχύς ἐστὶν αὕτη Ἀθηναίων, ἐὰν οἱ σύμμαχοι δυνατοὶ ὧσι χρήματα εἰσφέρειν, 1. 15). It is noteworthy, however, that his formulation is phrased as a proposition, an argument, typical of the author’s approach whereby two opposing interpretations are presented. The first is that money from the empire brings power to the Athenians. The second, the ‘democratic’ interpretation, is rather that ‘To those of radical democratic views it seems to be more advantageous for individual Athenians to have the wealth of the allies and for (the allies) to retain just enough to live on, and to work without being in a position to conspire’ (τοῖς δὲ δημοτικοῖς δοκεῖ μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὰ τῶν συμμάχων χρήματα ἕνα ἕκαστον Ἀθηναίων ἔχειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ὅσον ζῆν, καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀδυνάτους ὄντας ἐπιβουλεύειν). The existence of alternatives makes the first not an underlying assumption, but rather an argument, to be rejected in favour of a different way of looking at money and power. It is instructive for what it says about attitudes about money and power expressed in other contexts: they are all rhetorical formulations, not givens, or truths. A little further on, reference is made to the allies ‘who pay tribute’ (2. 1), a frequent formulation in Thucydides. Indeed the allies do pay tribute; but they need not be referred to in this formulaic way, rather than simply as ‘allies,’ or ‘cities whom the Athenians rule’.

Consider as well the alternatives in expressing the relationship between the allies and the Athenians: the allies make the city strong (*dunamin* [δύναμιν]; [Xen.] 1. 2); but an alternative expression was current as well: the allies make the Athenians wealthy ([Xen.] 1. 15). The latter is expressed in such a way as to imply the empire’s existence for the sake of wealth as an end rather than a means. While from the standpoint of the *polis* this is unsatisfactory in collective Athenian ideology (i.e. the wealth of the *polis* is acquired to be *spent*), from the standpoint of the individual citizen such a formulation would be compelling. Indeed, it is on the level of the individual male citizen that underlying assumptions about the empire are especially illuminating, a point to which I shall return.

It is important to recognize the unusual nature, in its Greek context, of fifth-century Athenian rhetorical conceptions of money and power.

Two points will make this apparent. First, that financial resources are essential to military success is a virtual commonplace today.⁴⁸ But such a view, that war and power cost money, was still novel in the mid-to-late fifth century, not surprising when one recognizes that the traditional milieu of war was on land and in that sphere the role of public money in waging war was non-existent or minimal – up to the time of the Peloponnesian War, that is. Sparta's traditional military pre-eminence and extreme financial poverty are the best illustration of this fact. The exigencies of naval power, demanding the heavy expenditure of public cash,⁴⁹ changed this fact irrevocably, but not only was it a relatively recent change, it had to be consciously and explicitly introduced to replace old ways of thinking about wealth and power. Inasmuch as such ideas about power were general and not simply a view of some sophist or historian, they must have been produced and given currency by orators, who reformulated the complex of ideas about power to give primacy for the first time in Greek history to the role of expenditure in the acquisition of state power. This was, in short, a development that needed to be taught, to be explained.

There is more at issue, however, than the new necessity of public money for military power: for it still does not explain the peculiarity, in its broader Greek context, of attributing credit for power explicitly to money. After all, *individual* wealth – if not cash – was always essential to waging war; but we do not hear of a similar formulation in connection with land power. Traditionally, a typical representation of a *polis*'s power would be its manpower: 'our strength lies in our brave men', Thucydides makes Sthenelaidas say to his fellow Spartans (1. 86. 3). But to be fully analogous to Athenian formulations, we would need something like this: 'our strength lies in the land that produced the wealth to obtain armour', or 'in the wealth of our land', or 'in individuals' money'. This makes clear that the substitution of 'money' for 'men' is not just a corollary of the change from land to sea power. Athens' strength could equally have been said to lie in its *nautikon* [ναυτικόν], its navy.⁵⁰ Yet

⁴⁸ But cf. P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, 1987), who as recently as 1987 constructed an argument connecting the rise and fall of world powers with economic strength or weakness, in many respects a variant on Thuc.'s novel arguments about financial resources and power; cf. L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History*, 1–5. 24 (Berkeley, Calif., 1993). 6–7.

⁴⁹ As David Lewis notes ('Public Property in the City', in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander* (Oxford, 1990), 246), 'the role of common defence may not need money/property at first . . . but is going to involve it as soon as the cost of the equipment needed (including, for instance, ships and mercenaries) outruns the resources of individuals.'

⁵⁰ e.g. Thuc. 2. 13. 2: 'the fleet, through which they were strong' [τὸ ναυτικὸν ἦπερ ἰσχύουσιν].

a typical land power's strength is not expressed as lying in its *strateuma* ('army') [στράτευμα], but in its men. I suggest that the 'strength comes from money' formulation would and did sound just as peculiar to a Spartan audience as it made sense to an Athenian audience.

Indeed, it is instructive to compare the way that a Spartan audience would be accustomed to think about money and power. Here Thucydides' speeches are again valuable, for, whatever position one takes on the extent to which they are his creation, the contrasting treatment of money and power in speeches directed at Spartan and Athenian audiences discernible in his *History* demonstrates that members of these two *poleis* looked at and thought differently about this issue: Thucydides is either being accurate (i.e. reflecting what points Archidamus did make) or appropriate (reflecting the kind of thing Archidamus might say). Archidamus exploits the 'money = power' formula, but in a significantly different way: in his speech to the Spartan assembly, he advises against a hasty decision for war, using as his chief argument the lack of financial resources available to the Spartan side. He notes that the Athenians' allies pay tribute, and that 'war is not a matter of men [literally, "arms", *hopla* [ὅπλα], but of expense, which allows manpower to be put to use' (I. 83. 2). What is of great interest here is the elementary and explanatory nature of the comment: Archidamus is instructing the Spartans in an area with which they are unfamiliar, and he is formulating the notion for them.⁵¹ War is not a matter of men – i.e., as the Spartans were accustomed to think – but rather of money and expense, i.e. something different. In this context, that is, the idea reflects not an underlying assumption but shows rather an attempt to foster, to create such a view. Sthenelaidas' response only confirmed that such an attitude toward money and power was foreign to the Spartans: 'they may have a lot of money and ships and horses,' he says, 'but we have brave allies' (I. 86. 3). His formulation, which aimed and succeeded at producing confidence in his audience, confirms my point above about the relative emotional power of the equation 'money = power': Sthenelaidas' listeners were emboldened to vote for war by an emphasis on manpower.

The origins of the formulation 'money = power'

As should by now be clear, the formula 'our strength lies in money' and its variations, of special importance being 'the revenue of the allies by which we are strong', is not a self-evident truth, but a contingent expression that stands in sharp opposition to the traditional formula 'our

⁵¹ Kallet-Marx (n. 48), 85 f.

strength lies in our men'. It implies a conscious reshaping of a traditional and typical formulation which it displaces in the public discourse of power among the collective citizenry. It takes on the form of a 'natural' and obvious given as well by an increased focus on money as an explicitly 'natural' concomitant of life. This does not just happen: the rhetorical connection between money and power, as distinct from the use of money to attain power, is artificial and deliberate.

How does the creating and shaping of such thought about money and power, in which money is so consistently privileged, begin? As I have argued, this is no natural consequence of the introduction of large-scale naval power. Of considerable importance, I suggest, is Themistocles and his proposal to use the silver from Laureion for the construction of a fleet.⁵² In fact, it is in his role that we can also neatly discern the broad effect of financial knowledge on both the orator and the audience. The exceptional nature of Themistocles' proposal, involving the use for building a fleet of money that citizens expected to have distributed to them, would have required justification, explanation, and rhetorical persuasion;⁵³ it is clear from Herodotus, Aristotle, and Plutarch that it did.⁵⁴ Persuasion would have been necessary not only to convince individual Athenians to forgo their community share of silver, but also to make them reconfigure their assumptions about Athens' military strength: it did not lie on land (an especially problematic notion, perhaps, after the stunning hoplite victory at Marathon) but rather in a fleet – and a publicly-owned one at that.⁵⁵ The justification provided, war with

⁵² Hdt. 7. 144. 1–2; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 7; Plut. *Them.* 4. 1–3, *Arist.* 46. Cf. M. Caccamo Caltabiano and P. Radici Colace, 'Darico Persiano e Nomisma Greco: differenze strutturali, ideologiche e funzionali alla luce del lessico greco', *REA* 91 (1989), 213–26, who argue that the emphasis on money in relation to power comes to Greece via Persia. Whether the Persian (military) economy and tributary system were monetized before the Persian Wars is controversial (cf. H. T. Wallinga, 'The Ionian Revolt', *Mnemosyne*, 37 (1984), 401–37). Even if we grant it, however, beyond a general association by Greeks of wealth and power with Persia and other eastern empires, there is insufficient reason to think that the Athenians in the early 5th cent. got the idea of attributing to money the attainment and exercise of naval power from Persia. Their own experience will in any case have been essential to the reshaping of their attitude toward the acquisition of power and the role of money in it. Specifically, large-scale accumulation and expenditure on military power seem to me to be necessary to prompt such a radical change in thought.

⁵³ Hdt. 7. 144, which implies that a distribution was the expected result of such a surplus. Distributions were the norm on Siphnos (Hdt. 3. 57. 2), as they also seem to have been on a regular basis among the Thasians (Hdt. 6. 46); for the regularity of the practice of distributing revenues, see K. Latte, *Kleine Schriften* (Munich, 1968), 294–312; S. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978), 145; cf. also P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia* (Oxford, 1981), at 22. 7.

⁵⁴ Each author provides a different version of the justification which Themistocles employed; but this only underscores the point that he was proposing something unprecedented and extraordinary.

⁵⁵ Lewis (n. 49), 254, notes this fundamental change that accompanied the advent of the navy: it was *demosiai* [public].

Aegina, obviously worked; but the implications of Themistocles' role as persuader and instructor on the use of this substantial sum of money⁵⁶ are important to appreciate: he was able to cash it in for his own political power – clear enough, thankfully, whether or not the Themistocles decree is genuine – but he also manifestly was instrumental in shaping the way Athenians thought about money: that it could and should be expended on military power, and that large quantities of immediately usable funds could yield significant military results.

We can see, then, in the case of Themistocles, how an orator acquired or enhanced his power through his ability to instruct and persuade on matters involving finances, and also, implicitly, that he was able thereby to influence and shape collective thought. But there may be more explicit indications of this last point; indeed, it is worth speculating that the new mode of thinking about money and military power stimulated by Themistocles, by the application of a huge quantity of silver (within its context) to the construction of a *polis* fleet, and especially by the victory at Salamis, fostered an awareness of the power of money in a military context which otherwise might have taken years of experience to learn, and that it decisively affected the Athenians' thinking about the structure and organization of the Delian League. The Athenians asked their allies to use their own financial resources in a novel way, removing them from their respective *poleis*, and placing them in a central, common treasury to create something that belonged to all *poleis* in common, just as they themselves had used their surplus in an extraordinary way in order to create a new military instrument that belonged to all of them.⁵⁷ Henceforth, the Athenians were predisposed to regard money and its use differently, and it accordingly makes sense that this predisposition was instrumental in enabling them to conceive the novel financial organization of the Delian League.

I have suggested the possibility that the explicit and remarkable emphasis on money as the source of power as reflected in the 'strength lies in money' formulation owes much to the impact of the decision to use at one time a substantial amount of money for the construction of a fleet, which may have consciously focused their attention on money and privileged that as the fundamental explanation of power. But there

⁵⁶ According to Herodotus (7. 144. 2) the Athenians were to build 200 ships with the surplus from Laureion, but he does not specify the amount of silver to be used, only that each citizen would have received 10 drachmas each, on the basis of which modern scholars have inferred a total of 50 talents, supposing a citizen population of 30,000 males; the *Ath. Pol.* specifies a figure of 100 talents from, more specifically, Maroneia for 100 triremes; see Rhodes (n. 53), 278, who places more weight on the account in the *Ath. Pol.*; cf. also F. J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton, NJ, 1980), 81–2.

⁵⁷ Kallet-Marx (n. 48). 54 ff.

may be more to it than that; or there may be another explanation entirely. Another possibility, also speculative, and not necessarily an exclusive alternative, is that it reflects and is an outgrowth of an aristocratic resistance to attributing to social inferiors – the *thetes* – credit for Athens' new strength as rowers in the fleet.⁵⁸ It is notable that 'money', or the abstract 'navy', is consistently emphasized to the exclusion of the men who rowed in the fleet and made Athens' naval power what it was; significantly, it is the Old Oligarch (1. 2) who, in his typical back-handed way, credits explicitly the 'common people' with making the *polis* strong.

The necessity of the empire for the democracy

Further evidence of the permeation of the assumption about the necessity of empire and the 'money = power' equation comes from the comic stage, and it reveals a way of thinking about the empire that expands its role as a given by implying its necessity to the functioning of the democracy. In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, performed in 422 at the Lenaia, Bdelycleon asks Philocleon to explain why the empire is great and what he gets out of it (519 ff.). Philocleon notes (548 ff.) his power as a juror (in general, not specifically in cases involving the empire), the 'flouting of wealth' (τοῦ πλούτου καταχίγη, 576) it allows him to do (i.e. when he convicts the wealthy), and, finally and best of all, the pay that it brings (605–6). The underlying assumption is that the empire is necessary, not just for the money it brings for power, but also for dikastic and other public pay. The famous accounting of the revenues by Bdelycleon that soon follows only proves the point: the revenues from the empire are implicitly connected with jury pay and the power of the juror (655 ff.). Once again, the linkage between imperial money and jury pay extends the 'money = power'/'necessity-of-empire' formulation to a belief in the necessity of empire for the democracy.

That this linkage reflects a contingency, not a necessity, emerges clearly in the exchange between Bdelycleon and Philocleon in the *Wasps*. The assumption that the empire is necessary to the operation of the democracy, specifically, the courts, and vital to the well-being of the dikast – in other words, the entire connection between imperial revenues and dikastic pay – is largely rhetorical: pay for dikasts came from funds administered by the *kolakretai*, [officials responsible for Athenian funds] at least

⁵⁸ Cf. Plut. *Them.*, 4. 3: 'Themistocles took away from the citizens the spear and shield, and reduced the Athenian people to the rowing-cushion and the oar' [Θεμιστοκλῆς τὸ δόρυ καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῶν πολιτῶν παρελόμενος εἰς ὑπηρεσίον καὶ κόπην συνέσπειλε τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον].

until 411, not from the Hellenotamiai.⁵⁹ Athenians were meticulous about keeping moneys from different sources in separate funds, distinguishing imperial from domestic revenue,⁶⁰ and also in earmarking specific funds for particular public expenditures.⁶¹ They knew well that jury pay was handed out by the *kolakretai*.⁶² The connection could convincingly be made and accepted as a given, as is reflected in Aristophanes, by virtue of the fact that the courts handled cases involving the allies, and an apparent source of jury pay was the *prytaneia* ['court-fees'], of which some presumably would have consisted of deposits from allies.⁶³ Of course, the *dikasteria* [law courts] handled substantial domestic litigation, and there is no evidence that tribute was a source of jury pay:⁶⁴ in reality the empire did not directly support the democracy, nor was it necessary to its functioning, as its fourth-century history demonstrates.

It is noteworthy that Pericles' rival Thucydides, in his attempt to break Pericles' influence by alleging the impropriety of spending allied moneys on non-League activities, apparently focused only on the building programme. This argument from silence by itself is hardly compelling given the nature of the evidence – Plut. *Per.* 12 – but if it were true that the democracy was in fact funded with imperial moneys, we should expect to have had some indication of it. On the contrary, what seems clear is that an intimate connection is made rhetorically, as a way of creating

⁵⁹ Rhodes, *AB* 102. A schol. to *Wasps* 684, which claims *phoros* as a source of dikastic pay, may be an inference on the basis of the implied connection in the play between imperial revenue and jury pay.

⁶⁰ Rhodes, *AB* 102, *contra* the view expressed in *ATL* 3, 360–1.

⁶¹ A. M. Andreades, *A History of Greek Public Finance*, trans. C. N. Brown (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), 366.

⁶² *Wasps* 695, 725; cf. *Birds* 1541, with schol.; Hesych., *S.V.* *kólakretai* [κωλακρέται]; Souda, *S.V.* *kólakretai* [κωλακρέται]. The source of the funds is an important question. According to [Xen.] it was the *prytaneia*. But some scholars, e.g. K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*² (Berlin, 1912–27), ii. 2, 331; H. Frisch, *The Constitution of the Athenians* (Copenhagen, 1942), 226, have doubted that this was a sufficient source, on the basis of *Wasps* 663, which puts the annual (combined) pay of the dikasts at 150 talents; but this is by no means to be taken literally, given the purpose of the passage; cf. D. M. McDowell, *Aristophanes Wasps* (Oxford, 1971), ad loc. See A. Boegehold, 'Three Court Days', *Symposion 1990: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte* (Cologne, 1991), 172, for a more realistic estimate of roughly thirty talents. Rhodes (n. 53), 139, refers to the *kolakretai* as the 'paying officers of the state treasury', a similar formulation to that in *ATL* 3, 360–1, which cites the *demosion* as the treasury, by which it appears to mean the Treasury of Athena. The Treasurers of Athena handled sacred money in that treasury, while the *kolakretai* were in charge of 'secular' funds, including the tribute reserve. One should keep in mind that the distinction that the Athenians drew was between 'public' (*dēmosia* [δημόσια]) and 'sacred' (*hierá* [ιερά]), as J. K. Davies notes, *CAH* V² (Cambridge, 1992), 304.

⁶³ [Xen.] 1. 16 and E. Kalinka, *Die Pseudoxenophontische ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ* (Leipzig, 1913), ad loc.; cf. Pollux 8. 38. On cases tried in Athens, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'Notes on Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire', *CQ* 11 (1961). 94–112, 268–80; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), 220–33.

⁶⁴ The only testimony to this effect is a scholiast's comment on *Wasps* 684, mentioned in n. 59, but by itself it does not warrant serious attention.

consensus about the empire as something necessary to the strength of the *polis* but also necessary to the functioning of the democracy.

Certainly if the equation of jury pay with money from the empire (without the formulation that this allowed for domestic, non-imperial revenue to be used for political pay) is any gauge, the arguments raised by Thucydides son of Melesias would have fallen on deaf ears. For what the assumptions in Aristophanes well demonstrate is that in popular consciousness there was no taboo at all with respect to the use of imperial money on the domestic operation of the *polis*. The *Wasps* shows that clearly. But the building debate in Plutarch – if historical – shows that at one point the question could fairly be raised, and thus it not only confirms that appropriate uses of imperial money could be a matter of policy debate, but it also reveals the process of consensus-shaping.

As in the case of the idea of expenditure for the city's power, expenditure in the democracy in the form of public pay is seen as power as well. The formulation 'empire = money = good for ordinary citizen because of *misthos* ['pay']' reflects the social force of rhetoric. The linking of private prosperity with the empire is at least as central to the shaping of public consensus as the linking of public security – i.e. the power of the *polis* – with money from the empire. The consensus is specifically that empire is necessary for both public and private self-interest, and a normal fact of life.⁶⁵

The relative unanimity about the existence and maintenance of empire achieved in fifth-century Athens has, since Finley, most often been credited to the level of material benefit derived from it by the majority of Athenians.⁶⁶ But not sufficiently appreciated is the extent to which this consensus was achieved through rhetoric in public forums like the Assembly and the theatre. The rhetorical link between empire and democracy bears on another discussion as well. Scholars have long cited the existence of democracy in the fourth century as proof of the fallacy of the argument that the empire was necessary to fund the democracy. We are looking at this issue the wrong way, however, if then we conclude that ancients like the Old Oligarch and Thucydides made a mistake when they thought that the empire was necessary to the democracy;⁶⁷ a more fruitful approach is archaeological, one that examines its foundations and structure. As we have seen, the 'necessity of empire' motif is

⁶⁵ Its normality finds reflection in comments like that in Ar. *Knights* 313.

⁶⁶ M. I. Finley, 'The Fifth-Century Athenian Empire: A Balance Sheet', in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978), 103–126 (= *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (New York, 1982), 41–61). [Ch. 1, this vol.]

⁶⁷ So Ober (n. 2), 24.

closely linked with democracy and public and private prosperity, and thus is a crucial component not only in engendering acceptance of the status quo but also in the construction of collective identity as Athenians among diverse individuals.⁶⁸ For, in fact, a collective ideology is not something that the *demos* simply possesses: it has to be created and recreated, and *rhetores* were central to that process by recreating and shaping a collective set of values, or ideology, one that was instrumental in making a male citizen an ‘Athenian’.

I have suggested that responsibility for shaping attitudes towards the empire, the allies’ money, and their connection with the democracy, as well as toward the *rhetor*, rests on those with financial expertise and authority who are the ones in a position to instruct and advise, but also to influence the way Athenians thought about money. We can easily see now the significance of this role for an orator’s own power. For just as it shaped thinking about the empire as necessary and normal, the formulation ‘money = power’ also served to reinforce the role of the *rhetor* as financial authority and instructor as a necessary and normal part of the democracy and to place enormous power in him, which he could use to shape collective thought. This has important consequences for the view of rhetoric in Athenian democracy proposed by Ober. For it contravenes the idea that orators simply gave voice to the collective will and ideology of, and constructed by, the *demos*; rather the orator has a much larger role in creating and shaping collective beliefs and attitudes, a role made possible and effective by the power concentrated in him as a teacher. This has larger consequences than simply that for a particular, individual orator’s power: the position of orator-as-expert is institutionalized, and regarded as normal and necessary by the stress placed on finances for the city’s power and for the functioning of the democracy, a condition requiring an instructor, a superior, at the helm. The attitudes toward the role of finances and their connection to power, the democracy, and individual prosperity, and the orator’s key role as teacher and expert in maintaining the city’s wealth, establish expectations and beliefs within the *polis* that over time become the norm: the ordinary citizen is student, listener, receiver of information and knowledge, and, finally, judge, and is conditioned rhetorically to accept this *de facto* hierarchical, unequal relationship as a normal part of the democratic status quo.

In an important respect this conclusion is an extension of Finley’s ‘structural demagogues’ thesis;⁶⁹ but it lays special emphasis on the

⁶⁸ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 271d–272a, which recognizes explicitly the variety of thought among Athenians; W. Thompson, ‘Athenian Ideologies’, *Prudentia*, 19 (1987), 22–33, brings out well the differing values and ideologies of Athenians.

⁶⁹ M. I. Finley, ‘Athenian Demagogues’, *Past and Present* 21 (1962), 3–24.

social force of rhetoric as the means by which consensus was shaped about the two areas most vital to Athenians, the democracy and the empire, interlocked to the *rhetor*, for whom financial knowledge was a powerful tool and technique of persuasion, and who created a rhetoric of expenditure and the necessity of empire. As Finley commented. ‘All writers accepted the need for political leadership as axiomatic.’⁷⁰ I would extend that to ‘Athenians’: as I have tried to show, by exploring the area of financial knowledge, they collectively were persuaded to view as legitimate and normal the concentration of power in individual leaders.

Yet the *demos* as audience and students should not be seen as passive or powerless, nor, as we have seen, is the *rhetor* occupying a place unaffected by anything but his expertise. The rhetorical process and the social and political environment make the relationship between the *rhetor* and *demos* considerably more complex. First of all, the citizen’s direct experience of money exchange in both public and private spheres, through receipt of payment for participation in the democratic institutions of courts, magistracies, Council (and later, Assembly), and through private commercial activity, predisposed him to be interested in and receptive to financial information, especially as it was tied to his welfare, and this will have affected and influenced the *rhetor*. Moreover, the rhetorical process is in any case one that involves negotiation between speakers and listeners and is at the same time governed by the field within which it operates, by the larger matrix within which popular attitudes are constructed, one in which key underlying assumptions and predispositions about money and the empire are critical factors.

As Bourdieu and others have shown, in any society, in the field of activity within which participants think and behave, there is a practical and unquestioning belief, a fundamental accord within which various strategies and relationships are played out, and within which communication and power function.⁷¹ We can see this clearly in the case of Athens, and it is particularly evident when one looks at conflict within the *polis*, for example, between Cleon and Diodotus, or between Pericles and Thucydides, son of Melesias – all share the same fundamental presupposition of the necessity of money from Athens’ allies for conversion to naval empire and power, as well as its normality.⁷² Thus the empire is both normal and necessary because of the tribute it supplies, not to be holed up in a treasury as a signifier of power, but rather accumulated for expenditure on power. No opening is given within the social/political

⁷⁰ Ibid. 5.

⁷¹ (n. 36), esp. 61–5.

⁷² Cf. Ar. *Acharn.* 642 (bringing in the *phoros*).

field by which to contest these assumptions. A significant illustration of this is the (apparent) absence of any questioning of whether imperial revenue beyond what was necessary for the military demands of the *polis* and league should continue to be extracted. This reflects the entrenchment of the belief that the removal of substantial local resources to the imperial city for accumulation as well as for expenditure was uncontested.

The kind of consensus that I have been sketching, however, raises a serious question, with which I end, though it cannot be answered here, one that pertains to the role and nature of debate in the democracy: given the effective control of the terms of discussion and its boundaries that we have seen produced by orators, such as is reflected, for example, in an unquestioning attitude toward the removal of the wealth of the allies, how open and varied was debate in fifth-century Athens?

10 *Archaeology and the Athenian Empire*[†]

ROBIN OSBORNE

Athenian imperialism in the fifth century directly or indirectly affected all cities of mainland Greece and the Aegean.¹ The empire meant more military activity and demands for tribute in money and offerings of other sorts (cows, full sets of armour from allies); it also changed the possibilities for exchange of goods in both positive (e.g., no pirates) and negative ways (the *Hellespontophylakes*[‡] we hear of in the Methone decree, and the general assertion of the Corinthians in Thucydides 1.120). Given all this, we should expect to see the consequences of Athenian imperialism in the archaeological record. Can we?²

In the 1961 *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* John Cook noted a contrast between the archaeological wealth of sixth-century Ionia and the shortage of archaeological remains to be dated to the fifth century; he suggested that this was a product of impoverishment because of the Ionians paying tribute both to Athens and to Persia under the Athenian empire.³ He briefly repeated this thesis in his *Greeks in Ionia and the East*: '[I]n the era of the Athenian league Ionic city life was at its lowest ebb. Archaeologically, it is virtually non-existent: no substantial new buildings seem to have been erected, Ionic art was at an end,

[†] Originally published in *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 129 (1999), 319–32.

¹ I am grateful to Helene Foley for the invitation to give a version of this paper as part of the Presidential Panel at the 1998 meeting of the APA and in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the AIA, and I am grateful to my fellow panelists and to audiences in Oxford, Swansea, St. Andrews and Leicester for comments and criticisms.

[‡] Literally 'guards of the Hellespont' – Athenian officials responsible for controlling shipping (and probably particularly the grain trade) through the strait between the Black Sea and the Aegean.

² Past considerations of this question have largely focused on two areas, Athenian art and the impoverishment of Ionian allies. I discuss the latter in Osborne 1994 and Osborne 1998. Here I concentrate on the material effects of empire and the issue of impoverishment.

³ Cook 1961.

and the sites of the eastern Aegean cities show scarcely any sign of urban habitation in this period.⁴ In reviewing Cook's book, Boardman devoted a single sentence to this thesis: 'Cook suggests that there was no substantial new building in Ionia under the Athenian League (p. 122), but there seems to be evidence for new temples or serious reconstruction in Chios, Samos, and at Didyma.'⁵

If Boardman's sentence suggests serious archaeological doubts about the basis of Cook's thesis, no one has picked that message up.⁶ The poverty of fifth-century Ionia, which the supposedly low levels of tribute paid by Ionian cities have been used to support, has become a 'fact.' Pritchett in 1971 referred to 'the economic eclipse of Ionia in the fifth century.'⁷ In 1972, Meiggs was doubtful about how far archaeology could be relied upon, denied that Ionian cities were paying both ways, and put more emphasis on the Ionian Revolt as a cause; but he too subscribed to the decline-of-Ionia thesis.⁸ By 1975 Amit was talking of 'the harsh fact of the Ionian decline,' with an interesting use of the definite article.⁹ Balcer's fantasies regarding Ionian social structure were based on accepting wholesale Cook's claims about a split between town and countryside; so he wrote in 1984: 'The long-term depopulation of the Ionians, and specifically the gentry, the burden of tribute to the Athenians, and the Ionian failure in economic competition accentuated by the emergence of Athens as the dominant imperial and commercial power marked the Ionian decline to a low provincial status.' In 1985 he suggested that the Athenians did not care about the development of countryside or city in Ionia.¹⁰

Since 1985 increased scepticism has been visible. Shipley has pointed out a) that on Samos 'the town and the Heraion were at a relative standstill ever since Polykrates fell'; b) that there was indeed building in the town of Samos and, to a limited extent, at the Heraion during the fifth century; and c) that there is no widespread reduction in Ionian tribute and that the relatively small sums paid may have other explanations – though the other explanation he offers (small population) would not be inconsistent with the decline-of-Ionia thesis.¹¹ The attack

⁴ Cook 1962: 122.

⁵ Boardman 1964: 83.

⁶ Even Simon Hornblower, who in vol. 1 of his Thucydides commentary (1991: 415) refers readers to Boardman's review ('[Cook's] general point may be right (though see Boardman's brief reply at *CR* 14 (1964) 83),' is prepared to state that 'mid-fifth-century Ionia was not flourishing' (531).

⁷ Pritchett 1971: 62–65.

⁸ Meiggs 1972: 270–71.

⁹ Amit 1975: 43.

¹⁰ Balcer 1984: 414ff.; 1985: 40.

¹¹ Shipley 1987: 146–48.

on drawing conclusions from tribute has been taken further by Kallet-Marx in her *Money, expense and naval power*; she repeatedly stresses that tribute was not the only form of imperial revenue.¹² But neither of these critiques amount to an adequate discussion of Cook's thesis. The issues that demand attention seem to me to be: first, whether Cook's archaeological observations are correct; second, how whatever archaeology reveals in this case is to be interpreted; third, whether, more generally, archaeology can measure prosperity; and fourth, whether archaeologically we are, or should expect to be, able to see the Athenian empire.

WAS COOK CORRECT ABOUT THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE?

Meiggs remarked in 1972 that 'it is too early to look for firm conclusions from archaeology. Excavation has barely tapped the surface of the Ionian cities.'¹³ Despite a quarter of a century's work since then, some of which has been published, that statement remains very largely true. To record that nothing is known from sites which have never been investigated is positively misleading: archaeological silences constitute evidence only if they are revealed by investigation and are not themselves merely the product of a lack of archaeological investigation.

It is clear that there was some building in Ionia and that talk of deurbanisation is exaggerated. Shipley's attack on Cook gathers as evidence of Samian activity in the fifth *and* fourth centuries two small temples at the Heraion, and, in Samos town, a pottery shop, a monument to the Persian Wars, a temple of Poseidon, and the Sacred Way. Miletos has its Hippodamian plan as evidence for considerable urban redevelopment, following the sack of 494 B.C.E., and a number of buildings in the harbour area in use in the Hellenistic period can be shown to be classical (if not definitely fifth-century) in origin. The temple of Athena, which aligns with the Hippodamian plan, belongs to the first half of the fifth century.¹⁴ On Khios, Boardman excavated a fifth-century temple building by the harbour at Emborio (also fifth-century rural buildings at Pindakas and a new village at Delphinion, but those are not so directly relevant). Mytilene had fifth-century walls.¹⁵ Aiolian Larisa saw a house enlarged c. 450 to give it a peristyle plan. Pergamon (not itself listed as tributary, but its harbour town of Elaia did pay) has a fifth-century

¹² Kallet-Marx 1993: 140-43.

¹³ Meiggs 1972: 270-71.

¹⁴ Akurgal 1978: 209-10.

¹⁵ *Archaiologikon Deltion* 17.2 (1961-62): 261-62.

phase to its walls, and the earliest buildings of its upper agora are perhaps also fifth-century.¹⁶

What is lacking here, of course, is any equivalent of the great sixth-century temples of Samos or Ephesos or Didyma, or indeed even of the less ambitious temples, both Ionic and Doric, found in the sixth-century Aegean. A weak version of Cook's archaeological claim must be allowed to stand – particularly since monumental temples are not things that, in general, have to await intensive archaeology for their discovery.

HOW IS THE FAILURE TO BUILD TO BE INTERPRETED?

But was Cook right to see the absence of fifth-century monumental architecture in Ionia as a sign of impoverishment? To answer this question we need to consider both the relationship between building and wealth and how the record of Ionia compares with that of other Greek cities inside, and indeed outside, the Athenian empire.

Thucydides (1.10.2) famously observed, *à propos* of Sparta and Athens, that there was no direct correlation between buildings and power. Between buildings and wealth, on the other hand, there is a necessary relationship; but although the decision to build demonstrates the availability of resources (of manpower as much as of money), few cities can have built just because they could afford to do so.

In the sixth century, temple building in Ionia had not been universal. Colossal temples are limited to Samos, Ephesos and Didyma; otherwise only the temple of Apollo Napaïos on Lesbos comes into the monumental class of temples with stylobates over 20 m. wide.¹⁷ More modest (or else indeterminate) temples are known from Khios (Emborio and Kato Phana), Myous, Mytilene and Phokaïa. Even at cities which in the fifth century pay substantial sums of tribute to Athens, there is often no record of substantial temple building in the archaic period – cities such as Klazomenai, Lebedos, Kolophon, Teos, Kyme. That there is no record does not mean that there was no building, but it is not obvious that the absence of evidence of fifth-century building at sites where there is no evidence of sixth-century building should be explained in terms of factors peculiar to the fifth century.

Why had Samos, Ephesos and Miletos built in the sixth century? These cities are close together in the same region, and legend told how, in the second generation after the settlement of men from Epidaurus on

¹⁶ Larisa: Akurgal 1978: 111–13; Pergamon: *IM* 42 (1992): 163–234 and 241.

¹⁷ See Osborne 1996b: 263–64.

Samos, Ephesians had expelled them, accusing them of conspiring with the Carians (Paus. 7.4.2–3), while in the Lelantine war Samos helped Khalkis and Miletos helped Eretria and Miletos and Samos clashed during the rule of Polykrates too (Hdt. 3.39). ‘Peer-polity interaction’ clearly has something to contribute to explaining what is going on. Being at a point of rich cultural contact with non-Greek civilisations may be important too.¹⁸

Miletos, Ephesos and Samos were rich, but so were other Ionian cities. At the battle of Lade Miletos provided eighty ships, Samos sixty, but Khios one hundred. Yet Khios built nothing in the sixth century comparable to those colossal temples. Her buildings fall much more within the tradition to which the archaic temples on Naxos or Paros belong. The Khians competed in a different world; we might also note that they did not organise settlements in the frenetic way the Milesians did – nor even to the same extent as the Samians.

It is not hard to see why peer-polity interaction might be less of a spur to building in the fifth century. The Athenian empire moved the focus of activity away from this tiny quarter of Ionia, and the Athenians, rather than the Milesians or Ephesians, became the people against whom to measure up. Competing with Athenians, however, was primarily a political matter: independence, not cultural superiority, had to be the first issue. As importantly, these cities now had their temples. Round one of the competition was over and some special motivation would be required to start round two. On the mainland, Athens’ insertion of herself into a new Ionian world already provided a motivation for the Ur-Parthenon (and would go on to produce the Temple of the Athenians on Delos); the Persian sack of Athens added further reason for building, and Olympia’s monumentalisation established the scale. On top of that, the complexity of relations within a large territory meant that one Attic sanctuary could not be brought up to international specifications without the same being done to all; hence the rash of building at Rhamnous, Loutsa, Brauron, Thorikos, Sounion, Vouliagmeni and Eleusis (at least).¹⁹

Comparing fifth-century building in Ionia with fifth-century building in Athens reveals clearly enough that the Ionian cities were not imperial powers, but it does little else. If buildings are to say anything more subtle than that about the Athenian empire, we need a different set of comparanda. It is appropriate to begin within the Athenian empire. How does the archaeological record for Ionia compare with that for other parts of the Empire?

¹⁸ Snodgrass 1986 for the former; Osborne 1996b: 264–66 for the latter.

¹⁹ Boersma 1970 is still the most convenient collection of evidence.

Building that can certainly be dated to the fifth century is pretty hard to come by anywhere in and around the Aegean. Marcus Lodwick, indeed, in his recent thesis, adopts a Cook-style explanation for this:

In contrast to the building activity on Delos in the Classical fifth century, stand the architectural fortunes of the other Cycladic islands on which there are no known monumental buildings in this period. Unless there is a major discrepancy in the archaeological record, this is most likely due to the drain in local resources caused by the forced membership of the Delian League to which substantial tribute in ships or money had to be paid. In the case of Paros, the terms must have been so harsh as to cause the island's wealth to come to a temporary end, as amply demonstrated by the termination of the island's once busy architectural activity. Likewise, the Athenian 'cleruchy' or garrison colony on Naxos perhaps further discouraged local displays of wealth. Delos was now the sole focus of new monumental architectural activity of the Cyclades; this was almost certainly not fortuitous.²⁰

Of the Cycladic facts there can be no doubt. On Lodwick's account Delos finished the Prytaneion c. 500–450 (*GD* 22); built a court wall and stoa to the Archagesion c. 480–70 (*GD* 74) and the so-called Thesmophorion (perhaps the Hestiatorion of the Keans) in 480–450 (*GD* 48), along with no fewer than four Treasury buildings (*GD* 17–20); began the Great Temple to Apollo and got it to frieze level (it was completed only at the end of the fourth and in the early third century) c. 475–450 (*GD* 13); and at the same time carried out Stage II of the Propylaia (*GD* 5); probably started late in the century on the North Building or Graphe (*GD* 35) and the temple of Artemis Lochia (*GD* 108); and saw the Athenians build their own temple c. 425–417 (*GD* 12). Elsewhere in the Cyclades, nothing. In the fourth century, excluding Delos, there is, by contrast, a late-fourth-century gymnasium at Amorgos; a fourth- or third-century temple at Anaphe; a late fourth-century (?) stoa at Palaipolis on Andros; an early fourth-century peristyle building, temples of Apollo Pythios and at Marmara (both 400–350), a tholos (350–300), an Asklepieion (C4) and an Archilocheion (325–300) on Paros; and on Tenos between 320 and 280 Building B, a fountain-exedra, Hestiatorion Q and a Temple of Poseidon (E1).²¹ But no fourth-century monumental architecture is known on Kea, Naxos or Thera – which must weaken the impact of Lodwick's remarks about the Naxian kleroukhy.

