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Living in a multicultural world: Intergroup ideologies and the societal context of intergroup relations

Serge Guimond¹, Roxane de la Sablonnière²,
and Armelle Nugier¹

¹Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive, CNRS UMR 6024, Clermont Université, Université Blaise Pascal, 63037 Clermont-Ferrand, France

²Department of Psychology, Université de Montréal, Montréal, H3C 3J7, Canada

In a relatively short time span, issues of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity have become central topics of discussion in various nations. As a result, the role of broad ideologies that frame and structure relations between groups has received increasing attention by social psychologists. Of particular concern has been the role of these intergroup ideologies in promoting intergroup harmony and reducing prejudice. In this article, we appraise the evidence related to three main intergroup ideologies, assimilation, colourblindness, and multiculturalism. We argue that research in this area has paid insufficient attention to the social and political context. Intergroup ideologies have been studied and conceptualised as being located solely within individual minds. We suggest that the potentially vital aspect of these ideologies is that they are sometimes widely shared by members of a social group. Integrating sociological and political analyses, we discuss the fact that intergroup ideologies are institutionalised as *policies* and that, as such, they often vary across countries and across time. We present a series of studies to illustrate the theoretical implications of studying the shared nature of these intergroup ideologies, providing insights into the question of when and why national policies can shape individuals' intergroup attitudes and beliefs and improve intergroup relations.

Keywords: Colourblindness; Multiculturalism; Assimilation; Culture; Norms; Prejudice; Policies; Intergroup relations; Social dominance; Equality.

A central challenge facing many countries today concerns the creation of a social climate where human diversity and harmony can coexist. Should one emphasise similarities and common ground or, on the contrary, should one recognise that there are important group differences? What type of policies can

Correspondence should be addressed to Serge Guimond, Université Blaise Pascal, Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive CNRS, 34 av. Carnot, 63037 Clermont-Ferrand, France.

E-mail: Serge.Guimond@univ-bpclermont.fr

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be effective in fighting against prejudice and intergroup discrimination? Can these policies engage newcomers? Social psychologists and other social scientists have been struggling with these questions for several decades now (see Green & Staerklé, 2013; Guimond, 2013). Nevertheless, the research has begun to focus on studying broad ideologies influencing intergroup attitudes and behaviours only in recent years (Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2002; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). The major goal of the current article is to clarify what we know about the effect of assimilation, colourblindness, and multiculturalism on intergroup relations and to review research related to a recent theoretical framework seeking to explain why these intergroup ideologies can sometimes have a profound influence on intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Our main concern is to understand how the social and political context may have an impact on the relation between intergroup ideologies and intergroup relations (see Figure 1). In a nutshell, we will argue that national policies developed to manage intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies are central elements of the social and political context. We will suggest that these policies generate cultural norms of integration; that is, general expectations about the level of support for various intergroup ideologies. Considering the role of these cultural norms can improve our understanding of the effect of national policies, and serve to integrate the role of intergroup ideologies within explanations of intergroup relations that are sensitive to the changing nature of the social and political context.




Figure 1. Framework for a context-sensitive approach to the study of intergroup ideologies.

UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATION: A NEW THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ethnocentrism, prejudice, and discrimination are fundamental problems of intergroup relations that are pervasive across time and culture (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Major theories developed in social psychology to explain these phenomena, such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Relative Deprivation Theory (Pettigrew et al., 2008), or Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), have tended to emphasise the role of processes assumed to be universally valid. Thus, researchers typically assume that the psychological determinants of prejudice operate in similar ways across countries. For example, social dominance orientation (SDO), a general tendency to support hierarchical and unequal intergroup relations, was found to predict higher levels of intergroup prejudice in many different countries, including France, Italy, Poland, Israel, China, and others (Guimond, 2010; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). In contrast, the extent to which country-specific factors explain prejudice and their role in the development of a general theory of intergroup relations have received little attention. Indeed, the understanding of how general principles of human behaviour can retain explanatory and predictive value in changing cultural, historical, economic, and political contexts is one of the major theoretical challenges facing experimental social psychology. Given the ubiquity of change (de la Sablonnière, French Bourgeois, & Najih, 2013; Reynolds & Branscombe, 2014), how can the same general explanation remain valid? Despite the deep implications of such questions for the status of social psychology as a science (e.g., Gergen, 1973, 1976), little progress has been made in recent years in trying to tackle them. We believe that integrating *etic* (culture-general) and *emic* (culture-specific) approaches in the study of intergroup attitudes and behaviours represents a potentially fruitful way of dealing with these issues (Berry, 1969; Chen, 2010). More specifically, we argue that studies on the role of intergroup ideologies as culture-specific factors affecting intergroup relations can bring about important new developments regarding these fundamental concerns.

To explain this point of view, our discussion is organised around four main issues: (1) definition of three intergroup ideologies, consideration of (2) correlational and (3) experimental research on the relations between intergroup ideologies and intergroup behaviours, and then (4) an analysis of how the social and political context may shape these relationships (see [Figure 1](#)). In contrast to previous work that pits multiculturalism against assimilation or multiculturalism against colourblindness, we suggest that a better starting point would be to consider all three ideologies as distinct sets of beliefs capturing three basic responses to diversity. Thus, based on available work, we first provide a detailed discussion of the nature of each of these ideologies, their core psychological

underpinnings, and the fact that they are formally institutionalised as government policies in some countries but not in others.

Second, we review research that tested the extent to which these intergroup ideologies can be measured as distinct psychological constructs. We consider the relation among assimilation, multiculturalism, and colourblindness and the way in which they are used to explain prejudice. We found strong correlational evidence suggesting that all three intergroup ideologies may be important in explaining prejudice. In the third part we consider experimental research, showing the causal effect of intergroup ideologies on stereotyping and prejudice. We note that existing experiments have not controlled for the potential effects of the wider social and political context. Thus, questions about the extent to which social-psychological facts are historically and culturally bounded become unavoidable. Should we assume that these intergroup ideologies function in exactly the same way and have the same effect in most countries? Our central argument here is that distinguishing between personal beliefs (mental representation) and beliefs that are widely shared in a culture (cultural representation) may be needed to understand the effects of intergroup ideologies and the variations in these effects across contexts. We present evidence supporting the shared nature of intergroup ideologies, showing systematic variations across societies that are consistent with national policies. In the fourth and final section we draw out the implications of this approach for the explanation of prejudice and for an understanding of the role of national policies in shaping intergroup relations. We outline a theoretical framework, pooling together general social-psychological determinants of prejudice and culture-specific determinants. We describe recent studies showing that the effects of assimilation, colourblindness, and multiculturalism on anti-Muslim prejudice can indeed vary as a function of the salience of the prevailing cultural norms of integration. We conclude by emphasising important limitations of the existing studies and by suggesting paths for the future.

CONTEMPORARY INTERGROUP IDEOLOGIES: REJECTING, IGNORING, OR CELEBRATING DIVERSITY?

To deal with cultural diversity and issues of citizenship and national identity, all nations can be expected to develop some formal and informal rules, policies, and traditions designed to guide action. Based on these rules, policies and traditions emerge a set of beliefs that can be called an intergroup ideology, suggesting how members of large-scale social groups should relate to, and accommodate one another in a given society. Intergroup ideologies refer to the ways of approaching and dealing with intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies (Rattan & Ambady, 2013). As a common-sense understanding of a complex social reality, intergroup ideologies probably have a lot in common with what Moscovici (1982) called “social representations” (see Plaut, 2002). When designing the

first instrument to measure attitudes towards multiculturalism, Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1977) used the term “multicultural ideology” to refer to this scale. They distinguished between three main ideologies, assimilation, multiculturalism, and segregation. Similarly, Park and Judd (2005) have written about the “ideological perspective” from which individuals consider the relations between members of different ethnic or racial groups. They identified the three ideologies noted above and suggested another one the colourblind ideology.

Because segregationist laws and policies (e.g., apartheid) have generally been disallowed in most countries, our analysis will be limited to assimilation, multiculturalism, and colourblindness as three contemporary intergroup ideologies that represent three basic responses to diversity. As Table 1 indicates, these intergroup ideologies can be related to distinct policies that reflect different views about how social categorisation is related to intergroup harmony (see Guimond, 2010; Kamiejski, De Oliveira & Guimond, 2012). Whereas some countries may be good examples of a given ideology/policy, as suggested in Table 1, it is understood that pure cases of each intergroup ideology/policy probably do not exist. Rather, in most societies one finds various ideologies that coexist and that become more or less important over time depending on a complex set of social and political influences. For example, ideas related to the political principle of *laïcité* have taken increasing importance in recent years in France (see Akan, 2009; Roebroek & Guimond, 2014). Our focus here on assimilation, colourblindness and multiculturalism should not be read as implying that these are the only intergroup ideologies that matter.

Assimilation

The ideology of assimilation, relatively unquestioned until the 1960s in the United States and Canada, reflects a preference for uniformity and homogeneity (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). As Schalk-Soekar and Van de Vijver (2008) noted, an “assimilation ideology involves” an orientation “to reduce or even eliminate differences between groups” (p. 2154). Taylor (1991) has argued that the influence of assimilation as an ideology can be seen even in the research

TABLE 1
Three main intergroup ideologies and their associated policy

<i>Intergroup ideology</i>	<i>Aim of policy</i>	<i>Principle of categorisation</i>	<i>Country</i>
Assimilation	To reduce or eliminate diversity	Recategorisation (one group)	Germany
Colourblindness (Universalism)	To ignore diversity	Decategorisation (no group)	France
Multiculturalism	To maintain/promote diversity	Salient categorisation (multiple groups)	Canada, Australia

topics that were the most popular in social psychology until the 1970s, such as the similarity-attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971). Decades of research has shown that similarity breeds attraction. By implication, and consistent with assimilation, a culturally homogeneous society should bring about interpersonal harmony, which is also suggested by some prejudice-reduction strategies based on intergroup contact.

The “contact hypothesis” is one of the most fruitful areas of research within social psychology (Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Swart, 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Over the years, three distinct and well-known models of intergroup contact have been proposed: the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) based on principles of recategorisation; the Personalisation Model (Brewer & Miller, 1984) based on decategorisation; and the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (Hewstone & Brown, 1986) based on social identity principles. All three models represent attempts to specify the theoretical conditions under which one can improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice (for recent updates, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dovidio et al., 2007; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Each of these social-psychological models of contact can be related to (but not equated with) a particular intergroup ideology (see Guimond, 2010).

