

EMERGENCE, DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF UN-NATO COOPERATION IN KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN*

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Abstract: International organisations (IOs) like UN, NATO and EU have been tasked with cooperating to provide numerous services that include security, distribution of humanitarian relief and management of reconstruction efforts. These joint operations have triggered the proliferation of scholarship on inter-organisational cooperation with competing theoretical explanations about the factors that facilitate and impede such cooperation. This article compares and contrasts the emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation of such cooperation involving the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in two of the organisations' largest missions – in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It argues that in all stages – emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation – cooperation is more successful when it emerges or is endorsed by officers operating in the field, when IOs overcome bureaucratic, resource and environmental constraints for cooperation and finally when the IOs choose a decentralised or informal way to manage their relationship.

The article advances the argument that inter-organisational cooperation is more likely to emerge informally among the field staff because it is more responsive to the surrounding environment and tends to overcome differences of organisational culture in order to divide tasks based on their expertise. To this end, the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan validate the argument that formal and imposed cooperation driven solely by member-states and IO headquarters is insufficient to overcome bureaucratic, resource and environmental constraints. Similarly, centralised attempts to institutionalise inter-governmental cooperation cannot be effective unless they take into account the preferences of field staff, IO partners and mediators.

Keywords: the United Nations, NATO, inter-organisational cooperation, Kosovo Force (KFOR) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Kosovo, Afghanistan

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INTRODUCTION

International organisations have become increasingly active players in various peace-making and peacebuilding initiatives. As the processes of building peace and post-conflict reconstruction have become more complex, various such IOs have been concerned with conflict resolution, economic development, the rule of law, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance or institutions building and other functions. Post-conflict missions frequently involve multiple intervening organisations which must coordinate with one another and with local stakeholders. To that end, the UN members have directed the organisation to act as a partner with regional organisations in various parts of the world including NATO, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), OSCE, ECOWAS and others. Improving coordination among these players has become a prominent theme among scholars and policy-makers of post-conflict reconstruction.

While the United Nations worked with multiple regional organisations, the UN-NATO dyad is particularly interesting because these two organisations have the longest track record of partnering with each other – they have been working together in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. NATO has also provided assistance and capacity-building support to other regional organisations partnering with the UN – the European Union and the African Union – for their post-conflict involvement in Africa.

How does inter-organisational cooperation emerge, advance and become institutionalised in complex multidimensional peace operations involving the United Nations and regional organisations like NATO? By focusing on two of the longest lasting missions – in Kosovo and Afghanistan – this paper argues that in its emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation, inter-organisational cooperation is more successful when it is endorsed by officers operating in the field, when IOs recognise the importance of informal and decentralised cooperation and when they find ways to overcome various constraints on cooperation.

The evidence from both cases confirms that the emergence and institutionalisation of cooperation starts in the field and spreads to IOs' headquarters. In the case of Kosovo, the international community negotiated a strict division of labour among different IOs at the onset of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. As a result, the two field missions, UNMIK and KFOR, were able to overcome cultural differences and coordinate efforts based on expertise and resources. In the case of Afghanistan, a poorly defined division of labour constrained field coordination despite notable efforts from headquarters. Skewed distribution of resources and a deteriorating environment further constrained the emergence and institutionalisation of cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF.

The presentation is organised as follows. First, it surveys the literature on the emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation of inter-organisational cooperation. Second, the study justifies the selection of the UN-NATO dyad in the context of international presence in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Third, the article compares differences and similarities in the emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation of inter-organisational cooperation in these two cases and their implications for broader theory of international cooperation. Finally, it draws conclusions and discusses policy implications of the proposed conceptual framework.

EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE, DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL COOPERATION

By and large, scholars of International Relations agree that cooperation emerges in several different ways – it can be *tacit* and, therefore, occur without communication, or an *explicit* agreement.¹ Additionally, cooperation can be *negotiated* through an *explicit* bargaining process or a *tacit* one, with the former easier to identify than latter which is often counterfactual and difficult to establish.² Tacit or explicit arrangements can be negotiated when actors attempt to resolve conflicts of interests or coordination problems in order to reduce transaction costs and pool resources. In other words, cooperation depends on members having convergent interests in a particular outcome to bring together international organisations (IOs) with the necessary expertise to achieve the desired outcome.³ Lastly, cooperation can also be *imposed* when there is an asymmetric relationship between two parties in which one of them serves as a common authority that promotes cooperative outcomes.⁴