Much of the Delian building can plausibly be directly connected with the Athenian empire. The four treasuries are surely linked to Delos

²⁰ Lodwick 1996: 214–15. In the following passage I use *GD* to refer to P. Bruneau and J. Ducat *Guide de Délos*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1991).

²¹ Amorgos: *Ergon* 1986, 1987; Andros: *Archaiologike Ephemeris* 1964: 2–4; Paros: *Archäologische Anzeiger* 1982: 245–90, 621–83; Tenos: Étienne and Braun 1986.

becoming the place for the treasury of the League itself, and I find it attractive to see the Great Temple as begun and financed with the share that Delian Apollo putatively took of the tribute while the Treasury was at Delos, and then broken off when the Treasury was removed to Athens and that share went to Athena.²²

Looking at the rest of the Aegean shows that the Cyclades are no more special than Ionia. A temple of Apollo Eretimios near Tholós on Rhodes with an associated theatre may belong to the end of the fifth century (or to the beginning of the fourth).²³ On Karpathos there are defensive walls that might date to the fifth century (or might not). Only for Thasos, where there have been extensive careful excavations, is there much to catalogue. Lodwick, who for architectural reasons looks at Thasos as well as the Cyclades, catalogues as ‘monumental’ only the addition of a Doric colonnade to the North building at Aliki. But on a less restrictive definition of ‘monumental’ rather more can be reported – all conveniently summed up by Grandjean ten years ago.²⁴ And it is worth reporting it, since non-monumental as well as monumental building costs money, and it may not be money alone that determines whether to build monumentally.

The fuller Thasian picture looks like this. A new amphora warehouse was constructed by the Gate of Zeus c. 475–450 and another building there late in the century; there is an early fifth-century building and a metalworking workshop near the Gate of Herakles. The Artemision was extended. There are signs that building extended into the plain during the century but also involved in-fill within previously built-up area – e.g., ‘sondage Platis.’ Near the Agora a sanctuary of Soteira was constructed, and the theatre existed by the end of the century. This compares with, in the late sixth or early fifth century, the construction of the city walls, the construction of the terrace for the Evraiocastro sanctuary, the building of a *leskhe* [hall] at the Heraklion, the extension of the sanctuary of Athena Polioukhos, the building of the harbour mole and the construction of the passage of the *theoroi* [sacred ambassadors].²⁵

There clearly is a contrast between the amount of construction in the quarter century or so before the Persian wars and that in the seventy-five years afterwards. But what are we to make of this contrast? Grandjean himself is clear that we should not make too much: ‘The

²² Lodwick (1996: 214) prefers to see that temple as ‘commissioned by the Athenians’ – despite his drawing attention to the fact that, unlike the Temple of the Athenians, it employed ‘typically Cycladic techniques and proportions.’

²³ Jacopi 1933.

²⁴ Grandjean 1988.

²⁵ For the last see *BCH* 117 (1993): 652.

capture of Thasos by the Athenians in 463 seems not to have had an impact on the different elements of the city; only the walls were affected, and even their destruction was not complete . . . The impoverishment of the city is visible through the tribute lists, but one sees nothing of this in the settlement of this period . . . The city, which experienced substantial architectural development at the start of the fifth century, was able to continue in this vein throughout the century, even adding some new projects.^{†26} Good sense, or special pleading?

To answer that question we need to look outside the Athenian empire. How much building did any city other than Athens do in the fifth century? If we restrict ourselves to temples, the Peloponnese can boast not only the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the new Heraion at Argos (which followed destruction of the earlier temple by fire), and the temple of Apollo at Bassai, but also quite large temples at such unsung places as Asea and Alipheira (temple of Athena). Sicily continues to show extravagant temple building down to c. 450 (temples of Victory at Himera, of Athena at Syracuse, A, O, M and ER at Selinous, Hera Lakinia at Akragas) but after that only Agrigento keeps up the momentum with temples of Concord (450–425), Hephaistos (425–406) and temple L (second half of the fifth century), apart from the propylon to the Demeter Malophoros sanctuary at Selinous and the Doric temple at Segesta, for the construction of which special factors may be operative. The temple of Poseidon at Paestum dates to c. 460 and the temple of Hera at Croton to a similar period; the Doric temple at Caulonia is the only Italian mainland temple from the second half of the century. No other place in the Greek world builds any temple on any scale between 480 and 400.

At Delphi there were monuments to the victory in the Persian Wars and to the Athenian monument to victory at Eurymedon, a fifth-century phase to the altar of Apollo (for which Hdt. 2.135, giving no indication of date, is our main evidence, and which was a Khian dedication), a mid-century Corcyrean base (following an early century Corcyrean bull), the treasury of Brasidas and the Akanthians (again on literary evidence, Plut. *Lys.* 1.1–3, *SIG*³ 79),²⁷ the Athenian stoa, the Knidian Leskhe (dated by Polygnotos' paintings) and a Trojan Horse dedicated by Argos

[†] 'La prise de Thasos par les Athéniens en 463 ne paraît pas avoir affecté les différentes composantes de la ville; seul le rempart a été touché, et encore son démantèlement n'a-t-il pas été complet. . . . L'appauvrissement de la cité est perceptible au travers des listes de tributs, on ne relève rien de tel dans l'habitat de cette époque. . . . La ville, qui avait connu un essor architectural considérable au début du Ve siècle a dû vivre sur cette lancée tout au long de ce siècle, en ajoutant même quelques créations nouvelles.'

²⁶ Grandjean 1988: 476.

²⁷ See Hornblower 1996: 11–12.

c. 414. In this meagre haul, monuments are as likely to be erected by Ionians as by anyone else.

A similar dearth of non-Athenian building is apparent if we turn to stoas.²⁸ There are plenty of Athenian stoas: we have just met the Athenian stoa at Delphi; in Athens itself there are the Stoa Poikile, probably the Stoa of the Herms, the stoa of the sanctuary of Artemis Brauronia on the Akropolis, the Stoa of Zeus, South Stoa I, a stoa in the Peiraieus, the west stoa at the Asklepieion. In Attica there is the pi-stoa at Brauron. Elsewhere there is the South Stoa at the Argive Heraion of 450–40, a stoa at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Kalaureia, and two stoas at Elis (all apparently of the last third of the century), the North Stoa II at Corinth, and the West Stoa and East Hall at Olynthos (all of uncertain fifth-century date), and the Theban stoa built from the spoils of Delion, known only from Diodoros 12.70.5. Coulton indeed notes this Athenian dominance and puts it down to the Athenian empire: ‘The economic history of Greece in the fourth century,’ he writes, ‘means that the distribution of stoas is very different from that in the fifth century. The contribution of Athens is not of major significance, for she no longer had the resources of her empire to finance building.’²⁹

Coulton’s emphasis on economic history points to one Thucydidean conclusion which this survey of fifth-century building would seem to encourage: building does not straightforwardly – does not at all, perhaps – reveal the political history of Greece. One could not predict whether or not a city belonged to the Athenian empire by whether or not it engaged in monumental building. The pattern of building within the Athenian empire is not markedly different from the pattern of building outside it. True, the Peloponnese can boast a small but significant crop of fifth-century temples, and that crop would compare relatively well with the crop of sixth-century temples there, but these conspicuously concentrate in cities (Asea, Alipheira, Phigaleia) which, as far as the literary record is concerned, entirely lack a fifth-century political history. These are cities of the lowest rank, whose peers are strictly their neighbours, and they are cities whose resources are in general agricultural, supplemented perhaps from the war booty of returning mercenaries.

But if the pattern of building in the fifth century does not reflect the major movements of political history, does it better reflect the economic history of Greece? The activity of Alipheira and Asea again argues against this, and alongside this can be laid the literary evidence for prosperity in cities which did not build in the fifth century. Indeed literary

²⁸ See Coulton 1974: 39–46.

²⁹ Coulton 1974: 46.

evidence suggests that Ionia itself was prosperous: Thucydides 8.40.2 remarks that Khios had more slaves than any other city except Sparta.³⁰ This is hardly a sign of poverty – Andrewes observes in his commentary that ‘Chios was a rich and extensive island, but the absolute number of its slaves cannot have been greater than that of Attica. Thucydides presumably had in mind the proportion of slave to free, the density of the slave population.’³¹ Thucydides remarks at 8.24.4 about the ‘eudaimonia’ [prosperity] of Khios, and in the context (it is coupled with *sophrosune* [prudence] and a rank order in which they are second to Sparta) this is clearly in part a political comment, but it must also suggest material prosperity. More generally the implication of the Persian King’s eagerness to collect arrears from Ionia (Th. 8.5), whatever those arrears were, implies that the amounts that could be pressed from the area were not insignificant.

In sum, Cook was right that there is less building in fifth-century than sixth-century Ionia, though there was more fifth-century activity there than he chose to acknowledge; but this is part of a wider pattern where, from Sicily to Asia Minor, Athens itself is the only serious exception to the rule that cities that had built monumentally in the century before the Persian wars build little in the years after. Cook was therefore premature, at least, in concluding that the dearth of building indicated an economic decline in Ionia that demanded an explanation in peculiarly Ionian terms. While we must allow at least a minimal correlation between possessing surplus funds and building, lack of building cannot be taken as a sign of lack of prosperity and the pattern of fifth-century building seems at least insufficiently explained in economic terms. Both sixth- and fifth-century patterns of building make more sense in terms of competition within and between communities, of neighbourly rivalry and ‘peer-polity interaction,’ than in terms of economic boom and slump.

CAN ARCHAEOLOGY MEASURE PROSPERITY?

The poor, individually and even collectively, are very hard to find in literary and epigraphic sources, both because those sources are dominated by activities that presuppose wealth and because we have no criterion for poverty in the way that we have criteria for wealth. Poverty does not show up archaeologically: failure to build in stone, failure to use high-class pottery, failure to put valuable objects into graves or offering

³⁰ Compare 8.15.2 with Robert, *BCH* 59 (1935): 453–59 for their military use.

³¹ *HCT* V.86–87.

trenches – none of these demonstrate poverty. Those of us who work on the eighth and seventh century in Attica have had to come to terms with this invisibility, not least as a result of Ian Morris's work, but it is a hard lesson to learn.³² In the excitement of finding that there was much more material in the Greek countryside in the late fifth and especially the fourth century than there was in the sixth, it was tempting to see this fact as a measure of prosperity. But careful work on the uncertain nature and size of these rural establishments leads to the conclusion that the mass of evidence was generated by a small percentage of the population, and I remain more attracted by the view that what we see is politically induced social choices rather than major economic revolutions *à la* van Andel and Runnels.³³ And it might be worse than that: though I am sceptical about some of the procedures they employ in their calculations, Bintliff and Snodgrass point to a real problem with finding archaeological remains in Boiotia to match the known population levels, and the total invisibility of the poor is a real possibility.³⁴

Measuring prosperity is not the same thing as saying something about the economy. I am a firm believer in the possibility of revealing something about the economy from archaeology, but more its nature and structure than absolute levels of productivity, etc. We are more likely to be able to see archaeologically whether the Athenian empire had an impact on the structure of the economy than on prosperity, but it will be small finds, and perhaps site distribution, that show that effect, rather than monumental buildings or their absence. Currently we do not have enough careful excavations to be able to compare, for example, the distribution of types of pottery within and outside the empire. To study distribution one must have good cemetery excavations, and from the empire we have virtually nothing of that sort beyond the Rheneia purification trench. One indication of this is that works by or near the Phiale Painter are recorded from Amyklai, Knossos, Corfu, Thebes, Oropos, Corinth, and the Near East as well as from Sicily and Italy; but from within the empire there is just one piece from Eretria and four from Rheneia and Delos.³⁵ Eretria and the island of Khalki off Rhodes (with one piece each) are the only imperial provenances recorded for the Eretria Painter's work, which otherwise is found in Spain, France, and the Black Sea as well as Italy and Athens.³⁶ With data so lacking analysis of patterns is futile.

³² Morris 1987; Osborne 1989.

³³ Osborne 1987, 1996a; van Andel and Runnels 1987.

³⁴ Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985.

³⁵ Oakley 1990.

³⁶ Lezzi-Hafter 1988.

IS THERE AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE?

Cook drew attention to a pattern that indeed deserved attention but jumped to the wrong conclusion. But if archaeology cannot tell us how impoverished the Ionians were, what can it tell us about the empire?

Monumental building is a way of forging an identity. Buildings, political or civic buildings but above all religious buildings with their associated rituals, form a focus for community endeavour and expression. Temples show off cult, they show that a community cares about its gods, and they imply that those gods are worth caring about. The Athenian building programme went hand in hand with the enhancement of cult in other ways – linking tribute payment to the Dionysia and making settlements abroad bring phalloi to parade, presumably on that occasion, enhancing the Panathenaia by ordering allies to come along with a cow and a full set of armour. Similarly the re-invention of tradition on Delos, when the festival of the Delia is started up again on a grand scale after the Athenian purification of the island, goes with the Athenian construction of a temple there. Athens was claiming that her own deities (and at Eleusis as well as on the Acropolis, see ML 73) and the Delian deities whose affairs she conveniently controlled (all the Delian amphiktions were Athenians, nonsensical though that was in terms of the point of having amphiktions running the sanctuary) deserved international attention.

What, by contrast, the absence of development of cult centres elsewhere in the empire shows is the failure of allies to promote their own sanctuaries and festivals in the face of this. Despite having the makings of cult centres with more than just a local pull, sanctuaries like the Heraion on Samos or the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesos seem, to judge from the archaeology, to have done nothing to promote themselves. It is not simply that they do nothing innovative in cult terms; they seem not even to reinforce in any material way their traditional cult activities, as one might expect them to if they were actively resisting outside pressure. This inactivity contrasts with the acute awareness of the possible politics of cult that is shown both by the Herodotean story of Telesarkhos' decisive opposition to Maiandrios' request to exchange a political for a cultic role following the death of Polykrates (Hdt. 3.142–43) and by the Samian foundation of games in honour of Lysander in the early fourth century.

There is no evidence which would suggest that Athens prevented or repressed cult activity among her allies (even if nothing suggests that she encouraged it), and only in the cases of Delian Apollo and perhaps Theban Amphiaraos is there evidence of Athens stealing the

limelight.³⁷ The decision not to build, or rather the failure to make the decision *to* build, has to have been more or less freely taken by Athens' allies; it was exactly the same decision as was taken by the great majority of Greek cities outside the Athenian empire too. It was a decision which suggests little desire to reconfigure existing patterns of cult activity or existing local and city identities. It was a decision, further, which suggests that the allies were not so unhappy about what Athens was doing that they felt impelled to adopt countervailing measures. Ionian enthusiasm to establish what we know as the Delian League, attested in some of our literary sources, can be understood in terms of the positive desire to assert a Greek identity; it was the political version of what massive temple building had done in the sixth century. Their choice of Delos as the centre not only drew on traditional ties celebrated in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, it also made the Ionians look *west*, and that was an advantage to be put alongside the disadvantages when Athens set up practical and cultic means of putting herself at the centre of the League.

For Cook and his followers, lack of archaeological evidence of fifth-century activity in Ionia and elsewhere in the Athenian empire is evidence of oppression. That interpretation is, I have tried to show, revealed as essentially baseless by comparison with the behaviour of cities outside the empire. It is hard enough to explain why people do things, harder still to explain why they fail to do things. But if we start from observations about the role of building, when it does occur, in peer-polity interaction, it may not be fanciful to interpret lack of building in a similar way. If we do so, it seems more reasonable to see the (lack of) archaeological evidence as revealing Athenian popularity rather than Athenian oppression, more reasonable to think that in the great debate over the popularity of the Athenian empire the evidence supports Geoffrey de Ste Croix rather than Thucydides.³⁸

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³⁷ For Amphiaraos see Parker 1996. [pp. 150–3, this vol.]

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PART IV

Popularity and Propaganda

Introduction to Part IV

How popular was the Athenian Empire? The question is a longstanding one, and has often been provoked by a concern to defend (or condemn) the behaviour of the city: should imperialism be seen as a stain on the otherwise glorious history of this beacon of democracy?¹ Such a concern might seem somewhat outdated (is it really the historian's job to pass judgement on the morality, or even likeability, of an ancient state?), but the question itself nevertheless remains both interesting and important, largely because of the other historical and historiographical problems which it provokes.

The historiographical issue revolves, once more, around the interpretation of Thucydides. The text of his history is full of material which seems to show that the Athenian Empire was universally and justifiably reviled in the Greek world outside Athens. The Athenians, it is alleged, betrayed their initial promises to save the Greeks from Persia, choosing instead to enslave Greece under their own power (3.10–14). They exercised this power brutally, and were prepared to contemplate (at Mytilene) and commit (at Melos) atrocities in order to keep their own position secure. And, perhaps most damningly of all, they seem to have regarded such extreme behaviour, and the hatred it provoked, as a price worth paying in order to maintain their position: 'you hold your empire (*archè*) like a tyranny now', Thucydides' Pericles tells the Athenians. 'Taking it may have been criminal, but letting it go would certainly be dangerous' (2.63). The historiographical question, then, is apparently straightforward: has Thucydides exaggerated the cruelty and unpopularity of the Athenian Empire?

¹ It is not a coincidence that the most influential nineteenth-century attempts to defend Athens' democracy and Athens' empire appear in the same work (George Grote's *History of Greece*, London: John Murray, 1846–56).

But in order to address this question properly it is also necessary to think more generally about the role of imperialism in Greek political thought and political practice. Would it be possible for any empire, no matter how it behaved, to be popular in the Greek world? Or would it always be unacceptable for one state to exercise imperial control over another, even if it conducted itself with utmost restraint, and even if that control brought some benefits to the empire's subjects? Some of the benefits that might be claimed to result from membership of the empire have been mentioned in earlier chapters: protection from Persia; enhanced opportunities for trade (as well as a decrease in piracy); and the opportunity for specific privileges for those who co-operated with Athenian interests (particularly, that is, to *proxenoi*). The first two articles in this part are, however, specifically concerned with one potential source of benefit (or harm) to the subjects of the empire: political interference.

Athenian intervention in the domestic politics of the allied states is well documented. Such interventions could extend to the comprehensive overhaul of a state's constitution, as seems to have been the case in Erythrae (where the Athenians established a democratic system closely modelled on their own),² or could take more limited form: support for democratic factions (as in the civil war on Corcyra), or protection of pro-Athenian individuals (*proxenoi*, again, are a clear example). The fundamental contention of de Ste Croix's article is that this interference should be seen as a positive feature of Athens' imperialism, and one which would have been welcomed by the majority of the population in the subject states.

De Ste Croix focuses on the effect that the empire had, or was claimed to have, on the freedom of the Greeks. The Greek terms for freedom (*eleutheria*, *autonomia*) are, he suggests, always imprecise, and this lack of precision allows them to be exploited for the purposes of propaganda. Allegations that Athenian imperialism destroyed the freedom of the subject-states should therefore be treated with caution, and not as definitive proof of the intrinsic unacceptability of empire.³ And there are, de Ste Croix suggests, positive reasons to suppose that the sort of political interference practised by Athens would have been regarded as a defence

² See Ch. 3.

³ The role of these concepts in Greek political and diplomatic thought is still much discussed. On freedom, see K. A. Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004. On *autonomia*, see (for a theoretical approach), M. H. Hansen, 'The "autonomous city-state": ancient fact or modern fiction?', in M. H. Hansen and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995, 21–43; for its use in propaganda, A. B. Bosworth, 'Autonomia: the use and abuse of political terminology', *SIFC* 3rd ser. 10 (1992), 122–52.

of freedom rather than an attack on it. If (as he argues) the populations of Greek city-states were consistently divided along lines of class and wealth, with the poor majority forming the democratic faction and the rich minority the oligarchic, then Athens' policy of supporting democrats in every state should be seen as a defence of democratic freedom in the face of oligarchic oppression. By intervening to support democrats, therefore, Athens might have impinged on some aspects of the freedom of the city-state, but they preserved the more valuable freedom of democratic citizens within the *polis*. The fact that Thucydides is so reluctant to admit this and so keen to emphasise (or overemphasise, according to de Ste Croix) the negative aspects of the empire reveals more about the historian's hostile attitude to democracy than it does about the true nature of the Athenian Empire.⁴

De Ste Croix's arguments are important, not least in revealing the necessity of challenging both ancient and modern assumptions about the freedoms which would be considered most valuable by a community and its members. But his conclusions have been questioned. Some objections to his work have been methodological. De Ste Croix operates on the principal that it is possible to distinguish between Thucydides the political partisan and Thucydides the objective reporter – that is, Thucydides (almost by accident, it seems) reports enough accurate information about the Athenian Empire to allow his distorted portrayal of its unpopularity (a portrayal that surfaces above all in the speeches) to be detected and corrected. Some critics of this view see it as giving too little credit to Thucydides' accuracy and impartiality. For them, everything in Thucydides, even the speeches, should be treated as historical fact rather than Thucydidean analysis. So when Thucydides recounts, for example, the Mytilenean complaints about the excesses of the Athenian Empire, this is a reflection of Mytilenean opinion, not of Thucydidean interpretation.⁵ An alternative objection is that de Ste Croix is not too sceptical of Thucydides' objectivity but too trusting. Can facts really be so neatly separated from analysis? And can it ever be safe to assume that a historian includes a detail, no matter how apparently trivial, simply for its own sake, rather than because it contributes to the wider story which he is attempting to tell?⁶

⁴ De Ste Croix develops his views of Thucydidean historiography (particularly with reference to Thucydides' representation of interstate politics) in *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London: Duckworth, 1972, 5–34.

⁵ For this argument (and other objections to de Ste Croix's theories), see especially D. W. Braeden, 'The popularity of the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 9 (1960), 257–69.

⁶ This approach to reading Thucydides is discussed by S. Hornblower's 'Narratology and narrative techniques in Thucydides', in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 131–66. For a more detailed analysis, see T. Rood, *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

De Ste Croix's historical claims have also been contested. It has been pointed out that the Athenian commitment to the establishment of democracy in the empire is perhaps less whole-hearted than is sometimes assumed.⁷ And de Ste Croix's conception of class struggle as a constant, defining, feature of life in the Greek city-states (which he explored at much greater length in a later study⁸) remains controversial. A rival view regards civil war in the Greek cities as deriving much less from conflict between rich and poor than from competition between competing elite factions.⁹ Finally, de Ste Croix's central claim – that the majority of the allies were content to be members of the Athenian Empire – has also come under attack.

One of the most important direct responses to de Ste Croix's article was made by de Romilly (who is also the author of a detailed analysis of Thucydides' account of the Athenian Empire).¹⁰ Her case, like de Ste Croix's, is based on close analysis of ancient sources, particularly Thucydides, but leads to very different conclusions. She emphasises the dangers of attempting to assess the attitude of the cities to Athens on the basis of only their actions – failure to revolt from Athens may be evidence for effective imperial oppression rather than allied contentment, and the complications brought by war (where Athenian pressure to remain loyal might be matched by Spartan pressure to revolt) make it even harder to disentangle the motivations for the allies' actions. De Romilly also argues against de Ste Croix's view that personal freedom was valued more highly than the freedom of the *polis*: it is the collective, she suggests, which is the most important actor in interstate politics, and the city as a whole – rather than any individuals within it – whose opinions and actions should be considered most indicative of attitudes to the Athenian Empire.

The last article in this part returns the focus of attention to Athens, and above all to the ways in which the empire was perceived and depicted in the city of Athens. The question of Athenian attitudes to empire has already been touched on in Kallet-Marx's analysis of Athenian perceptions of the empire's financial benefit, but while Kallet-Marx focused her attention on the representation of the empire in the assembly and theatre,

⁷ M. Ostwald, 'Stasis and *autonomia* in Samos: a comment on an ideological fallacy', *SCI* 12 (1993), 51–66.

⁸ *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, London: Duckworth, 1981.

⁹ Argued for by E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7.-4. Jh. v. Chr.*, Bamberg: Aka, 1978. (His views are summarised by A. Lintott in *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City, 750–330 BC*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, appendix 4.) Ch. 3 of Lintott's book provides further discussion of the relationship between imperialism and civil conflict.

¹⁰ *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.

Hölscher concentrates on the presence of imperial themes in the physical environment of the city. Athens was not unique in using monuments as a means of political expression, but was (Hölscher suggests) unusually systematic in its approach to monumentalising its history and political identity. The emphasis given to constructing monuments which celebrated and legitimated the Athenian Empire provides another perspective on the ambivalent attitudes to empire which have been discussed in this part (and have been visible throughout the book): on the one hand, the empire was a source of glory and pride; on the other, it exacted certain costs, not just from the allies but also, ultimately, from the Athenian people.

II *The Character of the Athenian Empire*^{†1}

GEOFFREY DE STE CROIX

Was the Athenian empire² a selfish despotism, detested by the subjects whom it oppressed and exploited? The ancient sources, and modern scholars, are almost unanimous that it was, and the few voices (such as those of Grote, Freeman, Greenidge and Marsh) raised in opposition to this harsh verdict – which will here be called ‘the traditional view’ – have not succeeded in modifying or even explaining its dominance. Characteristic of the attitude of many historians is the severe judgment of Last,³ who, contrasting Athens as the ‘tyrant city’ with Rome as ‘our shared homeland’ [*communis nostra patria*], can see nothing more significant in Athenian imperial government than that ‘warning which gives some slight value to even the worst of failures’.

The real basis of the traditional view, with which that view must stand or fall, is the belief that the Athenian empire was hated by its subjects – a belief for which there is explicit and weighty support in the sources (above all Thucydides), but which nevertheless is demonstrably false. The first section of this paper will therefore be devoted to showing that whether or not the Athenian empire was politically oppressive or economically predatory, the general mass of the population of the allied (or subject) states, far from being hostile to Athens, actually welcomed her

[†] Originally published in *Historia* 3 (1953/4), 1–41.

¹ Much of this article is based on a paper on ‘The Alleged Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire,’ read to the London Classical Society on 14th June, 1950. I have to thank Mr. R. Meiggs, Dr. V. Ehrenberg, Prof. A. Andrewes and Mr. P. A. Brunt for making valuable criticisms. I am specially grateful to Prof. A. H. M. Jones for his help and encouragement at every stage. This article, although written earlier (1950–51), may be regarded as a supplement to his ‘Athenian Democracy and its Critics,’ in *Camb. Hist. Journ.* XI (1953) 1–26. Among publications, I owe most to A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. I (hereafter referred to as HCT I), and B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (ATL).

² The word ‘empire’ (which often has a very different connotation) is used here, in most cases, simply as a convenient translation of *archê* [ἀρχή].

³ In *Camb. Anc. Hist.* XI 435–6.

dominance and wished to remain within the empire, even – and perhaps more particularly – during the last thirty years of the fifth century, when the *hubris* ‘overbearing behavior’ [ὑβρις], of Athens, which bulks so large in the traditional view, is supposed to have been at its height.

I THE ALLEGED UNPOPULARITY OF THE EMPIRE

By far the most important witness for the prosecution, in any arraignment of Athenian imperialism, is of course Thucydides; but it is precisely Thucydides who, under cross-examination, can be made to yield the most valuable pieces of detailed evidence of the falsity of his own generalisations. Before we examine his evidence, it will be well to make clear the conception of his speeches upon which some of the interpretations given here are based. Whatever Thucydides may have meant by the much discussed expression *ta deonta* [τὰ δέοντα],⁴ whatever purpose he may originally have intended the speeches to serve, there can surely be no doubt that some of the speeches⁵ in fact represent what the speakers would have said if they had expressed *with perfect frankness* the sentiments which the historian himself attributed to them,⁶ and hence may sometimes depart very far from what was actually said, above all because political and diplomatic speeches are seldom entirely candid.

Now Thucydides harps constantly on the unpopularity of imperial Athens, at least during the Peloponnesian War. He makes no less than eight of his speakers⁷ accuse the Athenians of ‘enslaving’ their allies or of wishing to ‘enslave’ other states, and he also uses the same expression in his own person.⁸ His Corinthian envoys at Sparta, summarising the historian’s own view in a couple of words, call Athens the ‘tyrant city’.⁹ Thucydides even represents the Athenians themselves as fully conscious that their rule was a tyranny: he makes not only Cleon but

⁴ I 22.1. I would translate, ‘what was most appropriate’ (cf. I 138.3; II 60.5).

⁵ Above all that of the Athenians at Sparta in 432 (173–8).

⁶ Cf. J. H. Finley, *Thucydides* (1947) 96: the speeches expound ‘what Thucydides thought would have seemed to him the factors in a given situation had he stood in the place of his speakers.’ This is almost the same thing. And see Jones, *op. cit.* ([in] n. 1) 20–21.

⁷ The Corinthians (I 68.3; 69.1; 121.5; 122.2; 124.3), the Mytileneans (III 10.3, 4, 5; 13.6), the Thebans (III 63.3), Brasidas (IV 86.1; 87.3; V 9.9), Pagondas (IV 92.4), the Melians (V 86; 92; 100), Hermocrates (VI 76.2, 4; 77.1; 80.5; cf. 82.3), Gylippus and the Syracusan generals (VII 66.2; 68.2). And see III 70.3; 71.1 (Corcyra). All occurrences of the words for political ‘enslavement’ are collected and analysed in *ATL* III 155–7.

⁸ I 98.4; VII 75.7. See also Ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.* I 18 (cf. I 8, 9; III 11; and *Thuc.* IV 86.4–5, for *douleia* [δουλεία] as subjection to the opposite political party); *Plut.*, *Cim.* 11.3; *Isocr.* XII 97; cf. the repudiation in IV 109.

⁹ I 122.3; 124.3.

also Pericles admit that the empire had this character.¹⁰ It must be allowed that in such political contexts both ‘enslavement’ and ‘tyranny’ – *douleia* [δουλεία] and *turannis* [τυραννίς], and their cognates – are often used in a highly technical sense: any infringement of the *eleutheria*, ‘freedom’ [ἐλευθερία], of a city, however slight, might be described as ‘enslavement’;¹¹ and terms such as *turannos polis*, ‘tyrant city’ [τύραννος πόλις], do not necessarily imply (as the corresponding English expressions would) that Athens was an oppressive or unpopular ruler. However, it will hardly be denied that Thucydides regarded the dominance of Athens over her allies as indeed oppressive and unpopular. The speech he puts into the mouths of the Athenians at Sparta in 432 admits that their rule is ‘much detested by the Hellenes’ and that Athens has become ‘hateful to most people’.¹² At the outbreak of the war, says Thucydides,¹³ ‘people in general were strongly in favour of Sparta, especially as she professed herself the liberator of Hellas.’¹⁴ Every individual and every city was eager to help her by word and deed, to the extent of feeling that personal participation was necessary if her cause were not to suffer. So general was the indignation felt against Athens, some desiring to be liberated from her rule, others dreading to pass under it’. In the winter of 413–12, when the news of the Athenian disaster in Sicily had become known, Thucydides¹⁵ would have us believe that all Hellas was astir, neutrals feeling that they ought to attack Athens spontaneously, and the subjects of Athens showing themselves ready to revolt ‘even beyond their capacity to do so’, feeling passionately on the subject and refusing even to hear of the Athenians’ being able to last out the summer.

This is what Thucydides wanted his readers to believe. It is undoubtedly the conception he himself honestly held. Nevertheless, his own detailed narrative proves that it is certainly false. Thucydides was such a remarkably objective historian that he himself has provided sufficient material for his own refutation. The news columns in Thucydides, so to speak, contradict the editorial Thucydides, and the editor himself does not always speak with the same voice.

In the ‘Mytilenean Debate’ at Athens in 427, Thucydides¹⁶ makes Diodotus tell the assembled Athenians that in all the cities the *demos* is

¹⁰ III 37.2; II 63.2. Cf. VI 85.1.

¹¹ See Thuc. I 141.1.

¹² I 75.1, 4. Cf. I 76.1; II 11.2 Isocr. VIII 79, 105; XII 57; Dem. IX 24.

¹³ II 8.4–5.

¹⁴ Cf. Thuc. I 69.1; II 72.1; III 13.7; 32.2; 59.4; IV 85.1; 86.1; 87.4; 108.2; 121.1; VIII 46.3; 52; Isocr. IV 122 etc.

¹⁵ VIII 2.1–2; cf. IV 108.3–6.

¹⁶ III 47.2. Diodotus just afterwards lets fall a remark which is a valuable clue to Thucydides’ mentality: he advocates the acquittal of the *dēmos* [δῆμος] of a revolting city, ‘so

their friend, and either does not join the Few, the *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], when they revolt, or, if constrained to do so, at once turns on the rebels, so that in fighting the refractory state the Athenians have the mass of the citizens (*to plêthos* [τὸ πλῆθος]) on their side. (The precise meaning of these expressions – *dêmos* [δῆμος], *plêthos* [πλῆθος], *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι] and the like – will be considered in the third section of this paper). It is impossible to explain away the whole passage on the ground that Diodotus is just saying the kind of thing that might be expected to appeal to an Athenian audience. Not only do we have Thucydides' general statement¹⁷ that throughout the Greek world, after the Corcyraean revolution of 427, the leaders of the popular parties tried to bring in the Athenians, as *hoi oligoi* [οἱ ὀλίγοι] the Spartans; there is a great deal of evidence relating to individual cities, which we must now consider. Of course, the mere fact that a city did not revolt from Athens does not of itself necessarily imply fidelity: considerations of expediency, short-term or long-term, may often have been decisive – the fear of immediate Athenian counter-action, or the belief that Athens would ultimately become supreme.¹⁸ But that does not alter the fact that in almost every case in which we do have detailed information about the attitude of an allied city, we find only the Few hostile; scarcely ever is there reason to think that the *demos* was not mainly loyal. The evidence falls into two groups: for the 450s and 440s B.C. it is largely epigraphic, for the period of the Peloponnesian War it is mainly literary. We shall begin with the later period, for which the evidence is much more abundant.

The revolt of Lesbos in 428–7, in which Mytilene was the ringleader, is particularly interesting, because it is only at the very end of Thucydides' account that we gain any inkling of the real situation. At first, Thucydides implies that the Mytileneans were wholehearted and that only a few factious citizens, who were proxenoi of Athens, cared to inform the Athenians of the preparations for revolt.¹⁹ We hear much of the determined resistance of the Mytileneans and of their appeal to Sparta, and we may well be astonished when we suddenly discover from Thucydides²⁰ that 'the Mytileneans' who had organised and conducted the revolt were not the main body of the Mytileneans at all, but only the

that the only group still allied to us does not become our enemy' [ὅπως ὁ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχόν ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται] (III 47.4). It is 'only the mass of the people' in an allied state which is likely to be loyal.

¹⁷ III 82.1.

¹⁸ Any such considerations must have become much weaker after the Sicilian disaster in 413 and the offer of Persian financial support for Peloponnesian operations in the Aegean during the ensuing winter: see e.g. Thuc. VIII 2.1–2; 5.5; 24.5.

¹⁹ III 2.3.

²⁰ III 27–28. Against Cleon's 'all' [πάντες] in III 39.6, see III 47.3. And note the mercenaries who appear in III 2.2; 18.1, 2.

governing oligarchy, for no sooner had the Spartan commander Salaethus distributed hoplite equipment to the formerly light-armed demos, with the intention of making a *sortie en masse* against the besieging Athenian force, than the demos immediately mutinied and the government had to surrender to Athens.

In describing the activities of Brasidas in the 'Thraceward region' in 424-3, Thucydides occasionally gives us a glimpse of the internal situation in the cities. First, it is worth mentioning that in recording the northward march of Brasidas through Thessaly, Thucydides says²¹ that the mass of the population there had always been friendly to Athens, and that Brasidas would never have been allowed to pass if *isonomia*, 'equal government' [ἰσονομία], instead of the traditional *dunasteia*, 'one-man rule' [δυναστεία], had existed in Thessaly. When Brasidas arrived in the 'Thraceward district,' probably in September 424, there seem to have been few if any Athenian garrisons there, for Thucydides mentions none, except that at Amphipolis, and represents the Athenians as sending out garrisons at the end of that year, 'as far as they could at such short notice and in winter.'²² Brasidas made his first attempt on Acanthus. The inhabitants were divided, the common people being faithful to Athens; but eventually the citizens gave way and opened their gates, influenced not only by an able speech from Brasidas, a judicious blend of threats and promises, but also by 'fear for their fruit', for it was just before vintage, and Brasidas had threatened to ravage.²³ When the Spartan invited the surrender of Amphipolis, he at first found little support within that town.²⁴ However, the combined effect of his military success in occupying the surrounding country, the advantageous terms he offered, and the efforts of his partisans within, was sufficient to procure the surrender of the city.²⁵

Thucydides²⁶ declares now categorically that there was general enthusiasm for revolt among the Athenian subject cities of the district, which sent secret messages to Brasidas, begging him to come to them, each

²¹ IV 78.2-3.

²² IV 108.6. It appears from IV 104.4 that apart from Eucles and his garrison in Amphipolis there were no reinforcements available except the seven ships of Thucydides at Thasos, half a day's sail distant. Thuc. IV 105.1 shows that Amphipolis could hope for no reinforcements from Chalcidice, but only 'from the sea . . . and from Thrace' [ἐκ θαλάσσης . . . καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θράκης]. In Thuc. IV 7 (425 B.C.), Simonides collects a few Athenians 'from the garrisons' [ἐκ τῶν φρουρῶν], which may have been almost anywhere in the N. Aegean. Part of the evidence on the subject of garrisons in the Athenian empire is given by A. S. Nease in *The Phoenix III* (1949) 102-11.

