

The Whole and the Parts: The Demands of 'Unity in Diversity'*

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Abstract

How does the current state of union accommodate the concurrent demands for unity and diversity? What kind of theorizing can grasp this dialectic and, with it, a general view of the whole? The essay revisits the concept of 'organized synarchy' and argues that Europe has brought about an ad-

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vanced system of ordered symbiosis among codetermined units which is not about their subordination to a superior centre, but rather about their preservation as distinctive but constituent units; it is about a common association retaining its essential character as an ordered plurality.

To Professor Dimitris Th. Tsatsos
– *in memoriam*, with gratitude

Prologue

AS Europe's federalist projections are in retreat, there emerges - more accurately, re-emerges - a statecentric view of the whole, questioning the extent to which the European Union (EU) has consolidated itself as a 'polity' in its own right: as a public architecture of ordered symbiosis whose essential 'constitution' cultivates conditions for a commonly shared future¹. Related to that is whether the EU 'polity' or, in less demanding terms, the 'political association'² it has come to

¹ Tsatsos distinguishes between 'polity' (*πολιτεία*) and 'state' (*κράτος*), defining the former as 'the sum total of social rules that govern a society' and the latter as 'the legal ordering of state authority'. See D. TH. TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity: Towards a New Democratic Discourse*, translated by N. Chrysoloras, Brussels: Bruylant, 2009, p. 1.

² 'In the most general sense', writes Weale, 'a political association has the ability to make rules that are treated as authoritative for the members of a collectivity. Democratic political association, in this general sense, arises when those binding rules are the product, according to some recognised process, of the expressed opinions of the members of the collectivity, either directly or through representatives'. See A. WEALE, *Democratic citizenship and the European Union*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,

resemble - defined as a general system of shared rule among codetermined polities - can hold its parts within a composite whole. As of the parts themselves, the question is raised whether they can meet the demands of collective ordered symbiosis and thus become '*symbiotes*' in Althusius' sense of the term: 'participants or partners in a common life'³.

Although a plural civic body may be said to exist, this is not in the compelling sense of a self-standing '*demos*'⁴ celebrating

2005, p. 51. The EU meets the general criterion, but if 'democratic' is added, assessments present a variety of takes. From Kinnas and Groom: 'Associations, then, as a "fraternal family of nations" - both governments and peoples - have both an internal dimension in the pursuit of a wide range of goals by a variety of actors at and across different levels within the ambit of the association. They also have an external dimension in offering a helping and healing hand to others beyond the confines of the association'. They conclude: 'Association is a flexible, open, decentralized and collaborative system which enables governments and peoples, states and IGOs to work together to the extent and in the form which suits them best individually. It is a useful tool in a world in which identity is a key value, but one in which complex interdependence accounts for a substantial part of the general well-being'. See J. KINNAS / A. J. R. GROOM, Association, in: A. J. R. GROOM / P. TAYLOR (eds), *Frameworks for International Co-operation*, London: Pinter, 1990, pp. 74 and 75, respectively.

³ J. ALTHUSIUS, *Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples*, edited and translated by F. S. CARNEY, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995 [1603, 1614, 2nd edition], p. 17.

⁴ Defined by Tsatsos and Nicolaidis, respectively, as 'a group of individuals who have enough in common to want to and to be able to decide collectively about their own affairs' and as 'the collective subject that arises out of the diversity, the dynamics, and the particulari-

the collective rewards of its civic union. This has been the case of Lijphart's 'consociational democracy': an elite-driven polity which combines the autonomy of the parts with conditions of stable rule for the whole⁵. It all comes down to the question of how to accord the EU 'polity', wherever situated in the federal/confederal, polity/organization or *demos/demoi* axis⁶, a viable equilibrium.

A View of the Whole

Democracy, defined by Tsatsos as 'an honest deduction of power to the will of the people'⁷, organizes the political constitution of public life in ways which reflect civic concerns and a sense of responsibility towards one's polity and fellow-citizens. Schumpeter identifies the following 'virtues usually

ties, of the sum total of the social base that organized itself under the auspices of an institutional power'. See TSATSOS, The European Sympolity, p. 49 and K. NICOLAIDIS, The New Constitution as European Demoi-crazy?, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 7(1), 2004, p. 81.