Alternatively, cooperation among different IOs could emerge through externally imposed arrangements by the leadership of these self-directed bureaucracies who undertake steps to develop organisational connections aimed at enhancing institutional coordination. Kent Kille and Ryan Hendrickson noted in this context that efforts by the UN and NATO headquarters in the last two decades have led to “parallel conceptual and strategic shifts from both organisations that served to mutually reinforce the development of closer organisational relationship” that routinise joint planning, resource and information sharing, and coordination.⁵ The biggest challenge to centralised arrangements negotiated by IO bureaucrats is that they rarely translate into a cooperative *modus operandi* among field staff.⁶

In addition to undermining the importance of field players, the literature on cooperation tends to overlook other causal variables such as players’ psychology and identity. For example, affection builds empathy and the latter consequently encourages players to recognise benefits of cooperation and, as a result, affection and reason stimulate players to “seek cooperation, not only as a means of achieving

1 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984) p. 3; see also Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 28–35.

2 Helen Milner, ‘International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses’, *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), p. 469. See also Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990) and Peter Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

3 Lisa Martin and Robert Keohane, ‘The Promise of Institutional Theory,’ *International Security* Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 42; Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act Through Formal International Organisations,’ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 39–51. Also, Robert Axelrod, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

4 See Helen Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

5 Kent Kille and Ryan Hendrickson, ‘NATO and the United Nations: debates and trends in institutional collaboration,’ *Journal of International Organisations Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011), pp. 44–45.

6 Susanna Campbell, ‘(Dis)integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN post-Conflict Interventions,’ *International Journal of Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15; No. 4, pp. 556–569.

specific ends, but of becoming ourselves.”⁷ Lastly, cooperation can be seen as an integral element of actors’ identities and interests.⁸

Thus, organisations’ behaviour can be linked to their interests which, consequently, can be approached as static from several different perspectives. From rationalist-positivist perspective, players infer various strategies aimed at maximising utility based on available information.⁹ In some instances such information is sufficient, while in others variation of information could empower IOs to “set the agenda, make amendments, and accept or reject the final package.”¹⁰ Alternatively, identity-based constructivist explanations illustrate this change over time with the modification of actors’ identities. They argue that actors determine their interests in the process of defining situations within various social contexts. In cases of unprecedented situations, various players, including international organisations, have to construct the meaning of their interests, “by analogy or invent them *de novo*.”¹¹

The process of adjustment leads to several patterns of interaction shaping the dynamics of inter-organisational cooperation. First, these IOs tend to pursue their tasks independently due to divergent organisational cultures. For example, in the case of the UN and NATO, the Alliance subscribes to a military culture that warrants narrowly-defined military tasks, whereas the United Nations fosters a culture of impartiality in the provision of humanitarian or reconstruction services.¹² Therefore, rigidity of cultural biases is generally expected to prevent cooperation due to cultures’ incompatibility.

Second, inter-organisational cooperation inadvertently leads to the assemblage of various actors forming a collective response to conflicts. As a result, new practices and relationships emerge among these actors at their headquarters and in the field that go well beyond the simple delegation or coordination of activities and occasionally lead to the emergence of symmetrical or asymmetrical dependency between these organisations. Such dependency is also determined by the availability of outside resources, more specifically the extent to which the organisation depends on these resources to survive, the other IOs control the resources in question and this particular organisation is capable of finding alternatives.¹³

Third, IOs’ interaction with the surrounding environment affects practices of cooperation in several different ways. On the one hand, an environment with deteriorating safety or shortage of resources could intensify competition among organisations interested in maximising available resources.¹⁴ On the other hand, an

7 Richard Ned Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007) p. 314.

8 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,’ *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 417.

9 Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics,’ *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn 1998), p. 679.

10 Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 51.

11 Wendt, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

12 Donna Winslow and Jeffrey Schwerzel, ‘(Un-) Changing Military Culture,’ in K. Spohr Readman (ed.) *Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004), p. 57.

13 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salanick, *The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 46. Also, Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman, ‘Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organisations,’ *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005), p. 599.

14 William Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971), p. 24–25.

unsafe environment or one with multiple competing actors could foster managerial discretion among organisations' decision-makers who, in turn, could choose to specialise in order to take advantage of available expertise and capabilities.¹⁵

Lastly, international efforts in post-conflict settings involve a range of actors (e.g. individuals, states, international organisations, and NGOs) working sequentially or simultaneously.¹⁶ Scholars agree that these players operate as typical bureaucracies whose primary goal is to advance their own interests and, therefore, they would seek coordination insofar as it generates additional resources for each organisation.¹⁷ However, the literature on international cooperation cites instances when IOs have been able to institutionalise coordination despite bureaucratic and organisational constraints. For example, IO staff at headquarters has initiated and developed strategic frameworks (e.g. integrated missions,¹⁸ joined declarations,¹⁹ and other mechanisms) to bring together their counterparts, local and international NGOs, bilateral agencies and local authorities operating in post-conflict environments.²⁰

In this context, scholars of international organisations have highlighted the importance of top leadership, such as the IOs' Secretaries-General, in terms of their individual efforts and how the interactions between their offices "fostered organizational cooperation or competition".²¹ This pattern was particularly noticeable in the exchanges between Javier Solana and Kofi Annan throughout Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo as they facilitated important organisational coordination during an intense and controversial security operation in 1999.