²³ Thuc. IV 84.1-2; 87.2; 88.1; cf. Diod. XII 67.2.

²⁴ Thuc. IV 104.3-4. Although an Athenian colony, it contained few citizens of Athenian origin (IV 106.1).

²⁵ Thuc. IV 103-106.

²⁶ IV 108.3-6; cf. 80.1; Diod. XII 72.1.

wishing to lead the way in revolting. They had the additional inducement, as Thucydides points out, of the recent Athenian defeat at Delium. On the face of it, Thucydides' account is plausible enough. There is good reason to suppose, however, that when he speaks of the 'cities' that were subject to Athens, he is thinking merely of the propertied classes. When Brasidas marched into the peninsula of Acte, most of the towns (which were insignificant) naturally surrendered at once, but Sane and Dium, small as they were, and surrounded by cities now in alliance with Brasidas, held out, even when their lands were ravaged.²⁷ Turning his attention to the Sithonian peninsula, Brasidas captured Torone, though it was held by an Athenian garrison (probably just arrived); but this was done only through the treachery of a few, to the dismay of the majority, some of whom joined the Athenian garrison when it shut itself up in the fort of Lecythus,²⁸ only to be driven out to Pallene. A Spartan commander was subsequently put in charge of the town.²⁹ In 423, after Scione had revolted spontaneously, its neighbour Mende was betrayed to Brasidas by a few.³⁰ Later, when the Athenian army arrived, there were disturbances at Mende, and soon the common people fell upon the mixed Scionean and Peloponnesian garrison of seven hundred. After plundering the town, which had not made terms of surrender, the Athenians wisely told the Mendean that they could keep their civic rights and themselves deal with their own traitors. In the case of Acanthus, Sane, Dium, Torone and Mende, then, we have positive evidence that the bulk of the citizens were loyal to Athens, in circumstances which were anything but propitious. In Aristophanes' *Peace*,³¹ produced in 421, it is 'the wealthy fat-cats' [οἱ παχεῖς καὶ πλούσιοι] whom the Athenians are said to have pursued with charges of favouring Brasidas. It would be simple-minded to suppose that this happened just because the richest citizens were the most worth despoiling. It may be that some of the other towns went over to Brasidas with the free consent of the demos, but only in regard to Scione,³² and possibly Argilus (whose citizens apparently hoped to gain control over Amphipolis by backing Brasidas)³³ does the narrative of Thucydides provide any grounds for this assumption; and even at Scione, which did not revolt until 423, some at first 'disapproved of what was being done'.³⁴

²⁷ Thuc. IV 109.5.

²⁸ Thuc. IV 110–113; cf. Diod. XII 68.6.

²⁹ Thuc. IV 132.3.

³⁰ Thuc. IV 121.2; 123.1–2; 129–30.

³¹ 639–40. Cf. Ar., *Vesp.* 288–9 ('a well-off man has come, one of the traitors from Thrace; see that you pot him' [καὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ παχὺς ἦκει | τῶν προδόντων ἀπὲι Θράκης | ὃν ὅπως ἐγχευριεῖς]), also 474–6, 626–7.

³² Thuc. IV 120–1.

³³ Thuc. IV 103.4.

³⁴ IV 121.1.

We now have to examine the movements in the Ionian cities after the Sicilian catastrophe, in 412 and the years following, when Thucydides, in the statement quoted earlier, attributes to the subjects of Athens a passionate desire to revolt, even beyond their capacity to fulfil. Jacqueline de Romilly, in her recent book, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien*,³⁵ asserts that although 'the conflict between democracy and oligarchy' ['l'opposition oligarchie-démocratie'] played an important role until the time of Brasidas, thereafter 'the conflict between master and subject sweeps the board' ['l'opposition maître-sujets balaye tout'], and 'one sees that the Athenians are incapable of retaining control over their subjects through the support of any faction: the desire for independence outweighs all other disagreements' ['on verra les Athéniens incapables de retenir leurs sujets par l'appui d'aucun parti: le désir d'indépendance aura pris le pas sur toutes les autres querelles']. This statement is not borne out by the evidence. In only a few cases have we sufficient information about the internal situation in a given city. Again we find, in all these cases, with perhaps one or two exceptions, that it was only the Few who had any desire to revolt. The events at Samos are particularly interesting: the Samian demos, after at least two if not three 'purges' of *dunatoi*, 'powerful' [δυνατοί], or *gnôrimoi*, 'distinguished men' [γνώριμοι],³⁶ remained faithful to Athens to the bitter end, and were rewarded with the grant of Athenian citizenship.³⁷ At Chios, although Thucydides speaks in several places³⁸ of 'the Chians' as planning to revolt from Athens early in 412, it is perfectly clear from two passages³⁹ that it was only the Few who were disaffected, and that they did not even dare to disclose their plans to the demos until Alcibiades and a Spartan force arrived. The leaders of the pro-Athenian faction were then executed and an oligarchy was imposed by force, under the supervision of the Spartan commander Pedaritus;⁴⁰ but this had no good results. When the Athenians invested the city, some of the Chians plotted to surrender it to them,⁴¹ but the blockade eventually had to be abandoned. At Rhodes, again, it was the 'the most powerful men' [δυνατώτατοι ἄνδρες] who called in the Spartans.⁴² When ninety-four Peloponnesian ships arrived at unfortified Camirus, *hoi polloi*, 'the masses' [οἱ πολλοί],

³⁵ Pp. 77-8, 263 n. 4.

³⁶ Thuc. VIII 21 (412 B.C.); 73 (411); Xen., Hell. II 2.6 (405 - but this may be a reference back to the earlier purges). See also IG i² 101/102. [IG i³ 96/48].

³⁷ Tod 96 (= IG i² 126 = ii² 1). [ML 94, IG i³ 127]

³⁸ VIII 5.4; 6.1, 3-4; 7.1; cf. 2.2.

³⁹ VIII 9.3; 14.2.

⁴⁰ Thuc. VIII 38.3. Until now Chios may have been a moderate oligarchy rather than a democracy.

⁴¹ Thuc. VIII 24.6.

⁴² Thuc. VIII 44.1.

fled in terror; but they were later got together by the Spartans (with the people of Lindus and Ialysus, the other two Rhodian cities) and 'persuaded' to revolt from Athens.⁴³ (With the terror of the Rhodians at the sight of the Peloponnesian fleet we may usefully contrast the friendliness of the Ionians in 427⁴⁴ towards ships which they took to be Athenian but which were in fact a Peloponnesian squadron – a friendliness which had fatal consequences.) About a year later there was an attempted revolution at Rhodes, which was suppressed by Dorieus.⁴⁵

When Astyochus the Spartan, with twenty ships, made an expedition to the mainland cities opposite Chios, with the intention of winning them away from Athens, he first failed to take so small a town as Pteleum, which must have put up a stout resistance, and then failed again in his assault on Clazomenae, though it too was unwalled.⁴⁶ Clazomenae had revolted a little earlier, but this seems to have been the work of a small party of oligarchs, and the movement had easily been suppressed.⁴⁷ At Thasos, the extreme oligarchs in exile were delighted when the Athenian Diitrephes set up a moderate oligarchy, for this, according to Thucydides, was exactly what they wanted, namely, 'the abolition of the democracy which would have opposed them' in their design of making Thasos an oligarchy independent of Athens.⁴⁸ The demos was not easily crushed, however, and the island remained in a very disturbed condition until Thrasybulus brought it back into the Athenian alliance in 407.⁴⁹ That the Thasian demos should have been friendly to Athens is all the more remarkable when we remember that the island had revolted,⁵⁰ about 465, as the result of a dispute with Athens about its *emporía*, 'trading posts' [ἐμπόρια], and gold mine in Thrace, had stood a siege of over two years, and upon surrendering had been given terms which have been described as 'terribly severe'⁵¹ – a sequence of events which has often been cited as an example of 'Athenian aggression'.⁵² After describing what happened at Thasos in

⁴³ Thuc. VIII 44. The Spartans then raised a levy of no less than 32 talents from the Rhodians (VIII 44.4).

⁴⁴ Thuc. III 32.1–3.

⁴⁵ Diod. XIII 38.5; 45.1.

⁴⁶ Thuc. VIII 31.2–3.

⁴⁷ Thuc. VIII 14.3; 23.6; cf. Diod. XIII 71.1.

⁴⁸ Thuc. VIII 64.2–5; Hell. Oxy. II 4. Of course the demos would oppose the destruction of the democracy: *enantíōsomenon*, 'will be opposed' [ἐναντιωσόμενον] (note the tense) must also apply to the revolt from Athens, referred to in the previous sentence.

⁴⁹ Xen., Hell. I 4.9; Diod. XIII 72.1; cf. Corn. Nep., Lys. II 2. And see Dem. XX 59 for the grant of privileges to the pro-Athenian party. In Xen., Hell. I 1.32 we should probably read 'in Iasos' [ἐν Ἰάσῳ], with U. Kahrstedt, Forsch. z. Gesch. d. ausgeh. V. u. d. IV. Jahrh. 176 n. 17.

⁵⁰ Thuc. I 100.2; 101.3; Diod. XI 70.1; Plut., Cim. 14. For the date, see Gomme, HCT I 391.

⁵¹ E. M. Walker in Camb. Anc. Hist. V 59.

⁵² E. g. by Meiggs in JHS LXIII (1943) 21.

411, Thucydides⁵³ makes the very significant comment that what occurred there was just the sort of thing that did happen in the subject states: ‘once the cities had achieved *sôphrosunê*, “prudence” [σωφροσύνη]’ – he means, of course, oligarchies of a moderate type – ‘and impunity of action, they went on to full independence’. We must not fail to notice that Neapolis on the mainland opposite, apparently a colony of Thasos, refused to join the island in its revolt, stood a siege, and finally co-operated in force in the reduction of Thasos, earning the thanks of the imperial city, expressed in decrees recorded in an inscription which has survived.⁵⁴

There is reason to think that in Lesbos⁵⁵ also there was little enthusiasm for revolt, except among the leading citizens. Although a Chian force of thirteen ships procured the defection of Methymna and Mytilene in 412, an Athenian expedition of twenty-five ships was able to recover Mytilene virtually without striking a blow (*autoboiei* [αὐτοβοεΐ]), and when the Spartan admiral Astyochus arrived, in the hope of at least encouraging Methymna to persevere, ‘everything went against him’. In the following year, 411,⁵⁶ a party of Methymnaean exiles – evidently rich men, since they were able to hire two hundred and fifty mercenaries – failed to get possession of their city. In 406 Methymna,⁵⁷ which then had an Athenian garrison (probably at its own request), was faithful to Athens and, refusing to surrender to Callicratidas the Spartan commander, was captured (with the aid of traitors within) and plundered. Mytilene⁵⁸ remained even longer on the Athenian side, only submitting to Lysander after Aegospotami. Other cities also refused to desert Athens, even when confronted with a formidable Peloponnesian armament. In 405, Cedrae in Caria⁵⁹ resisted Lysander’s attack but was stormed and the inhabitants (whom Xenophon describes as *mixobarbaroi*, ‘semi-barbarian’ [μιξοβάρβαροι]) were sold into slavery; and soon afterwards Lampsacus,⁶⁰ which also resisted Lysander, was taken

⁵³ VIII 64.5. (The participial clause has been deliberately ignored here, since the text is uncertain).

⁵⁴ Tod 84 (= IG i² 108) [ML 89, IG i³ 101] lines 39–55, re-edited by Meritt and Andrewes in BSA XLVI (1951) at pp. 201–3, lines 48–64. The date of this part of the inscription must be 407/6. As to whether Neapolis was a Thasian colony, see ATL II 86.

⁵⁵ Thuc. VIII 22–23; 32. The events of 427 (even the cleruchy) had evidently not created general hostility to Athens in Lesbos.

⁵⁶ Thuc. VIII 100.3. Athenian ‘guards’ [φρουροί] from Mytilene joined in the defence.

⁵⁷ Xen., Hell. I 6.12–15 (specifically recording that those in control of affairs at Methymna were pro-Athenian); Diod. XIII 76.5. Cf. pp. 274–5 below.

⁵⁸ Xen., Hell. I 6.16, 38; II 2.5; Diod. XIII 76.6 to 79.7; 97.2; 100.1–6. It is true that Mytilene was a main Athenian base, but the Mytileneans seem to have been friendly: see Diod. XIII 78.5; 79.2.

⁵⁹ Xen., Hell. II 1.15.

⁶⁰ Xen., Hell. II 1.18–19; Diod. XIII 104.8.

and plundered. Most remarkable of all in this group is Carian Iasus.⁶¹ Although it had paid heavily for its alliance with Athens by being sacked by the Peloponnesians in 412, and garrisoned after that, we find it loyal to Athens seven years later, for according to Diodorus, Lysander now took it by storm, massacred the eight hundred male citizens, sold the women and children as slaves, and destroyed the city – a procedure which suggests that resistance had been vigorous. So much for the alleged enthusiasm of the allies of Athens for ‘liberation’.

Only at Ephesus,⁶² and perhaps (during the Ionian War) Miletus,⁶³ among the cities about which we have any information, is there no visible trace of a pro-Athenian party. We may remember that Ephesus was always a centre of Persian influence: for example, its large donation in gold to the Spartan warchest, probably in 427, recorded in an inscription found near Sparta,⁶⁴ consisted of a thousand darics, the equivalent of four Attic silver talents or a little more.

We can now go back to the 450s and 440s B.C., a period for which, as mentioned above, the evidence on the questions under discussion is predominantly epigraphic. The revolt of Erythrae,⁶⁵ from 454 or earlier to 452, was almost certainly due to the seizure of power by a Persian-backed tyranny. Miletus⁶⁶ was also in revolt from at least 454 until 452/1; but during this period she was apparently under the control of a close oligarchy or tyranny, which seems to have driven out an important section of the citizen body (perhaps with Persian support), and was sentenced in its turn to perpetual and hereditary outlawry about 452, when the exiles returned and the city was brought back into the Athenian empire. The probable absence of Colophon⁶⁷ from the tribute quota-lists of the second assessment period (450/49 to 447/6), and the Athenian decree relating to that city of (probably) 446, certainly point to a revolt about 450; but the known Persian associations of this inland city, the fact

⁶¹ Thuc. VIII 28.2–3 (the attack was a surprise) and 36.1; 29.1; Diod. XIII 104.7; perhaps Xen., Hell. I 1.32 (see [n. 49] above).

⁶² Ephesus was in revolt by 412 (Thuc. VIII 19.3) and seems to have been in Persian hands (VIII 109.1; Xen., Hell. I 2.6). It remained an important Persian-Peloponnesian base for the rest of the war (Xen., Hell. I 5.1, 10; II 1.6, etc.).

⁶³ For the earlier history of Miletus, see below and [n. 66]. For Miletus in the Ionian War, see esp. Thuc. VIII 17.1–3 (cf. Ar., Lysistr. 108–9); 25.1–3; 28–29; 33.1; 36.1; 84.4–5; Xen., Hell. I 2.2–3; 6.8–12. Cf. Diod. XIII 104.5–6 and Plut., Lys. 8; 19.

⁶⁴ Tod 62 [ML 67] (= IG V 1 1), lines 22–23. For the date, see p. 245 below.

⁶⁵ See Tod 29 [ML 40] (= SEG X 11 = D 10 in ATL II 38, 54–57) and the very probable reconstruction of events in ATL III 252–5.

⁶⁶ See the admirable account by Meiggs in JHS LXIII (1943) 25–27 [pp. 66–9, this vol.]; cf. ATL III 257. (For IG i² 22, with later additions, see now D 11 in ATL II 57–60; SEG X 14).

⁶⁷ See Meiggs, *op. cit.* 28 [p. 71, this vol.]; ATL III 282–3. For IG i² 14/15 [IG i³ 37] (probably 447/6), see now D 15 in ATL II 68–69; SEG X 17. For the events of 430 and later, see p. 243 below.

that it was handed over to the Persian Itamenes in 430 by one of two parties in a *stasis* ‘civil war’ [στάσις] (presumably of the usual character – oligarchs against democrats), and the Colophonian oath to preserve democracy – perhaps newly introduced, or at any rate restored – in the treaty made with Athens in 446 or thereabouts, strongly suggest that the revolt was the work of oligarchs receiving Persian support. The revolt of Euboea in 446 may well have been mainly the work of the Hippobotae, the aristocrats of Chalcis, for the Athenians drove them out on the reduction of the island and probably gave their lands to cleruchs,⁶⁸ but inflicted no punishment beyond the taking of hostages,⁶⁹ as far as we know, on the other Euboeans, except that they expelled the Hestiaeans (who had massacred the crew of an Athenian ship) and settled an Athenian colony on their lands.⁷⁰ The revolt of Samos in 440/39,⁷¹ after certain Samians who ‘wished to revolutionise the constitution’ had induced the Athenians to set up a democracy, was certainly brought about by exiled oligarchs, who allied themselves with the Persian satrap Pissuthnes, employed a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and worked in conjunction with the *dunatôtatoi*, ‘most powerful men’ [δυνατώτατοι], remaining in the city. Here again there is no evidence of general hostility to Athens among the Samians, although once the oligarchs had got a firm grip on the city, and had captured and expelled the democratic leaders,⁷² they put up a stout resistance to Athens and were no doubt able to enforce the adherence of a considerable number of the common folk.

It is significant that in this early period, whenever we do have information about the circumstances of a revolt, we find good reason for attributing it to oligarchs or tyrants, who could evidently rely on Persian assistance wherever the situation of the city permitted. This is precisely the state of affairs we have already seen to exist later, during the Peloponnesian War. In some cases, both early and late, the bare fact of a revolt is recorded, without detail. Some of these revolts may have been wholehearted, but we certainly cannot assume so just because we have no evidence. Surely the reverse is true: surely we may assume that the situation we find in virtually all the towns for which we do have sufficient information existed in most of the remainder. The mere fact of the

⁶⁸ Plut., *Per.* 23; Ael., *VH VI 1* (2000 ‘allotments’ [κλήροι]). See the highly ingenious arguments of *ATL III* 294–7, where the other evidence is cited. For the Hippobotae, see also *Hdts. V* 77.2; *Strab. X* 1.8, p. 447.

⁶⁹ For the hostages, see *Tod 42* (= *IG i² 39*) [*ML 52, IG i³ 40*] lines 47–52 (Chalcis, 446/5); *IG i² p. 284* (Eretria, 442/1: note the reference to the ‘very rich’ [πλουσιώτατοι]). Examination of the quota-lists shows that almost certainly none of the Euboean cities suffered any increase in tribute.

⁷⁰ *Thuc. I* 114.3; *Plut., Per.* 23 etc.

⁷¹ *Thuc. I* 115.2 to 117.3 (cf. *VIII* 76.4); *Diod. XII* 27–28; *Plut., Per.* 24–28 etc.

⁷² *Thuc. I* 115.5; *Diod. XII* 27.3.

coming to power of an oligarchy in an allied city immediately upon a revolt from Athens, as evidently at Eretria in 411,⁷³ tends to confirm that the democratic party in that city was pro-Athenian.

It is not difficult to find other examples of loyalty to Athens on the part of her allies, or pro-Athenian movements inside cities in revolt. When the Athenian armament in Sicily was at its last gasp, the division under Demosthenes being on the very point of surrender, the Syracusans made a proclamation offering freedom to any of the islanders (the Athenian allies) who were willing to come over to them. Further resistance was now quite hopeless, and nothing could have restrained the allies from deserting except the strongest sense of loyalty. Yet Thucydides tells us that 'not many cities went over'.⁷⁴ The majority remained, to undergo a fate which they must have well known could only be death or enslavement. In 428 Methymna⁷⁵ refused to follow the rest of the Lesbian cities in their revolt. In 430 there was a 'civil war' [στᾶσις] at Colophon:⁷⁶ one faction called in the Persians and expelled the other, which removed to Notium but itself split into two factions, one of which gained control of the new settlement by employing mercenaries and allied itself with the medising citizens remaining in Colophon. In 427 the defeated party, no doubt democratic in character, called in the Athenians, who founded a new colony at Notium for the exiled Colophonians. The capture of Selymbria⁷⁷ and Byzantium⁷⁸ by the Athenians in 408–7 was brought about in each case by the treachery of a faction inside the city.

In the light of all the evidence which has been cited above, we can understand and accept Plato's explanation of the long life of the Athenian empire: the Athenians, he says, kept their *archê* [ἀρχή] for seventy years 'because they had friends in each of the cities'.⁷⁹

On many occasions we find support given to Athens by states, or democratic parties within states, outside the Athenian 'empire' proper. The bulk of the Plataeans, of course, were always faithful to Athens; it was only a few wealthy aristocrats who called in the Thebans in 431.⁸⁰

⁷³ Tod 82 [ML 82] (= IG XII 9, 187), the prescript of which refers to the 'Council' [βουλή] but not to the *dêmos* [δῆμος].

⁷⁴ Thuc. VII 82.1.

⁷⁵ Thuc. III 2.1, 3; 5.1; 18.1–2; 50.2.

⁷⁶ Thuc. III 34.

⁷⁷ Diod. XIII 66.4; Plut., Alc. 30.

⁷⁸ Xen., Hell. I 3.16–20; II 2.1; Diod. XIII 66.6; 67; Plut., Alc. 31.

⁷⁹ Epist. VII 332 c. Since Plato gives this as the one sufficient reason, it will hardly be maintained that he is merely referring to a handful of pro-Athenian individuals of note, such as those who received Athenian proxenia and were evidently expected (see Thuc. III 2.3) to act as Athenian watchdogs.

⁸⁰ Thuc. II 2.2; 3.2; III 65.2.

The Athenians had democratic supporters at Corcyra⁸¹ and Argos,⁸² and in the Boeotian cities,⁸³ especially Thespieae, Chaeronea and Siphae. In 424 the leading democrats at Megara⁸⁴ plotted to betray the city to Athens. Here we find the popular party, in a state which had been specially harassed by the Athenians, by a stringent trade embargo (the 'Megarian Decree', of c. 432 B.C.) and two ravaging expeditions a year,⁸⁵ prepared to take desperate risks to re-enter the Athenian alliance. There were pro-Athenian parties at Thurii and Messana;⁸⁶ and three other Sicilian towns (Egesta, Naxos and Catana), as well as certain Sicel communities, were on Athens' side. It would be unsafe to draw any general conclusions from the existence of pro-Athenian elements in the Sicilian states, since fear of Syracuse⁸⁷ may well have been the decisive factor in most cases. In his comment on the first naval defeat of Athens by Syracuse, however, Thucydides⁸⁸ clearly implies that the Athenians were used to creating dissension among their opponents by holding out the prospect of constitutional changes – in the direction of democracy, needless to say. And indeed, apart from the examples already mentioned, there are several recorded attempts, successful or unsuccessful, by parties inside cities, especially besieged cities, to betray them to the Athenians, notably at Syracuse,⁸⁹ and also at Spartolus,⁹⁰ Eion 'in the

⁸¹ See esp. Thuc. III 70.1 (cf. I 55.1) to 81; 85; IV 2.3; 46–48; Diod. XIII 48.1–6.

⁸² See esp. Thuc. I 102.4; V 29.1; 76.1–2; 78; 81.2; 82; 83.1–2; 116.1; VIII 86.8–9; Diod. XII 81.2–5.

⁸³ Thuc. III 62.5 and IV 92.6 (458/7–447/6); IV 76.2–3 and 89 (424, specifically mentioning Siphae and Chaeronea); Diod. XII 69.1 (also 424); Thuc. IV 133.1 (Thespieae, 423); VI 95.2 (Thespieae, 414). IG² 36, of c. 447/6 (SEGX33 gives a new fragment) [see now IG³ 23] is an Athenian proxy decree in favour of four named Thespians, one of whom is called, significantly, Athenaios. SEG X 81 (= IG² 68/69, with a new fragment) [IG³ 72] may refer to the settlement of the Thespian and other Boeotian exiles in 424/3. Thuc. III 62.5 (cf. IV 92.6) makes the Thebans say that before Coronea (447/6) the Athenians had already made themselves masters of most of Boeotia 'through civil war' [κατὰ στάσις]. The 'civil war' [στάσις] may well have involved pro- and anti-Athenian factions in the other towns (cf. Xen., Mem. III 5.2), but in view of Thuc. IV 76.2; VI 95.2, can we doubt that the strife took the usual social form, even if the question of Theban supremacy also entered into it? As for that well known puzzle, Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. III 11, there seems to be no certain evidence that Athens set up democracies in 458/7 in the Boeotian cities, other than Thebes (Ar., Pol. 1302b 29–30), and it is possible she may have accepted the existing oligarchies for a time, only to be compelled to remove or exile them for oppressive conduct ('the *dēmos* was enslaved' [ὁ δῆμος ἐδοῦλευσεν]: Ps.-Xen.) before 447/6, when they made their come-back. For an equally possible alternative, see Gomme, HCT I 318.

⁸⁴ Thuc. IV 66–74; Diod. XII 66–67.

⁸⁵ Thuc. IV 66.1; cf. Plut., Per. 30.

⁸⁶ Thuc. VII 33.5–6 (Thurii); VI 74.1 (cf. 50.1) and Plut., Alc. 22 (Messana). Cf. Thuc. VI 52.1; 88.1 (Camarina).

⁸⁷ See e.g. Thuc. VI 88.1.

⁸⁸ VII 55.2.

⁸⁹ Thuc. VII 48.2; 49.1; 73.3; Plut., Nic. 21; 22; 26. There were Syracusan exiles with the Athenian army in 415 (Thuc. VI 64.1). Thuc. VII 55.2 conveys the impression that in 415 Syracuse was a full democracy, just like Athens; but in view of Thuc. VI 41; Ar., Pol. 1304a 27–29; Diod. XIII 34.6; 35, it seems certain that its constitution was distinctly less democratic than that of Athens.

⁹⁰ Thuc. II 79.2.

Thraceward region' [ἐπὶ Θρόακης],⁹¹ Anactorium,⁹² Cythera,⁹³ Tegea,⁹⁴ and even Melos.⁹⁵

Now Melos is, for most people, the characteristic example of Athenian brutality. The cruel treatment of the conquered island was certainly indefensible. There are, however, certain features in the affair, often overlooked, which may at least help us to see the whole incident in better proportion. Although we have no record of any recent hostilities between the two states, we know that earlier the Melians had not remained neutral in the war, as so many people, obsessed by the Melian Dialogue⁹⁶, seem to think. Doubtless in 416 the Melians, when confronted with a large Athenian armament, said they would like to be regarded henceforth as neutrals.⁹⁷ In the Dialogue,⁹⁸ Thucydides appears to make the Athenians concede that they are committing what would nowadays be called 'unprovoked aggression'. Just before he begins the Dialogue, however, Thucydides⁹⁹ tells us that during the war the Melians had at first remained neutral, but that when the Athenians used violence towards them and plundered their lands, 'adopted a position of open warfare' [ἐς πόλεμον φανερόν κατέστησαν]. Epigraphic evidence allows us to go further still: it puts the original Athenian attack on Melos in quite a different light. The inscription found near Sparta, to which reference has already been made, records¹⁰⁰ two separate donations by Melos to the Spartan war-funds, one of twenty Aeginetan minae (roughly half an Attic talent): 'the Melians gave to the Lacedaemonians twenty minae in silver' [ἔδον τοῖς Μάλιοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀργυρίῳ φ(ί)κατι μνάς]. The other figure has perished. The donors are described, it will be noticed, as *toi Malioi*, 'the Melians' [τοῖς Μάλιοι]. Contrast the wording of another part of the same inscription, recording a Chian donation: 'friends among the Chians gave to the Lacedaemonians for the war . . .' [[ἔδον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις τῶν Χίων τοῖς φίλοι ποττὸν [πόλεμον . . .]]. This shows that the Melian

⁹¹ Thuc. IV 7.

⁹² Thuc. IV 49.

⁹³ Thuc. IV 54.3.

⁹⁴ Thuc. V 62.2; 64.1.

⁹⁵ Thuc. V 116.3.

⁹⁶ Thuc. V 85-113. This is not to be treated as an historical record: see H. Ll. Hudson-Williams in *AJP* LXXI (1950) 156ff., esp. 167-9. Cf. now M. Treu in *Historia* II 253ff.

⁹⁷ As in V 94; 112.3.

⁹⁸ See V 89: 'nor will we use pretty arguments . . . saying that we are attacking now because we have suffered some wrong' [οὔτε . . . μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς . . . ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξεργόμεθα], and 'or that you did not fight alongside the Lacedaemonians even though you are their colonists, or that you have not done us any harm' [ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποικοὶ ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε].

⁹⁹ V 84.2. Cf. the use of the expression 'adopted a position of open warfare' [ἐς πόλεμον φανερόν κατέστησαν] in V 25. 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Tod* 62 [ML 67] (= IG V i 1), lines 24-30, 36-41. The Chian donation is recorded in lines 8-10.

subscription was an official one. According to a speech of Brasidas, in Thucydides,¹⁰¹ the payment of tribute to Athens by Acanthus was regarded by Sparta as a hostile act; and the same interpretation would not unreasonably be placed by Athens, *a fortiori*, on a voluntary donation to Sparta. Now Adcock¹⁰² showed a few years ago that there is good reason to think these gifts to Sparta were made in the spring of 427, during Alcidas's expedition, when the Melians very probably gave aid and comfort to Alcidas. The Athenian ravaging expedition, which did not take place until the following year (and was led, incidentally, by Nicias),¹⁰³ was doubtless sent in retaliation for the assistance the Melians had given to Sparta. At any rate, Thucydides says expressly that after this the Melians 'adopted a position of open warfare' [ἐξ πόλεμον φανερόν κατέστησαν]. Diodorus¹⁰⁴ describes Melos as the one firm ally of Sparta among the Cycladic islands in 426. It is particularly interesting to observe that in 416 the Athenian envoys were not permitted by the Melian authorities to address the assembled people but were made to state their case 'before the magistrates and the few'¹⁰⁵ – a circumstance upon which Thucydides allows the Athenians to make scornful comment. Melos put up a stout resistance to Athens, it is true, but so at first did Mytilene, where, as we have seen, the majority had no great desire to fight Athens. As we learn from Thucydides that at the end of the siege there was treachery inside Melos, it seems likely that the Melian commons did not entirely share the passion for neutral autonomy so eloquently expressed by their oligarchs.¹⁰⁶

On the question of atrocities in general, it should be emphasized that very few acts of brutality are recorded against the Athenians during the war: the only serious ones¹⁰⁷ are those at Melos and Scione¹⁰⁸ and those

¹⁰¹ IV 87.3. Cf. SEG X 89 (= Tod 68 = IG i² 90 [IG i³ 76]), lines 19–20.

¹⁰² In *Mélanges Glotz* I 1–6.

¹⁰³ Thuc. III 91.1–3. A command would seldom be entrusted to a general not in sympathy with its objectives.

¹⁰⁴ XII 65.2. Probably this statement is technically incorrect.

¹⁰⁵ Thuc. V 84.3; 85.

¹⁰⁶ Some problems remain. Melos was evidently a prosperous island in 416: it was assessed for tribute in 425 at 15 talents (the same assessment as that of e.g. Andros, Naxos, Eretria), and shortly before the siege it seems to have issued a plentiful new coinage (see J. G. Milne, 'The Melos Hoard of 1907' = *Amer. Num. Soc. Notes and Monographs* no. 62, 1934); yet the Athenian cleruchy sent to Melos was of 500 men only. Thuc. (V 116.4) tells us that the Athenians put to death 'all the adult Melians whom they captured' [Μηλίων ὅσους ἠβώντας ἔλαβον]. But surely the traitors at least were spared? Were they perhaps very numerous? And who were the Melians restored by Lysander in 405 (Xen., *Hell.* II. 2.9; Plut., *Lys.* 14)?

¹⁰⁷ Even minor acts of cruelty seem to have been rare: the massacre of the crews of two captured ships in 405, by order of Philocles (Xen., *Hell.* II 1.31–32), was remembered as an isolated atrocity. The decree mentioned by Xen. (*ibid.*) and Plut., *Lys.* 9; 13 may or may not be historical (Grote rejected it), and certainly never took effect.

¹⁰⁸ Thuc. V 116.4 etc. (Melos); V 32.1 and Diod. XII 76.3–4 (Scione). These two massacres were evidently a favourite theme of anti-Athenian propaganda: see e.g. Xen., *Hell.* II 2.3; Isocr. IV 100; XII 63.

(less shocking) at Torone¹⁰⁹ and Thyrea.¹¹⁰ All these were to a greater or less extent sanctioned by the Greek laws of war,¹¹¹ even if they shocked some of the more humane Greeks of the time. The essential point is that the Athenians were certainly no more brutal, on the whole, in their treatment of the conquered than were other Greek states of their day; and the behaviour of the demos (in striking contrast with that of their own oligarchs) under the greatest test of all, civil strife, was exemplary: Aristotle's reference¹¹² to the 'habitual clemency of the demos' was well deserved, in particular by their conduct in 403, to which Aristotle and others pay tribute.¹¹³ The Argives enslaved the whole population of Mycenae and destroyed the town on capturing it about 465 B.C.¹¹⁴ In the Peloponnesian War, we are told by Thucydides,¹¹⁵ the Spartans began the practice of butchering all the traders they caught at sea – Athenians and their allies and, in the early part of the war, even neutrals. The Spartan admiral Alcidas slaughtered most of the prisoners he had taken from the Ionian states during his expedition in 427,¹¹⁶ although apparently they were not in arms. The Spartans in the same year, to gratify their implacable Theban allies, killed every one of the surviving defenders of Plataea in cold blood and enslaved their women.¹¹⁷ When the Helots were felt to be specially dangerous, apparently in 424, the Spartans secretly and treacherously murdered two thousand of the best of them.¹¹⁸ The Spartans massacred all the free men they captured on the fall of Argive Hysiae in 417.¹¹⁹ The men of Byzantium and Chalcedon slaughtered the whole multitude of prisoners (men, women and children) they had taken on their expedition into Bithynia in c. 416/5.¹²⁰ After Aegospotami, in 405, all the Athenian prisoners, perhaps three or four thousand in number,¹²¹ were put to death

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. V 3.4; Diod. XII 73.3. Here the men were spared.

¹¹⁰ Thuc. IV 56.2 (cf. II 27.2); 57.3–4. But these men were in the position of the garrison of a fort and hence were liable to be slaughtered on capture.

¹¹¹ Xen., *Cyrop.* VII 5.73; cf. Xen., *Mem.* IV 2.15.

¹¹² Ath. Pol. 22.4.

¹¹³ Ath. Pol. 40.3; Ps.-Lys. II 63–66; Xen., *Hell.* II 4.43; Isocr. XVIII 31–32, 44, 46, 68; *Epist.* VIII 3; Plat., *Menex.* 243e; *Epist.* VII 323b; Cic. I *Phil.* I 1.

¹¹⁴ Diod. XI 65.5.

¹¹⁵ II 67.4.

¹¹⁶ Thuc. III 32.1–2.

¹¹⁷ Thuc. III 68.1–2, 4; Diod. XII 56.4–6; cf. Isocr. XIV 62; XII 93. Some may feel that Thuc. is over-anxious to extenuate the *Spartan* share in the massacre: notice, in § 1, the apologetic clauses beginning 'thinking' [νομιζόντες] and 'considering' [ἠγροῦμένοι], and the placing of ultimate responsibility on the Thebans in § 4.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. IV 80.3–4 seems to put this event in 424, as does Diod. XII 67.3–4, no doubt following Thuc. For another Spartan killing of Helots, apparently in the early 460s B.C., see Thuc. I 128.1 (cf. Paus. IV 24.5).

¹¹⁹ Thuc. V 83.2; Diod. XII 81.1.

¹²⁰ Diod. XII 82.2.

¹²¹ Xen., *Hell.* II 1.31 (no figure); Plut., *Lys.* 11 (3000); 13; Paus. IX 32.6 (4000). Cf. the massacre of prisoners after the battles of Leucimma and Sybota (Thuc. I 30.1; 50.1).

by the Peloponnesians under Lysander, who during the same campaign killed all the men and enslaved the women and children of at least one city he took by storm, and enslaved all the inhabitants of at least one other.¹²² The close oligarchies which Lysander installed at this time in the Aegean and Asiatic cities executed their political opponents wholesale,¹²³ as did Lysander's *protégés* the Thirty at Athens, and the victorious revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries at Corcyra, Argos and elsewhere. It is necessary to emphasize all this, because isolated Athenian acts of cruelty have been remembered while the many other contemporary atrocities have been largely forgotten, and the quite misleading impression has come to prevail that the Athenians, increasingly corrupted by power, became ever harsher and more vindictive as the war progressed. In reality, this impression is probably due mainly to the Mytilenean Debate and the Melian Dialogue, in both of which our attention is strongly focussed upon the character of Athenian imperialism, as Thucydides conceived it. In the Mytilenean Debate,¹²⁴ by the nature of the arguments he presents, Thucydides conveys the impression that the Athenians were swayed only by considerations of expediency. As Finley puts it,¹²⁵ 'the advocate of simple decency had no other course than to talk in terms of calculation'. But mark how Thucydides explains the holding of the second assembly on the very next day after that on which the cruel sentence was pronounced. On the following day, he says, 'there were immediately some second thoughts, and reconsideration on the cruelty of the decree, and on the magnitude of their condemning a whole city to destruction, rather than just the guilty' [μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὁμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνώσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους] – no mere prudence here, but the moral emotion of remorse. Arguments from expediency may have predominated in the second assembly,¹²⁶ but in view of the passage just quoted it is difficult to accept Thucydides' implication that what really changed the minds of the Athenians was nothing but a callous consideration of self-interest.

An overwhelming body of evidence has now been produced to show that the mass of the citizens in the allied or subject states were loyal to

¹²² Iasus and Cedraea (see pp. 24of. above).

¹²³ See p. 273 below.

¹²⁴ Thuc. III 36–49. One may well wonder how fully the Athenian Assembly was informed, especially at its first meeting, about the mutiny of the Mytilenean demos.

¹²⁵ Thucydides 177.