⁵ A. LIJPHART, Consociational Democracy, *World Politics*, 21(2), 1969, pp. 207-225.

⁶ See respectively, M. FORSYTH, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981, pp. 1-16, M. POLLACK, Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity or Experiment in New Governance?, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8, 2005, pp. 357-398 and, on the third axis, NICOLAIDIS, The New Constitution as European Demoi-crazy?, WEILER *et al.*, *European Democracy and its Critique* and D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, Europe's Could-Be Demos: Recasting the Debate, *West European Politics*, 19(4), 1996, pp. 787-801.

⁷ TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity*, p. 12.

associated with the democratic method: human dignity, the commitment that comes from the feeling that by and large things political do conform to one's ideas of how they should be, the coordination of politics with public opinion, the citizen's attitude of confidence in and cooperation with government, the reliance of the latter on the respect and support of the man in the street'⁸. Yet, a contemporary dilemma is whether to enhance 'positive liberty' which, in Berlin's words, 'derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master', 'to lead one prescribed form of life'⁹, or opt for what Scharpf calls 'output-oriented legitimacy'¹⁰.

⁸ J. A. SCHUMPETER, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992 [1943], p. 246.

⁹ I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in: I. BERLIN, *Liberty*, edited by H. HARDY, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1958], p. 178. Whereas by 'negative liberty' he means: 'I am nominally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others'. See p. 169.

¹⁰ As he writes: 'Input-oriented democratic thought emphasizes "government by the people". Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the "will of the people" - that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. By contrast, the output perspective emphasizes "government for the people". Here, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question'. See F. W. SCHARPF, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 6. See also, K.-O. LINDGREN / T. PERSSON, Input and output legitimacy: synergy or trade-off? Empirical evidence from an EU survey, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(4), 2010, pp. 449-467. I am grateful to

Whatever the preferred choice, democracy is about citizens caring for their polity and, in Dewey's terms, 'a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience'¹¹; a view reminiscent of Althusius' account of 'politics' as 'the art of associating (*consociandi*) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called "symbiotics"¹².

Life (and thus living) in the democratic polity combines a mental/ideational and a procedural/working condition; 'a state of mind' and an 'institutional arrangement', to recall Schattschneider and Schumpeter, respectively¹³. But encouraging the *demos* to reflect on the demands of symbiosis requires a core set of virtues (and values) and the means for embodying them in the workings of public institutions. Maynor makes the point well when he writes that 'citizens must learn about the substantive nature of the institutions of the republic, how they work, how to use them, and, importantly, how to challenge them'¹⁴. This accords with Pettit's

my colleague Achilleas Mitsos for his comments and for this latter addition.

¹¹ J. DEWEY, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1916, p. 87.

¹² ALTHUSIUS, *Politica*, p. 17.

¹³ E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, *Two Hundred Million People in Search of a Government*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969 p. 42, quoted in D. ADAMANY, Introduction, in: E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*, Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1975 [1960], p. xii and SCHUMPETER, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, p. 269.

¹⁴ J. W. MAYNOR, *Republicanism in the Contemporary World*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 190.

'contestatory democracy' which, as he explains, 'will have to be deliberative, requiring that decisions are based on considerations of allegedly common concern, if there is to be a systematically available basis for people to challenge what government does' and 'inclusive, making room for people from every quarter to be able to press challenges against legislative or executive or judicial decisions' as well as 'responsive to the contestations that are brought against government decisions'¹⁵. This notion, he adds, 'connects with the emphasis in premodern republicanism on the virtue of having laws that have stood the test of time and that are part of an ancient constitution. And it connects also with the traditional view that the people have the right to challenge and resist laws that are arbitrary in character: that this indeed is what constituted the people as sovereign'¹⁶.