Our study recognises the importance of leadership within IOs as a necessary condition for inter-organisational cooperation. However, it argues that top leadership's efforts at IO headquarters would not suffice to attain successful coordination. In fact, less formal or decentralised channels that include maintenance of unofficial meetings alongside official ones tend to be equally or even more effective. The participation of official and private intermediaries focused on the intervention processes is essential for successful cooperation as the latter tend to address deeper psychological aspects, historical grievances, fears and hopes and, in general, enhance the broader base of support for the peace process.²² The key variables and patterns of interaction

15 Derek Boothby, 'Background Paper,' in *Cooperation between the UN and NATO Quo Vadis?* IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship, New York: International Peace Academy, 1999; Pfeffer and Salanick, *op. cit.*, pp. xix–xxi; Barnett and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 599.

16 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela All, *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 9.

17 Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,' *World Politics*, Vol. 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 48–49. Also, M. J. Williams, '(Un)Sustainable Peacebuilding: NATO's Suitability for Post-conflict Reconstruction in Multi-actor Environments,' *Global Governance*, Vol. 17 (March 2011), pp. 116–117.

18 Cedric de Coning, 'Mediation and Peacebuilding: the Role of SRSs in UN Integrated Missions,' *Global Governance*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 284–287.

19 Michael Harsch, 'NATO and the UN: partnership with Potential?' *SWP Research Paper* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2012), p. 14.

20 Bruce D. Jones, 'The Challenge of Strategic Coordination', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, (eds.), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 105–108.

21 Kent J. Kille and Ryan Hendrickson, 'Secretary-General Leadership Across the United Nations and NATO: Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, and Operation *Allied Force*,' *Global Governance*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (October–December 2010), p. 506.

22 Ronald J. Fisher, 'Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation,' *International Negotiation*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 71 and Andrea Strimling, 'Stepping Out of the Tracks: Cooperation between Official Diplomats and Private Facilitators', *International Negotiation*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 91.

related to the emergence, dynamics and institutionalisation of inter-organisational cooperation are summarised in table 1 below.

Table 1: Key Variables and Patterns of Interaction Explaining Inter-Organisational Cooperation

Elements of Inter-org. Cooperation	Key Variables Explaining Cooperation	Patterns of Interaction among IOs
Emergence	Mutuality of benefits (cost/benefit analysis)	<i>Informal or tacit cooperation</i>
	Actors' psychological/ cognitive dispositions	<i>Explicit or negotiated cooperation</i>
	Actors' identity	<i>Imposed Cooperation</i>
Dynamics	IOs' Organisational Cultures	<i>Symmetric or Asymmetric</i>
	IOs' Bureaucratic Politics	<i>Dependency</i>
	IOs' Surrounding Environment	<i>Competition for Resources</i>
Institutionalisation	Driven by IO member-states	<i>Centralised institutionalisation</i>
	Driven by IO headquarters	
	Driven by IO local field staff and partners	<i>Decentralised or informal institutionalisation</i>
	Driven by individual mediators and negotiators	

KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN AS SYSTEMIC CASES OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL COOPERATION

UN-NATO cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan presents two important instances of a “practice turn” from theory to an attention to actual cases that help to understand the structured practices of “strategic interaction” among actors.²³ These two cases share a number of similarities. First, the UN-NATO dyad represents an instance of systemic cooperation between a universal and a regional IO in two different post-conflict settings. Therefore, patterns of interaction between those two can be applied by extension to other similar instances of such strategic interaction between the UN and regional organisations (e.g. the EU, AU, OAS, ECOWAS, ASEAN and others). Second, Kosovo and Afghanistan represent cases of sustained inter-organisational cooperation each lasting consecutively over 150 months, which makes them the longest missions involving a dyad of a regional and an universal IO. Third, both of them involved a very large number of participating states (more than 30 on average), and a dense network of local and international NGOs engaged in the post-conflict process as shown in table 2.