¹²⁶ What precisely does Thuc. III 49.1 mean by *ῥηθειςῶν δὲ τῶν γνώμων τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας*? 'After the delivery of these two opinions, directly contradicting each other?' Or something like 'The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other' (Crawley), suggesting that there were other opinions too? At any rate, it is quite impossible to believe that on such an occasion only two speeches were made.

Athens throughout the whole period of the empire, until the final collapse in the Ionian War, and could on occasion give proof of a deep devotion to the imperial city, which can only be compared with the similar devotion of contemporary oligarchs to Sparta.¹²⁷ This judgment holds, whatever the character of Athenian imperialism may have been and whatever verdict we ourselves may wish to pass upon it. The evidence is all the more impressive in that it comes mainly from Thucydides, who, whenever he is generalising, or interpreting the facts rather than stating them, depicts the subjects of Athens as groaning under her tyrannous rule. A subsidiary conclusion of no small importance which has emerged from this survey is that Thucydides, generally (and rightly) considered the most trustworthy of all ancient historians, is guilty of serious misrepresentation in his judgments on the Athenian empire. He was quite entitled to disapprove of the later empire, and to express this disapproval. What we may reasonably object to is his representing that the majority of its subjects detested it. At the same time, it must be laid to Thucydides' credit that we are able to convict him of this distortion precisely because he himself is scrupulously accurate in presenting the detailed evidence. The partiality of Thucydides could scarcely have been exposed but for the honesty of Thucydides.

II 'INDEPENDENT' ALLIES AND 'SUBJECT' ALLIES

In the opinion of Thucydides, as we have seen, Athens was clearly guilty of abusing her power as hegemon of the Delian League, above all by destroying the autonomy of her allies and, as the 'tyrant city', turning them into her subjects. No one will wish to deny that Athens did change, during the first thirty years after the formation of the League, from a hegemon into a ruler, and the other member-states from allies into subjects. One may feel, however, that Thucydides' thought on this subject is confused, and particularly that his division of the allies into two groups, 'autonomous' and 'subject', is misleading.

From the earliest days of the Delian League some of the allies furnished ships, with their crews, while others paid tribute. The two groups will be referred to here as 'naval allies' and 'tributary allies' respectively. In the early period of the League this distinction had no particular political significance, but in the eyes of Thucydides the transformation of the

¹²⁷ Cf. Xen., *Hell.* II 3.25; Thuc. VI 11.7 ('they are plotting against the city by means of oligarchy' [πόλιν δι' ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλευούσαν]). This situation tended to reassert itself during the first half of the 4th century: see e.g. Xen., *Hell.* IV 8.20, 27; VI 3.14; Isocr. IV 16; VI 63.

Athenian hegemony into an empire was very closely connected with the conversion of naval allies into tributary allies,¹²⁸ and only the former remained in some sense autonomous. This distinction, between tributary allies who were mere subjects of Athens, and a class of ‘autonomous’ allies – usually equated, as by Thucydides, with naval allies – has been widely accepted in modern times. In fact the whole conception is wrong: the only valid reason for distinguishing naval allies from the rest is that the former provided contingents and the latter tribute, and there is no justification for singling out a class of ‘autonomous’ allies, in theory or in practice, whether these are thought of as identical with naval allies or in slightly different terms.

Thucydides conceived the condition of the tributary allies, whom he describes as ‘tribute-paying’ [φόρου ὑποτελεῖς], ‘subject to tribute’ [φόρῳ ὑπήκοι],¹²⁹ as one of *douleia*, ‘slavery’ [δουλεία];¹³⁰ but except on one occasion he is willing to call the naval allies *autonomoi*, ‘independent’ [αὐτόνομοι], and *eleutheroi*, ‘free’ [ἐλεύθεροι].¹³¹ The one exception is his clumsily worded list of Athenian allies in the Sicilian expedition:¹³² here, although he describes the Chians as autonomous, he puts Methymna, the only other naval ally at that date, in quite a different category, among the *hypêkooi*, ‘subjects’ [ὑπήκοι], although the Methymnaeans are described as ‘subject with respect to ships, not tribute’ [ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοι], in contrast with other Aeolians, who are *hypoteleis*, ‘tribute-paying’ [ὑποτελεῖς]. And incidentally it is evident from what Thucydides¹³³ says of the condition of the Boeotian towns after 447/6 that he did not regard them as autonomous in 458/7–447/6,

¹²⁸ The reason given by Thuc. (I 99) and Plut. (Cim. 11) for the allies’ eagerness to change to tributary status – in effect, their laziness – is not convincing. Athens seems to have had no difficulty later in procuring paid foreign volunteer crews. It is tempting to speculate that when Aristides attempted (as he must have done) to equate the alternative burdens of tribute and contingents, he made no allowance for the grant of pay to the crews, and that the alleged reluctance of the allies to serve was really a very reasonable refusal on the part of the poorer classes, from whom the rowers and sailors (c. 180 per trireme, out of c. 200) were drawn, to serve without pay. Pay being by far the largest item of expense in maintaining warships, its provision would have made the cost of a naval contingent altogether disproportionate to the corresponding tribute. This is immediately evident when calculations are made of the minimum cost of providing a contingent of reasonable size for almost any known tributary state, even on the assumption that a contingent might not be required every year.

¹²⁹ VII 57.3–5; cf. I 19; 56.2; II 9.4–5; III 46.2; V III.4; VI 22; 43; 69.3; 85.2 etc.

¹³⁰ See p. 234 above.

¹³¹ III 10.5 (‘they are *autonomoi* and free in name’ [αὐτόνομοι δὲ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι]); I 1.1, 3; 36.2; 39.2; 46.5; VI 85.2.

¹³² VII 57, esp. 3–5: ‘clumsily worded,’ because the *men*, ‘on the one hand’ [μὲν], of ‘of the subjects, on the one hand’ [τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων] is never answered – the *de*, ‘on the other hand’ [δέ], in ‘from the islands, on the other hand’ [ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων] and ‘from Ionia, on the other hand’ [ἐκ δ’ Ἰωνίας] refers back to ‘from Euboea’ [ἀπ’ Εὐβοίας]. Chios is first included among the ‘subjects’ [ὑπήκοι], and then in the next sentence characterised as autonomous.

¹³³ I 113.4.

when they were in alliance with Athens, although there is no reason whatever to suppose that they paid tribute.

Let us try to see whether we really can distinguish a class of Athenian allies who were specially autonomous, either *de jure* or *de facto*.¹³⁴ First we may consider the position in constitutional theory. It was of course originally understood that all the allies, naval or tributary, would be autonomous,¹³⁵ whether or not it was thought necessary to state this specifically in the treaties of alliance. In later times the Athenians probably still maintained that all their allies were autonomous. In decrees and treaties they seem to have inserted the word or not, according as the convenience of Athens in the particular situation seemed to require.¹³⁶ No constitutional principle can be detected, and it is impossible to identify a particular class of ‘autonomous’ allies in virtue of the possession of navies or any other fixed characteristic.

When we turn to consider the allies’ *de facto* enjoyment of autonomy, we find precisely the same situation: no general rules can be laid down, because every case was dealt with separately on its merits, and there is not the slightest reason to suppose that, in so far as coercion of the allies was practised by Athens, the naval allies or any other identifiable category fared better than the rest. Chios was the premier ally, especially during the Peloponnesian War, but in 425 Athens made Chios pull down her newly erected wall,¹³⁷ on suspicion (probably not without foundation)¹³⁸ of an intended revolt, and the comic poet Eupolis,¹³⁹ in his play *The Cities* (probably produced in 422), where the chorus consisted of member states of the empire, could say of Chios,

¹³⁴ The distinction here made between theory and practice is probably sharper than any Greek would have been prepared to draw and has been made merely to facilitate analysis.

¹³⁵ See Thuc. I 97.1. Ar., Pol. 1284a 41 (‘contrary to the agreements’ [παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]) cannot be regarded as conclusive. In Thuc. I 98.4, παρὰ τὸ καθεστῆκός need not mean more than ‘contrary to established usage.’

¹³⁶ We can infer from Thuc. I 67.2 (cf. 108.4; 139.1; 144.2) that the Thirty Years’ Peace, or conceivably the treaty by which Aegina became the ally of Athens in 457, specifically provided for Aegina to be autonomous, though she paid tribute. Tod 63 lines 11–12 (= D 22 in ATL II 76, lines 12–13 = SEG X 69, lines 5–6), of 427/6, seems to say that the Mytileneans (now deprived of their ships and left in the position of virtual tributary allies) are to be *autonomoi* [αὐτόνομοι]. The Peace of Nicias (Thuc. V 18.5) declares that certain ‘Thraceward’ cities, ‘paying the tribute as established in the time of Aristeides, are to be *autonomoi*’ [φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ’ Ἀριστείδου, αὐτόνομους εἶναι], the discreetly ambiguous participial clause demonstrating that in the official Athenian and Spartan view at this time *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] was not incompatible with the payment of tribute – at any rate, a fixed tribute. The Athenians in 412 decreed *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] to Samos (Thuc. VIII 21). And according to a quite probable restoration, an Athenian decree of c. 407 (Tod 88 = IG i² 116, lines 5–6 [ML 87, IG i³ 118]) provided for the Selymbrians to be *autonomoi* [αὐτόνομοι]. See also Gomme HCT I 225–6.

¹³⁷ Thuc. IV 51.

¹³⁸ See Tod 62 [ML 67] (= IG V i 1) lines 8–10; also SEG X 76 and Meritt in Hesperia XIV (1945) 115–9.

¹³⁹ Fr. 232 in Kock CAF I 321.

‘Well, it sends us warships, and men when it has to, and is obedient in other things, like a docile horse’.[†]

Moreover, the one probable allusion in our literary sources¹⁴⁰ to the infliction of the standard penalty of five talents for the murder of an Athenian in an allied state suggests that Chios had suffered in this way shortly before 421 B.C. Samos in 440, while still a naval ally, was coerced by Athens, which not only interfered to stop her private war against Miletus, but even changed her government to a democracy.¹⁴¹ A final argument is provided by the numismatic evidence:¹⁴² no category such as the known naval allies can be distinguished as a group by their coinage from the remaining states of the empire. The strikingly realistic formula which first begins to occur in surviving Athenian decrees not later than the early 440s,¹⁴³ ‘in the cities which the Athenians control’ [ἐν τῶν πόλεων ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι] (or some similar expression), surely includes any and every city in the empire in which the writ of Athens could be made to run.

Thus the important difference which Thucydides and those who follow him have professed to see between the two kinds of allies cannot be shown to have any justification in constitutional theory, and it can also be seen to have no regular application in practice. The confusion to which it leads is well illustrated by a quotation from a recent paper:¹⁴⁴ ‘Phaselis, though a tributary ally, was accorded the rights of an independent ally’. The mistaken conception of Thucydides is not easy to explain. It may have been due chiefly to four factors. First, it may have been customary for Athens, on the reduction of an ally which had revolted or for some other reason was being coerced, to deprive it of its warships.¹⁴⁵ Navies thus came to be invested with a special dignity, in the minds of the *oligoi*, ‘the Few’ [ὀλίγοι], above all, as the distinguishing mark of cities which had not yet been coerced by Athens. Secondly, the possession of a navy would, for all except a few inland towns, be almost a necessary condition of that revolt for which the allied *oligoi*

[†] πέμπει γὰρ ὑμῖν ναῦς μακράς ἄνδρας θ' ὅταν δεῖσῃ.
καὶ τάλια πειθαρχεῖ καλῶς, ἀπληκτος ὡσπερ ἵππος.

¹⁴⁰ Ar., Pax 169–72. The allusion has been detected independently by P. Roussel in REA XXXV (1933) 385–6; S. Y. Lurie in Vestnik Drevnej Istorii (1947) 20; R. Meiggs in CR LXIII (1949) 9–12.

¹⁴¹ See p. 251 above.

¹⁴² Very well analysed by E. S. G. Robinson in Hesp. Suppl. VIII (1949) 324–40.

¹⁴³ The two decrees in this series which are apparently the earliest, SEG X 19 and 23 (= IG i² 27 and 28) [IG i³ 27, 19], have the three-bar sigma and therefore can hardly be later than 445. See Meiggs as cited in [n. 66] above.

¹⁴⁴ R. J. Hopper in JHS LXIII (1943) 51, n. 149.

¹⁴⁵ Certainly Thasos, Samos and the Lesbian cities other than Methymna, and perhaps several others. Thuc. I 98.4 implies that Naxos was of this number but does not say so explicitly.

[ὀλίγοι] longed. Thirdly, the burden of the tribute, small as it was in most cases, may have fallen mainly on the propertied classes in at least some of the allied states. Except perhaps where the payment could be made out of indirect taxes, such as customs or market dues, something in the nature of an *eisphora* ['property tax'] may sometimes have been levied on the richest inhabitants. It will be seen that all these three considerations are such as would appeal only to the *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι] with whom Thucydides in the main sympathised. Finally, it appears that there was a not unreasonable general feeling that the payment of tribute to any state, according to its own sweet will, was somewhat degrading.

It is a great pity that Thucydides did not clearly express his own view about the condition of Sparta's allies. At times¹⁴⁶ he seems to contrast the subjection of the Athenian allies in the late fifth century, if only by implication, with the independence which Peloponnesian League members were supposed to enjoy;¹⁴⁷ yet he can represent the Mantineans as referring to their former membership of that League as *douleia*, 'slavery' [δουλεία],¹⁴⁸ and his statement¹⁴⁹ that Sparta, though she did not impose tribute on her allies, took care that they should be kept friendly to herself by oligarchical governments surely involves the tacit admission that the members of the Peloponnesian League were not really autonomous.¹⁵⁰ Again, the cleverly evasive and sarcastic reply given by the Athenians in 432, on the advice of Pericles, to the Spartan demand that they should 'let the Hellenes be autonomous', declares that Athens will leave her allies autonomous if they were so at the date of the treaty (the Peace of 446/5), and if the Spartans 'give back to their own cities the right to be autonomous, not in a manner designed to serve Spartan interests (μη σφίσι ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι), but in such a way as each may choose.'¹⁵¹

Did *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] and *eleutheria* [ἐλευθερία] have generally accepted meanings in the later fifth century; and if so, what were they? The concept of *eleutheria* [ἐλευθερία] seems to have been as

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. I 141.6.

¹⁴⁷ See on this V 77.5; 79.1.

¹⁴⁸ V 69.1. Cf. Diod. XII 80.2 (the Mantineans 'were compelled to be subject to the Lacedaemonians' [ἠναγκάσθησαν ὑποταγῆναι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις]).

¹⁴⁹ I 19; cf. 76.1. The fact that Sparta's allies remained armed no doubt weighed with Thucydides.

¹⁵⁰ There is no doubt that Sparta did on occasion intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Peloponnesian states. For clear examples during the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. V 81.2 (Sicyon); 82.1 (Achaia); for the 4th cent., see Xen., *Hell.* V 2.7 and Diod. XV 5; 12 (Mantineia); Xen., *Hell.* V 2.8-10; 3.10-17, 21-25 and Diod. XV 19.3 (Phlius). For other occasions on which Sparta coerced her allies, see Thuc. V 31.1-4 (Elis); 64ff. (Tegea); 81.1 (Mantineia); also Xen., *Hell.* III 2.21-31 and Diod. XIV 17.4-12; 34.1 (Elis); and doubtless Hdt. IX 35.2 and Paus. III 11.7 etc. (battles of Tegea and Dipaea, c. 465).

¹⁵¹ Thuc. I 144.2. Cf. I 76.1.

conveniently imprecise then as it was later under the Hellenistic kings and the Romans.¹⁵² Its antithesis, *douleia* [δουλεία], was also a favourite propaganda term, as we saw earlier. Both words defy exact definition. *Autonomia* [αὐτονομία], perhaps, had three essential elements: the right of the city concerned to choose, alter and administer its own laws (above all, of course, its political constitution), to elect and control its own magistrates, and to exercise full judicial sovereignty in its own courts. Membership of a league without the right of secession, or the unwilling reception of a garrison, might, as Gomme points out, limit the *eleutheria* [ἐλευθερία] of the city but not, strictly speaking, its *autonomia* [αὐτονομία].¹⁵³ But even if all fifth century Greeks had been prepared to agree on a definition of theoretical *autonomia* [αὐτονομία], there might be complete disagreement over its application to each individual case. If Sparta assisted a ruling oligarchy to crush a democratic revolution, could she not claim that she was merely helping to preserve an ‘ancestral constitution’? If Athens put down an oligarchy at the request of the democratic majority, could she not equally claim that the city concerned had, by the free decision of the majority, ‘chosen its own constitution’? Each would be appealing to a fundamentally different set of principles, between which reconciliation was in the nature of things impossible. Thus *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] too, under the pressure of class strife, could become, like *eleutheria* [ἐλευθερία], an empty slogan.

III DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY

We have seen that in the second half of the fifth century the struggle between Athens and Sparta coincided to a very large degree with the struggle between democracy and oligarchy. Now the fundamental truth – far too seldom explicitly stated – is that the oligarchs¹⁵⁴ were, in general, the propertied classes, and the democrats were the poor. This is easily understandable. After the passing away, except in backward areas like Thessaly, of the old hereditary ruling aristocracies, there was only one conceivable basis for the definition of the governing class (the *politeuma* [πολίτευμα])¹⁵⁵ in a Greek oligarchy, namely ownership of property; and it was only natural that the majority of the rich should favour

¹⁵² See A. H. M. Jones in *Anatolian Studies* presented to W. H. Buckler (1939) 103–17.

¹⁵³ Gomme, HCT I 384–5. In his definition of *autonomiai* [αὐτονομίαι], Gomme omits the first of the three elements given above, which, as the etymology of the word suggests, must have been primary.

¹⁵⁴ This term is used here, for convenience, to include not only oligarchs, in the strict sense (i.e. members of a ruling oligarchy), but also all who favoured oligarchy.

¹⁵⁵ Note the significant remark made twice by Aristotle (Pol. 1278b 11; 1279a 25–26): *politeia* [πολιτεία] and *politeuma* [πολίτευμα] are the same thing.

a form of constitution in which they themselves were all-powerful, instead of being outnumbered (as they were liable to be in a democracy) by a mass of poor citizens.

In a series of striking passages in the *Politics*, Aristotle¹⁵⁶ makes the economic basis of Greek party politics as clear as anyone could wish. Oligarchy, of course, means literally ‘rule by the few’, but Aristotle insists that the criterion of mere number is not at all essential, and that the small number of the governing body in an oligarchy is quite accidental and due to the simple fact that the rich are generally few and the poor generally numerous. The real basis of the distinction between oligarchy and democracy, he says, is not the small or large size of the governing class but *penia kai ploutos* [πενία καὶ πλοῦτος], poverty and wealth. If the rulers rule in virtue of their wealth, it is an oligarchy – and Aristotle says he would still call it an oligarchy, even if the rich rulers were a majority!¹⁵⁷ So he formulates his definitions: oligarchy exists ‘whenever those who own property are masters of the constitution’; democracy, by contrast, exists ‘when those who do not possess much property but are poor are the masters’. Aristotle also says that oligarchy serves the interests of the wealthy, democracy those of the poor – in fact, he will not call it democracy at all when the masses govern in the interests of the whole body of citizens.¹⁵⁸

This brings out a point of great importance in the Greek conception of democracy. Corresponding to the two principal meanings of the Greek word *dēmos* [δῆμος] (the whole people, or the lower classes, the poor), there are two meanings of *dēmokratia* [δημοκρατία]: first, a constitution in which the whole people (the *demos* in the broad sense) is sovereign; and secondly, a constitution in which the sovereign power is the *demos* in the narrower, technical sense: the mass of poor citizens. The first conception of democracy (government by all citizens) was probably held by most democrats,¹⁵⁹ the second (government by the poor) by all oligarchs. It is of course the first conception which corresponds to our own idea of democracy; the second one (a state of affairs in which the poor rule – of

¹⁵⁶ Pol. 1279b–80a. Cf. 1290b 1–20 (more orthodox); also 1302a 12–13, where Ar. refuses to admit that any *stasis*, ‘civil war’ [στάσις] worth mentioning can take place within the *demos*.

¹⁵⁷ The way Ar. expresses himself is confused. What he is really saying is: ‘The only distinction I will recognise, the prime one, whether rich or poor are the majority, is between political rights based on wealth and political rights available to all citizens – among whom the poor are in practice, of course, the majority.’

¹⁵⁸ Similarly, Thuc. (II 37.1) makes Pericles say that Athens is called a democracy because it is governed ‘not in the interests of the few but of the many’ [μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ’ ἐς πλείονα] – not, it will be noticed ‘in the interests of all’ [ἐς πάντα]. Pericles would surely have been more likely to say the latter; but cf. what has been said about the speeches in Thuc., at p. 233 above.

¹⁵⁹ As by Athenagoras, in Thuc. VI 39.1.

course entirely in their own interests) has affinities with the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Marxist theory. Greek oligarchs, when they were in a position to do as they liked, naturally put first the interests of the propertied class (and if they were extreme oligarchs, only a section of that); it is hardly surprising, therefore, that they should have insisted on representing democracy as a form of government under which the poor necessarily exploited the rich for their own benefit.¹⁶⁰

Much light may be thrown upon Greek politics by an analysis of the word *dêmotikos* [δημοτικός], which serves as the normal adjective both for *dêmos* [δῆμος], in its narrower sense, and for *dêmokratia* [δημοκρατία]. There is often no way of rendering it adequately in English except by a periphrasis. It is unfortunate that the English transliteration 'demotic' has become attached to a certain type of Egyptian writing.¹⁶¹ Now *dêmotikos* [δημοτικός] is the adjective naturally derived from the noun *dêmos* [δῆμος], but in almost all its various uses it corresponds to the more restricted, the specifically party-political, sense of that term; the word *dêmosios* [δημόσιος] is the standard adjective applied to things pertaining to the whole people, the State. The Greeks had a perfectly good adjective, *dêmokratikos* [δημοκρατικός], derived directly from the noun *dêmokratia* [δημοκρατία]; but this word is very much less common than *dêmotikos* [δημοτικός], and we often find *dêmotikos* when we should have expected the other. In his *Constitution of Athens*, for example, Aristotle never once employs *dêmokratikos* [δημοκρατικός] but uses *dêmotikos* again and again. A point which deserves special attention is that *dêmotikos*, unlike *dêmokratikos*, carries no suggestion of *rule by* the demos, either in its strict etymology or in popular usage. A man was *dêmotikos* if he was on the side of the lower orders, the poor, or if he acted against the interests of a ruling oligarchy or even of the propertied classes in general. Thus Aristotle¹⁶² twice speaks of Peisistratus as *dêmotikôtatos*, 'extremely *dêmotikos*' [δημοτικώτατος]. Yet Peisistratus was a tyrant. Here, and in many similar contexts, it gives a decidedly misleading impression if, as is very commonly done, we translate *dêmotikos* by 'democratic'. There was nothing democratic about the popular tyrants, yet they were emphatically *dêmotikoi* [δημοτικοί]. Our word 'democratic', as it is generally employed nowadays, stresses method rather than aim and attitude and suggests decision by majority vote; whereas the Greek, stressing aim and attitude and paying much less attention to method, applied the term *dêmotikos* above all to such

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Ar., Pol. 1318a 18-26.

¹⁶¹ As in Hdts. II 36.4.

¹⁶² Ath. Pol. 13.4; 14.1.

people and such measures as were opposed to the interests of the wealthy class. The connotation of the word *dêmotikos*, as it is commonly used in classical Greek, is often closer to the Soviet than to the Western sense of the word 'democratic'. The ordinary poor Greek seems not to have expected to have much personal say in the management of public affairs – at any rate, if he had not already tasted the sweets of democratic government, and sometimes not even then. He was content as a rule if the state was administered by men of the upper classes who were reasonably *dêmotikoi*, especially if these men were elected by and responsible to him and his fellows; but where no sufficient supply of men of this stamp existed, he might be quite ready to accept a tyrant who was *dêmotikos* in preference to an oligarchy which was the reverse. He might even prefer an aristocrat like Pericles to a man of humble origin, as a democratic magistrate, because other things being equal the aristocrat would have had a much better start in life and would be more competent and perhaps less easily corruptible. The poor, Aristotle says,¹⁶³ are willing enough to remain quiet, even when they have no political power, provided no one does violence to them or robs them of their substance. Any ambitions they may entertain will be satisfied if they are given the right of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; and they can sometimes be fobbed off with even less.¹⁶⁴

It is not legitimate to object that although the economic character of Greek party divisions is clear enough by Aristotle's time, the situation was not the same in the fifth century.¹⁶⁵ In fact there is ample evidence to prove the existence of precisely the same general groupings, not only in the earlier fourth century, but also in the fifth. Xenophon, for example, specifically opposes the terms *dêmos*, 'people' [δῆμος], and *plousiôtêroi*, 'the wealthier' [πλουσιώτεροι],¹⁶⁶ and defines the *demos* (whose rule is *dêmokratia* [δημοκρατία]) as 'the poor men among the citizens' [οἱ πένητες τῶν πολιτῶν];¹⁶⁷ and in the brilliant little oligarchical pamphlet containing a fictitious conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles, incorporated in the *Memorabilia*,¹⁶⁸ we find the ruling power in a democracy, 'the united masses' [τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος], opposed to (and conceived as tyrannising over) the owners of property. Similarly, the Oxyrhynchus historian,¹⁶⁹ writing of the year 396, divides the Athenians into 'the

¹⁶³ Pol. 1297b 6–8; cf. 1318b 16–20.

¹⁶⁴ Pol. 1318b 21–22, 23–27.

¹⁶⁵ For this view, see e.g. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*² 372, cf. 361.

¹⁶⁶ Hell. IV 8.20.

¹⁶⁷ Mem. IV 2.36–37.

¹⁶⁸ I 2.40–46.

¹⁶⁹ Hell. Oxy. I 3. Cf. Ar., Eccl. 197–8.

reasonable property-owners' [οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες], and 'the *dēmotikoi* masses' [οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί]. For the fifth century we have a contemporary political pamphlet, that of the Pseudo-Xenophon (the 'Old Oligarch'),¹⁷⁰ which takes it for granted that the Greek states were deeply divided on social and economic lines into broad groups between which there existed a permanent and deep-seated antagonism. Various terms are applied by the Old Oligarch to each of his two categories, but all those of each set are used more or less as equivalents. On the one hand we have the propertied class, who are usually called *hoi chrēstoi*, 'the worthy' [οἱ χρηστοί],¹⁷¹ but also *hoi plousioi*, 'the rich' [οἱ πλούσιοι], *gennaioi*, 'well-born' [γενναῖοι], *oligoi*, 'the few' [ὀλίγοι] *dunatōtatoi*, 'most powerful' [δυνατώτατοι] *dexiōtatoi*, 'best off' [δεξιώτατοι] *eudaimones*, 'happy' [εὐδαίμονες] *aristoi*, 'finest' [ἄριστοι], *beltistoi*, 'best' [βέλτιστοι], *to beltiston*, 'the best class' [τὸ βέλτιστον]; on the other hand there are the poor, usually described as *hoi ponēroi*, 'the worthless' [οἱ πονηροί], or *ho dēmos*, 'the people' [ὁ δῆμος], but also as *hoi penētes*, 'the poor' [οἱ πένητες], *dēmotikoi* [δημοτικοί], *dēmotai*, 'commoners' [δημόται], *cheirones*, 'the worse people' [χείρονες], *to kakiston*, 'the worst class' [τὸ κάκιστον], *plēthos*, 'masses' [πλήθος], *ochlos*, 'the mob' [ὁ ὄχλος]. The characterisation of the demos as *hoi penētes*, 'the poor' [οἱ πένητες], is explicit in two passages,¹⁷² where *ho dēmos*, 'the people' [ὁ δῆμος], is opposed to *hoi plousioi*, 'the rich' [οἱ πλούσιοι], and it is implicit throughout. The Old Oligarch emphatically asserts¹⁷³ that in every country *to beltiston*, 'the best class' [τὸ βέλτιστον], is opposed to democracy, in no city is it well disposed towards the demos. Possibly most upper-class Athenians of the fifth century, before about 413 at any rate, would have repudiated many of the Old Oligarch's assertions or at least deprecated such plain speaking. But that is not the point: the Old Oligarch is surely writing for a non-Athenian audience, and his pamphlet is particularly valuable for the light it sheds on the viewpoint of the upper classes in states other than Athens. The picture he draws, with its extremes of black and white, is of course somewhat exaggerated and over-simplified, but its basic division of the citizens of the Greek states into two broad economic and social

¹⁷⁰ The most useful recent discussions of Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. are those by Gomme, 'The Old Oligarch,' in *Athenian Studies* presented to W. S. Ferguson (HSCP Suppl. I, 1940) 211-45, and by H. Frisch, *The Constitution of the Athenians* (1942), who give full references to the earlier literature.

¹⁷¹ With the Old Oligarch's persistent use of *chrēstoi* [χρηστοί] and *ponēroi* [πονηροί] in a social and political sense, cf. Cicero's description of the Roman Optimates as 'good men' *boni* and of their political opponents as 'reprobates' *improbi*.

¹⁷² I 13; II 10; cf. I. 5; II 14, 18.

¹⁷³ I5; III 10. In the latter passage, the demos may perhaps be that of Athens.

categories between which there existed a deep-seated political tension, is amply confirmed by other contemporary evidence.

Thucydides,¹⁷⁴ in the speech he puts into the mouth of Athenagoras the Syracusan, represents the alternative to *dēmokratia* [δημοκρατία] as the rule of the owners of property. And, as we saw in the first section of this paper, Thucydides, Xenophon and the rest, in their accounts of the political struggles of the late fifth century, constantly bring before us cities divided into two factions, of which one, normally pro-Athenian, is called the *dēmos* [δῆμος], *polloi*, ‘the many’ [πολλοί], *pleones*, ‘the larger class’ [πλέονες], or *plēthos* [πλήθος], and the other is referred to by some such name as the *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], *dunatoi*, ‘powerful’ [δυνατοί], *dunatōtatoi* [δυνατώτατοι] or *gnōrimoi*, ‘notable’ [γνώριμοι], and is usually pro-Spartan. The various terms in each group are all more or less synonymous. It would be perverse in the extreme to pretend that the word *demos* (by far the most common in its group) does not normally mean the mass of the common people – as the other terms obviously do – but simply a leading clique of democratic politicians, or something of the sort. Occasionally the expression may have the latter meaning – but if so, the clique is called the *demos* because it is regarded as acting on behalf of the real *demos*, the lower classes as a whole.¹⁷⁵ There is an excellent example of this in Thucydides’ account of the events at Samos in 412–11. First,¹⁷⁶ the ‘*demos*’ puts down an oligarchy of aristocratic landowners. Later,¹⁷⁷ we discover that this ‘*demos*’ was essentially a small body of about three hundred. But since the oligarchs were very much more numerous (six hundred were killed or exiled, and others remained), the three hundred must have been supported by the lower classes as a whole. And when they themselves turn against the common people and try to seize power for themselves as an oligarchy, they automatically cease to be the *demos*. The wording of the crucial phrases deserves to be quoted: ‘those of the Samians who had earlier revolted against the powerful class, and who were the *dēmos*’ [οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος], and ‘they were planning to attack the other others, on the grounds that they were the *dēmos*’ [καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δῆμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθήσεσθαι]. The ultimate *demos* straightway sets up a democracy and is referred to as *hoi pleones* [οἱ πλέονες].

¹⁷⁴ VI 39.1. Euripides, too, makes his basic political classification (Suppl. 238–45) in economic terms.

¹⁷⁵ The popular *leaders* are normally referred to as ‘the leaders of the *dēmos*’ [οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται], as by Thuc. III 75.2; 82.1; IV 46.4; 66.3, the last passage distinguishing between such people at Megara and their own rank and file (evidently numerous: note *plēthos* [πλήθος] in 68.4).

¹⁷⁶ VIII 21.

¹⁷⁷ VIII 73.2.

Thucydides, in his rather rhetorical reflections¹⁷⁸ – prompted by the appalling events at Corcyra in 427 – on the acute political strife in the Greek cities in the late fifth century, makes it quite clear that the conflicts which he describes as now taking place throughout the Greek world were between the same basic factions everywhere: one consisting of the popular party, having as its slogan ‘political equality of the masses’ [πλήθους ἰσονομία πολιτική], its leaders eager to call in the Athenians, and the other, the *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], with the slogan ‘prudent aristocracy’ [ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων], equally anxious to bring in the Spartans. This analysis tallies well with the detailed factual evidence and is certainly correct in its broad outlines. There will of course have been exceptions – cities, for example, in which the demos was too much intimidated or too politically immature to offer much resistance to rule by the *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], and where the active democratic faction was quite small. In these exceptional cases it would be wrong to conceive the great mass of the people as being pro-Athenian. But words such as *polloi* [πολλοί], *pleones* [πλέονες] *plêthos* [πλήθος] are so habitually applied by our sources to the democratic or pro-Athenian factions, and their opponents are so invariably spoken of as a minority of *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], *dunatôtatoi* [δυνατώτατοι] or *gnôrimoi* [γνώριμοι], that we must suppose the former to have greatly outnumbered the latter in the great majority of cities. The *leaders* of the demos, needless to say, would nearly always be members of the upper classes who were (or at least were considered to be) *dêmotikoi* [δημοτικοί] in outlook; but the rank and file, as we have already established, would be drawn mainly from the poorer classes. There may well have been in many cases a considerable minority, sometimes even a majority, who joined neither side; but as we hear little or nothing about such people¹⁷⁹ we cannot argue about them except *a priori*.

The only times in fifth century history when we have some detailed information not only about the composition of the various parties in a state and their activities but also about their political programmes, are the years of oligarchic revolution at Athens, 411 and 404. A particularly valuable piece of evidence is Aristotle’s brief analysis¹⁸⁰ of the political factions existing in the year 404. His three groups can be shown to have existed equally in the years 412–10, when they seem first to have crystallised. Aristotle distinguishes three parties: (1) *hoi dêmotikoi* [οἱ δημοτικοί], the common people, who wished to preserve the existing democracy, and are set apart from *hoi gnôrimoi* [οἱ

¹⁷⁸ III 82–83.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Thuc. III 82.8

¹⁸⁰ Ath. Pol. 34.3.

γνώριμοι],¹⁸¹ subdivided into (2) outright oligarchs, organised in political clubs, and (3) ‘those who, though not members of the political clubs, were yet considered to belong to the best class of citizens, and desired the ancestral constitution’. These last we can call moderate oligarchs. (The extreme oligarchs had no real constitutional programme: they simply wanted irresponsible personal power for their own small group, both in 411 and in 404.) Now it has not been sufficiently realised that the oligarchical ‘terror’ at Athens in the spring of 411, vividly described by Thucydides,¹⁸² could not have been so completely effective, nor could the crucial assembly have been held more than a mile outside the walls, at Colonus (with the Spartans close at hand, so that none but cavalry and hoplites could attend), and the drastic constitutional changes put through with not so much as a single dissentient voice,¹⁸³ except with the connivance, or at least the passive acquiescence, of the majority of the hoplite class. It is clear from Thucydides’ narrative that the ‘demos’ – at this juncture, essentially those of the Thetic class who were not serving as rowers in the fleet – were never won over to willing acceptance of the oligarchy. The behaviour of extreme oligarchs need never surprise us; what seems astonishing at first sight about the events of 412–10 is that so many men of the hoplite class who had surely been loyal enough to the democracy in earlier years¹⁸⁴ should develop into oligarchs, to the extent of first countenancing a ‘terror’ directed against the radicals,¹⁸⁵ then submitting for some months to a regime which put power into the hands of a set of unprincipled extremists, and finally setting up a constitution which disfranchised at least half the citizen population, including the whole body

¹⁸¹ Elsewhere (e.g. in Pol. 1291b 28; 1303a 8) Ar. sometimes uses this term in a broad sense, as here.

¹⁸² VIII 65;–66; cf. Ps.-Lys. XX 8–9; Plut., Alc. 26. See also Thuc. VIII 70.2. Ar., Ath. Pol. 29ff. gives an entirely different and on the whole much inferior version of these events: he ignores the ‘terror’ and does not even mention that the vital assembly took place at Colonus, or its suspicious unanimity; he contradicts himself (cf. 30.1 and 32.1 with 32.3) in trying to make out that a ‘moderate’ constitution was produced under the authority of the (as yet non-existent) ‘Five Thousand.’ Ar.’s account must go back ultimately to a source the writer of which was anxious to make the ‘revolution of the 400’ appear a much more constitutional affair than it actually was, and manipulated his facts accordingly: the most obvious possibilities which have been suggested are Antiphon’s famous speech in his own defence, and the Atthis of Androtion, whose father Andron was one of ‘the 400’.

¹⁸³ Thuc. VIII 69.1: ‘with no objections’ [οὐδενός ἀντειπόντος].

¹⁸⁴ Thuc. VIII 66.5 notes that the conspirators included some men whom no one would ever have suspected of oligarchical tendencies.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. the attitude of Theramenes, the moderate oligarch *par excellence*, in 404: as a member of the ‘Thirty,’ he seems to have made no real resistance to the new ‘terror’, until the extremists began to ‘liquidate’ wealthy aristocrats and showed they had no real intention of associating the upper classes as a whole in the government (Ar., Ath. Pol. 35.4; 36.1). It even appears from Xen. (Hell. II 3.15, 38), who admired Theramenes and had rather similar political views, that the only executions against which Theramenes protested were of men who had not worked against the interests of the *kaloï kagathoi*, ‘upper classes’ [καλοὶ κάγαθοί].

of sailors upon whom success in the war mainly depended – ‘the rowing people, saviours of the city’ [ὁ θρανίτης λῆώς, ὁ σωσίπολις], as Aristophanes¹⁸⁶ had called them earlier. The explanation surely lies in the unprecedented combination of a military catastrophe, a desperate financial situation, and the greatly increased ravaging of Attica from the new fortified enemy base at Decelea.¹⁸⁷ The process which had begun to lower the relative status of the more prosperous landed proprietors during the Archidamian War¹⁸⁸ set in again, in an intensified form.¹⁸⁹ The richest citizens were bearing the burden of the now regularly recurring and very expensive trierarchy,¹⁹⁰ and both they and an unascertainable proportion of the men of moderate wealth may have been saddled with several levies of eisphora.¹⁹¹ The economic basis of the influence of the old governing class may have been seriously impaired. In time of severe financial stringency, those who control the state politically can usually manage to put most of the burden on to others. The obvious solution for the Athenian upper classes in 411 was to make a twofold reform, both economic and political, by ceasing to give pay for the performance of public duties. This would both save money and exclude many poor citizens from playing much part in politics. But in order to do this, and effect other reforms in their own interests, the propertied class had to take the state machine entirely into their own hands, by force. No doubt there were numbers of hoplites, especially the poorer ones, who did not willingly accept the policy of the oligarchs in 411; but among the ‘notables’ we know of only a handful in this category,¹⁹² and there is no reason to suppose there were many others. Thus in 411 (and again in 404) we see the propertied class as a whole turning against democracy, even at Athens itself – for it is surely ludi-

¹⁸⁶ Acharn. 162–3.