One of the core propositions of the Common Ingroup Identity Model suggests that if members of two separate groups (*us* and *them*) can be led to recategorise themselves as members of a single superordinate group (*we*), prejudice and discrimination towards former outgroup members would diminish. As several researchers have noted (see Brown, 2000; Hewstone, 1996; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jones, 2002), this recategorisation process reminds one of an assimilation model that requires minority group members to give up their distinctive social identities in order to better adapt to the mainstream culture (see Table 1). Proponents of the Common Ingroup Identity Model acknowledge that “Emphasis on a one-group representation is associated with a cultural ideology of assimilation” (Scheepers, Saguy, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2014, p. 325).

Of course, assimilation can be defined in many different ways (see Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, & Sidanius, 2010). The “melting pot” version of assimilation, historically dominant in the United States (with the motto *E Pluribus Unum*; see Davies, Steele, & Markus, 2008), suggested that all groups coming to the USA could contribute equally to the formation of the new common ingroup by melting their differences away. However, this is not the view that actually prevailed in various countries. In practice, the historical record suggests that assimilation has usually implied a unidirectional process in which cultural minorities experienced pressures to recategorise themselves and to conform to the majority (Gordon, 1964; Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; No et al., 2008; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Because it implies pressures to conform to a single cultural standard and a single identity, an assimilation ideology can be seen as fundamentally inegalitarian in nature (Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Leyens,

2012; Taylor, 1991). It assumes that *they* should conform to what *we* do, because “we” know better than “they” do. In the words of Newman (1978), “the original Social Darwinist doctrine of assimilation relied upon the assertion that the dominant group’s culture is socially superior” (p. 42). Governmental efforts aimed at reducing diversity and homogenising the population are indicative of an assimilation policy. This type of policy is still influential today in many countries (see Table 1; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzel, 2001).

Colourblindness

Colourblindness is a second major intergroup ideology that has attracted considerable research attention over the last decade (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Colourblindness means ignoring group differences (see Table 1). It essentially suggests that racial or ethnic membership should not matter and that regardless of race or ethnicity, all people are the same; thus, one should not categorise people along ethnic or racial lines (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In other words, a colourblind ideology rests on the principle of decategorisation advocated by Brewer and Miller (1984) in their Personalisation Model (see Table 1). In contrast to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, which argues for recategorisation into a common group, Brewer and Miller’s (1984) Personalisation Model suggests that it is best if people come into contact as individuals rather than as members of distinct groups (see also Miller, 2002). Thus, both the colourblindness and personalisation models promote the idea that ignoring group membership and avoiding any reference to existing social categorisations can reduce intergroup bias (see Brown, 2000; Kenworthy, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2005; Verkuyten, 2014). This means that there are clear conceptual grounds that distinguish assimilation (implying efforts to reduce group differences through recategorisation) from colourblindness (implying efforts to ignore group differences through decategorisation).

Another reason why this colourblind approach should not be confused with assimilation is that, as Markus (2008) noted, the colourblind model implies that “everyone should be treated equally” (p. 657). This is different from an assimilation ideology that tends to be egalitarian in nature. Rattan and Ambady (2013) traced the origins of colourblindness to Justice Harlan’s interpretation of the United States constitution in a decision in 1896 to the effect that the constitution is “colourblind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.” The fact that present-day experimental social psychology is studying the effect of ideas that have been around for so many years testifies to the fundamental nature of this ideology (see Apfelbaum et al., 2012; Levy, West, & Ramirez, 2005). In 1963, in one of his most famous speeches shortly before being assassinated,

Martin Luther King referred to colourblindness as an ideal concept (King, 1963). However, these ideas are not relevant only to the American national context. They can probably be traced back to the French revolution of 1789; thus, it is not surprising to imagine that in other societies, such as present-day France, these ideas are also very much in tune. The theme of equality is a central component of the founding myth of the French Republic. As the French political philosopher Laborde (2001) explained, “Cultural differences are unimportant in the face of the essential unity of mankind, which demands that individuals be respected ‘*sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion*,’ [without distinction based on origin, race or religion] as proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. This culture-blind understanding of equality permeates France republican philosophy and still informs public policy” (Laborde, 2001, p. 719).

Social scientists in France have provided detailed analyses of the French model of integration called *modèle républicain* or republicanism (see Amiraux & Simon, 2006; Brouard & Tiberj, 2005; Schnapper, 2004, 2007; Wieviorka, 2001). The French republican model has some relatively unique features, such as the principle of secularism (or *laïcité*, see Roebroek & Guimond, 2014). Nevertheless, a large amount of literature attests to the fact that republicanism in France, much like the colourblind model, rests on a principle of decategorisation. For example, in describing French immigration and integration policy, Schnapper, Krief, and Peignard (2003) wrote, “Universalistic principles have always been favoured over acknowledging the particular characteristics of migrant population. The principle of French policy is to be ‘colourblind’. No ‘minority’ policies exist, nor the very idea of minorities” (p. 15). Similarly, Felouzis (2006) noted, “The French State, currently, does not recognise any group membership whatsoever based on religious, cultural or other grounds, it only sees ‘free and equal’ citizens” (p. 318, our translation). Thus, the colourblind approach has deep historical roots in France (see Table 1).

As in the case of assimilation, colourblindness has been defined in various ways and has been the source of much debate (see Levy et al., 2005). Cognitive research on automaticity and the process of categorisation raises doubts about the possibility of being able to avoid categorisation and suggests possible rebound effects if people succeed in doing so (see Correll et al., 2008). Moreover, it has been argued that colourblindness concerning race in the USA has been instrumental in legitimising racial inequality and avoiding knowledge of racial discrimination. Indeed, ignoring race may also be the best way to ignore the existence of racial discrimination (see Apfelbaum et al., 2012). There is evidence that the colourblind ideology, like the Protestant work ethic, reflects systems of beliefs with dual intergroup meanings that are being associated with equality among American children but are also becoming increasingly associated with the justification of inequality during adolescence and the adult years (see Levy et al., 2005). Similarly, Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, and Chow (2009) argued that intergroup ideologies are used to reach certain political ends. Consequently, their

meaning is malleable, as it can shift from egalitarian to anti-egalitarian depending on political motives and agendas. Although similar criticisms of colourblindness have been voiced in France (Laborde, 2001), the research on the dual meaning of colourblindness has been restricted to the American context so far.

Multiculturalism

Finally, in contrast to the two previous intergroup ideologies, multiculturalism reflects a positive evaluation of cultural and ethnic diversity. As Verkuyten (2006) suggested, a multicultural approach involves acknowledging group differences, appreciating diversity, and respecting minority group identities. Hewstone and Brown (1986) proposed, within their Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model of intergroup contact, that social categorisation into distinct groups should remain salient during contact so that positive attitudes towards a given member of a group can be generalised to other members of that group. This model of intergroup contact is quite compatible with multiculturalism (see Table 1; see also Brown, 2000; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Both perspectives imply that categorisation into distinct cultural or ethnic groups should become the rule rather than the exception and that such social categorisation will not necessarily increase intergroup prejudice (see Hewstone, 1996; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Park & Judd, 2005).

Multiculturalism is a form of pluralism (Huo & Molina, 2006) that can be described as a dual-identity model (Baysu, Phalet, & Brown, 2011; Guimond, 2010; Verkuyten, 2014). Whereas an assimilation approach would emphasise a one-group representation, as noted above, a multicultural approach would allow and even promote the development of a dual-identity representation (e.g., “we can be Canadians and Ukrainians/Polish/Irish at the same time”). A dual identity has been advocated within the Common Ingroup Identity Model as an alternative form of recategorisation that can improve the generalisation of positive effects of intergroup contact (Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Scheepers et al., 2014). Thus, work on this model tends to converge with other models, such as Hewstone and Brown (1986), as well as with research on multiculturalism.

A policy of multiculturalism, seeking to recognise and promote cultural diversity as a positive national feature, was first introduced in 1971 in Canada (Berry, 2006; Berry et al., 1977; Guimond, 1999, 2010). Since then, every Canadian government, regardless of political orientation has pursued this policy. Many other countries have subsequently adopted similar policies, most notably Australia and Sweden (see Berry et al., 1977; Bertossi, 2007; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Guimond, 1999; Wieviorka, 2001). Compared to assimilation and colourblindness, the ideology of multiculturalism is much more recent. Nevertheless, it has been the topic of numerous on-going debates (see Green & Staerklé, 2013; Kymlicka, 2012; Verkuyten, 2006). One problem raised by these debates is that multiculturalism can now mean many different things. As

Bloemraad et al. (2008) noted, it is useful to distinguish between *four* distinct meanings of the term. First, multiculturalism can be used as a *demographic* description of a group or society. In that meaning, one can state that France, Belgium, or the United States are multicultural societies in the sense that they are made up of many different cultural groups. Research on the effect of multicultural experiences has been using this definition (see Crisp & Turner, 2011). However, this is different from using multiculturalism as a government *policy*, the second definition of the term. It is possible to have multicultural experiences in societies where there is no policy on multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can also refer to the *ideology* of individuals that stresses the need to recognise and celebrate ethnic, cultural, or religious diversity. Finally, multiculturalism can refer to a specific *normative political theory* developed by political philosophers (e.g., Kymlicka, 1995).

In the present paper we are concerned mainly with multiculturalism as a *policy* and with multiculturalism as an intergroup *ideology*. Considering these two meanings, we investigated the relation between the existence of a policy of multiculturalism in a given country and the attitudes or ideology of people towards multiculturalism. Drawing on the work done in sociology and political science, it is now possible to identify countries that have a strong multicultural policy. The extent to which the endorsement of multiculturalism as an intergroup ideology depends on the existence of a policy is a question that has not been considered in recent reviews of social-psychological research in the area. Both Rattan and Ambady (2013) and Sasaki and Vorauer (2013) presented excellent reviews of research, including the detailed analyses of experimental studies on the effects of colourblindness vs. multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Yet little has been said about the fact that these intergroup ideologies also involve instantiation of policies that are more or less important depending on the country that one is referring to. This is a major limitation of research in this area that we will address later on. Before that, it might be useful to spell out in more detail the actual policies or conceptions of citizenship that can be found in various countries.

