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

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Introduction: What is Security Studies?

Alan Collins



Chapter Contents

Introduction

Welcome to Security Studies: *the* sub-discipline of International Relations. It is the study of security that lies at the heart of International Relations. It was the carnage of the First World War, and the desire to avoid its horrors again, that gave birth to the discipline of International Relations in 1919 at Aberystwyth, United Kingdom. This concern with the origins of war and its conduct enabled International Relations to 'distinguish itself from related disciplines such as history, economics, geography, and international law' (Sheehan 2005: 1). It is the survival of agents, which for much of the discipline has meant sovereign states, that has become accepted as the dominant explanatory tool for understanding their behaviour. Security is a matter of high politics; central to government debates and pivotal to the priorities they establish. Quite simply, 'no other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security"' (Der Derian 1995: 24–5).

Definition of security

Welcome, then, to a subject of great importance and, since you are about to embark upon the study of this subject, no doubt you would like to start with a definition of security. Or, what it means to be secure? You will see in Key Quotes 1.1 that many scholars have done so. The good news is that a consensus has emerged on what security studies entails—it is to do with threats—and the even better news is that hidden within that simple definition lies the complexity that you are about to delve into. What is most striking about the definitions in Key Quotes 1.1 is that, while war and the threat to use force is part of the security equation, it is not exclusively so. The prevalence of

threats is sufficiently far-reaching for Security Studies to encompass dangers that range from pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and environmental degradation through to the more readily associated security concerns of direct violence, such as terrorism and interstate armed conflict. The latter, which so dominated the discipline that during the Cold War it became synonymous with Security Studies, is actually a sub-field of Security Studies and is known as Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press publishes a textbook that is concerned with Strategic Studies: it is called *Strategy in the Contemporary World*.

With the Cold War over, Security Studies has re-emerged, and core assumptions about what is to be secured, and how, have come to occupy our thoughts. Traditionally the state has been the thing to be secured, what is known as the referent object, and it has sought security through military might. In the chapters that follow you will find alternative approaches to security; approaches that offer different referent objects, different means of achieving security, and that indicate that past practice, far from enhancing security, has been the cause of insecurity. You are, then, about to study a subject that is undergoing great change as it questions its past assumptions, deepens its understanding of what should be secured, and broadens its remit to encompass a diverse range of threats and dangers. Of course, this broadening of the subject matter creates a blurring in the distinction between Security Studies and the study of International Relations more generally. In this sense the broadening of Security Studies mirrors the wider blurring between International Relations and Political Science. The process of globalization has led to internal issues becoming externalized and external issues internalized. The role of domestic agents and policy concerns appear prominently on global agendas, whether it is the future political structure of Afghanistan or deforestation in the Amazon. This blurring of the demarcation between International Relations, Political Science, and Security Studies can be seen in the breadth of topics covered in this book and the centrality of security in theories of international relations (for more on this see Chapter 27). This is to be welcomed. I know it can appear confusing and it would be much easier to categorize topics neatly, but this is to misunderstand the nature of the social sciences. These disciplines are subdisciplines precisely because they overlap and have 'something to say' about the same topics. Instead of looking for different subject matters, it is better to think about different approaches. Despite the contested nature of security, you know that ultimately we are interested in how referent objects are threatened. With that thought in mind, examining this diverse range of topics might seem rather less daunting.

Structure

The book is not designed to be read from start (Chapter 1) to finish (Chapter 27) because that is not the way to read an academic text. If this seems a peculiar thing for me to write, then let me explain. You are not reading a novel in which the aim is to keep you in suspense until the final pages where you discover who committed the crime or whether the lovers live happily ever after. You want to know the questions and the answers as soon as possible, and then, because—as important as the answers are, they are not the most important thing—you should want to know why these are the answers and how they were reached. Think of it as a complicated maths question in which the mathematician has scribbled furiously on the blackboard (or more likely today the whiteboard) a series of, to a layperson, unintelligible equations that eventually lead to an answer. It is the bit in between the question and the answer (the bit in between are those impenetrable equations) that reveals why the answer was found and found in that particular way. It is like this with your studies too. You should want to know, and your tutor will certainly want to know, why you believe in the answers you have found: to know your thought processes. Knowing why you think about a subject the way that you do, so that these thought processes can be convincingly articulated in oral and written form, is what reading for a degree is all about.

Therefore in this book, when reading the chapters, it is perfectly fine to read the introduction and then the conclusion, but you then have to read the bits in between to know why the answers found in the conclusion were reached. Understanding the author's thought processes will help you develop yours. So, having read what this book contains, which you will find in this chapter, then read the conclusion. Chapter 27 will present you with the state of Security Studies, and the theorizing that has taken place in the discipline. It provides you with the context of why we, students and tutors (scholars of the subject), think about the subject the way that we do. In particular, the chapter reveals the differences between American and European approaches to theorizing about security, as it traces past, present, and possible future trends in how security is studied by today's scholars. For those new to Security Studies and/or International Relations, it will be a testing read, but stick with it, because it will be a chapter that you will want to read more than once as you increase your knowledge of this subject; in each read you will discover something new. Once Chapters 1 and 27 have been read, the book becomes a pick 'n' mix, so if you want to start with weapons of mass destruction (Chapter 18) or terrorism (Chapter 19) then go right ahead. That is not to say that the structure has no meaning, and I would strongly advise that you at least begin with the Approaches section and especially Chapters 2 and 3 in order to appreciate the primary role that states and power have had in the study of security. By beginning with the Approaches section you will be able to appreciate just how hugely important different approaches are in establishing what constitutes security; a point that will be evident once you have read Chapter 27.

The book is divided into three sections: differing Approaches to the study of security; the Deepening and Broadening of security; and, finally, a range of Traditional and non-traditional issues that have emerged on the security agenda. The authors come from a range of countries, and their examples are global in scope. Nevertheless, the field of Security Studies, as with International Relations more generally, is dominated by Western thought and approaches. One of the refreshing changes in post-Cold War Security Studies is that

KEY QUOTES 1.1 Definitions of security

'Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.'

Bellamy (1981: 102).

'A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.'

Walter Lippman, cited in Buzan (1991a: 16).

'National security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad.'

Luciani (1989: 151).

'A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.'

Ullman (1983: 133).

'Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.'

Wolfers (1962: 150).

'Security–insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities—*both internal and external*—that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.'

Ayoob (1995: 9; emphasis in original).

'Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. . . . Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.'

Booth (1991: 319).

'If people, be they government ministers or private individuals, perceive an issue to threaten their lives in some way and respond politically to this, then that issue should be deemed to be a *security* issue.'

Hough (2008: 10) (emphasis in original).

'Security . . . implies both coercive means to check an aggressor and all manner of persuasion, bolstered by the prospect of mutually shared benefits, to transform hostility into cooperation.'

Kolodziej (2005: 25).

'"Security" is not just a social concept or topic to be studied or analyzed; it is also a problem to be managed or otherwise controlled by human communities on a regular basis if they hope to survive.'

Smith (2010: 2).

the security problems of the developing world are no longer either ignored or seen through the prism of the East–West conflict. We are therefore examining these security problems and, perhaps, in doing so, we will witness the emergence of specifically African or Asian approaches to the study of security that will force us to rethink core assumptions and gain a greater understanding of the Security Studies field. In the meantime the field, while global in scope, remains dominated by Western thought.

Approaches

In the book's first substantive chapter, Chapter 2, Charles Glaser introduces the first of the two dominant explanations of why and how states have sought security: realism. Realism is not one approach but rather a set of approaches, and in this chapter you will be introduced to the divisions within this explanation of why states behave the way they do as they seek security in an anarchic international environment. One such division concerns debates within structural realism, but there is also a more fundamental division within realism: structural realism versus motivational realism. Utilizing the emergence of China as a great power, this chapter explains the key concepts realism brings to the study of security as well as the breadth of approaches that fall within its framework. The second dominant explanation of why and how states have sought security is the focus for Chapter 3. Here, Patrick Morgan will introduce you to liberalism. Whereas realism seeks an explanation for state behaviour in the international system, liberalism looks to the state as the unit of analysis and places importance on domestic actors' power and preferences and the nature of their political systems. Since behaviour is a product of domestic circumstances for liberalists, states are not alike, and this means that international relations are determined by the choices people make; the world can operate in a realist manner, but for liberalists it does not have to. The recognition among state leaders that they have common, shared, values means that they can establish agreements on a range of issues from trade to human rights that will benefit them all and thus create a secure environment. Liberalism, while recognizing that cooperation can be difficult, is nevertheless an optimistic approach that posits lasting security as a possibility.

We can think of these opening chapters as covering traditional approaches to understanding the search for security because they have underpinned much of our thinking during the previous century; they remain hugely influential, and just because they are traditional does not mean they have been replaced by more recent thinking. New thinking about security has emerged, especially in the post-Cold War period, and such approaches are explained and examined in the other chapters in the Approaches section. You should think of these new approaches as challenging the dominance of the traditional insights offered by realism and liberalism. It may be that you find the traditional explanations of how security can be conceived of and achieved convincing. This is fine so long as you reach that conclusion with an understanding of the other approaches—in other words, that you find an approach to understanding security convincing based not on ignorance of other approaches but with a full understanding of them.

The first alternative approach has one of the most recent labels to enter the security studies field—historical materialism—but it hails from a tradition on a par with the previous two chapters; in this instance Marxism. Written by Eric Herring, it provides both an explanation of what historical materialism is and how it relates to the other approaches in this book's first section. The exploitative nature of capitalism and the insecurities this generates form the focal point for this approach to understanding what constitutes security, and this is explained with reference to the arms trade industry and international development. Since this book is not intended to be read one chapter after another you might want, after having read this chapter, to look at Chapter 22 (Defence Trade) and especially Chapter 16 (Development and Security) to explore what insights an appreciation of historical materialism provides in these particular issue areas. Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' was, in part, an obituary for Marxism but perhaps in a slightly modified form you will consider it has much to reveal about the insecurities that plague the contemporary world (Fukuyama 1992).

The next alternative approach, and one that shares with realism, liberalism, and Marxism a long tradition, is peace studies, although as a formal field of study its origins are found in the post-1945 period. Here the approach to security is distinctively broad based, both in the nature of threats that the field covers and also in its approaches to finding solutions. Thus, although initially concerned with the arrival of nuclear weapons, peace studies, long before the post-Cold War era, were noting the security implications of environmental degradation and poverty. With its wide agenda, it is not perhaps surprising to learn that academics working in peace studies come not just from politics and international relations but other disciplines in the social sciences, notably anthropology and sociology, as well as the natural sciences, such as physics and mathematics; it is a truly interdisciplinary field. In Chapter 5 a leading authority, Paul Rogers, provides a historical account of how peace studies developed, highlighting its characteristics and revealing its continued relevancy to contemporary security studies.

The following chapter captures the reflections that took place by some scholars studying security in the immediate post-Cold War period. Labelled Critical Security Studies (CSS), these reflections pre-date the end of the Cold War, but they have flourished since the removal of the nuclear sword of Damocles that hung over the study of security. David Mutimer provides an explanation of the different approaches that have developed since CSS first arrived on the scene in 1994. For those new to critical thinking it is a demanding read, but thoroughly worthwhile, because, amongst many of the things on which it will give you pause to ponder, it unashamedly forces you to think through your assumptions, and it reconnects security with its normative origins.

While CSS was challenging traditional ways of thinking about security, another alternative approach was challenging the traditional explanations for state behaviour in International Relations more broadly; first coined in 1989, social constructivism has rapidly emerged as a third explanation for why international actors behave the way they do. As with realism and liberalism, it is not one approach, and in Chapter 7 Christine Agius introduces us to two broad camps: conventional and critical constructivism. For constructivists identities matter in explaining the search for security, and identities are constituted through interaction. Since state identities are malleable and can change as a consequence of interaction, this means we create the world in which we live. Conceiving of relations as a product of how we think of them—as opposed to them being something independent from us—enables us to think of threats as socially constructed. This can, as Chapter 7 reveals, provide important insights into topics such as NATO enlargement and the War on Terror.

One of the new 'buzz words' in the security literature is human security. It shares much in common with critical approaches to security, the most notable being its critique of the state-centrism of the traditional approach. As the name suggests, the referents for security are humans, but, as Pauline Kerr explains in Chapter 8, while this change of referent object reveals the close connection between development and security, it also brings many challenges to maintaining analytical rigour. Dividing human-security proponents into narrow and broad schools makes it possible for you to appreciate the vast arrays of threats that exist to humans and their livelihoods and thus enables you to make your own judgement about what constitutes security. The chapter also compares the state-centrism of realism with human security to reveal both of their strengths and weaknesses.

A criticism aimed not just at security studies but at the wider field of international relations is the failure to appreciate the important insights that gender provides. In the penultimate chapter in the Approaches section, Caroline Kennedy reveals two elements that gender can provide in our understanding of security: a practical appreciation of the role women have been ascribed in the security field and a discursive element that reveals the implicit link between militarism and masculinity. The latter highlights how the notions of honour, nobleness, and valour are associated with masculinity and war, implicitly therefore leaving femininity devoid of such positive attributes. The former notes how women, if they are mentioned at all, are portrayed in a secondary, supporting role to men, whereas the reality is that in many ways (rape, prostitution, breeders) women are victims and their plight has remained a silence in the study of security.

The final chapter in the Approaches section, Chapter 10, examines a process known as 'securitization', which was introduced to the literature by scholars working at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen. Known collectively as the Copenhagen School, these scholars place primary importance on determining how an issue becomes a security issue, by how it is articulated. That is, we think of something as a security issue because the elite, such as political leaders, have convinced us that it represents a threat to our very survival. They are, therefore, interested in the 'speech acts' that the elite use in order to convince an audience that, in order to counter a threat, they require emergency powers. It is then a subjective approach to determining what constitutes security. A threat exists because an audience has been convinced it exists by the elite and it has granted the

elite the authority to use emergency powers to counter the threat. The threat therefore is not something that simply exists; it has to be articulated as a threat for it to become a matter of security. Ralf Emmers explains this process, notes limitations with the concept of securitization, and uses case studies ranging from Australian reaction to undocumented migration to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Deepening and Broadening

The middle section of the book examines the deepening and broadening that has taken place in Security Studies. As will have become evident from the Approaches section, the theoretical approach you take towards examining security will determine the type of subject matter that you consider constitutes security. This part of the book contains six sectors of security; these are the recognizable sectors that you will find in the Security Studies literature. The exception is regime security, which I have included instead of political security, first because political security has a tendency to become a miscellaneous section in which security issues that cannot fit in the other sectors end up, and secondly because, while political security is concerned with external threats (concern with recognition), its greater utility lies in internal threats (concern with legitimacy) to the regime. Labelling the chapter 'regime' therefore clarifies what the referent object is and also highlights the internal dimension of this security sector. Whether these sectors do constitute security is contentious, so, as with all your reading, adopt a critical, enquiring mind, and see if you are persuaded.

We begin with military security because it is the home of our traditional understanding of what constitutes security; the use or threat to use force. In Chapter 11 Michael Sheehan provides a clear exposition of the issues that are the staple diet of military security: war, deterrence, alliances, arms control, and so on; but, while these can be explained by traditional approaches, this chapter reveals that the alternative approaches have something to say about these issues as well, and, in so doing, shed new light on the subjects. Military security used to be the *sine qua non* of security studies, and, while it no longer dominates the discipline as it once did, it remains very much part of the security agenda and remains an indispensable component. What has changed is what constitutes military security, and this chapter reveals the breadth and depth of the subject in a concise and accessible fashion.

Turning our attention to the security concerns within states enables us to appreciate that life in the developed world is far from indicative of that lived by most of the planet's inhabitants. The majority of people living in the developing world face a vast range of insecurities, from half a million people dying each year from the use of light weapons to 40,000 dying each day from hunger. There is, as Richard Jackson writes in Chapter 12 on regime security, 'a profound disjuncture between the kinds of security enjoyed by a small group of developed nations and the kind of security environment inhabited by the majority of the world's population'. In this chapter you will have the opportunity to understand the underlying causes of the developing world's inherent insecurity and why it is that, far from being the providers of security, governing regimes become the main source of their peoples' insecurity. It is a bleak picture that is portrayed, but after reading the chapter you will appreciate the complexities that make bringing security to these millions of people both urgent and yet extremely difficult. The notion of an insecurity dilemma captures not only the spiralling nature of the violence but also how problematic it is to find a solution.

The broadening of security so that it means more than a preoccupation with the state and military defence should have been appreciated by now. In Chapter 13 on societal security, an alternative to the state, and indeed the individual, is posited. In this instance you will be introduced to the notion of a collective of people becoming the thing to be secured. In recent times the term 'ethnic' has become a popular label for describing conflict between groups within states. In this chapter Paul Roe introduces you to a means of examining the dynamics behind those ethnic conflicts where identity lies at the conflict's core. Importantly he does so by focusing on non-military issues that can give rise to insecurity and thereby shows how ambiguity in such seemingly non-threatening issues, such as education, can indeed become matters of great concern. If you have an interest in the nexus between security and identity, this is a must-read chapter.

Although it pre-dates the end of the Cold War, it was in the 1990s, and especially because of concern over ozone depletion and global warming, that environmental change began to be thought of as a 'new' security threat. In Chapter 14, while you will be exposed to the vast array of environmental degradation that is occurring in today's world, the question of interest is what makes environmental change a matter of security. Jon Barnett provides an explanation of why the environment emerged on the security agenda before providing six interpretations of environmental security. You will, therefore, have the opportunity to consider whether the environment really is a security issue and whether labelling it as a matter of security helps or hinders attempts to reverse environmental degradation. For those with a normative interest in studying international security, this is an important chapter to read.

The final two chapters in this section are concerned with economics from two very different perspectives. In Chapter 15 Gary Shiffman utilizes the rational decision making that underpinned Adam Smith's explantion of human nature to indicate how economic instruments of the state can be used to pursue security goals. With an appreciation of what explains human behaviour, it then becomes possible to pursue economic policies, such as sanctions, trade agreements, or aid strategies, to fulfil policy goals. Drawing upon a variety of examples, such as US economic engagement with North Korea and US financial controls on terrorist assets, the chapter reveals the security considerations that underpin economic policy.

The final chapter of the deepening and broadening part of the book, Chapter 16, continues the economy theme, but here the focus is on how the liberal international political economic order provides prosperity for the developed North at the expense of the developing South. Globalization is thus presented as an explanation for those structural conditions that expose people to a range of insecurities. Insecurities that ultimately can drive demands for change and such change might be manifest in rebellion, riots, and regime change. In this chapter Nana Poku and Jacqueline Therkelsen draw upon the recent events in Egypt and Greece to highlight the insecurities that a globalized world has created.

Traditional and non-traditional

The final section of the book highlights a series of traditional and **non-traditional security** issues that have emerged on the Security Studies agenda. The section begins with **traditional security** concerns and then moves to the non-traditional issues that have emerged as the subject area has expanded. We begin by addressing the traditional security concern of the threat and use of force. This is examined by looking at how Western strategy has evolved post-Cold War away from deterrence to compellence and in particular to the use of coercive diplomacy. This captures the logic behind Western, and in particular US, strategic thinking.

The Bush administration's willingness to talk of 'pre-emptive' use of force, and indeed to implement it, revealed a significant change in strategic thinking in the West. It is no longer simply enough to deter opponents from taking action; it is now necessary to persuade, coerce, and, on occasion, force them to change their behaviour. This, as Peter Viggo Jakobsen writes, has led to the post-Cold War era witnessing the pursuit of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is the threat, and if necessary the limited use of force, designed to make an opponent comply with the coercer's wishes. It is action short of brutal force and thus an attempt to achieve a political objective as cheaply as possible. It has been used to respond to acts of aggression, halt weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, and stop terrorism. Chapter 17 provides you with the criteria for what constitutes coercive diplomacy and the obstacles to its success, and concludes that Western efforts have largely failed. If you want to understand the strategy that underpins Western, and specifically US, policy on the use of force since the end of the Cold War, this is a chapter for you.

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the acronym WMD has been catapulted into everyday usage. Weapons of mass destruction, and the fear that rogue states or terrorists will target the USA or Europe with such weapons, has become a central concern for Western states. The belief that Iraq had an undisclosed arsenal of WMD provided the justification for the USA's decision to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, and it was the nuclear programmes of both North Korea and Iran (the former a declared weapons programme; the latter a potential and feared possibility) that earned them membership of Bush's 'Axis of Evil'. What, though, are WMD, why are they considered so different from conventional weapons, how easy are they to use, and what has been their impact on international relations? These are the questions that James Wirtz addresses in Chapter 18.

Terrorism, perhaps even more than WMD, has come to occupy a top spot on the security agendas of states. In Chapter 19 Brenda and Jim Lutz provide a definition of terrorism and explain the various types (religious, ethnic, ideological) and causes of terrorism.

Using a typology that sees terrorism as either a form of war, or crime, or disease, they are able to explain why certain countermeasures are adopted by states and their implications for civil liberties. The chapter will provide you with details of terrorists ranging from the Ku Klux Klan to **al-Qaeda** and reveal the incidence of terrorism that has occurred throughout the world in recent times.

After the end of the Cold War but prior to 9/11, the subject that came to prominence in the field of international security concerned the use of (primarily Western) military force to intervene in cases of severe human suffering; it has not gone away, and in Chapter 20 Alex Bellamy charts the arguments for and against humanitarian intervention. The atrocities committed in Bosnia and the genocide of Rwanda heralded the arrival of the responsibility to protect (R2P). What R2P means, what it means for coercive state intervention, and what future R2P has in a world where mass atrocities continue—as witnessed in Libya 2011 and Syria—are the subjects the chapter examines.

We then turn our attention to the increasing demands for energy coupled to the declining pool of available resources; in the light of this, it is not surprising that energy security has become a critical issue for states (and people). Chapter 21 on energy security provides both a detailed coverage of the topic, specifically related to oil demand, and a link to previous chapters in the Approaches and the Deepening and Broadening sections. You will, for example, have an opportunity to look at what historical materialism argues about the state of energy security, and at the connections that energy security has to economic and regime security, as well as thinking about energy security as an issue not just for states but for human security as well. The USA figures prominently, and reading this chapter will enable you to appreciate that energy security involves a complex nexus of geopolitical, economic, and strategic concerns, which link together distant regions of the globe, and disparate security concerns.

Chapter 22 examines the last of the traditional security issues in this book: the arms or defence trade. In this chapter Suzette Grillot provides an historical overview of how the trade in arms has evolved, including recent trends, as well as the connections between the legal and illicit arms trade. It concludes by examining the methods implemented to control the defence trade. The chapter reveals the defence trade to be multifaceted and complex with a variety of actors engaged in the production and procurement of weapons. Case studies include the procurement of weapon systems by terrorists as well as efforts to limit the trade in particular weapon systems, such as landmines.

In Chapter 23 we turn to our first non-traditional security issue, health, and here Stefan Elbe examines how diseases such as AIDS and SARS are a threat to both human and national security. AIDS is a pandemic; it was estimated in 2010 that around 1.8 million people die annually of AIDS-related illnesses, while a further 2.6 million people continue to become newly infected with the virus every year. This chapter shows how diseases can be thought of as a security issue for individuals, ranging from their economic impact to specific effects on food security for instance, to national security matters, such as the prevalence of HIV amongst soldiers. While diseases represent an exacerbating factor for national security, they are a direct threat when individuals are the referent object. This chapter concludes by noting that terrorists have deliberately used a biological agent to spread terror, and the potential for further attacks has enhanced the salience of bio-security on states' security agendas.

Our next chapter focuses on another non-traditional security matter that has become increasingly prominent on national security agendas; transnational crime. In 1999 Thailand identified the narcotics trade as the country's number one threat to national security. Drug trafficking, along with, among others, human trafficking and money laundering across national frontiers, are all forms of transnational crime, and, as the Thai experience reveals, this non-traditional security issue has risen rapidly up the national security agendas of states in the post-Cold War era. In Chapter 24 Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas reveal the multiple ways in which transnational crime impacts directly, and indirectly, on human and national security. They explain why it has become more prevalent since the 1990s, the links between organized crime and terrorism, and the various responses that states have taken to curb its operation. If you want to appreciate a 'dark side' of globalization and how transnational criminal activity has impacted on international security, this is a must-read chapter.

Chapter 25 turns our attention to one of the most current topics to appear in the field of security studies; cyber-security. Whether in the fields of security, diplomacy, or indeed any aspect of international relations, information and its generation, management and manipulation has always been considered paramount. The ability to control knowledge, beliefs and ideas are as central to achieving security as tangible resources, such as military forces and raw materials. It is the realm of cyberspace, connoting a fusion of communication networks, databases, and sources of information, that is the environment for this chapter's examination of information control. Utilizing three different discourses (technical, cyber-crime and cyber-espionage, cyber-war) Myriam Dunn Cavelty explains the inherent insecurity of information infrastructure, although she does conclude that the level of cyber-risk is often overrated.

The examination of what non-traditional issues constitute Security Studies today concludes by examining the concept of child soldiers. This is a topic that has recently gained prominence, but it is not new; children have been agents in conflict for centuries. They are an under-theorized and under-utilized political agent, and in Chapter 26 Helen Brocklehurst brings to the fore their recruitment and role and the implications these have for our thinking about war and security. The legal dimension is examined and the difficulties of demobilization and reintegration are highlighted. Throughout, the chapter provides a critical analysis, challenging preconceptions and revealing the complexities the topic of child soldiers encapsulates.

Conclusion

You are, as I am sure you appreciate, about to embark upon a whirlwind tour of a fascinating subject—a subject that has undergone, and continues to undergo, a thorough introspection of its core assumptions. It is a wonderful time to be a scholar of the discipline—and by scholar I mean students and tutors—because there is so much new and innovative thinking taking place that it is impossible for it not to open your mind. Listen to the ideas contained in the chapters that follow and if, by the end of it, you are more confused than you are now, then it has been a worthwhile enterprise. A caveat should, though, be added: that your confusion is not a reflection of ignorance but an appreciation of how complicated and complex the subject is and how challenging it is therefore to be a scholar of Security Studies. The chapter began with the question: what is Security Studies? It is all of this and more. Happy reading.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins3e/

- Salehi, R. and Ali, S. H. (2006), 'The Social and Political Context of Disease Outbreaks: The Case of SARS in Toronto', *Canadian Public Policy*, 32/4: 373–85. This paper addresses the impact of government policies and politics on the diffusion as well as transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-S-CoV) within a local Toronto context.

IMPORTANT WEBSITE

- **http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts** This website contains information about the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. It is an information hub for policy makers and academics working on non-traditional security and offers analytical tools by analysing the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization.

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PART 2
Deepening and Broadening Security

11

Military Security

Michael Sheehan



Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter examines the continuing importance of military security. It notes that international relations has historically seen security almost entirely in terms of the military dimension, before going on to review the impact of the broadening of the concept of security on approaches to the study of its military dimension. It then analyses the key aspects of the traditional approach to military security and some of the most common ways in which states have sought to acquire it historically, such as war, alliances, and, more recently, nuclear deterrence. The chapter then reflects on some of the difficulties in acquiring military security, and ways in which its pursuit can sometimes reduce, rather than increase, security, before concluding with a reminder of the continuing centrality of military security, even within a significantly broadened understanding of security as a multifaceted concept.

Introduction

The concept of security has been central to the study of international relations since its inception as a discipline, but has had a restricted definition for most of that period. Barry Buzan (1991a: 7) argued in 1991 that security was an 'essentially contested concept' and that the study of international relations was marked by 'unsolvable debates' about the meaning of security. Actually this is far from being the case; such debates are a comparatively recent phenomenon. For most of the twentieth century there was in fact a scholarly consensus regarding the understanding of security, and that consensus limited its meaning to *military* security, so that in practice security studies was synonymous with strategic studies, the study of the relationship between military **power** and the achievement of political objectives. States were seen as entities that provided 'collective goods' to their citizens, of which the most important was freedom from external attack (Kapstein 1992: 14). In the post-Cold War period, the move to broaden the concept of security has been largely successful, with additional security 'sectors' taking their place alongside the military domain. 'Military security' also refers not just to responses to military threats, but to the use of the military instrument to address broader security isues, as is the case in humanitarian interventions and peace operations. But it is important to recognize that military security retains a central place in the expanded definition of security, and for governments remains an absolute priority. The expansion of the meaning of security involved adding additional sectors, but the core military sector remained. Military issues continue to be paramount, because 'a state and its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure' (Buzan 1991b: 35). Military forces capable of defending the country and supporting its foreign policy remain central to state security. It therefore remains a priority in terms of the attention paid to it by International Relations as an academic discipline. Nevertheless, the expanded definition of security has not left military security untouched, and has seen for example a new willingness to use military force for humanitarian interventions, whose objectives clearly relate to the 'deepening' of the meaning of security.

Approaches to military security

The traditional approach to studying military security was dominant during the Cold War, and remains intellectually hegemonic in the United States even in the post-Cold War era, though it has lost its predominance elsewhere. In the traditional approach, security is a military phenomenon, military capabilities take priority in governments' budgetary allocations, and the projection and deterrence of military force is central to understanding the workings of international politics.

In an early realist contribution to the study of national security, Arnold Wolfers (1962: 150) noted that threats can result from a psychological construction as well as an empirical reality. Wolfers pointed out that 'security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked'. His insight was not followed up for several decades, which was unfortunate, since it opens the analysis to a more social-constructivist understanding of security in all its forms.

It is possible to study military security through non-realist analytical lenses, however. Rather than making the realist assumption that the structural realities of the international system are a given, which define the need for particular forms of military capability and policy, it is possible to adopt a social-constructivist approach, which sees all human reality as the product of human interaction and capable of being interpreted in different ways, and altered by human actions. In this approach, cultural factors and **norms** become central to the analysis (Adler and Barnett 1998). It is also important to be aware that the security of the state is an essential, but not always sufficient, condition for making its citizens secure.

Because of the prevalence of 'expeditionary wars' and humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War period, alternative conceptions of security such as the 'human security' approach can also be related to military security. The traditional military objective of defeating or destroying enemy armed forces is inadequate when post-war 'peace building' or national reconstruction of the defeated state is a crucial policy objective. States also feel obliged to take account of the United Nations' call for the creation of a 'culture of protection' in situations of armed conflict. Wartime and post-war human security needs therefore need to be integrated into

military security policies and in key procedures, from war plans to military training. In addition, national militaries must increasingly plan for missions in which they need to operate successfully alongside civilian government personnel and non-governmental organizations. Soldiers cannot be expected to be 'armed social workers', and there is a paradox in using soldiers, individuals trained in violence, to deliver stable peace in humanitarian operations. The presence of trained civilian staff may be crucial to the long-term success of the operations (Lamb 2007). A European Union advisory panel has proposed the creation of a new type of mixed military–civilian formation, a division-sized (15,000 personnel) 'Human Security Response Force' of which two-thirds would be military and one-third police and civilian social and development specialists (Barcelona Report 2004). However, the idea that military and non-military security instruments should form part of such a 'networked-security' approach remains controversial for many civil society groups, who see this development as simply the 'militarization' of the other security sectors.

In 1977 Snyder (1977) introduced the concept of **strategic culture** in understanding the way that countries formulate and implement military-security policies. In contrast to the structuralist approach of neorealism, Snyder argued that societies' beliefs and historical behaviour patterns are crucial for understanding their policy decisions. Factors such as the continuing influence of national myths and social and political norms (Wendt 1996) help shape the boundaries of what a government considers vital or not, acceptable or not, achievable or not, urgent or not, and influences the manner in which governments seek to implement their policy choices.

A more 'critical' approach to military security would also note that, in the 'real' world, ontology is changing. In their wars on terror both the United States and Israel have deployed their armed forces abroad in large-scale military operations, the USA in Afghanistan (post 2001) and Israel in Lebanon (2006) and Palestine (2009), where the operations were directed not against the armed forces of those states, or to secure the territory, but in pursuit of sub-state **insurgent** or terrorist forces (al-Qaeda, Hisbollah, Hamas). In Columbia, US forces have been operating against insurgent forces linked with the international drugs trade. This is a very different use of military capability from the realist state-to-state logic, although the use of military forces in the counter-insurgency role has a long historical pedigree. Prior to the development of national police forces in the nineteenth century, the military were the only force the state had at its disposal for such purposes.

In addition, a critical approach to military security is valuable in recognizing that in many parts of the world the 'military security' threat facing a population, and sometimes facing the national government, is not the armed forces of neighbouring states, but those of the state itself. The 'threat' to states such as Argentina, Chile, Greece, South Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan, and many others in recent decades has been military coups against the national government, followed by long periods of brutal military dictatorship. The cosy assumption that a state needs to maximize its own military capabilities to face external threats safely takes no account of these realities. In 1948, Costa Rica abolished its armed forces in recognition of the fact that they, not those of other countries, were the real threat.

Focusing on the population rather than the state is also typical of the social constructivist approach, which highlights the implications of notions of 'identity' for military security. Where realism sees identities as essentially fixed, the social constructivist approach sees them as being more fluid, and this has important implications for the use of force in international relations. Conflict can be the forge in which national identity is formed, rather than a struggle between pre-existing rival identities, as Campbell (1998b) argues was the case during the Bosnian War in the early 1990s. Campbell (1992) in fact insists that the state itself is constructed through the practice of pursuing militarized security against real or imagined external threats.

The social constructivist approach to security is useful because, in Onuf's words (1989), the international system is 'a world of our making'. The meaning that governments and individuals attach to events is crucial—for example, President George W. Bush seeing the 9/11 attacks as part of a war, rather than a terrorist attack requiring a policing response, or the way in which the understanding of 'child soldiers' has evolved in recent decades, or whether the conflict in Bosnia was a 'civil war' or an 'invasion'. The socially constructed meaning societies give to events shapes the way they respond to them, and interpretations of 'national interest' are crucial in underpinning national security policies.

Governments can choose to 'securitize' certain issues and not others. While the US government under President George W. Bush saw the struggle against terrorism as an aspect of military security, for example, its European allies tended to view it in terms of traditional policing and counter-subversion policies. The decision about whether or not to place an issue within the military-security discourse will reflect the political objectives of those promoting the move. Militarization (in the conceptual sense), like theory, is 'always for someone and for some purpose'. It is not a politically neutral step; it will be taken because it advances the objectives of an influential group within the national polity.

KEY POINTS

- Military security has both an objective and a subjective dimension.
- While realist approaches have dominated the study of military security, other approaches, such as constructivism, can also be employed.
- A constructivist approach identifies alternative possibilities where a structuralist approach sees constraints as defining.