Yet, building instruments of democratic shared rule does not require a radical reordering of pre-established orders and cultures in the EU, but a structured plurality of diverse but constituent publics¹⁷. The aim is for distinctive but engaging publics to form a 'Republic of Europeans', whose democratic vitality and 'civility'¹⁸ draw from claims to 'civic unity in

¹⁵ P. PETTIT, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 277 and 277-278, respectively.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 278.

¹⁷ See K. A. LAVDAS / D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *A Republic of Europeans: Civic Potential in a Liberal Milieu*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, especially chapters 2 and 3.

¹⁸ On the term 'democratic civility', see R. W. HEFNER, *On the History and Cross-Cultural Possibility of a Democratic Ideal*, in: R. W. HEFNER, *Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-Cultural Pos-*

polycultural diversity'¹⁹; it is about capturing the dialectic of that plurality. Thus the need for evolutionary forms of authority-sharing which may, in time, move the EU from a type of association termed 'organized synarchy'²⁰ to one founded on Pettit's 'freedom as non-domination' thesis²¹, 'permitting', in Bowman's words, 'multiple forms of political membership and overlapping sites of pooled sovereignty'²². A sense of 'demos-hood' may still be needed, but along the lines of Tsatsos' 'sympolity'²³, Dobson's 'multipolity'²⁴ or

sibility of a Modern Political Ideal, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998, pp. 3-49.

¹⁹ See K. A. LAVDAS / D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, A Republic of Europeans: Civic Unity in Polycultural Diversity, in: L. BEKEMANS *et al.* (eds), *Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship: Translating Values into Actions*, Venice: Marsilio, 2007, pp. 207-227.

²⁰ D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *Theorizing European Integration*, 2nd edition, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 131-146.

²¹ Pettit defines 'domination' as 'a power of interference on an arbitrary basis'. See PETTIT, *Republicanism*, p. 52. As Viroli writes on 'republican liberty', 'it accepts the idea of liberty as an absence of impediment, but it adds the requirement that liberty be an absence of domination (of the constant possibility of interference)'. He explains: 'The source of this interpretation of political liberty was the principle of Roman law that defines the status of a free person as not being subject to the arbitrary will of another person - in contrast to a slave, who is dependent on another person's will'. See VIROLI, *Republicanism*, p. 43 and 8, respectively. See also SKINNER, *Liberty before liberalism*, p. 27.

²² J. BOWMAN, The European Union Democratic Deficit: Federalists, Skeptics, and Revisionists, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 5(2), 2006, p. 193.

²³ See TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity*.

MacCormick's 'mixed commonwealth'²⁵; at best, a '*res publica composita*'²⁶; at least, a structured plurality of codetermined polities; or, following Nicolaidis' conception, a 'European "demoi-cracy" founded on the persistent plurality of its component peoples but not reducible to a set of complex bargains among sovereign states'²⁷; or, from Taylor's optic, a 'symbiotic consociation'²⁸ but with a propensity towards a civic-oriented association whose publics can transfer their democratic claims to and via the central institutions.

The above conceptions are also attuned to an imaging of the EU as a 'confederal consociation'²⁹; a term aimed to build on

²⁴ L. DOBSON, Constitutionalism and Citizenship in the European Union: A Normative Approach, *Constitutionalism Web-Papers*, 1, 2000, p. 15.

²⁵ N. MACCORMICK, Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth", *Law and Philosophy*, 16(4), 1997, pp. 331-356.

²⁶ On HOENONIUS' distinction in his *Disputatorium Politicarum Liber* (1615) between '*res publica simplex*' - 'consisting', as Elazar writes, 'of one state' - and '*res publica composita*', see D. J. ELAZAR, *Covenant and Civil Society: The Constitutional Matrix of Modern Democracy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998, p. 25.

²⁷ NICOLAIDIS, The New Constitution as European Demoi-cracy?, p. 76.

²⁸ P. TAYLOR, *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process*, London: Pinter, 1993, pp. 80-111.

²⁹ D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, Democracy and Symbiosis in the European Union: Towards a Confederal Consociation?, *West European Politics*, 17(4), 1994, pp. 1-14.