¹⁸⁷ The devastation during the Decelean War was evidently much more prolonged and severe than that of the Archidamian War: see e.g. Thuc. VI 91.6–7; 93.2; VII 19.1–2; 27.2–5 (esp. 5); 28.1, 4; VIII 69.1; 71.1; Hell. Oxy. XII 3–5; Lys. VII 6–7, 24.

¹⁸⁸ It was precisely the best land which must have suffered most from the Spartan ravaging (see e.g. Thuc. II 19.2), and here the wealthiest landowners would have been found. The rich also lost their fine and well-furnished country houses (Thuc. II 65.2; cf. Hell. Oxy. XII 4–5; Isocr. VII 52). See also W. G. Hardy in CP XXI (1926) 346–55.

¹⁸⁹ It was the *dunatōtatoi* [δυνατώτατοι] who ‘suffered most of all’ [ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα], according to Thuc. VIII 48.1.

¹⁹⁰ The speaker in Lys. XXI 2 claims to have spent 6 talents in 7 years as trierarch during the Ionian War. As late as 415 this service could be cheerfully and even enthusiastically fulfilled (see Thuc. VI 31.3), but in 405 Aristophanes (Ran. 1065–6) spoke disapprovingly of attempts by the rich to evade the burden, and it appears from Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. III 4 that prosecutions of trierarchs for failing in their duty were not uncommon.

¹⁹¹ There are references in the orators to ‘many taxes’ [πολλὰ εἰσφορὰι] being paid during the Peloponnesian War (e.g. Lys. XII 20; XXV 12; XXX 26; also perhaps Antiph. II [β] 12 – but see K. J. Dover in CQ XLIV, 1950, at p. 59). There seems to be a reference to unwillingness to pay as early as 411 (Ar., Lys. 654).

¹⁹² Leon and Diomedon, Thrasybulus, Thrasyllus and Chaereas (Thuc. VIII 73–74).

crous to describe as a democracy, even as a 'limited' or 'moderate' democracy, a regime such as that of the Five Thousand, which disfranchised the poorer half at least of the citizen population.

The miserable results of the two revolutions finally discredited oligarchy at Athens. For much of the fourth century it seems to have had no open advocates there; those who were in fact moderate oligarchs found it politic to pretend that what they wanted was nothing but democracy – only of course it must be the good old democracy which had flourished in the good old times, not the vicious form of democracy which had led to all sorts of unworthy men gaining power for their own nefarious ends, and so forth.¹⁹³ Isocrates furnishes some excellent examples of this kind of propaganda, notably in his speech *On the Peace* and in his *Areopagiticus*. Even Demetrius of Phalerum claimed that he 'not only did not destroy the democracy, but even restored it' [οὐ μόνον οὐ κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηνόρθωσε].¹⁹⁴

We are constantly told that it was city particularism, the passion for *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] of the *polis* [πόλις], which was of paramount importance in Greek political life. Ehrenberg in a recent article,¹⁹⁵ after admitting that the rule of Athens may have brought many benefits to her empire as well as to herself, goes on to say: 'But no Greek, and therefore not Thucydides either, would ever see things in this light – not because the Greeks did not value material prosperity (they certainly did), but because they could not help thinking mainly, if not exclusively, in political terms, that is to say, in terms of Polis life and in particular of Polis autonomy . . . Nothing counted when weighed against the loss of political freedom'. The historical evidence, on the contrary, shows beyond doubt that at times of crisis the passion for polis autonomy proved less powerful, with many if not most citizens, than class feeling. If our sources, when they are generalising, often fail to reveal this fact, that is because they reflect almost exclusively the opinions of those moderate oligarchs who were on the whole prepared, except at moments of extreme crisis, to tolerate either oligarchy or democracy, under both of which they could normally hope to maintain their own position. It is

¹⁹³ It would be foolish to swallow all this anti-democratic propaganda – for that is what it is. For example, we shall not take seriously the piteous complaints of Isocr. XV 159–60 when we recall that the orator himself, although a very rich man, had borne a remarkably small share of State burdens (he was trierarch not more than thrice, each time jointly with his son: Isocr. XV 145; cf. Ps.-Plut., Mor. 838a), and that the eisphorae paid at Athens during some 20 or more years of particular strain (377 to 357–5) did not total much more than 300 talents (Dem. XXII 44) – an exceedingly small amount. Very many passages in the orators show that the wealthy habitually concealed their property and thus evaded their obligations to the State: see *Classica et Mediaevalia* XIV (1953) at p. 34 and n. 17.

¹⁹⁴ Strab. IX 1.20, p. 398.

¹⁹⁵ In *JHS* LXVII (1947) 48.

most interesting, however, to find Thucydides¹⁹⁶ making Brasidas admit to the Acanthians that for either the Few or the Many to be put under the domination of the other would be more unpleasant than subjection to a foreign yoke. Few would-be oligarchs would have admitted they were in a state of political freedom under a democracy, and no democrat would have felt that he was free under an oligarchy. The willing subservience of democrats to Athens, of oligarchs to Sparta, examples of which were cited in the first section of this paper, often involved the deliberate sacrifice of *autonomia* [αὐτονομία]. It was a sacrifice of a sort which many Greeks were evidently quite prepared to make, if only it would save them from falling under the domination of their political opponents.

The exiled ‘men of substance’ [ἄνδρες τῶν παχέων] of Naxos who in 499 invited Aristagoras to restore them¹⁹⁷ knew perfectly well that this would involve subjection to Persia. The demos of Aegina, probably two or three years before or after Marathon, plotted to betray the island to an Athenian expeditionary force, but were massacred, to the number of seven hundred, by the governing oligarchy of wealthy men.¹⁹⁸ The Samian oligarchy was put down by Athens in 441/0, as mentioned earlier,¹⁹⁹ at the request of Miletus and certain Samians ‘who wished to revolutionise the constitution’. The Samian oligarchs retaliated by allying themselves with Pisuthnes, the Persian satrap. Reference has already been made²⁰⁰ to some very probable examples of aristocratic medising in the mid-fifth century, at Erythrae, Miletus and Colophon, to further medising and atticising by the Colophonians early in the Archidamian War, and to the attempted betrayal of Plataea to her hereditary foe, Thebes, in 431, by a few citizens conspicuous for their wealth and their noble birth. At Athens, where the remarkable economic expansion of the sixth and fifth centuries, and the benefits of empire, did much to mitigate class conflict among the citizens, a considerable proportion of the propertied classes must have accepted the democracy – even the radical democracy of 461 onwards – until the tide of prosperity began to turn and the adverse effects of the war made themselves seriously felt, as already described. Yet even at Athens we find oligarchs ready to become subject to an outside power, if only the democracy could be put down.

¹⁹⁶ IV 86.4–5. Cf. G. B. Grundy, *Thuc. and the History of his Age*² I 172; N. M. Pusey in *HSCP* LI (1940) 215–31. The statement of Brasidas is in effect contradicted in *Thuc.* VIII 48.5 (the passage beginning ‘for it was not . . .’ [οὐ γάρ]); but the facts compel us to accept the opinion put into the mouth of Brasidas in preference to the other.

¹⁹⁷ Hdts. V 30.

¹⁹⁸ Hdts. VI 91–93.

¹⁹⁹ See p. 242 above.

²⁰⁰ See p. 241 above.

Isagoras and the aristocrats were willing to become dependants of Sparta in 508/7, rather than submit to the democratic reforms proposed by Cleisthenes.²⁰¹ In 479 and 457 there were oligarchic plots at Athens involving treasonable correspondence with an enemy,²⁰² first Persia, then Sparta; and at the time the Old Oligarch wrote the betrayal of the city 'by a few' was evidently a distinct possibility.²⁰³ The extreme oligarchs of 411 would of course have preferred autonomous oligarchy to anything else; but we know from Thucydides²⁰⁴ that they would have chosen a necessarily Spartan-dominated oligarchy in preference to autonomy under a restored democracy. And the extreme oligarchs of 404/3 were willingly subservient to Sparta, to the extent of sending for a Spartan garrison and harmost.²⁰⁵

IV THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF THUCYDIDES

Our subject is the Athenian empire and not its great historian; but as certain criticisms have been made of Thucydides in the first and second sections of this article, it is only right that an explanation should be offered of the reasons for the defects in his History which have been pointed out above. Why did Thucydides, who was an exceptionally truthful man and anything but a superficial observer, so deceive himself about the attitude of the Greeks towards the Athenian empire? There can only be one answer: political and social influences, at the end of the fifth century exceptionally powerful, drove the historian to look at the whole Greek world in terms of that relatively small section of the Athenian citizen body to which he himself belonged, so that when he wrote of the detestation of Athens, or the longing for revolt, felt by *hoi polloi* [οἱ πολλοί], or 'all the Greeks' [οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες], or 'the subject cities' [αἱ πόλεις ὑπήκοοι], or 'the allies' [οἱ ξύμμαχοι], or 'every individual and city' [πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις],²⁰⁶ he was thinking only of the upper classes, of that comparatively small body of what is sometimes called 'educated opinion'. This point of view he quite honestly conceived as that of the Greeks in general. It is a perfectly

²⁰¹ Hdts. V 70; Ar., Ath. Pol. 20. 2.

²⁰² Plut., Arist. 13 (479); Thuc. I 107.4, 6 (457).

²⁰³ See Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. II 15.

²⁰⁴ VIII 91.2-3; cf. 90. 2.

²⁰⁵ Xen., Hell. II 3.13-14; Ar., Ath. Pol. 37.2; Diod. XIV 4.3-4; Plut., Lys. 15. The sacrifice of *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] to class and party interests became even more common, of course, in the 4th century – especially during the rise of Macedon; but Ps.-Dem. XVII 10, 15 sufficiently accounts for the existence of well-to-do 'Philip-supporters' [φιλιππιζοντες]. Specially interesting is the obsession of Aeneas Tacticus with the likelihood of the betrayal of the city by a discontented faction.

²⁰⁶ Thuc. I 75.4; VIII 2.1; IV 108.3 and VIII 2.2; IV 80.1; II 8.4.

natural and very common failing, and it is entirely characteristic of the Greek and Roman historians, most of whom, if they did not actually belong to the governing class of their day, had thoroughly acquired its outlook. When we are studying Thucydides, then, we must never forget that we are studying a member – if an exceptionally intelligent and gifted member – of the Athenian propertied class.

The nature of Thucydides' political outlook is a very complicated question, especially since that outlook must have undergone considerable development during the period of some thirty years in which he was writing his great History. Attempts have been made to sketch that development, in accordance with theories about the dates at which certain parts of the History are held to have been written; but they are all subjective, and agreement has not been reached on any of the major problems involved. For present purposes, the History of Thucydides must be considered as a unity,²⁰⁷ and references here to Thucydides' attitude are to the outlook which he eventually came to possess, so far as we can infer it from the History.

Four points are particularly material for establishing Thucydides' political position. First, as we have seen, when he generalises about the attitude of the allies and others towards the Athenian empire he identifies himself with the outlook of the anti-Athenian Few and ignores the generally pro-Athenian Many. Secondly, although he clearly had a great admiration for Pericles, he is at pains to insist that the Periclean regime was a democracy in name only²⁰⁸ – a statement which gains point if we take the word *dēmokratia* [δημοκρατία] here in the narrower sense: government by the demos, the lower classes. Thirdly, there is a significant passage²⁰⁹ in Thucydides' much-praised lament over the bitter political strife of which Corcyra provided the first example, and which then became general: the moderates among the citizens (τὰ μέσσα τῶν πολιτῶν), he says, perished at the hands of (the extremists on) both sides, either for not joining in the struggle or because survival was begrudged them. This statement – and indeed the whole context – shows emotional sympathy with the moderates.²¹⁰ In fact they must usually have fared much better than the extremists of both parties, who no doubt tended everywhere, as at Athens and Corcyra, to destroy each

²⁰⁷ This must not be taken to imply acceptance of the extreme 'unitarian' view of the composition of the History, ably presented by J. H. Finley in his book, *Thucydides, and his article, 'The Unity of Thucydides' History,* in *Athenian Studies* (see [n. 170] above) 255–97.

²⁰⁸ II 65.9. Plut. (Per. 9) remarks that this is tantamount to calling the Periclean regime an aristocracy.

²⁰⁹ III 82.8 (fin.).

²¹⁰ Cf. the praise of 'the men of moderate possessions' in such passages as Eurip., *Suppl.* 238–45; Ar., *Pol.* 1295b 1–96a 40; 1296b 34–97a 7.

other first, and had no reason for special animosity against the moderates. Fourthly, Thucydides²¹¹ speaks of the moderate oligarchy of the ‘Five Thousand’, which governed Athens for about eight months, from October 411 to June 410,²¹² in terms which leave little doubt that it was the form of constitution he most admired (as did Aristotle and so many others): he calls it a balanced combination of oligarchy and democracy, and he expresses the opinion that ‘the initial phase of this regime was one of the periods when the Athenians seemed to be best governed, at least in my lifetime’ [οὐκ ἤκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες]. The precise form of the ‘constitution of the Five Thousand’ is a well known puzzle, but two features of it are reasonably certain: both Thucydides and Aristotle²¹³ tell us that it was based on a hoplite franchise and non-payment for office. What Thucydides eventually came to desire, then, was an outright oligarchy of (roughly speaking) the hoplite class. It would be absurd to suppose that he ever became a narrow oligarch, after the stamp of the ‘Four Hundred’ or the ‘Thirty’. He makes it clear, by the tone of some of the passages he has inserted in his History, notably the Funeral Speech and the glowing tribute to Pericles,²¹⁴ that he found values in the way of life of Periclean Athens which he realised were an integral if not a necessary part of its democratic constitution. Indeed, the passages which have just been mentioned and parts of the speeches in which the empire is defended may be considered, from one aspect, as a defiant reply to the wholesale denunciations of the way of life of the imperial city which Thucydides himself must have heard from the extreme oligarchs.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, the fact remains that in pronouncing his favourable verdict on the regime of the ‘Five Thousand’ Thucydides was in effect approving the total disfranchisement of the poorer half (if not more than half) of the citizens of Athens.²¹⁶ To call such a man a democrat, even a moderate democrat, is impossible, by contemporary Greek standards even more than by our own. [But see Addendum, p. 276 below.]

So long as the lower orders had been willing to accept with little or no question the leadership of aristocrats (exercised to a remarkable degree, during the Periclean regime, in their interests), Thucydides, like many

²¹¹ VIII 97.1 (cf. 65:3); Ar., Ath. Pol. 33.1, 2 (cf. 29.5).

²¹² On the dates, see Meritt, Athenian Financial Documents 104–114, 176–9.

²¹³ VIII 97.1; cf. Ar., Ath. Pol. 33.2. [But see Addendum, p. 276 below.]

²¹⁴ Also, e.g., VIII 48.6 (see p. 272 below).

²¹⁵ Cf. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thuk.² 237–42.

²¹⁶ Five thousand would of course have been very much less than half the citizen population in 411, but Polystratus, member and ‘enroller of citizens’ [καταλογεύς] of the Four Hundred, claimed (rightly or wrongly) that he had enrolled 9000 (Ps. Lys. XX 13), and if the *politeuma* [πολίτευμα] under the ‘Five Thousand’ in fact consisted of the hoplite class, it may have numbered very roughly a third to a half of the citizen body.

other members of the Athenian propertied class, may have been content with the forms of democracy. During the Peloponnesian War, however, the economic situation changed, probably to the special detriment of the upper classes,²¹⁷ and there seems also to have been a pronounced change in the political climate, no less real because its nature is difficult to describe. The root of the matter probably is that after the death of Pericles the lower orders began to assert themselves much more in the Assembly, the Council and the courts. The Assembly, though it continued to elect mainly men of position to the *strategia* [generalship]²¹⁸ took a decidedly more active part in governing the state, exercising a strict control over the policy of the officers it elected, and punishing them for negligence and even lack of success – sometimes, it would seem, with excessive harshness.²¹⁹ For this new activity the *demos* found a new type of leader: the series of so-called ‘demagogues’, beginning with Euclates, Lysicles and Cleon, satirised by Aristophanes as ‘sellers’ of something or other,²²⁰ and continuing with men like Hyperbolus, Androcles and Cleophon. The main function of these ‘demagogues’ – about whom we are very ill informed – was to be spokesmen of the *demos* in the Council and Assembly. When Thucydides²²¹ lays the chief blame for the fall of Athens upon the successors of Pericles,²²² he is surely thinking above all of these men.²²³ According to him,²²⁴ in their competition for leadership

²¹⁷ See pp. 262–3 above.

²¹⁸ From certain passages in the comic poets, it can surely be inferred that recently, perhaps from the early or middle years of the Archidamian War, at least one or two men of no social standing had been elected generals, and that this was regarded as an innovation: see e.g. Eup., fr. 117 (in Kock, CAF I 288–9), from the Demoi, usually dated 412, cf. fr. 100 (CAF I 283), also from the Demoi, and the earlier fr. 205 (CAF I 314), from the Poleis, probably of 422 B.C., where Cleon may be one of the targets. (Contrast Ar., Ath. Pol. 26.1; Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 3). In fact the generals were always chosen mainly from the leading families: for the 4th century evidence, see the admirable work of J. Sundwall, *Epigraphische Beiträge* (Klio, Beiheft IV, 1906). Some families had a tradition of public administration: see e.g. Lys. XVI 420; Plat., Menex. 234 b.

²¹⁹ At least twice: Thuc. IV 65.3 (Sicily); Xen., Hell. I 7 and Diod. XIII 100–3 (Arginusae). But see Grote’s comments on the latter incident.

²²⁰ See the list of – ‘sellers’ [πῶλαι] in Ar., Eq. 128–43, with Schol. ad id. 129, 132, naming Euclates and Lysicles; for the latter see also Plut., Per. 24.

²²¹ II 65. 10–12.

²²² Himself rightly called *dēmagōgos*, ‘demagogue’ [δημαγωγός], by Isocr. VIII 126; XV 234; cf. II 16; VIII 122; X 37; Lys. XXVII 10.

²²³ *Prima facie*, all the post-Periclean political leaders are included in the indictment. But Nicias must certainly be left out, in view of the remarkable encomium in VII 86.5. Nor can Thuc. be thinking of the oligarchic leaders (of the extremists, like Antiphon and Phrynichus, or of the moderates, like Theramenes), for it is evident from VI 65.11 that he has in mind particularly men who strove for the ‘leadership of the *dēmos*’ [προστασία τοῦ δήμου] – i.e. the demagogues, and no doubt Alcibiades.

²²⁴ II 65.10; cf. Ar., Ath. Pol. 28.4. The allegation that one’s political opponents are mere flatterers of the *demos* seems to have been very common in the 4th century: see e.g. Dem. III 22 and VIII 34 (where the ‘orators’ [ρήτορες] concerned, the spokesmen of the peace party, are certainly not radical democrats); Isocr. VIII 3–5, 9–10, 121; XII 140; XV 133; Aeschin. III 127, 134.

they ‘they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people’ [ἐτράποντο καθ’ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδίδοναι], by which he seems to mean that they made it their special aim to please the people (in order to win popularity for themselves). This is just the sort of thing a member of the old governing class would have said about ‘upstart radicals’, whatever their real aims and behaviour might have been, and we are under no obligation to accept mere generalised political propaganda of this sort, even from Thucydides, in the absence of confirmatory factual evidence.²²⁵ What evidence of this kind is there? Cleon was probably responsible²²⁶ for the increase – a very necessary increase, if prices were rising – of one obol a day in the jury pay. He may well have been the prime mover in the great increase in the tribute in 425; but it is significant that there is no complaint about the increase in Aristophanes’ *Knights*, produced only a few months later, although the whole play is essentially an attack on Cleon.²²⁷ The absence of any blackguarding of Cleon on this point is hardly explicable unless we assume that his political opponents fully supported the increase in the tribute – as they would surely have done, once they realised that repeated *eisphorae*, which would fall mainly on them, could only be avoided by passing the burden on to their *protégés*,²²⁸ the men of property in the allied states. Thucydides detested Cleon and could not bring himself to be just to him: West and Meritt,²²⁹ themselves hostile to Cleon, have shown reason to suppose that Thucydides has completely misrepresented the results of his campaign in the ‘Thraceward region’ in

²²⁵ Similar general accusations in Aristophanes, of which there are many (e.g. *Acharn.* 370–4, 633–5; *Eq.* 213–8, 801–4, 1115–50, 1340–57; *Vesp.* 665–8 etc.), and in the other comic poets, are not factual evidence. Unanimity among the comedians on political matters need not surprise us or oblige us to believe them. They all seem to have belonged to the propertied classes (see Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*² 20–21), and they naturally detested the *polupragmôn*, ‘busybody’ [πολυπράγμων] – a term which seems to have been applied freely to (among others) the humble citizen who ventured to take more interest in politics than his betters thought was good for him.

²²⁶ There seems to be no earlier direct assertion of this than Schol. ad *Ar.*, *Vesp.* 88, 300, who does not quote any ancient authority. Passages such as *Ar.*, *Eq.* 51, 255 do not prove the fact, though it is probable enough in itself.

²²⁷ None of the passages (e.g. *Ar.*, *Eq.* 313, 326, 839f.) usually quoted in support of the theory that the decree of Thudippus (*Tod* 66 [ML 69] = A 9 in *ATL* I and II) was Cleon’s work proves anything of the kind. The whole theme of the *Knights* is that Cleon manages everything in the State, and some reference to the tribute was unavoidable, but there is not even a hint of the recent great increase. None of the literary sources (see e.g. *Ps.-Andoc.* IV II; *Plut.*, *Arist.* 24) connects Cleon with the raising of the tribute. Cf. also *Theopomp.* fr. 94 in *FGH* II B no. 115 – if this is indeed a quotation from *Theopompus*. But the sequence of events reconstructed with great probability by Wade-Gery and Meritt in *AJP* LVII (1936) 377–94, and their attractive suggestion (p. 392, n. 36) that Thudippus was Cleon’s son-in-law, combined with the general statements in the *Knights*, make it difficult to resist the conclusion that Cleon was behind the decree.

²²⁸ *Ps.-Xen.*, *Ath. Pol.* I 14.

²²⁹ In *AJA* XXIX (1925) 59–69.

422. Of the policy of the other demagogues we know virtually nothing. But Cleophon surely did anything but curry favour with the demos on easy terms, even if he did introduce the *diobelia*,²³⁰ apparently a form of poor relief, which must have been very necessary after the Spartan occupation of Decelea. Cleophon's war policy, whether mistaken or not, called for great efforts and great sacrifices, and he seems to have been the mainstay of Athenian resistance in the last months – so much so that, as Lysias²³¹ says, he was the one man the oligarchs were most anxious to destroy. If these 'demagogues' were really mere flatterers of the demos, it is strange that of the six whose names were mentioned above, at least four or five should have died violent deaths: Cleon and probably Lysicles fell in battle, Hyperbolus and Androcles were assassinated, Cleophon was judicially murdered.²³² Naturally enough, it was against these men that the resentment of the political conservatives was concentrated; but they evidently had a large following in their own day, and the memory of some of them (Cleon and Cleophon, at any rate) was still honoured by many in the fourth century, as we know from Lysias and a speech in the Demosthenic corpus.²³³ Can any direct factual evidence be brought forward in support of Thucydides' generalisation about the policy of the 'demagogues'? Unless it is forthcoming, it would be wiser to reserve judgment on them.

Thucydides himself was an exile from 424 to 404.²³⁴ But before 424 the change of heart among the Athenian upper classes had already begun, and during the latter part of his exile he could not have failed to learn that that change had become much more pronounced. His new environment would also have had a profound effect on his outlook. Now that he was far removed from daily contact with the life of Athens, and obliged to associate almost exclusively with those *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι] who hated the Athenian democracy, he was bound to become much more critical of the Athenian demos.

What was Thucydides' attitude to the Athenian empire? This is a question to which almost everyone gives a different answer. The principal reason for this is that the historian's attitude to the empire was thoroughly ambivalent, that he could habitually entertain quite different feelings towards it at one and the same time, now one and now another

²³⁰ Ar., Ath. Pol. 28.3. The *diobelia*, 'two-obol payment' [διωβελία] first appears in 410: Tod 83 (= IG i² 304) [ML 84, IG i³ 375] line 10.

²³¹ XXX 12.

²³² Thuc. V 10.9 (Cleon); III 19 (Lysicles – if this was indeed the 'demagogue,' as is probable but not certain); VIII 73.3 (Hyperbolus); VIII 65.2 (Androcles); for Cleophon, see Lys. XIII 12; XXX 10–14; cf. Xen., Hell. I 7.35.

²³³ Ps.-Dem. XL 25 (Cleon); Lys. XXX 12–13 (Cleophon). And see Ar., Ran 569–78, where the two distressed innkeepers invoke Cleon and Hyperbolus as their protectors.

²³⁴ Thuc. V 26.5.

coming uppermost. On the one hand he was much impressed by the greatness and brilliance of imperial Athens, in which, as a patriotic Athenian, he must have felt a deep pride. In inter-state politics he was a realist, calmly accepting the fact that in the relations between Greek cities force and not justice was in practice the supreme arbiter. He was not shocked by the calculated and restrained exercise of state power, which he regarded as an inevitable and in some ways a desirable feature of the contemporary scene. On the other hand, sharing as he did the outlook of the allied *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι], he felt that Athens had abused her power – not as much as another imperial city in her position might easily have been tempted to abuse it,²³⁵ but enough to provoke general hatred and a longing to be quit of her rule. In the Melian Dialogue, with enigmatic impartiality, he gives the Athenians an unanswerable case, according to the prevailing practice of inter-state relations, based ultimately on the appeal to force, in the name of expediency; but he has chosen for this highly generalised debate a setting which could not fail to arouse in his readers, knowing of the massacre that was to come, the strongest prejudice against the Athenian speakers.

One thing Thucydides does not say, explicitly or implicitly, although the statement is often attributed to him: he does not say that the Athenian radical democrats believed that ‘Might is Right’. When the Athenian envoys at Sparta say, αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι,²³⁶ they are simply saying, ‘It has always been the rule for the weaker to be subject to the stronger’. They are merely recognising a natural tendency, a ‘law of human nature’,²³⁷ not trying to adduce a moral justification. The theory that the interest of the stronger is *to dikaion*, ‘what is just’ [τὸ δίκαιον], that Might is Right, does not seem to make its appearance in surviving literature until the time of Plato, who puts it into the mouths of Callicles, not an historical character, and Thrasymachus, a sophist whom there is not the slightest reason to connect with the radical democrats.²³⁸ Did any fifth century Greek seriously maintain that Might is Right, or is this merely a clever distortion of the realist position actually held by the Athenian radicals. It is easy to imagine how this distortion could come about. The oligarchs had been accustomed to maintain that under the old regime, where they had been masters, Right rather than Might had prevailed. When the

²³⁵ See e.g. I 76.3 to 77.6.

²³⁶ Thuc. I 76.2; cf. V 89 and the next note.

²³⁷ See IV 61.5; V 105.2; cf. Democritus fr. 267 Diels⁶. And see Demosth. XV 28–29: inter-state relations are decided by force, because there are no accepted laws to be invoked, such as guarantee private rights, within a city, to weak and strong alike.

²³⁸ Plat., Gorg. 483d; Rep. 338c ff.; cf. Laws 714c; 890a. It is quite possible that the extreme oligarchs of the late 5th century did openly declare that Might is Right.

democrats exposed this pretence, the obvious counter-attack was to twist the democratic admission that force did govern into the claim that force ought to govern.

V WHY THE MANY WERE FRIENDLY TO ATHENS

It is part of the traditional view of the Athenian empire that the common people of Athens, under the influence of the 'demagogues', drove the allies hard, while the 'best people' did what they could to protect them. Of course oligarchs like Thucydides the son of Melesias, and perhaps Antiphon,²³⁹ would pose as defenders of the allies, by way of showing their opposition to the whole policy of the democrats. But the traditional view cannot be allowed to stand here either. Apart from the other evidence, there is a very striking and important passage in the last book of Thucydides,²⁴⁰ which seldom receives the attention it deserves. The whole passage (which would presumably have been worked up into a set speech if the History had ever been finished) describes the point of view of Phrynichus, the Athenian oligarch, in 411. Phrynichus realised, says Thucydides, that the setting up of an oligarchy at Athens would not have the effect of making the allies, many of whom were then in revolt, any better disposed towards Athens. He admitted 'that the allies expected the upper classes (of Athens) to prove just as troublesome to themselves as the demos, as being those who devised the acts injurious to the allies, proposed them to the demos, and gained most of the benefit from them; and that as far as the upper classes were concerned, they (the allies) might come to a violent end without trial, whereas the demos was their refuge and the chastiser of these men'.²⁴¹ This is a very remarkable statement, all the more valuable in that it is put by Thucydides (without contradiction) into the mouth of an oligarch, who could have no possible reason for making an admission so damaging to his own party if it were not true. It gives us two pieces of information: that most of the perquisites of empire went to the Athenian upper classes; and that the Athenian demos was more just and merciful towards the allies than were its 'betters'.

²³⁹ For Thucydides, see Plut., Per. 11-14. We know from Harpocration that Antiphon wrote speeches on the tribute of Lindus and Samothrace. According to Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 14, the Athenian *chrēstōi* [χρηστοί] tried to protect the *chrēstōi* in the allied states.

²⁴⁰ VIII 48.6. On the interpretation adopted here, there is a grammatical anomaly: *akritoi* [ἄκριτοι] for *akritous* [ἀκρίτους]. But if, as has been suggested, we take *akritoi* [ἄκριτοι] to refer to Phrynichus and his party, we make nonsense of the passage.

²⁴¹ A pleasant illustration, if historical, would be the story told by Agathias in Anth. Pal. VII 614 (with which cf. Plut., Nic. 6; Arist. 26). An example of clemency on the part of the Assembly is the sparing of the Rhodian Dorieus, the famous athlete, in the Ionian War (Paus. VI 7.4-5; Xen., Hell. I 5.19).

Humble folk in the allied cities who were oppressed by their own *oligoi* [ὀλίγοι] would have had no hesitation in trying to obtain redress from Athens, either in the form of assistance for a *coup d'état* or by recourse to recognised judicial procedure. The power to transfer certain cases to Athens, especially serious criminal cases, was one of the most important features of the government of the empire. The Old Oligarch²⁴² shows how the process operated to the advantage of the common people both at Athens and in the allied states. He says outright that the Athenians persecute the ‘worthy (*chrēstoi*) . . . and help the worthless (*ponēroi*)’ [χρηστοί, . . . τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αὖξουσιν], and again that in the law courts ‘they protect the *dēmos*, and destroy their opponents’ [τοὺς μὲν τοῦ δήμου σῶζουσιν, τοὺς δ’ ἐναντίους ἀπολλύουσιν]. He explains that by compelling the allies to sail to Athens for judicial decisions the Athenians not only derive financial benefit (which he probably exaggerates); they can govern the allied states, supporting the popular side and making short work of their opponents, without having to go overseas; and thus the allies are obliged not merely to pay respect to visiting generals, trierarchs and ambassadors (who would at least be gentlemen) but also to curry favour with the Athenian *demos* itself and lick its boots, thus becoming ‘slaves of the Athenian *demos*’. He adds the information that if the allies were allowed to try their cases at home, they in their turn, detesting Athens as they do, would make short work of the pro-Athenian parties in their midst – by which he means democratic agitators and suchlike. If you want real *eunomia*, ‘good government’ [εὐνομία], he says, you must have the laws made for the *demos* by the *dexiôtatoi*, ‘best off’ [δεξιώτατοι], and then the *chrēstoi*, ‘worthy’ [χρηστοί], will chastise the *ponēroi*, ‘worthless’ [πονηροί], and not allow ‘madmen’ [μαινομένους ἀνθρώπους] any voice at all. The Old Oligarch reflects with satisfaction that in such a desirable state of affairs the *demos* would rapidly fall into *douleia*, ‘slavery’ [δουλεία]. These passages give us an interesting glimpse of the attitude of many influential members of the propertied classes in the fifth century, against whose interests the Athenians were working when they claimed overriding powers in respect of certain judicial cases. We are able for a moment to foresee what would happen when Athenian control was removed – what actually did happen after the ‘liberation’ of the allies by Sparta, when (as at Athens itself under the ‘Thirty’) there were ‘many massacres’, and ‘the slaughter of countless numbers of the popular party’.²⁴³

²⁴² Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 9, 14, 16–18 (cf. I 4; III 10).

²⁴³ Plut., Lys. 13; 19. See also Diod. XIII 104.5–7; XIV 10.1–2; 12.3; 13.1; Isocr. IV 110–4; Polyae. I 45.4.

We need not be surprised, then, that the masses in the cities of the Athenian empire welcomed political subordination to Athens as the price of escape from the tyranny of their own oligarchs. This is not the place to consider whether they received other benefits from Athenian rule; protection against their own oligarchs is enough for our present purposes. Athens undoubtedly gave much support to the Many in the allied states against their own Few, who of course (with the sympathy of the Few at Athens, including Thucydides) regarded the resulting democratisation as the direct consequence of Athenian tyranny. Almost all our literary sources, imbued with oligarchical prejudice, present this point of view only. Active Athenian support of the Many must certainly have increased after 461, and may perhaps have become intensified again after the death of Pericles; but in the absence of confirmatory detailed evidence there is no reason to suppose that the Athenians became to any marked extent increasingly 'oppressive', except in the peculiar oligarchical sense, during the second half of the fifth century.

We may accept the statement of Isocrates²⁴⁴ that the Athenians did not set up 'opposition governments' unjustifiably in the allied states, and thus stir up factional strife. On the contrary, it was the boast of the Athenian democrats that they had suppressed *stasis*, 'civil war' [στάσις].²⁴⁵ To borrow a phrase from a modern politician, Athens did not 'export revolution', at any rate to states which were not already well supplied with that commodity. The way Isocrates²⁴⁶ puts it, in another speech, is that 'our fathers tried to induce (*epieithon* [ἔπειθον]) the allies to establish in their cities the same form of government as they themselves preserved with loving care'. This may not be so very far from the truth. At any rate, it is a grave error to take the introduction of a democracy on the Athenian model as a necessary indication of Athenian 'bullying'. Would not the Many in an oligarchical state be only too delighted to copy, even in minute details, the famous constitution of democratic Athens? Might they not even be glad to have an Athenian garrison on hand while they were learning to work their new constitution? We know that the democrats at Corcyra in c. 410, having reason to suspect that their *dunatôtatoi* [δυνατώτατοι] were about to hand the city over to Sparta, obtained a garrison from the Athenians.²⁴⁷ And the Athenian garrison at Lesbian

²⁴⁴ IV 104; cf. XII 99. Even the Old Oligarch does not accuse the Athenians of stirring up civil strife, but only of habitually taking the side of the 'worse' in a *stasis* [στάσις] (III 10). And see ATL III 149-54.

²⁴⁵ Ps.-Lys. II 55-56; Isocr. IV 106.

²⁴⁶ XII 54; cf. IV 105-6. The Athenians boasted that they gave the allies freedom, equated with democracy: Ps.-Lys. II 18-19, 55-56; Isocr. IV 104-6; XII 68; cf. the clever satire on such claims in Plat., Menex. 242-3.

²⁴⁷ Diod. XIII 48.5-6. Cf. Thuc. III 75.2.

Methymna, as already mentioned,²⁴⁸ had probably been supplied at the request of the party in power. At Erythrae the well known inscription²⁴⁹ shows the Athenians installing a garrison whose commander is given the task of supervising the selection by lot of the vital Council. But there is not the slightest warrant for inferring from this that Erythrae required to be ‘held down’ by an armed force; and as for what have been referred to as the ‘important political functions’ of the garrison commander, these were limited (in the surviving portion of the decree) to supervising a choice by lot, and therefore amounted to no more than ensuring that there was *no* jiggery-pokery. Democracies cannot easily be created overnight; it may take a long time to learn how to work one. Clever oligarchs, skilled in the hereditary art of government, would know just how to take advantage of the inefficiency of a new democratic regime, and they could probably rely in most cases on getting power back into their own hands before very long, unless the popular government received assistance as well as advice from the parent democracy. If the city could not afford to pay its councillors and dicasts (and probably very few cities could), the Many would find it very difficult to prevent the Few from regaining domination of the Council and the courts, upon which so much would depend. If it came to fighting, a small body of determined hoplites could be relied upon to deal with a much larger number of unpractised light-armed²⁵⁰ – and if the odds were too great, mercenaries could be hired. The Athenians, therefore, must have received many requests for assistance from the democratic parties in other states, and of course their intervention was regarded by the oligarchs – themselves quite prepared to call in the Spartans, if not the Persians – as an intolerable infringement of *autonomia* [αὐτονομία] and *eleutheria*, ‘freedom’ [ἐλευθερία]. If the Athenian *hêgemonia* [ἡγεμονία] changed by degrees into an *archê* [ἀρχή], the responsibility would seem to lie partly with the Many in the allied states, who often welcomed and even invited intervention. It may well be embassies bearing appeals of this sort, *dêmos* [δῆμος] to *dêmos*, which Aristophanes has in mind when he sneers in the *Acharnians*²⁵¹ at allied ambassadors who come to Athens with fine, complimentary phrases, flattering the Athenians in order to gain their own ends; he adds an encomium of himself as ‘having showed the *dêmoi* in the cities how to be democrats’ [τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δεῖξας, ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται]

²⁴⁸ See p. 240 above.