Traditional military-security studies

Prior to the expanding of the definition, security was understood in overwhelmingly military terms and was seen as meaning 'military protection against the threats posed by the armed forces of other states'. It was further assumed that the referent object of security, the thing that needed to be made secure, was the state. Thus, military security was about identifying actual and potential military threats from other states, and coping with them, either by acquiring sufficient levels of appropriate military capability oneself, or by allying with other states that possessed such a capability. The ultimate mechanism for maintaining security was the resort to war. Thus Lippmann (1943: 51) argued that 'a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war'. The study of military security is, therefore, the central concern of strategic studies, and one of the central concerns of security studies. In this regard, one can think of security studies as a subset of international relations, and strategic studies as a subset of security studies, the latter focusing solely on the military dimension of security in terms of the threat and use of force to achieve political objectives.

For traditionalists, the requirement for governments to focus their attention on military rather than other forms of security was seen as being a result of the structure of the international system. For traditional realists, the key element of the system is that it is an anarchy—that is, there is no world government. States are therefore obliged to produce their military security through their own efforts, and these efforts will seem threatening to other states in the system, causing them to respond in kind, and triggering an arms race spiral as a result of this '**security dilemma**'. This produces what Snow (1991: 1) called the 'violent peace'. John Herz (1950: 158), who originated the term 'security dilemma', argued that it had crucial domestic as well as international implications because it resulted in 'power-political, oligarchic, authoritarian and similar trends and tendencies in society'. In this regard it has implications for the other security sectors as well, particularly political and societal security.

This was important, because the **traditional security** approach assumed that the domestic political order was stable and essentially peaceful, whereas there was an arena of 'necessity, contingency and violence beyond the state' (Dalby 1992b: 105). In reality, the boundaries of military security are themselves necessarily somewhat fluid. Since the perception of a 'threat' implies the recognition of vulnerabilities, military security must encompass internal elements such as actual or potential insurgencies and terrorism, ideological division, nationalist pressures, in fact any 'national weaknesses that might be exploited by an enemy' (Freedman 1992: 754). Moreover, states tend to define 'threats' not just in terms of existential dangers to the country, but also of actions by other states or actors which frustrate certain foreign policy objectives.

As well as this specific ontology (understanding of what it was that was being studied), traditional military security studies also operated with a very particular positivist epistemology (or understanding of what constituted legitimate knowledge). This was based upon empiricism, naturalism, and objectivism (Smith 1996: 18). A 'scientific objectivism' was held to be characteristic of the way that military security issues were studied (Wyn Jones 1996). Military security theorists assumed that the scientific method was applicable

KEY QUOTES II.1 The security dilemma

'When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security. Unless the requirements for offence and defence differ in kind or amount, a status quo power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor. For this reason others cannot infer from its military forces and preparations whether the state is aggressive. States therefore assume the worst. The others intentions must be co-extensive with his capabilities.'

Jervis (1991: 92–3)

both to the natural and the social worlds (naturalism), and that it was possible for security analysts to remain objective by distinguishing between 'facts' and 'values' (objectivism). Finally, analysis, following the scientific method, would proceed through empirical validation or falsification. The 'real world' would be investigated, without bias or ideology influencing the results. As outlined by Walt (1991: 222), 'security studies seeks *cumulative* knowledge about the role of military force. To obtain it, the field must follow the standard canons of scientific research.' The study of military security is in this sense seen as a search for 'truth'.

Although security realism is often contrasted with idealism, there are idealistic elements within the realist world view in this regard. As Reus-Smit (1992: 17) notes, many traditional security specialists effectively see the state as an 'idealized political community', where the survival and well-being of the population as a whole is aggregated into a minimalist notion of state security. It is this assumption that allows Buzan (1991a: 328), for example, to claim that 'national security subsumes all other security considerations'. For critics such as Booth (1991: 320) this is illogical, since it gives priority to 'the security of the means as opposed to the security of the ends'.

Military power is relative to the situation in which a state tries to use it. It was a fatal error by Iraq under Saddam Hussein to think that, because its army performed well against Iran, it was capable of standing up to the forces of the United States. How much military capability is deemed to be enough depends partly on what threats exist, and partly on what a state wishes to do with its military capabilities, both in terms of its overall defence strategy and on whether it sees the security of other states as also crucial to its own security, and thereby feels a need for power projection capabilities.

For most of the Cold War period, therefore, thinking about security in the heavily armed states of the developed world focused not on security in a broad sense, but rather on what were seen to be the requirements for maintaining the **balance of power** in the nuclear age, through policies of deterrence, **alliance** formation, and force projection. These ideas were reflected in the writings of key scholars such as Kissinger (1956), Brodie (1959), and Schelling (1960b).

More recently, contributors to realist thinking have divided into somewhat different *neoclassical* realist approaches that have differing assumptions on the implications of the security dilemma for military security. Offensive realism operates with a traditional interpretation of the security dilemma, in which rivalry and conflict is inevitable. Defensive realists, in contrast, do not assume that the international anarchy always leads to conflict. It can often produce relatively peaceful areas of the world, where states do not face any insurmountable military security threats, so that major external military dangers are seen as exceptional and unusual, rather than the norm (Rose 1998: 149).

KEY POINTS

- Traditional security approaches focused on military threats posed to the state in an environment characterized by the security dilemma.
- Security specialists used a positivist methodology, emphasizing the scientific method.
- Post-Cold War realists have divided into groups with differing assumptions about the implications of the security dilemma.

War

States acquire and maintain military capabilities ultimately because they face the possibility of war. The problem of war has always been foundational to the

study of international relations and central to security studies. Security studies has always operated with a Clausewitzian perspective on war: that war is not a social aberration or mass psychological disorder, but rather is simply a rational instrument of policy, in the same way as diplomacy or economic sanctions. It is a continuation of politics by other means. War, according to Clausewitz, is a political activity, 'intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. It is simply a brutal form of bargaining.

In the 1970s and again in the 1990s it became fashionable in some academic circles to argue that war was on the decline and the use of military force as a foreign-policy instrument was increasingly unattractive for states. Most of this writing originated in America and Western Europe, two areas of the international system that had certainly become less dangerous environments since the end of the Second World War.

Advocates of this logic argued that foreign-policy objectives had become more intangible, that there was less emphasis on territorial expansion and more emphasis on trade. States now sought to win friends and influence people, rather than to invade and occupy their territories. Nuclear weapons had proved to be effectively unusable, great powers had failed dismally to achieve their military objectives in wars in Vietnam (the USA) and Afghanistan (the USSR), and the international system seemed dominated by states with major constraints on their armed forces, such as Germany and Japan. Some went so far as to suggest that, at least between the major powers, war was becoming obsolete.

Certainly war is a risky option to resort to. Of all wars occurring between 1815 and 1910, 80 per cent were won by the governments that started them. But 60 per cent of the wars between 1910 and 1965 were lost by the initiating state. But, in the post-Cold War period, war does not seem to have lost its salience for military security. The debates about it have rather been concerned with the nature of the wars that have taken place and the implications of revolutionary developments in military technology.

One area of debate has concerned the question of whether or not a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) has been underway in the post-Cold War period. The term revolution suggests a sudden and radical break with the past, and it has been suggested that the technological superiority of American military forces revealed in the 1991 Gulf War showed that just such a revolution had occurred. This interpretation placed great emphasis on technological developments. However, sceptics such as Lambert have cautioned against overemphasizing the significance of technological change, while underestimating the importance of changes in doctrine and organization.

Kaldor and Münkler have engaged with the issue of whether the wars typical of the post-Cold War period differ in form sufficiently from previous eras that they can be termed 'new wars'. While Kaldor (1999), argues that such wars are indeed a new phenomenon, Münkler (2005) disagrees, arguing that such a view lacks historical depth, but that a 'new terrorism' is the central challenge facing contemporary states.

In the 'new-wars' thesis, identity politics are central to the explanation of political violence. Kaldor argues that the conflicts typical of the post-Cold War period have been struggles to control the state in order to assert a particular understanding of national identity. A feature of such conflicts is that they are internal to the state, taking the form of insurgencies and civil wars. They therefore lend themselves to a constructivist analysis, rather than a traditional analysis of military security.

KEY POINTS

- War remains a legitimate instrument of national policy for states.
- War between the major powers risks consequences that have dramatically reduced its attractiveness.
- Technological and doctrinal changes may be driving a revolution in military affairs.
- Since 1991 the dominant form of warfare has been intra-state rather than inter-state.

Alliances and neutrality

One method of acquiring military security is to become a member of a military alliance. Security analysis has thus historically also paid attention to the issues relating to the attractiveness or otherwise of alliance membership, usually linking it to structural realist explanations of international politics (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981). States will seek membership of such an alliance if they believe that their own resources are inadequate to maintain their sovereignty and security, and will make common cause with states that share their goals, or at least perceive similar threats.

Alliance formation is particularly notable when a potential hegemonic power threatens the other states in the system. Alliance theories are often linked to balance of power theory. While some scholars argue that states automatically ally to 'balance' against a threatening state (Walt 1987), others argue that states are just as likely to 'bandwagon'—that is, to ally with the likely winning hegemon. In practice, the reasons for joining alliances vary widely.

More powerful states may also create alliances in order to extend their protective umbrella over weaker friendly states. Alliances are often seen by members not so much as essential tools for balancing against a potential hegemon, but rather as mechanisms for exercising influence over allies, whose own military security policies may increase the dangers to their allies—for example, by drawing them into confrontations or expeditionary commitments against third parties. They allow states to restrain or exert pressure on states within the alliance framework (Osgood 1968; Ikenberry 2001). While the idea that states prefer to join alliances with states that share common cultures or ideologies appears logical, such 'affinity theories' have not been confirmed by detailed studies of alliance formation (Russett 1971; Walt 1987).

The obligations assumed as members of an alliance vary significantly between organizations. Because of its size and longevity, NATO can sometimes be seen as a 'typical' alliance. In reality it is a very unusual alliance, completely unlike most others in history. Alliances vary in terms of issues that cause them to be created, the situations in which military commitments are triggered, the degree of military integration that takes place within the alliance, the numbers of allies, the geographical scope of the alliance, and many other factors.

Most military alliances are assembled for the purpose of waging war, and end when the war is concluded. Their purpose is to coordinate the allies' common war effort to maximum effect. Integration of forces is unusual. NATO is unusual, both in that it is a peacetime alliance and in that it has remained in existence for sixty years, outlasting the disappearance of all its original reasons for being created. Alliances tend to have brief existences because they require the harmonization of many conflicting interests, which becomes more difficult over long periods particularly if there is not an overwhelming sense of commonly perceived external threat.

Critics of alliances argue that they contribute little to a state's military security, and are destabilizing for the international system. Wright (1965: 774) argued that they simply generate opposing alliances and are incompatible with collective security, since they promote a selective response to acts of aggression. However, Kegley and Raymond (1982) found that on balance alliances make a positive contribution to peace and security as long as the alliance structure is flexible and when alliance commitments are considered binding by the member states.

Nevertheless a state is likely to avoid alliance membership if it feels strong enough to maintain its security unaided, or if it feels that its sovereignty will

CASE STUDY 11.1 NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty. NATO is a military alliance that has expanded in the post-Cold War period and by 2009 comprised twenty-eight countries from North America and Europe. It was originally created as an insurance against a revival of German militarism after the Second World War and as a collective defence initiative against the perceived threat from the Soviet Union.

The key clause of the Washington Treaty is Article 5, which declares that each ally will treat an attack against one Ally as an attack against all and respond with its own military forces as if it itself had been attacked. Article 4 of the treaty ensures consultations among Allies on security matters of common interest. The NATO members routinely consult each other on security matters, a habit that has become ingrained over six decades since 1949. In the post-Cold War period, NATO expanded its remit and geographical zone of operations, to allow it to become a collective security organization, operating in counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan, as well as peacekeeping in Kosovo.

Although its longevity and political influence encourage a perception of NATO as a 'typical' alliance, in reality NATO is historically unique. In terms of the length of time it has existed, the fact that it has done so in peacetime, rather than wartime, the degree of military integration among its members, and a number of other factors, NATO is an institution without precedent or parallel in recorded human history.

be compromised by alliance membership, or that the obligations and risks involved outweigh the potential benefits. Many states have historically sought security, not by joining alliances, but, on the contrary, by declaring neutral or non-aligned status. Occasionally **neutrality** is forced upon a state. Austria's neutral status was not a national political choice, but rather the price imposed by the superpowers in return for ending their military occupation and restoring Austrian sovereignty in 1955. Finnish neutrality was a conscious choice by Finland's government, but one taken in the knowledge that any other option would be likely to trigger a renewed Soviet invasion after 1945. Other states, such as Sweden, have seen neutrality as providing more security, sovereignty, and freedom than entry into a military alliance dominated by one or more of the great powers (Joenniemi 1988: 53). Neutrality does not come cheap. Because they do not have access to the military capabilities of allied states, neutral countries typically have to maintain large armed forces and institute systems of national service.

Neutrality is a legal status. A neutral state must remain outside military alliances in peacetime, and refrain from activities that might seem to align it too closely with the members of any existing alliances. In return, its neutral status will (or at least should) be accepted by the belligerent states in wartime. In the post-Cold War period, collective security organizations have become more prominent than collective defence bodies, but, given that the systemic factors promoting alliance formation have changed little in the post-Cold War period, alliances are likely to remain important mechanisms by which states pursue military security (Snyder 1997: 78).

KEY POINTS

- Military security can be pursued unilaterally by relying on one's own capabilities, multilaterally via alliance membership, or unilaterally via a policy of neutrality.
- States join alliances to compensate for their own relative military weakness.
- Alliances vary significantly in terms of their membership, objectives, and obligations.
- Some states have historically preferred to remain neutral rather than join alliances.

Deterrence

For most of the Cold War period, not only did 'security' studies in the developed world focus almost exclusively on military security, but within that focus there was an enormous, if perhaps understandable, emphasis on the study of the issue of nuclear deterrence. The stress on deterrence occurred despite the fact that nuclear weapons were never actually employed in war during the Cold War.

Early writers on nuclear weapons believed that they would be a 'powerful inhibitor to aggression' and would lead military security policies to become designed to avert wars rather than to win them (Brodie 1946: 73). In practice, the impact of nuclear weapons was more complicated. They did act as an inhibitor of full-scale war between the nuclear-armed great powers during crises (Kennedy 1969), but had no impact on those states (the vast majority) that did not possess such weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons certainly encouraged superpower diplomatic caution during the Cold War, and also encouraged the superpowers to pursue **arms control**. But it also encouraged the development of a balance-of-power system that tried to limit the propensity for superpower military engagement worldwide, and stabilized a nuclear balance where the superpowers constantly strengthened themselves so as not to have to fight.

In terms of generating a sense of security, military power can serve a number of ends. Where feasible, defence is the goal that all states aim for first. If defence is not possible, deterrence is generally the next priority. The defensive use of military power revolves around two purposes. The first is to ward off an attack. Should this not succeed, the second purpose is to minimize the damage to oneself if attacked.

The deterrent use of military power works with a different logic. Deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. It seeks to prevent an adversary from doing something by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it. The threat of retaliation or punishment is directed at the adversary's population or industrial infrastructure. It is effective only if the adversary is convinced you have both the will and the power to carry out the threat. Hence deterrence can be judged successful only if the retaliatory threat has not had to be carried out.

Nuclear weapons have paradoxically made those that possess them more militarily secure than any previous states in history, and more militarily insecure than any other states in history. Everything depends on the effectiveness of deterrence. Robert Art (1980: 22) argues that nuclear security buys conventional power projection capability: 'precisely because security can be bought so cheaply with nuclear weapons is each superpower able to use the bulk of its defence dollars on conventional forces, which can be readily employed and more finely tuned'.

Deterrence produces security not by physically obstructing a certain course of action, as defence does, but by threatening a response that makes the action seem disproportionately costly and therefore unattractive in the first place. In practice this is not entirely straightforward. Deterrence will work only if the threatened state clearly possesses the capability to inflict overwhelming retaliation, successfully convinces the adversary that it would be certain to do so if attacked, and is able to communicate clearly what is and is not acceptable within its deterrence doctrine. All these requirements are problematical in various ways. There are additional issues related to commitments to allies. Against a fellow nuclear-armed state, the willingness to use nuclear weapons is tantamount to committing suicide. Such a 'passive' deterrent threat may be credible when one's own population is threatened, but an 'active' deterrent threat, to follow the same course in defence of an ally, is much more difficult to make credible.

There are also clear moral issues. Actually to carry out the threat of retaliation is for a state to commit genocide against its enemies. This would be in breach of all existing laws of war, and the moral codes of all the world's major religions. Given social norms against blackmail and violent intimidation of other people, and particularly those who threaten violence against children, the old, or the helpless, it is debatable whether even the *threat* to use nuclear weapons is morally acceptable. Such issues spawned a large and lively scholarly literature (see, e.g., Elshtain 1992).

Michael McGuire argues that the 'theology' of deterrence encouraged the development of an arcane language that disguised the brutal realities of nuclear weapons' 'countervalue' rather than, say, city-targeting strikes. It also assumed a particular kind of worse-case analysis, where an enemy course of action needed only to be conceivable for it to be included in the threat assessment. Finally, because 'retaliation' actually meant genocidal mass murder of civilian populations, deterrence encouraged continual efforts to paint the adversary as a people deserving of such a terrible fate (McGuire 1986: 24–9). This critique is another example both of the importance of cultural determinants of military security thinking, and of the potential disjuncture between 'state' and 'population' logics when pursuing military security.

A number of authors have argued that the characteristics of the nuclear balance of power since the end of the Cold War are so different from the 1945–91 period that the world has now entered the Second Nuclear Age. The number of nuclear-weapons states will continue to increase, but the stability of deterrent relationships will decrease, so that a failure of deterrence and an outbreak of nuclear war becomes more likely.

KEY POINTS

- Nuclear deterrence theory dominated Cold War security studies.
- Nuclear deterrent relationships can increase and decrease security simultaneously.
- Deterrence has very different moral implications from policies based upon defence.
- The Cold War was the First Nuclear Age. The post-Cold War period may represent a Second Nuclear Age, with different implications for the pursuit of military security.

KEY QUOTES 11.2 Deterrence and defence

'Defence is possible without deterrence and deterrence is possible without defence. A state can have the military wherewithal to repel an invasion without also being able to threaten devastation to the invader's population or territory. Similarly, a state can have the wherewithal to credibly threaten an adversary with such devastation and yet be unable to repel his invading force. Defence, therefore, does not necessarily buy deterrence, nor deterrence defence. A state that can defend itself from attack, moreover, will have little need to develop the wherewithal to deter. If physical attacks can be repelled or if the damage from them drastically minimized, the incentive to develop a retaliatory capability is low. A state that cannot defend itself, however, will try to develop an effective deterrent if that be possible.'

Art (1980: 7)

Cooperative security and arms control

Traditional approaches to military security assume that the existence of international anarchy leads inevitably to the security dilemma. However, a number of scholars such as Wendt (1992: 407), have argued that while the anarchy may indeed exist, it is not inevitable that it should produce a security dilemma, and might indeed encourage cooperation among states. The operation of the security dilemma is a result of the practices of states, not of the structure of the system, and practices can change.

One example of states seeking to circumvent the difficulties of the security dilemma is through practices of cooperative security such as the pursuit of arms control and disarmament. A feature of the search for military security in the Cold War period was the pursuit of arms control. It was recognized that a purely adversarial relationship between nuclear armed states was far too dangerous and that therefore efforts should be made to negotiate agreed constraints on military capability in certain areas, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction.

Classical disarmament theory assumed that weapons, rather than being a route to security, were a cause of insecurity. They were seen as both deepening tensions between states, and making them more likely to resort to the use of force in times of crisis (Claude 1964: 262–3). The solution was therefore to reduce armaments, thereby reducing tension. Booth (1975: 89) described this approach by paraphrasing Clausewitz as 'a continuation of politics by a reduction of military means'. Arms control is a more conservative approach to building military security, though it can lead to disarmament in the longer term. Arms controllers did not see weapons as producing insecurity merely by their existence. On the contrary, they believed that weaponry was a normal and acceptable part of international relations (Bull 1961: 8). The arms control community therefore promoted the creation and maintenance of balances of power in which arms control would complement unilateral force improvements as the route to military security (Lefever 1962: 122).

Arms control as an approach to military security sought to distinguish between 'those kinds and quantities of forces and weapons that promote the stability of the balance of power and those which do not; to tolerate or even to promote the former and to restrict the latter' (Bull 1961: 61). Thus while disarmament always implies weapon reductions, arms control may simply freeze numbers, or even increase them through mutual consent. Schelling and Halperin (1961: 2) defined the objectives of arms control as being 'reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it'. This was a clear attempt to address the 'costs of security' discussed earlier. In practice, however, subsequent decades of experience with arms control demonstrated that these objectives often conflicted with one another. Increasing the number of survivable nuclear weapons may make war less likely, but increases the cost of preparing for it, and the death and destruction if it occurs. Developing complex verification regimes, reduce the likelihood of war, and the death and destruction if it occurs, but still increase the cost of being prepared for it.

One problem that policy makers encountered in subsequently implementing arms control was that politicians and the general public expected agreements to produce lowered numerical balances, what Krepon (1984: 130) called 'optical parity'. But, as Schelling (1985–6) pointed out, this reflected a shift from a concern with the *character* of weapons to an obsession with numbers. Bertram also argued that what is important is 'who could do what' rather than 'who had what'. But, from the point of view of economics and public perceptions, numbers are clearly important. Nevertheless, the arms control approach led to the conclusion of a large number of important agreements during the Cold War period, which can be held to have had a significant stabilizing function.

In the post-Cold War period arms control lost momentum. A number of agreements were signed in the first half of the 1990s, but these represented the tidying-up of the Cold War agenda. Arms control became less central both to the practice of military security after 1991 and to scholarly debates about the best way to sustain such security. The very different international political environment called for what Daalder (1993) described as 'threat deconstruction'. However, while progress largely halted in some areas, arms control thinking was applied to some new areas, such as light weapons and to the issue of conventional weapons proliferation.

KEY POINTS

- Arms control has become an important cooperative dimension of efforts to acquire military security through mutual restraint.
- Arms control does not challenge the central role of weaponry and military power in the international system, but focuses on problems produced by specific weapon systems and relationships.
- In the post-Cold War period arms control lost much of its salience, but remains a useful tool for pursuing security.

CASE STUDY 11.2 The 'New START' Treaty

The New START Treaty was signed in Prague in April 2010 between the Russian Federation and the United States and entered into force in February 2011. It has a lifespan of ten years, but can be extended for a further five. It superseded the 1991 START Treaty signed at the end of the Cold War which reduced Superpower strategic nuclear delivery systems to 1,600 each with a total of 6,000 warheads per country. New START reduces delivery systems to 700 each (with 100 in permitted non-operational reserve) and 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads. This represents a huge reduction from the 12,000 warheads each, on 2,500 delivery systems permitted under the 1979 SALT II Treaty. Unlike SALT and START, the New START has no sub-limits, each country can choose for itself how it wishes to divide its permitted total between inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers. New START continues the verification techniques pioneered in earlier treaties and also has mandates for eighteen on-site inspections per year. Every six months the two countries exchange an updated database of their strategic nuclear holdings and facilities, and there is a continuous process of 'notifications' of treaty-relevant information to the other country. The treaty also obliges the signatories to hold 'exhibitions' showing new weapon systems, such as the US B-2A bomber and Russian RS-24 missile.

The USA and Russia have seven years in which to complete the New START reductions. By the end of the process US–Russian nuclear warheads will have fallen to their lowest level since the 1950s.

The cost of military security

Analysts of international relations have reflected not only on the nature of security and alternative military strategies for maximizing it, but also on the fact that some of these strategies can be self-defeating, or generate security problems in other dimensions of the broader security agenda. Military security is of a different moral order to the other security sectors. The right of a people to defend their independence and way of life by maintaining and, if necessary, employing military capabilities is recognized under international law. However, as Klaus Knorr (1970: 50) said 'military power is ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to occupy and control, and hence to coerce', and it therefore has rather different implications to the pursuit of environmental security for example.

There are also economic and political issues. Military power can be acquired only by enormous effort in terms of the commitment of manpower and economic resources. All states struggle to acquire and maintain what they consider to be adequate military forces, and democratically elected governments therefore face particular difficulties in deciding upon the appropriate level of military capability. There are two main reasons for this. In the first place, such capability is extremely expensive to acquire, and high levels of defence spending may be unpopular, especially during long period of peace. Defence spending generates 'opportunity costs', the value of the social good a government could not invest in because it chose to spend the money on military capabilities. When President Eisenhower was asked the cost of the latest American bomber, he replied that the cost was 'a modern brick school in more than thirty cities, or two fully equipped hospitals'.

Acquiring military security is neither simple nor straightforward. One issue that overlaps with issues

of economic security is the question, not so much of how much military capability does a state *need* to be secure, but how much can it *afford*? States often acquire less military capability than they would ideally like. The costs of acquiring such capability are real. The demand for security is a normative demand, it is the pursuit of a particular value. As Wolfers (1962: 150) noted, security is a value 'of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure'.

The pursuit of military security requires states to make sacrifices in terms of spending on other social, or even security, goals that they might have. State resources are relatively scarce, and therefore the decision to spend resources on acquiring military security means such decisions are inevitably a subject for 'moral judgement' (Wolfers 1962: 162).

Secondly, the concentration of military power that a government feels is required to defend a democracy against its enemies in certain ways poses an inherent threat to the very values it is designed to protect. A state can become dangerously 'militarized' by such efforts. And the *use* of military force may damage democratic values, since it represents an undemocratic mechanism—the resort to force and violence to resolve disputes, rather than using dialogue and compromise, as would be expected in the domestic democratic context. In wartime civil rights are invariably weakened, and normally abhorrent practices such as the use of torture may be condoned.

Efforts to acquire military security may generate security problems of their own. Increasing the size of national armed forces may trigger an arms race with other states, for example, and require modified policies, such as the addition of arms-control initiatives. Acquiring substantial military capabilities may also encourage states to pursue military options when non-violent instruments still had the capacity to succeed. The use of force is seen both as legitimate for states, but also as a threat to the stability of the system, but the perception of the possibility of military threats from external actors ensures that states continue to maintain such capabilities.

The inhibitions in the use of violence between states are considerable, and they rest on the most basic kind of self-interest. Violence is seldom the most effective way of settling disputes. It is expensive in its methods and unpredictable in its outcome. However no state (with the exception of Costa Rica) has yet found it possible to dispense with armed forces. The capacity of states to defend themselves, and their evident willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of international negotiations is carried on. Every new state since 1945 has considered it necessary to create armed forces.

KEY POINTS

- Military security is expensive to acquire.
- The 'costs' of doing so are social as well as economic.
- Acquiring military capability can have consequences that threaten as well as secure a state's values.

Conclusion

The expansion of the concept of security has moved the focus of security studies away from a purely military understanding. Nevertheless, military security remains an absolutely crucial dimension of security as a whole. Governments continue to invest considerable resources in attempting to acquire it, and analysts of international relations seek to understand military security both in its own right and in relation to efforts to increase security in the non-military realms. Military security is extremely expensive to acquire, and the opportunity costs in terms of the human security agenda are profound. Efforts to increase military security can have unintended counterproductive consequences in the military or other fields. Questions about how much, and what kind of, military capability to seek in relation to perceived threats remain at the heart of the study of security.

QUESTIONS

1. Why is it important to study military security?
2. Are governments correct in prioritizing military security?
3. To what extent is the requirement for military security produced by the international anarchy and the security dilemma?
4. Has the end of the Cold War invalidated the arguments for security policies based on nuclear deterrence?
5. In what ways can military security be said to have objective and subjective reality?
6. How useful is arms control as a means of achieving military security?
7. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional realist approach to military security?
8. To what extent can the military-security environment be said to be 'socially constructed'?
9. Is war becoming obsolete as an instrument of national policy?
10. In what ways can the pursuit of military security leave a state perceiving itself as less secure?

FURTHER READING

- Anthony, I. and Rotfeld, A. (eds) (2001), *A Future Arms Control Agenda*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. A useful collection of essays reflecting on the potential utility of arms control in the post-Cold War period.
- Baylis, John, Wirtz, James J., and Gray, Colin S. (eds.) (2010), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Excellent collection of essays on the relationship of military power to international security.
- Biddle, Stephen (2004), *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. A good recent study of the issues involved in attempts to use force to increase military security in conventional terms.
- Freedman, L. (2004), *Deterrence*, Cambridge: Polity Press. A brief and effective study that provides a clear and well-structured explanation of the nature and history of nuclear deterrence.
- Kaldor, M. (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in the Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity. Kaldor offers a controversial take on the nature of war in the post-Cold War era. Some of her arguments are disputable, but the book is provocative, thoughtful, and worthy of study.
- Minear, L. and Weiss, T. G. (1995), *Mercy under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. A very good study of the complexities of using traditional military capabilities in humanitarian interventions.
- Sloan, E. (2002), *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, Montreal: McGill-Queens Press. A good survey of the issues involved in the RMA debate.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **http://www.armscontrol.org** The Arms Control Association is a national non-partisan membership organization that seeks to build public understanding of and support for effective arms-control policies. It produces the journal *Arms Control Today* and its website provides information on a range of issues relating to military security.
- **http://www.defense.gov** The web portal for the United States Department of Defense, a crucial resource for understanding contemporary US defence policy and thinking.

- **http://www.fas.org** The website of the Federation of American Scientists. Provides excellent resources on the military capabilities and policies of key states.
- **http://www.sipri.org** The website of the excellent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins3e/

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Regime Security

Richard Jackson



Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter examines the unique security dilemma facing developing countries. It begins with an explanation of the security threats facing states with weak institutional and coercive capacity and lack of national cohesion—what are called weak states—before going on to look at the kinds of security strategies that weak-state elites typically adopt to try and manage their predicament. Referred to as an 'insecurity dilemma', and in contrast to the **security dilemma** facing strong, developed states, the problem faced by weak states is a security environment in which the primary threats to security originate from internal rather than external sources. The chapter goes on to examine a number of competing theoretical explanations for how the weak state predicament arose and why it persists. It concludes with a brief discussion of international attempts to build security in weak states, and the long-term prospects of transforming weak states into strong states.

Introduction

By any measure of security, the disparity between the wealthy, developed countries of the **global North** and the rest of the world could not be greater. Citizens of the small group of highly developed nations face no real threat of major war and enjoy abundant food supplies, economic prosperity, comparatively low levels of crime, and enduring political and social stability. Even the threat of terrorism is extremely minor compared to the everyday risks of accident or disease.

By contrast, the majority of people living in developing countries face profound security challenges, including perennial threats of **intra-state war** and communal violence, poverty and famine, weapons proliferation and crime, political instability, social breakdown, economic failure, and, at its most extreme, complete **state collapse**. At the most basic level of physical security, between twenty million and thirty million people have lost their lives in more than 100 intra-state wars in developing regions since 1945. Around 90 per cent of the victims were civilians, and tens of millions of people were displaced by the fighting, many of whom have remained refugees for decades after. There are between twenty and forty intra-state wars ongoing in any given year, all of them in developing countries. In a great many more developing nations serious internal political violence, such as military coups or rebellions, ethnic or religious violence, campaigns of terrorism or riots and disorder, is a constant threat.

In addition, half a million people are killed every year by light weapons, frequently during criminal violence and almost all in developing countries. Added to these military threats, an estimated 40,000 people die every day from hunger and tens of millions of others die annually from diseases such as influenza, HIV/**AIDS**, diarrhoea, and tuberculosis. Tens of millions more suffer from chronic poverty, lack of employment opportunities, inadequate health, and environmental ruin. There is, in other words, a profound disjuncture between the kinds of security enjoyed by the small group of developed nations and the kind of security environment inhabited by the majority of the world's population. From a global perspective, insecurity is actually more the norm than security.

This situation provides us with important reasons for trying to understand the nature and consequences of insecurity in the developing world. Empirically, we need to understand why so many wars and bouts of major political violence since 1945 continue to take place in the developing world, and why most of them originate from internal rather than external sources. Conceptually, there is an urgent need to find appropriate theories and concepts that can accommodate the unique character of the security situation in these countries, not least to facilitate more appropriate and more effective international security policies. From a normative perspective, there are clear humanitarian imperatives to try and deal with the immense suffering caused by the lack of basic security in the world's 'zones of instability'. Finally, enlightened self-interest dictates that we make a real effort to resolve the fundamental inequality in security between the developed and developing worlds. Globalization means that insecurity in any part of the world cannot be contained within increasingly porous national borders; security is, to a large extent, interdependent. In many ways, terrorism, gun crime, illegal migration, the drugs trade, and environmental damage are all spillover effects of persistent insecurity in the developing world.

In this chapter we shall try to make sense of the profound security challenges facing developing countries and the unique security dilemma they find themselves trapped in. We shall examine the nature of the main security threats facing developing nations, the key security strategies that they have adopted to deal with these threats, and the domestic and international causes of their security predicament. The argument we wish to advance in this chapter is that, unlike the developed nations of the global North, the primary security threats facing **weak states** are potentially catastrophic and originate primarily, although not exclusively, from internal, domestic sources. They include, among others, the threat of violent transfers of **power**, insurgency, secession, rebellion, genocide, warlordism, and, ultimately, state collapse and anarchy.

Moreover, these internal threats are rooted in the fundamental conditions of statehood and governance, thereby creating an enduring 'insecurity dilemma' (Job 1992) for ruling elites: the more elites try to establish effective state **rule**, the more they provoke challenges to their authority from powerful groups in society. In this context, **regime security**—the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule—becomes indistinguishable from **state security**—the condition where the institutions, processes, and structures of the state are able to continue functioning effectively, regardless of the make-up of the ruling elite. For weak states, the domestic sphere is actually far more dangerous and threatening than the international sphere.

Given this inversion of the accepted conception of the classical security dilemma (in which military threats originate primarily from other unitary states in an anarchic international system), it is not surprising that the weak state **insecurity dilemma** has received little attention in the orthodox security studies literature. By focusing on a limited number of states (the great powers and developed countries), a limited set of military threats (Soviet expansionism, foreign invasion, nuclear proliferation, rogue states, international terrorism), a limited array of security strategies (national defence, deterrence, arms control, alliances), and employing a restricted conception of security (externally directed 'national security'), the security challenges facing the majority of the world's population have been largely sidelined in academic studies. Widening and deepening our understanding of security therefore necessitates a new set of diagnostic tools that allow us to get to grips more fully with the security challenges facing the vast majority of the world's people and the unique kind of states they inhabit.