Taylor's consociational analogy of the then Community³⁰ and account for its statecentric, yet evolutionary, nature as a consensual union whose polities retain a key role in managing their common association³¹. Although systemic growth may release pressures towards centralization, these do not in themselves make for a 'federal republic' or any other superior centre; rather, they are an indication of states adjusting to collective terms without negating their own orders. Recent changes in the workings of the EU³² have not affected its character as a 'synarchy of co-sovereigns'³³. This is key to acknowledging that, for all its late-modern predicaments, sovereignty cannot be convincingly detached from the parts: the EU is about strengthening the latter through, not despite, states' collective capacity to combine skills, resources and authority. Taylor made the point well: 'The states became stronger through strengthening the collectivity'³⁴. As Krasner writes:

The European Union is an example of an institutional arrangement that has transgressed conventional sovereignty rules so successfully that it is hardly seen as being a transgression at all. The member states of the EU have used their international legal

³⁰ P. TAYLOR, *The European Community and the state: assumptions, theories and propositions*, *Review of International Studies*, 17(2), 1991, pp. 109-125.

³¹ D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *Democracy in the European Union*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998, pp. 171-209.

³² See P. CRAIG, *The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

³³ See CHRYSOCHOOU, *Theorizing European Integration*, p. 139, and LAVDAS/CHRYSOCHOOU, *A Republic of Europeans?*, pp. 48-50.

³⁴ P. TAYLOR, *The European Union in the 1990s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 97.

sovereignty, their right to sign treaties, to create supranational institutions and pooled sovereignty arrangements that have compromised their Westphalian/Vattelien sovereignty [...] The European Union has been so successful because it has created over time a set of self-enforcing equilibria. Individual states may have not been entirely happy with specific decisions that were taken, but their leaders still decided that adhering to the Union was better than departing from it³⁵.

Despite concessions taken by states to deal with the antinomies of shared rule, they did not lose sight of their own autonomy: accommodating varying degrees of unity and diversity has invited respect for their own integrities in ways which make sovereignty still valid but not equated to classical self-rule. This confirms Lijphart's principle: 'on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by the segments' leaders, but on all other issues, decision-making is left to the segments'³⁶. As to the EU's confederal - treaty-based -

³⁵ S. D. KRASNER, *The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty and International Law*, *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 25(4), 2004, pp. 1085-1086. On 'Vattelien sovereignty', see p. 1077, fn. 4. Even despite the reality of the Brexit vote, this view seems to capture the idea of states opting for the rewards of shared sovereignty. On 'Westphalian sovereignty' see S. D. KRASNER, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 20-25, D. PHILPOTT, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, chapter 5 and R. JACKSON, *Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, pp. 49-56; on changing conceptions of sovereignty, see J. BARTELSON, *The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited*, *The European Journal of International Law*, 17(2), pp. 463-474.

³⁶ A. LIJPHART, *Consociation and federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 13(3), 1979, p. 500.

attributes, states retain control over the extension of powers to the centre; they still determine their future, for all the profound impact large-scale institutionalization has on their domestic orders. Thus the German Constitutional Court's account of the EU as a '*Staatenverbund*' in its Maastricht and Lisbon rulings³⁷. As stated in the latter: 'The concept of *Verbund* covers a close long-term association of states which remain sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis of a treaty, whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their Member States, *i.e.*

³⁷ See BVerfG, 2BvR 2134/92 and 2BvR 2159/92. For an analysis, see M. HERDEGEN, Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union", *Common Market Law Review*, 31(2), 1994, pp. 235-49, U. EVERLING, The Maastricht Judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its Significance for the Development of the European Union, *Yearbook of European Law*, 14, 1994, pp. 1-19 and J. H. H. WEILER, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, *European Law Journal*, 1(3), 1995, pp. 219-58. On the 'Lisbon ruling', see BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009 and, for an analysis, C. WOHLFAHRT, The Lisbon Case: A Critical Summary, *German Law Review*, 10(8), 2009, pp. 1277-1286 and C. SCHÖNBERGER, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's epigones at sea, Special Issue: 'The Lisbon Judgement and the German Federal Constitutional Court', *German Law Journal*, 10(8), 2009, pp. 1201-1218. Appropriate conceptual analogies are Tsatsos' 'sympolity' and Forsyth's 'federal union of states: 'a profound locking together of states themselves as regards the exercise of fundamental powers' or 'a contract between equals to act henceforth as one'. See TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity*, pp. 1-6 and 29-39 and FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, pp. 15 and 16, respectively.