Conceptions of citizenship

The concept of citizenship refers to “a form of membership in a political and geographic community” (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 154). It entails a set of rights and duties linking the citizen to the state. The issues of citizenship are related to many longstanding concerns of social psychologists that are only beginning to be considered (Condor, 2011). The framework displayed in Table 1 that distinguishes between three main intergroup ideologies is consistent with an influential conception of citizenship developed in sociology by Koopmans, Stratham, Giugni, and Passy (2005). The main reason why this work may be important for social psychologists is that it provides empirical evidence on the actual




Figure 2. Four types of citizenship regimes in a two-dimensional space and representative countries © 2005 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota. This image is adapted from Figure 1 in Koopmans et al., 2005 with permission of University of Minnesota Press. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

policies that are found in various countries. As shown in Figure 2, Koopmans et al. (2005) used two dimensions to distinguish between four main conceptions of citizenship. These are conceived as “ideal-typical configurations of citizenship and migrant incorporation” (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 10–11). It is acknowledged that most countries may be situated between the boxes. This also applies to the framework presented in Table 1, which considers that in some countries, such as the USA, all three intergroup ideologies may be relevant. At the same time, Koopmans et al. (2005) believed that many countries are usually closer to some ideal types compared to others and, as discussed below, their empirical analysis confirmed that expectation.

The first dimension used by Koopmans et al. (2005) refers to the equality of individual access to citizenship and incorporates the “ethnic” vs. “civic” distinction that has drawn the attention of some social psychologists (see Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). While this “ethnic” vs. “civic” distinction is important, it offers only a limited understanding. This is because, as Bloemerad et al. (2008) noted, many countries, such as Canada, France, or the USA, that would otherwise seem to have extremely different political approaches, can all be classified as having a civic conception of citizenship. Koopmans et al. (2005) addressed that problem by adding a second dimension, the amounts of cultural differences and group rights

that are considered appropriate. This dimension incorporates debates around multiculturalism.

Koopmans et al. (2005) have developed a series of empirical indicators of policies and regulations in various domains (e.g., nationality acquisition, citizenship rights, cultural rights and so on) in order to assess the actual citizenship regime of five European countries. These indicators were computed for each country based on several sources (legal texts, media, Internet web sites, and experts) at three points in time: 1980, 1990, and 2002. This is an important contribution described as being the “apex” in terms of “empirical validation of philosophical systems” (Van Reekum, Duyvendak, & Bertossi, 2012, p. 420). The results of this quantitative analysis of policy indicators confirm that, as we have suggested above, Germany is a good example of a country with a policy of assimilation, as is Switzerland, whereas France fits the republican universalism or colourblind conception (see Figure 2). Among the European countries that they considered, Koopmans et al. (2005) suggested that the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands fit the multiculturalist conception. Although we agree that the UK and the Netherlands have a stronger multicultural approach compared to France or Germany, questions can be raised about whether they fit an ideal type nowadays. Indeed, in recent years it has become clear that both the Netherlands and the UK have retreated from multiculturalism (Joppke, 2004). Thus, we suggest that Canada is a better example of a country with a multicultural policy. As will be seen later on, this model may be useful for understanding why supporting multiculturalism might not be in contradiction with supporting colourblindness. It also suggests that using a single dimension (i.e., from assimilation to multiculturalism) in the assessment of policy might have limitations and that the policy of some countries (i.e., France) might not be adequately measured on such a dimension.

Figure 2 might remind the reader of a number of similar frameworks in social psychology, most of them derived from Berry’s (2005) acculturation model (see Berry et al., 1977; Dovidio et al., 2009; Hahn, Judd, & Park, 2010; Haslam, Egghins, & Reynolds, 2003). The similarity is only apparent because, to our knowledge, no framework in social psychology has focused on the policy orientations of *specific countries*. Koopmans et al. (2005) were not simply suggesting a distinction between assimilation and multiculturalism. They reported empirical evidence to the effect that, between 1980 and 2002, the actual policy in Germany, for example, has been one of assimilation, and more so than in the UK or the Netherlands.

None of the countries considered by Koopmans et al. (2005) has a segregationist policy. In Berry’s (2005) acculturation model, segregation is also considered as one of the strategies of the larger society (dominant group) that corresponds to the strategy of “separation” from the point of view of ethno-cultural groups. Although segregation is outside the scope of the present review, the important point to note is that in both Koopmans et al.’s (2005) and Berry’s

(2005) models, segregation (separation) is clearly distinct from multiculturalism. Yet, in Europe, several political leaders—e.g., Angela Merkel in Germany in October 2010, David Cameron in the UK in February 2011, followed by Nicolas Sarkozy in France a couple of days after—have all spoken about multiculturalism as if it was a form of segregation that encouraged “different cultures to live separate lives”. This description is clearly not consistent with the multiculturalism policy as it was established in Canada (see Kymlicka, 2012). The Canadian policy was developed not simply as a cultural policy celebrating diversity, but also as an equity policy designed to make progress towards the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, and political life (Berry, 2013).

MEASURING SUPPORT FOR ASSIMILATION, MULTICULTURALISM, AND COLOURBLINDNESS

What is the empirical evidence concerning the distinction among assimilation, multiculturalism, and colourblindness from a social-psychological point of view? Do we need to distinguish colourblindness from assimilation as suggested above or are these two concepts pretty much the same in the minds of most people, as other researchers have argued? Are there any relationships between personal support for these ideologies and the observed level of ethnic or racial prejudice of various individuals? Although few studies have assessed all three ideologies simultaneously, existing evidence provides relatively clear answers to such questions.

Table 2 displays items that have been used in past research to measure assimilation, colourblindness, and multiculturalism (see Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977; Levin et al., 2012). Participants indicated their level of agreement with each item on an agree/disagree rating scale. Note that these measures did not assess how people define assimilation, multiculturalism, or colourblindness. Instead, they measured whether people support some principles that are theoretically defined as reflecting a given intergroup ideology. Starting with the national survey conducted by Berry et al. (1977) in Canada in 1974, a series of studies attempted to assess the views of Canadians and Americans on the multiculturalism/assimilation debate (see Berry, 2006; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Cameron & Berry, 2008; Esses & Gardner, 1996; Kalin & Berry, 1996; Lambert, Mermigis, & Taylor, 1986; Lambert & Taylor, 1988; Taylor, 1991). These early findings can be summarised in four main points:

- (1) Multiculturalism conflicts with assimilation. The more people support assimilation, the less they support multiculturalism.
- (2) Support for multiculturalism among the Canadian population, which was moderate at best in the early 1970s, has tended to increase over time.

TABLE 2
Scale items for measures of assimilation, colourblindness and multiculturalism
(from Levin et al., 2012)

Assimilation ideology

- (1) People who come to [the US] should change their behaviour to be more like [Americans].
- (2) Foreigners should try harder to adapt to [American] cultural traditions if they want to stay in the [US].
- (3) The unity of this country is weakened by people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways.

Colourblind ideology

- (1) We should treat citizens of this country as [Americans] and not as members of particular ethnic, religious or sexual communities.
- (2) I do not want [Americans] to be identified by their race, national origin, or religion.
- (3) [American] society is made up first and foremost of citizens, not of groups.
- (4) For the unity of the country, individuals should be considered [Americans] before any consideration is given to their race or religion.
- (5) It's best to judge one another as individuals rather than members of an ethnic group.
- (6) It's important to recognise that people are basically the same regardless of their ethnicity.

Multicultural ideology

- (1) Immigrant parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland.
 - (2) A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.
 - (3) We should help ethnic and racial minorities preserve their cultural heritage in [the US].
-

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- (3) Overall, the multiculturalism policy in Canada has been associated with more tolerant intergroup attitudes and a positive effect on intergroup relations;
- (4) The evidence does not support the claim that a policy of multiculturalism has a negative effect on social cohesion or national unity, as many feared. On the contrary, the more people identify with their ethnic subgroups, the more they also identify as Canadians. In fact, multiculturalism has *become* a major source of national pride in Canada.

Lambert and Taylor (1988; Lambert et al., 1986; Taylor, 1991) conducted a series of studies among minority group members in order to assess the viability of a multicultural approach. Because the multiculturalism policy advocates that newcomers should be allowed to maintain their culture and language of origin, such a policy makes sense only to the extent to which immigrants consider cultural maintenance to be of value. Thus, these studies involved asking participants to take a stand on a 7-point scale, where 1 meant that immigrants should *abandon* their culture of origin and adopt the way of life of the majority and 7 meant that immigrants should *maintain* their traditions as much as possible when establishing themselves in the new country. Community after community, it was found that in the USA and in Canada there was a strong tendency for the Greeks to

want to maintain their Greek identity, for Italians to maintain their Italian identity, for Arabs to maintain their traditional values and customs, and so on (Moghaddam et al., 1993). These findings were clearly consistent with the aims of multiculturalism in the sense that we should not seek to separate people from identities if they value those identities. Note that if the results had shown that most immigrant communities wanted to forget about their culture of origin as soon as possible, then obviously the need for the development of a policy of multiculturalism would have been seriously undermined.

It might be argued that the results above are questionable because people were forced to choose between multiculturalism and assimilation. However, extensive research using Berry's model of acculturation that distinguishes between four acculturation strategies (i.e., integration [multiculturalism], assimilation, separation, and marginalisation) has similarly shown that, with few exceptions, immigrants display a preference for integration rather than assimilation (see Berry, 2005; Berry et al., 2006; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Sam & Berry, 2010). These studies assessed the four acculturation strategies independently. For example, to assess assimilation, participants were asked to react to statements such as "To live in California means that we should give up our immigrant cultural heritage for the sake of adopting mainstream American culture" (Bourhis, Barrette, El-Geledi, & Schmidt, 2009, p. 451). Even when people can express their preference for several different options independently, they display a preference for the option of "integration" corresponding to a multiculturalism policy. Furthermore, preferences for integration usually correlate negatively with preferences for assimilation.