²³ See Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Introduction and Framework’ in Adler and Pouliot (eds.) *International Practices* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 5.


Table 2: UN-NATO Cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan: similarities and differences

	<i>Mission in Kosovo</i>	<i>Mission in Afghanistan</i>
Similarities		
<i>Mission Duration (number of months to December 2014 inclusive)</i>	186	153
<i>Number of participating states</i>		
As of 2010	33	31
Max number of participating nations	39	50
<i>Number of local and international NGOs involved</i>	4,882 (local, 2008) (500 active, 2008)	1,911 (local, 2013) 287 (int'l, 2013)
Differences		
<i>Territorial scope (thousand km²)</i>	10.9	652.86
<i>Total troops deployment as of 2010</i>		
Troops deployed per thousand km ²	722	198
Troops deployed per 10,000 people	463	431
<i>Total casualties (to 2010 inclusive)</i>	113	1,539
<i>Average operational costs (to 2010 inclusive, in millions USD)</i>	32.1	223.6

Sources: The World Bank Database, <http://data.worldbank.org/country> and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko> (both accessed 14 October 2014).

However, there are also several notable differences between these two cases in terms of militarisation, operational and human costs, and ownership. First, Kosovo represents one of the most heavily militarised missions in the history of post-conflict reconstruction with about 1 peacekeeper per 40 citizens at the peak of the mission and 1 soldier per 200 citizens in 2010. The mission in Afghanistan, on the other hand, was designed with a 'light footprint' in mind, employing only about 1 soldier per 4,200 citizens at the mission's inception in 2003 as shown in figure 1. Such an arrangement was, in part, a reflection of US policymakers' preference to use US rather than international armed forces and personnel in the global war on terror in the early 2000s. The size of the international military presence in Afghanistan became comparable to the one in Kosovo only in 2010 when the 'the light footprint' strategy was abandoned altogether and the ratio on the ground improved to 1 soldier per about 215 citizens.

Figure 1: Per Capita (One Million) and Per Thousand Km² Troop Deployment in Kosovo and Afghanistan (2000–2010)



Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko> (accessed 14 October 2014).


Second, the resource gap between these missions is even more noticeable when comparing the missions' operational costs – at its inception the per capita spending in Afghanistan was only a 1/7th of the spending in Kosovo. Even in 2010 when this gap became least noticeable, the international community was still spending about 30% more per resident in Kosovo than it did in Afghanistan (see figure 2, left graph). Similarly, casualties among international personnel illustrate that average per capita troop casualties in Afghanistan were more than 14 times higher than in Kosovo as shown in figure 2, right graph. The graph also depicts significant variation of troop casualties in Afghanistan during different stages of the mission which consequently affects the variation of UN-NATO relations on the ground, and these IOs' relations with other stakeholders in the area.

Third, the format of UN-NATO cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan which varied significantly was defined differently by the UNSC, thus creating a significant variation of mission 'ownership,' i.e. the extent to which each IO 'owns' certain areas of responsibility in these post-conflict settings. In the case of Kosovo, the UNSC produced only one resolution (1244) which outlined a strict division of labour among different IOs in four distinct pillars of post-conflict reconstruction wherein KFOR was charged specifically with maintaining security on the ground. Alternatively, ISAF and OEF in Afghanistan were jointly assigned to deal with complex issues of post-conflict reconstruction while UNAMA was given a much narrower mandate by design. Both cases showed that, despite variation of mission ownership, similar patterns can be noted in the mode of emergence, dynamics, and institutionalisation of inter-organisational cooperation.

Lastly, whereas the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan represent separate practices of UN-NATO cooperation, they cannot be approached completely

independently. The international community became engaged in Afghanistan 33 months after it did so in Kosovo and since then has run these as parallel missions allowing for a dynamic exchange of ideas, personnel, and expertise. As a result, the main stakeholders in Afghanistan accepted, modified or ignored some of the previous experiences in Kosovo to the extent that these were applicable to their mission.

Figure 2: Per Capita Operational Costs and Casualties in Kosovo and Afghanistan (2000–2010)



Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko> (accessed 14 October 2014).