KEY POINTS

- There is a profound disjuncture between the security challenges facing developed and developing countries.
- There are important empirical, conceptual, normative, and self-interested reasons to attend to the security of developing regions.
- Weak states face a unique set of security challenges that originate primarily from internal sources.
- Orthodox approaches to national security are severely limited in what they can tell us about the conditions of security in weak states.

The weak-state insecurity dilemma

The unique insecurity dilemma facing weak states is largely a function of the structural conditions of their existence. Weak states lack the most fundamental of state attributes—namely, effective institutions, a monopoly on the instruments of violence, and consensus on the idea of the state. Consequently, as incomplete or 'quasi-states' (Jackson 1990), they face numerous challenges to their authority from powerful domestic actors and manipulative external actors. In order to understand how this condition of insecurity arises in the first place, we need to examine the primary structural characteristics of weak states and the nature of the internal security threats they face.

Weak states

Assessing state strength can be a difficult and controversial exercise; scholars tend to apply different measures. Thomas (1987) associates state strength/weakness with institutional capacity and distinguishes between two forms of state power: despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power refers to the state's coercive abilities and the exercise of force to impose its rule on civilians. By contrast, infrastructural power refers to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's institutions and its ability to rule through consensus. States may be 'weak' or deficient in one or both of these capacities, but, as a general rule, strong states have less need to exercise coercive power because their infrastructural power makes it unnecessary. Paradoxically, the more a weak state exercises coercive power, the more it reinforces its 'weakness' and corresponding lack of infrastructural power.

In contrast, Buzan (1991a) argues that states consist of three primary components: a physical base, institutional capacity, and the 'idea of the state'. For Buzan, state strength/weakness rests primarily in the less tangible realm of the 'idea of the state' and the extent to which society forms a consensus on, and identifies with, the state. Weak states, therefore, 'either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation' (Buzan 1983: 67).

Migdal (1988) provides a counterpoint to both these formulations. He defines state strength in terms of state capacity, or 'the ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state to get people in the state to do what they want them to do' (Migdal 1988: xvii). But then he reverses attention to how society and groups within it tolerate, permit, or resist the development of the state. He argues that most developing societies end up in a state/society standoff where the state confronts powerful social forces with substantial coercive force, which in turn provokes violent resistance—as occurred in Libya and Syria during the uprisings in 2011. In Migdal's view, weak states are less the issue

than strong societies. This internal **balance of power** between state and society militates against the emergence of prototypical Western-style nation states.

In summary, three dimensions of state strength appear to be important: (1) infrastructural capacity in terms of the ability of state institutions to perform essential tasks and enact policy; (2) coercive capacity in terms of the state's ability and willingness to employ force against challenges to its authority; and (3) national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree to which the population identifies with the nation state and accepts its legitimate role in their lives.

Empirically, it can be seen that most developing nations are weak or deficient on most if not all of these dimensions. Or, they have overdeveloped coercive capacities but lack infrastructural capacity and social consensus. As a consequence of these fundamental deficiencies, weak states typically display all or many of the following characteristics: institutional weakness and an inability to enact national policy or perform basic state functions such as tax collection and providing law and order; political instability, as evidenced by coups, plots, rebellions, protests and frequent violent changes of government; the centralization of political power in a single individual or small elite who command the machinery of government to run the state in their own interest; unconsolidated or non-existent democracies; ongoing economic crisis and structural weakness; external vulnerability to international actors and forces; intense societal divisions along class, religious, regional, urban–rural, and/or ethnic lines; lack of a cohesive or strong sense of national identity; and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for both the government of the day and the institutions of state in general, often expressed in widespread protests, boycotts, strikes, and disorder.

The most important characteristic of weak states is their frequent inability to establish and maintain a monopoly on the instruments of violence. Even in states with well-developed coercive power, civilian governments do not always retain the absolute loyalty of the armed forces and face a constant threat of military intervention. For most weak states, however, the armed forces are ill equipped, poorly managed, and prone to factional divisions. At the same time, a range of social actors—rival politicians with their own private armies, warlords, criminal gangs, locally organized militias, armed and organized ethnic or religious groups, and private security companies or mercenaries—are powerful enough to resist the state's attempt to enforce compliance. In such a situation, even the most minimal requirement of statehood—the monopoly on the instruments of violence—is largely out of reach.

At the other end of the scale, and in complete contrast, it is suggested that *strong states* have the willingness and ability to 'maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with official laws, act decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the national economy, and retain legitimacy' (Dauvergne 1998: 2). Strong states also possess high levels of sociopolitical cohesion that is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies, strong national identities, and productive and highly developed economies—although these are not immune to crisis and social protest. Most importantly, strong states exist as a 'hegemonic idea', accepted and naturalized in the minds of ordinary citizens such that they 'consider the state as natural as the landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives without it' (Migdal 1998: 12).

Crucially, the notion of weak and strong states is not a binary measure but rather a continuum along which states in the real world fall. Moreover, it is a dynamic condition. States can move back and forth along the continuum over time given sufficient changes to key factors: weak states can become strong by building a strong sense of national identity, for example; and strong states could potentially weaken through increased social conflict brought on by immigration or austerity measures, for example. Most states in developing regions fall towards the weak end of the state-strength continuum.

KEY POINTS

- The key dimensions of state strength/weakness are infrastructural capacity, coercive capacity, and national identity and social cohesion.
- Weak states are typically characterized by institutional weakness, political instability, centralization of power, unconsolidated democracy, economic crisis, external vulnerability, social divisions, lack of national identity, and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy.
- The most important characteristic of weak states is their lack of a monopoly on the instruments of violence.
- State strength or weakness is a dynamic continuum along which states can move; it is possible for weak states to become strong states and vice versa.

Threats to weak states

Because of their debilitating structural characteristics, weak states face a number of internal and external security challenges. *Internally*, weak states face the continual threat of violent intervention in politics by the armed forces. Such interventions can take the form of *coup d'état*, mutiny, rebellion, or revolt over pay and conditions. There have been literally hundreds of coup attempts in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, and nearly two-thirds of Africa's states have experienced military rule since independence. Military rulers still govern numerous developing countries.

Weak states also face serious threats from **strongmen**, individuals, or groups who exercise a degree of coercive and/or infrastructural power in their own right and who challenge the authority of the state. They may be semi-legitimate actors such as politicians or traditional and religious leaders who nonetheless command large followings and private access to weaponry. Alternatively, they may be criminal gangs or **warlords**—charismatic individuals who command private armies and enforce a kind of absolutist rule in areas under their control, primarily for the purposes of pursuing illegal commerce. Examples of such strongmen include the drug cartels in Colombia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, and some of the rebel leaders in Africa during the 1990s, such as Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, and Jonas Savimbi. If the state fails to accommodate or placate such groups, they may launch a violent challenge to the regime.

In other cases, weak states face challenges from various social groups such as protestors, ethnic groups, religious movements, ideological factions, or local militias who organize for self-defence. Owing in large part to pre-existing divisions, the inability of the state to provide adequate welfare, and the tendency to employ excessive coercion, a great many ethnic groups in weak states have organized politically and militarily to protect their interests. Gurr's *Minorities at Risk* project (2000) found more than ninety ethnic minorities were either actively engaged in violent conflict with the state or at medium-to-serious risk of significant political violence. Similarly, in a number of Middle Eastern and Asian countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Thailand, religious groups have launched violent challenges to the state. Ideologically driven groups also continue to threaten weak states, from the Maoist insurgency in Nepal to the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. It is a sad fact that virtually all armed groups in weak states—state armies, warlord factions, and local, ethnic, and religious militias—employ large numbers of child soldiers (for more on child soldiers see Chapter 26). Into this mix, the so-called Arab Spring which began in early 2011 has seen broad-based democracy movements challenging, sometimes violently, established rulers in countries across the Middle East and elsewhere.

A final internal threat can come from the steady erosion of state institutions and processes. Increasing lawlessness and the eventual collapse of governmental institutions can create a power vacuum in which the ruling elite simply becomes one of several factions struggling to fill the void and claim the formal mantle of statehood. At various times during the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia, for example, several different factions claimed to be the legitimate government at the same time, despite lacking the necessary control of territory or governing institutions required for formal recognition. In the final analysis, any of these threats— military intervention in politics, warlords and strongmen, ethnic demands for secession, protest movements, or state collapse—may lead to sustained bouts of all-out intra-state war.

Because of their internal fragility, weak states also face a variety of *external* threats. Lacking the infrastructural or coercive capacity to resist outside interference, weak states are vulnerable to penetration and intervention by other states and groups. Powerful states may directly invade or may sponsor a coup or rebellion in order to overthrow a regime, such as the American invasions of Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq, NATO's support for the Libyan rebels in 2011, and French intervention in numerous African states over several decades. Alternatively, the provision of significant quantities of arms and military assistance to rebel movements, such as American support to UNITA in Angola and Soviet support for the Vietcong in Vietnam, can pose a serious threat to the ruling elite. Often, support for rebel factions or coup plotters can come from sources closer to home, such as rival neighbouring states. A great many regional rivals—such as India–Pakistan, Uganda–Sudan, Somalia–Ethiopia, Iran–Iraq—have threatened each other in this manner. In addition, very small weak states can be threatened by the tiniest of external groups: mercenary coups and invasions have been launched against the Seychelles, the Maldives, the Comoros, and Guinea-Bissau, sometimes by no more than a few dozen men. In most cases, the coups were thwarted only through assistance from powerful allies such as France or India.

A related external threat comes from the spillover or contagion of conflict and disorder from neighbouring regions. Lacking the necessary infrastructural capacity to control their borders effectively, weak states can often do little to prevent the massive influx of refugees, fleeing rebels, arms smuggling, or actual fighting. Major external shocks like this can seriously threaten the stability of the weak state. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 spilled over into Zaïre, a weak and failing state; the shock eventually led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime, invasion by several neighbouring states and large-scale factional fighting (see Case Study 12.1).

Related to this, weak states are threatened by the uncontrollable spread of small arms and light weapons. In the hands of warlords, criminals, and private militias, these weapons pose a real challenge to the authority of the state and can intensify existing conflicts and seriously undermine peace efforts. Light, portable, durable, and easy-to-use (even by children) small and light weapons are easily obtained through legal and illegal channels, and, once in use, have a tendency to spread throughout the region. An estimated $5 billion worth of light weapons are traded illegally every year to the world's conflict zones, killing an estimated half a million people per year in criminal activity and civil violence.

KEY POINTS

- Internally, weak states are threatened by military factions, rival 'strongmen' such as warlords or criminals, rebellions from minorities, institutional collapse, protest and disorder and ultimately, intra-state war.
- Externally, weak states are threatened by interference from powerful international actors, contagion and spillover from neighbouring states and the small arms trade.

The weak-state 'insecurity dilemma'

The combination of state weakness and internal threats creates a security challenge unique to weak states. It is distinctive because it arises from meeting *internal* threats to the regime in power, rather than *external* threats to the existence of the nation state. The inability of the state to provide peace and order creates a contentious environment where each component of society—including the ruling elite or regime—competes to preserve and protect its own well-being. This creates a domestic situation similar to the neorealist conception of structural anarchy where groups create insecurity in the rest of the system when they try to improve their own security. To distinguish this internally oriented condition from the classical *security dilemma*, it is helpful to think of it as an **insecurity dilemma**. This condition of insecurity is self-perpetuating because every effort by the regime to secure its own security through force provokes greater resistance and further undermines the institutional basis of the state and the security of the society as a whole.

In a sense, the weak-state insecurity dilemma is caused by an initial and profound lack of 'stateness', in particular, the inability to establish a monopoly on the instruments of violence. This failure can be both normative—in the sense that the state has failed to convince the population that armed resistance is wrong or counterproductive—and practical—in that the state cannot physically disarm and control all its rivals. Either way, the lack of a political and institutional centre with a monopoly of force creates an insecurity spiral—a semi-permanent situation of 'emergent anarchy'—where armed groups are forced to engage in self-help strategies.

Thus, within the weak-state context, where ruling elites use the machinery of government primarily to secure the continuation of their rule, the concept of *national security*—the security of a whole socio-political entity, a nation state with its own way of life and independent self-government—is wholly inapplicable. In practice, the idea of **state security**—the integrity and functioning of the institutions and idea of the state—and **regime security**—the security of the ruling elite from violent challenge—become indistinguishable. Because of the fusion of state and government, when a particular regime is overthrown, as the Syad Barre regime was overthrown in Somalia in 1991, the entire apparatus of the state collapses too. In this sense, weak-state security *is* regime security.

KEY POINTS

- The weak-state insecurity dilemma is primarily an internal condition based on the contradiction between societal and state power.
- It is engendered by a lack of 'stateness', most importantly, the failure to establish a monopoly on the instruments of violence.
- The weak-state insecurity dilemma transforms national or state security into regime security.

Security strategies in weak states

The structural characteristics of weak states and the unique insecurity dilemma in which they are trapped severely constrain the range of policy options open to ruling elites. Essentially, the conditions of governance create a semi-permanent condition of 'crisis politics' or 'the politics of survival' (Migdal 1988) in which short-term strategies of regime security substitute for long-term state-building policies.

Elite security strategies

Weak state elites typically employ a mix of internal and external strategies aimed at regime survival. *Internally*, elites employ a mix of carrot-and-stick approaches to challengers. First, lacking both infrastructural capacity and wider social legitimacy, weak-state elites are often forced to rely on coercive power and state intimidation to secure continued rule. This entails creating or expanding the security forces, spending large sums of the national income on military supplies, and using violence and intimidation against real and perceived opponents of the regime. This is perhaps the most common survival strategy of weak-state elites, and it is reflected in the appalling human rights record seen in a great many developing countries. Typically, regimes try to suppress opposition or protest through the widespread use of torture and imprisonment, assassination and extra-judicial killings, disappearances, the violent suppression of political expression, forced removals, destruction of food supplies, and, in extreme cases, genocide, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing—as seen in Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere during the Arab Spring.

A key dilemma for elites is that the instruments of coercion—the armed forces—can themselves develop into a threat against the regime. For this reason, elites sometimes deliberately weaken the armed forces by creating divisions, establishing elite units such as presidential guards, and fomenting rivalry between different services. Such divide-and-rule strategies are also used against other potential sources of opposition, such as state bureaucracies, religious groups, traditional authorities, and opposition politicians. From this perspective, the deliberate undermining or hollowing-out of state institutions can be a rational and effective means of preventing the rise of potential centres of opposition to the regime.

On the other side of the ledger, elites sometimes find it easier to try and create positive inducements for supporting the regime. Typically, this entails the establishment of elaborate patronage systems, whereby state elites and various social groups are joined in complex networks of mutual exchange. In this way, corruption acts as a form of redistribution and a means of integrating the state in an informal power structure. Such systems may extend to strongmen in a form of **elite accommodation** (Reno 1998). Warlords or political leaders with private armies may be permitted control over a particular area, have state resources diverted their way, or be given exclusive control over a particular commercial activity, for example, in exchange for an agreement not to try and overthrow the regime or encroach on its other activities. In the settlement ending the war in Sierra Leone, the warlord leader of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Foday Sankoh, became Minister for Mines in an attempt to buy his loyalty. Ethnic manipulation or 'the politics of identity' is another typical strategy in weak states. In what is a form of divide and rule borrowed from colonialism, elites will sometimes deliberately foment inter-communal conflict as a means of preventing the emergence of united opposition to the regime. At other times, it is simply a method of rooting a regime's power base in what is seen to be a reliable source of support. Thus, elites will favour certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest, and appoint members of the elite's own ethnic group to positions of power. Such strategies are frequently successful, as ethnic consciousness is usually well developed and readily exploitable in many developing societies.

A final internal strategy involves the careful manipulation of democratic political processes. Because of their external vulnerability, a great many weak states have been forced by international donors—developed states and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and World Bank—to begin the process of democratic reform. Alternatively, pressures stemming from widespread protest and demands for democratic reform—such as the movements we have seen in the Arab Spring—can also force regimes to make concessions. A great many weak-state rulers have successfully managed the transition to multi-party democracy and retained control of the state, primarily through careful manipulation of internal opponents and external perceptions. Typically, this involved monopolizing and controlling the media, the co-option

KEY QUOTES 12.1 Private military companies

'Private military companies—or PMCs, as the new world order's mercenaries have come to be known—allow governments to pursue policies in tough corners of the world with the distance and comfort of plausible deniability. The ICIJ investigation uncovered the existence of at least 90 private military companies that have operated in 110 countries worldwide. These corporate armies, often providing services normally carried out by a national military force, offer specialized skills in high-tech warfare, including communications and signals intelligence and aerial surveillance, as well as pilots, logistical support, battlefield planning, and training. They have been hired both by governments and multinational corporations to further their policies or protect their interests.

Some African governments are little more than criminal syndicates—warlords such as Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, or more sophisticated elites, such as the rulers of Angola. But to sell diamonds and timber and oil onto the world market requires foreign partners.

The people doing the extracting, the bribing, the arms dealing, and the deal-making are South African, Belgian, American, Israeli, French, Ukrainian, Lebanese, Canadian, British, Russian, Malaysian, and Syrian. They are a class of entrepreneur that operates beyond borders, often unaccountable to shareholders and unfettered by the regulation they would encounter in their own countries. They have become influential political players in the countries in which they operate.'

van Niekerk (2002)

of opponents, setting up fake parties to split the vote, gerrymandering, ballot rigging, candidate and elector disqualification, and manipulating the electoral rules. Constructing the outward appearance of democracy without any substantial concessions can actually function to bolster regime security by giving it a degree of international legitimacy. The partial transition in Egypt following the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 is arguably an example of this process.

In addition to these internal strategies, weak-state elites also look to form alliances with powerful *external* actors as a means of bolstering regime security. An increasingly prevalent strategy has been to employ foreign mercenaries or private military or security companies as force multipliers. There are nearly a hundred **private military companies** (PMCs) operating in 110 states around the world (see Key Quotes 12.1). Often working closely with oil and mineral companies, the industry is thought to be worth as much as $100 billion per year. Weak states employ private security contractors, because they see them as being more effective and reliable than many national militaries. With superior weapons and training, these private armies have often proved to be decisive in securing weak-state survival against various internal threats, although this tactic failed in Libya's civil war in 2011. In Angola and Sierra Leone, the notorious PMC Executive Outcomes turned the tide against rebel forces, recapturing diamond mining areas in the process.

More formally, weak states seek out alliances with powerful states that can help to guarantee regime survival. During the Cold War, many weak states obtained military support from one or other of the superpowers in exchange for political and strategic assistance in the East–West confrontation. In Africa, at least twenty countries entered into defence agreements with France; subsequent military intervention by French troops was decisive in keeping several West African regimes in power, including Zaïre/DRC (see Case Study 12.1), Togo and Ivory Coast. At present, the war on terror is providing weak states with another opportunity to bolster their internal security: in exchange for cooperation in fighting terrorism, the United States provides countries like Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan (see Case Study 12.2) with vital military and economic assistance. External intervention of this kind can be crucial for keeping internal rivals at bay and ensuring regime security.

Finally, weak-state elites sometimes join together with other weak states in regional defence arrangements designed primarily to prop each other up. For example, under new multilateral security agreements, both the **Economic Community of West African States** (ECOWAS) and the **Southern African Development Community** (SADC) have since 1990 intervened a number of times in member states to overturn coups or secure governments from overthrow by rebel forces. In March 2011, Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain to protect the regime from an uprising. Thus, the creation of regional security architecture, including regional peacekeeping forces, can function as a strategy of mutually reinforcing regime security.

Security outcomes

The perennial conundrum facing weak-state elites lies in the contradiction between ensuring the short-term security of the regime and the long-term goal of state making. Many of the security strategies described are, in the long-run, self-defeating, as they further undermine the foundations of the state, provoke even more serious opposition from social groups, and delay genuine state consolidation. For most weak-state elites, however, there is no way out of this dilemma; if they neglect regime security in favour of more genuine state-building activities such as strengthening state institutions and forging a sense of national identity, they are just as likely to be overthrown in a coup or toppled by a rebellion. Thus, with few genuine alternatives, elites have to persist with policies that could eventually lead to complete state disintegration and collapse.

Ultimately, of course, a key outcome of these strategies is that the weak state, or rather the regime, becomes the greatest single threat to the security of its own people. In weak states, individual

KEY POINTS

- Internal security strategies include repression and military expansion, employing mercenaries and private military companies, using divide-and-rule strategies, deliberately undermining state institutions, patronage politics and elite accommodation, identity politics, and democratic manipulation.
- External security strategies include employing private military companies and mercenaries, entering into external defence agreements with Great Powers, and joining in regional defence organizations.

CASE STUDY 12.1 Anatomy of a weak state: the Democratic Republic of Congo

The central African state of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has always been a weak state. It has suffered from tremendous insecurity since its founding, and ruling elites have employed all the classic regime security strategies to avoid being toppled.

At independence in 1960, Congo was poorly prepared for full statehood, with irrational national boundaries, underdeveloped state institutions, poor infrastructure, a fragile economic base, and only 100 university graduates to fill the civil service. In the first four years of independence, the country was plunged into civil war, with three main factions vying for power and the mineral-rich Shaba province attempting to secede. Order was established only with the help of a large-scale United Nations Operation. In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko took power in a military coup.

Throughout his rule, Mobutu faced numerous threats to his regime: military rebellions, dissident movements, attempts at secession, mercenary revolts, invasions and violent disputes, and conflict spillover from neighbouring states. Cobalt and copper-rich Shaba province was invaded by mercenaries and exiled dissidents on four occasions.

Following the pattern of weak-state rules, Mobutu employed a number of classic regime security strategies. He employed mercenaries to subdue the country in the first years of his rule, bribed opposition politicians to join the government, suppressed opposition movements, engaged in identity politics, hollowed out state institutions to prevent the rise of potential opponents, and split the armed forces into several factions to avoid coups and rebellions. Externally, he allied with the United States, providing a conduit for getting arms to Angola's UNITA rebels. In exchange, he received massive amounts of military and economic aid, which he then used to manage internal opposition. French paratroopers and American logistical support helped Mobutu to defeat an invasion of Shaba in 1978.

In 1996, a rebel alliance led by Laurent Kabila and backed by Rwanda emerged in the east of the country in the chaos engendered by the spillover of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Within a few months, and despite employing a mercenary army, Mobutu's regime collapsed. The Kabila-led alliance soon fell apart, however, and full-scale civil war broke out in 1998. Rwanda and Uganda intervened on the side of different rebel factions, while Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops to support the Kabila government. Africa's 'first world war' raged until peace accords were signed in 2003, leading to elections and the withdrawal of most foreign occupying forces. However, Rwandan troops intervened again in 2009 and the war continues in early 2012 in eastern DRC, despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force and elections in 2011. The UN estimates that more than five million people have lost their lives in the conflict. Despite a recognized central government, the DRC continues to exist as a semi-collapsed state, with various warlords, ethnic militia, criminal enterprises, and foreign entrepreneurs engaged in large-scale looting, trade monopolization, and the exploitation of minerals.

KEY POINTS

- The long-term effect of elite security strategies is to reinforce insecurity for both the regime itself and the wider population.
- In extreme cases, elite security strategies can lead to complete state collapse.

citizens often face a much more serious threat from their own governments than they do from the governments of other states. Instead of ensuring individual and social security, the continual use of coercion makes the state the primary threat to security. Moreover, the threat is affected on several levels: repression and identity politics threatens their physical survival through the spread of violent conflict; and deliberately undermining state institutions and patronage politics threatens their welfare and livelihood.

Explaining insecurity in weak states

There are different theories about the causes of weak-state or regime insecurity. Taken together, they can tell us a great deal about how conditions of insecurity evolve and persist. State-making theories explore the origins of the weak-state insecurity dilemma in the initial state-construction process. Warlord politics theories explore the impact of neoliberal globalization and the end of the Cold War on the choices facing weak-state elites. The combination of the inherited structural features of statehood and the nature and processes of the international context explain much about why weak states find it so difficult to escape from their insecurity dilemma.

State-making theories

Observing weak-state insecurity, scholars like Ayoob (1995) have suggested that these conditions represent a normal stage in the long-term state-building process

CASE STUDY 12.2 Anatomy of a weak state: Uzbekistan

The Central Asian country of Uzbekistan gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. From 1924 to 1991 Uzbekistan had been governed as an outlying colony in the Soviet Empire. Consequently, at independence it shared many of the weaknesses of other post-colonial and post-Soviet states, such as an externally oriented, dependent economy, weak national institutions, overdeveloped coercive capabilities, a legitimacy crisis, and a history of authoritarianism.

President Islam Karimov, a former Communist Party boss, has ruled Uzbekistan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Throughout this period, the Karimov regime has been under constant threat from dissidents and anti-government campaigners, crime syndicates and drug traders, a small-scale terrorist campaign, opposition Islamic groups, and spillover from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Tadjikistan.

Karimov has clung to power using a variety of regime security strategies, most commonly severe repression against real and potential opponents. Despite nominal constitutional protections, the government has banned public meetings and demonstrations, restricted the independent media, arrested thousands of opposition political and religious supporters, and used horrific torture and murder to suppress dissent. Uzbekistan presently has the worst human rights record in the former Soviet Union. Other internal strategies used by Karimov to maintain power have included the clever manipulation of elections and referendums, rewriting the constitution to centralize all power in the president, and endemic corruption among government officials.

Externally, Karimov's primary strategy was to ally the regime with the United States in the War on Terror. In 2002, the two countries signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership. In return for hundreds of millions of dollars of economic and military support, Uzbekistan provided the USA with military bases from which to conduct missions in Afghanistan, coercive interrogation facilities for terrorist suspects in the controversial rendition programme, and diplomatic support for US policies in the United Nations.

However, the US–Uzbek partnership came under severe strain following the military crackdown against anti-government demonstrators in the city of Andijan in May 2005, when hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed and injured. Following US criticism of the appalling human rights situation in Uzbekistan, and the imposition of sanctions by the European Union, Karimov ordered the closure of US military bases in the country. In response to the deterioration in relations with the USA, Karimov turned instead towards building closer relations with Russia, a strategy of some success for a number of years. Since 2008 however, relations with the West have once again improved, and in early 2012, Uzbekistan maintains fragile relationships with Russia, its neighbours, and the West.

from which strong states will, in time, emerge. Taking a historical view, they argue that the European experience proves that state building is a long and traumatic process, taking several centuries to complete and involving a great deal of bloodshed. Typically, it entailed sustained and bloody conflict between a centralizing state and powerful social forces before a monopoly on violence was achieved and disparate groups of people were welded into a single national identity. Significantly, representative institutions emerged only gradually, after a powerful central state and a cohesive sense of national identity had been established.

The argument is that what has been observed in developing countries since the mid-twentieth century is a similar process of state consolidation to that experienced by European states in past centuries, but with additional obstacles that were absent during the European experience. For example, today's weak states have to cope with the ongoing effects of colonial rule, which includes: the imposition of alien doctrines and institutions of statehood; irrational territorial boundaries and the lack of national identity; societies divided along class, religious, and ethnic lines; stunted and dependent economies; and an entrenched culture of political violence.

The contemporary state-building process is also constrained by a shortened time frame. Unlike European states, weak states today are expected to become effective, fully functioning, democratic states within a few decades. Moreover, they are expected to do it without the violence, corruption, and human rights abuses that accompanied the European state-building process. Established international **norms** and rules, such as the protection of minority and human rights and the right of self-determination (which often encourages ethnic rebellion), also complicates the state-building process. A particularly problematic norm is the inviolability of statehood. Once a state achieves independence and is admitted to the United Nations, its status cannot be revoked or its territory subsumed into another state, no matter how unviable it proves to be in practice. Thus, unlike European entities such as Burgundy and Aragon, which could not complete the state-building process and were absorbed into larger, more viable units, today's weak states must struggle on indefinitely.

In short, according to this approach, we can expect weak states to experience a great deal more bloodshed and violence over an extended period until stronger, more representative states emerge. Until then, they will remain 'quasi-states'—states possessing the nominal features of statehood, such as international recognition, but lacking the infrastructural capacities to create and secure a sense of genuine national identity (Jackson 1990).

KEY POINTS

- Scholars like Ayoob suggest that the conditions of insecurity in weak states are an expression of the historical state-building process.
- The European state-building process was similarly bloody and long.
- Weak states face the state-building process in an environment constrained by the experience of colonialism, a shortened time frame, and problematic international norms.

Warlord politics

During the Cold War, many weak states maintained a semblance of stability and integration through various forms of elite and social accommodation. The primary means of accommodation was the construction of a patrimonial or *redistributive state*—a system of patronage where state resources were distributed to supporters through complex social and political networks. The redistributive state was frequently maintained by direct superpower assistance, loans and development assistance from international financial institutions, and periods of high-commodity prices that supplied its primary national income. Temporary disruptions to the stability of the weak-state redistributive system came from sudden falls in commodity prices, wider economic shocks (such as the oil shocks), and the sudden loss of superpower support (which could be compensated for by switching to the other superpower, as Somalia did in the 1970s). In many cases, these shocks resulted in serious internal violence.

The end of the Cold War signalled a period of profound transformation in the international system. A major consequence of the end of superpower conflict was the decline of military and economic support for many weak states. At the same time, international financial institutions began to demand changes in the economic and political policies of weak states—what are called 'conditionalities'—in exchange for continuing loans and assistance. In keeping with the global

trend of privatization and deregulation, weak states were forced by lenders and investors to sell off and downsize government bureaucracies. These developments severely disrupted the redistributive state and forced rulers to find new ways of accommodating rival strongmen and restless social groups.

Somewhat paradoxically, elite strategies have since involved the deliberate creation of state collapse and social disorder. This entails hollowing out state institutions, fragmenting the armed forces, and creating parallel informal armed groups, thereby spreading the means of violence even further into society. The logic of 'disorder as a political instrument' is that, within the context of a collapsing state, elites can pursue forms of commercial activity that are not possible under normal circumstances, such as trading in illegal commodities, looting, protection rackets, coercive monopolies, and the like. Thus, exploiting the shadow markets engendered by neoliberal globalization, and in alliance with local strongmen and multinational companies, weak-state elites have created a new kind of political economy, what Reno (1998) has called 'warlord politics'. Crucial in this enterprise is the ability to employ private companies to perform state roles, especially the task of providing regime security.

As an alternative political-economic system, warlord politics provides elites with several advantages. It permits commercial activity and accumulation in the grey or shadow regions of the global economy, tapping into resources that would otherwise be unavailable to weak-state elites and that are desperately needed to buy protection from rivals. In this sense, warlord politics facilitates the process of elite accommodation needed to keep regimes safe from violent overthrow. It also inhibits the emergence of mass social movements because civil society finds itself trapped between a rapacious state and well-armed networks of strongmen pursuing their own illiberal agendas.

In short, warlord politics represents an innovative response to rapid global change that permits the survival of the regime under harsh new conditions. From this perspective, state collapse and widespread disorder are not a temporary aberration in the normal functioning of the state, but a new form of regime security forced on weak-state elites by changes in the wider international system.

KEY POINTS

- The end of the Cold War and the adoption of conditionalities by IFIs severely disrupted the redistributive state.
- Weak-state elites responded by developing new and innovative forms of political economy based on shadow and predatory commercial activities called 'warlord politics'.
- Warlord politics works to control internal threats from strongmen and mass movements.

Conclusion: prospects for the weak state

In this chapter we have examined the conditions of insecurity that affect the majority of the world's states. We have suggested that the insecurity dilemma facing developing countries is both profound and unique, and is rooted in the fundamental structures and processes of incomplete statehood. The conditions of insecurity in weak states are the result of three interrelated factors: the historical state-making process; the structures and processes of the present international system; and the security strategies employed by weak-state elites. In the context of profound internal threats and constraining external conditions, national security becomes a matter of maintaining short-term regime security. The pursuit of regime security, however, is itself a profoundly contradictory process; short-term policies of regime security undermine the more important state-building project—and the security of the state and society.

From this perspective, weak-state insecurity appears to be an inescapable condition. There have been very few clear-cut cases where weak states have made a successful transition to state consolidation and genuine national security. The fundamental security challenge facing weak states lies in achieving greater levels of stateness and moving towards improved levels of genuine state strength. The challenge, therefore, lies in the willingness and ability of weak-state elites to substitute short-term regime security strategies for long-term state-building strategies.

Should regimes choose to take the state-building project seriously, the process will undoubtedly be long and difficult, not least because a number of entrenched internal and external obstacles to effective statehood remain. These include: the continued distorting effects of colonialism; the processes of neoliberal globalization and the imposition of external conditionalities; small arms proliferation; continuing external intervention by powerful actors; the existence of constraining international norms; and debilitating internal conditions such as poverty, social division, weak institutions, and the like. The global war on terror launched in the wake of 9/11 has also had a negative effect on the state-building project, as the fight against terrorism has largely diverted international attention and resources from poverty eradication, democracy promotion, and peace-building activities. Weak-state elites have also been able to brand their internal enemies as terrorists, and, just as during the Cold War, receive military support in exchange for cooperation in the fight against terrorism (see Case Study 12.2). In other words, the new war on terror has allowed weak-state elites to reprioritize regime security over state building and receive vital international support for their efforts.

As during the Cold War, the problems of weak-state insecurity take a low priority on international agendas compared to the interests of the Great Powers. So far, solutions to the weak-state security dilemma have not moved far beyond the establishment of multi-party democracy and free markets. It is sometimes argued that forceful 'regime change' and perhaps even a liberal or benign recolonization, such as occurred in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, is the only effective long-term solution. Others stress the need for humanitarian intervention to protect the security of civilians and promote human rights. They argue that 'cosmopolitan peace-keeping' (Kaldor 1999) and so-called peace-building missions are required to transform violent domestic politics in weak states into long-term peace and stability. In practice, both approaches are based on a similar liberal perspective, which envisages a minimal state devoted to protecting individual and market freedoms. The main problem is that, thus far, despite decades of effort, no case of enforced neoliberalization, through either conditionalities, regime change, or peace building, has succeeded in transforming a weak state into a strong state.

Given the enormous challenges facing weak states, and recognizing the fundamental inequities of the state project itself and the failure thus far to reform illiberal weak states, some radical commentators have suggested that state building should be abandoned in favour of alternative forms of political organization based on either smaller units—city states or ethnic groups, for example—or larger units—such as regional organizations like the European Union. The first option, sub-state political organizations, seems impractical in regions that are awash with weapons, criminal gangs, and poverty; the case of Somalia, which has been without a functioning central government since 1991, is informative in this regard. The second option, regional organization, is similarly not without its limitations. While it has had a modicum of success in the European Union, in regions characterized by weak states, underdevelopment, and instability, such as Africa or Latin America, regional processes are severely constrained in what they can achieve.