Among majority group members, support for multiculturalism was also negatively related with support for assimilation (see Guimond, 2010). In one study Wolsko, Park, and Judd (2006) presented the results of a factor analysis of items purporting to measure multiculturalism and assimilation among large and diverse samples of American respondents. The results revealed two separate factors, confirming the distinction between multiculturalism and assimilation. Support for assimilation correlated negatively with support for multiculturalism. Furthermore, and consistent with previous research, Wolsko et al. (2006) found that endorsement of assimilation was related to increasing levels of intergroup bias whereas endorsement of multiculturalism was related to decreasing levels of bias. However, Wolsko et al. (2006) did not measure colourblindness. Indeed, none of the early studies carried out in Canada was concerned with colourblindness. How does support for colourblindness relate to assimilation and multiculturalism? As noted above, many researchers assume that colourblindness contradicts multiculturalism because colourblindness is assumed to be almost identical to assimilation. While it is true that, theoretically, ignoring group differences (colourblindness) may seem the opposite of giving them recognition (multiculturalism), the empirical evidence does not confirm a negative relation between multiculturalism and colourblindness. Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson,

and Casas (2007) conducted two studies in the United States with Black and White participants. In the two studies, one with college students and the other one involving a community sample, the measures of multiculturalism and colourblindness loaded on two separate factors, confirming that they are two distinct psychological constructs. However, for both Black and White participants, support for multiculturalism correlated *positively* with support for colourblindness (see also Rosenthal & Levy, 2012; Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010).

In two studies conducted among university students in France, Kamiejski, Guimond, De Oliveira, Er-Rafiy and Brauer (2012) also found that measures of colourblindness and multiculturalism were significantly and positively correlated. Furthermore, both predicted lower levels of anti-immigrant prejudice in France, and both were associated with lower levels of social dominance orientation (SDO). The third study by Kamiejski, Guimond, et al. (2012) conducted with French-Muslim participants of North African origin also measured the four acculturation strategies of Berry's model. This was a sample of adults contacted in public places in Clermont-Ferrand. The results showed that supporting colourblindness was positively related to the integration strategy of Berry's model but *negatively* related to the assimilation strategy. In other words, the more North Africans in France supported colourblindness, the less positive they were towards assimilation (adoption of French culture without retention of North-African culture), directly contradicting the view that colourblindness is interchangeable with assimilation. In fact, colourblindness appeared to be positively related with multiculturalism and negatively related with assimilation.

Considering the model of Koopmans et al. (2005), it is apparent that colourblindness and multiculturalism share a commitment to equality, which is not shared by assimilation (see Figure 2). This could explain why support for multiculturalism correlated positively with support for colourblindness. To examine this interpretation, Kamiejski, Guimond, et al. (2012) considered the correlations between support for colourblindness and support for each of the two components of the SDO scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The SDO scale comprises items related to equality (reverse-scored) and items related to group-based dominance and hierarchy. Evidence suggests that these two components can sometimes function differently (see Jost & Thompson, 2000). Kamiejski, Guimond, et al. (2012) found that colourblindness correlated significantly with the equality component of SDO, even when statistically controlling for the group-based dominance component. The reverse was not the case. Supporting colourblindness did not correlate with the group-based dominance component of the SDO scale when controlling for the effect of the equality component. In other words, supporting colourblindness, much like supporting multiculturalism, reflects a commitment towards equality. Although the word "equality" was not a part of the scale measuring colourblindness (see Table 2), these results strongly suggest, as we suspected, that in France at least, the value of equality underlies the support for colourblindness. Put differently, the goal of treating everybody

equally probably motivates support for colourblindness and the tendency to avoid ethnic, racial, or religious categorisation. Given the extensive experimental research by Moskowitz and Lee (2011), which suggested that an egalitarian goal is highly effective in preventing the initial stage of the stereotyping process, this suggests that colourblindness can be a powerful prejudice-reduction tool.

Perhaps there are different dimensions of colourblindness that characterise different countries? However, research so far has not found support for this view. On the contrary, it appears that the colourblind items in Table 2 form a robust scale that successfully captures the basic meaning of colourblindness as an intergroup ideology in both France and the USA. Siy (2013) used four distinct scales of colourblindness and tried to identify separate dimensions of colourblindness. Several studies conducted with American participants showed that the Knowles et al. (2009) 4-item scale, the Levin et al. (2012) 6-item scale (displayed in Table 2), Rosenthal and Levy's (2012) 5-item scale, and Siy's (2013) 11-item colourblindness scale were all tapping the same unidimensional construct. This is strong evidence for the validity of the colourblindness scale displayed in Table 2.

The research on the management of diversity in organisations has also supported the view that colourblindness should be distinguished from both assimilation and multiculturalism. Podsiadlowski, Gröschke, Kogler, Springer, and van der Zee (2013) found empirical support for a conceptual distinction among what they called "colour-blind", "cultural fairness", and "reinforcing homogeneity" perspectives on diversity in a study of members of multinational organisations in Austria. They defined the perspective of "reinforcing homogeneity" as an orientation seeking to avoid or even reject a diverse workforce in favour of a homogeneous workforce. Clearly this relates to what we have called Assimilation in Table 1. They measured this perspective using items such as "people fit into our organisation when they are similar to our already existing workforce". They found that this perspective relates to viewing diversity as a cost and as a threat. The second and third perspectives, called "cultural fairness" and "colourblindness" respectively, were found to be empirically distinct. These correspond to what we have called multiculturalism and colourblindness. With respect to the colourblind approach, they noted that it entails the belief that "People should be treated equally no matter where they are from; cultural background does not count and does not need to be specifically dealt with in personal management" (p. 160). Moreover, they argued that "ensuring equal and fair treatment and avoiding discriminatory practices" (p. 160) is a basic characteristic of *both* the cultural fairness approach and colourblindness. In other words, while distinct, multiculturalism and colourblindness may in fact be highly compatible psychologically because they are both driven by an egalitarian component, as suggested by Kamiejski, Guimond, et al. (2012).

This is also what emerged from the study by Levin et al. (2012), one of the few studies that have measured assimilation, multiculturalism, and colourblindness simultaneously (see Table 2). From the perspective of social dominance

theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), the authors noted that all ideologies can be classified as legitimising myths, either Hierarchy-Attenuating or Hierarchy-Enhancing. A legitimising myth is defined as a set of beliefs that provide a justification for a given distribution of social values within the social system. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myths justify inegalitarian distributions (e.g., Protestant work ethic) whereas hierarchy-attenuating legitimising myths support egalitarian distributions (e.g., socialism). Furthermore, to classify a given set of beliefs as a legitimising myth, social dominance theory proposes two criteria. First, SDO as a measure of support for social hierarchy and group-based dominance should correlate positively with hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myth and negatively with hierarchy-attenuating legitimising myth. Second, an ideology may be considered as a legitimising myth to the extent that it mediates the effect of SDO on a relevant outcome measure. Levin et al. (2012) tested these propositions among 299 White American college students. Consistent with the evidence reviewed so far, it was found that assimilation correlated *negatively* with multiculturalism and colourblindness, and that multiculturalism correlated *positively* with colourblindness. Furthermore, support was observed for the model displayed in Figure 3.

To measure generalised prejudice, Levin et al. (2012) assessed participants' general attitudes towards Blacks, Asians, Arabs, and Muslims. This scale of generalised prejudice was reliable ($\alpha = .88$). The model represented in Figure 3 is interesting for several reasons. First, because we know that SDO is one of the most powerful predictors of prejudice and outgroup derogation (Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Pratto et al., 2006), it is important to identify the variables that




Figure 3. Path model of relationships among SDO (Social Dominance Orientation), personal support for intergroup ideologies, and prejudice. Path coefficients are standardised beta coefficients. © 2012 Elsevier. Reproduced from Levin et al., 2012 with permission of Elsevier. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder. *** $p < .001$.

can explain the SDO–prejudice link. Previous experimental studies have shown that participants who are randomly allocated to a dominant social position in a hierarchical system display significantly higher levels of outgroup prejudice compared to a control group (see Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003). SDO mediated these experimental effects. Indeed, those who are led to hold a powerful social position in a setting with norms that favour equality, and where they are thus unlikely to favour inequality and group-based dominance, did *not* show higher levels of prejudice (De Oliveira, Guimond, & Dambrun, 2012). These experimental findings go beyond correlational results to suggest that SDO is a mechanism that generates greater prejudice. Hence, the question is what accounts for the fact that those who consistently score high on SDO display more prejudice and racism? Few studies have documented the factors that can mediate the effect of SDO on prejudice. Levin et al. (2012) showed that in the USA the three intergroup ideologies mentioned in this study fully mediate the effect of SDO on ethnic prejudice (see Figure 3). SDO had a positive effect on assimilation, and assimilation had a positive effect on prejudice, supporting the view that assimilation is a hierarchy-enhancing intergroup ideology. In contrast, SDO had a negative effect on multiculturalism and colourblindness, and both multiculturalism and colourblindness had negative effects on prejudice, supporting the hierarchy-attenuating nature of these intergroup ideologies.

These findings provide new perspectives on current political debates on multiculturalism. If multiculturalism is a form of segregation and if some people support it as such, one should find that supporting multiculturalism correlates positively with SDO. Many studies have shown that this is clearly not the case. Assimilation but not multiculturalism related positively to scores on the SDO scale. Wagner, Tisserant, and Bourhis (2013) recently confirmed these results concerning assimilation among a sample of French students. Of course, these findings are correlational and do not indicate causal directions. One could argue that generalised prejudice mediates the relations between SDO and personal support for the three intergroup ideologies. Although Levin et al. (2012) found that this alternative model did not fit the data well, methodologically stronger evidence would be needed to completely rule out alternative models. Nevertheless, given the amount of studies showing that SDO predicts prejudice, these findings of Levin et al. (2012) are theoretically consistent with the fact that these intergroup ideologies are antecedents of prejudice rather than consequences of it. This point also emerged from the experimental studies of Brown and Zagefka (2011), suggesting that acculturation preferences (what we call intergroup ideologies) do have a *causal* effect on intergroup attitudes.

In sum, the bulk of the evidence supports a distinction among assimilation, multiculturalism, and colourblindness. Multiculturalism seems to conflict with assimilation but not necessarily with colourblindness, contrary to initial theoretical expectations. Multiculturalism and colourblindness are hierarchy-attenuating legitimising myths that can be expected to have positive effects on intergroup

relations whereas assimilation is hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myth that can promote more hostility and prejudice. Testing these expectations however would require experimental studies.

THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP IDEOLOGIES ON INTERGROUP RELATIONS

An experimental paradigm

The experimental paradigm created by Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000) was an important advancement in this research area because it suggested that one could study the effect of intergroup ideologies on cognition and behaviours in the laboratory setting. In such cases participants are randomly assigned to a condition where they are led to believe that the colourblindness approach or the multiculturalism approach should be used to deal with intergroup relations. This is done by presenting participants with information based on social science evidence supporting either a multicultural approach or a colourblind approach. After carefully considering this information, participants are asked to engage in tasks that will insure that they have been well exposed to the message (i.e., giving five reasons why a given approach can have a positive effect on intergroup relations; circling the answers of previous participants that were close to their own). Stereotyping and prejudice are then measured as dependent variables. The results based on this paradigm suggest that this type of experimental manipulation can have a significant effect on intergroup perceptions and attitudes, going beyond past research in suggesting definite causal relations.

This paradigm has generated a considerable amount of research, the results of which, often complex, have been reviewed recently; thus there is no need to duplicate these reviews here (see Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013; see also Apfelbaum et al., 2012). Suffice it to say that, initially, Wolsko et al. (2000) showed that, relative to a control condition, both colourblindness and multiculturalism significantly reduced ingroup bias and ethnocentrism among White American students from the University of Colorado which is consistent with the correlational results reviewed above. Using a slightly different manipulation with a focus on multiculturalism, Verkuyten (2005) also found that multiculturalism significantly improved intergroup attitudes among Dutch majority group members and among members of the Turkish minority living in the Netherlands (see also Kauff & Wagner, 2012). Subsequent research has shown that several moderating variables can qualify these findings (see Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013).

Regarding the effect of assimilation on intergroup attitudes, all studies except one that have used the paradigm of Wolsko et al. (2000) have contrasted multiculturalism with colourblindness, without considering the role of assimilation. Research related to the Common Ingroup Identity Model has revealed some

unintended effects of recategorisation that seem to be in line with the role of assimilation (see Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorisation theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2001; Turner, 1987), people can react quite defensively when their identity as members of a group is not acknowledged or recognised. Consequently, experiments have sometimes shown increased rather than the expected decreased in-group bias following recategorisation (see Crisp et al., 2006). These experimental effects are consistent with the view that the emphasis on a one-group representation contained in the Common Ingroup Identity Model represents an assimilation ideology and that this ideology has negative consequences for intergroup relations. Crisp et al. (2006) showed that these “negative” effects of recategorisation were especially likely to occur for perceivers who are highly identified with their subgroup. In fact, they showed (Experiment 4) that when maintaining the salience of subgroups within a recategorised superordinate group, high identifiers no longer displayed the increased ingroup bias.

Verkuyten (2011) tested the effect of assimilation as an ideology directly in four studies, using both correlational and experimental procedures. The paradigm of Wolsko et al. (2000) described above was used in the experimental part of this project. The results showed that assimilation increases prejudice among majority group members, especially when they identify strongly with their ingroup. In addition to having a control condition and an assimilation condition, the design of the experimental studies also had a multiculturalism condition. Regarding the effect of the multiculturalism condition, Verkuyten (2011) wrote: “In contrast to previous work [...], the experimental manipulations in Studies 3 and 4 did not elicit a more positive attitude when participants were encouraged to think in terms of multicultural recognition. One reason might be the changing social and political context in The Netherlands, which in the past decade has moved from an emphasis on multiculturalism towards assimilation” (p. 802).

This critical point about the previous work has not been made before. It stands to reason that if the latter experimental findings reflect the influence of the socio-political context, it must also have been the case for the earlier experiments, including the original studies of Wolsko et al. (2000). This relates to a basic concern raised by Guimond et al. (2013) about the fact that experimental studies on the effect of intergroup ideology have all been carried out in a single country at a single point in time. Consequently, variations in the social and political context were not controlled for. In other words, research in this area may represent what Tajfel (1972) identified as “experiments in a vacuum”. Given variations in policies across countries (see Figure 2), is it reasonable to assume that an experiment testing the effect of a multicultural ideology will yield the same outcome regardless of the socio-political context? Should we not expect that the experiment conducted in a societal context that is sympathetic to the goals of multiculturalism will yield different results from the experiment conducted in the context that is hostile towards multiculturalism? If social

psychology takes into account the influence of the social context, it should provide explanations that incorporate the influence of the social and political context. Otherwise, researchers will continue to propose post-hoc interpretations that do not offer important theoretical advances.

At present there is so little evidence of the psychological effect of national policies that several researchers are now asserting that institutional policies apparently have little impact on the individual (Abu-Rayya 2009; Van de Vijver, Breugelmans, & Schalk-Soekar, 2008). For example, research conducted with university students indicated uniformly positive attitudes towards multiculturalism and uniformly negative attitudes towards assimilation across many different countries, even when the countries in question have different national policies (see Bourhis et al., 2009). Bourhis et al. (2009) suggested that these results reflect the common individualistic culture shared by university students across the western world. However, the implication of this analysis is that the policies themselves make very little difference.

Similarly, Breugelmans, Van de Vijver, and Schalk-Soekar (2009) have investigated the stability of majority attitudes towards multiculturalism in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2007. Using large samples, they used 19 items from the Multicultural Attitude Scale of Breugelmans and Van de Vijver (2004) to measure support for multiculturalism. This scale, developed on the basis of the multicultural ideology scale of Berry and Kalin (1995), has shown good psychometric properties. Because the policy of multiculturalism in the Netherlands has undergone substantial changes during this period, one would expect to find a significant shift in attitudes towards multiculturalism. Contrary to that expectation, Breugelmans et al. (2009) reported that support for multiculturalism has remained remarkably stable over the 9-year period.

With these results, one conclusion would suggest little or no relation between policy and ideology. However, an alternative point of view suggests that current null findings may not offer a sound basis from which to draw conclusions. The above evidence may simply indicate that the relationships between institutional policies and intergroup ideologies are more complex than expected. Introducing the concept of cultural norm of integration, Guimond et al. (2013) predicted and found strong and reliable relations between integration policies and intergroup ideologies.

The missing link: Cultural norms of integration and national policies

In recent years, social psychologists have become increasingly concerned about the influence of culture on human cognition and behaviour (Guimond, 2010). It appears that this influence is not as fixed and permanent as was once thought (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Recent studies have shown, for example, that cultural differences in individualism–

collectivism often boil down to differences in cultural norms rather than differences in personal beliefs or values related to individualism and collectivism (Fischer et al., 2009; Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Zou et al., 2009). In this context, Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg and Wan (2010) proposed an *intersubjective approach*, claiming that “rather than acting on their personal beliefs and values, people sometimes act on the beliefs and values they perceive to be widespread in their culture” (p. 482).

Guimond et al. (2013) have similarly argued for the need to consider the *perceived level of support* for a given intergroup ideology, or perceived *norm*, as a critical process allowing one to better understand the link between intergroup ideologies and national policies. So far, intergroup ideologies, such as multiculturalism, have been studied as personal attitudes; that is, people are requested to indicate the extent to which they personally support or oppose various ways of dealing with diversity and intergroup relations (see Table 2; for an exception, see Breugelmans & Vijver, 2004, who have also measured perceived social norms about multiculturalism). This means that intergroup ideologies have been conceptualised as being located within individual minds. Guimond et al. (2013) have argued that what is missing from this conceptualisation is that members of a cultural group often share intergroup ideologies (see Moscovici, 1982).

In his theory of culture Sperber (1996) proposed a distinction between mental representations and cultural representations that is highly relevant here. Mental representations are beliefs, attitudes, or memories that are located within individual minds. Sperber (1996) emphasised that a small number of these cognitions will be communicated to others. He suggested that cognitions that are repeatedly communicated and that become widespread within a social group should be called “cultural representations” in the sense that they are representations shared by a group of people (see also Norenzayan & Atran, 2004). This is of course highly related to the defining concerns of social psychology as a field of study (see Guimond, 2010; Mesoudi, 2009; Smith & Semin, 2006). As Moscovici (1976) noted, every science is organised around the analysis of a central phenomenon. The fundamental phenomenon in *social* psychology is the phenomenon of social influence, the fact that our own personal ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and values are shaped by what others around us believe in or value (Crandall, O’Brien, & Eshleman, 2002; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Moscovici, 1976; Nugier & Chekroun, 2011; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001; Turner, 1991; Zou et al., 2009). Yet research on intergroup ideologies has neglected this basic point.

This theoretical analysis led Guimond et al. (2013) to propose a model, which suggests that the policies that are found in various countries will generate cultural norms of integration that will shape individual endorsement of intergroup ideologies, and this endorsement will in turn have an effect on intergroup attitudes and behaviours. They tested this model by conducting the same study in four countries: Canada, the USA, the UK, and Germany. These countries were selected because they have taken different approaches in the assimilation/

multiculturalism debate. Indeed, according to the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI, see <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/index.html>) developed by Banting and Kymlicka (2003), Canada can be classified as a country with a *strong* pro-diversity policy, the USA and the UK as having a *medium* pro-diversity policy, and Germany as having a *low* pro-diversity policy. This classification is based on nine specific criteria, such as the existence of a government policy promoting multiculturalism, having a multicultural ministry or secretariat, allowing dual citizenship, and so on. Other analyses of the policy within each of these four countries are generally consistent with this ranking. As mentioned above, Koopmans et al. (2005) also find that the policy in Germany is assimilationist in nature and thus low in terms of the promotion of diversity. More recently, Europe has been at the forefront of attempts to structure the knowledge about integration policies with the development of a new index (not to be confused with the MPI) called the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, for complete details see <http://www.mipex.eu/>). MIPEX is a measure of policy that is distinct from the MPI developed by Banting and Kymlicka (2003). Using 148 policy indicators, MIPEX measures integration policies in all countries that are members of the European Union as well as several additional countries in more recent years. MIPEX I comprises the data gathered in 2005, MIPEX II in 2007, and MIPEX III in 2011. In each country the data are gathered to assess seven policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. Thus, MIPEX identifies countries that are closest to achieving the highest European and international standards for all residents. Higher scores on this index indicates greater pro-diversity of the policy in a given country (see Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013, for initial evidence on the value of MIPEX as an index of the extent to which a country is engaged in a policy of multiculturalism).