To summarise, Kosovo represents a slightly longer, yet smaller in scale and less complex instance of inter-organisational cooperation in a post-conflict setting, whereas Afghanistan is a more recent, larger, and a significantly more complex case. The focus on the UN-NATO relationship illustrates broader patterns of interaction and their significance for the overall peace processes in various parts of the world. It also highlights driving forces behind the emergence and institutionalisation of cooperative behaviour. Lastly, comparing the two dyads helps us to derive new hypotheses, explore causal mechanisms and draw conceptually valid conclusions about inter-organisational cooperation.²⁴

EMERGENCE, DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF UN-NATO COOPERATION IN KOSOVO

Ethnic clashes between Kosovar Albanians – the numerically dominant ethnic group in Kosovo – and the central authorities in Belgrade over the status of this

²⁴ For details about strengths of case studies see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies in Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 19–22.

former Serbian province led to growing tensions in the late 1990s. The international community's attempts to broker a peace agreement between Belgrade and Pristina reached a stalemate after several rounds of multilateral talks in 1999. The failed negotiations at Rambouillet consequently led to a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against the Serbian authorities between March and June 1999 without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent Serbian authorities from committing crimes against humanity in their troubled province. The campaign ended with the conclusion of an Interim Agreement rubberstamped by UNSC Resolution 1244, thus marking an important political compromise among main players in the region (e.g. the European Union, Russia, and the United States).

The Security Council resolution provided a broader framework for inter-organisational cooperation. While it did not resolve key issues (e.g. the mission's end date or the path for determining Kosovo's final status), UNSC Resolution 1244 established a clear mandate with strict division of labour among different IOs. Four broad 'pillars' of responsibilities were introduced and each one was delegated to a different IO. The first one dealt with the interim civil administration and was the responsibility of the UN itself with UNHCR charged with humanitarian affairs. Institution building was the responsibility of OSCE and Kosovo's reconstruction fell to the European Union. The fourth pillar – the military component of the mission – was delegated to the NATO-led KFOR.²⁵ The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – through its Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) – had authority over the first three pillars, whereas the KFOR Force Commander was responsible for the security in the province.

Following the end of the bombing campaign, the UN and NATO were expected to work together on a number of tasks that included assistance with the return of all refugees, protection of Serbs and the restoration of security in the province. In reality, officials from both IOs offered few specific guidelines how to address these security challenges. On occasions when such instructions were provided, the primary goal was to avoid unnecessary casualties or a possible mission creep.

As a result, both IOs did very little to improve planning and synchronise their actions. One such instance was the UN and NATO's inability to formulate a common policy on war crimes consistent with the guidelines of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), thus facilitating the flight of alleged war criminals in the first months after the end of the military campaign.²⁶ On another occasion, NATO Headquarters turned down private SRSG requests to authorise KFOR to conduct policing, protect minorities or go after individuals who had committed human rights violations, while many allies were very cautious about casualties within their own contingents and were reluctant to participate in state building, policing or protection of minorities.²⁷ On the UN's side, senior officials were also worried that closer cooperation with their NATO counterparts would militarise the UN's work in Kosovo and would subsequently alienate crucial allies to the peace process such as Russia, the Kosovar Serbs and the Serbian authorities.

25 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 54.

26 Hochschild, *op. cit.*, p. 295; also Juan Pekmez, *The Intervention by the International Community and the Rehabilitation of Kosovo* (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2001), p. 7.

27 T.W. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Peace Operation during the 1990s* (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, 2005), p. 434.

Alternatively, both IOs successfully acted as partners when they were able to reach important *ad hoc* accommodation. For example, NATO officials agreed to carry out border patrols and weapons inspections upon UNMIK request. Similarly, KFOR took over limited law enforcement responsibilities that included arrests of individuals charged with arson, violent assault or murder. NATO troops in partnership with UNMIK set up courts and prisons in Kosovo and supported the work of newly appointed mobile units of judges and prosecutors.²⁸ These instances illustrate that successful cooperation is more likely to emerge informally or tacitly among field officers to meet the immediate needs of the main stakeholders on the ground.

In addition to divergent organisational cultures at UN and NATO Headquarters, dynamics of cooperation between these two IOs were shaped by an asymmetrical distribution of resources leaving UNMIK chronically under-resourced and frequently dependent on KFOR. UN personnel had varying degrees of expertise due to the fact that officers were drawn from over sixty countries all of which created additional complications. The organisation faced major challenges to set up a new judicial system. The international police force in Kosovo struggled to gain the population's trust and had very limited capacity to fight organised crime.²⁹

Whereas organisational culture and the asymmetric distribution of resources constrained inter-organisational cooperation in Kosovo, the deteriorating security environment facilitated coordination between these two IOs. For example, the UN and NATO collectively agreed to work together towards settling Kosovo's final status only after spontaneous riots broke out in Pristina in March 2004. The increased violence in the province forced the UN and NATO to reach out to senior UNMIK officials who helped to appease the Albanians, addressed their security concerns and pledged support towards improving inter-ethnic relations. Søren Jessen-Petersen, who was appointed a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) shortly after the riots broke out, made the final status issue a top UN priority and took pragmatic steps to engage the Kosovar Albanians while also reaching out to the Kosovar Serbs and the major figures in the Serbian government.³⁰