In the end, overcoming the internal and external obstacles to state building in the developing world will require tremendous political will and resources, and the elaboration of alternative and innovative approaches to state-building assistance. More importantly, it will require fundamental reform of international economic and political structures, including the international trade in weapons. Given the present preoccupation with international terrorism and the lack of enthusiasm by the world's developed states for debt relief, development, and curbs on the small arms trade, the short-to-medium-term future of the weak state looks as bleak as it ever was, although the international movement for greater democratic participation exemplified in the Arab Spring may offer some hope (for more on the arms trade see Chapter 22).

? QUESTIONS

1. In what ways are orthodox approaches to security limited in their explanation of the weak-state insecurity dilemma?
2. What are the primary differences between weak and strong states?
3. Outline the main internal and external security threats facing weak states.
4. What makes the security dilemma in weak states unique?

5. What are the differences, if any, between national security, state security, and regime security in the weak-state context?
6. What domestic and international strategies do weak-state elites adopt to try to manage their security challenges?
7. What are the main internal and external obstacles to state building for weak states?
8. What impact has the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization had on the weak-state security predicament?
9. Is abandoning the state-building project in favour of alternative forms of political organization a realistic solution to the weak-state security dilemma?
10. What role should the international community play in the state-consolidation process?
11. How might the global democracy movement seen in the Arab Spring affect the process of state consolidation and the quest for greater security in developing countries?

FURTHER READING

- Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Provides an informative analysis of the weak-state security predicament in its internal, regional, and international dimensions.
- Buzan, Barry (1991), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. A seminal reformulation of security beyond its traditional focus to include the security predicament facing the majority of weak states in the world.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. (1996), *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. An empirical analysis of contemporary warfare, which demonstrates that internal war within weak states has been the primary form of international conflict since 1945.
- Job, Brian (1992) (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. A very useful collection of essays from leading experts on some of the key dimensions of security in developing states.
- Kaldor, Mary (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity. A provocative and original statement on the changing nature of warfare and the need for new approaches to peacekeeping in weak states.
- Musah, Abdel-Fatah and Kayode Fayemi, J. (2000) (eds), *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*, London: Pluto. Provides a fascinating collection of essays on the security dilemma associated with the intervention of mercenaries in Africa's weak states.
- Reno, William (1998), *Warlord Politics and African States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Provides a compelling analysis of how weak-state elites have adapted governance strategies to the opportunities and constraints of neoliberal globalization.
- Rich, Paul B. (1999) (ed.), *Warlords in International Relations*, London: Macmillan. An insightful collection of essays by leading experts on the role of warlords, the small arms trade, private military contractors, and other security challenges facing weak states.
- Thomas, Caroline (1987), *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. An original formulation of the weak-state security predicament.
- Zartman, I. William (1995) (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. An important collection of essays on the nature, causes, and consequences of weak-state decay and collapse.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **http://www.iansa.org** The International Action Network on Small Arms is a global network of civil society organizations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The website contains resources on all aspects of small arms proliferation and international efforts to regulate the trade.
- **http://www.iss.co.za** The Institute for Security Studies is a leading research institution on all aspects of human security in Africa. The website contains news, analysis, and special reports on all aspects of security in Africa.
- **http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm** The Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) programme at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, the University of Maryland, coordinates major empirical research projects on armed conflict, genocide, and politicide, minorities at risk, regime types, and state failure. The website has links to all the major projects and datasets.

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Societal Security

Paul Roe

Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter explores the concept of societal security. It starts by looking at how society came to be conceived as a referent object of security in its own right. It then goes on to discuss the so-called Copenhagen School's understanding of both society and societal identity, showing how societal security is tied most of all to the maintenance of ethno-national identities. In looking at threats to societal security, through examples such as the former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland, the chapter discusses a number of those means that can prevent or hinder the reproduction of collective identity, and, in turn, at how societies may react to such perceived threats. The concept of a societal security dilemma is then introduced to show how societal security dynamics can spiral to produce violent conflict. The chapter concludes by considering some of the main critiques of the concept as an analytical tool.

Introduction

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s significant moves took place designed to take security studies beyond the confines of the dominant realist and neorealist paradigms. For the most part, such moves were made possible by the winding-down and eventual end to the Cold War. The decreasing threat of nuclear war opened the way for the emergence of other, non-military conceptions of security. For example, writing at the end of the 1980s Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989: 162–77) suggested that international security be rethought to include resource, environmental, and demographic issues. Mathews, together with a number of like-minded others (see, e.g., Ullman 1983; Booth 1991), came to be known as the 'wideners': those wishing to broaden the concept of security out of its military-centric confines. One such widener was Barry Buzan.

The term 'societal security' was first introduced by Buzan in *People, States and Fear* (1991a). In the book, societal security was just one of the sectors in his five-dimensional approach, alongside military, political, economic, and environmental concerns. In this context, societal security referred to the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious, and national identities, and customs of states (1991a: 122–3). Each one of Buzan's five sectors was formulated within the confines of an essentially neorealist framework: all the dimensions remained as sectors of national—that is, state—security. 'Society' was just one section through which the state might be threatened. Furthermore, threats in the military sector were seen as primary: as the priorities given to each dimension depended on their relative urgency, Buzan argued that military security was still the most expensive, politically potent, and visible aspect of state behaviour (1991b: 35). Hence: 'A state and society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure' (1991b: 37).

Although recognizing Buzan's vital contribution to the 'broadening' of international security, a major contention was that introducing more sectors of state security was simply not enough. While security studies was indeed beginning to move away from its preoccupation with military issues, it was still very much state-centric in its focus. What was required, therefore, were other referent objects of security: that international security should be 'deepened' as well as broadened brought with it a refocusing on what or indeed who should be secured, from the individual through to the global level. (For a fuller discussion of human versus state security, see Chapter 8.) Set against this, the concept of 'societal security' came to mark out a distinct third, and indeed middle, position; one that was reluctant to consider notions of either human or global security, but one that was also in agreement that the realist and neorealist approach to international security had become just too narrow. As a result, this middle position began to talk about the security of other collectivities, or 'societies'.

A duality of state and societal security

In the 1993 book *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Ole Wæver, together with Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, suggested that 'societal securities' had become increasingly important vis-à-vis concerns over state sovereignty in contemporary, post-Cold War Europe. Most crucially, the writers claimed that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach to international security had now become untenable as a context for societal security. They suggested a reconceptualization: not five sectors relating to the state, but instead a duality of state and societal security. Although society was retained as a dimension of state security, it also became a referent object of security in its own right.

The key to this reconceptualization was the notion of *survival*. While state security is concerned with threats to its sovereignty—if a state loses its sovereignty, it will not survive as a state—societal security is concerned with threats to its identity—if a society loses its identity, it will not survive as a society. States can be made insecure through threats to their societies. But state security can also be brought into question by a high level of societal cohesion. This relates to those instances where a state's programme of homogenization comes into conflict with the strong identity of one or more of its minority groups. For example, during the 1990s the 'Romanianness' of the Romanian state was compromised as the large Hungarian minority in the Transylvania region of the country further asserted its 'Hungarianness'. In other words, the more secure in terms of identity these societies are, the

less secure the states containing them may feel. For Wæver (1993: 25) and his collaborators, in this way **traditional security** analysis had created 'an excessive concern with state stability', and thus had largely removed any sense of 'the "security" of societies in their own right'.

As a concept, societal security was conceived very much as a reaction to events in Europe, in both the East and in the West. In the West, the process of European Union (EU) integration meant that political loyalties were increasingly being shifted, either upwards to the EU level itself, or downwards to the level of the regions, thus weakening the traditional link between state and society. Meanwhile, in the East, the collapse of some of the former socialist countries showed starkly the conflict between adherence to the state (Federal Yugoslavia) or adherence to its constituent groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims). As an analytical tool, the concept has therefore mainly been employed in a very much European context (see, e.g., Huysmans 1995; Herd and Lofgren 2001; Roe 2002). However, its applicability arguably goes much further, in particular to those 'weak states' in parts of South East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. And more will be said about this in the conclusion to this chapter.

Society and societal identity

Put simply, society is about identity: it is about the self-conception of collectivities and individuals identifying themselves as members of that collectivity. Thus, societies are units constituted by a sense of collective identity. Wæver (1993: 17) defines collective identity as simply 'what enables the word *we* to be used'. In this sense, however, a 'we' identity can vary a great deal as to the kind of group to which it applies, the intensity to which it is felt, and the reasons that create a sense of it. Moreover, societies are composed of, and support a multitude of, different identities. That is to say, societies are multiple-identity units. How, then, is it possible to talk about a society's identity?

According to Anthony Giddens (in Wæver 1993: 19), there are two main ways to think about society. The first one is something fixed that has boundaries marking it off from other similar units. The second one is something that is constituted by social interaction; society is viewed rather as a fluid concept, referring more to a process than to an object. For Wæver (1993: 19), however, defining society as a process arguably reduced it to more or less any classification of 'we'—a view of society that cannot easily be employed in the analysis of international security. The interest for the so-called Copenhagen School, as in particular Buzan and Wæver came to be known, was in 'societies operating as units in the international system', where their reactions to threats against their identity have politically significant effects. Accordingly, Wæver distinguished between society and 'social group'. Here, societal security is concerned with the security *of* society as a whole, but not the security of groups *in* society (social group).

Wæver (1994: 8) notes that security action is 'always taken on behalf of, and with reference to a collectivity . . . that which you can point to and say: "it has to survive, therefore it is necessary . . ."'. From this there are two main points to keep in mind. The first one is that for the collectivity there are distinctive kinds of behaviour that cannot be reduced to the individual level. Like state security, societal security must be approached as the security of societies having more than, and thus being different from, the sum of their constituent individual and social groups. Thus, society is viewed as an entity possessing a reality of its own. The second one, and following on from the first, is that societies must also be seen as having the right to survive. For example, while farmers might be considered as a distinct social group, the argument is a difficult one to make that 'farmers' also constitute a significant entity operating alongside the state in political terms. Moreover, the argument that farmers automatically have some kind of right always to be farmers is a difficult one to sustain, as farms are routinely allowed to go out of business for a number of reasons. (However, when farming, as in the case of France in particular, is tied very closely to a particular notion of collective identity—in this instance 'Frenchness'—then farmers may become part of a societal security agenda: farms in France going out of business represent a loss of what it means to be French.)

Such difficulties over defining society can be tackled further by pinning the relationship between society and **societal identity** to a more easily definable unit. Wæver refers to Giddens' view that, as 'units', modern societies are most often nation states or based on the idea of the nation state. Indeed, Wæver (1993: 19) claims that the nation is a special case of society characterized by: attachment to territory, or at least a sense of homeland; a continuity of existence across time, from past generations to the present; and a sense of being one of the entities that make up the social world. In this way, though, the idea of nation and state are often blurred. Buzan, Wæver, and a further collaborator, Jaap de Wilde (1998: 121), recognize all too well that the problem with *societal* is that the related term *society* is often used to refer to the state population. Taking the example of Sudan, they emphasize that 'Sudanese society is that population contained by the Sudanese state but which is composed of many societal units (e.g. Arab and black African). This is not our use of societal; we used societal for communities with which one identifies.' Thus, while, on the one hand, nation can be defined in relation to 'citizenship', on the other hand, it can also be defined in terms of 'ethnicity'. And this distinction is often characterized by the terms 'civic nation' and 'ethnic nation'.

Nations perform a number of roles—most prominently, the marking of borders, thereby staking claim to control a territory. For much of the time, though, the concept of nation is underpinned by common cultural (more often than not ethnic) bonds. Nations are, in this regard, very much a response to the need for identity. Belonging to a distinct culture tells us 'who we are', and it is this process of self-identification that is key to nations.

Although nationality and ethnicity are indeed often mingled, nation and ethnic group can be distinguished in the following terms: a nation strives for a state of its own, whereas an ethnic group acts within the state as it exists. Anthony D. Smith (1993: 48–62) suggests that an ethnic group constitutes a nation when it has become 'politicized': when the group is not only bound by a distinct culture, but also begins to act as a cohesive political unit. Smith's formulation is a useful one—although it must be kept in mind that politicized ethnic groups do not always strive for statehood. Nations, therefore, are often predicated on ethnicity. Shared ethnic origins provide nations with some sort of legitimacy over claims for territory and political autonomy. Thus, with regard to society, Wæver duly employs the label 'ethno-national' group.

Perhaps the only rival to ethno-national identity as a political mobilizer is religion. Religion possesses the ability to reproduce its 'we' identity more or less unconsciously across generations. It is also able to generate a feeling of self-identification, which can be as intense as that of nationalism. Moreover, where religious and ethno-national identities reinforce each other (Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs), this can produce very defined and resilient identities.

Wæver (1993: 23) concludes that the main units of analysis for societal security are 'politically significant

KEY QUOTES 13.1 The importance of societal security

'In the West and the East, at the centre and the periphery, cultural identity and societal security have become the central theme of political attitudes and conflicts'.

Hassner (1993: 58)

'With the increasing intertwining of security and identity, a new agenda has emerged, both for policy-makers struggling with the dilemmas and uncertainties of post-Cold-War Europe, and for academics trying to make sense analytically and conceptually of this changed continent . . . exploring the interface between security and identity can shed considerable light on the structural dynamics and underlying trends of contemporary European politics.'

Aggestan and Hyde-Price (2000: 1)

KEY POINTS

- To begin with, societal security was just a sector of state security. This is where the state can be destabilized through threats to its language, culture, religion, and other customs.
- The societal security concept was (re)conceived in the light of the processes of integration in Western Europe and disintegration in Eastern Europe.
- Societal security was reconceptualized as a referent object of security in its own right.
- Societal security concerns the maintenance of collective identity: if a society loses its identity it will not survive as such.
- Societal security represents a middle way between notions of individual and global security.

ethno-national and religious entities', and accordingly defines societal security as 'the ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and possible and actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religion and national identity and custom.'

But just what 'possible and actual threats' might Wæver be referring to? The next section tackles this question.

KEY POINTS

- Societies are units formed by a sense of collective identity, where collective identity is defined as what enables the word 'we' to be used.
- For security analysis, societies are different from social groups. Societies have a reality of their own, they can operate as units in the international system, and they are invariably seen as having the right to survive.
- Nations and states are sometimes difficult to distinguish. Societies may be nation states, but do not always refer to state population.
- Society most often equates to ethno-national group, although religious groups may also be relevant units for analysis.
- Societal security can be defined as the maintenance of distinct ethno-national and religious identities.

Threats to societal identity

Objective definitions of threats to societal security are as problematic as they are for states. Indeed, perhaps more so. Given the sometimes fluid nature of collective identities, not all changes to it will necessarily be regarded as threatening. Some change will be seen as the natural process by which groups respond to meet changing historical conditions. Nevertheless, some processes invariably carry with them the potential to harm societal security.

Threats to societal security exist when a society perceives that its 'we' identity is being brought into question, whether this is objectively the case or not. Those means that can threaten societal identity range from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generations. This, according to Buzan (1993: 43), may include 'forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community'. Threats to the reproduction of a society can occur through the sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity. If the institutions that reproduce language and culture, such as schools, newspapers, museums, and so forth, are shut down, then identity cannot easily be passed on from one generation to the next. Moreover, if the balance of the population changes in a given area, this can also disrupt societal reproduction.

As a referent object of security, society can be harmed through all of Buzan's five dimensions: societal, military, political, economic, and environmental. And, while some of the sectors are talked about at greater length in Chapters 11, 12, 14, and 15, it is worth describing here their specific relationship to societal identity.

The five sectors of security

Buzan et al. (1998: 121) have divided threats in the societal sector of security into three main categories: **migration**, **horizontal competition**, and **vertical competition**. In cases of migration, the host society is changed by the influx of those from outside; by a shift in the composition of the population. Think of examples in the early 2000s in the UK, where immigrants, particularly from countries such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, have been accused of intensifying the formation of ghettos in major conurbations such as Greater London and the West Midlands, and where fears have likewise grown over competition for often scarce local resources such as education and health care. Horizontal competition refers to groups having to change their ways because of the overriding linguistic and cultural influences of others. For example, in the Soviet Union many of the republics were 'Russified'; Russian language and culture came to dominate over Latvian, Estonian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh identities, to name but a few. Finally, vertical competition refers to those instances where, because of either integration or disintegration, groups are pushed towards either wider or narrower identities, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia.

In the military sector, it is invariably the case that an external military threat will threaten the society or societies within the state. Here, threats to societal security can arguably be seen mainly in terms of depopulation—where enough members of the society are killed (or sometimes deported) either to hinder or to prevent collective identity being transmitted from one generation to the next.

However, some societies within invaded states may not always view armed aggression as a threat. Some minorities may be liberated either from their own regimes or from occupation by a foreign power. Besides, while external military aggression will invariably threaten state sovereignty, it may not necessarily pose a concomitant danger to the society's identity. Take, for example, Nazi Germany's invasion of France in 1940. There was an obvious potential to threaten both the French state and French society. However, while French sovereignty was indeed violated, for the most part French society remained relatively secure: French identity was not, to any significant extent at least, intentionally suppressed. Contrast this with Hitler's prior invasion of Poland in 1939: hand in hand with the military threat to the Polish state was also a political–societal threat to Polish identity: the Poles' Slavic identity coupled with the Nazi's policy of *Lebensraum*. As such, except when invasion is specifically designed towards the harming of state populations, such threats are mainly directed against either the maintenance of political autonomy (puppet states) or the survival of the incumbent regime (regime change).

Military threats to societies may also come from internal aggression. Perhaps the clearest example of this is when a regime, representing one ethnic group, uses its armed forces to suppress other minorities (for more on this see Chapter 12).

In the political sector, threats to societies are most likely to come from their own government, usually in the form of the suppression of minorities. And in this way political and military threats to societal identity will be closely linked. Political threats can often be mitigated by the state itself: for example, certain legislation can be introduced in order to protect societal identity. However, when the state machinery is overwhelmingly controlled by a dominant society, then not only might the state be unwilling to provide societal security but it may itself be posing the threat.

The economic sector of security is for the most part characterized by how the capitalist system can undermine cultural distinctiveness by generating global products (televisions, computers, and computer games), attitudes (materialism and individualism), and style (English language), thereby replacing traditional identities with contemporary 'consumer' ones.

In the environmental sector, threats to societies can occur especially when identity is tied to a particular territory. This is certainly the case when culture is adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by its natural surroundings. Threats to the environment may thus endanger the existence of that culture and sometimes the people themselves. For example, the loss of huge swathes of the Amazon rainforest has seriously affected many of its indigenous peoples in terms of their traditional existence as hunter-gatherer communities. In addition to deforestation, pollution, climate change, and desertification also pose similar threats to societal security.

Genocide, 'culturecide', and the Yugoslav wars

If carried out on a large enough scale, many such threats to societal security come to correspond with the definition of genocide as set out under the terms of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. According to Article 2 of the Convention, genocide refers to acts that intend to destroy, physically or biologically, 'national, ethnical, racial or religious groups'. This was highlighted only too starkly during the conflict in Rwanda (see Case Study 13.1) and the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The now well-known horrors of **ethnic cleansing** saw the intentional killing, violence against (including sexual), and deportation of peoples on the part of all parties to the Yugoslav conflicts, although such acts were perpetrated most by the Bosnian Serb army and paramilitaries. We can think not only of the 1995 massacre of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica, but also of the existence of many camps in towns, such as Foca, where women were imprisoned and subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In addition to ethnic cleansing, however, what some have termed cultural cleansing was also a prevalent practice. By contrast, **cultural cleansing** is perpetrated not against members of the group as such, but against manifestations of group culture. This involved the deliberate destruction of churches, mosques, libraries, and monuments across much of Bosnia-Hercegovina and parts of Croatia, and was intended to wipe out hundreds of years of history from the former Yugoslavia. It is what some writers have described as 'culturecide', and it strikes right against the very core of societal identity (see Key Quotes 13.2).

KEY QUOTES 13.2 The effects of cultural cleansing

'You have to understand that the cultural identity of a population represents its survival in the future. When Serbs blow up the mosque of a village and destroy its graveyards and the foundations of the graveyards and mosques and then level them off . . . no one can ever tell this was a Muslim village. This is the murder of a people's cultural identity.'

Boeles (1990)

'In extreme circumstances, systematic discrimination threatens communal groups' most fundamental right, the right to survival. Many groups also face cultural discrimination and the risk of de-culturation or so-called cultural genocide in the form of pressures or incentives to adopt a dominant culture, or denial of cultural self-expression.'

Gurr (1993: 6)

CASE STUDY 13.1 The Rwandan genocide

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was provoked by the assassination of the country's president, Juvenal Habyarimana, in April of that year. Over the course of the following three months, up to as many as three-quarters of a million Tutsis are estimated to have been killed by Hutu militias, the most notorious of these being the *Interahamwe*.

Historically, Tutsis, who at the time of the genocide made up around 15 per cent of Rwanda's population, had been privileged over Hutus by the country's aristocracy and, in this way, the difference between the two groups was as much economic and social as it was ethnic. However, under Belgian administration a strict system of racial classification served both to exaggerate and to reinforce ethnic difference: Tutsis were considered superior by virtue of being seen as more 'white' looking by their colonial rulers. Following an uprising in 1959 and the establishment of an independent republic in 1961, the new, Hutu-dominated government retained racial classification as a means of subordinating the Tutsi minority. Government suppression resulted in the flight of tens of thousands of Tutsis from Rwanda, and culminated in an invasion by Tutsi rebels from neighbouring Uganda in 1990.

From a societal security perspective, perceived ethnic differences were used by the majority Hutus to reinforce grievances over the privileges historically enjoyed by the minority Tutsis: Tutsis were murdered and expelled because of their ethnic identity, and not just because of their prior economic and social standing. The ideology of 'Hutu Power' articulated a culturally defined disdain for, and superiority over, Tutsis: Tutsis were portrayed as foreigners, and Hutu propaganda frequently depicted them as cockroaches and rats. Moreover, as in the former Yugoslavia, the majority of rapes perpetrated by Hutu militias against Tutsi women were carried out with the express intention of trying to destroy Tutsi culture.

Skjelsbaek (2001: 219)

Culturecide, or 'cultural genocide', is not a part of the Genocide Convention, although Raphael Lemkin (1944), who is seen as being the originator of the term 'genocide', did propose a cultural component to it. Lemkin argued that the destruction of cultures was every bit as disastrous as the physical destruction of nations. Although not clearly defined, the UN's 1994 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does use the term 'cultural genocide'; amongst other provisions, Article 7 calls for prevention against the deprivation of 'cultural values' and against any imposed forms of 'assimilation or integration by other cultures'. Indeed, the term 'cultural genocide' (culturecide) is used regularly by politicians, scholars, and human- and minority rights activists to describe threats to societal security. For example, in 2008 the Dalai Lama accused China of cultural genocide, referring to ethnic Chinese immigration into Tibet and the restrictions placed on Buddhist worship.

Against perceived threats through all five dimensions of security, societies can react in two ways. First, by trying to move the threat onto the state's security agenda—and actions taken by states to defend their societies are quite common. However, second, societies can also choose, or may be forced, to defend themselves through non-state means. As Buzan (1993: 56–7) enquires: 'What happens when societies cannot look to the state for protection . . . ?' Unable to turn to the regime to guarantee their survival, societies will have to provide for their own security; they will be in a self-help situation. And just how societies help themselves is the matter of the next section.

KEY POINTS

- Objectively defining threats to societal security is difficult, especially as some changes to group identity will be seen as a natural response to shifting historical circumstance.
- Societal identity can be threatened from the suppression of its expression through to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generations.
- Ethnic cleansing; the deliberate killing, violence against, and deportation of members of one society by another, and cultural cleansing, the systematic destruction of institutions and symbols designed to promote and maintain group identity, are two prominent manifestations of threats to societal security, and were widely employed, for example, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia.
- Societies can be threatened through all five of Buzan's sectors of security, although the societal and military dimensions are perhaps the most important.
- States often take measures to defend their own societies. But, in multi-ethnic states in particular, societies may find themselves in self-help situations, where they are compelled to provide for their own security.

Defending societal identity

Perhaps most evidently, societal identity can be defended using military means. This is particularly the case if identity is linked to territory: the defence of the historic homeland. If the threat posed by one group to another is military (armed attack from a neighbouring society), then some kind of armed response is invariably required. However, in such a scenario, societal security dynamics are likely closely to resemble those of armed aggression between states: defending societal identity becomes much the same as defending state sovereignty. Therefore, in order to show how societal security can be used as a distinct (from state security) analytical tool, the remainder of this section turns its attention to the intra-state level of analysis, and to multi-ethnic states where societal insecurities are most often apparent.

While some societies (as states or quasi-states) may very well have an army or at least some kind of militia that can be utilized for defence, the vast majority of intra-state groups possess no such exclusive means of protection. For them, members of the group will either make up part of the state's armed forces as a whole, or have military forces composed of the same ethnic group in a neighbouring state. Facing a threat in identity terms, such groups are therefore left with two main options: first, they can try to form their own militia/defence force as a means or protection, although this can prove to be extremely difficult; or, second, they can try to defend their identity using non-military means.

Non-military means of defence

At the intra-state level, the vulnerabilities felt by many groups may often derive not so much from armed aggression as from demographic processes and political–legal means designed to deprive societies of beliefs and practices vital to the maintenance of their culture. Returning to the example of ethnic cleansing, Robert Hayden (1996: 784) highlights how, for example, such threats to societal identity can be shaped very much by demographic considerations: 'Within areas in which the sovereign group is already an overwhelming majority, homogenization can be brought about by legal and bureaucratic means, such as denying citizenship to those not of the right group.' In more mixed areas, however, Hayden goes on, homogenization requires more drastic measures such as killing and physical expulsion. And, although it is only the attempted extermination of the minority group in this regard that has been widely recognized as ethnic cleansing, 'it is important to recognize that legal and bureaucratic discrimination is aimed at bringing about the same result: the elimination of the minority'.

When the nature of the threat is non-military (legal, bureaucratic), countervailing measures are also likely to be so. In the *Identity, Migration* book, Wæver et al. (1993: 191) suggest that for threatened societies 'one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity'. This can be done, Wæver (1995: 68) notes succinctly, by defending culture 'with culture'; and consequently 'culture becomes security policy'. The idea of defending culture with culture is a slightly tricky one to unpack, but John Hutchinson provides a useful starting point. Hutchinson (1994) describes the project of what he calls **cultural nationalism**. Cultural nationalism is designed to generate a strong feeling of self-identification. It emphasizes various commonalities such as language, religion, and history, and downplays other ties that might detract from its unity. In this sense, cultural nationalism celebrates what is special about our *identity* (see Key Quotes 13.3). Self-identification, as

KEY QUOTES 13.3 The project of cultural nationalism

'[C]ultural nationalists establish . . . clusters of cultural societies and journals, designed to inspire spontaneous love of the community in its different members by educating them to their common heritage of splendour and suffering. They engage in naming rituals, celebrate national cultural uniqueness and reject foreign practices, in order to identify the community to itself, embed this into everyday life and differentiate this against other communities.'

Hutchinson (1994: 124)

KEY QUOTES 13.4 Societal security and minority rights

' "First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give a stronger expression to that identity" . . . Or, in the language of the Copenhagen School, being a minority, and thus pursuing minority rights, is a matter of societal security.'

Roe (2004: 288)

such, often takes place because societal identity has been threatened: 'Our present identity has become too weak. We therefore need to change it and make ourselves strong again'.

Defending societal identity through cultural nationalism can be seen in the case of relations between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.

In Portadown, the Protestant Orange Order has struggled to maintain what it sees as its historic right to march down the predominantly Catholic Garvaghy Road. Likewise, many of the town's Catholic inhabitants have protested, claiming that the march is highly provocative. For the Orange Order, not to march is tantamount to surrender: 'We have been walking down this road for generations. Why should we stop now?' In this way, the right of the Orange Order to march is inextricably bound up with the maintenance of its Protestant identity: it is the right to express who *we* are, where *we* come from (and indeed, where *we* are going). It is a societal security requirement. However, for the Catholic community the march is a celebration of the Protestant victory at the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, and thus represents a serious attack on their own identity. As Michael Ignatieff (1993: 169) points out, the victory of William of Orange over the Catholic King James 'became a founding myth of ethnic superiority. . . . The Ulstermen's reward, as they saw it, was permanent ascendancy over the Catholic Irish.'

In the face of what many Protestants have come to see as the erosion of their ascendant status in the province, Orange Order marches are a cultural-nationalist strategy aimed at strengthening their identity: the celebration of the self.

In perhaps more concrete terms, collective identity can be strengthened when cultural nationalist strategies are manifest as **cultural autonomy**. Cultural autonomy entails the granting of certain rights in relation to the means of cultural reproduction: the control of one's own schools, newspapers, religious institutions, and so forth.

Similarly, societal groups may also employ 'ethnic' or '**political nationalism**' as a means of defence. Unlike cultural nationalism, political-nationalist projects have an explicit territorial element to them. Political nationalism, as manifest in political autonomy, often involves self-government along a wider range of issues, such as the ability to control some of its own legal and financial affairs (for example, as with the Basques in Spain). In this way, political autonomy usually equates to some kind of autonomous region within the state. In its most extreme expression, though, and if threats to societal identity are seen as particularly severe, political-nationalist projects may seek outright independence outside of the existing state structure.

In this way, the concept of societal security and questions of human and minority rights become closely linked. Both Will Kymlicka (2001) and Gwendolyn Sasse (2005) have discussed the implications of framing minority rights as a security issue: Kymlicka argues that using the language of (societal) security effectively prevents thinking about the provision of minority rights in terms of justice, while Sasse shows how actors, such as the OSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), are increasingly cognizant of the balance between security and rights (or justice) based concerns. Similarly, Paul Roe (2001; 2004) has talked about the role of the HCNM in mitigating societal security dilemmas (see the following section), and has also made the argument that societal security concerns are an inherent quality of minority-rights provisions (see Key Quotes 13.4).

KEY POINTS

- Military means may often be used to defend societal identity. This is particularly the case when identity is linked to territory.
- At the intra-state level, however, many societal groups may have no such means of armed protection. Forced to provide for their own security, such groups are compelled to employ non-military countermeasures.
- Cultural-nationalist strategies can be used to defend societal security. When manifest as cultural autonomy, this involves the control over those institutions that are responsible for cultural reproduction, such as schools and churches.
- Political-nationalist strategies are also a means of defending collective identity. Political autonomy, however, is more territorially based and thus involves a much greater measure of self-government within the state.
- Secession is the most extreme form of defence for societal security.

Societal security dilemmas

Thus far, the chapter has noted the importance of societal security, in particular with relation to Europe's security agenda. It has talked about how societal identity can be threatened, and how threatened societies can respond to those dangers. In this section, the notion of a societal security dilemma is discussed. The purpose is to highlight how societal security dynamics can escalate to the point of violence and war, and, importantly, to show how conflict in this way can be generated by non-military concerns.

In the *Identity, Migration* book, Buzan (1993: 46) suggests that, by analogy with relations between states, it may be possible to talk of **societal security dilemmas**, and that societal security dilemmas might explain why some ethnic conflicts 'come to acquire a dynamic of their own'. But what does a societal security dilemma look like? How does it operate? How is it different, if at all, from the traditional (state) security dilemma? And what effects might it produce? Chapter 2 touches on the concept of the security dilemma. But for our purposes here it is useful briefly to revisit the concept.

The (state) security dilemma

For the most part, the security dilemma describes a situation where the actions of one state, in trying to increase its security, causes a reaction in a second, which, in the end, decreases the security of the first. Consequently, a process of action and reaction is manifest whereby each side's policies are seen to threaten the other. Thus, at the core of the concept lies an escalatory dynamic. The key to this escalatory dynamic is *ambiguity* and *uncertainty*.

States usually try to increase their security by building up their arms. But most arms that can be used for defence can also be deployed for offensive purposes. A tank, for example, can just as easily be employed to attack a neighbour's territory as it can to defend one's own. Arms, therefore, are invariably ambiguous in nature; on the one hand, they are a means to protect oneself, while, on the other, they are a way of harming others. And it is this crucial role that arms play in being able to generate both security and insecurity that has led the vast majority of writers to conceive of the security dilemma in almost exclusively military terms.

In turn, the ambiguity of military postures creates uncertainty about the intentions of one's adversary. Faced with the indistinguishability between offence and defence, decision makers must come to distinguish between 'status quo' states and 'revisionist' states.

Accordingly, decision makers are forced to assume the worst. In an anarchical, self-help system, it is prudent to equate capabilities with intentions: what the other can do, it will, given the opportunity. Countervailing measures are therefore taken, generating a spiral of insecurities, which, in the context of states, is often manifest as arms racing.

The societal security dilemma

But how can this equate to societies, rather than states? While collective identity can certainly be threatened by military means, as has been pointed out, societal insecurities and responses to those insecurities may often be non-military in nature. In other words, thinking about a societal security dilemma also prompts the shift to a non-military security dilemma. In this way, a first question is what can create ambiguity if not arms?

For societal security dilemmas, ambiguity can stem from the two sides of nationalism; cultural (positive) and ethnic (negative). Many writers describe ethnic (political) nationalism in rather malign terms, often characterized in this regard with the annexation of territories and the disintegration of states. By contrast, cultural nationalism is often seen as more benign, as

KEY QUOTES 13.5 The two sides of ethnicity

'On the one hand, ethnicity . . . is often perceived as backward and dangerous. On the other hand, [some] authors tend to view ethnicity as . . . the self-expression of the threatened and the marginalised. Ethnicity can be both positive and negative. Of course, the divisive nature of contemporary ethno-nationalism, its violent boundary makings, its exclusiveness, etc., must also be viewed as considerable challenges to the modern international system, as well as potentials for violence and wars. One must not forget, however, that ethnicity has also a potential for internal group solidarity and loyalty.'

Lindholm (1993: 24)

it tends to work within existing state structures. The goal of cultural nationalists is to amend the current order and not overturn it: it is more 'status quo' than 'revisionist' (see Key Quotes 13.5).

In practice, however, clear distinctions between cultural nationalism and political nationalism are often difficult to make. Indeed, Hutchinson (1994: 125) himself notes that cultural nationalist projects may sometimes employ ethnic nationalist strategies in order to secure their goals. That is, cultural nationalism sometimes may be compelled to change itself from a solely cultural movement into a political one in order to get its concerns onto the state agenda, or to be able to expand into a genuinely mass movement in order to realize its desires. In certain circumstances, then, cultural nationalism might be conflated with political nationalism. And ambiguity might thus be apparent in the sense that cultural nationalist movements come to resemble a political nationalist project; the desire for cultural autonomy becomes confused with that for political autonomy. But how might this happen?