²⁴⁹ Tod 29 [ML 40] (= D 10 in ATL II 38, 54–57 = SEG X 11), esp. lines 11–14.

²⁵⁰ Ar., Pol. 1321a 19–21 refers to Ar.’s day, after the rise of the peltast, and is not applicable to the 5th century.

²⁵¹ 633–42.

No attempt has been made here to present a complete defence of the Athenian empire, or to give a ‘balanced judgment’ upon it. There is no doubt that the Athenians did derive considerable profits for themselves out of the empire, and to some extent exploit their allies. But if, as we have seen, the empire remained popular with the Many, then its benefits, from their point of view, must have outweighed the evils. The more abuses we find in Athenian imperialism (and of course abuses were not lacking), the more virtues, from the point of view of the Many, we must at the same time discover, or else we shall be further than ever from being able to account for the popularity of the empire.

ADDENDUM

When this article was already in proof, I realised that a different interpretation of Thuc. VIII 97. 1–2 is preferable to that adopted in the text (pp. 261, 262, 267). There is in fact no valid evidence that under the regime of ‘the Five Thousand’, praised by Thucydides, those below hoplite status were denied the franchise altogether. It is more probable that they were merely excluded from the *boulê*, ‘council’ [βουλή] – the key institution of the democracy – and perhaps other *archai*, ‘magistracies’ [ἀρχαί]: this would be sufficient to give the ‘men providing their own weapons’ [ὄπλα παρεχόμενοι] effective control of ‘affairs’ [τὰ πράγματα]. (I shall be defending this view in detail elsewhere.) But if ultimate sovereignty thus reposed in the whole body of citizens, the majority could at any time vote away the privileges temporarily reserved to the upper classes – as they eventually did.

The dividing line between oligarchy and democracy must be drawn somewhere. Surely the essential criterion is whether or not there is a property qualification for voting in the sovereign Assembly (see Busolt, Gr[iechische] Staatsk[unde, Munich 1920–6], I 444 n. 1, 572). Thucydides, on the interpretation of VIII 97. 1–2 now proposed, was giving his approval to what was substantially a democracy, with oligarchic elements which could be (and were) got rid of at the will of the majority.

This gives a satisfactory meaning to ‘a balanced combination resulted of government in the interests of the few and the many’ [μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο]. On the usual interpretation the *polloi* [πολλοί] had in fact no share and there was thus no real ‘combination’ [ξύγκρασις].

12 *Thucydides and the Cities of the Athenian Empire*[†]

JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY

Thucydides says, quite often, that the Athenian empire was unpopular and inspired hatred. But this, of course, is only a general statement; and it might be a subjective view. Indeed it is a remarkable testimony to the personal authority of Thucydides that it has not been more often questioned. However, we are making up for that now; and since the article written, some eleven years ago, by Mr de Ste Croix,¹ the validity of this view has been subject to much discussion. Now, being interested in Thucydides as a writer, I should like to examine the kind of censure he has recently incurred, and see how it agrees with the work in general: I shall consider first the alleged inconsistency between his opinions and his facts, and secondly his alleged suppression of evidence; in both cases I shall try and show that we are confronted with general tendencies, which are so deeply rooted in Thucydides' thought and in contemporary circumstances as not to be liable to our criticism.

First of all, can we prove Thucydides to be wrong from the sheer study of the facts? I doubt it very much.

Even an audience listening to a lecture is wont to hide, by fear of being either rude or cruel, their real opinion; and they might act kindly when they don't want to. Now, what about a city, placed between powerful armies and undergoing pressures of all kinds? It is, of course, well known, although not always well kept in mind, that its real opinion might then be rather distorted, either through lack of sincerity or through a simple sense of opportunity. When there is an Athenian fleet ready for actual intervention and one asks what the people think, one is more likely

[†] Originally published in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 13 (1966), 1-12, and recently reprinted (in French translation) in de Romilly's *L'invention de l'histoire politique chez Thucydide*, Paris 2005.

¹ G. E. M. de Sainte Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 3 (1954-1955) 1-41. [Ch. 11, this vol.]

to measure, in the forthcoming answers, the force of that fleet than the free opinion of those in the city. This has been wisely indicated by Mr Bradeen, in his article in *Historia* (1960), when he refused to lay too much stress on the revolts of Thrace or Ionia saying these 'are not really fair tests of Athens' popularity, for there were always extraordinary military pressures which distorted the situation'.² But I should like to ask: when were such pressures not to be found?

Pressure prevailed: not only with the cities of the empire, not only in war-time, not only according to Thucydides. In fact, we must never forget that war was then for the Greeks the natural feature of political life. This shows in institutions and common habits: for instance, in the fact that, in the fifth century, one decided to have peace for a number of years, not for ever: peace was but a provisional interruption of war. And even while it lasted, it was felt as a sort of balance between equal pressures. Thucydides often suggests it, but it is no personal view of his: when one of his characters says that freedom finally comes to an equal power of resisting your neighbours ('for all, freedom consists in being able to hold one's own' [πᾶσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται], iv. 92. 4), he only repeats about politics the famous saying of Heraclitus about the world at large: 'war is the father of all things, king of all, and shows some to be gods, others men, makes some slaves, others free' [πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους] (fr. 53).

Now, this phenomenon had become particularly important as a feature of political life at the time of the Peloponnesian War. The Persian Wars having taught the cities to act together and discuss with one another all over the Greek world, the system of alliances had become wider and more complex. The opposition between the main states had made it necessary for each of them that they should interfere in all places. And the growing difference in power between them and the small cities, combined with practical progress at sea, had made it easy for them to do so. The result was so impressive that we can probably explain in that way the reaction we find in the IVth century, and that vain but eager effort towards achieving federations, and everlasting peaces, and general settlements (*koinê eirenê* [κοινή εἰρήνη]).

However, during the Peloponnesian War, pressure was stronger and more wide-spread than it had ever been – the result being that small cities could scarcely do anything without being prompted by fear or pressure,

² D. W. Bradeen, 'The Popularity of the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 9 (1960) 257–269, cf. p. 267.

whatever the origin of those.³ Think of a city like Poteidaia, which was the origin of so many difficulties: of course it was, as an ally, submitted to Athenian pressure – but not only that: Athens fears the inhabitants might revolt ‘won over by Perdiccas and the Corinthians’ [ὑπό τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων] (i. 56.2). ‘Won over’, indeed! (the same ‘win over’ (*peithein*), which will be used later when the Lacedaemonians arrive in Rhodos with ninety-five ships, and the inhabitants fly away, but soon get brought together by these Lacedaemonians, who ‘persuade’ them: ‘they persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from Athens’ [Ῥοδίους ἔπεισαν ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων], in viii.44. 2). Now, to revert to Poteidaia, it must be noticed that Perdiccas and Corinth had tried to persuade her because they were themselves afraid of the increasing Athenian power. And indeed, what does Athens do, but send thirty ships there, with orders for having hostages taken, and the walls destroyed? But does that threat prevail? It doesn’t, because Poteidaia has in the meantime dealt with Sparta, who feels ready for war. No small city can be considered, but that the big ones soon appear at work.

Now, practically, if we consider the free cities, it soon emerges that their political behaviour is entirely commanded by the actual intervention of the two main cities. Each of these two stirs its own friends, who then move according to the amount of co-operation afforded. In Corcyra, where *stasis* rages, we see the condition of the oligarchs made worse, then better, then fatal, according to the fact that there arrive first twelve Athenian ships (iii. 75), then fifty-three Peloponnesian ships (76), then again sixty Athenian ships. In Megara, where political strife is not so exasperated, people try to make the best of the situation: democratic leaders begin with an attempt to hand the town over to the Athenian forces which are present (iv.66): then arrives Brasidas, and the town as a whole feels afraid.⁴ Being in doubt, people decide to wait and see: ‘to keep an eye on the future’ [τὸ μέλλον περιδεῖν] (iv. 71. 1), or, as says one of the following chapters: ‘looking to see which side would claim victory’ [περι-ορωμένους ὅποτέρων ἢ νίκη ἔσται] (iv. 73. 1). This, indeed, is another nice word, well chosen to describe the feeling of a prudent city caught in a great clash of forces. We find it again about the Sikels.⁵ And I feel sure

³ They might be compelled by a huge and distant city or by smaller but nearer neighbours: see, for instance, Oiniadai compelled to accept Athenian alliance through the pressure of her neighbours: ‘forced by all the Acarnanians’ [ὑπό τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηναγκασμένους] (iv. 77. 2). Every single city is obliged to a certain policy, as says Brasidas, ‘by others who were stronger’ [ὑπ’ ἄλλων κρείσσονων] (iv.114. 5).

⁴ Both parties act rather decently; and, on the whole, they are afraid of starting a real civil war, particularly the oligarchs (at least, those among them who were moderate, and therefore not in exile).

⁵ vi. 103. 2: at first, they preferred to wait and see: ‘previously they were watching over things’ [πρότερον περιεωρῶντο].

that we should follow Haase and read it, with the same meaning in v. 31. 6, about the Boeotians and Megarians, ‘keeping an eye on the activities of the Lacedaemonians’ [περιορώμενοι τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων] (not, as we have in the manuscripts, ‘being watched over by the Lacedaemonians’ [περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων]).⁶ Anyway, about Megara, the text is sure. Each party, says Thucydides, thinks it will be safer to join its own friends after they are found to be victorious: ‘to go over to the victorious party’ [κρατήσασσι προσχωρήσαι]. And in fact, as the Athenians do not start battle, the people in Megara open their gates to Brasidas ‘since he was victorious’ [ὥς ἐπικρατήσαντι] (73.4). Then, they establish an oligarchy – and a lasting oligarchy, just as if it had sprung from the most sincere opinion!

One thing only can hinder this overwhelming power of pressure: it is the fact that some people, whose opinions are only too well known, are afraid of reprisal: the leading democrats, in Megara, won’t have Brasidas, because they know his friends will turn them out into exile. Pressure always avails, save where another fear acts as a counter-influence.

Now this is perhaps taking us a little too far away from the cities of the empire; but I should not have dwelt upon these facts, were it not that they seemed to me to convey a double lesson: first, that when Thucydides presents his reader with a picture showing the relation between Athens and the cities of the empire as one resting primarily on force and fear, his picture can be discussed, but cannot be attributed to bias, as it holds for all cities; and secondly, that it is of no avail, in such a world as that, to infer anything about opinion from the actual behaviour of any of the small cities.

But, if this holds for all cities, it is easy enough to appreciate how much it can weigh with the cities of the empire.

In a way, it would be easy enough to show that peace is of the same nature for them as for the others⁷ and that they often display the same changes of attitude or the same prudent expectancy that we have met with in the case of free cities – particularly when there are two possibilities of help at hand. For instance, in Mende, we see that Brasidas, on his arrival, finds a city ready to revolt, whereas the arrival of Athenian troops, soon after, causes a new democratic and pro-Athenian activity

⁶ That is to say: ‘treated with honour by the Lacedaemonians’. Of course *perioran* [περιορᾶν] may have various meanings (see i. 69. 3); but even in iv. 124. 1: τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος means: ‘being on the look out to see what would happen to Mende’. The reading and meaning we suggest are more in agreement than the other with the general trend of thought in Thucydides.

⁷ That the peace and *status quo* between Athens and her allies was equally a matter of reciprocal fear is made clear by the passage in book iv, where we see Athens afraid lest Chios should ‘attempt some revolution’ [τι νεώτεριεῖν], while Chios is herself afraid lest Athens should ‘plan a revolution’ [νεώτερον βουλευεῖν]!

to be roused.⁸ Finally, only those who fear reprisals can resist pressure: others follow the opportunity and yield to the strongest.

But these cities, no doubt, were confronted with harder problems than the others. As they represented the real basis of Athens' power, Athens' enemies would normally try to win them over or overcome them with as much eagerness as Athens herself would display in trying to keep them.⁹ Therefore, more pressure; and more continuous, more elaborate pressure.

Indeed, opinion there was not only distorted by actual pressure: it had generally been prepared and organized, both by law and by force. We all know that, on the whole, the cities of the empire had come to their new condition through revolt and surrender.¹⁰ Now, it is quite obvious that Athens, in each case, was careful to provide against any similar revolt in the future – the cities sometimes give hostages, and no doubt some oligarchs are killed or sent into exile. The majority may well have liked it, I am not discussing that – but, if not, would people be very keen on showing it? I wonder!

These measures, of course, had generally been taken before the war began.¹¹ But still, we see how Athens proceeds with her allies who are not members of the empire. Such is the case of Stratos, in Acarnania: in the early years of the war, after it had just proved both faithful and useful, the Athenians apparently thought that one never knew, for they sent an army there 'and drove out from Stratos, Koronta and other places those men who did not seem reliable' [ἐκ τε Στράτου καὶ Κορόντων καὶ ἄλλων χωρίων ἄνδρας οὐ δοκοῦντας βεβαίους εἶναι ἐξήλασαν] (ii. 102. 1). No doubt, after such measures, historians will notice that these people were, indeed, 'reliable'. This is one example. We can also see how Athens proceeds when cities of the empire fail her during the war: she hands Notion back to the people of Colophon 'except those who had collaborated with the Persians' [πλὴν τῶν μηδισάντων], (iii. 34. 4), she kills the people most responsible for the revolt in Mytilene – how many? even here, where Thucydides does give a precise figure, we cannot tell! The manuscripts say one thousand, more

⁸ iv. 129–130. This is all the more notable as Thucydides does not hint at any such reasoning on the part of the people, and only mentions *stasis*.

⁹ The Peloponnesians seem to have discussed the possibility of inducing the allies to revolt when they started the war (i. 81. 3; 122. 1) – even though they did not do much in that line before Brasidas. However, Corinth at least had always been active: the incidents which brought out the war are clear proof of that.

¹⁰ Thucydides, i. 98. 4. He mentions Naxos (98), Thasos (100–101), Euboea (114), Samos and Byzantium (115). But, as says Gomme (*ad* i. 98): 'Athens would doubtless take advantage of "treasonable" designs as well as actual secession to interfere with the states' autonomy'.

¹¹ He shows it in the Pentekontaetia, quite formally, although without many details: see note 10.

humane scholars suggest thirty.¹² However, no similar problems arise when the whole population is destroyed – which soon becomes the new fashion. But, even in less startling conditions, it cannot be denied that the opinion might, thanks to Athens' prudence, be just as mutilated as was the city itself. And even in complete peace and concord, it cannot be denied that the opposition might be a little shy of taking similar risks.

This fear might be all the stronger as in fact the small cities knew they could not act against Athens: they had often been deprived of their walls and ships; Athens had the fleet. Athens could send forces, everywhere, before anybody else. And, in case she won, she would know whom to get at: she had come to hear about individuals and have agents in the cities. Again, this may have been appreciated by some people. But, if not, would it show? Facts wouldn't tell us.

Probably this is an important reason why we never hear anything about *stasis*, or about opinion, in the cities of the empire before they have actually revolted and are in such a position as to have to choose between two protectors. They could not afford *stasis* and would have been persuaded not to want it. In fact, it has been noticed that one of the advantages of the empire was, in the opinion of the Athenians, that one should escape *stasis*.¹³ The cities did not have *stasis*; nobody moved; but this was like what Gibbon writes, speaking about Lausanne: 'All are silent; but it is the silence of fear and discontent; and the secret hatred which rankled against government begins to point against the few who are known to be well-affected.'¹⁴ However, in the Vth century, contemporaries, whether in Athens or in Sparta, could not be mistaken about it.

Now this certainly doesn't mean that there was not in each city a true democratic party, favourable to Athens, as well as an oligarchic one, favourable to Sparta. Thucydides, in more cases than one, says that there was. And it doesn't mean either that in some cases these two parties did not fear each other's hatred more than they did a foreign dominion: this was particularly true for people who had already committed themselves on one side or the other, and had nothing to hope in case their enemies won. But it means that, in fact, the strength and audacity of each of these two parties were in proportion with their practical hopes; and that their actual success often depended on a more indifferent or more reasonable mob, which would be actuated by pressure, circumstances and opportunity.

¹² iii. 50. 1; cf. Gomme, *ad loc.*: 'The number shocks; war often does.'

¹³ Cf. Ste Croix, *op. cit.*, [p. 274 in this volume], quoting [Lysias] ii. 55 ('made their allies free from *stasis*' [ἄστασιάστοις δὲ παρασχόντες τοὺς συμμάχους]) and Isocrates, iv. 106.

¹⁴ To Lord Sheffield, 4 April 1792.

Finally this is what emerges from the whole history of the war: not only does Thucydides carefully point, in each particular case, to one and the same way of reasoning, it is also clear that the very sequence of events seems to illustrate a similar view of history.

When do people revolt? The answer is simple: when they think they have an opportunity. They cannot think such is the case in the first years of the war. But after the plague, the Mytilenians declare that there is a chance (iii. 13.3: ‘since there has not yet been an opportunity’ [καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὐπω πρότερον]); and Athens understands that they revolt because they believe her to be weak (iii. 16. 1: ‘because of a perception of weakness’ [διὰ κατὰ γνώσιν ἀσθενείας]). Still, they are divided; and other allies help Athens with readiness, because they see that she is stronger (iii. 6. 1: ‘seeing no vigorous activity from the Lesbians’ [ὀρῶντες οὐδὲν ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων]). Brasidas, later, finds more success. He arrives in Thrace after Athens has failed in Megara and Boeotia; and he has troops with him. Therefore, people yield: whatever his promises, they do so, partly, because of his troops and of what they fear (iv. 84. 2: ‘because of fear for their harvest’ [διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος]; 88.1: ‘concerning their worries about the harvest’ [περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ]); and they do it also because they think Athens will not move (108. 4: ‘since there seemed to be no danger to them’ [καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς]), an idea which Thucydides justifies by a long parenthesis about Athenian *dunamis*, ‘power’ [δύναμις], and what people believed about it. However, what irritates Athens most is that these cities should be impressed by the military power of Sparta, which, consisting of land-troops, cannot protect the allies (122. 5: ‘trusting in the unhelpful strength of the Lacedaemonians’ [τῆ κατὰ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσχύι ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες]). All that holds together. And so does the fact that, after Brasidas’ death and the return of peace, the allies are again obedient. Obedient they remain – till the disaster in Sicily provides them with a new *kairos* ‘opportunity’ [καιρός]. And then comes a new wave of revolts. And still the same kind of commentaries, for Thucydides, speaking about Chios, says she acted reasonably, for she did not revolt before she could do it with powerful allies (viii. 24. 5: ‘along with many good allies’ [μετὰ πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων]) and before she could see that Athens did not feel safe.

Now all this confirms one thing: that war comes first. War explains pressure; pressure explains opinion, or avowed opinion; and the success at war commands the rhythm of revolts. This order has not always been fully understood by historians and classicists, and I should like to mention one example. In v. 14, Thucydides comments upon the reasons for peace; and he says that Athens wished it because she had been defeated in various places and had lost confidence; then he goes on saying: ‘also, she

was afraid lest her allies, emboldened by these defeats of hers, might abandon her more and more'. Now Steup boldly declares that this is surely an interpolation: the fear of defections, he says, could only appear as a cause explaining why Athens had lost confidence, not as an additional motive; and he asks 'why such a fear?' Defections had then stopped and there was no reason to fear them. But this is misunderstanding the normal order of ideas for a Greek of that time: one feared revolt after a blow to one's power, as a result of it; as was said above, war comes first.

Indeed, the brief analysis already given is enough to show that, if we try to write a history of opinion in the cities according to their practical behaviour, we shall finally be writing a history of the war, and of the Athenian success at war. It would be useless to do it at length. But I should like to add one word about Book viii, as I have there a personal matter to clear up. I wrote in my book on Thucydides and the Athenian empire, that after the disaster, 'the desire for independence overcomes all other differences', and that the internal conflict between Athens and her allies then 'causes all other problems to fade into the background'.¹⁵ And this has been criticized both by Mr de Ste Croix and by Mr Bradeen as 'not borne out by the evidence'.¹⁶ Well, let us be frank: these two gentlemen were quite right, and the statement was rash; for there still existed in the cities, no doubt, a strong opposition between democrats and oligarchs, or between Athens' friends and her enemies. And the pro-Spartan party did not easily impose its views, either in Chios (viii. 14)¹⁷ or in Clazomenai (14; 23),¹⁸ or in Rhodos (44).¹⁹ And one of the main islands did remain faithful: that is Samos (21) (although it could be argued that she received a fair price when she was granted autonomy, and that she was submitted to no small pressure when the Athenian fleet chose her as an anchoring ground and base.²⁰ Thus far my statement

¹⁵ pp. 84–85 of the English translation (Blackwell 1963).

¹⁶ *Historia* 3 (1954) 6 [p. 238, this vol.], and 9 (1960) 267, n. 55.

¹⁷ In Chios, the 'the few' [ὀλίγοι] act quite alone, the 'the many' [πολλοί] being kept in the dark, so that when the time comes, they are 'surprised . . . and stunned' [ἐν θαύματι . . . καὶ ἐκπληξεί]; later, there are movements against Sparta, which has to take hostages (31. 1); there is also internal strife, and people killed; and it is said that the city keeps on the oligarchic side 'constrained . . . by necessity' [κατ' ἀνάγκης . . . κατεχομένης] (viii. 38. 3). Hence a lack of enthusiasm in this new ally of Sparta's.

¹⁸ At 31. 2 we see that in spite of Peloponnesian pressure, the people 'were not listening' [οὐκ ἑσθήκουσιν], and although they have no ramparts, they cannot be made to surrender.

¹⁹ Only the 'the most powerful' [δυνατώτατοι] are in action: the 'the many' [πολλοί] are kept in the dark (44); see above, p. 279.

²⁰ And here again the faithfulness of the city has been prepared: the democrats have killed two hundred people and exiled four hundred; that is why the Athenians think these people are 'already strong' [βεβαίους ἤδη] (21); yet, in spite of all that, we see that Athens later meets with difficulties: viii. 73. 4. and the risk of her losing hold of Samos is mentioned as a possible disaster: 'Samos, whose loyalty was the only reason that the Athenians had retained their empire up to this point, was lost to the Athenians' [καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίους ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν. δι' ἣν μόνον ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῖς ἐς τοῦτο ξυνέμεινεν].

was rash and untrue. But why was it so? Because, carried on by the ideas which I have just explained and which emerge from the work of Thucydides, I was thinking not of the opinion of the leaders on both sides, but of the practical attitude of the cities. I was thinking of the rhythm of revolt, how so many of the cities send embassies to Sparta, and how so many of them break their bond with Athens – whatever the means or the reason: Chios (viii. 14), Teos (16), Miletos (17), Lebedos (19), Methymna (22), Ephesos (23), and soon after Abydos, Lampsakos, Thasos, Euboea, Eresos! Obviously, the pro-Athenian leaders could no longer keep their hold on the cities. Opinion had not altered, but actual behaviour revealed a new trend.

From the beginning to the end, then, all the facts corroborate the overwhelming power of pressure, which seems to have covered up all questions of opinion under the commanding influence of opportunity.

Hence an impossibility of criticizing. Naturally, I do not deny that there was – at any time or in any city – a pro-Athenian party: what I deny is that we can ever judge of its importance by considering its action. As regards opinion, facts are prone to lie. And we are to believe what we are told: Thucydides' narrative cannot be half as convincing as are his own statements. A hard conclusion to offer to historians! But I may add a corrective remark; for the demonstration may turn out to be a little less negative than it first pretended to be. Indeed, if force was such an overwhelming element in all political relations, could it be otherwise between the strong Athens and her weak allies? That it was such is not only a likely inference but one that is strongly recommended by the very sequence of events, as shows from the short summary above. And perhaps I should confess that, in my opinion, Book viii does here deserve a special treatment and claim a validity all its own. For the first time we find something which suggests naval pressure on both sides. Both Athens and Sparta have now got money and fleets; both Athens and Sparta are near at hand. And then we see that although true democrats keep faithfully to the empire, on the whole the islands seem to accept, without too much difficulty, the policy of other leaders. It all happens as if the main trend had always been to keep to Athens till it were possible to escape. And this is also the time when some Athenian oligarchs hope to make their position better by spreading oligarchy in the cities. Now the very fact that such an idea could occur to them shows that these people thought the oligarchic party in the cities to be stronger than the other:²¹ seeing the pro-Athenian leaders so incapable of keeping their

²¹ Indeed the big cities had always been more or less addicted to oligarchic government – so for Mytilene, Chios and Samos: see Bradeen, *op. cit.*, p. 264–265. The passage where Plato (Letter VII, 332 c) explains the long success of the empire by the fact that Athens had acquired

hold on the cities, these men were trying a sort of desperate effort to grasp at them in another way. Their failure is not surprising: political opposition was no more a sufficient bait, either on one side or on the other.

The very power of pressure, which prevents us in each single instance from inferring anything about opinion, does at the same time confirm the political background of Thucydides' description.

Yet there remains a difficulty. Even though the main and deepest trend should have been a desire to escape Athens' authority, if it were possible to do so without incurring too much harm, was it not wrong of Thucydides that he should not have more clearly mentioned the existence, at least, of division in almost all the cities, and the role of this *eunoia* [goodwill], which proved real till the end?

This is the other question, for which the work, I think, does provide an answer.

What, finally, do some of us criticize in Thucydides? The fact that he says 'The polis', when that meant a group of leaders, followed for a time by enough people to be able to act on behalf of the city. That is what Mr Pleket calls a mistake: 'part for the whole' *pars pro toto*.²² Thucydides does that, indeed – both when he relates an event and when he makes a statement, either in his own name or in one of the speeches. But here again, this habit of his is not limited to the cities of the empire: it prevails with any city, Athens included. And therefore the reason cannot be bias.

First, one could suggest a practical reason, arising from the nature of his subject-matter. He is the historian of a war, and therefore more intent to see in what manner a revolt was caused by the development of the war or might, in turn, modify this development, than to get a precise idea of the how and the why, and who began, and who was the leader and who followed or not.

But I think there is another and deeper reason; and this is to be sought in the different nature of both political parties and national feeling at the time considered. Our modern parties are precise; they have official members and leaders, regular programmes, practical means of spreading information and propaganda. No such thing existed in ancient times. There were, of course, people who held a theoretical programme. But the usual distinction was mainly between rich and poor; and it was easily

friends in the cities seems to me to betray a theory about concord more than a statement about historical reality, which would not agree with all the other passages in his work that go against Athenian democracy and over-nourished power. (On the theory of *eunoia*, see my article in *JHS* 78 (1958) 92–101)

²² In 'Thasos and the popularity of the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 12 (1963) 74.

admitted that each man was on the side which was more beneficial for him.²³ This meant a kind of spontaneous opportunism, which would bring out easier changes according to circumstances.²⁴ And it would easily lead to a national opportunism, such as was displayed by Alcibiades at Sparta, saying that he felt it a duty to maintain the kind of government with which the city happened to be ‘greatest’ [μεγίστη] and ‘most free’ [ἐλευθερωτάτη].²⁵ This would be true of all, but mainly of the people as distinct from the leaders, of the people that Thucydides sometimes called *to plêthos* [τὸ πλῆθος]. For we must remember that the social distinction was nothing so systematic as what we should describe now as class opposition. Both Euripides (in *Supplikes*, 238–245) and Plato (in the *Republic*, viii. 565 a) insist that there was a middle class who ‘kept to the existing institutions’ and did not go into political quarrels (*apragmones*, ‘uninvolved’ [ἀπράγμονες]): these would of course be more easily won over. After all, even in Athens, which was so much more alert to politics than other cities, all those who were adverse to democracy were not ‘oligarchs’; and all those who enjoyed democracy were not ready to go to any extreme for it. And in Megara, for instance, we see the leaders of the *demos* (οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται) feeling sure that the *demos* could not be made to follow their own line, and acting, therefore, on their own behalf, in a secret manner.²⁶ In such a fluctuating condition of opinion, the prevailing tendency might just as well be one that was bred by a small group of plucky people, or one that was imposed on them by the spontaneous opportunism of the mob.²⁷ It even happens that some people are all the more daring as they are fewer in number and have therefore more reason to fear reprisal: we see that in Mende, where Thucydides says ‘they were few’ [ὀλίγων τε ὄντων] among the reasons for obstinacy, which causes some trouble among scholars.²⁸ In all such cases, opinion was something unsteady and illogical. And this suggests that Thucydides may have been both prudent and justified when he refused to go into these dubious distinctions if he could help it.

Indeed he was all the more justified as the uncertainty of parties had a definite counterpart in the precise reality of the *polis*: this was something

²³ Cf. Lysias xxv. 8: ‘whichever constitution is beneficial to him, this is the one he is eager to see established’ [ἥτις ἂν ἐκάστῳ πολιτεία συμφέρη, ταύτην προθυμείται καθεστάναι]. Similarly, the ancient *staseis* in Athens meant both family rivalry and different ideas.

²⁴ In the passage quoted above, Lysias adds that the government is therefore free to make its partisans as numerous as they can be.

²⁵ vi. 89. 6.

²⁶ iv.66. 3. The Peloponnesians, seeing the traitors at work, believe the whole city has taken arms against them: a proof that even in the presence of events, it might be difficult to know!

²⁷ ‘the many’ [πολλοί] (meaning the democrats) would be likely to have the majority when allowed to vote; but vote was not everything, and all practical matters would not be decided according to that clear-cut distinction.

²⁸ Madvig suggested *orgilôn* [ὀργίλων] and Classen-Steup admitted a lacuna!

real, felt as a much more precise and living unit than any we know nowadays. If parties were not strong, clear-cut groups, that was because the city was a strong, clear-cut group. If people were not ashamed of national opportunism, that was because the city was where they first belonged. The city provided the place where one met, and learned the news, and had rights. But it was not only a place, and not thought of primarily as such. It was a group of persons: ‘the Athenians’ [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι], ‘the Akanthians’ [οἱ Ἀκάνθιοι]. And the fact that wherever people had a vote to give, they decided not on people and programmes but on the matters at hand, directly, made it easier for them to feel that they *were* the city. The city was no framework, it was a collective being.

No doubt that explains in some way the trend of thought which we find in all Greek authors – and which for ever precludes the modern approach to political philosophy: I mean the habit of drawing close parallels between cities and individuals. This extends from the simple colloquial remarks of the type ‘both in private and in public’ [καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ] or ‘men against man, and city against city’ [ἄνδρες ἄνδρα καὶ πόλις πόλιν], to the great constructions of Plato where the parallelism is made to bear on every single detail of the analysis.

Now this, I think, can be considered as the main and indeed sufficient reason for Thucydides’ simplification – a simplification which, as I said, shows for all the cities, to a smaller or greater degree.

For Athens, he says a little more, because the discussions between her leaders do have a direct bearing on the war. And yet, he does not say much. What do we know about the parties, the programmes? We hear of Pericles’ difficulties in ii. 65; but these are with ‘the Athenians’ [τοὺς Ἀθηναίους]; in the next sentence, there is indeed one word about different motives in the *dēmos* [δῆμος] and the *dunatoi*, ‘powerful’ [δυνατοί]; but immediately, Thucydides adds: ‘the whole population did not . . .’ [οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες. . .] Even where we should find it most useful, he hates splitting the cities into fractions. And we should keep in mind that when he has to be even briefer than that, this anonymous collectivity is all that remains: in the Pentekontaetia, it is always ‘the Athenians’ [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι]. Thucydides never says that Kimon’s party did this, or that Themistocles’ friends moved such and such a decision: he presents us with one living being who either sent expeditions or stopped war. And he does that just as if all Athenians had always been of the same opinion, leaving out all the Athenians that did not share ‘Athens’ ambition, just as he leaves out all the people in the cities who did not share ‘the cities’ dissatisfaction.

This is, in fact, such a natural trend of the ancient mind that it shows in many small details of style or vocabulary. We all know how difficult

it may be to draw a clear distinction between the different meanings of the word *demos* – which may be: the poor classes, the democratic party, democracy, or also the city as a whole.²⁹ The mistake *pars pro toto* is here rooted in the everyday use of language. But if we try and translate Thucydides, we soon find that the same ambiguity recurs in many details.

In the beginning of Book iv it is said that some ships from Syracuse conquer Messine ‘on their invitation’ [αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων]. Was that the whole city calling them in? Of course not. Therefore, Steup suggests one word was lost and we should read ‘on the invitation <of some of their men>’ [αὐτῶν <ἀνδρῶν> ἐπαγαγομένων].³⁰ But this is obviously wrong; though it is only a small part of the city, the responsibility is felt as being common.

Similarly, there seems to be a difference between the action of a city accepting, on her own behalf, some conditions and that of a small group, betraying her so as to make her surrender. And yet both actions are equally attributed to the city, when we read, in v. 17.2: ‘they had gone over to them by agreement, not through treachery’ [ὁμολογία αὐτῶν προσχωρησάντων καὶ οὐ προδόντων]³¹ (we moderns would say ‘through being betrayed’ [προδοθέντων]!).

Probably this is the explanation of the strange formula used by Brasidas in iv. 86.4. when he says it would not do to submit by force the greater number to the few (which means *hoi polloi*, ‘the many’ [οἱ πολλοί] to *hoi oligoi*, ‘the few’ [οἱ ὀλίγοι]), or the smaller number to the whole: τὸ ἕλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι. The expression is so strange that some scholiasts have failed to understand it and have tried to explain *tois pasi*, ‘the whole’ [τοῖς πᾶσι] as meaning either Macedonians or Thessalians, or even Lacedaemonians. But no foreign country is considered here; if the expression is queer, that is partly because our writer enjoys *variatio*, but mainly because in everybody’s eyes at that time, there was not a great difference between majority and total amount.³²

Our ancient Greeks who were wise enough to understand with Hesiod how much the half is more than the whole, seem also to have been true citizens enough to admit that a part was equal to the whole!

Yet it is unfortunate that this should have inspired the habits of our historian, precisely for a time when he says himself that it was a time of

²⁹ See Gomme *ad* ii. 37. 1 and de Ste Croix, *op. cit.*, p. [255].

³⁰ *andrôn*, ‘men’ [ἀνδρῶν], being equivalent to *tinôn*, ‘some’ [τινῶν].

³¹ Classen: *prodontôn*, ‘traitors’ [προδόντων], *sc.*: *tinôn*, ‘some’ [τινῶν].

³² I should not, for that reason, make too much of an alleged opposition between ‘arranging matters for the majority’ [ἔς πλείονας οἰκεῖν] (ii. 37. 1) and ‘for all’ [ἔς πάντα], as does Ste Croix, *op. cit.*, p. [255] and n. 158.

stasis, and when political strife within the cities was more general and more violent than on any other occasions. *Stasis* fills up all Greece, from Book iii on,³³ and in Book viii, it finally reaches. Athens herself:³⁴ there are political changes, different parties, internal strife; and Thucydides has to change his usual manner. The result is not a success. He has now to mention names, programmes, plots; and that obliges him to go backwards in time: ‘while this was taking place and even before . . .’ (viii. 45), ‘about this time and already before’ (viii. 63). But the difficulty is not his. And the history he is writing is no more the history of a normal city.

The historiographic difficulty he meets with is linked to the political contradiction, which Plato so strongly brought out, saying that no city should be called *polis* but his own ideal one, which had concord and unity: the others are manifold; and a divided city is at least two *poleis* – one being the *polis* of the rich, the other the *polis* of the poor (*Republic*, iv. 422 e–423 a; 551 d).

Now this certainly shows us that the real unity of the polis was more a dream than something real. Or better than a dream, it was an ideal limit never perfectly to be reached. But an ideal limit is not wholly unreal either. Nor were all the cities utterly split into hostile and murderous factions. Even in those who were the most deeply harmed by this evil, there were times when the citizens did join again, in spite of all,³⁵ and after so many evils, one decided not to keep the evils in mind, μή μνησικακήσειν.³⁶

In any case, this ideal limit shows us what was the usual trend of thought, which would avail in all ordinary cases, that *stasis* did not distort. It shows us that for a Greek of that period, a city was, of all necessity, a whole – just as an individual is a whole, even though he might have inner qualms and quarrels between different parts of himself.³⁷ Now one could very well describe the hesitation and changes of an individual, without mentioning the leading element in every action, or describe the general aim he makes for, without saying in what measure he gives himself over to such pursuit. This is what we have with the *polis*: one can describe its action as a series of more or less coherent moves, without explaining their origin or, as aiming all at one thing, without explaining who approved or disapproved of the aim.

³³ People know its importance and speak about it (see, for Sicily, iv. 61. 1, vi. 17. 3 et 4); its reign is linked with that of ‘treachery’ [προδοσία].

³⁴ Cf. the repeated use of the word: viii. 78; 94. 2; 95. 2; 96.2; 98. 4; 105. 5; and cf. ii. 65. 12.

³⁵ See the example of Leontini, v. 4.

³⁶ E.g. in Samos, vii.73 – not to mention the famous example of Athens. This importance of patriotism has been emphasized by T. J. Quinn, in *Historia* 13 (1964) 265.

³⁷ Even in an individual, the discovery that there were different parts, and possible disagreement between them, did take a fair amount of time. The actual disagreement was first strongly felt by Euripides, its theory was progressively drawn by Plato. The subtlety of it appeared in modern times and is at the back of Freud’s psychology.