As can be seen in Table 3, of the four countries selected by Guimond et al. (2013), Canada is the country with the highest score on MIPEX III, consistent with the MPI in Banting and Kymlicka (2003). The second line in Table 3 indicates the change in score for each country from MIPEX II in 2007 to MIPEX III in 2011, thus during the period immediately preceding the study of Guimond et al. (2013). A positive change score would indicate a move towards a stronger multicultural policy. The score for the USA was not computed in MIPEX II so no change score is available for this country. However, it can be

TABLE 3

Scores on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) for four countries rated as high in pro-diversity policy (Canada) to low (Germany) on the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI). Higher scores indicate more pro-diversity policy

	<i>Canada</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Germany</i>
MIPEX III (2011)	72	62	57	57
Change from MIPEX II (2007)	+1	<i>na</i>	-10	+1

seen in Table 3 that the policy in Canada and in Germany has been stable over time, which was not the case in the UK. In fact, of all 30 countries considered, the change in the UK (-10) is the most important one, suggesting decreased support for diversity and increased support for assimilation. In other words, by 2011 the policy in the UK became much more assimilationist, very similar to that in Germany. However, because the UK was much more multicultural in its approach in previous years, it probably deserves to be considered as having a medium, while Germany can be considered as having a low, pro-diversity policy.

Within each of these four countries, approximately 300 university students were asked to answer a questionnaire measuring the perceived multiculturalism norm, the perceived assimilation norm, as well as personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and assimilation. In Germany participants came from both East and West Germany. In Canada they came from the province of Ontario (University of Toronto and University of Ottawa) whereas in the UK they came from the University of Kent. In the USA the participants were sampled in three different states, California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Personal attitudes were measured using two 3-item scales (see Table 2). "Normative" items were created simply by adding phrases such as "In [country], most people think that ..." at the beginning of measures of personal attitudes such as those displayed in Table 2. Moreover, for these normative items, participants received written instruction stating that they were to indicate the extent to which the views presented were shared by other people in their country. All foreign students were excluded from the final sample, leaving only Canadian, British, American, and German citizens. Guimond et al. (2013) predicted strong country differences in the perceived norms but not necessarily in personal attitudes. A significant Country by Type of measures (norms vs. personal attitudes) interaction ($p = .001$) supported this prediction.

More specifically, it was expected that Canada would be highest in terms of the perceived multiculturalism norm, followed by the two countries classified as medium in their pro-diversity policy (i.e., the USA and the UK), with Germany showing the lowest level of perceived support for multiculturalism in the country. The findings supported this hypothesis. Differences between countries in the perceived norms were large and statistically significant. On a 7-point scale, the only country where the perceived level of support for multiculturalism was higher than the mid-point of the scale was Canada, with a mean score of 4.45 ($SD = 1.13$). This is consistent with the fact that Canada has a strong multiculturalism policy. The mean score in Germany was 2.95 ($SD = 0.82$), implying little support for multiculturalism in Germany. This is consistent with the fact that there has never been a national policy of multiculturalism in Germany. The mean scores in the USA and in the UK were between these two extremes (3.74 and 3.49 respectively, with SD s of 1.06 and 1.03, respectively).

In contrast, when considering personal support for multiculturalism—that is, when considering support for the intergroup ideology of multiculturalism as it is

usually measured—such a clear differentiation between countries as a function of their policy was not observed (see Guimond et al., 2013). For example, German participants favoured multiculturalism ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 0.89$) almost as much as did Canadian participants ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.12$). Based on results such as this one, one is led to believe that Germany and Canada do not differ much in terms of multiculturalism. In fact, considering the perceived norm, the results revealed that only Canadian participants perceive that others share their views on multiculturalism. We will consider the implications of these findings for the explanation of prejudice later. Before that, it should be noted that Guimond et al. (2013) also used a priming manipulation to explore the effect of norm salience. All participants were randomly assigned to a condition that manipulated the salience of the integration norm. In the norm-salient condition, participants were first led to think about the views that are widespread in their country by answering the norm items before expressing their own personal views. In the norm-not-salient condition, the reverse was the case. Participants were asked to express their personal views first before answering the norm items. A significant country \times condition interaction was observed on the measure of the perceived multiculturalism norm. This interaction was significant for participants from Canada and the UK, who reacted differently to the manipulation, but not for participants from the USA and Germany. As shown in Figure 4, Canadians perceived the multiculturalism norm to be significantly stronger in the norm-salient condition compared to the norm-not-salient condition. With an identical manipulation, the reverse was observed among British students who perceived the multiculturalism norm as significantly *weaker* in the norm-salient condition compared to the norm-not-salient condition. Reinforcing the idea of a difference in cultural norms in the two




Figure 4. Significant interaction effect of norm salience condition on perceived multiculturalism norm by country (1 = low perceived support for multiculturalism; 7 = high perceived support for multiculturalism in the country). © 2013 American Psychological Association. Reproduced from Guimond et al., 2013 with permission of the American Psychological Association. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rights holder. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

settings, this experimental effect is strikingly consistent with the move away from multiculturalism reported in MIPEX for the UK (see Table 3; see also Joppke, 2004). No such retreat from multiculturalism occurred and no such “negative” effect of the experimental manipulation of norm salience was observed in the other three countries considered.

In sum, when measuring the perceived level of support for multiculturalism (or multicultural norm), we found a pattern of results that is consistent with the actual diversity policy in the country, as assessed by MPI or by MIPEX. In the country classified as highest in diversity policy, people perceived the highest level of support for multiculturalism.

The results regarding the perceived assimilation norm and personal attitudes towards assimilation were generally the reverse of what was found for multiculturalism. The only country where the perceived assimilation norm was lower than the mid-point of the scale was Canada ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.30$). The assimilation norm was perceived to be much stronger in the USA ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.07$), in the UK ($M = 4.80$, $SD = 0.93$) and in Germany ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.03$). Thus, investigating the cultural norms of integration revealed information that is useful to identify the nature of the policy that is operating in a particular country. Whereas the perceived multicultural norm was found to be much stronger in the USA compared to Germany, the perceived assimilation norm was not found to be much weaker. This suggests that the ideology of assimilation is just as powerful in the USA as it is in Germany.

Cultural norms of integration as shared beliefs

To what extent do the perceived norms related to assimilation and multiculturalism reflect shared beliefs? This question was investigated as a part of a large study involving a representative sample of the French population ($N = 1001$; see Guimond, Streith, & Roebroek, *in press*). Using measures similar to those used by Guimond et al. (2013), it was hypothesised that the perceived assimilation and multiculturalism norms would be less likely to vary by socio-demographic characteristics than would personal attitudes, reflecting the fact that the former are more widely shared by the French population than the latter. The results supported this expectation. Personal attitudes towards assimilation and multiculturalism varied significantly by age, gender, level of education, and political orientation of the respondents. In contrast, the perceived norms varied only by the level of education, with the better educated respondents being more likely than others to perceive the French as supporting assimilation rather than multiculturalism. However, we found no effect of gender, age, or political orientation on the perceived norms, suggesting that these perceptions reflect widely shared beliefs.

To measure political orientation, participants were asked to place themselves on a scale from “the most left-wing position” to “the most right-wing position”. The validity of this self-placement scale was checked with answers to an item




Figure 5. Perception of the level of support (*i.e.*, norm) for Assimilation (AS) and for Multiculturalism (MC) in France as a function of political orientation (1 = little support; 4 = high support). © <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>, All rights reserved. Reproduced from Guimond et al., *in press* with permission of <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightholder.

asking the respondents to name the political party that best represented their views. Figure 5 displays the mean scores on the measures of perceived multiculturalism and assimilation norms in France according to the political orientation of the respondents. It shows that all political groups in France agree that French people are more likely to support assimilation than multiculturalism. Particularly striking is the fact that the extreme-left is in total agreement with the extreme-right in these judgements. This is of course far from being the case when considering the measures of personal support for assimilation and multiculturalism. As shown in Figure 6, mean scores on the scales measuring personal




Figure 6. Personal attitudes towards Assimilation (AS) and Multiculturalism (MC) in France, as a function of political orientation (1 = unfavourable; 4 = favourable). © <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>, All rights reserved. Reproduced from Guimond et al., *in press* with permission of <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightholder.

support for multiculturalism and assimilation revealed, as expected, large differences as a function of the political orientation of the respondents. Whereas the extreme-left wing rejects assimilation and supports multiculturalism, [Figure 6](#) shows that only the extreme-right political group in France supports assimilation over multiculturalism. This means that the extreme-right-wing group is in fact the only group in France that holds personal views that are congruent with the perceived position of most French people. In other words, these results indicate a phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1993). The French largely underestimate the support that exists in the population in favour of multiculturalism. The position that is considered the majority opinion is in fact a minority position. With the exception of the extreme-right, the French population expressed positive private views of multiculturalism. Comparing [Figure 5](#) (perceived norms) and [Figure 6](#) (personal attitudes) provides in a sense a measure of the distinction between the individual and the social mind (Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 2012).

NATIONAL POLICIES AND ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE

The ultimate goal of much research on intergroup ideologies is to identify the conditions that can foster harmony in intergroup relations. Thus, when studying the perceived norms and the levels of personal support for various intergroup ideologies, our aim was to document the ways in which a given intergroup ideology reduces the levels of prejudice against outgroups. In many western nations today, Muslims, or those who are assumed to be Muslims, are often the victims of prejudice and discrimination. In an analysis of data from the European Values Study conducted in 30 countries, Stabac and Listhaug (2008) suggested that the level of anti-Muslim prejudice is generally higher compared to the level of prejudice against other immigrants. Historical and political analyses of the Islamist movement led Kepel (2008) to propose that the outcome of the major conflict of our times will be played out not in New York, Washington, Riyadh or Bagdad, but in the European suburbs. From this point of view, the European community can either succeed in integrating ethnic and religious minority groups within its ranks, which should diminish the conflicts, or fail and push these minorities to the margin, laying the grounds for extremism and fanaticism. To better understand current conflicts, a major task is to identify the conditions under which the majority groups in Europe and other western nations adopt open and accepting attitudes towards Muslims, as oppose to rejecting and discriminatory views.