Within the state, the desires of the group will either be communicated verbally and/or be presented in written form through official memoranda and manifestos. In such a context, such desires may not be clearly articulated to others—a problem that can be compounded if insufficient communicative channels exist within the state. Moreover, certain verbal and/or written pronouncements may contradict previous ones. Others may thus be thrown into confusion, causing them to misperceive the group's intentions. Dominant actors may employ exaggerated threat perceptions. This is often with the intention of mobilizing political support in order to sustain and create national or local power bases. For each scenario, countervailing measures might then be taken, which, in turn, can result in an action–reaction process and the subsequent outbreak of ethnic violence and war. In this way, Roe (2002, 2005) uses the societal security dilemma to explain the outbreak of ethnic violence between Hungarians and Romanians in the Transylvania region of Romania in 1990. He argues that misperception over questions of greater cultural and political autonomy for the region's ethnic Hungarians caused many Romanians to view this as a threat to their own status as a majority identity.

KEY POINTS

- A societal security dilemma occurs when the actions taken by one society to strengthen its identity causes a reaction in a second, which, in the end, weakens the identity of the first.
- In societal security dilemmas, actors may be uncertain as to whether the other is employing either a cultural-nationalist (cultural autonomy) or political-nationalist (political autonomy/secession) strategy. Assuming the worst can lead to a spiral of nationalisms and, finally, violent conflict.
- As an explanation for ethnic conflict, societal security dilemmas can highlight those important non-military dynamics that traditional (state) security dilemmas miss.

Conclusion

Thus far, the chapter has shown the importance of societal security concerns and how the concept can be used profitably as an analytical tool. However, the Copenhagen School has not been without its critics. And in this concluding section some of the major contentions are considered.

The charge of reification

A first, and perhaps most fundamental, criticism concerns the Copenhagen School's view of the construction of collective identity. In a comprehensive critique of the societal security concept, Bill McSweeney (1996: 82) charges Wæver, Buzan, and their fellow collaborators with reification. He claims that both 'society' and 'identity' are treated as 'objective realities, out there to be discovered': seen in objectivist terms, societies and societal identities are 'things' that somehow naturally exist. McSweeney (1996: 85) takes a more constructivist view in which society is rather a fluid entity: 'Identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation . . .'. If, in this way, society is subject to constant construction and reconstruction, the question becomes whether societies, like states, can be seen as objects around which security dynamics can be observed. In a direct response to McSweeney's contentions, Buzan and Wæver (1997) refute the charge of objectivism, arguing that theirs is also a constructivist approach. Unlike McSweeney, though, they claim that, while societal identities are indeed socially constructed, once constructed they can also be regarded as, at least temporarily, fixed. In a subsequent review of the societal security concept, Tobias Theiler (2003: 254) talks of the Copenhagen School's 'persuasive defence', and agrees that when 'beliefs and institutions become deeply sedimented' they 'change only very slowly'. As an analytical tool, therefore, societal security is useful in accounting for specific events in specific places at specific times. An example of this is Graeme P. Herd and Joan Lofgren's study (2001) of societal security concerns between the Baltic States and their Russian minorities during much of the 1990s.

Nevertheless, more poststructural writings, such as the work of David Campbell (1992), contend that the construction of collective identities is made possible only through reference to external threat; what Campbell calls 'discourses of danger'. That is to say, societal identity exists not prior to the identification of threat but as a very consequence of it. Indeed, as Michael C. Williams (2003: 519) argues: 'A successful securitization of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity . . .'. This serves to highlight the criticism that the Copenhagen School have failed to theorize the relationship between threat and collective identity construction.

Who speaks for society?

A second major criticism concerns the separation between state and society. In particular, the question arises as to who speaks for society if not the state. Certainly, where state and society coincide, in the case of relatively homogenous nation states, societal security concerns are invariably articulated by the government or by major political parties, the very same voices that speak on behalf of the state. In such an instance, to the observer state security and societal security may very well appear as pretty much one and the same. However, while the voice may indeed often be the same, the 'grammar' may nonetheless be different: state security concerns come hand in hand with the language of sovereignty, while societal security concerns come hand in hand with the language of identity. The point here is essentially tied to the Copenhagen School's notion of securitization, which is discussed at length in Chapter 10. For the purposes here, though, what is important to keep in mind is that, although state and society may be coterminous, *how* the referent object is threatened gives rise to different responses.

Sometimes, though, as has already been discussed, states and societies do not coincide. And in these instances the voices of state security and societal security may be different. For minority groups, societal security concerns are not always voiced from within the government, unless minority political parties are part of the ruling coalition. Minority groups may at least have some kind of representation within the legislature. If not, though, such societies will be forced to articulate their concerns outside the state apparatus. In this regard, cultural elites (writers, poets, academics) can try to mobilize their societies against the government (majority group).

The dangers of speaking societal security

From this second criticism comes a third, and it concerns the political implications of voicing societal security. As Williams (1998) points out, although, on the one hand, McSweeney charges the Copenhagen School with objectivism, on the other hand, he also notes how the societal security concept is dangerously subjectivist too. Politicians can use perceived threats to societal security to legitimize racists and xenophobic

KEY QUOTES 13.6 Legitimizing racism and xenophobia

'What if [Jean-Marie] Le Pen manages to manufacture a majority consent, verified by polls or other measurement techniques, around the idea of racism and xenophobia, or if the IRA creates a 'collective identity' which incorporates intense anti-British sentiment into a symbol of Irish solidarity? Such hypothetical developments are not wildly improbable, and would immediately present a serious security problem in France and Ireland'.

McSweeney (1996: 87–8)

political agendas. For example, defending 'our' identity against 'theirs' can serve to characterize immigrant communities as dangerous Others who must either be assimilated or expelled (see Key Quotes 13.6). There is certainly a risk here, but a risk that Wæver (1999: 337) believes is worth taking: 'This danger [of giving rise to fascist and anti-foreigner voices] has to be offset against the necessity to use the concept of societal security to try to understand what is actually happening.' This is what Jeff Huysmans (2002) has called the 'normative dilemma' of writing security.

Applying the concept elsewhere

While not really a substantive criticism of societal security, a final point worth considering is whether the concept has a potentially wider application outside Europe. As was mentioned, the Copenhagen School's thinking about societal security was very much a response to the European Security agenda of the 1990s—to the processes of Western integration and Eastern disintegration. So what about elsewhere?

As an analytical tool, societal security is particularly effective for understanding the security concerns of multi-ethnic states: relations between the regime (majority group) and the country's minority groups. And this is the focus of the so-called Third World Security School (see, e.g., Job 1992; Ayoob 1995). For many countries in the developing world, the greatest threats are often internal. During the process of nation building, where minority identities are assimilated into the majority, state regimes may often require minority groups to give up all, or part, of their cultural distinctiveness. These ethnic differences, together with the state's inability to provide for certain sections of its people, cause the population to express its loyalty elsewhere. And it is this lack of cohesion between the state and its societies that defines the state as 'weak'. Weak states provide propitious conditions for the study of societal insecurities (see, e.g., Collins 2003; Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006), and serve to locate the concept more firmly in the peace studies tradition where the provision for 'identity needs' (Galtung 1990) are, alongside other social and economic freedoms, critical to the realization of social justice.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways does societal security mark a departure from more traditional thinking about security? Cannot realist and neorealist approaches adequately capture the dynamics of nationalism and ethnic conflict?
2. What is the difference between society as a sector of security and society as a referent object?
3. How far can 'societies' be seen as rational, instrumental actors?
4. Is there a clear distinction to be drawn between societies and 'social groups'?
5. In what way might societies be said to have a right to survive?
6. Are societies, as the Copenhagen School claim, all about identity?
7. How can multi-ethnic states threaten the societal security of their minority groups? How can minorities try to counter these threats?
8. How differently does, for example, a map of Europe look seen through a societal security rather than a state security perspective?
9. Is the Copenhagen School right in saying the European security agenda has become increasingly concerned with questions of group identity?

FURTHER READING

- Aggestam, L. and Hyde-Price, A. (eds) (2000), *Security and Identity in Europe*, London: Macmillan. Excellent coverage of key issues facing European security; including NATO enlargement, EU integration, and the wars in the Balkans.
- Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P., Tromer, E., and Wæver, O. (1990), *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Pinter. Precursor to the *Identity, Migration* book, this is the Copenhagen School's exploration of the new, emerging European security agenda through Buzan's five dimensions.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press. Perhaps the most important edited collection concerning the impact of norms and identity on security and foreign policy and behaviour.
- Lapid, J. and Kratochwil, F. (eds.) (1999), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Edited volume that covers the 'constructivist turn' in international relations from the Copenhagen School to postmodern and poststructural approaches.
- McSweeney, B. (1999), *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Provides excellent critiques of existing constructivist approaches to security and identity.
- Roe. P. (2005), *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma*, London: Routledge. One of the few books that successfully combines questions of identity with traditional security studies scholarship.
- Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gusterson, H., and Duvall, R. (1999), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Dangers*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Introduces sociological and anthropological approaches in examining the cultural production of insecurity in local, national, and international contexts; from the Korean War, to the Cuban Missile Crisis, to the conflicts in the Middle East.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **http://www.ciaonet.org** Provides access to a wide range of working papers, journals, and policy briefs, including previous COPRI works.
- **http://www.systemicpeace.org** Official website of the Center for Systemic Peace. Contains datasets, project reports, including Ted Robert Gurr's *Minorities at Risk* and an extensive library of bibliographical references for works that examine violent conflicts from both a human and societal security perspective.
- **http://www.hrw.org** Excellent resource for news releases, publications, reports, and event lists concerning human and minority rights in Europe and elsewhere.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins3e/

14

Environmental Security

Jon Barnett

Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter discusses the concept of environmental security. It explains the way environmental security has both broadened and deepened the issue of security. It describes the evolution of the concept as a merger of international environmental agreements, efforts by the peace movement to contest the meaning and practice of security, the proliferation of new security issues in the post-Cold War era, and the growing recognition that environmental changes pose grave risks to human well-being. The chapter examines the different meanings of environmental security, and then it explains four major categories of environmental security problems—namely, the way environmental change can be a factor in violent conflict, the way environmental change can be a risk to national security, the way war and preparation for war can damage the environment, and the way environmental change can be a risk to human security. It explains how environmental security can mean different things to different people and can apply to vastly different referent objects in ways that sometimes have very little to do with environmental change.

Introduction

In its most basic sense **insecurity** is the risk of something bad happening to a thing that is valued. For example, people who value their jobs are concerned about the risk of unemployment, families who value having enough to eat are concerned about the regular supply of food, and governments that value **power** are concerned about losing office. So, security can apply to many different things that are valued (referent objects such as jobs, health, or organizations) and refer to many different kinds of risks (unemployment, lack of food, a change of government). The environment has also been seen as a referent object of security, and **environmental change** has been seen as a security risk. These connections between the environment and security fall under the heading of **environmental security**, and this chapter provides an overview of this concept.

Environmental security is one of a number of 'new', **non-traditional security** issues that have served to deepen and broaden the concept of security. It helps to deepen security, as it entails considering not just the security of states, but also the security of 'the environment' as well as its many nested subsystems. It broadens security by considering risks other than war—principally the risks posed by environmental change—to the things that people value. Further, like the concepts of human security and gender security discussed in this book (see Chapters 8 and 9), environmental security is sometimes a *critical* security project in that it is used to ask questions about who and what is being secured—and from what risks—by orthodox security policies (see also Chapter 6 of this book).

Like security studies more generally, environmental security has entailed much research of a more practical kind. There have been numerous attempts to assess the extent to which environmental change causes violent conflict within and between countries (this is examined in the fourth section of this chapter). There are explanations of the ways in which environmental change may undermine national security (explained in the fifth section of this chapter). There have been investigations of the ways in which war and preparations for war affect the environment (discussed in the sixth section of this chapter). Finally, there has been a growing body of research that investigates the linkages between environmental change and development issues such as poverty and human security (as explained in the seventh section of this chapter). These research endeavours have influenced policy development in some countries, in intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, and in non-governmental organizations such as the World Conservation Union and Greenpeace.

KEY POINTS

- The environment can be both an object to be secured and a source of risk.
- Environmental security means different things to different people.
- Environmental security has contributed to both a broadening and a deepening of security.
- Environmental security has both critical and applied dimensions.

The origins of environmental security

Environmental security emerged as an important concept in security studies because of four interrelated developments beginning in the 1960s. The first of these was the growth of environmental consciousness in developed countries. A number of events stimulated and sustained the growth of the environmental movement at this time. Notable among these was the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson's widely read book *Silent Spring* (also serialized in the *New Yorker*), which explained the impacts of pesticide DDT on animals and the food chain. Carson was among the first of many people whose use of print and electronic media have created and sustained awareness of environmental issues; others include notable personalities such as David Attenborough, Jacques Cousteau, and David Suzuki.

The number of environmental non-governmental organizations—of which there are now more than 100,000 worldwide—also seriously began to grow in the 1960s. From an international relations perspective, a notable development was the creation of large international environmental non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund (1961), Friends of the Earth (1969), and Greenpeace (1971). Their functions have grown to include networking across countries, research, awareness raising, policy development and monitoring, capacity building, fund raising, and lobbying at local, national, and international forums. Their issue agenda is similarly broad, extending beyond

BACKGROUND 14.1 Major multilateral environmental agreements

1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar)

1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention)

1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution for Ships, 1973, and Protocols (MARPOL)

1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)

1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement

1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal

1992 Convention on Biological Diversity

1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

2000 Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity

2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants

conservation to include environmental justice, gender inequities, genetic engineering, indigenous rights, nuclear non-proliferation, poverty alleviation, sustainable energy technologies, and waste management. A growing number of non-governmental organizations of various scales and in various locations are incorporating environmental security issues into their work, including the African Centre for Technology Studies, the Institute for Environmental Security, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the Stockholm Environment Institute, and the Worldwatch Institute.

The 1970s also saw the beginning of international summits on environmental issues, and a proliferation of international agreements on environmental issues. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (itself established in 1972), there are now over 500 multilateral environmental agreements, most of which were signed after 1972 (see Background 14.1). The first major global environmental summit was arguably the **United Nations Conference on the Human Environment** (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972. It initiated a number of intergovernmental investigations, meetings, and agreements on global environmental problems. These merged at times with parallel investigations into development and common security, and culminated in the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) entitled *Our Common Future*. The WCED report popularized the term 'sustainable development', and it introduced the term 'environmental security' (see Key Quotes 14.1). It set the scene for the watershed United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which has had follow-up conferences in 1997, 2002, and 2012.

The second major development leading to the emergence of environmental security was attempts from the 1970s onwards by a number of scholars to critique orthodox security discourse and practices by highlighting their inability to manage environmental risks to national and international security. This is the origin of the critical component of environmental security. Among the first attempts to do this were Richard Falk's *This Endangered Planet* (1971), and Harold and Margaret Sprout's *Toward a Politics of Planet Earth* (1971) (see Key Quotes 14.2). Both books argued that the international political system needs to comprehend and collectively to respond to common environmental problems, as they pose threats to international stability and national well-being. These ideas about environmental interdependence and **common security** have remained key themes of environmental security studies.

It was not until 1983, when Richard Ullman published an article titled 'Redefining Security', that the idea that environmental change might cause war was seriously proposed. Ullman defined a national security threat as anything that can quickly degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state, or that narrows the choices available to people and organizations within

KEY QUOTES 14.1 Environmental security

'A comprehensive approach to international and national security must transcend the traditional emphasis on military power and armed competition. The real sources of insecurity also encompass unsustainable development . . .'

'Environmental stress can thus be an important part of the web of causality associated with any conflict and can in some cases be catalytic.'

'Poverty, injustice, environmental degradation and conflict interact in complex and potent ways.'

'As unsustainable forms of development push individual countries up against environmental limits, major differences in environmental endowment among countries, or various stocks of usable land and raw materials, could precipitate and exacerbate international tension and conflict.'

'Threats to environmental security can only be dealt with by joint management and multilateral procedures and mechanisms.'

WCED (1987: ch. 11)

KEY QUOTES 14.2 Environment and security

'We need to revamp our entire concept of "national security" and "economic growth" if we are to solve the problems of environmental decay.'

Falk (1971: 185)

'The thrust of the evidence is simply that the goal of national security as traditionally conceived—and as still very much alive—presents problems that are becoming increasingly resistant to military solutions.'

Sprout and Sprout (1971: 406)

'Neither bloated military budgets nor highly sophisticated weapons systems can halt deforestation or solve the firewood crisis.'

Brown (1977: 37)

'The pressure engendered by population growth in the Third World is bound to degrade the quality of life, and diminish the range of options available, to governments and persons in the rich countries.'

Ullman (1983: 143)

'Conflict over resources is likely to grow more intense.'

Ullman (1983: 139)

'If a nation's environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will steadily decline, its social fabric deteriorate, and its political structure become destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether conflict in the form of disorder and insurrection within the nation, or tensions and hostilities with other nations.'

Myers (1986: 251)

'It is thus inescapable that any concept of international security must in the last analysis be based on this obligate relationship of humankind with its environment.'

Westing (1986: 195)

'Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.'

CNA Corporation (2007: 6)

'Climate change not only exacerbates threats to peace and security. It is a threat to international peace and security'

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, UN Security Council, 20 July 20 2011

the state. A number of environmental scientists have also argued that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict (see Key Quotes 14.2).

These early arguments for the connections between the environment and security were very much of peripheral concern to Western security institutions occupied with the 'hard' business of winning the Cold War. For the United States and its allies, security meant national security from the military and ideological threat of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the principal strategy to achieve this was to build and to maintain military superiority. However, one notable event troubled this pure vision of security. In 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) restricted oil exports, leading to a quadrupling of the price of oil on world markets. This showed that the industrial capacity that underpinned the military superiority of the West was vulnerable to the dictates of the suppliers of energy. This event firmly established the idea of energy security in mainstream security planning.

A shift in the strategic landscape is the third reason why environmental security is now an important concept in

security studies. The end of the bipolar world order created by the Cold War created something of a 'vertigo' for security policy and security studies, and for a few years the old ways of thinking about security became less obviously relevant (O'Tuathail 1996). This 'vertigo', combined with the growing environmental consciousness of people in developed countries, the call for common security approaches in *Our Common Future*, and preparations for the UNCED Rio conference, created the intellectual and policy space for environmental security to enter the mainstream as one of a suite of 'new' security issues (Dalby 1992a). So, from 1989 onwards there were many more publications and studies on environmental security, including in prominent security journals. These were to have some influence on policy, particularly in the United States (Barnett 2001). In the first decades of the twenty-first century climate change and increasing instability in world food and energy markets are issues that foreign and security policy makers in many countries consider to be security issues.

The fourth reason why environmental security has become an important concept in security studies is because of the growing recognition that environmental changes do not merely pose risks to ecosystems; they also pose risks to human well-being. It is now well understood that environmental change poses real risks to human security by undermining access to basic environmental assets such as productive soils, clean water, and food; by contributing to violations of civil and political rights such as to the means of subsistence and health; and by restricting people's access to the economic and social opportunities they need to develop meaningful lives (Matthew et al. 2009). As this recognition has grown, environmental security has become an important concern of environmental and development studies, and this has resulted in increased dialogue between security, development, and environmental researchers and policy makers.

KEY POINTS

- Environmental security emerged as an important concept in security studies because of:
  - the development of environmentalism in developed countries after the 1960s;
  - attempts to contest the meaning and practice of security from an environmental standpoint;
  - changes in strategic circumstances, in particular the end of the Cold War;
  - growing recognition of the risks environmental changes pose to human security.
- There are now a large number of multilateral environmental agreements.
- Both political scientists and environmental scientists have contributed to the development of the concept of environmental security.

Major interpretations of environmental security

Since the early 1990s environmental security has been an important concept in security studies and increasingly also in environmental studies. Yet the meaning of environmental security is ambiguous, perhaps because of the vagueness of the words *environment* and *security*. The basic meaning of **environment** is the external conditions that surround an entity, but it can be more accurately defined as the living organisms and the physical and chemical components of the total Earth system (Boyden et al. 1990: 314). **Security** is also an all-encompassing yet vague concept, which has perhaps been best defined by Soroos (1997: 236) as 'the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being'. The ambiguity of these words has given rise to many different meanings of environmental security.

Six principal approaches to environmental security can be discerned from the literature (see Table 14.1). First, environmental security can be seen as being about the impacts of human activities on the environment. This interpretation of environmental security—sometimes also called 'ecological security'—emphasizes at least implicitly that it is ecosystems and ecological processes that should be secured, and the principal threat to ecological integrity is human activity (see Think Point 14.1). In this view humans are secured only in so far as they are part of the environment (Pirages and DeGeest 2004). Recognizing that human activities are now powerfully changing the biosphere, Dalby (2009) extends the notion of ecological security to talk of 'anthropocene security', which he says is "security in terms of ecological understandings of humanity as a new presence in the biosphere that we are already changing quite drastically" (2009: 172). Such formulations of security differ radically from mainstream security discourse and policy, and have so far had little influence on either.

Table 14.1 Six key interpretations of environmental security

Name	Entity to be secured	Major source of risk	Scale of concern
Ecological security	Natural environment	Human activity	Ecosystems
Common security	Nation state	Environmental change	Global/regional
Environmental violence	Nation state	War	National
National security	Nation state	Environmental change	National
Greening defence	Armed forces	Green/peace groups	Organizational
Human security	Individuals	Environmental change	Local

! THINK POINT 14.1 Human impacts on . . .

Land

- In the past 40 years nearly one-third of existing cropland has been abandoned because of erosion.
- 25 per cent of all land is affected by some form of land degradation.

Forests

- During the 1990s 16.1 million hectares of natural forests were cleared each year.
- Between 1990 and 2000, 3 million hectares of forests were cleared in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Biodiversity

- 184 species of mammals, 182 species of birds, 162 species of fish, and 1,276 species of plants are critically endangered (extremely high risk of extinction).
- Approximately 27,000 species are lost every year.

Freshwater

- Eighty countries containing 40 per cent of the world's population experienced severe water shortages in the mid-1990s.
- Approximately half of the world's wetlands were lost during the twentieth century.

Coastal and marine areas

- Approximately half of all mangrove forests were cleared in the twentieth century.
- 58 per cent of the world's coral reefs are threatened.

The atmosphere

- Concentrations of CO_2 have increased by 30 per cent since 1750.

UNEP (2002, 2005)

The second key approach to environmental security focuses on common security. The causes and impacts of some environmental problems are not confined to the borders of nation states. Some problems such as ozone depletion and climate change are very 'global' in nature in that they are caused by cumulative emissions of gases from many countries, which in turn affect many countries. However, to say that these problems are 'global' is not to say that all countries are equally responsible for them, or that all countries and communities are equally at risk from them (see Case Study 14.2 and Think Point 14.2). Other environmental problems, such as acid rain, smoke haze, and water scarcity and pollution, are often caused by, and impact on, more than one country. This means that groups of countries with similar environmental problems cannot easily unilaterally achieve environmental security, and so their common national security interests require collective action. This is the rationale behind the many treaties discussed in the previous section. However, while many environmental problems are to some degree 'common', no two countries have exactly the same interests, and all have sovereign rights. For these reasons multilateral environmental agreements have not significantly halted environmental degradation. The four other major approaches to environmental security are each discussed in the following sections.

! THINK POINT 14.2 The environmental impacts of armed forces

- In the 1980s the US military was the largest holder of agricultural land in the Philippines.
- The US nuclear weapons programme was conducted in thirty-four states and covered 2.4 million acres of land; clean-up costs are expected to be in the order of US$200–300 billion.
- Nuclear tests have been carried out at seven sites in the South Pacific, making four islands completely uninhabitable and causing above-average cancer levels in residents of the Marshall Islands.
- The former Soviet Union dumped up to 17,000 containers of nuclear waste and up to 21 nuclear reactors into the Barents and Kara seas.
- The US military generates more toxins than the top five US chemical companies combined.
- In the United States in the 1980s there were 26 US military bases with significant toxic hazards; clean-up costs were estimated to be over US$400 billion.
- Worldwide use of aluminum, copper, nickel, and platinum for military purposes exceeded the combined demand for these materials in all the developing countries.
- One quarter of all the world's jet fuel is consumed by military aircraft.
- The US military–industrial complex may be responsible for at least 10 per cent of the US total CO_2 emissions, making it responsible for some 2–3 per cent of total global emissions or more than those of all Australia, Finland, Sweden, and New Zealand combined.

Renner (1991); Seager (1993); Heininen (1994); Dycus (1996)

KEY POINTS

- Both 'environment' and 'security' are ambiguous concepts.
- Interpretations of environmental security differ according to the entity to be secured, the source of risk to that entity, and the solutions proposed.
- Most interpretations of environmental security do not require much change in security thought and practice because they are concerned with the nation state and/or the risk of armed conflict.
- The ecological security and human security approaches to environmental security challenge the security-**policy community** to consider alternative objects of security, and alternative security risks.

Environmental change and violent conflict

The connections between environmental change and violent conflict have been a central and long-standing concern of environmental security studies. The critical questions, which have yet to be conclusively answered, are whether environmental change contributes to violent conflict, and, if so, to what degree and in what ways?

Early writing on the connections between environmental change and violence borrowed heavily from realist international relations theory and focused largely on resource scarcity and conflict between states. Gleick (1991), for example, argued that there were clear connections between environmental degradation and violence, suggesting that resources could be strategic goals and strategic tools, and that resource inequalities could be a source of conflict. The early contributions from Ullman and Myers (see Key Quotes 14.2) also canvassed the possibility of interstate war caused by resource and environmental problems. The possibility of war between countries with shared water resources was often highlighted (see Case Study 14.1). The idea that environmental change may cause wars between countries has been critiqued by researchers such as Deudney (1990) and Barnett (2001), as well as by liberal theories about the ways complex interdependence and trade mitigate against resource wars, and by subsequent waves of research on environmental conflicts (see Peluso and Watts 2001).

Population growth and its links to environmental degradation and subsequent violent conflict were also a theme of early writing on environmental violence (see, e.g., Myers 1987). Yet the linkages between both population growth and environmental change, and environmental change and violent conflict, are not overly straightforward. Poverty and technology are critical additional variables. In low-income and technology-poor societies more people means more consumption of natural resources for food, fuel, and shelter, but it can also mean more labour, and this can stimulate innovation, and lead to more environmentally sustainable forms of production and

CASE STUDY 14.1 Water wars?

The idea that countries might fight over water has been widely discussed by academics, politicians, and in the media. For example, for Thomas Naff (1992: 25), 'the strategic reality of water is that under circumstances of scarcity, it becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, intense, salient, complicated, zero-sum, power-and prestige-packed issue, highly prone to conflict and extremely difficult to resolve.'

Most commentators suggest that a future water war is most likely to occur in the Middle East, a region already rife with religious, ethnic, and political tensions. Attention was first drawn to the problems of shared waterways and water scarcity in the region by the Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, who later became Secretary General of the United Nations, who reportedly observed that 'the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics' (cited in Gleick 1991: 20).

There are 261 major river systems that are shared by two or more countries. Yet this geographical misfit between water and national boundaries does not necessarily imply that states will fight over water. Indeed, Priscoli and Wolf (2009) demonstrate that, despite rapid population growth and increased demand for water for agriculture, industry, and cities in the twentieth century, there have been only a handful of minor skirmishes over international water, in contrast to the more than 400 treaties concerning water. Countries, it seems, are more likely to cooperate than fight over water, including in the Middle East (Allan 2002, Tir and Ackerman 2009). Despite evidence to the contrary, the risk of water wars continues to be overstated by some academics, politicians, journalists and NGOs, who each have their reasons for wanting to promote the problem (Katz 2011).

consumption. In high-income and high-technology societies people consume up to a hundred times more resources and energy than people in developing countries. For example, while India had 17 per cent of the world's population in 2007, it produced only 4.7 per cent of the world's carbon-dioxide emissions in 2004, whereas the United States, with 4.6 per cent of the world's population in 2007, produced 22 per cent of all greenhouse-gas emissions in 2004 (World Bank 2009b). These differences imply that the aggregate number of people is not as important as the amount of resources they consume and the volumes of waste they produce.

The relationship between population, environmental change, and violent conflict was most systematically explored by the Project on Environment, Population, and Security at the University of Toronto. The Toronto Project carried out numerous case studies to investigate the links among population growth, renewable resource scarcities, migration, and conflict. These studies examined cases where there had been violent conflict, and then they sought to determine the influence of environmental factors in the generation of those conflicts. At around the same time another project—the Zurich-based Environment and Conflict (ENCOP) Project directed by Guenther Baechler (1999)—also conducted case studies on the linkages between environmental degradation and violence. Common findings of both projects are that: unequal consumption of scarce resources contributes to violent conflicts; violent conflicts where environmental scarcity is a factor are more likely in low-income resource-dependent societies; and, when mechanisms that enable adaptation to environmental scarcity fail, violent conflict is a more likely outcome. Both Homer-Dixon (1999) and Baechler (1999) find that environmental change is not an immediate cause of conflict, but it can at times be an exacerbating factor. Both also find that environmental change is unlikely to be a cause of war between countries.

Since the Toronto and ENCOP Projects there have been three further developments in environmental violence research. The first of these has been a series of quantitative analyses of aggregated data to test the relationships between various environmental and social variables such as resource scarcity/abundance, population growth, and income inequality. These studies have tentatively shown that 'strong states' tend to be less prone to internal conflicts, whereas states undergoing significant economic and political transitions are relatively more prone to internal violent conflict (Esty et al. 1999). A number of them suggest that it is the abundance of natural resources as much as their scarcity that drives armed conflict (Collier 2000; de Soysa 2000). They have also shown that poverty is an important causal variable in internal wars. Because these studies are constrained by the quality of data they use, and lack detailed field-based observations, their findings are inevitably somewhat uncertain (Conca 2002).

The second new development in environmental violence research seeks to learn from peaceful responses to environmental change rather than from instances of violence. This is an important approach if the goal of research is to help prevent conflicts,

because understanding what works to promote peace is as important as understanding what causes violent outcomes. Thus far the focus of this research has been on cooperation between states over shared resources such as rivers and seas (Conca and Dabelko 2002). This research endeavour serves as a useful reminder that cooperation among people and groups is also an outcome of common environmental problems.

The final new approach to environment and violence research involves detailed field-based studies of places that have experienced environmental problems and violence. These studies have stressed the importance of unequal outcomes of social and environmental changes. For example, inadequate distribution of the returns from resource extraction activities has been a factor in violence in West Kalimantan (Peluso and Harwell 2001), the Niger Delta (Watts 2001), and Bougainville island (Böge 1999). They show that a range of intervening economic, political, and cultural processes that produce and sustain power are seen as more important in causing (and preventing and resolving) violent conflict than the actual material environmental changes that take place.

More recently, the search for evidence for and debates about the influence of environmental change on violent conflict have coalesced around the influence of climate change on violent conflict. Statistical studies show correlations between periods of cooler weather and increased conflict in Europe and China, and between El Niño and the incidence of conflict (see N. Jones 2011). There are also studies that suggest that changes in mean annual rainfall (both negative and positive) increase the risk of violent conflict. Overall, however, as was the case with the earlier studies about environmental change and conflict, the evidence for connections between climate change and conflict is still inconclusive. Nevertheless, most researchers agree that changes in climate will not directly cause conflict between states, but may increase the risk of conflict within states under certain circumstances. Climate change is therefore often referred to as a 'threat multiplier'.

KEY POINTS

- There are no strong causal relationships among population growth, environmental change, and violent conflict.
- Environmental change is not an immediate cause of conflict, but it can at times be an exacerbating factor.
- Environmental change is unlikely to be a cause of war between countries.
- Groups experiencing common environmental problems can also cooperate to address those problems.

Environmental change and national security

Most interpretations of environmental security take existing theories of national security, and then factor in environmental issues. Regardless of whether or not environmental change may cause violent conflict within or between states, in many less subtle ways it can undermine national security.

Environmental change can weaken the economic base that determines military capacity. In some developed countries, and in most developing countries, natural resources and environmental services are important to economic growth and employment. Income from and employment in primary sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, and from environmentally dependent services like tourism, may all be adversely affected by environmental change. It has been widely reported, for example, that China's rapid economic growth—which has funded its military modernization programme—is ecologically unsustainable because of water shortages, water pollution, and land degradation. So, in some cases, if the natural capital base of an economy erodes, then so does the long-term capacity of its armed forces. Because it exposes people to health risks, environmental change can also undermine the human development that Sen (1999) considers important for economic growth. It can also weaken the legitimacy and stability of ruling regimes by decreasing the income they gain from resource-based rents or taxes, thereby undermining their ability to provide welfare, employment, and key services (Kahl 2006). In other words, if economic development can be ecologically unsustainable, then national security can be similarly unsustainable.

Climate change too is seen to be a risk to the territorial integrity of states. For example, cyclones are likely to be more intense under climate change, raising the prospect of more events of the kind that occurred when hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, killing more than 1,000 people, displacing over 500,000 people, and causing damage valued at over US$100 billion. Climate change also poses risks to critical infrastructure such as those required for producing and distributing energy, water, and food, and for transport

CASE STUDY 14.2 Climate change and atoll countries

Atolls are rings of coral reefs that enclose a lagoon that contain small islets with a mean height above sea level of approximately 2 metres. There are five countries comprised entirely of low-lying atolls: Kiribati (population 85,000), the Maldives (population 309,000), the Marshall Islands (population 58,000), Tokelau (population 2,000), and Tuvalu (population 10,000).

Climate change is likely to cause sea levels to rise by between 9 and 88 cm by the year 2100. Atoll countries are highly vulnerable to sea-level rise because of their high ratio of coastline to land area, lack of elevated land, soft coastlines, relatively high population densities, and low incomes to fund response measures. Also, climate change is likely to result in more intense rainfall events and possibly more intense droughts. The combined effect of these changes on atoll societies is likely to include coastal erosion, increases in flooding events, freshwater aquifers becoming increasingly contaminated with saline water, and decreasing food security because of reduced harvests from agriculture and fishing. The World Bank estimates that by 2050 Tarawa atoll in Kiribati could face an annual damages bill equivalent to 13–27 per cent of current Kiribati GDP.

This combination of changes in mean conditions and extreme events driven by climate change may mean that atoll countries are unable to sustain their populations, a possibility with even a moderate amount of climate change. This danger to the sovereignty of the atoll countries is arguably greater than anything any single country could impose; indeed, nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands and severe fighting in Kiribati during the Second World War had relatively minor impacts compared to the risks posed by climate change. This risk that climate change poses to national sovereignty is a very clear case of national (and human) environmental insecurity. Thus, in 2011, the President of Nauru, speaking on behalf of the Pacific small island states, told the United Nations Security Council that for small islands climate change was as great a security threat as nuclear proliferation.