Now, my opinion would be that this system, which seemed so well justified for all the cities, except in those where *stasis* was at its worst, was particularly justified in the case of the cities of the Empire. First, Athens would there rely on democrats but she would by no means have encouraged *stasis* and, on the other hand, these measures that she took, seeing to this or to that, were of all necessity resented by the whole city. One can enjoy democracy but not be keen on surrendering one's ships and walls; one can enjoy democracy, yet not be keen on giving away money to be used by other people. One can enjoy having the upper hand against one's political adversaries and still not be keen on having to deal with foreigners and accept their orders. 'Couldn't we have had the upper hand without paying such a price for it?' one would ask oneself. Practically, I do not see any difficulty in believing that even the democrats, who were on Athens' side and showed *eunoia* to her, did, in truth, wish her far away, if it could be so without too much harm for themselves. They could enjoy democracy, but not perhaps, to quote Aristophanes, 'the way in which the *dēmoi* in the cities . . . exercised democratic power' [τούς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν . . . ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται].³⁸

If this is so, it again turns out that I have to be finally a little less negative than I had first proposed. For this does not mean only that Thucydides was right in not entering into all the details of inner division and opinion in the cities, but that this opinion was such that the *poleis*, *qua poleis*, were largely adverse to Athens, either through rancour or through fear.

When speaking about pressure, I suggested that Book viii could be considered as particularly illuminating. Now, about the *polis*, I think we could stop and consider Brasidas' policy in Book iv.

I do not mean its results, which, no doubt, are impressive; but I suggested myself that pressure could have played a part there and certainly did. However, I mentioned, together with pressure, promises. Now, it is worth considering what the promises were.

In Megara, which was an independent city, Brasidas had come with an army – and both parties waited, each one wishing to rally to its own protectors when these had achieved victory. In fact, even Brasidas' friends were afraid that his admittance would bring forth some *stasis* that would wreck the city (this confirms that people thought of the city and that *stasis* had some limits); then, when he is victorious, they welcome him (which confirms that opportunity prevails not in the opinion of the leaders, but in their strength and influence, that is to say

³⁸ *Ach.*, 642.

in the attitude of the state). Afterwards, the democratic leaders leave the town but the mass of the people agrees to start a negotiation with the oligarchs (κοινολογησάμενοι iv. 74.2) and recall the exiles who would swear ‘not to keep evils in mind, and to counsel what was best for the city’ [μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλευῶσιν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ ἄριστα]. Now, this is surely a good example of the true reality of the *polis* as a whole, even in a case of *stasis*.

But think how different is Brasidas’ manner in Akanthos. There, in that city of the empire, he uses a new argument which he could not use in Megara: he says he does not come as the friend of one group as opposed to another; no-one, therefore, should be afraid lest he might hand the city over to some of the citizens: ‘I have not come to stir up *stasis*’ [οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάζων ἤκω], he says, with repeated arguments and solemn insistence. And, having heard that, the greatest part of them (οἱ πλείους) feel satisfied and open the gates of the city. Now, what is important here is not the success itself, but the principle. With a city of the empire, Brasidas does not need to work on *stasis*, for he feels he disposes of a bait, which is more effective and can avail with all – that is freedom; and this he is going to use as his main argument with all the cities in the same situation. In Torone, for instance, he repeats that he has not come to destroy any city or individual, and that everybody will be alike for him. And we see, then, how the faithful democratic cities react. In Amphipolis, the friends of Athens are the more numerous (iv. 104. 4), but when they see both pressure and offers, as says Thucydides, ‘their opinions shifted’ [ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας], and they won’t listen any more to the Athenian commander (106. 2: ‘the Athenian general on the spot was no longer heeded’ [τοῦ παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροώμενον]). Other cities, yielding to immediate satisfaction, try their chance. Some revolt even after the armistice; and, in Skione, he sounds so friendly that even those who were at first opposed to the negotiation do join in with enthusiasm: ‘all alike, even those who had previously been unhappy at what was happening’ [πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα] (121. 1).³⁹

I could not quote all the passages and I don’t think it would be necessary to do so. In fact, it is clear that Brasidas thought he had there a good argument, for he could offer something that everybody would wish to have. And it is equally clear that he was right. Our Athenian oligarchs had no bait in Book viii, and political opposition could not provide them with one: Brasidas had one, and he could overcome political opposition.

³⁹ On these revolts, see the analysis by T. J. Quinn, *Historia* 13 (1964) 260–262.

The cities then turned to what was good for them, as cities: ‘manifest domestic benefit’ [τοῦ φανερώς οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ].⁴⁰ The common wish for liberty, which was the deepest and truest wish of all, had only been hampered and silenced by former pressure.

Now, if this is true, we can see that Thucydides was clearly right when he said that the opinion in the cities was everywhere against Athens. His statement in Book ii. 8, where he says that every single individual and state was full of energy to help the Spartans as best they could, by word or deed, sounds at first somewhat different from what we read in the narrative, which shows that the cities of the empire did not feel much enthusiasm before Brasidas came and mentions quite clearly that even then they hesitated and often resisted. But the difference seems to me to arise neither from a difference in date,⁴¹ nor from any secret bias: it arises from the fact that Thucydides, here, simplifies even more than elsewhere. He does it firmly and boldly. Yet he does it in keeping with the ideas and manner of life prevailing in his time, and in keeping with his own habit of rejecting what meets the eye in order to grasp at the final and secret truth – the ‘truest reason’ [ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις]. The cities, *qua* cities, were passionately against Athens. They would gladly have shown it, had they been in a condition to do it. Many of them did, when the time came.

Thucydides’ picture, then, does not contradict Gomme’s confident verdict on the Greeks: ‘Put a pen into their hands or a brush or a chisel, and they do not know what partiality is.’⁴² And yet it is a personal picture, into which, as we can see, enter both choice and interpretation. This we know better since scholars like Mr de Ste Croix and others called our attention to what was, before then, too lightly accepted as obvious. But my contention has been that choice does not mean error, and that interpretation can be a matter, not of political opinion, but of political approach and philosophy. If this is right, this controversy would finally throw some light, not on Thucydides’ shortcomings, but on his methods and on the background which accounts for his general position – that is to say on some features of the history of ideas.⁴³

⁴⁰ iv.120. 3.

⁴¹ As suggested by A. W. Gomme.

⁴² *The Greek attitude to Poetry and History* (Berkeley, 1954), p. 162.

⁴³ This paper was first read at a University of London Seminar on 28 February 1966 in the Institute of Classical Studies.

13 *Images and Political Identity: The Case of Athens*[†]

TONIO HÖLSCHER

SOME GENERALITIES

‘Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens’: if this title refers to the connection between a specific political and social system and a specific artistic ‘culture,’ the problem it poses can be approached from two different points of view. Focusing on fifth-century Athens, we can search for various products and activities of the arts and their functions in this specific polis, thereby envisaging art in relation to a single, limited, and specific political and social system. Or else, focusing on fifth-century arts as such, we can define a broader range of political systems and historical societies within which these arts had their functions, thus seeing political or social systems in relation to a specific artistic culture.

All this would be easy if artistic styles coincided with specific political and social systems. This, however, is an ideal constellation that does not correspond easily with the real conditions of Greek culture. Chronological or regional differences in artistic styles often do not coincide with political changes or differences. Conversely, many artistic phenomena as well as their changes over time are common to all of Greece, independent of specific political systems.

Monolithic concepts of culture tend to construct homogeneous cultural systems, divided into regional units and following each other in clear-cut homogeneous epochs. This approach, based on an a priori assumption, encourages simplistic views of structural unity that ignore or even suppress contradictory factors. A more dynamic and

[†] Originally published in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raafaub (eds.) *Democracy, Empire and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*, Cambridge, MA, and London, 1998, 153–83. For copyright reasons, not all the images used here are identical to those in the original article.

I thank Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raafaub for useful comments and for helping to improve my English text.

open concept should take into consideration that a society's cultural manifestations and developments are multiple and often conflicting: sectors with long-term traditions, like religion or family structures, may coexist with dynamic ones, like social values or artistic styles, all of these intersecting with political events and changes. This does not mean that individual cultural fields coexist independently, one beside the other; rather, all sectors interact with one another and are connected in the minds of the same people. Among these factors contributing to a society's 'cultural makeup,' one, such as religion, politics, or private life, may for a time rise to predominance and influence other fields more or less thoroughly, resulting in relatively uniform cultural attitudes. But on the whole, we should envisage complex interactions among various cultural factors, that is, not structural unity but multifactored functional systems. In this sense we may ask whether fifth-century Athens used general forms of contemporary art, adapting them to her specific purposes, or created new forms that can properly be called specifically Athenian, democratic or imperial.

In Greek art, the early fifth century was a period of sudden and radical changes. Within one decade, 490–480,¹ artists created a new image of the human figure and a new concept of the human person that remained influential at least to the beginning of our own century. Some of the most impressive examples of this new art, which we still call 'classical,' were created in Athens. A few years earlier, this city had begun her revolutionary development toward democracy, and it remained the protagonist of democracy for two centuries. Hence we may reasonably ask whether classical Greek art was democratic art.

At first sight, the answer seems obvious. During this period all major works of art in Athens as elsewhere in Greece were public monuments and had their function in public spaces; moreover, those of Athens were mostly commissioned by the people's Assembly. There seems little doubt, therefore, that democracy was the ultimate cause or at least an important condition of artistic developments. Yet things are more complicated. In fact, the 'artistic revolution' of the early fifth century was neither a specifically Athenian nor a specifically democratic revolution.

Generally, our view of fifth-century art is heavily influenced by Athens, not only because the literary sources are much richer and modern research has been much more active there than elsewhere, but also because of all Greek cities Athens had by far the greatest resources to invest in public monuments. This, however, explains primarily quantity, not quality. The question of whether classical art was essentially a

¹ All dates are B.C.E.

creation of democratic Athens prompts us to ask further in what sense it was – or was not – specifically Athenian and democratic.

Without going into details, it is obvious that all essential features of the new formal system – above all the distinction between active and nonactive parts of the human body demonstrating the potential activity of the figure, the austere faces signifying self-control and self-consciousness, the ideological simplicity of clothing and attitudes, and on the whole a new sense of time and space – were adopted immediately in all parts of the Greek and Greek-influenced world, from Xanthos to Motye, from Thessaly to Cyrene, in democratic as well as aristocratic or monarchic states.² The leading sculptors of the first generation were Onatas from Aigina, Hageladas from Argos, and Pythagoras from Samos, the latter working mostly in southern Italy. Pheidias of democratic Athens is not more ‘classical’ than Polykleitos from Argos, the first theorist of sculpture, originating from and working for Peloponnesian aristocracies that fostered athletic ideals. Hence the general language of classical art was not tied to specific political conditions. Differences of style certainly existed, depending on collective tastes of individual regions or poleis, or even the preferences of individuals, but these were minor variations. The general ‘revolution’ of the visual arts in the fifth century cannot be explained by the ‘miracle’ of Athenian democracy.³

Obviously, this ‘revolution’ is not merely an aesthetic phenomenon but part of a radical change of thought, mentality, and social values all over Greece.⁴ The rise of democracy has something to do with this change, although not in the sense of an immediate, straightforward, and exclusive interdependence of the two phenomena. Rather, *isonomia* (political equality) and democracy should be seen as particular aspects of this global change which, however, was far more encompassing than such political manifestations and affected aristocratic and monarchic societies as well.

In order to concentrate on Athens, then, I shall not ask whether and to what extent classical art as such was Athenian, democratic or imperial, but how classical art was used in democratic Athens, and whether in the use of art Athens’ specific conditions prompted specific differences from other cities.

² Ridgway 1970. Concepts of time and space: Kraemer 1931; Schweitzer 1969.188–99; Csapo & Miller 1999.

³ The most explicit declaration of this view, laden with ideological overtones, was the Washington and New York exhibition ‘The Greek Miracle’ of 1992, celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of Athenian democracy: see Buitron-Oliver 1992 and [Boedeker & Raaflaub 1999b].

⁴ Pollitt 1972; Hölscher 1989; Morris 1999.

POLITICAL MONUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION

The Athenians made intensive use of images to create and strengthen political and social identity. This function of images developed in principle on two levels. On one, public monuments created political identity; on another, objects of social life, especially equipment of symposia and religious rituals, presented in their images the society's ideal concepts and models. All this, however, was common practice in Greece. But within this framework there developed in Athens, on both levels, some characteristic features that were connected with the specific political and social conditions of this city.

Political monuments are not a new concern of classical archaeology.⁵ For more than a century, the iconography and historical circumstances of public monuments as well as their reconstruction have been investigated in Athens and elsewhere.⁶ Following an intermediate period of pure art history in the first two generations of this century, scholars began to 'rediscover' such monuments in the 1960s, paying special attention to their political and ideological messages and taking into account entire groups of public monuments, such as the votive monuments of the Persian Wars or historical paintings of the classical period.⁷ Categories of semiotics were employed moderately, for example, in analyzing the image of Athena Parthenos.⁸ The examination of votive practices of poleis, especially in the conflict between Athens and Sparta that resulted in a veritable war of monuments, offered better insight into the functions of political monuments.⁹ It represents a significant change of perspective, compared especially with the nineteenth century, that such monuments are not considered merely as material sources left from antiquity but as powerful factors in political conflicts. We should continue in this direction, asking even more comprehensively how monuments were used and how they worked in the reality of public life.

What, then, is the function and meaning of what we call a monument?¹⁰ To begin with, monuments are designed and erected as signs of power and superiority. As such, they are effective factors of public life: not secondary reflections, but primary objects and symbols of political actions and concepts. They may be disputed and even fought over,

⁵ See generally Stähler 1992, 1993. I am preparing a monograph on Greek political monuments.

⁶ See especially the contributions by French and other scholars on monuments of Delphi, uncovered since 1891.

⁷ Gauer 1968b; Hölscher 1973.

⁸ Fehr 1979–81.

⁹ Hölscher 1974, followed by Stewart 1990.89–92.

¹⁰ Generally on the notion of 'monument,' see Mai 1989.

pushed through against possible resistance, or destroyed by a successful opposition.

Monuments have their place in public space. They mark its public character, claiming it and unfolding their effect in it. They inevitably address the community and, precisely because of their public nature, challenge it, provoking consent or contradiction; they do not allow indifference because recognition automatically means acceptance. They represent the public power of certain persons or ideological concepts. They proclaim a public message and demand its general and collective approval. In this sense monuments represent and create ideological identity; in fact, they are the concrete expression of such identity, be it of a whole community or of groups or individuals within this community, and their destruction signifies the annihilation of that identity. Toward the outside, they fence off their community and turn aggressively against foreign or hostile communities.

The character of monuments is particularly subject to historical change. It is defined by the sector of social life within which a community develops its identity, be it religious, political, economic, cultural, or otherwise. This means that very different objects, such as temples, statues of political heroes, banks, libraries, or sports fields can become monuments of their respective communities.

For all these reasons, it is a fact of considerable historical significance that in Greece from around 500 political monuments became a characteristic feature of major cities and sanctuaries. The centers of public life were now occupied by symbols expressing political claims and by examples of political behavior for citizens to imitate. This suggests that these communities for the first time expressly and consciously developed a political identity – which is obviously connected with the fact that politics constituted a new sphere with its own standards, behavior patterns, and ideals.

FORERUNNERS AND EARLY FORMS OF POLITICAL MONUMENTS

Before the sixth century the Greeks apparently did not know political monuments in the strict sense of the word. Certainly, from the eighth and seventh centuries poleis and tyrants erected public buildings and dedicated votive offerings which all had or could assume a political character. Above all, great temples of polis deities and large areas used as agoras must have strengthened collective identity, as well as expressed it. But all these structures served primarily concrete public or religious functions; none of them had the main purpose of conveying a strictly

political message. Even the lavishly decorated treasuries at Delphi, the chest of Kypselos at Olympia, or the throne of Apollo Amyklaios at Sparta do not define explicitly the political identity of their dedicators; their themes remain within the sphere of panhellenic religion and myth, without referring to specific political claims, objectives, merits, or ideals, and thus without defining the specific identity of a polis.

A first step toward political self-representation seems to have been taken with the emergence of the *tropaion*.¹¹ From the late eighth century, successful or wealthy warriors after a military victory deposited their arms in one of the great sanctuaries as votive gifts.¹² But only from the middle of the sixth century, written sources inform us of *tropaia* erected on the battlefield by the victors to mark the place where they had put their enemies to flight. This probably corresponds to the actual development: trophies originated in the sixth century, not primarily as religious offerings to the gods by victorious warriors, but as a monumental, celebratory sign of victory set up collectively by the army on the place of its glorious success. An analogous measure, attested above all in post-Kleisthenic Athens, was the dedication of spectacular pieces of booty in great sanctuaries, resulting in veritable war monuments that referred to specific victories over specific enemies.¹³

At first, trophies, erected on wooden stumps, were obviously not meant for eternity. But as early as the middle of the fifth century, the ephemeral sign of victory changed to a lasting monument: parts of a column and a large ionic capital from about 450 were found on the battlefield of Marathon, presumably crowned by sculptural figures, perhaps a Nike group with a *tropaion*.¹⁴ This column seems to be the remains of a monument for the famous battle, erected probably under Kimon.

In the decades around 500 several Greek states erected at Delphi and elsewhere large statuary groups that show a new political character.¹⁵ A remarkable example is the monument of Phokis, dedicated around 490 after the famous victory over the Thessalians, and representing Apollo, the strategoi [generals] of the cavalry and infantry, the seer Tellias, and the epichoric heroes.¹⁶ This clearly was not only a votive offering to the god but also a proud self-representation of a victorious state, celebrating

¹¹ My view of the origin of the *tropaion* differs from most previous research: Charles-Picard 1957.17–64; Lammert 1939; Pritchett 1974.246–75. I will deal with this problem elsewhere.

¹² Snodgrass 1980.105–7; Pritchett 1979.240–95.

¹³ See below at nn. 34, 53ff.

¹⁴ Vanderpool 1966. A similar *tropaion* seems to have been erected after the battle of Salamis: Wallace 1969. See also West 1969.

¹⁵ On these monuments see Ioakimidou 1997.

¹⁶ Pausanias 10.1.10. Ioakimidou 1997. 135–43, no. 2.

a decisive political success. Similar monuments are known from cities as different as Tarentum, Phlious, and Apollonia in Epiros.¹⁷

A new wave of political monuments originated in the Persian Wars,¹⁸ representing many states with testimonies of their glorious deeds both in the panhellenic sanctuaries and in their own cities.

These observations reveal some basic aspects of the origins of political art in Greece. The sphere of politics detached itself more and more from other sectors, gaining increasing autonomy. Public monuments were erected deliberately to present famous achievements most effectively in public spaces. This reflects a society's efforts to develop its identity, decisively and in a very new way, in the public sphere. And such efforts, like the concept of equality appearing in burial customs,¹⁹ were common to states of very different geographical location and political order.

Athens, however, soon became the protagonist in this process. The collective identity of her citizens was concentrated first and most resolutely in the political sphere. The erection of political monuments was prompted by several experiences in different political domains, all enhancing the development of political identity: first, within the community and in opposition to tyranny, the identity of the 'isonomic' citizens; then, toward the outside, against the Persians, Athens' identity as the champion of the Greeks; finally, in part against the resistance of her allies, Athens' identity as the dominating force in the Delian League.

MONUMENTS OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

The history of Athenian political monuments begins with the statue group of the tyrant-slayers Harmodios and Aristogeiton (fig. 1).²⁰ This was the first truly political monument in Greece, without any religious function in the sense of cult or votive practice (the Tyrannicides' hero cult was celebrated at their tomb in the Kerameikos cemetery); it was set up in the Agora, in the center of political life, commemorating and celebrating the ideological founders of the new isonomic state. Familiar with the monuments of Washington, Garibaldi, or Bismarck that furnish our modern squares, we find it difficult to appreciate what an unprecedented act the erection of this one was: neither cult statues nor votive dedications to a deity nor sepulchral statues, they did not belong to any

¹⁷ Ioakimidou 1997.157-66, no. 8; 200-13, no. 12; 173-79, no. 10; 243-55, nos. 16-17.

¹⁸ Gauer 1968b.

¹⁹ See Morris 1999.

²⁰ Brunnsäker 1971; Fehr 1984; Taylor 1991; Boedeker 1999.



Figure 1 The tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Naples, Museo Nazionale Archeologico.

traditional category of sculptures. Their meaning is revealed by their placement on the edge of the orchestra, the meeting place of the citizens' Assembly before the construction of the Pnyx.²¹ There the tyrant-slayers

²¹ Timaios Sophistes, *Lexicon Platonicum*, s.v. orchestra. On the Pnyx, see Boedeker & Raaflaub 1999a, text at n. 47.

stood not only as praiseworthy heroes but above all as concrete examples of behavior for the citizens during the *ekklesia* [assembly] and the *ostrakismos* [vote for ostracism]. Its paraenetic character is particularly evident from the fact that this monument recognizes not a successful achievement but a political attitude. Since the citizens of isonomic Athens developed their identity in opposition to tyranny, Harmodios and Aristogeiton were supposed to encourage them to embrace the ideology of the Tyrannicides!

The setting of a monument is an integral part of its function; hence the location of the tyrant-slayers is a salient and innovative feature, to be explained by the specific situation of isonomic Athens. More precisely, this monument's historical significance is twofold. First, in politics, these images must have served the needs of citizens who, confronted with the new responsibility of taking decisions on their whole political order, may have felt insecure and helpless; lacking adequate preparation, they had to learn new behavior patterns – for which Harmodios and Aristogeiton, protagonists of the new order, provided helpful models. Second, as a testimony of historical structures, this monument appears as the most significant symbol of this very political order. For if it is correct that the state of Kleisthenes, creating a sphere of politics as an almost autonomous domain, was the first political system that did not grow slowly and more or less unconsciously from Archaic times but was constructed almost completely from scratch by a conscious intellectual act, then the setting of a visible symbol in the central public space appears as the clearest indication of this new political consciousness.

The equivalent of the tyrant-slayers on the level of myth was Theseus.²² His introduction into political art by the early isonomic state was well calculated: while the fame of Harmodios and Aristogeiton probably was mostly limited to Athens, monuments outside Attica evoked the glory of this widely known hero. Precisely in the first years after Kleisthenes a new sequence of Theseus' youthful deeds, equivalent to those of his great model Herakles, appears on Athenian vases (figs. 2a, 2b) and on the Athenian treasury at Delphi.²³ In the present context, two points should be stressed. First, while Herakles, the principal hero of Archaic Athens, represented the panhellenic ideals of the upper class,²⁴ Theseus was chosen as a patriotic hero. Second, this hero was less an aggressive warrior than a protagonist of the domestic order

²² Generally on Theseus in classical Athens: Schefold 1946; Connor 1970; Calame 1990; Castriota 1992, 33–63.

²³ Neils 1987.

²⁴ Here I differ from Boardman's interpretation (e.g., Boardman 1984). See my forthcoming book on representations of Greek myths.



Figures 2a, b Cycle of the deeds of Theseus. Red-figured kylix. London, British Museum.

which in those years seems to have been the main concern of Athenian self-confidence. It was only after the Persian Wars that Theseus changed into a protagonist against foreign aggressors. In the Theseion, the new center of Athenian imperial identity, he was depicted fighting against centaurs and Amazons, assuming a role he allegedly played also at

Marathon. A third painting, alluding to Athens' dominion of the sea, showed him recovering Minos' ring from his father Poseidon.²⁵

Later, under the full-grown democracy when the realm of political activities expanded greatly, there apparently emerged a need for models of broader significance, representing Athenian citizenship as such. This perhaps is the reason for the increasing frequency in vase painting of the Eponymous Heroes of the Athenian tribes.²⁶ Even in the Agora, the monument of the Tyrant-slayers was supplemented by a nearby statue group representing the Eponymous Heroes, probably erected under Perikles.²⁷ Like the tyrant-slayers, these statues did not have any religious function – the various tribes attended the cults of their heroes separately in their own districts of the city; rather, as a community of heroes on the Agora, they represented the citizen's community in its political subdivisions. In addition to the initial and individual act of tyrannicide, political identity was thus created by evoking collective consciousness of the polis' political organization. In this case too, in addition to its general significance, the monument served a special function. The pedestal of the Eponymous Heroes was used for putting up public announcements, such as lists of citizens liable to military service, initiatives for new laws, or court cases. The monument's shape fits this function well: a fence of stone beams was installed, certainly not only for the people's comfort while they were reading the announcements (as assumed by some scholars) but primarily to prevent tampering with those texts. In a city that had become far too big for oral transmission of such information, it must have been vital to have a central place for public announcements. It should be no sacrilege against classical art to assume that this was the main reason for erecting this monument: the heroes of the ten tribes stood there as the symbols of the community and its political order, sanctioning its public acts.

The force of collective egalitarianism in the fifth century is demonstrated above all by the disappearance of aristocratic grave sculptures which were so prominent in Archaic Athens. This striking change in burial customs seems to have been misinterpreted by those scholars who connect it with an alleged law, of Kleisthenes or his immediate successors, restricting funerary expenditure.²⁸ From Cicero we know only of a law 'some time after Solon,'²⁹ and its content is not easily understood as a reference to sculptured grave markers. More importantly, the end

²⁵ Thompson & Wycherley 1972.124–26.

²⁶ Kron 1976.

²⁷ Shear 1970; see Hölscher 1969; Thompson & Wycherley 1972.38–41; Kron 1976.282–332; Ioakimidou 1997.

²⁸ See Eckstein 1958; Richter 1961.38–39, 53; Zinserling 1965; Stupperich 1977.71–86; Clairmont 1983; Garland 1989; I. Morris 1992.128–55.

²⁹ Cicero, *De legibus* 2.64–65.

of sepulchral sculpture in Attica did not come abruptly, as we should expect in the case of legislation, but gradually: after large numbers of kouroi and stelai on tombs of the late sixth century, scattered latecomers occur until ca. 490–480³⁰ which can be explained only as a result of collective self-restriction. If so, the importance of the phenomenon becomes even clearer: the end of proud self-assertion on the part of the elite was caused not by a political law, possibly proposed by a particular political group, but by general social self-control.³¹

As a further consequence, this process encouraged the creation of new political spaces.³² The new Boule of the 500 was given a new Bouleuterion, perhaps the first example of a type that was to become very successful, and, above all, although perhaps somewhat later, the *ekklesia* was transferred to a new meeting place on the Pnyx. Even topographically, the domain of politics now occupied a space of its own.

MONUMENTS OF THE PERSIAN WARS

In the long run the ideology of *isonomia* and democracy seems to have been an insufficient base for the patriotic self-confidence and political identity of normal Athenian citizens. Not much democracy is visible in Athenian state monuments of the fifth century. The principal idea of the new political order was equality – an ideal that was not easy to swallow for a society as competitive as the elite of Archaic Greece, especially if this meant including the demos. The ‘agonale Mensch’ [‘competitive man’] of Jakob Burckhardt was not well equipped mentally for the egalitarian demands of the new epoch. Therefore, if the citizens had to be equal, at least their state had to be superior to others. Moreover, by strengthening patriotic feelings and turning energies against outside rivals and enemies, interior tensions could be overcome more easily. This seems to be the reason why in Athens, as in other cities, most political monuments celebrate military victories. Obviously this corresponded to the mentality of the majority of Athenian citizens. Some of them might have thought that democracy was the essential basis for such successes, but the glorious results overshadowed this basic structure.

Already the young state of Kleisthenes founded its self-confidence upon a famous military victory over the united forces of Chalkis and Boeotia in 506, celebrating it with a conspicuous votive offering on the

³⁰ E.g., Kouros Kerameikos: Knigge 1983. Women’s stele Athens: Richter 1961.55–56, fig. 174. Significantly, various scholars have interpreted these and other late specimens as votive offerings.

³¹ See I. Morris 1992, who draws a broad picture of self-restraint in burial customs all over Greece from around 500 and proposes an interesting model of interpretation.

³² See Hölscher 1991.370–72; 1996.



Figure 3 Political monuments of the Athenian Akropolis. Athena Promachos and (background right) victory-quadriga from Chalkis and Boeotia. After G. P. Stevens, *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 494, fig. 44.

Akropolis.³³ This dedication, displaying the chains of the prisoners of war together with a bronze four-horse chariot and a celebratory epigram (fig. 3), was much more than a traditional act of gratitude toward the city's goddess; it was also a spectacular self-assertion of the dedicators. So, contemporaneously with the beginnings of political monuments, votive gifts in the great sanctuaries could assume the character of explicit political manifestations.³⁴

The great moment of new political self-confidence and identity were of course the wars against the Persians. The problem that immediately arose in this situation was the emergence of two partly conflicting identities: a panhellenic identity, opposed to the barbarians, and a polis identity, competing with other Greek states. The erection of monuments reflected this development and was part of the process itself.³⁵

³³ Herodotus 5.77; Pausanias 1.28.2; Raubitschek 1949.191–94, no. 168; 201–5, no. 173. See also Boedeker 1999.

³⁴ In the early fourth century, an inscription in Olympia stresses that a gilded statue of Gorgias was set up in Delphi not for the glory of the famous orator but to honor the god: Fränkel 1877.43–47. If the personal and nonreligious aspect of this votive offering needed to be rejected so forcefully, it must have been rather widespread.

³⁵ Gauer 1968b.

It is striking how systematic the practice of erecting political monuments became soon after its introduction. Panhellenic solidarity of course had to be demonstrated in places of shared significance. The great monuments of the anti-Persian alliance were thus set up in the three great panhellenic sanctuaries: after the battle of Salamis a statue of Apollo with a ship's acroterion at Delphi, after Plataea the tripod on the serpents' column in the same sanctuary, a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia, and a statue of Poseidon at the Isthmos.³⁶ Individual cities, however, chose two different and even opposite places to manifest political identity. Within their own polis they sought to strengthen the patriotic feelings of their citizens; places to set up such monuments were the Agora and the city's main sanctuary. Toward the outside they had to compete with other cities, and since competition presupposes a common place as well as a common public, such monuments were almost all set up in the same panhellenic center, at Delphi. In several cases, this bipolar structure of political representation resulted in double monuments erected at the same time at home and on the stage of panhellenic competition: around 480 the Phokians set up two monuments representing the struggle of Apollo and Herakles over the tripod, one at Delphi, the other in their own sanctuary at Abai;³⁷ two decades later, the Argives celebrated their victory near Oinoe, together with Athens over Sparta, with large sculptural groups of the Seven against Thebes and the Epigonoi, both at Delphi and in their Agora.³⁸

Again, Athens soon became the protagonist in these practices. At home, three public spaces developed into a panorama of glorious military achievements: the Akropolis, the Agora, and the state cemetery of the Kerameikos, i.e., the public spaces of gods, citizens, and the dead.³⁹ No other polis created so systematically an ideological topography of its political identity, based on the memory of its glorious achievements, almost a public monumental physiognomy directed both toward her own citizens and foreign visitors.

In the Agora, monuments were erected for various battles against the Persians.⁴⁰ Some of their epigrams have been preserved, both in literature and on fragments of their pedestals. What the monuments themselves looked like remains obscure; perhaps they consisted of stelai with names of fallen warriors. This would accord with a stele erected in the

³⁶ Gauer 1968b.71-72, 75-98.

³⁷ Herodotus 8.27; Pausanias 10.13.7; Ioakimidou 1997. 143-48, nos. 3-4.

³⁸ Pausanias 2.20.5; 10.10.3-4. For the Delphic monument, see Bommelaer & Laroche 1991.113-14, no. 112; Ioakimidou 1997.226-42, nos. 14-15. For Argos: Pariente 1992.195-98.

³⁹ I am planning a separate study on this system of public spaces.

⁴⁰ ML no. 26 (pp. 54-57); Matthaïou 1988; Barron 1990.



Figure 4 The 'Eion Herms.' Red-figured pelike. Paris, Musée du Louvre.

Agora of Samos after the battle of Lade in 494, containing the names of those who had fought against the Persians.⁴¹

Better known are the three herms erected after the capture of Eion in 476 for Kimon and the other strategoi, a particularly conspicuous monument (fig. 4).⁴² Its character was both religious and political, as in other cases in this early phase of political monuments: the pillar form followed the Archaic tradition of images of Hermes, while three famous epigrams proclaimed that the Athenians had erected these herms as a political honor to their victorious citizens and generals, and that this monument was intended to inspire the Athenians to endure the hardships of war for the common cause.

⁴¹ Herodotus 6.14.

⁴² Wycherley 1957, nos. 301, 304, 309; Thompson & Wycherley 1972.94–96; see La Genière 1960.

These herms were placed in the northwestern corner of the Agora, together with many other, in part older, images of that type, which gave the area the name of 'The Herms.' This placement offers a key to understanding the significance of the herms.⁴³ It has been rightly assumed that before the Persian Wars the city wall ran just north of the Agora; hence in Archaic times the most important gateway, the predecessor of the Dipylon and the Sacred Gates, must have been located precisely beyond this northwestern corner.⁴⁴ Set up on the borderline between inside and outside, the herms of the Agora therefore protected the community's public space, initially perhaps the whole area of the city, later the political center. This explains how they could become honorary monuments of military victories. It was their old religious function of protection that was now turned in a political sense against a specific external enemy: the Persians were to be expelled concretely and symbolically from Athens' public space.

Later monuments in the Agora prove that the Persian Wars were instrumental in enhancing political and patriotic identity. Three phenomena seem essential here. First, the achievements and glory of contemporary politics were emphasized more and more openly in such monuments. The best example is the famous 'Painted Stoa' (Stoa Poikile), erected around 460 by the circle of Kimon and adorned with a great cycle of paintings that combined two great deeds of mythical ancestors with two contemporary Athenian victories: the expulsion of the Amazons by Theseus' Athenians, the fall of Troy with considerable participation of an Athenian contingent, the triumph of Marathon under the leadership of Kimon's father Miltiades, and a battle near Oinoe, where Athens had recently won her first spectacular victory over Sparta.⁴⁵

Second, a new aspect is introduced into political self-representation by the fact that the celebration of the Persian Wars was not confined to the aftermath of the event itself but continued in the Stoa Poikile several decades later. Other Greek states praised their contributions against the 'barbarians' in monuments immediately after those battles – but Athens continued this habit over the next generations, thereby creating a sort of historical physiognomy of the city that demonstrated her superiority over her rivals. This attitude resulted from an unparalleled need of legitimation for permanent hegemony; not accidentally, the only possible candidate for a similar perpetuation of the Persian War glory is Sparta.⁴⁶

⁴³ Harrison 1965.108–17.

⁴⁴ Travlos 1960.40–42; Lauter-Bufé & Lauter 1975.

⁴⁵ Hölscher 1973.50–84; see a forthcoming article by F. De Angelis.

⁴⁶ See below at n. 91.

Third, accordingly, these achievements of the recent past became worthy of memory and took on a dimension of glory comparable to the great deeds of the heroes of myth, as the cycle of paintings in the Stoa Poikile illustrates. This shows a new kind of self-confidence of the present in comparison with the overwhelming mythical past.⁴⁷ The discovery of history in classical Greece is a discovery not of the past but the present. A similar sequence of Athenian glorious accomplishments from mythical times to the present day was created in the funeral orations at the state burials in the Kerameikos. Other cities too used their patriotic myths for present-day political aims, but none of them, as far as we know, perhaps again with the exception of Sparta, developed its political identity so decisively as an ideological system of myth, history, and actuality.

This systematic character of patriotic myths is even more evident in two other monuments that were placed not in the Agora but in the second area of political self-representation: on the Akropolis. Already in the 450s the shield of the colossal Athena 'Promachos' showed a mythological scene, the battle of Theseus and the Lapiths against the centaurs.⁴⁸ Soon afterward the Parthenon was decorated with a comprehensive mythological apparatus, containing the four great myths of Greek self-defense against foreign enemies: giants, centaurs, Amazons, and Troy.⁴⁹ The traditional interpretation of these myths sees them as predecessors and metaphors of the Persian Wars. But, without opposing this view, I sense that this program has a much broader meaning: it represents a range of polar oppositions and threats to the Greek way of life that were repelled by Greek, especially Athenian, heroes: blasphemous giants, brutal semimonsters, aggressive females, and Orientals as hybrid cultural antipodes.

Taken together, these myths constitute a manifold, almost complete panorama that defines Greek identity against various opposite worlds. This corresponds to a basic structure of Greek thought that defines values in polar oppositions: kosmos versus chaos, humankind versus animals, men versus women, Greece versus Orient, culture versus primitiveness, self-control versus *hybris* and brutality, freedom versus slavery.⁵⁰ These myths therefore are more than mirrors or metaphors of the Persian Wars: they constitute a cosmic-historical panorama within which these wars receive their interpretation and significance. In developing and using

⁴⁷ See also Boedeker 1999.

⁴⁸ Niemeyer 1960.76–86; Gauer 1968b.102–5; Höcker & Schneider 1993.58–60. The name 'Promachos' is uncertain for the fifth century; see Harrison 1996.

⁴⁹ Thomas 1976; Knell 1990.95–108; Castriota 1992.134–83. See my forthcoming book on representations of myths.

⁵⁰ See Cartledge 1993.

paradigmatic myths in such a global system, Athens probably again was unique.

The Parthenon, of course, covers a much broader range of themes, constituting the most systematic program of Athenian self-presentation, including, besides the defeat of hostile forces, the evocation of the city's own patriotic traditions. Significantly, even in this most complex symbol of Periklean Athens not much stress is placed on democratic values. The pediments show the religious and mythical traditions of the city: the birth of Athena and her contest with Poseidon for Attica, surrounded by local divinities and heroes; and the frieze selectively represents the community of citizens in the Panathenaic procession, with the majority of the participants being noble young men in the functions of horsemen and charioteers.⁵¹ Democracy seems to be more an implicit condition than an explicit theme of Athenian self-confidence.

The third area that developed into a monument of historical self-representation was the state cemetery in the Kerameikos. Beside extensive areas of family graves, from the fifth century a separate political cemetery was reserved for public burials⁵² – another symbol that politics had become a domain of its own, an autonomous space in a concrete as well as metaphorical sense. In the course of time the collective graves of the fallen warriors with their lists of names and relief decorations formed a sequence of achievements from the past down to the present, another historical physiognomy, a façade of glory in front of the main entrance to the city.

All three public spaces where the citizens came together for their most important common concerns – in the Agora for political decisions with their fellow citizens, on the Akropolis for religious rites with their goddess, and in the Kerameikos for collective burials with their dead – were adorned with and defined by monuments that were supposed to foster a strong political and patriotic identity in all those who participated in these public manifestations.