Lastly, the case of Kosovo confirmed that informal attempts by leaders and staff on the ground tend to be more successful to institutionalise inter-organisational cooperation in comparison to centralised attempts by senior officials. From the mission's outset, field officers developed unofficial yet effective UNMIK-KFOR interaction among the two missions which was maintained over the years. Eventually these informal cooperative arrangements led to the establishment of a Joint Security Executive Committee and regular joint strategy meetings.³¹

Alternatively, attempts formally to institutionalise UN-NATO cooperation in Kosovo were much less successful. For example, in the early days of the military campaign in 1999, NATO and UNHCR Secretaries-General Javier Solana and Sadako Ogata concluded a formal agreement that the Alliance would provide assistance to the UN agency with airlift operations, offloading and the immediate storage of aid arriving by sea or air as well as logistical support in the setting up of refugee camps. In exchange, NATO reaffirmed UNHCR's leading role in humanitarian tasks and

28 John Cockell. 'Civil-Military Response to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo,' *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October–December 2002), pp. 487–88.

29 Hochschild, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

30 Perritt, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–89.

31 Cockell, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

agreed to support the UN “based on the discussions” between the heads of each IO.³² While the Solana-Ogata agreement was an important pragmatic arrangement that met the needs of both organisations, it was also heavily criticised by UNHCR field officers and relief NGOs in the region who were concerned that NATO’s approach lacked clarity and that the agreement jeopardised UNHCR’s impartiality in providing humanitarian relief.³³

Kille and Hendrickson’s work indicated that cooperation among UN and NATO Secretaries-General “helped to create the political climate for the use of force” during the 1999 campaign against Yugoslavia and prevented to a considerable degree an institutional clash between the top leadership in these two organisations over NATO’s military action.³⁴ Kofi Annan and Javier Solana were attentive to the other IO’s concerns during the military campaign and they maintained partner relations in seeking to resolve the crisis in this part of the world. This article accepts the assertion that such meaningful interaction among IO leaders was important for the success of inter-organisational cooperation. However, it argues that this interaction among top-level officials alone is insufficient for the emergence and institutionalisation of successful coordination among the two IOs.

Consider for example the decision to hold regularly scheduled weekly meetings at UNMIK headquarters that involved international organisations and agencies operating in Kosovo. Since this was a centralised decision by UN and NATO headquarters, it was met with considerable scepticism by many field officers from the other IOs who believed that this format was ineffective due to UN’s decreased role in the post-conflict process after Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Nonetheless, field officers continued to attend these meetings even after 2008 solely because they wanted to reaffirm their commitment to post-conflict reconstruction and the UN’s leading role, not because they expected to make any practical arrangements at the table.³⁵

EMERGENCE, DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF UN-NATO COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan presents a more complex case of UN-NATO cooperation, larger in scale with greater costs and casualties. The international community became involved there in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 after a US-led international coalition overthrew the Taliban. This operation known as *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) was accomplished without substantial ground forces.³⁶

32 Letter from Ms Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees to NATO SG Javier Solana, 3 April 1999.

33 Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Divided Partners: the Challenges of NATO-NGO Cooperation in Peacebuilding Operations,’ *Global Governance*, Vol. 17 (January-March 2011), p. 100; also Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda, and Marc Sommers, ‘NATO and the Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis,’ *Occasional Paper #36* (Brown University: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 2000), p. 11, available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/nato-and-humanitarian-action-kosovo-crisis> (accessed 17 March 2013).

34 Kille and Hendrickson, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

35 Author’s interview at the EU Special Representative Support Team in Kosovo, 19 June 2013, Pristina, Kosovo.

36 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,’ available: <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>, (accessed 25 January 2014).

In the aftermath of OEF, the UN was charged predominantly with institution-building and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and was stripped of key tasks of post-conflict reconstruction. These were subsequently transferred to two separate missions, International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and OEF, both of which were under separate chains of command but were jointly given the task of addressing complex security issues. This arrangement was, in part, a result of the US policymakers' preference as it was believed that a broad mandate to the UN could constrain the use of US armed forces and personnel in the global war on terror.

The initial arrangement created a somewhat dysfunctional division of labour between the United Nations and NATO – the UN was given a fairly narrow political mandate that included human rights, the rule of law, gender issues, national reconciliation and coordinating human rights efforts.³⁷ At the same time, all other military and civilian efforts with regard to security and reconstruction were left to OEF (under US command) and the UN-authorized ISAF mission. Even after OEF and ISAF were brought under integrated NATO command, the skewed division of labour and uneven distribution of resources remained in place.