Barnett and Adger (2003)

and trade. It also poses risks to military facilities such as naval yards and training grounds (Dabelko 2009).

While many of the environmental problems countries face are principally caused by internal developments within those countries, some problems are largely beyond their control. Examples of this include the impacts of global emissions of ozone-depleting substances on rates of skin cancer in southern latitudes, the legacies of nuclear-weapons tests conducted during colonial times in French Polynesia and the Marshall Islands, the impacts of the Chernobyl nuclear-reactor accident in 1986 on East European countries, the impacts of forest fires in Indonesia on air pollution in Malaysia and Singapore, and the impacts of global emissions of greenhouse gases on low-lying countries and countries with high climatic variability (for example a 45 cm rise in sea level will potentially result in a loss of 11 per cent of Bangladesh's territory, forcing some 5.5 million people to relocate) (see Case Study 14.2). Transboundary flows differ from traditional external security threats in that they are uncontrolled and most often unintended; in this respect they are 'threats without enemies' (Prins 1993).

However, understanding environmental problems as national security issues is not unproblematic. Daniel Deudney (1990) offers three reasons why linking environmental issues to national security is analytically misleading. First, he argues that military threats are different from environmental threats in that military threats are deliberately imposed and the cause of the threat is easily identifiable, whereas environmental threats are accidental and their causes are often uncertain. Second, Deudney argues that linking environmental issues to national security may not have the effect of mobilizing more attention and action on environmental problems, but, rather, it may serve to strengthen existing security logic and institutions. There are reasonable grounds to consider that this has been the case—for example, a 2007 study by the CNA Corporation argued that climate change 'poses a serious threat to America's national security' and concluded that part of the solution was that the US 'Department of Defense should enhance its operational capability' (CNA Corporation 2007: 6, 8; see also Background 14.2). Deudney's third argument against environmental security is that environmental change is not likely to cause wars between countries (as discussed in the previous section). So, while there is some basis for considering environmental problems as national security problems, the problem remains one of interpretation—of what constitutes national security, of whom it is for, and of how it is to be achieved.

BACKGROUND 14.2 The 1998 National Security Strategy

The 1998 *National Security Strategy* was the first major national security policy statement to include environmental issues in a significant way. Here are some excerpts:

- 'The same forces that bring us closer increase our interdependence, and make us more vulnerable to forces like extreme nationalism, terrorism, crime, environmental damage and the complex flows of trade and investment that know no borders' (White House 1998: iii).
- 'We seek a cleaner global environment to protect the health and well-being of our citizens. A deteriorating environment not only threatens public health, it impedes economic growth and can generate tensions that threaten international stability. To the extent that other nations believe they must engage in non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources, our long term prosperity and security are at risk' (White House 1998: 5).
- 'Crises are averted—and US preventative diplomacy actively reinforced—through US sustainable development programs that promote voluntary family planning, basic education, environmental protection, democratic governance and the rule of law, and the economic empowerment of private citizens' (White House 1998: 8).
- 'The current international security environment presents a diverse set of threats to our enduring goals and hence to our security . . . [including] terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage [which] threaten US interests, citizens and the US homeland itself' (White House 1998: 10).

KEY POINTS

- Environmental change can put at risk the quality and quantity of resources available to a country.
- Environmental change can put at risk the economic strength of many countries.
- Environmental change poses risks to population health in many countries.
- Some environmental risks come from beyond a country's borders, and are unintentional.
- Linking environmental issues to security issues may not help solve environmental problems.

Armed forces and the environment

Linking environmental change with security inevitably means addressing the linkages between the most important of security institutions—the military—and the environment. It is when considering the role of militaries that some of the most profound contradictions with the concept of environmental security are raised. The goal of most militaries is to win wars, and so they train for and sometimes fight wars with devastating consequences for people and the environment. This contrasts considerably with the goals of the environmental movement to achieve sustainable development and peace.

Warfare almost always results in environmental degradation. The use of nuclear weapons in Japan, defoliants in Vietnam, depleted uranium ammunition in Kuwait and Kosovo, the burning of oil wells in Kuwait, the destruction of crops in Eritrea, and the draining of marshes in south-eastern Iraq are all examples of the direct impacts of war on the natural environment. In most cases the consequences of these impacts last well beyond the end of fighting.

Warfare also has indirect—but in many ways more extensive—impacts on the environment. In many cases, spending on fighting is sustained by resource extraction, and in some cases it is resources that are the principal source of conflict. For example, timber in Cambodia and Burma, gems in Afghanistan, and diamonds in Sierra Leone have all been sources of income for armed groups. In these kinds of conflicts, control over and extraction of resources is of paramount concern and the environmental and social impacts of extraction are not considered. Violent conflict almost always involves denial of territory to opponents, sometimes with associated environmental impacts. Landmines are often used, and there are now over 100 million landmines lying in 90 countries denying access to land for productive purposes. Countries particularly affected include Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq.

War also affects economic development in ways that impact indirectly on the environment. Money spent on weapons, for example, is money that could have been spent on social and environmental activities. War deters foreign investment and aid, disrupts domestic markets, and often results in a decline in

exports. It depletes and damages the labour force, creates a massive health burden, and destroys productive assets such as factories and communications and energy infrastructure. War often results in increased foreign debt, increased income inequality, reduced food production, and a reduction in GDP per capita. It also creates refugees and internally displaced people. Famines are also increasingly caused by war. The East African famine in 2011–12, which killed between 50,000 and 100,000 thousand people, was largely caused by disruptions to food supplies and livelihoods due to ongoing warfare in Somalia.

These environmental, economic, and social effects of war all negatively impact on people's access to the kinds of resources they need to develop themselves in ecologically sustainable ways. They also reduce the amount of economic resources available to governments and communities to implement environmental policies and programmes, restrict access to the kinds of technologies needed for sustainable economic growth, suppress educational attainment and restrict the policy learning necessary for understanding and responding to environmental problems, damage the infrastructure needed to distribute resources such as water, electricity, and food efficiently and equitably, and weaken the institutions and social cohesion necessary for a society to manage its environmental problems. So, armed forces wage war, and war is extremely bad for environmental security.

As well as causing major environmental impacts in times of war, in times of peace militaries also cause environmental damage. They may indeed be the single largest institutional source of environmental degradation in the world. This raises serious questions about the possibility of militaries having a positive role in environmental protection and recovery. Despite this, in the 1990s the United States Department of Defense (DOD) claimed it made a positive contribution to environmental security, through, for example, supporting 'the military readiness of the US armed forces by ensuring continued access to the air, land and water needed for training and testing' and contributing to 'weapons systems that have improved performance, lower cost, and better environmental characteristics' (Barnett 2001: 79). This, and other responses by the United States, suggests that what the DOD is securing through these 'environmental security' measures is its own capacity to wage wars.

The idea that environmental change may be a cause of armed conflict also has implications for armed forces. If environmental change is likely to make for a more unstable international environment through environmentally induced wars, for example, then this suggests that armed forces are still required to help manage these negative effects. In this way arguments about the threats environmental change poses to security help to justify existing security institutions like the armed forces, even though they may have significant environmental impacts.

KEY POINTS

- Armed forces have very different goals from the environmental movement.
- War causes environmental damage.
- War is harmful to sustainable development.
- Armed forces are major consumers of resources and major polluters.

Environmental change and human security

The concept of environmental security refers to a sector of security (the environment) rather than a referent object to be secured. Thus, it is possible to talk of the environmental security of the international system, of nation states, and, as explained in this section, of people (human security) (see also Chapter 8). The environment is one the seven sectors identified in the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP 1994) early definition of human security (the others being economic, food, health, personal, community, and political security), and so for some time now environmental change has been identified as a human security issue.

Whereas the ways in which environmental change threaten the welfare of the international system and states are somewhat ambiguous and hypothetical, the ways in which it affects the welfare of individuals and communities is obvious (see Case Study 14.3). People are environmentally insecure in all sorts of ways, and for all sorts of reasons. Broadly speaking the determinants of environmental insecurity are: where people live and the nature of environmental changes in those places; how susceptible people are to damage caused by environmental changes; and people's capacity to adapt to environmental changes.

CASE STUDY 14.3 Environmental change and food security

Food security arises when all people at all times have access to a sufficient quantity of safe and nutritious food necessary for an active and healthy life. It is a function of the availability of food (food production plus imports less exports), people's ability to access the food that is available (people get food by growing it themselves, buying it, or receiving it as a gift), and the ability of people to safely prepare food (which is usually about having access to clean water and energy for cooking), as well as their bodies' ability to utilize food (people suffering form severe diarrhoea, for example, typically do not absorb nutrients from food as well as healthy people). Largely because of poverty and the resultant inability to buy food, in 2010 there were over 900 million people in the world who were chronically hungry (FAO 2011).

While food prices and poverty remain the primary drivers of food insecurity, environmental change can undermine food security in many different ways. Land degradation and declining rainfall can cause declines in food production, as can overfishing and depletion of fish stocks, both of which mean lower food availability in producing regions and in the places to which they may export. It can also affect people's ability to access food as long-term or sudden decreases in food production can cause both job losses among people who work in food production as well as increases in food prices. Damage to food distribution and storage infrastructure due to extreme events can also undermine people's ability to access food. Environmental change can also undermine people's ability to utilise food, as it may lead to increased contamination of fresh water, depletion of local fuel sources (such as fuelwood), and increasing illnesses so decreasing the ability of people's bodies to absorb nutrients.

Ericksen 2008

For example, subsistence farmers in the mountains of East Timor rely almost exclusively on their own farm produce for food, they earn very little if any money (on average less than US$0.55 cents per day), their farms do not have irrigation, the soils they farm are not very fertile and are eroding, infrastructure for storing and transporting food is not well developed, agricultural productivity is low, and rainfall is variable. So, in seasons where the rain fails, food production falls and farmers have no ability to supplement their diet with other food sources because they cannot afford to purchase food. As a result, hunger and malnutrition are widespread in East Timor in drought years. In this case, the environmental insecurity of Timorese farmers is a function of the physical properties of their environments—they live in steep mountainous areas with thin soils and variable rainfall, and they also depend on farming as their only source of livelihood; if they had alternative sources of income, they could afford to buy food. The capacity of East Timor's farmers to adapt to land degradation and water shortages is constrained by poverty: if they had more money, they could afford to invest in irrigation systems, soil-erosion control programmes, food-storage systems, tractors, and fertilizers to increase production so that food would not be scarce during drought years. The causes of this environmental insecurity of Timorese farmers lie not so much in the environmental characteristics of where they live, but rather in the deep rural poverty caused by twenty-five years of violent occupation of East Timor by the Indonesian armed forces.

A comparison between Timorese farmers and Australian farmers underlies the ways in which human environmental insecurity is more socially created than naturally determined. Australian farmers live in similar environmental conditions (thin soils and variable climate), but they eat little if any of their own production, which is instead sold on markets, irrigation is widely available, food transport and storage systems are modern and efficient, fertilizers and pesticides are easily afforded, high levels of government support are available, and there is a wide array of options for off-farm income. Therefore, when drought strikes Australia, farmers do not go hungry; at worst they lose some livestock and some income. For both Timorese and Australian farmers climate variability is likely to increase because of climate change, and, while it will be difficult for Australian farmers to adapt to sustain their existing income levels, for Timorese farmers it may well be even more difficult for them to maintain enough food to keep their children healthy.

Environmental change therefore does not undermine human security in isolation from a broad range of social factors, including poverty, the degree of support (or discrimination) communities receive from the state, the effectiveness of decision-making processes, and the extent of social cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable groups. These factors determine the capacity of people and communities to adapt to environmental change so that the things that they value are not adversely affected. In terms of environmental change, for example, upstream users of water, distant atmospheric polluters, multinational logging and mining companies, regional-scale climatic processes, and a host of other distant actors and larger-scale processes influence the security of individuals' use of natural resources and services. Similarly, in terms of the social determinants of insecurity, larger-scale processes such as warfare, corruption, trade dependency, and economic liberalization affect people's sensitivity to environmental changes and their capacity to adapt to them. Finally, past processes such as colonization and war shape present insecurities, and ongoing processes such as climate change and trade liberalization shape future insecurities.

Understanding human environmental insecurity therefore requires understanding the larger-scale past and present processes that create wealth in some places and poverty in others, and environmental change in some places and not in others. Think Point 14.3 describes some of the existing levels of inequality that generate environmental security for some people, and environmental insecurity for others. Therefore, even though the focus of human security is the individual, the processes that undermine or strengthen human security are often extra-local. Similarly, then, the solution to human environmental insecurity rests not just with local people, but also with larger-scale institutions such as states, the international system, the private sector, civil society, and consumers in developed countries. In this respect, even an approach to environmental security that focuses on human security cannot avoid taking into account nation states and their security policies.

THINK POINT 14.3 Inequality and environmental insecurity

Inequalities in consumption

- The wealthiest 10 per cent of people in the world account for 59 per cent of all consumption.
- The poorest 50 per cent of people in the world account for 7.2 per cent of all consumption.
- The wealthiest 20 per cent of people in the world:
  - consume 58 per cent of all energy resources;
  - consume 84 per cent of all paper;
  - own 87 per cent of the world's vehicles.
- The poorest 20 per cent of people in the world:
  - consume 4 per cent of all energy resources;
  - consume 1.1 per cent of all paper;
  - own less than 1 per cent of the world's vehicles.

Inequalities in pollution

- The average person in a developed country causes as much pollution as 30 people in developing countries.
- The wealthiest 20 per cent of people in the world produce 53 per cent of all carbon-dioxide emissions; the poorest 20 per cent produce 3 per cent.

Unequal insecurity

- Of the people living in developing countries:
  - 60 per cent do not have basic sanitation,
  - 37 per cent do not have access to electricity,
  - 30 per cent do not have access to clean water.
- Every year poor-quality water in developing countries results in 5 million deaths due to diarrhoea, 3 million of which are children.
- Air pollution causes 175,000 premature deaths a year in China.

UNDP (1998); World Bank (2008b)

KEY POINTS

- Environmental security is an important component of human security.
- Physical changes in the environment are only one aspect of people's environmental insecurity; other factors are the extent to which people rely on the environment for their welfare, and the ability of people to adapt to environmental changes.
- Not all people are equally environmentally insecure.
- People who are environmentally insecure are also often insecure in other ways.

Environment or security?

Security is a power word. When a problem is identified as a security issue it can lead to state monopolization of solutions (see Chapter 10) (Wæver 1995). Environmentalists have used environmental security to 'securitize' environmental problems—to make them matters of 'high' politics that warrant extraordinary responses from governments equal in magnitude and urgency to their response to more orthodox security threats. They have also used environmental security to highlight the opportunity costs of defence spending, and the environmental impacts of military activities, including war. This is the 'political rationale' of environmental security (Soroos 1994).

This securitizing move has to some degree raised the profile of environmental issues among foreign and security policy makers and agencies, so that there is a general recognition that environmental changes can in some sense be considered as security issues. These changes relate mostly to a broadening of the issue of security, but there has arguably been little real change in policy and action in terms of the referent object of environmental security. The focus of much of the research and writing on environmental security on environmental violence, on environmental threats to national security, and on greening the armed forces suggests that it is the environmental security of the state that still matters most for the security-policy community. Indeed, the concept of environmental security and its messages of impending danger may have helped security institutions to appropriate environmental issues in ways that help to maintain national security business as usual.

For the environmental and peace movement, therefore, environmental security has not lead to the trade-offs between military security and environmental security that they hoped for, nor has it lead to increased resources committed to solving environmental problems. Instead, environmental problems have been incorporated into mainstream security discourse and policy; the emphasis has been placed on environmental change as a cause of violent conflict rather than human insecurity; and on addressing environmental threats from other places as opposed to attending to domestic causes of environmental change. In this respect, much that is called 'environmental security' has had little to do with the environment, and much to do with security.

Despite all these arguments, there are some good reasons for continuing to use the concept of environmental security. It has gained some purchase with development agencies, as it helps to capture the environmental dimensions of social vulnerability. It communicates the critical nature of environmental problems better than standard concepts like sustainability or vulnerability. Environmental security can also serve as an integrative concept to link local (human security), national (national security), and global (international security) levels of environmental change and response. Further, in that it involves merging international relations with development studies and environmental studies, environmental security helps produce new fusions of knowledge and awareness. It offers a common language that facilitates the exchange of knowledge among people from diverse arms of government, civil society, and academia across both the developed and developing worlds. Finally, environmental security still helps to contest the legitimacy of the dominant security paradigm by pointing to the contradiction between simple state-based and military approaches to national security, and the complex, multi-scale, and transboundary nature of environmental flows.

KEY POINTS

- Environmental security has in some ways 'securitized' environmental problems.
- Environmental security may have helped secure security.
- Environmental security helps create new coalitions of actors and interests.

Conclusions

Environmental security has been one of the key new security issues that has helped to broaden the meaning of security in the post Cold War period.

It is the product of: efforts by the environmental movement to raise the profile of environmental issues and contest the practices of national security;

the increasing recognition that environmental problems demand common security approaches and the growth in multilateral environmental agreements; and the strategic vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. Therefore, despite some twenty years of prior thinking about the connections between the environment and security, it was not until the 1990s that the concept of environmental security came to prominence and featured regularly in academic journals, in the speeches of politicians and security bureaucrats, and in the work of environmental organizations.

There are many different interpretations of environmental security because there are many different approaches to security and an even broader range of approaches to environmental change. At two ends of the spectrum of views are those people who follow the orthodox national security paradigm, who understand environmental security as being about the ways in which environmental change might be a cause of armed conflict between countries; and environmentalists, who tend to see environmental security as being about the impacts of human activities—including military activities—on the environment. Somewhere in the middle ground are those who are concerned about the ways in which environmental change undermines human security.

The most influential interpretations of environmental security are those that fit well the orthodox security paradigm. In particular, arguments that environmental change may be a cause of violent conflict between and within countries, and suggest that environmental problems in other countries are threats to national security, have all largely been accepted by the security-policy community and the armed forces—especially in the United States. So, environmental security is still largely understood to be about threats to the nation state rather than to the environment *per se*, to other states, or to individuals. This suggests that, while environmental security may have broadened the meaning of security, it has been less successful in deepening it. This is not to say, though, that for some countries environmental change is not a major security problem, as the example of climate change and atoll countries shows.

The growing attention paid to environmental change as a human security issue does not fit so well with the Western security-policy community. It does, however, have some appeal to the development-policy community and to environmental groups and organizations. In the future it is likely that the concept of environmental security as human security will become more central in the fields of environmental studies and development studies, and figure more prominently in their respective policy domains. Research and policy will extend to include the impacts of environmental change on women and children, on livelihoods, and on human development. There may also be more research and policy development on institutions for cooperation on common environmental problems at a range of scales.

In the same way that environmental security did not gain much purchase with the security-policy community during the Cold War, it received far less attention in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. This suggests that environmental security is a second-order security problem, which is considered only in times when more conventional dangers from armed aggression do not dominate national security concerns. The immediate future of the environment as a security issue may therefore be determined by the relevance of other security problems. However, in the longer term environmental issues may well become paramount security concerns, as the impacts of certain environmental problems seem set to increase—for example, concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are ever increasing and so, therefore, will sea levels and the intensity of climatic hazards such as cyclones, floods, and droughts; problems of nuclear waste have not been dealt with and the stockpile is still growing; and water demand is increasing but supply is relatively fixed. So, the relevance of environmental security will most probably increase until such time as truly common and cooperative approaches implement serious reforms to achieve forms of social organization that are ecologically sustainable. In this sense, current practices of national security are a significant barrier to achieving environmental security for all people.

QUESTIONS

1. Is environmental security about the impact of humans on the environment, or about the impact of environmental processes on things that people value?
2. What reasons explain why there has been so much effort devoted to finding connections between environmental change and violence?
3. What are the implications of calling environmental problems security issues?
4. Can armed forces enhance environmental security?
5. What kinds of environmental problems are national security issues? For what reasons?
6. What kinds of environmental problems are human security issues? For what reasons?
7. What causes someone to be environmentally insecure?
8. How is it that the securitization of environmental issues may have helped to secure security?
9. How could the human security and national security approaches to environmental security be reconciled?
10. What are the most appropriate policies to provide environmental security? Who should implement them?

FURTHER READING

- Barnett, J. (2001), *The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era*, London: Zed Books. A critical examination of different approaches to environmental security which promotes a human security approach.
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- Dalby, S. (2009), *Security and Environmental Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press. A critical geopolitical perspective on environmental security.
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- Homer-Dixon, T. (1999), *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Summarizes the author's highly influential work on environmental scarcity and violence.
- Kahl, C. 2006. *States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. A widely acclaimed empirical study of the relationship between resource scarcity and political instability.
- Matthew, R., Barnett, J., McDonald, B., and O'Brien, K. (eds) (2009), *Global Environmental Change and Human Security*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. A contemporary collection of essays outlining various dimensions of the relationship between environmental change and human security.
- Peluso, N. and Watts, M. (2001) (eds), *Violent Environments*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. A collection of detailed field-based qualitative case studies of environmental disputes.
- WCED (1987), *World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. A foundational report on the environment and common security.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ecsp** The Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the pre-eminent centre for environmental security studies in the United States. The site contains a wealth of information including the influential Environmental Change and Security Project Report.
- **http://www.envirosecurity.org** The Institute for Environmental Security is an international NGO. This website is a good source for up-to-date information on events and publications in the area of environmental security.
- **http://www.unep.org** The United Nations Environment Program provides leadership on environmental issues within the UN system. Among other things, this site contains information about global environmental issues, summits, and treaties.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins3e/

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Economic Security

Gary M. Shiffman



Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter provides an economic framework for analysing and countering organized violence. The systematic use of violence can be considered warfare, crime, and insurgency. The decision makers involved have different goals and face different constraints. However, economics as a science provides some common attributes of criminals, terrorists, and insurgents. Understanding these dynamics informs the kinds of countermeasures analysts and operators will use in their efforts to promote security. Economic instruments include sanctions, aid, finance, and trade, and will be explored through case studies.

Introduction

Security evolves in complex yet understandable ways. Technologies provide new opportunities for people to do bad things, and new opportunities for people to counter bad actors, and make the world a better, safer, and more secure place. Law enforcement and national security practitioners know this well. We know that this evolving game of 'cat and mouse' will continue into the future, not simply because it has existed for thousands of years; but, despite the evolution of technology as well as economic growth and development, human nature does not change. People behave with purpose and meaning, in ways that are understandable and largely—but not completely—predictable. While you know that your pencil, when dropped, will fall to the floor with certainty, you cannot assert with the same degree of confidence the reaction of a person pushed to the ground in anger. However, with some knowledge about the people involved in a shoving match, you may predict with some level of confidence the reaction of a pushed person. Will a fight escalate or end? Fortunately, we have a science of human behaviour and decision making, and this chapter will take a scientific approach to security studies. We will build on the science with a case study approach to understanding traditional economic tools.

Economic science of security

Economics is the science of individuals making decisions in conditions of scarcity. When readers previously encountered this topic, perhaps in an introductory economics course at school or university, they learned to associate economics with trade balances, gross domestic product (GDP), and interest rates. While it is true that economists work on each of these and many other issues, as you will see later, this chapter asks you to leave behind whatever negative memories you may have of that introduction to economics. In this chapter, we will concern ourselves with what is often understood as 'microeconomics', and use this material as the foundation for explaining the mechanisms of macroeconomic policies to advance national security. Specifically, we want to apply economic concepts such as supply and demand, substitution, institutions, and rationality to the observable world of freedom and security.

Overview of economic theory

Like the force of gravity acting on a pencil, the human inclination for improvement through social interaction allows us to anticipate human actions and reactions. Our scientific approach starts from the perspective that does not differentiate human decision making between 'bad actors' and 'good'. Tyrants, drug kingpins, terrorists, insurgents, and yes, democratic leaders, each seek some combination of wealth, power, and justice. For the physical world, the natural sciences such as physics and chemistry help us understand actions and reactions—why the dropped pencil falls to the floor and at what speed. When it comes to human causes and reactions, we use social science.

> Human action is purposeful behaviour. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life.
>
> von Mises 1949: II

To understand human action related to resource allocations (e.g. 'guns versus butter'), and conflicts over resources (i.e. water, oil, food, diamonds, etc.), grievances (e.g. ethnic, religious, national), or political control, we use the science of economics. Economic theory begins in eighteenth-century Scotland with Adam Smith and his inquiry into human nature. Although Smith considered himself a moral philosopher, his work led to the creation of the academic and professional field that we today call economics. Back then, however, when he was a student and then professor, such a field did not exist. Adam Smith wrote about human nature, morality, virtue, and other dynamics of individual decision making. In 1759, he published *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, where he tackled issues such as human judgement, approbation, virtue, and what he defined as 'systems of moral philosophy' (Smith 1759). Almost two decades later, Smith published the fifth edition of his most famous work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Smith 1776/1904). Building on his earlier work, *Wealth of Nations* remains concerned with fundamental human nature, and how individuals make decisions but also addresses wealth creation and why some have more wealth than others. So, economics, at its foundation, is a science that provides insights into human decision making and can be applied to any domain of human interaction. Global security is a byproduct of human decision making under conditions of scarcity.

Economists assume that humanity acts with purpose, and tends to exchange in order to achieve goals, as evidenced by the division of labour. To understand the economist's view of human nature, we refer to Smith and focus on Book I of the *Wealth of Nations*. After describing the process of pin making and how one person can make up to twenty pins per day, but ten people can make 48,000 pins per day, therefore increasing the productivity of one worker to 4,800, 1/10th of 48,000, he writes:

> This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in

> human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
>
> Smith 1776/1904: I.I.3

Smith suggests here that this division of labour which we observe comes not from choice—therefore is not taught to us in secular, religious, or cultural institutions—but human nature itself. In the nature versus nurture debate, the division of labour comes from nature.

Purposeful human action—if it is to be the foundation for a science of behaviour—must apply universally, not be subject to language, religion, or other socio-cultural volatility, and be verifiable through observation. Every human has a propensity to trade—to exchange one thing for another. When we say 'every human', we understand that to mean every individual throughout the world and throughout history. This specific human trait does not change with place and time. As with any rule, we can find exceptions. Economic theory and its models assume the individual to be 'sane' and 'rational'. Not everyone fits this description, but almost everyone. In social science modelling, we call people 'rational actors'. The literature exploring the topic of rationality and the economic actor is rich (Kunreuther and Slovic 1978; Kahneman 2002; Smith 2003).

The significance of this observation of purposeful action describing human nature is threefold, and it gets us closer to national security problem solving. First, we now understand an aspect of human nature that can be associated with anyone in the world. We can apply this insight to world leaders, terrorists, insurgents, and tyrants, as well as democrats, and friendly monarchs. As security operators, policy makers, or analysts, we know something about every actor whose behaviour we might seek to stop, influence, or just understand. Second, this insight into human nature does not depend upon cultural or religious assumptions, but provides the base upon which these analytic layers rest. Socio-cultural knowledge, and other popular human terrain factors, play important roles in helping us understand security environments, as suggested in the discussion on 'incentive vectors'. Third, this understanding of the universal and unchanging aspect of human nature comes from observation, and so modelling an individual's actions and reactions can occur where we can observe prior actions and reactions. Economists work from observed human behaviour—we *know* people exchange because we can *see* people exchange. Many disciplines from across the social sciences assume esoteric topics—such as the afterlife and the supernatural—that cannot be observed yet which provide important insights into human action. However, Smith's basic assumption of human nature—the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange—simply comes from observation. We do not require any religious or other socio-cultural viewpoint. Understanding fundamental human nature begins with observing the human trait that people tend to trade.

Smith operationalizes the observed trait, explaining why individuals trade, in the same chapter. He notes:

> [M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
>
> Smith 1776/1904: I.I.2

In order to trade, individuals need other people; we cannot trade in the absence of others. In fact, trade and the benefits of trade increase with the number of participants in a given market. A manufacturer requires suppliers, workers, and customers. Likewise, in order to overthrow a ruler, an insurgent requires the help and support of others—suppliers, workers, and constituents. To succeed, any leader, democrat or autocrat, relies upon others almost all of the time. The economics of security starts with the observed phenomena of the division of labour and trade, and the argument that this occurs naturally and universally throughout history and human terrain.

Adam Smith tells us the key element of any exchange: 'give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want'. Self-interest motivates exchange. Self-interest motivates the marketplace for political power as well as for goods and services. Knowing something about all human nature, we can better explain what we see, anticipate people's actions and reactions, and influence the future of global security. In the exchange people reveal their preferences through the choices they make. If a person pays one dollar for a bottle of water, and we observe the act, then we can infer something about the observed person. Assuming she was sane and rational and was not coerced to buy that water, we know that, at that place and time, she preferred a bottle of water to a dollar. We know someone's preference through their actions because behaviour is not random but directed toward goals. So observing your behaviour allows me to infer your preferences. This insight applies equally to drug kingpins, prime ministers, and everyone else.

To apply economics to security studies by understanding revealed preferences and asking how we compel people to change behaviour, again we refer to Adam Smith's statement: 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.' Every human interaction includes the explicit or implicit formulation: give me that which I want and you shall have this which you want. If you think about your relationships, you obviously pay the waiter for good service and the grocer for your food. Humans behave in predictable ways: we seek goals, betterment, and more 'good' things while avoiding 'bad' things. And, we increase our ability to reach these goals through interaction with other humans. To develop tools for security policy, we further dissect the decision-making dynamics.

When a criminal commits a crime, he makes a choice, making assumptions about the behaviours of others, and therefore revealing his preferences to those able to observe his actions. He knows that there is some probability of apprehension and some consequence (e.g. 'I could get caught and go to prison'), but he commits the crime anyway because he believes it to be the best available option ('This is my most likely way to get money today'). At this point, we know some of what we need to infer why that crime on that day and time represented the preferred option, but not enough.

To understand and change the behaviour of a criminal, terrorist, or tyrant, we must propose a bargain; we must offer something in exchange, something that they might prefer. We can offer a 'good' or the avoidance of something 'bad,' but a bargain must be proposed, and the incentives must be sufficient to gain acceptance. That any individual will respond to incentives, in a nutshell, encapsulates economics. Now we need to talk about the system of incentives and apply this to security.

Five vectors of economic incentives

Goals

People maximize. They want to survive and improve life for self, offspring, family, community, nation, country, and world, but not all goals equally. Think in terms of concentric social circles around a person; the closer someone is to this centre, the stronger the kinship and sense of shared future, and the greater the inclination to modify actions for some other's benefit. Perhaps you set career or education goals for yourself, you support a fundraiser for your local school or civic association, and you support a professional sports team. Your level of dedication differs across the spectrum for self and for others. Beyond goals, however, we each make our individual choices within respective systems of constraints.

Resource constraints

Resource constraints, or wealth constraints, limit the amount of resources to be spent on some good. One may want expensive cars, but have only enough wealth to allow a choice from among inexpensive models. So, tools such as sanctions constrain wealth, and tools such as economic aid and trade promotion increase wealth. These foreign policy actions influence the decision making of others and can be effective tools of security policy.

Institutional constraints

Beyond goals and wealth constraints—common elements of cost–benefit analsys—our analysis must also consider the institutions in which individuals take action. Douglas North offers the following well-established definition:

> Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.
>
> North 1994: 360

Institutional constraints consist of the man-made rules that structure and govern behaviour, guiding decision making. These include formal rules, such as laws and

regulations, but also informal rules, such as cultural norms of behaviour. Since theft is illegal and this law is strictly enforced in my community, I cannot steal. In one's home, one may face a prohibition on eating candy after brushing teeth; although the law does not prohibit late night candy, the norms of my household do.

Policy makers can seek to influence the institutions of others through formal rule making, such as laws, statements of policy at international institutions such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution, or transparency and moral suasion, such as the 'name and shame' policies designed to identify individuals providing financial support to terrorists.

Information

Information plays a significant role in decision making, and therefore must comprise an important part of security analysis and policy making. Although theory asserts that people act in their own best interests, 'rational action' depends on the information available and how that person perceives that information. For example, if you pay US$10,000 for a car, you prefer the car to the money, and the dealer prefers the money to the car, otherwise the exchange would not occur. You base your decision to hand over $10,000 on assumptions about the condition of the car—but you have imperfect information. With perfect information, people do not overpay for cars; but in the absence of information, an individual may rationally purchase a 'lemon' (see Akerlof 1970).

Information is an economic good, and the provision and denial of information can influence economic decision making. Although we believe that most actors are rational, the 'rational' response to certain information is affected by each person's perspective, and by how the information is presented or framed. People make choices based on what they perceive to be in their best interests, and our analysis must therefore consider what might be influencing this perception. In turn, by manipulating the information available, and the way that information is presented, we can manipulate the way a person perceives a situation, and so the way that they see their goals and constraints. **Prospect theory** considers how people make decisions not based on objective analysis, but on their perception of a situation (Kahnemann 2002). For example, in a classic experiment, subjects were asked to place their arm into cold water twice. The first time, they held their hand in the water for 60 seconds at 14 degrees Celsius, and the second time, they submersed their hand for 60 seconds at 14 degrees Celsius followed by 30 seconds at 15 degrees Celsius. When asked which experience was the least unpleasant, and which one they would prefer to repeat, most people preferred the 90 second option. How is this rational? Why would people prefer 90 seconds of pain over 60 seconds? The answer lies in framing. Participants remembered the last 30 seconds of the experiment most clearly. Since those 30 seconds felt a little better in the second experiment compared with the first, they remembered the entire experience as better and so preferred it, even though the first 60 seconds were identical in each case.

Time horizon

Decisions are also affected by a person's view of the 'time horizon'—how far one looks into the future. An individual's time horizon can change based on age, health, and goals, for example. Leaders are likewise influenced by their time horizon. All policies, such as monetary and fiscal sanctions and trade agreements made by policy makers, must consider a leader's demonstrated perspective when offering incentives or threatening sanctions.

As we move to economic tools of security, we bring forward economic science and the five vectors of economic incentives: goals, wealth constraints, institutional constraints, information, and time. To assess or craft policies, we must disaggregate the decision-making process and identify the system of incentives.

KEY POINTS

- Economics—a science concerned with how individuals make decisions—can help us understand security issues.
- People possess the propensity to exchange with others; and, through the division of labour, people become better off.
- Institutions are the man-made rules that constrain behaviour, which can be formal and/or informal.
- Scarcity requires choice. You cannot have everything, and you cannot have it now.
- To change the behaviour of an adversary, we must offer incentives, taking into account the five vectors of economic incentive.