In this regard, to test the effect of national policies, comparative studies are needed. Because prejudice is universal, showing that there is prejudice in a country where there is a particular policy does not imply that the policy is responsible for this level of prejudice. On the other hand, comparative studies that test a theoretical hypothesis do not require large representative samples,

although they would be ideal. As Straus (2009) showed, using unrepresentative samples of students is, paradoxically, a valid means of testing for national context effects. If the national policy has an effect on people, it will affect students as anybody else: “convenience samples that are not representative of the nation but are comparable across nations can provide valid tests of theories about differences between nations” (Straus, 2009, p. 183). Still, there is a need to be clear about the policies that exist in a given country. Claiming that a particular country has a multicultural policy when in fact it does not will necessarily lead to dubious conclusions. This is why our measures of cultural norms of integration may be important. Objective classifications of the policies, such as MIPEX, are certainly useful. However, for some specific cases, it is possible that the objective classification is not very informative about what is actually going on in the country (Berry et al., 2006). Using both specific policy indices and measures of perceived norms probably offers the strongest basis for testing the effect of national policies on prejudice.

Considering previous correlational and experimental research, Guimond et al. (2013) in their four-country study (Canada, USA, UK, and Germany) predicted that if national policies are indeed an important element of the socio-political context, having an effect on intergroup relations, then participants from the country with the strongest pro-diversity policy should display the lowest levels of anti-Muslim prejudice. In contrast, critics of multiculturalism would make the opposite prediction because, far from solving problems of intergroup relations, multicultural policies would in fact increase racism and discrimination by fostering group essentialism (Kymlicka, 2010; Verkuyten, 2006). To measure prejudice, participants were presented with a list of 15 groups and were asked to indicate their general attitude (1 = *very unfavourable* vs. 7 = *very favourable*) towards each of them. The following four groups were included in that list in random order: Pakistanis, Arabs, Turks, and Muslims. The ratings of these four groups were averaged to form a single scale of anti-Muslim prejudice, reverse coded so that higher scores indicated less-favourable ratings or higher prejudice. Previous research using these thermometer-type ratings have shown that this is a valid measure of prejudice that predicts relevant behaviours (such as discriminatory intentions or voting for the extreme right; see Dambun & Guimond, 2001; Guimond et al., 2013; Gutin & Guimond, 2014). The reliability coefficients were similar for all four countries. In addition, SDO correlated significantly with this measure of anti-Muslim prejudice in all four countries, supporting the cross-cultural validity of the measure.

The results showed a significant effect of country on anti-Muslim prejudice, with Canadians, as expected, showing the lowest level of prejudice and Germans showing the highest level. The difference between Canadian and German students was highly significant and consistent with previous research, suggesting that a multiculturalism policy is associated with more favourable intergroup attitudes. The mean level of prejudice observed among American and British




Figure 7. Integrative conceptual framework showing the interplay of potentially universal and culture-specific determinants of intergroup attitudes and behaviours. © 2013 American Psychological Association. Reproduced from Guimond et al., 2013 with permission of the American Psychological Association. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

participants was between these two extremes, with Americans being similar to Canadians and the British being similar to the Germans. However, going beyond past research, Guimond et al. (2013) tested a causal model, seeking to explain why country (diversity policy) has a significant effect on anti-Muslim prejudice.

The model, represented schematically in Figure 7, attempts to include variations in the socio-political context as an integral part of a framework seeking to explain intergroup attitudes and behaviours. More specifically, the model pools culture-specific factors (such as cultural norms related to assimilation and multiculturalism) and general social psychological determinants (such as SDO). Whereas the influence of the former (e.g., cultural norms) can be largely dependent on the socio-political context, the effects of the latter (e.g., SDO) are expected to operate in similar ways, regardless of the socio-political context. As shown in Figure 7, the policies that are found in various countries are expected to generate distinctive cultural norms of integration. These norms are an important feature of the socio-political context that can vary considerably across nations and across time. When salient, they are expected to play an important role in the explanation of intergroup attitudes and behaviours indirectly, through their effect on the level of support for a given intergroup ideology, and directly, in the sense that, as the intersubjective approach suggests (Chiu et al., 2010), people can sometimes act on the basis of the views that they perceive to be widespread in their country. Thus, the socio-political context of

a country that has a strong multiculturalism policy is expected to be characterised by a strong multicultural norm that values cultural diversity. This multicultural norm is expected to lead to a personal commitment towards multiculturalism (personal endorsement) that will result in more tolerance and less anti-Muslim prejudice (see Figure 7).

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to test this framework. It included country as a variable in the analysis (Germany coded as low, the USA and the UK coded as medium, and Canada coded as high in pro-diversity policy) as well as all variables discussed above, including the measures of perceived multicultural and assimilation norms, SDO, the measures of personal support for multiculturalism and assimilation, and the measure of anti-Muslim prejudice. Whereas various parts of this model were discussed above, such as the intergroup ideology (endorsement) → prejudice path, or the country (policy) → cultural norm path, the aim here was to test the framework as a whole. The results showed that, as expected, there was an especially good fit between the proposed model and the empirical evidence in the norm-salient condition as opposed to the norm-not-salient condition (see Guimond et al., 2013). This is a critical result, suggesting not only that the normative context is a pivotal element of the proposed model, but also that the influence of cultural norms on cognition and behaviour are more likely to be observed when these norms are salient in a given situation (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Hong et al., 2000; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). More specifically, in the norm-salient condition, the results of SEM revealed an acceptable fit of our overall model: $\chi^2 = 34.05, df = 4, p = .00, RMSEA = .079, CFI = .99, GFI = .99$. As shown in Figure 8, the direct effect of country on prejudice, which was




Figure 8. Mediation model testing overall conceptual framework in the norm-salient condition. For “Country”, Germany is coded as low in terms of diversity policy (1), the UK and the USA are coded as medium (2), and Canada is coded as high (3). Paths represent unstandardized coefficients. Dashed paths indicate nonsignificant pathways. MC = multiculturalism; AS = assimilation; SDO = social dominance orientation. © 2013 American Psychological Association. Reproduced from Guimond et al., 2013 with permission of the American Psychological Association. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

statistically significant in the norm-not-salient condition, became non-significant in the norm-salient condition, supporting the hypothesis that the variables in our model can account for the effect of national policy on prejudice especially in that condition. Indeed, in the norm-salient condition, SEM revealed that country (policy) has a significant positive effect on the perceived multiculturalism norm (.53, $p < .001$) and, the perceived multiculturalism norm has a direct negative effect on anti-Muslim prejudice ($-.12$, $p < .001$) and an indirect effect via personal attitudes towards multiculturalism. Consistent with past research, supporting multiculturalism (personal endorsement) predicted a lower level of anti-Muslim prejudice ($-.18$, $p < .001$). In short, these data provide, for the first time to our knowledge, evidence that the lower level of prejudice observed in Canada can be linked to the fact that there is a stronger multicultural norm in Canada than in other western countries. The existence of a multiculturalism policy in Canada can obviously explain the fact that the perceived multicultural norm in Canada is stronger. Thus, these results quite strongly implicate the policy in the explanation of intergroup attitudes.

When considering the domain of assimilation, the findings were similar with one exception (see Figure 8). Country had a significant negative effect on the perceived assimilation norm ($-.27$, $p < .001$), and the perceived assimilation norm had an indirect effect on prejudice via personal attitudes towards assimilation but no direct effect on prejudice ($-.02$). Consistent with past research, supporting assimilation was predictive of a higher level of anti-Muslim prejudice (.22, $p < .001$).

Concerning the lower part of the model involving general determinants (see Figure 7), there was no effect of country (diversity policy) on SDO but SDO had, as predicted, a direct effect on prejudice (.18, $p < .001$) as well as an indirect effect through personal attitudes towards assimilation and multiculturalism. Moreover, the effects of SDO were independent of the perceived multiculturalism and assimilation norms. Thus, the results confirmed that the perceived norms (the box labelled "Culture-specific determinants" in Figure 7) and SDO (the box labelled "General social-psychological determinants") are two independent factors that affect personal support for intergroup ideologies (the box labelled "Personal endorsement ..." in Figure 7).

Finally, within-country analyses were conducted to test the hypothesis, which proposed that whereas some variables in the model played the same role across countries (e.g., SDO) other variables played a different role in different countries. It was predicted that when the societal context supports multiculturalism, personal attitudes towards multiculturalism would mediate the effect of SDO on prejudice, whereas when the societal context supports assimilation, attitudes towards assimilation would mediate the effect of SDO on prejudice. These predictions were confirmed in the norm-salient condition. Whereas SDO predicted prejudice in all countries and in all conditions, evidence suggests that the mediating role of personal attitudes towards assimilation and multiculturalism

varied across countries. In Canada personal attitudes towards multiculturalism rather than personal attitudes towards assimilation mediated the SDO–prejudice relation. In Germany the reverse was the case; that is, only personal attitudes towards assimilation were a significant mediator of the SDO–prejudice relation. In the USA and the UK both personal attitudes towards multiculturalism and towards assimilation mediated the SDO–prejudice relation, which is consistent with the fact that, in these countries, both assimilation and multiculturalism are important intergroup ideologies.

French Colourblindness: *La vie en rose*?

The evidence presented by Guimond et al. (2013) demonstrated the importance of considering the societal context when studying the effect of two intergroup ideologies: multiculturalism and assimilation. Although Guimond et al. (2013) did not consider the role of colourblindness, their study was a part of an overall project designed to test the effect of colourblindness by considering the socio-political context in France. As Table 1 indicates, and as Koopmans et al. (2005) suggested (see Figure 2), France is a good example of a country with a colourblind policy. Thus, a separate study (De Oliveira, Kamiejski, & Guimond, 2014) was conducted with 200 French university students using a very similar procedure. The study was conducted at approximately the same time as the one conducted with students from Canada, Germany, the USA, and the UK by Guimond et al. (2013). As in previous studies, foreign students were excluded from the final sample. Focusing on colourblindness in France appeared particularly relevant because, apart from Kamiejski, Guimond, et al. (2012), almost all social-psychological studies carried out on colourblindness have been conducted in the USA. The bulk of the findings obtained in the USA have *not* shown that colourblindness is able to bring about intergroup harmony (see Park & Judd, 2005; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). Apfelbaum et al. (2012) concluded their review of recent research by suggesting that “colour blindness often creates more problems than it solves” (p. 208).