This poorly designed framework gave NATO forces military and civilian responsibilities which they were not prepared to handle. Such an arrangement stood in stark contrast with the mission in Kosovo, where post-conflict reconstruction was structured around four separate pillars each under centralised authority of a different IO (e.g. the UN, OSCE, the EU, and NATO). Humanitarian and reconstruction efforts were similarly ineffective since every UN agency had to answer to its own headquarters.³⁸ This setting affected cooperation on the ground – for example NATO's civilian representative had very limited power over UN and NATO assets, while UN staff avoided close contacts with NATO military officials as they were concerned that such behaviour would be frowned upon by their colleagues in the field and by their superiors in New York.³⁹

Much as in Kosovo, the gap in organisational culture between the UN and NATO was noticeable in Afghanistan as well. For example, NATO preferred to work through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that would produce a clear short-term impact on security and then pass the reconstruction task on to the UN and the NGOs. The UN, on the other hand, subscribed to a long-term philosophy that reconstruction should be implemented properly “with a fifty-year perspective.”⁴⁰ As a result, prior to 2007 both organisations sought minimal coordination in the field despite widespread recognition that such coordination was essential for the mission's success. Furthermore, when UN diplomats in Kabul tried to break away from their organisational silos and initiated efforts to improve coordination with their NATO counterparts, UN headquarters made sure that they understood such enthusiasm was frowned upon in New York.⁴¹ Resource availability and the changing security environment further influenced the dynamics of UN-NATO cooperation. While both IOs experienced a chronic shortage of resources, this pattern was more notable among UN agencies. Since ISAF and the PRTs were the largest recipients of international

37 Harsch, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

38 Author's interview with NATO Official, at NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, May 2013.

39 M.J. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

40 Author's interview with NATO Official at NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, May 2013.

41 Canadian diplomat Chris Alexander who served as the Deputy SRSG in Afghanistan was an example of an official who sought closer cooperation with NATO but was eventually side-lined by his UN counterparts at the Secretariat who criticised him for being “too close with NATO.” For details see M.J. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

funding, the uneven distribution of resources accelerated competition among the UN agencies as the latter felt marginalised in the reconstruction process.

The changing security environment created two separate dynamics. First, the rapid deterioration of security after 2006 shown in table 2 forced the Security Council to strengthen UNAMA and sharpen its mandate, budget and field staff. UNSC's decision consequently facilitated field cooperation with ISAF "at all levels and throughout the country," improved civil-military coordination and led to ISAF's public acknowledgement of UNAMA's leading role in the coordination of civilian efforts.⁴² The main stakeholders endorsed a set of guidelines for the interaction and coordination of civilian and military actors.⁴³ The new UNAMA guidelines also ensured that NGOs and the UN would lead efforts in humanitarian efforts, while ISAF, in turn, expected to receive additional communication about plans and projects of humanitarian agencies that had relevance to the security situation on the ground.⁴⁴

Second, at later stages of the mission, efforts to impose coordination to field officers failed to produce desired effects. In response to the decisions of the 2009 and 2010 NATO Summits, the Alliance chose to bolster ISAF by dispatching civilian units alongside the military presence, as NATO's presence once again refocused from security to political issues that included major economic reforms to support private sector development, job creation, increased agricultural productivity, education and vocational training, capacity building, governance, the rule of law and other civilian tasks.⁴⁵ The UNAMA staff expected that these new units would work closely with them since UN experts had previous experience. However, such coordination did not materialise mostly because the Americans wanted to disburse the aid as quickly as possible and did not want to be constrained by UN procedures. The new arrangement created a skewed distribution of resources, increased asymmetric dependency between UNAMA and ISAF and had an adverse effect on overall UN-NATO cooperation. Instead of contributing to good governance, these international practices facilitated corruption because many local stakeholders were trying to take advantage of the new funding opportunities.⁴⁶

Finally, Brussels and New York were under tremendous pressure to institutionalise their cooperation since the inception of the mission in Afghanistan and numerous senior diplomats were dispatched to serve as liaison officers in partnering UN and NATO departments (e.g. OCHA, DPKO, NAC and others). The peak of these efforts was the conclusion of the Joint Declaration on NATO-UN Cooperation signed by the two Secretaries-General – Jaap De Hoops Scheffer and Ban-Ki Moon – in September 2008. The document expressed a principled commitment to cooperation and outlined areas of possible coordination, but remained vague as to concrete measures to accomplish it.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, this agreement would have been impossible to conclude

42 UNSC Resolution 1806, available: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/279/31/PDF/N0827931.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 12 March 2014).