Economic tools of security policy

We accept the common understanding of economic tools as those related to wealth—the creation and loss of wealth. For the purposes of this chapter, we will group economic tools into four categories: sanctions, trade, finance, and aid. Of course, these four groupings are neither mutually exclusive nor all encompassing, but they provide a time-tested structure for gaining an understanding of the topic and its associated intuition.

Policy makers often use economic instruments to achieve security policy goals—goals other than wealth creation or loss. For example, US leaders prioritized the investment of time and resources in concluding bilateral trade agreements with relatively small economies such as Jordan and Oman for reasons other than GDP growth of the US economy. Bilateral trade agreements can provide foreign policy power. Beyond wealth, economic tools provide a system of resources and constraints that, if properly constructed, can allow for the influence of the decisions of leaders. We address each class of tool here.

Sanctions

Economic sanctions are the politically motivated denial, or threat of denial, of normal economic relations with the intent of changing behaviours or, at a minimum, disassociating with another economy. The tools have evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War, becoming more targeted on individual actors and less on blanket condemnations of an entire population. However, focusing economic sanctions remains a difficult challenge. The tool will continue to improve as policy makers appreciate the system of incentives acting on an individual's self-interest and propensity of humans—more specifically, those leading countries—to engage in exchanges.

Imagine two countries, A and B, with Leader A and Leader B respectively the recognized political leaders of each. If Leader A ceases all trade in goods and services with B for political reasons, she has instituted a broad sanction. She may choose this policy to promote regime change in B, or simply to disassociate with a regime that engages in gross violations of human rights. This pattern has characterized economic sanctions since the Cold War, but success at causing regime change appears limited. For example, US president John F. Kennedy instituted a broad economic embargo against Fidel Castro's Cuba in 1962 following the Cuban nationalization of all US-person owned property in Cuba. Although the policy goal of regime change did not come about, many remain in support of the policy fifty years later with no expectation that the sanctions will bring about regime change. Alternatively, imagine Leader A denying normal economic relations with only the family and business associates of Leader B. This targeted sanction represents a trend in sanctions policies over the past fifteen years. For example, US policies following the 9/11 attacks on the United States sanction specific people and businesses from transacting in the United States; these sanctions target a small group of individuals when compared to an embargo of an entire country, and intend to target those who supported the 9/11 attacks. (For further reading on sanctions, see Drezner 1998; Haasss 1998; Elliott, Hufbauer, and Oegg 2008; and Shiffman and Jochum 2011.)

Sanctions serve important purposes. From a political viewpoint, exert economic power to advance peace and freedom. Morally, they can deny economic participation in egregious evils. Militarily, they may isolate dangerous regimes and weaken threats to regional and global security. These arguments comprise most rhetorical justifications for sanctions policies.

Political leaders intend sanctions to prompt target governments to either comply with some requirement or suffer the consequences. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the choice was to verify disarmament or struggle with growing economic deprivation. In Castro's Cuba, the choice was to advance democratic reforms or miss benefits associated with trade and investments with the United States.

However, broad economic sanctions have proven fairly limited in altering behaviour. When intended to cripple a target country's economy, they generally fail because dictators do not seek national wealth only. Power is key. Dictators balance maximizing regime revenue and minimizing security costs to remain in power. They welcome economic growth when it funds the regime's security needs and controls society; they do not welcome growth when it promotes the emergence of formidable power struggles such as a middle class eager to advance political reform and openness.

Moreover, sanctions may actually solidify a dictator's power. Dictators can turn to other partners for trade and investment when facing unilateral sanctions—sanctions from just one country. This is why untargeted unilateral sanctions have little economic impact (Shiffman 2006). Multilateral sanctions such as those imposed by the United Nations (UN)

may have loopholes that can paradoxically help a dictator sustain power. UN sanctions imposed against Saddam's Iraq in 1990 were intended to pressure him to disarm. Saddam manipulated the sanction to bolster his regime—resources flowed to the military and elite, and a propaganda campaign blamed sanctioning powers, especially the USA, for the population economic hardships. Throughout the Arab world and elsewhere, sanctioning powers received blame as the instigator for Saddam's actions.

Sanctions can remain a credible policy tool as long as policy makers understand the costs and likely benefits of the policy. If they set an achievable goal in an achievable timeline, and can manage the constraints, then they may understand how a sanction will impact the target leader's decision making.

Dictators are people, so they base their actions on a cost–benefit analysis. However, not all dictators are alike, so we need to look at each individual we seek to influence, and determine goals, wealth and institutional constraints, information deficits, and time horizons when analysing and crafting policies to influence behaviour. We have the same human nature, but different behaviours due to differences across the incentive vectors. A simple way to start this analysis is through four hypothetical dictators. Ronald Wintrobe (1990) developed a typology based upon four models: totalitarian, tyrant, tinpot, and 'timocrat', and Shiffman (2006; Shiffman and Jochum 2011) further developed the model (Figure 15.1).

Starting near the bottom left of the diagram, a *tinpot* seeks to steal the wealth of the people he governs and usually governs in a location with a history of frequent changes in government (i.e. coups, overthrows, or even elections). Therefore, tinpots seek wealth and face few institutional constraints to theft, but face the challenge of staying in power and alive. The tinpot, then, acts under a short-term time horizon, unaware of when, for example, a general will seek to assassinate him or the populace will move to overthrow him. The tinpot takes money for personal gain and does not invest more than absolutely necessary in the economic engine of the country's economy. The *totalitarian*, by contrast, seeks power, and uses the wealth from the economy to invest in the tools of remaining in power. Specifically, the totalitarian uses wealth to buy the loyalty of those closest to him in power to avoid a coup or assassination. He also purchases the instruments of repression to keep the population from uprising. He invests in the productive means of the economy, since his income and wealth are tied to that of the economy, but never to the detriment of his relative power over others. He has a long time horizon, seeking to rule until death, and even put his family into power once he passes away. Like the totalitarian, tyrants and timocrats also invest heavily in the institutions of power, seeking to remain in power for long periods of time. The difference lies in their choice of tools. The *tyrant* will invest more heavily in repression, and less on loyalty, preferring to be feared rather than loved. The *timocrat*, by contrast, seeks support and loyalty from those around him, and so invests in his generals and senior officials, as well as in the population. The timocrat is also known as the 'benevolent dictator'—the king that seeks the love and admiration of the entire kingdom.

Figure 15.1 Typology of autocracy



Source: Shiffman and Jochum (2011). Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

THINK POINT 15.1 Dictator's dilemma

Dictators remain in power by convincing all potential future challenges for power: 'If you challenge me, I will win and you will pay a price for the failed attempt. However, to convincingly threaten any and all challenges, I require people loyal to me; someone must support and carry out my acts if repression. Therefore, I must also rely on the loyalty of some people; otherwise, I cannot maintain power.' The dictator must use repression and loyalty as tools to stay in power.

BACKGROUND 15.1 North Korea: quick facts

1948 Founded by Kim Il Sung (the 'Great Leader')

1994 Kim Il Sung declared 'President for Life' following his death. His duties assumed by his son, Kim Jong Il (the 'Dear Leader')

2011 Upon the death of Kim Jong Il, his duties transferred to his son, Kim Jong Un

According to the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 2012): 'After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the DPRK since the mid-1990s has relied heavily on international aid to feed its population. North Korea's history of regional military provocations, proliferation of military-related items, long-range missile development, WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs, including tests of nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, and massive conventional armed forces are of major concern to the international community.'

Political leaders (autocrats and democrats alike) must spend money to stay in power. In democracies, look at the amazing amounts of spending on political activities to receive votes in future elections. The autocrat, however, faces the added complexity of the 'dictator's dilemma' (Wintrobe 1998); see Think Point 15.1.

Based upon our economic analysis, a policy that seeks to alter the leader's wealth constraint might provide the greatest opportunity to influence the decision making of the leader. A good case study, since it most clearly represents a tyranny using Wintrobe's typology, is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, led by the Kim dynasty. (To help contextualize this discussion, see Background 15.1.) The Great and Dear Leaders each reveal a preference for maximizing power in order to stay in power, and to do so over an indefinite time horizon. The Leaders display near total control over the domestic political levers of power. The biggest challenge facing any dictator is transition; and the Kims managed to handle succession twice—first in 1994, then again in 2011. Beyond the domestic aspiration to rule forever, the Kims have shown an interest in regional power through the development of nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapons-armed ballistic missile arsenal in North Korea would alter regional and global dynamics in significant ways. Can we use economic tools to change the behaviour of the Kim dynasty and the DPRK government?

In order to increase regional power, the Kim dynasty needs wealth, and North Korea is a poor country. Based upon economic analysis, a policy that seeks to alter the Leader's wealth constraint might provide the greatest opportunity to influence the decision making of the leader; see Table 15.1.

American presidents had made agreements—entered into exchanges—with Kim Jong Il on several occasions. In 1994, US President Bill Clinton's administration negotiated the Agreed Framework, where the United States provided 500,000 tons of oil and two so-called light-water nuclear reactors—significant wealth to President Kim Jong Il's regime. In exchange, President Kim promised to close the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. What was the trade? Wealth for a security. If we go back to our analysis, the exchange makes sense. Kim wants to remain in power and his wealth constraint perhaps most significantly challenges this goal. The United States and allies want to prevent or slow down the DPRK nuclear weapons programme. Both sides got what they wanted or so it seemed.

In 2002, Kim Jong Il admitted to cheating on the Agreed Framework, and continued to develop weapons-grade plutonium and a ballistic missile capability. Recall that we inferred a second Kim goal of regional power; and additional concessions were made to Kim in exchange for further promises and inspections. In 2007, Kim was again caught and confirmed violating agreements related to nuclear materials, so President Bush struck another agreement. The US will lift trade sanctions in exchange for further guarantees on the cessation of the DPRK nuclear programme. Again, wealth for security.

Table 15.1 Goals and constraints for Kim Jong Il, and perhaps Kim Jong Un

Goal	Remain in power and increase power regionally
Institutional constraint	Strong power at home; very little support internationally
Wealth constraint	Significant; poor economy
Information	Domestic calculations probably well informed; internationally, however, the isolated regime may make decision based upon incomplete and inaccurate information
Time horizon	Current leader's father and grandfather sought indefinite power; new leader may be the same, but 'revealed preferences' yet unknown

In each of these instances, however, Kim received the wealth immediately, therefore maintaining control over the institutions of power inside North Korea. And the US and allies received only promises regarding future behaviour—promises not kept. As recently as 2012, with the installation of Kim Jong Un, President Obama has agreed to provide 240,000 metric tons of food to Kim in exchange, once again, for promises to stop enriching uranium and conducting nuclear tests.

Trade

Trade, when voluntary, makes all parties to the exchange better off. Trade creates wealth. In the previous section, we addressed sanctions as the denial of trade; in this section, we discuss trade promotion in goods and services. If I am thirsty and have one dollar, and I exchange that dollar for a bottle of water, then I have exactly what I preferred—a water bottle to a dollar. If I valued the dollar more than the water, I would not buy the water. So, after the exchange, I have something I value in excess of $1—I have increased my wealth. If the vendor valued the bottle of water more than $1, she would not sell it to me for that amount. Trade makes all participants better off—wealthier. Aggregating these actions of many, one can say nations engage in trade to become better off. Trade, therefore, sounds like an economic 'good'—something that people want.

However, when we look at the world, we do not see free trade everywhere. Some leaders oppose this economic good. We know the leader makes choices in his or her own interest; if one does not engage in trade, one must consider some trade a 'bad' for the decision maker.

Both democrats and autocrats benefit from trade, but both can also be seen opposing free trade in the world. Dictators may not favour free trade if it increases the power of political opposition, makes insurrections more likely, decreasing the ability to sustain power. Democratic leaders must take positions that serve some constituencies more than others. For example, free trade may make the country better off over time, but harm a local community or trade union, in the short term. In comparison with the long-term benefits of trade, constituencies and politicians can make decisions based upon short time horizons. A worker may need a job to afford this month's rent, and his views on trade will reflect this short-term imperative. Politicians want votes and campaign dollars for their next election. Under these conditions, we can observe domestic interests hindering free trade. In spite of clear long-term benefits, we see people rationally opposing free trade. Case Study 15.1 offers an excellent example by way of the Bilateral Trade Agreement between the United States and Pakistan.

Access to the US marketplace is a good; countries wish to increase trade with the United States in order to become richer. Once established, the withdrawal of economic engagement becomes a sanction—a tool used to influence a leader's behaviour. The US President thus has a powerful tool to advance national security. The trade agenda confirms the use of trade agreements as a security tool. Think about the US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Jordan implemented in 2010. Jordan represents a small economy relative to the US economy, and expanded bilateral trade and would not likely provide jobs or measurably increase take-home pay to large segments of American workers. In 2000, by advocating an FTA with Jordan, US political leaders sought political gain—influence with Jordanian leadership and leveraging Jordan's economic benefits to advance security for the US and its allies (Office of US Trade Representative 2009).

Export controls protect technological advantage, maintain security, and further foreign policy objectives. Policy makers may regulate or prevent the sale of technology and goods to certain countries for security reasons. The US Department of State controls the sales of munitions. The US Department of Commerce controls items that can have both civilian and military applications, and the US Treasury Department oversees trade embargoes. Import restrictions, on the other hand, protect a country's businesses from certain unfair advantages of imported foreign goods. They include a number of policies such as anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. Policy makers restrict imports for three main reasons: as an intervention to correct some market failure and make trade *fair*, as a way of limiting access to the US domestic market for a particular trade benefit, and as a remedy to influence the behaviour of other policy makers.

Finance

The exchange of money influences national security and creates opportunities to leverage world leaders and events. The international financial system supports the international trade today, as well as trade across time—trading something today for something tomorrow.

In finance, people benefit from access to the market in two ways: first, from the ability to trade weak currency for strong currency; and second, from the ability to finance today's consumption with tomorrow's income—otherwise known as debt and equity.

Most of the domestic currencies traded in the world today hold no intrinsic value. Hold up any currency note you may have in your pocket. Unlike a gold coin, which retains value when melted down, a US dollar, for example, holds no value when ripped into pieces. We call this a **fiat currency**. US dollar bills have a value because people expect the US central bank and the US government to protect that value. Entire economies work upon the faith that central banks will preserve the value of the currencies. But not all central banks exercise the same degree of responsibility, so some currencies hold their value better than others. And if you do business, or save money, you want to use a currency that holds value.

People trade different currencies as products in the global economy. Just as one can trade in commodities, such as oil or cars, so it is possible to trade dollars, euro, pesos, etc. We expect individuals to hold money

CASE STUDY 15.1 US–Pakistan bilateral trade agreement

Countries that have preferential trade agreements with the United States enjoy significantly lower tariffs than those categorized as non-preferential. Therefore, while countries in Africa and Latin America with preferential trade agreements can import textiles with an effective duty tax rate of 0.19 per cent and clothes with a rate of 2.52 per cent, Pakistan's exports are subject to 9.47 per cent tax on textiles and 15.4 per cent on clothing, putting it at a severe disadvantage to its competitors in this sector. As Pakistan plays such an important role in the United States' counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East, US policy makers are considering extending a preferential trade agreement to the country to engender goodwill.

Supporters of this agreement argue that it will give the United States increased leverage over Pakistan's leaders. America currently accounts for 25 per cent of Pakistan's export market, and this would only grow if Pakistan was given preferential trade status. If the Pakistani people value this trade, an agreement would not only increase goodwill in the short term, but would also provide US policy makers with greater leverage over the country in the future: they can credibly threaten to end the agreement. An increase in trade would also increase the country's wealth, which would both add legitimacy to Pakistan's leaders (a goal they must wish to pursue) and encourage the growth of a middle class that would have a stake in the country's economic future, putting pressure on the government to keep these ties alive. Finally, a thriving Pakistani economy would lower unemployment; and so, if poverty reduction promotes security, this lowers the chances that violence will continue domestically and internationally.

However, other policy makers in the United States oppose these initiatives because they go against their own interests. This trade agreement would threaten the loss of American jobs in certain states—particularly California, Georgia, and North Carolina, where 44 per cent of American textile workers live. One might expect US congressmen in these states to oppose such an agreement if the next election influences their time horizons. The agreement could also be opposed by those in Pakistan who would lose out on such an agreement, such as some in the military or leaders from political factions who oppose democracy and good relations with the West.

that retains or grows in value and avoid money that loses value. Just like trade in goods and services, this insight into currencies gives analysts explanatory power over observed events, and allows policy makers to find tools of influence in international finance.

Consider the case of George Soros, who was once called 'the man who broke the Bank of England' by *The Financial Times* (Freeland 2009). Soros and other investors were unhappy with the Bank of England's interventions in the currency market to maintain the pound sterling as strong currency. In 1992, Soros 'shorted' almost $10 billion worth of the pound sterling, betting that the Bank of England would have to devaluate its currency. The Bank of England had been trying to keep the pound sterling strong vis-à-vis other European currencies, but the move of Soros and other investors forced the bank to pull out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and led the pound sterling to plunge.

Sovereign wealth funds—huge investment portfolios owned by the sovereign state—similarly can help or harm a currency and damage an economy. Foreign governments may purchase an ownership in large corporations and financial institutions, gaining leverage over some political leaders in the process.

When people trade across time, often one party purchases debt from another. Debt is a promise to pay in the future for what you receive now. You can think of debt as a trade across time; you gain value today in exchange for a value in the future. One can purchase a car or home because of access to the debt market. Interest rates reflect the cost of the exchange. For example, US$1 today in exchange for US$1.10 in one year is a 10 per cent annual interest rate. Like all other forms of trade, individuals desire access to the market, which provides that opportunity for voluntary exchange and an increase in wealth. Access to debt markets is an economic good. In terms of security policy, therefore, offering access to credit—or denying it—can provide significant incentives to a foreign leader to change behaviour. See Case Study 15.2, which illustrates the effectiveness of post-9/11 counter-terrorist financing.

Aid

People may support giving aid out of compassion, but national security decision makers also understand the significant national security power derived from providing and denying development assistance grants and loans. As an economic good—something that leaders in the developing and poorest countries desire—aid money can incentivize individual decision making and therefore advance national security. For example, Leader A communicates to Leader B this message, 'Stop abusing ethnic or religious minorities in your country, and we will give you foreign assistance and encourage others to do the same.'

In addition to the quid-pro-quo of money for action, some argue that ending poverty promotes global security. USAID's document 'Foreign Aid in the National Interest' (see Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity, U.S. Agency for International Development, (2002), Washington, D.C. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/foreign_aid_in_the_national_interest-full.pdf) argues that security increasingly relies on the prosperity of the rest of the world. If he agreed, Leader A would communicate to Leader B: 'Use these funds for economic growth, and we will provide

CASE STUDY 15.2 Counter-terrorist financing post-9/11

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the Treasury Department created the Office of Terrorist Financing and Intelligence (OTFI) and adopted a three-pronged security strategy. First, to deter individuals from supporting lenomist groups, it instituted a 'name and shame' programme to publicly identify individuals known to provide financial support to terrorist groups. Second, the US Treasury stepped up efforts to 'block' the assets of those involved in supporting international terrorism. By Executive Order 13224 (2001), the US President asserted the authority to 'freeze' assets, money and real property, denying access to the owners of the assets if the owner engages in or supports acts of international terrorism. Finally, the US President instituted policies to deny access to American banks to those engaged in or supporting international terrorism. Therefore, identified individuals, groups, or states, could not trade in US dollars, or borrow money in US funds. In addition to these domestic efforts, the US attained international support for these policies, with many countries and the UN adopting mirroring policies, seen for example in UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) regarding the situation in Afghanistan. In summary, leaders can (1) apply the tools of international finance to deny access to a person's or a country's own assets, (2) deny someone the ability to conduct transactions in a specific currency, and (3) deny access to the ability to borrow or lend money–the debt market.

CASE STUDY 15.3 World Bank Development Assistance to the PRC

An intense debate took place in 1999 over World Bank loans to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The World Bank took the position that moving 60,000 non-Tibetan ethnic Han people into an historically Tibetan region would foster economic development in a part of rural China. Human rights groups and non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, opposed this project. They maintained that the resettlement was in line with PRC policies intended to undermine the Tibetans' culture and identity as a separate nation of people.

Under claims of 'cultural genocide', several US members of Congress took action opposing the World Bank, and President Clinton also voiced his opposition to World Bank President James Wolfensohn.

With respect to the case of the World Bank and the PRC, of particular interest is how the US leaders influenced world events. They opposed US funding to the World Bank in an amount equal to that which the World Bank would be providing to Chinese leaders for this relocation project. The World Bank continued to fight for the programme but the US opposition prevailed. De jure, the United States cannot kill a World Bank project; de facto, by threatening to deny money that the World Bank expected, that is exactly what happened.

Without the World Bank project, the PRC had no alternative but to carry out the project with its own funds. While it is not clear whether PRC authorities changed their behaviour as a result of the debate, any damage to ethnic Tibetans took place without US and world community funding.

CASE STUDY 15.4 Somalia

The US relationship with Somalia, although complicated, presents a clear example of the use of aid for national security interests. In fact, aid can be seen as a barometer of US–Somali relations through the years. Aid, or Official Development Assistance (ODA), in its many forms from states or other international actors is almost always distributed with some motive beyond the humanitarian. In the last century, the USA and the Soviet Union (USSR) used aid as a powerful tool of influence during the Cold War. This was especially the case on the African continent where the superpowers backed supporters, who sometimes engaged in proxy wars.

Somalia, under the leadership and influence of General Mohamed Siad Barre, aligned itself with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and he received military and economic assistance in exchange. In the late 1970s, however, the USSR under Leonid Brezhnev ceased providing aid to Somali leaders and populations and decided instead to back a more socialist regime in Ethiopia, the *Derg*. US leaders in the Ford and Carter administrations saw this as an opportunity and began backing Somalia against the Ethiopians in a war that broke out in the Ogaden border regions of the two countries.

This shift in aid donors to Somalia began a long and complicated relationship of aid from the United States to Somalia. Beginning in the early 1990s, aid for Somalia was used by President George H.W. Bush during and after the Somali civil war to give preference to 'warlords' whom US policy makers thought were serving their best interests in the region. President Bill Clinton backed the United Nations in one of the first militarized aid distribution schemes that ended in the infamous 'Black Hawk Down' incident. More recently, Somalia has received aid in a variety of indirect forms to avoid directly sending actual US-backed aid workers into the country. This aid is sent to refugee camps in Somalia and Ethiopia not only with the intent to help a needy people, but also to curb radicalization of extremist sympathizers to the terrorist group al-Shabaab. Like many insurgencies and terrorist organizations before it, al-Shabaab provides services and 'aid' to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people. The US administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, wishing to win hearts and minds away from extremist organizations, counter these with US aid to provide food and medical services, and other social support, to directly offset the influence of al-Shabaab.

more. If you squander these funds, we will cut you off from further assistance.'

In January 2004, US President George W. Bush launched the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to promote economic growth. In the past, poor countries received aid because they were poor. With the MCA, US aid was linked to the policy decisions of developing countries' leaders. Aid, therefore, became conditioned to leaders who advanced policies encouraging foreign direct investment and trade, transparency, rule of law, and contract sanctity. The MCA policy accounts for a leader's incentive vectors.

Insurgents and terrorists find refuge in the places on earth with weak central governments, which are incapable of enforcing a rule of law; this creates an opportunity for an illicit safe haven. On 3 April 2009, President Obama articulated the link between terrorism and poverty when he said: 'Poverty does not create terror—yet, terror takes root in failing nations that cannot police themselves or provide for their people' (Office of the Press Secretary 2009). Supported by drug cultivation and trade, the Taliban and al-Qaeda found this ideal environment in Afghanistan.

KEY POINTS

- Economic policies can provide effective national security tools by working through the vectors of incentives to influence the decisions of leaders.
- Sanctions intended to influence the actions of an adversary must decrease wealth, and therefore the options available to the adversary.
- The size and nature of the market in which an economy can trade influences the ability to create wealth. Trade policies can entice leaders to change behaviours in exchange for access to markets or trade preferences, and advance security.
- Access to banking and finance markets, like those for goods and services, represents an economic good, and policy makers can incentivize security-promoting behaviours in others by providing and denying access to debt and equity.
- To the extent that poverty promotes insecurity, economic policies that alleviate poverty can increase security. And economic policies must take into account the incentives of not only the leaders, but the populations it is intended to influence.

Conclusion

As we have seen throughout this chapter, we can apply economic science to understand threat and policy-making environments, and improve actions taken to promote security. People are inclined to trade to gain wealth, and this allows for a suite of economic security policies. By analysing an individual's actions and considering their system of incentives, policy makers can utilize economic tools to create agreements that are mutually beneficial, win leverage with foreign leaders and improve the living conditions of people throughout the world. By considering the economic science of human behaviour we can describe and forecast the actions and preferences of people whose backgrounds and beliefs seem widely different from our own, and so create more effective security policy.

QUESTIONS

1. What does Adam Smith's moral philosophy teach us about fundamental human nature and how does economic science help us understand the behaviours of different individuals?
2. Are violent criminals, terrorists, and insurgents economic actors who seek economic goods just like most people in the world?
3. Provide an example of how a market allows individuals to increase wealth for the self and others.
4. What institutional rules, other than laws, might impact a political leader's decision to engage in acts of war?

5. In what ways can we think of economic policies as 'bargains' in which one leader offers a deal or a trade to another? Can you provide an example?
6. Like Smith's butcher, brewer, and baker, do terrorists require support from others? Can you pick a terrorist and describe their vectors of incentives as you understand them from publicly known or revealed preferences?
7. When would economic sanctions denying market access for good, services, or finance likely bring about a desired policy objective?
8. What is the difference between high quality currency and low quality, and how is currency an economic good capable of being used to as a tool to change behaviour?
9. Beyond the goods and services exchanged in a market, how can you describe access to debt markets and international financial institutions as an economic good and tool for security policy?
10. How would you craft a new development assistance grant programme to a foreign country to maximize your security policy goals?

FURTHER READING

- Berman, Eli (2009), *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Using economic theory, this book explains how radical religious sects can run such violent, deadly terrorist organizations.
- Dam, Kenneth (2001), *The Rules of the Global Game*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. An academic and veteran policy maker, Ken Dam explains the political economy of Washington, DC providing insight into the democratic process of decision making.
- Easterly, William (2001), *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Former World Bank economist, Easterly makes clear the importance of economic incentives, and why ignoring them can lead to failed policies.
- Shiffman, Gary M. and Jochum, James J. (2011), *Economic Instruments of Security Policy: Influencing the Choices of Leaders*, 2nd edn, London: Palgrave Macmillan. This book provides a deeper exposition on the economics of security studies with an emphasis on the political economy of autocracy. Specifically, it provides a technical model of the political economy of totalitarianism, contrasted that with other forms of political leadership.
- Smith, Adam (1776/1904). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannan. Library of Economics and Liberty. 18 March 2012. http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html. The definitive source text on economics; a free version is available online at this link.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **www.EconomicInstruments.org** This site specifically provides links to information on two courses and a book on the general topic of economic instruments of security policy.
- **http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements** The Office of the United States Trade Representative lists all countries with which the USA presently has trade agreements. This site also provides current information concerning newly introduced FTAs, which have not yet been fully implemented.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins3e/

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Globalization, Development, and Security

Nana K. Poku and Jacqueline Therkelsen



Chapter Contents

Reader's Guide

This chapter proposes that globalization is a neoliberal ideology for development, promoted by key international financial institutions, which deepens inequality between and within nations on a global scale, resulting in increased global insecurity through a growing sense of injustice and grievance that may lead to rebellion and radicalization. The authors argue that, ultimately, the globalization ideology for development services the interest of its advocates, the elites of the core capitalist economies that dominate the international financial institutions, at the expense and immiseration of the majority of people in developing economies and the weaker segments of their own societies. The chapter is set out in three stages: first, it presents the case for conceptualizing globalization as a neoliberal ideology for development; second, it provides evidence to demonstrate the harmful effects of the ideology on societies, particularly across the developing world, and; third, it explores the connection between uneven globalization and global insecurity through two case studies: the Egypt uprising in 2011, and the collapse of the Greek economy in 2010.

Introduction

To its advocates, **globalization** encapsulates new technology, supported by more open policies designed to create a world more interconnected than ever before. This spans not only growing interdependence in economic relations, such as trade, investment, finance and the organization of production globally, but also social and political interaction among organizations and individuals across the world. For the leading globalizers, the process is apolitical with unrivalled productive capacity, which, if unhindered by state regulations or fear, can deliver unprecedented material progress for the poor. In what follows, we argue that the world is far from realizing this potential and the current phase of globalization is generating unbalanced outcomes, both between and within nations. Indeed, the euphoria the process has generated, and continues to generate, serves to disguise the very real social and economic inequalities that are not merely leftovers from the past, but are the result of the **ideology** at the heart of the process. This is an ideology indebted to the epistemological insights of classical economic liberalism, with its emphasis on open markets, limited government intervention, de-controlled pricing systems, liberalized trade and investment and privatizing areas of the economy previously controlled by the state.

We set the argument out in three stages. In the first stage, we present the case for conceptualizing globalization as an ideology for **development**, highlighting the key actors involved and the key policies being promoted. In the second stage, we draw on a growing body of evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of the ideology on societies and communities, particularly across the developing world. The final section makes the case for why uneven globalization may pose the greatest risk to global security. We argue that wealth is being created through globalization, but too many people across all countries are not sharing in its fruits; nor do they have any voice in shaping the process. For the three-quarters of the world's population caught on the barren side of the globalization fence, the process has not met any of their basic needs; many live in the limbo of the informal economy without formal rights, decent livelihoods or the legitimate prospect of better futures for their children. While poverty is a pervasive feature of most societies, past and present, and can push some individuals towards desperate acts of violence in their struggle for survival, it is the notion of unjust inequality that brings to the disadvantaged a sense of grievance. It is out of this grievance that radicalization and rebellion is likely to ferment, with untold ramifications for national and international security.

Globalization as a neoliberal ideology for development

Globalization as a concept

The late Susan Strange rated the notion of globalization as the 'worst of all the vague and woolly words' in the discipline of International Relations, as it refers to 'anything from the Internet to a hamburger'(Strange 1986). Yet, it would be misguided to argue that there is nothing new about contemporary globalization. Quantitatively, most manifestations of global connectivity have reached unprecedented levels during the past half-century (Scholte 2005). While the eventual picture remains in doubt, the principal agents of such change are evident enough, such as globalizing corporations emerging from a rapid process of super-mergers, techno-scientific networks, and the aesthetic architects of mass culture. At the same time, there is also a shrinking of the world brought about by the third technological revolution that has enabled us to travel both vicariously and instantaneously to almost all regions of the world (Allen and Hammett 1998). Similarly, economic activities are no longer focused at the local level and the objective is no longer to serve a limited population with immediate needs (Dicken 1992). Socio-economic activities are geared towards producing commodities that satisfy the desires of absent others who, in all likelihood, one will never meet. Globalization has, therefore, radically altered the manner in which we conduct our lives (McGrew and Poku 2007). Such processes are further strengthened by a trend towards large-scale corporate mergers designed to create enterprises with genuinely global scale and reach (Dicken 1992). Globalization is a response both to changing configurations in global relations—new connectivities as well as new divisions—generating the need for an original approach to grasp those changes. Moreover, it is a process driven by economics.

The neoliberalism of globalization

Reflecting its economism, regulators of trade, finance, and industry have held pride of place in policy making around contemporary globalization. Among global governance organizations, for instance, the international financial institutions (IFIs), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have overshadowed agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on questions of managing globalization. Viewed in this way, it becomes possible to imagine globalization as an ideology seeking to remodel the world in an image that serves the mindsets of its advocates. This mindset reflects an intellectual lineage that connects with nineteenth-century classical economic liberalism (see Key Ideas 16.1).

Cultural, ecological, geographical, political, and psychological aspects of globality are generally approached as functions of, and subordinate to, economics, if they are considered at all. Indeed, liberalism tends to treat economics in isolation from other dimensions of social relations. In particular, the doctrine supposes that economic policies in world politics could be a culturally and politically neutral matter of technical expertise. A key aspect of economic liberalism is that it was also the central ideology behind European colonialism. In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776/1904), Adam Smith considered colonialism to be economically beneficial to both the colonial powers and the colonies, and he was only opposed to the exclusive (monopolistic) trade conditions that some metropolitan countries established with their colonies. Smith noted, 'The *exclusive* trade of the mother countries tends to diminish . . . both the enjoyments and industry of all those nations in general' (Smith 1776/1904: 467, emphasis added).

The contemporary version of liberalism (popularly referred to as **neoliberalism**) emphasizes certain micro-foundations of traditional neoclassical economics, such as the efficiency of market competition, the role of individual consumers in determining economic outcomes, and criticisms of distortions associated with government intervention and regulation of markets (Saad Filho and Johnston 2005).

Neoliberal articulations of globalization not only claim to capture the nature and extent of complex and inter-related political, economic, social, and technological processes that are extending and deepening relations between countries and peoples across the world, but also involves normative statements and judgements about the perceived benefits and, following from this, appropriate responses and policy prescriptions. Neoliberal ideology, as embodied in *The Washington Consensus* (see Background 16.1), has generated consensual guidelines through terms and concepts, which circumscribe what can be thought and done and has given intellectual respectability to ideas that support the deregulation of markets and the 'rolling back' of the state (Murphy 2000). States are presented as being increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global market, compelled to adjust to the realities of technological changes and intensifying economic interdependence that make it impossible to de-link from the global economy. Governments, international development agencies, and other multilateral economic institutions, like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), have played a major role in devising development strategies, grounded in neoliberal economic principles, promoting marketization and moves towards free trade and export-led growth strategies. Increasingly, it is the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank who 'make the rules', favouring the adoption of neoliberal, pro-market policies (O'Brien et al. 2000).

KEY IDEAS 16.1 Classical economic liberalism

Classical economic theory was developed in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the work of political economists such as Adam Smith (1723–90) and, later, David Ricardo (1770–1823). Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) was a critique of mercantilism, the dominant economic theory of the time. According to E. H. Carr (1945: 5), 'the aim of mercantilism . . . was not to promote the welfare of the community and its members, but to augment the **power** of the state, of which the sovereign was the embodiment . . . wealth was the source of power, or more specifically of fitness for war'. Wealth (bullion) was brought in by exports, and heavily controlled by government who intervened in economic life to encourage the export of goods and restrict imports. During this time, society, and thereby export markets, were seen as static, and the only means for a nation to expand its markets was to capture existing markets from other nations, for example by waging trade wars. Mercantilism, then, was viewed by classical economic theorists as a source of international conflict and a promotion of government and aristocracy at the expense of societal welfare. Instead, they suggested market capitalism would better promote general welfare through the efficient allocation of scarce resources within society. The market should be free from government interference as it would be managed through a self-regulating mechanism Smith called an 'invisible hand'. This self-regulation was based around a belief in human nature as essentially self-interested and materialistic. Internationally, free trade was promoted as a more peaceful means of generating wealth, and according to the theory of comparative advantage, each national economy would benefit more from free trade than from pursuing nationalism and self sufficiency. Free market ideas dominated the United Kingdom and United States economies of the nineteenth century, and included the doctrine of laissez-faire, which dictated the state should have no economic role, in the belief that unrestrained pursuit of profit by individuals would result in benefit for society as a whole. Laissez-faire theories were not seriously challenged until the depression years of the 1930s, but in the late twentieth century, they saw a revival through neoliberalism (Burchill 2001; Heyward 2003).