However, our approach suggests that to understand the effect of colourblindness as an intergroup ideology it may be critical to consider the wider social and political context. Our initial investigation conducted in France (i.e., Kamiejski, Guimond, et al., 2012) quite clearly suggested that colourblindness might have a more positive effect on intergroup relations in the French rather than American racial relations context. With the measure of anti-Muslim prejudice used by Guimond et al. (2013), which involved ratings of Pakistanis, Arabs, Turks, and Muslims, the mean score observed by De Oliveira et al. (2014) among the sample of French university students was 2.94 ($SD = 1.42$) on a 7-point scale, with 7 indicating a higher level of prejudice. This low score is equivalent to the mean score of 3.16 ($SD = 1.49$) observed in Canada by Guimond et al. (2013). In

TABLE 4
Results of national surveys comparing France, the UK and Germany on attitudes
towards Muslims (adapted from Weil, 2008)

<i>Institute</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>% yes</i>	<i>% No</i>
Harris, 2007	“Would you object if your child was to marry a Muslim?”	France	19	51
		U.K.	36	41
		Germany	39	38
PEW, 2006	“There is a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society”	France	26	74
		U.K.	54	35
		Germany	70	26
Harris, 2007	“Muslims are a threat to National security”	France	20	68
		U.K.	38	45
		Germany	28	58

The survey conducted by Harris Interactive was published August 20 2007 in the Financial Times (see Weil, 2008). The survey conducted by Pew Research Center (2006) was retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/>

other words, French university students display, as do Canadians, a significantly lower level of anti-Muslim prejudice compared to British ($M = 3.62$) or German students ($M = 3.63$). These results are not unusual. Weil (2008) attracted our attention to several surveys conducted among representative samples, all showing that the French display more positive attitudes towards Muslims than do the Germans or British. Table 4 presents some of these results originating from American (Pew Research Center, 2006) and British institutes (Financial Times, 2007, see Weil, 2008). The findings addressing the questions reported in Table 4 showed large differences between countries, with people in the UK and Germany consistently displaying less-positive attitudes towards Muslims compared to people from France (see also Kepel, 2008). Thus, our results among university students are in line with these data from representative samples.

Weil (2008) assumed that these survey results reflect the positive role of the French republican model but he did not provide any data to support such a claim. In contrast, we have examined this question in detail. Our contention that France has a strong colourblind tradition leads us to expect a strong colourblind norm in France that would help to explain the lower level of anti-Muslim prejudice in France.

Following the procedure of Guimond et al. (2013), all French students were randomly assigned to a control condition (norm-not-salient) or to a norm-salient condition. French participants in the norm-salient condition of De Oliveira et al. (2014) started by answering five items assessing the colourblind norm in France. As was observed in Canada for the multiculturalism norm (see Figure 4), the results in France revealed that the participants in the norm-salient condition perceived the colourblind norm in France to be significantly stronger compared

to the participants in the norm-not-salient condition ($p = .03$). This is the first piece of evidence to suggest a colourblind norm in France. Furthermore, when controlling for the perceived multiculturalism and assimilation norms, the mean score of French participants in the control condition on the measure of the colourblind norm in France was significantly higher compared to the mean score of German participants and marginally higher compared to the mean score of British participants reported in the study of Guimond et al. (2013). Large differences were also observed between the three countries in the level of personal attitudes towards colourblindness. De Oliveira et al. (2014) found that French students were more likely to support colourblindness compared to British or German students.

In sum, the French context is characterised by a stronger colourblind norm compared to the German and to some extent the UK contexts. We believe that the lower level of anti-Muslim prejudice observed in France is, at least partly, the result of the influence of this norm. Indeed, De Oliveira et al. (2014) found that personal support for colourblindness has a stronger negative effect on anti-Muslim prejudice in the norm-salient condition than in the norm-not-salient condition. Furthermore, colourblindness mediated the effect of SDO on prejudice only when norms were salient, which is consistent with the results reported by Guimond et al. (2013). In that condition, lower levels of SDO led to higher levels of support for colourblindness and support for colourblindness led to lower levels of anti-Muslim prejudice.

CONCLUSION

All societies are culturally diverse but only some societies have a multiculturalism policy designed to maintain and enhance their diversity. Many have other types of policies, such as a colourblind policy or an assimilation policy. What are the psychological implications of living in a society that supports multiculturalism as opposed to assimilation or colourblindness? The research reviewed here indicates that important developments have occurred in recent years in relation to this question.

We reviewed correlational and experimental research, showing that multiculturalism and colourblindness have less deleterious consequences for intergroup relations compared to assimilation ideology. Although there is much support for this view, evidence that multiculturalism and colourblind ideologies can have negative consequences for intergroup relations has also been reported (see Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). The central question remains: What explains the effect of these intergroup ideologies on individuals' intergroup attitudes and behaviours? We have argued for a new vantage point in this regard, giving more attention to the wider social and political context and suggesting that intergroup ideologies may have variable effects that depend on this context.

The evidence reviewed in relation with this approach rests mainly on the distinction between the perceived cultural norm related to a given intergroup ideology and personal attitudes towards that ideology. The results confirmed the validity of this distinction. This first step opens new perspectives for research in this area. For example, perceived norms and personal attitudes can be congruent or incongruent. Are there important implications when there is a perfect match between the two as opposed to a mismatch? In most if not all previous studies, including large-scale surveys carried out in Europe, the focus has been on personal views and personal attitudes towards multiculturalism. Our findings reveal the need for further research that would also investigate cultural representations or the perceived level of support for various intergroup ideologies. It cannot be assumed that the results obtained when using measures of personal attitudes are interchangeable with those that rely on perceived norms.

Not only is the distinction between perceived norm and personal support a valid one psychologically, but also the second type of evidence reviewed above indicates that the policy that exists in a country is more strongly related to the perceived cultural norms than to personal attitudes. For example, a manipulation of norm salience led to the perception of a weaker multicultural norm only in the country that has experienced a (negative) change in policy prior to the study (as indicated in MIPEX, see [Table 3](#) and [Figure 4](#)). In contrast, and consistent with previous research, we failed to observe a similar link between policy and personal attitudes towards multiculturalism. Finally, this distinction between norms and personal attitudes was shown to be important for understanding the effect of the national context on prejudice.

The results suggest that a strong diversity policy will have a positive effect on intergroup attitudes to the extent that it succeeds in creating a norm that values cultural diversity. Countries claiming that multiculturalism is creating problems of intergroup relations probably did not succeed in creating such a norm. Our arguments do, however, have some important limitations. We have no evidence about how a norm that favours diversity can be created or about why a backlash can happen. What feature of a multiculturalism policy could be critical in this regard? How do ideas about multiculturalism, colourblindness or assimilation come to be widely distributed and shared in a society and even across societies? Clearly, social psychology has a lot to offer for the analysis of such questions. Yet not much has been done so far in this regard. Creating cultural norms takes time and probably rests on a clear and coherent plan of action. Research needs to be conducted to test the properties of norms, such as their coherence or consistency, which can facilitate their internalisation. For example, it might be useful to look into research that has focused on the process by which people integrate new identities into their self (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007) to provide insights about the ways to integrate the norms. We would also argue for the need to consider how some key institutions (e.g., schools, organisations, media) can be involved in spreading intergroup ideologies (see Weldon, 2006).

For example, multiculturalism is being transmitted in the school system of many countries through programmes of multicultural education (Verkuyten, 2014). However, in other countries, such as France, the alleged incompatibility between multiculturalism and a colourblind approach leads to a strong resistance (Lorcerie, 2002). At present, we know very little about the role of the schools in disseminating intergroup ideologies.

Research is also needed to deal with other theoretical and methodological shortcomings. Cultural norms of integration were studied in a restricted number of countries, often with unrepresentative samples, limited experimental control, and adequate but perhaps not optimal measurements. These initial studies did not use representative samples, as noted above. In fact, because young and highly educated individuals can be expected to favour cultural diversity, the use of university students was particularly interesting to gauge a potential tendency to engage in social projection. People often project their own self-views onto others (Krueger, 2007). When asking about what the Canadians, Americans, British, or Germans think of multiculturalism and assimilation, one option was that students would simply project their own views about multiculturalism and assimilation unto their national group. This is not what occurred because German students, as predicted, were personally very supportive of multiculturalism (as were university students in other countries) but they estimated that most Germans are not in favour of multiculturalism. This was confirmed with a representative sample of the French population (Guimond et al., *in press*). However, with a representative sample one can gauge the extent to which the perceived norm is an accurate estimate of personal views. In France we found a case of pluralistic ignorance, with most participants favouring multiculturalism but believing that most other people in France did not. Research should be conducted in other countries. It would be important to know for example if a norm that favours multiculturalism was created in countries that are high on various indices of multiculturalism policy, such as Australia or Sweden.

Studies distinguishing between minority and majority groups are also needed. The fact is that the perception of a strong multicultural norm in Canada is based on a sample of English-speaking Canadians from Ontario. The extent to which immigrants and minority group members share these cultural representations should be closely examined in the future. As a part of our on-going research, we found strong and reliable differences between French-speaking and English-speaking people in Québec, with the former being more likely to perceive a predominant assimilation norm over multiculturalism in Québec (de la Sablonnière, Pelletier-Dumas, & Guimond, 2014). Interestingly, when considering personal support for multiculturalism, no reliable differences between the two groups were observed.

Because a shared belief tends to be perceived as more valid compared to the one that is not shared, it is important to study how people respond when they learn that other people share their beliefs (i.e., when a cultural norm is made

salient). We know that even if a norm is misperceived, it can still influence behaviour (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993). However, we also know that the effects of norms are important when they are salient or relevant in a particular social context (Cialdini et al., 1991). Our findings suggest that without a manipulation of norm salience, much of the effect of these cultural norms of integration can go unnoticed. This was observed most notably when testing the mediating factors of the SDO–prejudice relation. When cultural norms were salient, personal attitudes towards multiculturalism mediated the effect of SDO on anti-Muslim prejudice in Canada, whereas attitudes towards assimilation mediated this effect in Germany, and attitudes towards colourblindness mediated this relation in France. The same process takes on different forms in different countries. These results support the idea that the effects of intergroup ideologies vary across countries to the extent that these countries have distinctive social and political context. However, the important message is also that certain variables that operate in similar ways across cultures can be combined with culture-specific processes to arrive at better explanations. Clearly, future research needs to explore the value of an approach that combines culture-specific and culture-general processes.

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