At Delphi Athens expressed no less systematically her ambitions toward the other Greek poleis. After Salamis the Athenians built there a wonderful stoa to exhibit the captured ropes of Xerxes' bridge over the Hellespont.⁵³ After the foundation of the Delian League, they erected a striking monument celebrating the battle of Eurymedon: a bronze palm tree with gilded fruits and a gilded palladion on top.⁵⁴ A

⁵¹ Boardman 1985; Knell 1990.108–26; cf. Maurizio 1999.

⁵² Stupperich 1977.4–70; Clairmont 1983.

⁵³ Amandry 1953.33–121.

⁵⁴ Amandry 1954; Gauer 1968b.105–7; Stähler 1989. See the red-figure skyphos, Lambrinudakis et al. 1984, no. 352: Apollo seated on palm tree.

third Athenian monument at Delphi, right at the entrance of the sanctuary, was even more ambitious. Supposedly made from the booty, it glorified the battle of Marathon, representing the commander Miltiades with Apollo and Athena, the heroes of the ten Attic tribes, and three other Attic heroes, Theseus, Kodros, and supposedly Philaios, the ancestor of Miltiades.⁵⁵ In such cases there is almost no difference between a religious votive offering and a political monument. The message of the Athenian votive group in Delphi does not differ fundamentally from that of the Marathon painting on the Athenian Agora or the statues of the Eponymous Heroes in the same place.

As for the impact of such monuments on the Athenian public, the epigrams of the Eion Herms proclaimed the aim to inspire the Athenians, now and in the future, to endure the hardships of war for the common good. The same exemplary character is obvious in the tyrant-slayers' images. This must have been a feature of most political monuments.

On the other hand, such monuments must have been rather challenging for visitors to the Agora.⁵⁶ Public images of contemporary fellow citizens were considered an extraordinary honor and looked at with great suspicion. This attitude, which originated in the egalitarian ideology of democracy, is well attested for the fourth century but certainly goes back to the early times of Athenian *isonomia*. The celebratory representation of Miltiades in the Marathon painting is said, although in a later source, to have caused debate and alternative proposals in the Assembly,⁵⁷ and Plutarch reports that the proposed award of an honorary wreath to Miltiades was rejected with the argument that the battle had been won by all Athenians.⁵⁸ The Eion Herms were praised in the fourth century as examples of good political practice because they celebrated all ten strategoi without naming any of them.⁵⁹ And the Tyrannicides, considered the first honorary images set up to contemporaries, were succeeded only in the early fourth century by those of Konon and other politicians.⁶⁰ Even then, there existed a law prohibiting honorary statues near these founding heroes of democracy,⁶¹ and a series of rules established a clear hierarchy of such honors.⁶² Such rules, supervised by the Assembly, indicate the criteria by which people judged these monuments when visiting the Agora.

⁵⁵ Gauer 1968b.56–70; Kron 1976.215–27.

⁵⁶ See, in general, Gauer 1968a.

⁵⁷ Aischines, *Ktesiphon* 186; Hölscher 1973.55–56.

⁵⁸ Plutarch, *Kimón* 8; cf. Herodotus 8.125.

⁵⁹ Demosthenes, *Leptines* 112; Aischines, *Ktesiphon* 183–85.

⁶⁰ Demosthenes, *Leptines* 70; schol. on Demosthenes, *Meidias* 62.

⁶¹ *IG II²* 450.b7–12; 646.37–40; 1039.39; Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 852e.

⁶² Wycherley 1957.207–17.

Unfortunately, much less is known about the impact of political monuments in panhellenic centers like Delphi. The concentration of most monuments along the sacred way made them conspicuous not only to common visitors but especially to the official delegations of poleis from the whole Greek world who certainly made known in their cities the 'messages' they perceived. Public control will have watched suspiciously even votive offerings in those sanctuaries; this may explain why the Pythia forbade Themistokles to dedicate Persian spoils at Delphi.⁶³

The Athenian monuments for the Persian Wars testified first and foremost, although implicitly, to Athens' claim to superiority in Greece. This is why in the Stoa Poikile the glorious representation of Marathon was complemented by the Oinoe painting, celebrating a victory over Sparta. Soon such monuments would announce this claim, in surprisingly explicit forms, also to the allies in the Delian League.

MONUMENTS CONCERNING THE DELIAN LEAGUE

The first aggressive monument of Periklean policy against Athens' allies was the statue of Athena Lemnia, celebrating the institution of cleruchies (Athenian settlements on confiscated territory) after the departure of new settlers to the island of Lemnos around 450 (fig. 5).⁶⁴ This was much more than an ordinary votive offering after a successful undertaking; it was a political monument of considerable ambition, larger than life size and executed by the famous Pheidias. Although apparently dedicated by the clerouchs themselves, it was surely not financed by the poor emigrants but by the Athenian state, quite probably at the instigation of Perikles himself.

This highly important monument was placed in an equally important position, at the entrance to the Akropolis, within the Propylaea, to the left. Later the connection with Perikles was stressed by setting up his portrait statue next to it. In the early 440s, at the very time when Perikles proposed the project of a panhellenic congress to discuss the rebuilding of the sanctuaries destroyed by the Persians,⁶⁵ the statue of Athena Lemnia as protectress of his imperialistic policy also marked his new emphasis on the Akropolis and the start of his building program to embellish the sanctuary.

At the same time, outside the Akropolis he gave another signal of his building plans, through the statue of Hermes Propylaios, created by

⁶³ Pausanias 10.14.5-6.

⁶⁴ Furtwängler 1893.4-43. Hartswick 1983 doubts the identification; Protzmann 1984 contests it. Location: Hölscher 1975.192-93; Höcker & Schneider 1993.99-104.

⁶⁵ If Plutarch, *Perikles* 17 is authentic: see Stadter 1989.201-4.



Figure 5 Athena Lemnia. Dresden, Staatliche Kunstsammlungen.



Figure 6 Hermes Propylaios of Alkamenes. Munich, Glyptothek.

Alkamenes (fig. 6).⁶⁶ Rightly dated to the 440s, it must originally have been made for the Old Propylaia.

Hermes Propylaios and Athena Lemnia marked the occupation of the Akropolis by Perikles: Hermes outside defining the religious sphere,

⁶⁶ Identification and date in the 440s: Willers 1967.

Athena inside emphasizing its political character and making clear that the building program was inseparably connected with Athens' domination of the Delian League. The representatives of the allies, who had to come to Athens every fourth year to participate in the celebration of the Panathenaia, entered the Akropolis under the eyes of this Athena. Surely they will have reported to their fellow citizens how openly Athens proclaimed her imperialist ambitions.

Soon afterward an allied state documented its suppression by Athens with a monument on its own territory. In the Heraion of Samos the most important votive monument of the fifth century was a group by Myron, showing Herakles' introduction into Olympus.⁶⁷ The curved pedestal supported three over-life-size figures: Zeus standing in the middle, Athena on one side, both turning to Herakles coming from the other. The group has been interpreted convincingly as a monument celebrating Athens' victory over the Samian revolt in 440, commissioned probably not by Athens, for it was not usual to dedicate monuments in the sanctuaries of other cities, but by the pro-Athenian party of Samos which thereby openly proclaimed its political allegiance. In this monument the Samian Hera did not appear at all but the goddess of Athens played a prominent role: its message was unmistakable.

Other cities avoided open conflict with Athens. At Ephesos, in the sanctuary of Artemis, a monument was erected in these same years, the early 430s, perhaps as a direct answer to the statuary group in neighboring Samos: the famous Amazons, made by Polykleitos, Pheidias, Kresilas, and some other sculptor(s) (fig. 7).⁶⁸ These Amazons did not represent dreadful oriental enemies, as in Athens, but highly venerable figures, symbolizing the city's own traditions and identity.⁶⁹ Having found asylum in Ephesos, they testified to the age and the protective force of the sanctuary of Artemis. The date of the sculptural group has tentatively been connected with the dedication of the temple, 120 years after its foundation.⁷⁰ However this may be, the Ephesian and Samian monuments, dedicated around the same time, reflect two possible political attitudes toward Athens. While the Samian group expresses submission, the Ephesian Amazons represent an act of self-assertion against overpowering Athens: the Ephesians claimed to possess a sanctuary with

⁶⁷ Buschor 1953; Berger 1969.

⁶⁸ Despite endless discussions on the Ephesian Amazons, little useful research exists on their historical significance. Exceptions: Gauer 1980, 1992; Höcker & Schneider 1993.104-10; Schmaltz 1995. See work in preparation by R. Bol; Hölscher 2000a.

⁶⁹ Gauer 1980, 1992 sees the Amazon group as a monument of Athens or the Delian League, based on the Athenian view of the Amazons as paradigmatic enemies. According to the Ephesian version, however, the Amazons played a positive role in the Artemision.

⁷⁰ Devambez 1976.272.



Figure 7 The Ephesian Amazons: 'Amazon Mattei': Rome, Museo Capitolino; 'Amazon Sciarra': Berlin, Staatliche Museen; 'Amazon Sosikles': Rome, Museo Capitolino.

a myth at least as old and venerable as that with which arrogant Athens dominated the scene. They even challenged Athens, where artists from all over Greece were attracted by the allies' money that financed Perikles' buildings,⁷¹ by inviting to Ephesos the most famous sculptors of the age: not only Pheidias from Athens but also his great rival Polykleitos. So at least once the Ephesians demonstrated that Athens, acting as the center of the world, was not that unique!

Even this impressive monument, however, could not really compete with Athens, where the most ambitious temple project since Archaic times, the Parthenon, was almost complete, and the unprecedented chryselephantine statue of Athena Parthenos was dedicated in 438. A year later, the rebuilding of the entrance of the Akropolis was initiated with the new Propylaia of Mnesikles, followed by the temple of Athena Nike, the figural decoration of which reflects the atmosphere of the

⁷¹ See Kallet 1999.

great victories of the middle 420s.⁷² Proof that this temple was planned together with the Propylaia has at last freed us from the old controversy about its initiators. The building indeed was part of Perikles' program, and even if the figural decorations were created only after his death they could not stand in complete opposition to the original concept.⁷³

The Nike temple's decoration follows but extends the program of the Parthenon. The eastern pediment showed the fight between the gods and the giants, the western pediment another mythical battle, perhaps against the Amazons.⁷⁴ In any case, these must have been selections from the myths of the Parthenon that recorded the victories of the Greek, especially the Athenian, kosmos over threatening enemies. The middle acroterion on the roof, known from an inscription, represented the fight of Bellerophon against the Chimaira.⁷⁵ This too is a Greek hero's victory over a dangerous foreign monster, emphasizing again, though with a different accentuation, the classical confrontation between Greek ideals and the menace from opposite, outside forces.

The friezes illustrate historical themes:⁷⁶ on the south side fights against the Persians, probably not a specific battle but the Persian Wars as a whole; on the western and northern sides Athens' fights against contemporary Greek enemies in the decades after the Persian Wars, perhaps differentiated between Peloponnesians and central Greeks. The themes of the Parthenon were thus taken up but continued into recent historical times, creating a mythical-historical sequence as in the cycle of the Stoa Poikile and in the funeral orations. In allegorical form, the same theme is developed on the parapet.⁷⁷ Relief decoration, turned toward the outside, facing the city, repeated the same motives on all three major sides: Athena seated on a rock, surrounded by Nikai celebrating victories (figs. 8a, 8b). The Nikai are setting up *tropaia*, decorating them with Greek and oriental armor; they glorify victories against the Persians as well as against Greek enemies, as represented in the fighting scenes on the friezes; other Nikai are sacrificing bulls – according to one recent interpretation, at the festival of the *Oschophoria*; in my own opinion, more likely in an *ad hoc* victory celebration, typical after successful battles. This crowd of attractive girls celebrating victories seems to illustrate most suggestively the high spirits prevailing in Athens in these years.

⁷² Sanctuary: Mark 1993. Sculptural decoration: Simon 1985, 1985/86; Stewart 1985; and Hölscher 2000b.

⁷³ This has been demonstrated, I hope definitively, by Mark 1993.115–22, 140.

⁷⁴ Despina 1974.

⁷⁷ Simon 1985.280–86; 1985/86.21–27; Stewart 1985.



Figure 8a Nikai with bull. Parapet of the temple of Athena Nike in Athens. Athens, Acropolis Museum.

An important point in this context is picture-language. These are not realistic scenes of a sacrifice, not only because it is executed by divine girls but also because the erection of *tropaia* and the offering of sacrifices could not have taken place at the same time. Nevertheless, they are drawn together effectively in this composition, just as the multiplication of the *Nikai* represents the great number of Athenian victories. Similarly, on a contemporary vase a victorious musician is surrounded by four *Nikai* who, according to their inscriptions, indicate his successes in various competitions.⁷⁸ Art has here created a new ‘conceptual’ picture-language for celebratory messages of which there are further examples in this period: personifications of *poleis* and other political entities, and of abstract political notions; allegorical motives, such as handshakes between deities representing treaties between specific *poleis*; or state deities conferring honorary crowns to men of merit.⁷⁹ The emergence of such a political picture-language with special iconographic motifs and a

⁷⁸ Goulaki-Voutira et al. 1992, no. 352.

⁷⁹ Especially on documentary reliefs: Kasper-Butz 1990.59–65, 115–29.



Figure 8b Nike decorating a tropaion. Parapet of the temple of Athena Nike in Athens. Athens, Akropolis museum.

specific compositional syntax is closely related to the creation of political monuments in this period. An architectural equivalent to this ideological ‘hymn to Athenian superiority’ is the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the Agora, built in these same years and pronouncing the claim of

‘liberty’ in the center of the ‘freest of all Greek cities’ – with a similar whirling Nike on the roof.⁸⁰

On the Nike parapet elements of this picture-language are adopted for the most euphoric victory celebration in classical Greek art. Here we sense almost physically the effusive atmosphere and the enthusiastic optimism that so often dominated politics in Athens. Moreover, this euphoric state of mind seems to have been infectious. We find the same high-spirited style in a contemporary monument, the famous Nike on an eagle, on top of a 9 m-high pillar, set up in Olympia by Athenian allies, the Messenians and Naupaktians, to celebrate the victory over Sparta near Spakteria in 425 (fig. 9).⁸¹

All this originated in but was not bound to Athenian conditions. After the Peloponnesian War victorious Sparta gave a harsh response to the monuments of the defeated Delian League. At Sparta, the commander Lysander dedicated two Nikai on eagles, thus outdoing the monument at Olympia;⁸² at Amyklai, among other votive offerings a tripod was erected that was supported by a figure of Sparta, thus making use of the new picture-language of state personifications;⁸³ and at Delphi, Lysander surpassed the Athenian *ex-voto* representing Miltiades between Apollo, Athena, and Athenian heroes by a much larger monument showing himself between the gods and heroes of Sparta, accompanied by twenty-eight commanders of the allied fleet.⁸⁴

In Athens the soldiers of the allied Spartan army who had fallen in 403 against Thrasybulos were even buried in the state cemetery of the Kerameikos, the heart of Athenian patriotism. No wonder that Thrasybulos, after recovering from this defeat, reacted by erecting a huge trophy beside this document of Athens’ humiliation.⁸⁵

VASE PAINTING

Beside the public sphere of political monuments with their explicit messages there was, at least equally important, the whole sphere of social, religious, moral, and mental values and attitudes. The richest source – and far from sufficiently exploited – among the visual arts for such phenomena is vase painting: preserved in tens of thousands of specimens and therefore accessible by statistical methods, it offers an incomparable

⁸⁰ Raaflaub 1984.68–72; 1985.244–48.

⁸¹ Hölscher 1974.

⁸² Pausanias 3.17.4.

⁸³ Pausanias 3.18.8.

⁸⁴ Pausanias 10.9.7–11; Bommelaer 1971; Bommelaer & Laroche 1991.108–10, no. 109; Ioakimidou 1997.

⁸⁵ Willemsen 1977; Lysias, *Epitaphios* 63.



Figure 9 The Nike of the Messenians and Naupactians. Olympia Museum.

repertoire of themes and is rather precisely datable. A systematic investigation of Athenian vases could result in a complex history of Athenian social mentality, as it developed from decade to decade. In accordance with their functions, Athenian vases were not a medium for political

messages but emphasized more personal themes. Yet they mirror not only individual interests of vase painters and the purchasers of their products but also the themes of social discourse during the important occasions when they were used, especially the symposium.

Vases with figural representations cover a much wider range of themes than public monuments, and are of a different character. This becomes particularly evident when vase painting chooses the same subjects as monumental art. Systematic investigations of this phenomenon are almost completely lacking, but some examples may demonstrate the nature of this discourse within the private sphere.⁸⁶

The experience of the Persian Wars prompted various reactions that were expressed on different occasions, and therefore in different kinds of works of art. While Aeschylus emphasized in his *Persians* the religious and moral aspects of this conflict, and the mural painting in the Stoa Poikile praised the exemplary bravery of the Athenians and their protagonists, vases show more personal attitudes.⁸⁷ Beside heroic encounters, there appear extremely negative depictions, the most disgusting on an oinochoe where a Greek with an erect penis, held in his hand like a pistol, approaches a man in oriental costume who offers himself for the sexual act.⁸⁸ Such scenes did not occur in dramatic performances nor in public monuments, but we can imagine that people who had appreciated the 'official' view in the theater and on the Agora could make quite different statements in the evening during the symposium. Mentalities change according to occasions.

Different attitudes are also reflected in myths. The painting of the fall of Troy in the Stoa Poikile stressed the moral implications of the victory of Greeks over mythical Orientals, while the Vivenzio hydria, painted immediately after the sack of Athens in 480, evidently expresses compassion with the conquered city through its mourning women (fig. 10).⁸⁹ And while on public monuments the Persians for centuries remained the exemplary enemies of the Greeks, vase paintings of real and mythical Persians show a radical change of attitude from an extremely negative to an almost utopian image of otherness in the late fifth century.⁹⁰

In this sense painted vases were, beyond the realm of politics, an effective medium of a discourse on complex themes of collective relevance. However, although produced for a long time exclusively in Athens, they are not exclusively Athenian phenomena, for they were traded and

⁸⁶ See also Shapiro 1999.

⁸⁷ Hölscher 1973.38–49; Raeck 1981.101–61.

⁸⁸ Schauenburg 1975.

⁸⁹ Simon & Hirmer 1976 (1981).105–6, pls. 128–29. Such compassion was also expressed in tragedy.

⁹⁰ Hölscher 1989.18–20; see Miller 1997.



Figure 10 Iliupersis. Red-figured hydria of the Kleophrades-Painter. Naples, Museo Nazionale Archeologico.

appreciated all over the ancient world, especially by the Etruscans with their very different political and social structure. Even so, it was certainly not by chance that this lively discourse of images originated in Athens.

CONCLUSION

Was all the art discussed in this chapter specifically Athenian, imperial or democratic? And if so, in what sense? The answer depends on whether we focus on Athens and its monuments or on political art as such.

Political monuments were confined neither to Athens nor to isonomic or democratic states at all. Political identity, the general theme of such monuments, was expressed from the early fifth century by states with various constitutions. They followed in principle the same practices and spoke the same language.

The phenomenon of political monuments is closely connected with basic features and attitudes of classical art, culture, and mentality. I can sketch this here only with some short remarks. Explicit identity was an important new concern of this epoch. It appears on various levels: as individual identity in realistic portraits as well as personal behavior, e.g.,

of Themistokles who 'always wanted to behave in his own way';⁹¹ as polis identity in public monuments; as Hellenic identity against the 'barbarians' in many manifestations, both iconic and literary.

All this goes together with the basic feature of classical sculpture: the contraposition of active versus nonactive parts of the human body, indicating a change of the entire 'system' and the whole concept of man and nature; it aimed primarily at showing explicitly the body's own forces, especially a figure's ability to stand upright and move by its own energy, and implied connotations like self-determination and responsibility. At the basis of this attitude stood the radically new mentality expressed by Xenophanes:⁹² not the gods have given all things to men, but men themselves have found everything in the course of time. Although at first sight such phenomena seem to go well together with democracy, they are attested in states of very different character. It was a broad change of cultural patterns that formed the basis of the Athenian development toward democracy but was not bound to these specific political tendencies and ultimately affected all kinds of society in Greece.

Within this general frame, Athens was a special case. Political monuments, secular as well as religious, were used here in an explicit and systematic way to create political identity. This practice is attested from the beginning of the Kleisthenic order and is essentially connected with it. Some monuments, above all the group of the tyrant-slayers, stress the values of *isonomia* and democracy and show to what extent politics had become the focus of the citizen community.

Yet such monuments are remarkably rare. Much more emphasis is given to Athens' glory in the Persian Wars and its predominance in Greece. Political mythology too concentrates on these themes. The Athenians' collective identity was composed of various elements. Among these, *isonomia*, with its egalitarian demands, was of course an indispensable basis of the citizens' political role and thus of civic identity, but it was a concept of potential rights, of necessary conditions, more than of positive achievements. In the foreground of Athenian pride and self-assertion stood those concrete heroic accomplishments in war that accorded so well with the traditional agonistic values. Since the principal aim of political monuments was to ensure the identification of the citizens not with the underlying principles but with the most acknowledged aspects of their state, military superiority as guarantor of public and private prosperity proved more attractive.

⁹¹ Plutarch, *Themistokles* 18. On the origins of Greek portraits, see Metzler 1971; Hölscher 1973.207–11; Himmelmann 1994.49–88.

⁹² Xenophanes, fr. B18 DK. See Meier 1980.435–99 (1990b.186–221); Hölscher 1974.88–111.

Most elements of political art, iconographic motifs as well as components of picture-language, are not exclusively Athenian. But in many respects Athens appears to have played a leading part. Political monuments in the public space of an agora are known from various sites, but the Athenian tyrant-slayers are apparently the first and certainly the most programmatic example. Monumental victory memorials made from war booty were dedicated in sanctuaries by various states, but none as spectacular and specifically commemorative as the Athenian dedications from Chalkis on the Akropolis and from the Persians at Delphi. From the Archaic period, many cities connected myths and contemporary history to express political claims, but fifth-century Athens used this combination to create particularly complex and global concepts. Public spaces were laid out and differentiated everywhere in Greece from the origin of poleis, but democratic Athens created a particularly complex public topography. State burials were conferred to single persons in various poleis, but the concentration of collective and individual graves in the Athenian state cemetery, forming a façade of glory, a historical physiognomy of the city, at its main entrance, was unique in Greece. Monumental works of art were used everywhere in Greece to adorn public areas and buildings, but the Athenians adopted art in uniquely systematic and ambitious ways to define the specific character of public spaces. As a result, by monumentalizing and perpetuating with works of art the glory of her great citizens and their famous achievements, Athens gradually developed into a monument of her own historical identity.

Athens' only possible rival in this respect may have been Sparta. Pausanias' description gives an impression of Sparta's complex and ambitious historical topography, focused also on the city's glory in the Persian Wars.⁹³ Critical investigation is needed to make clear to what extent these sites were authentic testimonies of classical Sparta rather than retrospective glorifications by later centuries. But, Thucydides' comment on the modest appearance of late-fifth-century Sparta notwithstanding,⁹⁴ many of these memorial sites – less magnificent than their Athenian counterparts but effective places of memory – may well testify to Sparta's political identity as the great rival of classical Athens.

Since most Athenian political monuments seem to have been stimulated less by democracy than by empire, the need for legitimation must have been particularly strong in the latter sphere. This must be the reason why Sparta in this respect appears as Athens' only possible rival.

⁹³ Pausanias 3.11–18.

⁹⁴ Thucydides 1.10.2.

Ultimately, in all these manifestations a psychological factor must have been at work. The sheer quantity and the ambitious scale of artistic achievements in Athens should not only be explained by a surplus of financial resources – which of course was an indispensable factor – but also understood as a qualitative feature. Clearly, the citizens of Athens, more than those of other cities, felt an unprecedented need to create political identity by way of public monuments. Moreover, they surrounded themselves in their private sphere, especially in the form of painted vases, with an immensely rich discourse of themes related to their social, religious, moral, and mental values. I suggest that such artistic intensity was a result of the ‘adventure’ on which Athenian society had embarked in the fifth century.⁹⁵ Their path led them, almost irresistibly, into a political order without precedent and into dominion over an empire of incomparable extension; theirs was a balancing act without net that must have created an ambivalent state of collective psychology, between euphoric self-assertion and profound self-doubt, in which all themes of social import were discussed, represented, celebrated, and questioned without end. In this psychological sense, the background to Athenian art of the fifth century was not so much democracy or empire as such but the intense and risky character of Athenian politics in this age of unprecedented opportunity, accomplishment, and challenge.

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⁹⁵ See Meier 1996.

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Postscript: The Aftermath of Empire

The Athenian Empire ceased to exist as a political entity in 404. The Athenians' defeat in the Peloponnesian War was followed by the loss of their allies, their overseas possessions, and their military power (Athens was allowed to retain a fleet of only twelve ships). But the empire continued to exert an influence over interstate behaviour for many years after its demise. Later reactions to the Athenian Empire are therefore often of interest to historians of the fourth century (and of subsequent periods), but they also offer an important insight into the nature of the fifth-century empire – particularly the questions of popularity and ideology which were raised in the previous part.

It is possible to see much of the diplomatic activity of fourth-century Greece – and certainly of fourth-century Athens – as a series of responses to and reactions against the imperial escapades of the fifth century (an idea explored at length by Ernst Badian).¹ The Athenians sometimes liked to gloss over (or even deny) the behaviour that might have made them unpopular, preferring to celebrate the freedom which their empire had allowed to the Greeks and the power and glory which it had brought to Athens:

Now your ancestors . . . commanded the willing obedience of the Greeks for forty-five years; they amassed more than ten thousand talents on our Acropolis; the then king of Macedonia was their subject, just as a barbarian ought to be subject to Greeks; they erected many fine trophies for victory on sea and land . . . and by these deeds, alone of mankind, they left behind them fame that cannot be wiped away. (Demosthenes, *Second Olynthiac* 24)

¹ 'The ghost of empire. Reflections on Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century BC', in W. Eder (ed.), *Die Athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995, 79–106. Note also the brief survey in R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, ch. 22, the collection of relevant ancient material in R. G. Osborne, *The Athenian Empire*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2000, 123–4, and the more general exploration of fourth-century approaches to imperialism by S. Perlman, 'Hegemony and *arkhe* in Greece: fourth-century BC views', in R. N. Lebow and B. S. Strauss (eds.), *Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, 269–86.

This yearning for empire is represented as driving Athens' policy from an early stage in the fourth century: Xenophon's account of diplomatic negotiations in Athens in 395 famously attributes to the Thebans the claim that 'we all know, men of Athens that you would like to regain the empire (*archê*) you once had' (*Hellenica* 3.5.10).

In practice, however, the Athenians seem to have been slightly more circumspect, or at least more aware of the resentment which their fifth-century activities might have caused. This recognition is usually thought to be most clearly visible in the Athenians' major diplomatic manoeuvre of the fourth century: the multilateral alliance known as the 'Second Athenian League'. The decree which sets out the prospectus for this alliance makes certain undertakings to potential allies: there will be no political interference (no breaches of *autonomia*), no Athenian presence (military or otherwise) in allied territory, and no demands for tribute.² The extent to which the Athenians kept to these promises continues to provoke disagreement among students of fourth-century history.³ But the fact that such guarantees were thought necessary is certainly significant for understanding fourth-century imperialism, and might also be helpful in thinking more generally about empire in the Greek world.

If this document is seen as a repudiation of imperialism in general – in favour of a more moderate, hegemonic, form of leadership – it could provide a rare contemporary perspective on the defining features of imperialism.⁴ And even if it is taken only as a more specific reaction against the form of control exercised by Athens in the fifth century, then this too provides an important – and officially endorsed – counterpart to the unflattering assessments of the Athenian Empire which appear in other sources of the period. The activities which the Athenians rule out in the prospectus of the Second Athenian League are, of course, closely associated with their earlier empire, and other fourth-century texts suggest that the fourth-century Athenians were wise to distance themselves from this behaviour. The Athenian orator Isocrates, in his speech *On the Peace*, is particularly critical of the activities of imperial Athens: political interference, financial exploitation (particularly the collection of tribute) and general arrogance combined, Isocrates argues, to alienate the Greeks and bring disaster to Athens. The Chian historian Theopompus is similarly scathing in his assessment of Athenian actions and motives. The Athenians, he alleges,

² RO 22 (also translated in Osborne, *Athenian Empire*, no. 246).

³ J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, supports the view that this was a genuine attempt to develop a less oppressive form of hegemony; G. T. Griffith, 'Athens in the fourth century', in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 127–44, advocates a more sceptical reading of Athenian motives.

⁴ On the problems of defining imperialism, see the Introduction.

lied about their achievements in the Persian Wars in order to ‘boast, and to defraud the Greeks’ (F1 53); their leaders were corrupt (FF 90, 94); and their fourth-century claims to have become reformed characters should be viewed with extreme suspicion: the Athenians, he alleges, did not abolish tribute in the Second Athenian League, they simply renamed it (‘they called the tribute “assessed contribution” since the Greeks resented the word “tribute”’: F98).⁵

In spite of Theopompus’ concerns, however, the fourth-century Athenians never managed to replicate the position of dominance which they had achieved through their fifth-century empire, and nor did any other Greek city-state. Both Athens and other city-states (particularly Sparta and Thebes) employed some of the techniques of the Athenian Empire from time to time: further attempts were made to levy tribute, to impose favourable political systems, or to enforce loyalty to an alliance by military intervention.⁶ But use of these methods remained scattered and short-term, and the next chapters in the diachronic history of imperialism focus not on the world of the Greek city-states, but on Macedon (home of Alexander the Great) and Rome. Athens’ role in that history is not that of imperialist power, but imperial subject.⁷

⁵ On Theopompus’ attitude to fifth-century Athens, see W. R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968. For more general studies of his work see G. S. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1991 (which includes a translation of the fragments); M. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

⁶ On Spartan attempts at empire in the fourth century, see A. Andrewes, ‘Spartan imperialism?’, in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 91–102; P. A. Cartledge, *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, London: Duckworth, 1987, esp. chs. 6, 17.

⁷ On Athens in the Macedonian Empire, see C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1997. The experience of Athens (and other Greek cities) under Roman control is the subject of S. Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Intellectual Chronology

Note: for a detailed chronology of the political events of the fifth century, including information on the expansion of and revolts from the Athenian Empire, readers are advised to consult the chronological table in *The Cambridge Ancient History* (2nd edn), vol. 5: *The Fifth Century BC*, pages 506–13.

BC	
490–479	Persian Wars
478	Formation of Delian League
c. 475/469	Revolt of Naxos: the first (unsuccessful) attempt to secede from the Delian League, according to Thucydides (1.98)
c. 454	Treasury of Delian League moved to Athens; first Tribute Quota Lists erected in Athens
449?	Peace of Callias
447	Beginning of construction of Parthenon
437	Beginning of construction of Propylaea
431	Outbreak of Peloponnesian War
420s	Herodotus, <i>Histories</i>
420s/410s	Temple of Athena Nike (possibly planned in the 440s)
420s/410s	Pseudo-Xenophon (the ‘Old Oligarch’), <i>Constitution of the Athenians</i>
414	Aristophanes, <i>Birds</i>
404	End of Peloponnesian War; end of Athenian Empire
c. 400	Thucydides, <i>History of the Peloponnesian War</i>
378/377	Foundation of Second Athenian League
355	Isocrates, <i>On the Peace</i>
mid-4th C.	Ephorus, <i>History</i> (no longer extant, but extensively used by Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch)
350s–330s	Theopompus of Chios, <i>Hellenica</i> and <i>Philippica</i>

- 330 Alexander the Great captures and burns the Persian capital Persepolis, allegedly as revenge for the Persian destruction of Athens in 480
- 320s Aristoteleian *Constitution of the Athenians*
- late 1st C. Diodorus Siculus, *Universal History*
- AD
- c. 50–120 Plutarch's biographies, including *Pericles*
- 1780–1838 Louis François Sebastien Fauvel in Greece and Turkey (for much of the time as French consul in Athens). His antiquarian explorations include the discovery of several inscriptions – the decree imposing regulations on Erythrae (IG i³ 14, ML 40) is known only from his transcription.
- 1830s Fragments of the Tribute Quota Lists begin to be discovered in relatively large quantities
- 1846–56 George Grote's *History of Greece* argues that the Athenian Empire is generally beneficial to its subjects
- 1851 The second edition of Boeckh's *Staatshaushaltung der Athener (Public Economy of Athens)* offers one of the first detailed discussions of the Tribute Quota Lists and their usefulness as evidence for the Athenian Empire and the ancient economy
- 1855 First fragment of the Standards Decree discovered in Smyrna (now Izmir, Turkey), although not recognised as such until 1894
- 1870 U. Koehler, *Urkunde und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des delisch-attischen Bundes*: the first monograph on the evidence for the Athenian Empire
- 1880 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's 'Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit' sees the Athenian Empire as a model for Prussian *Colonialpolitik* (and also suggests for the first time the existence of an Athenian decree imposing common currency on the Empire)
- 1939–53 Publication of *The Athenian Tribute* lists: a 4-volume collection of the Tribute Quota Lists and other important epigraphic evidence for the Athenian Empire
- 1961 Harold Mattingly first publishes his arguments for a revised dating of many inscriptions of the Athenian Empire (in 'The Athenian coinage decree', *Historia* 10, 148–88)
- 1972 Russell Meiggs's *Athenian Empire* published

Guide to Further Reading

References to modern works dealing with specific themes and problems can be found in the relevant parts of the General Introduction and introductions to each section. I have not referred there to discussions found in the general histories of the Athenian Empire (except where those discussions are the most detailed or definitive account available). But it is important nevertheless to be aware of these general works. The most comprehensive and authoritative English-language study of the Athenian Empire is still Russell Meiggs's *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972): this provides a full narrative of the empire's history (from the close of the Persian Wars through to, and beyond, Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War), as well as investigations of key themes in the study of the empire (the tribute; imperial officials; cleruchies, and so on). M. F. McGregor's *The Athenians and their Empire* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987) provides a readable, if somewhat uncritical, narrative of the empire's history. The relevant chapters of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, written by some of the foremost scholars in the field (David Lewis, P. J. Rhodes, and others), are also worth consulting.¹ P. J. Rhodes's *Athenian Empire* (in the *Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics* series, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) is the most compressed of all these studies, but also the most up to date, and a good guide to some of the key controversies in the subject.

Detailed engagement with the history of the Athenian Empire requires close study of the ancient sources. Of the literary sources the most important, and most difficult to interpret, is Thucydides. Numerous translations are available, of which the Penguin edition (translated by Rex Warner, with an introduction by Moses Finley) is probably the most widely used. Other useful editions are the *Landmark Thucydides* (which has a rich range of maps, as well as good discussions of the military, polit-

¹ Volume 5: *The Fifth Century BC*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

ical and cultural themes of the work) and the Norton Critical Edition (which includes an interesting selection of classic interpretative articles on both Thucydides and the war he describes).²

Thucydides is well served by commentaries. Particularly notable are Gomme, Andrewes and Dover, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (5 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945–81), and Hornblower's *Commentary on Thucydides* (2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991–). The latter is still incomplete (the two volumes which have appeared so far cover the text up to the Peace of Nicias), and slightly less detailed in some of its analysis, but also more wide-ranging in the themes it addresses. It is also (unlike the *Historical Commentary*) designed to be accessible to readers who do not know Greek. Hornblower's monograph *Thucydides* (London: Duckworth, 1987) is a useful starting point for exploring the context, methods and nature of Thucydides' history, while C. Pelling's *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian* (London: Routledge, 2001) provides further important insights on the use of Thucydides (and other literary texts) for the study of Greek history. The massive *Brill's Companion to Thucydides* (edited by Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Leiden: Brill, 2006) offers up-to-date surveys of almost every aspect of contemporary Thucydidean studies, and is a good source for the (huge) further bibliography on the historian.

Non-Thucydidean literary sources are also widely available in translation, whether in the Loeb Classical Library (the easiest place to consult the relevant parts of Diodorus – books 11–13, in volumes 4 and 5 of the Loeb edition) or in Penguin Classics: in this series, it is especially worth noting the Plutarch *Lives* collected in *The Rise and Fall of Athens*, and the translation (with introduction) of the Aristoteleian *Athenian Constitution* by P. J. Rhodes (author of the authoritative commentary on this text).³ Aristophanes' comedies are also available in either of these series, although Sommerstein's translations and commentaries (published, with parallel Greek text, by Aris and Phillips) are often worth consulting too. Finally, the *Athenian Constitution* of Pseudo-Xenophon (the 'Old Oligarch') can now be studied in Robin Osborne's LACTOR edition (*The Old Oligarch: Pseudo-Xenophon's Constitution of the Athenians*, London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 2004).

² *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, tr. R. Crawley, ed. R. B. Strassler, New York: Free Press, 1996; *The Peloponnesian War: A New Translation, Backgrounds, Interpretations*, tr. W. Blanco, ed. W. Blanco and J. T. Roberts, New York: Norton, 1998.

³ *A Commentary on the Aristoteleian Athenaiion Politeia*, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Osborne is also responsible for the most useful anthology of evidence for the Athenian Empire (also part of the LACTOR series): *The Athenian Empire* (London: London Association of Classical Teachers, 4th edn, 2000). This thematically arranged volume includes some extracts from literary texts, but is especially helpful for its selection (and explanation) of key epigraphic evidence for the empire's history and characteristics. For a fuller collection of epigraphic evidence (arranged chronologically, and not restricted to the Athenian Empire), see Meiggs and Lewis's *Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988): this edition provides detailed commentary on many key texts; translations are not included, but can be found in Fornara's *From Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The general methods and problems of using epigraphic evidence are discussed by Fergus Millar in M. H. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 2. For other material and archaeological evidence, see J. M. Camp, *The Archaeology of Athens* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), and J. Hurwit, *The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Almost all of the evidence discussed in these works is Athenian in origin. Non-Athenian material is still rare and, where it exists, difficult to access, but some sense of the evidence for, and activities of, the member states of the empire can now be gained from M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen (eds.), *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

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