43 Afghanistan Civil Military Working Group, Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan, 20 May 2008, available: <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Guidelines%20Afghanistan%20v.%201.0%202008.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2014).

44 Harsch, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

45 See U.S. Department of State, 'Report of Inspection: Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan,' Report No. ISP-I-10-32A, Washington, DC, 2010, available: <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organisation/138084.pdf>, p. 4 (accessed 6 January 2015).

46 Author's interview with NATO Official at NATO HQ in Brussels, May 2013.

47 See Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Ban Ki Moon, 'Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation,' New York, 23 September 2008.

without previous successful coordination between UNAMA and ISAF on practical areas such as the UN report on casualties.⁴⁸ However, the Joint Declaration was not received without opposition by UN diplomats who believed it would significantly constrain the organisation's operational independence on the ground and would create asymmetric dependence on NATO, thus compromising the UN's culture of neutrality in conflict areas as this could also expose the UN staff in Afghanistan and elsewhere to greater risk. Some government officials further criticised the document as an attempt by the UN Secretary-General to undermine the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and went as far as accusing Ban Ki-Moon of "secretly" concluding an agreement behind the UNSC's back.⁴⁹

CONCLUSION

The Kosovo and Afghanistan cases point to several important findings about the system and complexity of inter-organisational cooperation in post-conflict settings. First, a well-structured cooperative framework (such as the one in Kosovo) tends to facilitate the emergence of informal cooperation among field officers. Alternatively, lack of clearly defined tasks and responsibilities tends to impede the emergence of cooperation on the ground as shown in the cases of UNAMA and ISAF (in Afghanistan). Second, both cases showed that, unlike centralised coordination among HQ, informal cooperation among field officers leads first to informal and then possibly to a more formal institutionalisation of cooperation. Third, by and large, clashing organisational cultures and shortage of resources constrain the dynamics of field cooperation and make centralised efforts by HQs and national governments ineffective. Fourth, a deteriorating security environment could facilitate cooperation among field officers as illustrated by several instances in Kosovo and Afghanistan (e.g. the riots in 2004 or the events leading to the 2008 Joint Declaration). However, if resources are controlled by one of the IOs and this organisation attempts to impose solutions on its counterparts centrally, it is likely such a policy will lead to a non-cooperative outcome which could consequently jeopardise broader efforts to institutionalise cooperation (as shown by the troops surge in Afghanistan after 2009). Finally, variation in tasks, responsibilities, and 'ownership' among UN and NATO in different post-conflict settings did not necessarily show any notable differences in the patterns in which cooperation between these two IOs emerged, advanced, and consequently became institutionalised.

To sum up, scholars and policy-makers need to be aware that both the emergence and possible institutionalisation of successful cooperation tends to originate among field offices operating in post-conflict settings. To that end, they should recognise that transfer of authority and greater mission autonomy is likely to improve patterns of

48 Initially, the report was not coordinated with NATO and did not take into account NATO's position and, as a result, NATO officials thought that some of the information presented there alienated the locals and parts of the international community. Consequently, the UN staff agreed after 2008 that the Alliance should have a say on the content of the report, which helped improve the Alliance's public image in the country.

49 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made such a statement; see Steve Gutterman, 'Russia Official Blasts "Secretive" UN- NATO Deal,' *the Associated Press*, 9 October 2008.

coordination.⁵⁰ Alternatively, centralised efforts can be successful when the division of labour among IOs is clearly formulated from the mission's outset. However, these efforts are likely to have a very limited impact when new mandates are centrally established and resources are being distributed without taking into account IOs' strengths on the ground. Finally, to understand better the origins, dynamics and institutionalisation of inter-organisational cooperation, we need to study more closely other causal variables that include the variation of missions' tasks and the role of formal and informal leadership in IOs.⁵¹

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association for Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IO(s)	International Organisation(s)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
NAC	NATO's North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
OAF	Operation "Allied Force" against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (24 March–10 June 1999)
OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF	Operation "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan (7 October 2001–31 December 31 2014)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan
SRSF	Special Representative for United Nations Secretary-General
UN	United Nations Organisation

⁵⁰ Author's interview with NATO Official at NATO HQ in Brussels, June 2013.

⁵¹ For details on the role of leadership in IO see Michael B. Schroeder, 'Executive Leadership in the Study of International Organization: A Framework for Analysis,' *International Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2014), p. 339.

UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council