BACKGROUND 16.1 The 10 steps of *The Washington Consensus*

1. Fiscal Discipline: budget deficits of no more than 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
2. Public Expenditure Priorities: redirect what is left of reduced public expenditures away from domestic industry and towards poverty-reduction priority areas of the budget, especially towards primary health and education, and infrastructure.
3. Tax Reform: broadening the tax base, cut marginal tax rates, improve tax administration.
4. Financial Liberalization: reforms towards market-determined interest rates, abolition of preferential interest rates for privileged borrowers and achievement of a moderately positive real interest rate.
5. Exchange Rates: a unified exchange rate (for trading) set at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional exports, and managed so as to assure exporters that competitiveness will be maintained in the future.
6. Trade Liberalization: changing quantitative trade restrictions with tariffs, and then progressively lowering these tariffs until a uniform low tariff in the range of 10 per cent (or at most around 20 per cent) is achieved.
7. Foreign Direct Investment: abolish restrictions on the entry of foreign firms; establishing 'national treatment' for foreign investors, i.e. no beneficial subsidies or taxes or other support for domestic firms.
8. Privatization: state enterprises should be privatized.
9. Deregulation: abolish regulations on entry of new firms or competition laws that favour domestic firms; ensure that any remaining regulations are 'justified' by safety, environmental, or financial oversight needs.
10. Property Rights: legal reforms to secure property rights without excessive costs and to regularize the informal sector.

A neoliberal ideology for development

That other societies outside of Europe now participate in the neoliberal globalization process does not make it any the less ideological, or devastating in its consequences, but merely points to changes in the global configuration of power and class. In this sense, the preoccupation in globalization discourse with the benefits of interdependence is a distraction from confronting new forms of colonialism. Unlike the old forms, with their emphasis on domination, subjugation, and exploitation, under globalization the process is driven through policies and systems designed to distance its perpetrators from unseemly motivation. Nothing exemplifies this more than the promotion of neoliberal ideology to the developing world by the chief advocates of globalization: the IMF and World Bank. For these institutions, the causes of underdevelopment reside squarely within the affected countries, rather than resulting mainly or at least in part from the structure of the global economy. Hence, the remedy lies not in a large-scale redistribution of wealth or structural transformation of the way international trade and finance regimes operate, but rather in domestic reform. The desperate need of developing countries for aid in the final decades of the twentieth century provided the context in which to force domestic policy changes, and the oil crisis of the 1970s was the catalyst for this.

In 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) dramatically increased the price of oil, undermining growth rates in many economies around the world. Oil producing nations, of course, gained from the price rise, and proceeded to invest their profits in Western banks. These banks, which also needed to make a profit, lent the money on to developing nations at low interest rates. Many poor

countries who were suffering in the wake of the oil price rise were glad of this injection of foreign finance. In 1979, OPEC raised the price of oil again, but by this time in the developed world (in particular the United States and United Kingdom), governments with a new economic agenda (monetarism) had come to power. They believed the high levels of inflation coupled with stagnation in economic growth witnessed during the 1970s were due to reckless government spending. They believed the solution was to cut government expenditure and reduce demand in the economy overall, and one of the most important tools used to reduce demand was to raise interest rates.

These economic changes had two immediate, practical effects. First, the recession induced by the demand-reduction policies being implemented in the industrialized world not only hurt the populations of those countries, it also affected people in the developing nations, because it lowered demand for developing-country exports. Second, the rise in interest rates also meant developing countries had to make much higher levels of debt repayments. Many countries now had great difficulties in keeping to repayment schedules and, as private commercial banks, alarmed at the prospect of countries defaulting on their debt, withdrew from lending new money, the World Bank and IMF stepped in to bail countries out with new loans. However, these loans came with conditions attached—known collectively as **Structural Adjustment Programmes** (SAPs).

Structural adjustment programmes and loans

As more and more developing countries faced greater difficulties servicing their huge debts from the 1970s, pressure to adopt SAP policies grew strong, as a wide range of bilateral and multilateral donors insisted upon economic reform as a condition for the disbursement of funds and for rescheduling the debt. By the end of 1985, 12 of the 15 debtors designated as top-priority debtors, including Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines, had submitted to SAPs (Cavanagh et al. 1985). Over the next decade, Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) proliferated as the economies of more and more developing countries came under the surveillance and control of the World Bank and the IMF.

Later, in the 1990s, the SAPs evolved into a broader package of policies, involving government expenditure cuts, de-controlled prices, liberalized trade and investment, and the privatization of areas of the economy previously controlled by the state, and the other elements of what came to be called *The Washington Consensus*, largely because they were championed most vigorously by United States Treasury Department (Klein 2008). Although there are many variations of SAPs at country level, at heart, they all share the same logic, namely, the need to maintain fiscal discipline whilst discouraging protectionism. Implicit is the assumption that post-colonial development, with its heavy emphasis on state-led growth, had failed the developing world (Collier and Institute of Economic Affairs (Great Britain) 1998). Structural adjustment, therefore, was designed to roll back the state, which included privatizing public enterprises, dismantling trade barriers, abolishing state marketing boards, removing price controls, and liberalizing exchange rates (see Tables 16.1 and 16.2).

These measures were meant to help countries resolve balance of payments problems, reduce inflation and to prevent future economic crises by promoting

Table 16.1 IMF adjustment policies

IMF macroeconomic adjustment (stabilization) policies	Economic objectives
Devaluation	To promote exports and reduce demand for imports by raising their prices
Public spending reduction on: wages; employment; investment; subsidies; etc. *Tax increases*: taxes on incomes; taxes on spending	To reduce the budget deficit and thus: slow down the growth of government debt; slow down the growth of the money supply; and reduce overall demand, and thus demand for imports
Tighter monetary and credit policies and higher interest rates	To reduce overall demand, and thus demand for imports; to limit or reduce the rate of inflation

Table 16.2 World Bank structural adjustment policies

World Bank structural adjustment policies	Economic objectives
Reducing the role of the state: restricting government spending; privatization; deregulation of markets. *'Getting the prices right'*: freeing interest rates; freeing exchange rates; freeing wages; freeing prices; agricultural produce price increases; parastatal price increases; subsidy reductions; tax reforms; cost recovery. *Opening the economy*: trade reform; foreign investment reform. *Institutional strengthening and capacity-building.*	To increase economic efficiency, and thus improve long-term economic performance

longer-term structural reforms—particularly those pertaining to the public sector. Often, the reforms led to periods of economic austerity as government expenditure was drastically reduced and market forces were unleashed. The World Bank euphemistically called this process 'crossing the desert', and argued that short-term pain was necessary for long-term success in economic growth and improvements in the quality of life (Poku 2006). The 'short-term pain' provoked a storm of criticism, especially from African governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They were joined by international agencies, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) who, in 1987, made a fundamental challenge to the adjustment paradigm by publishing *Adjustment with a Human Face—a multi-country study of the effects of IMF policies on children*. In response, both the World Bank and the IMF said they would prioritize the social sectors and poverty reduction concerns in their policies and even admitted their initial attempts in the early 1980s to push through adjustment, whatever the price, caused unnecessary hardship (World Bank et al. 1989).

From 1980 to 2000, growth in most developing countries implementing neoliberal policies declined significantly compared to the preceding 20 years. As the UNDP's Jan Vandemoortele concludes, 'If the 1980s were the "lost decade for development", the 1990s were the "decade of broken promises"'(Vandemoortele 2003: 1). The failings lie in the belief that markets will correct deficiencies of states by promoting growth. A report by the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)** (2011a) suggests developing countries, despite a massive increase in their openness to trade over the last 20 years, are earning less. This is attributed to a number of reasons, such as their continued concentration on the production of primary commodities, which (with the exception of oil) are subject to the challenges of **commodity** price volatility (see Think Point 16.1); and also the failure of most developing countries to shift their production into technology-intensive products. They lack the necessary finance and technological expertise, as well as human capacity, and they are unable to attract **foreign direct investment** (FDI) to remedy this. Where they have moved from primary commodities into manufactured exports, the latter have been resource-based and labour intensive, thus adding little value. Moreover, the export drive, undertaken simultaneously by so many developing countries, itself contributes to price decreases.

Looking to the future, given the surfeit of labour in these poor countries, the picture grows even more worrying as we can foresee a race to the bottom with low wages being used as an enticement in the highly competitive market to attract foreign direct investment. This point is evidenced in the experience of the relatively developed region of Southern Europe, where foreign investment through European Union membership has solved some problems for some people at some points, only to create other problems at a later date. This example also shows that trade cannot be divorced from issues of finance and attendant instabilities of global financial markets, which contributed to millions being thrown below the poverty line in 2010 with the collapse of the Greek economy (see the discussion of the Greek economy in the final section: Global inequality as a threat to global security). Investors continually seek out the location where they can make the greatest profit, and this results in capital and export production being moved from one location to another, with all the attendant difficulties for local populations in terms of insecure employment opportunities.

! THINK POINT 16.1 Commodity price volatility

Commodity prices have historically been among the most volatile of international prices and they tend to follow general business cycles of boom and bust. High commodity price volatility, if not properly managed, can have negative development implications on commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs) mainly because of volatile and uncertain revenue flows, which can complicate not only fiscal management, but also budgetary and long-term planning. High price volatility also undermines CDDCs' development efforts as it could discourage investment, widen trade deficits, and aggravate household poverty, particularly as commodity sectors generally constitute the major source of livelihood for large sections of the population in low-income and least developed countries (LDCs) (UNCTAD 2011b: 2–9).

The legacy of structural adjustment programmes

Today, there are scant signs that the structural adjustment policies are achieving their desired objectives: macroeconomic stability and growth. Amid the bitter recriminations between the concerned parties—developing countries, NGOs, and the institutions of global economic governance—it is not clear whether the lack of effective results stems from an unwillingness to undertake reforms on the part of the developing countries, or the unsuitability and impracticality of the adjustment policies being recommended for their economies. The combined effects of SAP policies on the developing world has been to push millions of people already on the margins of vulnerability to adopt coping mechanisms that expose them to greater risk of disease and death (see Table 16.3). In Africa, for example, Nguyuru H. I. Lipumba (1994) observes that the dominant view among African intellectuals is that structural adjustment programmes are part of the continent's problems, not the solution.

KEY POINTS

- The advocates of globalization point to its benefits, but three-quarters of the world's population do not share in these benefits. The current phase of globalization is generating increased social and economic inequalities, between and within states.
- Much of this inequality is as a result of the neoliberal predominance in the current phase of globalization, which promotes open markets and limited government intervention, which favours the advanced capitalist economies and disadvantages developing economies.
- This neoliberal predominance on a global scale is created and maintained by the international financial institutions, and, in this way, it becomes possible to imagine globalization as an ideology seeking to remodel the world in an image that serves the mindsets of its advocates. This supports the idea of the current phase of globalization as an ideology for development and a new form of colonialism.
- Many developing countries received conditional loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, under the structural adjustment programmes of these institutions. The neoliberal-based loan conditions caused great and unnecessary hardship in developing countries and there is still no evidence they achieved their objectives for macroeconomic stability and growth.

Neoliberalism and the fostering of inequality

The rising inequality between and within nations

This uneven distribution of global investment patterns, with its associated selectivity and polarization of societies, has given rise to the following: a growing gap between the rich and poor within and between nations, in particular between the North (the developed world) and the South (the developing world); the destruction of quality jobs and their replacement by casualization and temporary jobs; growing unemployment, in particular in developing countries, which goes hand in hand with poverty; and mass migration in pursuit of adequate standards of living. As a result, a true process of immiseration is now observable in many parts of the world, particularly within developing countries. The facts of

Table 16.3 Impact of common structural adjustment measures on the poor

Intended result	Policy	Common impact on the poor
Reduced budget deficit, freeing up money for debt servicing	Reducing government expenditure	Reduced health, education, and social welfare spending and the introduction of cost-recovery and user-fees put health care and education beyond the reach of many ordinary people. Public sector redundancies and salary freezes lead to fewer teachers and doctors
Increased efficiency	Privatization of state-run industries	Massive redundancies and increased unemployment with no social security provision push families deeper into poverty
Increased exports, boosting foreign exchange reserves needed for debt repayment	Currency devaluation and export promotion	Cost of imports soar, including vital resources such as imported medicines. Moreover, export prices fall because many countries are promoting the same exports under SAPs, so countries are still in no better position
Reduced inflation	Raising interest rates	Farmers and small companies can no longer afford to borrow money and are forced to reduce production or go out of business
Increased efficiency in food production	Removal of price controls	Basic food prices rise, putting even greater pressure on already stretched household budgets

global inequalities are truly staggering: the richest 25 million Americans have an income equal to that of almost two billion people, while the assets of the world's three richest men, even after the recent fall in the value of stock markets, is greater than the combined income of the world's Least Developed Countries with a total population of more than one billion (World Bank 2011).

Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, who clearly believes integration into the global economy has huge potential for the developing world, concedes 'there is clear evidence that far too many of the world's people have been left behind' (Lagarde 2011). Most obviously, global welfare inequalities have mushroomed alongside the noted advancements in technological development and the rapid expansion of trade and investment. Whether inequality is measured in terms of disparities among states or between specific social groups; by gross domestic product or per capita national income; by relative levels of wealth and poverty; by the degree of influence states and non-state actors exercise in international institutions and decision-making bodies; in terms of access to food and health care; or the distribution of life chances more generally, the world is a grossly unequal place and, if anything, is becoming more so as we move on in the twenty-first century. At a conceptual level, it is possible to identify at least two dimensions of inequality at the heart of globalization: inequality between nations and inequality within nations.

Inequality between nations

Inter-national inequality refers to the differential impact of globalization on regions and states across the globe. A fifth of the world's people live in the highest income countries that have 86 per cent of the world's gross domestic product, 82 per cent of the world's export markets, and 68 per cent of FDI (World Bank 2011). For what constitutes FDI see Background 16.2. The bottom fifth of the population have about 1 per cent in each category. Nor have increased levels of growth and prosperity across the globe improved the situation for the poorest of the world's peoples. For example, the WTO has facilitated globalization, but greater openness in world trade is correlated negatively with income growth among the poorest 40 per cent of the world's population (World Bank 2009a).

The polarized nature of foreign investment provides yet another example of inter-national inequality resulting from uneven globalization. At the beginning of the last decade, the North held over three-quarters of the accumulated stock of FDI and attracted 60 per cent of new FDI flows (World Bank 2005). Moreover, insofar as FDI went to the developing countries (South), it was concentrated in ten countries, with China alone accounting for more than one-third. Thus

BACKGROUND 16.2 Foreign direct investment

Foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs where an entity—for example an individual, public or private enterprise, a government, or groups of entities–owns at least 10 per cent of a foreign (i.e. non-resident) enterprise, with the aim of developing a long-term relationship between investor and enterprise. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposes that FDI forms an essential part of the rapidly evolving process of international economic integration, creating direct, stable and long-lasting links between economies. Furthermore, the OECD argues that FDI encourages the transfer of technology and knowledge capacity across borders, and enables the host economy to market its products more widely, internationally. Lastly, under the right policy environment, FDI, as an additional source of funding for capital investment, can be used to support enterprise development (OECD 2009).

foreign investment resources are being concentrated on those countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Colombia, Malaysia, and Taiwan, which are performing most strongly in global trade. Eight countries that accounted for 30 per cent of developing country GDP absorbed around two-thirds of total FDI. At the other extreme, the 48 Least Developed Countries received around US$800 million in FDI in 1995—roughly the same size as flows into Brazil, and less than 1 per cent of the total transfer to developing countries (World Bank 2011).

Inequality within nations

While IFIs continue to hold great store by the potential contribution of trade liberalization to development, the reality is far less certain. A UNDP study, for example, notes 'there is no convincing evidence that trade liberalization is automatically or always associated with economic growth, let alone poverty reduction or human development' (UNDP 2004: 4). Moreover, even if growth occurs, it does not necessarily and inevitably translate into development for people in general, even if it does for their states or select interests within them. Branko Milanovic (2002) questions long-held assumptions of international trade theory that say increased openness will result in more equal income distribution within poor countries. Milanovic found, in countries with a low per capita income level, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, it is the rich who benefit from trade openness, while in countries where average income has risen, such as Chile or the Czech Republic, openness seems to be related to the rise in income of the poor and middle class relative to the rich. In China, global economic integration has been accompanied by more acute rural–urban polarization, and also by unemployment for previously secure workers in restructured state-owned enterprises (Cook and Jolly 2001).

The pattern of inequality across the globe continues to reveal significant divisions between North and South, but when the focus shifts to inequalities between social groups, the picture begins to look more complex. It is estimated that the bottom 50 per cent of global wealth holders together possess barely 1 per cent of global wealth, compared with the richest 10 per cent of the world's population holding 88 per cent of global wealth, and the top 1 per cent owning a staggering 44 per cent of global assets (Credit Suisse 2012: 10). This stark division of wealth cannot simply be understood in terms of North/South relations. There are incidences of severe poverty in the North, while pockets of wealth exist in even the poorest countries. In the United States since the 1970s, virtually all income gains have gone to the highest earning 20 per cent. This decline in income for the vast majority of the American population has also had important implications for poverty trends. The US poverty rate rose from 14.3 per cent in 2009 to 15.1 per cent in 2010, reaching its highest point since 1993 (Berube 2011). This trend in the United States is evident in many other industrialized states. Across the global geopolitical landscape, the overall patterns of resource distribution have tended to shift since the 1960s from the shape of an egg to a pear. In other words, fewer people have occupied the top, and more people have slipped towards the bottom: 925 million people, or one-seventh of the world's population, are malnourished (WFP 2012a), with 75 per cent of the hungry people living in developing countries (WFP 2012b); some two billion people, around 30 per cent of the world's population, are anaemic, contributing to 20 per cent of all maternal deaths (WHO 2012); and 884 million people still use unsafe drinking water sources, exposing them to waterborne sickness (UNICEF 2012). Our globalized world is one in which, for many people, finding food to eat and a supply of clean drinking water is a part of their daily struggle of existence, consuming many hours of labour.

KEY POINTS

- The uneven distribution of global investment patterns has given rise to a growing gap between the rich and poor within and between nations, rising unemployment, and mass migration in pursuit of adequate standards of living, leading to a process of immiseration, particularly in developing countries.
- Inequality between nations here refers to the differential impact of globalization on regions and states across the globe, for example in terms of gross domestic product, access to export markets, and foreign direct investment. This also translates into related degrees of influence in international institutions and decision-making bodies, that shape the forces and impacts of globalization.
- Inequality within nations here refers to unequal wealth distribution between social groups which, in the poorest countries, appears to be deepened through trade liberalization, challenging long-held assumptions of international trade theory that say increased openness will result in more equal income distribution within poor countries.
- Industrialized states are also experiencing increasingly unequal wealth distribution while pursuing neoliberal economic policies and practices, with growing numbers falling into poverty.

Global inequality as a threat to global security

The advancement of the industrialized states' neoliberal agenda through globalization as an ideology for development has failed to deliver the promised macroeconomic stability and growth, with intended trickle down benefits. Instead, globalization continues to increase the gap between rich and poor, between and within states, and the barren side of the fence becomes ever more crowded. Globalization, thereby, services the interest of its advocates, the elites of the core capitalist economies, at the expense and immiseration of the majority of people in developing economies—arguably a form of neo-colonialism—and the weaker segments of their own societies. At the point where desperation meets grievance is where rebellion and radicalization are likely to ferment. Recent examples of the revolutionary uprisings in Egypt in early 2011, and the murmurs of radicalization in Greece in 2010 and ongoing in response to IMF imposed austerity measures, provide useful case studies of neoliberal economies to demonstrate how this insecurity can manifest in the real world, and is explored further later. Globalization's incitement of rebellion and radicalization may have untold ramifications for national and international security in the years ahead.

Anti-neoliberal revolution

Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, along with Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's Tunisia, was considered to be at the forefront of instituting neoliberal policies in the Middle East. However, the rhetoric of Egypt's political economy during the Mubarak era did not match the reality, as was the case in every other neoliberal state from Chile to Indonesia (Armbrust 2011). In Egypt, the unfettering of markets and agenda of privatization were unevenly applied, and the most vulnerable members of society suffered most at the hands of neoliberalism. As Walter Armbrust (2011) observed, 'Organized labor was fiercely suppressed. The public education and the health care systems were gutted by a combination of neglect and privatization. Much of the population suffered stagnant or falling wages relative to inflation. Official unemployment was estimated at approximately 9.4 per cent last year (and much higher for the youth who spearheaded the January 25th Revolution), and about 20 per cent of the population is said to live below a poverty line defined as $2 per day per person'. Meanwhile, the wealthy and well-connected profiteered from the neoliberal political agenda as Egypt reallocated public resources for the benefit of a small and already affluent elite. Privatization provided windfalls for favoured and connected individuals who purchased state-owned assets for much less than their market value, or who monopolized rents from such diverse sources as tourism and foreign aid.

On 25 January 2011, a popular uprising began in Egypt. It consisted of mainly non-violent civil resistance in the form of demonstrations, marches, labour strikes, and civil disobedience and lasted eight days.

The millions of protesters came from a variety of social, economic, and religious backgrounds, but were united in seeking the resignation of the unelected president for 30 years, Hosni Mubarak. While demands may have been expressed as regime change and a desire for democracy in Egypt, implicit in these demands was an expectation of greater social and economic justice. A large element of what motivated millions of people to join the hundreds of dedicated activists on the streets in protest, eventually overwhelming the state security forces, was economic grievances that are intrinsic to neoliberalism (Armbrust 2011; Bogaert 2011).

Armbrust suggests these grievances cannot be reduced to absolute poverty, for revolutions are never carried out by the poorest of the poor. The protesters, rather, rebelled against the erosion of a sense that some human spheres should be outside the logic of markets. Under Mubarak, state provision of education and health care suffered greatly and wages in the private sector in particular were allowed to fall far below adequate standards. The protesters rejected the structural adjustments, austerity measures, and privatization that had put the middle and working classes in Egypt increasingly under pressure, mainly due to the cutback of income redistribution mechanisms and rising job insecurity (Bogaert 2011).

A neoliberal response

While the revolution brought regime change, Maya Mikdashi (2011) suggests observers should not be too quick to applaud the defeat of neoliberalism in Egypt. She notes that, rather than demanding the end of neoliberal market practices, protesters demanded only the reform of those practices and sought more equal economic opportunities. The international advocates of neoliberal globalization are only too eager to assist with this 'reform'. As Naomi Klein argued in *The Shock Doctrine* (2008), the free-market fundamentalism promoted by economist Milton Friedman (and highly influential in the United States in particular) is predicated on restructuring economies following catastrophic disruptions, natural or man-made, including revolutions. The restructuring takes advantage of a moment of profound societal dysfunctionality or 'shock', as a normally functioning society or political system would not vote for, or accept, it. Furthermore, the restructuring is couched in appealing language; in the case of Western intervention in Egypt, assistance is offered in the language of supporting a transition to democracy and freedom.

While the Egyptian economy is already structured around neoliberal principles, the Western neoliberal globalization ideology continues to strive for the neoliberal utopia, and is pushing for both economic and institutional restructuring towards greater neoliberalism, as a solution to the revolutionary discontent. Adam Hanieh (2011) suggests that at the core of the Western governments' and IFI's interventions in Egypt is an attempt to accelerate the neoliberal programme instituted under the Mubarak regime. The IFI assistance packages appear to heed the call of protesters by promoting measures such as employment creation and infrastructure expansion among other popular demands, but these are in fact premised upon the classic neoliberal policies of privatization, de-regulation, and opening to foreign investment. Hanieh further observes that the aid packages promised to Egypt do not in any way represent a break from the logic encapsulated in previous economic strategies for the region. Debt relief and loans are all conditional on the fulfilment of neoliberal reforms.

Importantly, despite the claims of democratic transition, the institutions of the Egyptian state are being remodelled within this neoliberal drive as an enabling mechanism of the market. This is part of a change in developmental strategy from the IFI's, since the 1990s, that emphasizes the link between the functioning of the markets and their institutional governance. The new strategy promotes the rule of law, decentralization, good governance and other such measures with the supposed aim of reducing rent-seeking capabilities of the well-connected and ensuring greater transparency in economic affairs, but with the explicit aim of advancing legitimacy for neoliberalism. The result is a tailoring of public institutions to the needs of the private sector, while removing any ability of the state to intervene in the market. Hanieh proposes that 'Egypt is, in many ways, shaping up as the perfect laboratory of the so-called post-Washington Consensus, in which a liberal-sounding 'pro poor' rhetoric—principally linked to the discourse of democratization—is used to deepen the neoliberal trajectory of the Mubarak-era.' However, the anti-neoliberal revolutionary spirit has been stirred in Egypt, and indeed across North Africa and the Middle East, and the continued and accelerated imposition of the neoliberal globalization ideology, with the concomitant deepening of inequality, is likely to have explosive consequences for global security.

While anti-neoliberal rebellion and revolution is one challenge to security, radicalization is another. The crisis in the neoliberal global financial system, beginning in 2008, and the ensuing recession, have wrought havoc with national economies and individual livelihoods alike. Widely considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the current crisis has resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions around the world, the bailing out of banks by national governments, the failure of key businesses and decline in consumer wealth. Importantly, many countries are struggling to fund public services and service their debts, and a number of European Union countries are facing a sovereign debt crisis where their governments are unable to pay back their debts on time and in full, with potentially devastating implications for the European economy, and globally. In response, many European nations are implementing austerity measures to counter this debt crisis. Three European countries, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, have so far accepted large, relatively high interest, bail-outs from other governments, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund to prevent sovereign default on their debt, with conditions for reduction on public spending. Greece, the worst affected, provides a stark case study of radicalization in the face of the failure of neoliberalism.

In Greece, IMF-imposed austerity measures have included sacking 30,000 civil servants, raising taxes, cutting public sector salaries and putting a raft of state assets up for sale. However, the result is a cumulative 10 per cent decline in output through 2010 and 2011, and an unemployment rate of 18.4 per cent. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio has actually risen, not fallen, since the 'rescue' package was implemented, and forecasts from the European Commission show debt reaching 198 per cent of GDP by 2013. On its own terms, the bail-out programme has been self-defeating (Stewart 2011). The IMF growth forecasts for Greece were wrong, with 2011 being the fifth successive year of recession, with the Greek economy contracting up to –20 per cent over the period. The IMF blames its failed forecasts on the Greek government for not fully committing to the programme, institutional and legal hurdles to reform, as well as lack of vigour in tax collection. Consequently, the IMF, in late 2011, announced further austerity for Greece, amounting to €20bn of public spending cuts to be imposed between 2012 and 2015. It is estimated around 150,000 civil servants will lose their jobs, unemployment will rise to 19 per cent, the already slashed salaries, pensions, and social services will be cut further, the minimum wage will be reduced, and collective bargaining abolished (Douzinas 2011).

Already, the Greek population has shown its opposition to these measures. Violent protests broke out in May and December 2010, labelled 'anti-austerity protests', as tens of thousands of people marched in opposition to the parliament approval in December of reforms and spending cuts that are a condition of the €110bn (£92bn) EU/IMF bailout granted in May (Reuters 2010). More insidious, however, is the rise of radicalism in the form of support for the far right and attacks on immigrants. The inclusion of the extremist Popular Orthodox Rally (Laos) party, which garnered 5.6 per cent of the vote in the 2009 elections, in the three-party administration caretaker government following the replacement of Prime Minister Giorgios Papandreu with technocrat Lucas Papademos, sees the far right in government for the first time since the collapse of military rule almost 40 years ago. While this provoked Greek opponents to protest in the streets; leftist politicians decrying the development as a 'historic mistake'; and Jewish groups describing the inclusion as 'deeply troubling' (H. Smith 2011), it has failed to generate the Europe-wide outrage that was expressed through sanctions and suspension of ties with Austria, when the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) joined an Austrian coalition government from 1999 to 2005. Furthermore, in Greece, the extreme right-wing party Golden Dawn, to the right of Laos, won its first ever seat on the Athens city council in November 2010 on an anti-immigrant agenda (Lucht 2011), and an MRB poll in Greece released in December 2011 revealed the fascist Chrysi Avgi, of Golden Dawn, picking up 1 per cent of the national vote for the first time (H. Smith 2011). As Greece struggles to keep its head above water, dark-skinned immigrants and asylum seekers are increasingly becoming scapegoats in racially motivated daily attacks in Athens, and the European Court of Justice has declared that asylum seekers could not be returned to Greece as they were at risk of being subjected to 'inhuman or degrading treatment' (Lucht 2011).

KEY POINTS

- The advancement of the industrialized states' neoliberal agenda through globalization as an ideology for development has failed to deliver the promised macroeconomic stability and growth, with intended trickle down benefits.
- While poverty is a pervasive feature of most societies, past and present, it is the notion of unjust inequality that brings to the disadvantaged a sense of grievance. It is out of this grievance that radicalization and rebellion are likely to ferment, with untold ramifications for national and international security.
- Recent examples of the revolutionary uprisings in Egypt in early 2011, and the murmurs of radicalization in Greece in 2010 and ongoing in response to IMF imposed austerity measures, provide useful case studies of neoliberal economies to demonstrate how this insecurity can manifest in the real world.
- The global response to the revolutionary uprisings and radicalization appears to be the imposition of still more neoliberal policies, with what consequences for global security?

Conclusion

This uneven distribution of global investment patterns with its associated selectivity and polarization of societies has given rise to a series of modern phenomena, all indelibly associated with globalization, key among which are: a growing gap between the rich and poor within and between nations—in particular between North and South; the destruction of quality jobs and their replacement by casualization and temporary jobs; growing unemployment, in particular in the developing countries, which goes hand in hand with poverty (Wallace 1999), and; mass migration in pursuit of adequate standards of living (Allen and Hammett 1998). As a result, a true process of immiseration is now observable in many parts of the world, particularly within developing countries.

The liberal global governance network which determines the rules of the world trading system is essentially undemocratic, unaccountable, and lacking in transparency (McGrew and Poku 2007). The IMF, World Bank, and WTO are, of course, heavily influenced by the states that exercise most power within them, and they, of course, are the core capitalist states. The structure of global trade directly impacts on the security of the vulnerable billions, and their governments and the people themselves have no voice to affect this. All too often, corporate actors have had a hand in setting the global trade agenda, in drafting WTO agreements, and generally exercising a role that is not open to most developing countries due to their low level of financial and human resources.

Without more extensive representation in the governance of trade, it is unlikely that all-important job creation will be prioritized, and this is one of the mandates of the WTO Charter. Yet, in security terms, this is imperative, and demands action. Without employment opportunities, individuals, households, communities, sub state regions, countries, and entire world regions are denied the chance to fulfil basic needs within the marketplace: 200 million people in 2012 are classified as unemployed by the ILO (2012), and this is a push factor in migration, with the majority of migrants being unskilled. The ILO (2012: 9) urges that 'to generate sustainable growth while maintaining social cohesion, the world must rise to the urgent challenge of creating 600 million productive jobs over the next decade, which would still leave 900 million workers living with their families below the US$2 a day poverty line, largely in developing countries'.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, trade liberalization has been promoted beyond the core capitalist states by the 'Group of 7' (G7) (seven of the world's largest economies) and by unrepresentative, undemocratic global governance institutions, which they dominate. Second, it is difficult to test the validity of the assumption that free trade promotes growth and development, when politically motivated, self-interested protectionism characterizes the trade policies of core states, thus denying export opportunities to the rest, while simultaneously forcing them to liberalize and dumping on them heavily subsidized products, thus crippling local production outside of the core. Third, the fact that core capitalist states are unwilling to play by free market rules must prompt us to reflect on the reason for this reluctance. The answer is that to go down this road would be hugely destructive of sections of their domestic societies. In other words, G7 governments are well aware that capitalist markets based purely on profit do not work well for societies, and hence their unwillingness to implement them.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the key theories, assumptions and goals behind neoliberalism?
2. What are the key features of neoliberalism in the global economic system?
3. What are the key differences between neoliberal theory and its implementation?
4. What is the role of international financial institutions in promoting neoliberalism as an ideology for development?
5. How has neoliberal globalization impacted differently on developed and developing countries?
6. How has neoliberal globalization impacted differently on the wealthier and poorer segments of society?
7. How does global inequality increase global insecurity?
8. Compare and contrast neoliberalism with alternative theories of development.

FURTHER READING

- Glenn, John (2008), *Globalisation: North–South Perspectives*, Oxford: Routledge. This book provides a very good introduction to globalization and its impacts across the developed and developing world.
- Klein, Naomi (2008), *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, London: Penguin. This book is a thought-provoking read that explores the very visible 'hand' of capitalism.
- McGrew, Anthony and Poku, Nana K. (2007), *Globalisation, Development and Human Security*, Cambridge: Polity. This book contains a series of essays by leading scholars on the challenges that globalization is posing for development.
- Scholte, Jan Aart (2005), *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. This is an excellent and highly accessible book, exploring the dimensions of globalization, and the rise of superterritoriality.
- UNDP (2010), *The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, Human Development Report*, New York: United Nations Development Programme. This report offers a useful reflection on progression and regression in human development over the past few decades.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/** Human Development Report 2010—The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development.
- **http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org** The Bretton Woods Project focuses on the World Bank and the IMF to challenge their power, open policy space, and promote alternative approaches. They do this because they see these institutions as influential funders, proponents, and enforcers of economic and development policies, and global opinion formers.
- **http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/Reports** *Jadaliyya* is an independent ezine produced by ASI (Arab Studies Institute). *Jadaliyya* provides a unique source of insight and critical analysis that combines local knowledge, scholarship, and advocacy with an eye to audiences in the United States, the Arab world, and beyond. The site currently publishes posts in both Arabic and English.
- **http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_49041236_1_1_1_1_1,00.html** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World.
- **http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_34849_1_1_1_1_37467,00.html** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—Financial Market Trends and Policies.