the citizens of the states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation'³⁸. As von Beyme comments: 'It has the drawback of being practically untranslatable, except into Swedish (*statsförbunder*). In all the major languages, the most readily accepted translation would be federation or confederation'³⁹. But this does not prevent the 'centre' from exercising authority; rather, it challenges the assumption, even contention, that it is becoming all the more 'state-like'. True, the 'centre' retains a key role in regional management and there are good reasons for states to enhance the centripetal dynamics of the general system. But the latter is bound by state-controlled rules; the result being that 'ever closer union' rests on states' capacity to invest in the common rewards of shared rule; it is not driven by those who envisage a federal end condition. As Taylor writes, 'the interests of the collectivity and the states had to be compatible and symbiotic'⁴⁰.

'Organized synarchy' projects a general image of the whole: an ordered political association of codetermined sovereignties whose working condition evolves alongside its component orders. It makes us think of a union called upon to meet the demands of ordered symbiosis within a polity-building

³⁸ BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, par. 229C, quoted in F. C. MAYER / M. WENDEL, *Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism*, in: M. AVBELJ / J. KOMÁREK (eds), *Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 143.

³⁹ K. VON BEYME, *Fischer's Move towards a European Constitution*, in: C. JOERGES *et al.* (eds), *What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer*, Badia Fiesolana, FI: European University Institute, 2000, p. 77.

⁴⁰ TAYLOR, *The European Union in the 1990s*, p. 181.

exercise that allows the parts to be treated as constitutional polities in their own right. This may be far from a post-statist order, but also more than merely a reflection of legal/institutional synergies: it embraces a transcendental quality which resembles Althusius' 'commonwealth' construct⁴¹:

For Althusius, the ownership of sovereignty is shared by the narrower and wider political communities constituting the universal commonwealth. It is, in other words, a kind of co-sovereignty shared among partially autonomous collectivities consenting to its exercise on their behalf and within the general confines of this consent requirement. The only modern political system coming somewhat close to this notion of confederal sovereignty may be the European Union, the supranational powers of which ultimately rest on negotiated agreement⁴².

As Taylor put it: 'Something remarkable had happened: sovereignty was now a condition, even a form, of participation in the larger entity [...] It was even possible to imagine states which were sovereign but which normally exercised no exclusive competences'⁴³. In the EU, sovereignty is still alive, but also attuned to the demands of a common association. After all: 'Membership in the European Project had always been sought in order to restore the nation states of Europe [...] It was necessary to understand this to see that further integration need not lead to the creation of an overweening

⁴¹ See ALTHUSIUS, *Politica*, especially chapter 1.

⁴² T. O. HUEGLIN, *Early Modern Concepts for Late Modern Worlds: Althusius on Community and Federalism*, Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999, p. 4.

⁴³ P. TAYLOR, *International Organization in the Age of Globalization*, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 47.

superstate'⁴⁴. Thus answering the question of whether the EU still represents a states' affair, should take stock of its essential character as an 'organized synarchy' which escapes the rigidities of cultural and civic homogeneity that served the nation-building (hi)stories of the parts. The EU may still be a states' affair, but one in which states interact with a plurality of forces, actors, spaces and conditions which make them increasingly aware of the demands of their association.

Reflective Overview

EU polity expectations are rather limited today, given the unfolding crises in the daily management of the general system as with the uncertainties caused by the Brexit vote and the all-alarming rise of the far-right⁴⁵. Of relevance too are the

⁴⁴ P. TAYLOR, *The End of European Integration: Anti-europeanism examined*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 7.

⁴⁵ Most notably in Germany, but also following the 2014 European Parliament elections. See among other commentaries on the German national elections of 24 September 2017, L. KING, *The return of the far right in Germany: What does the rise of the AfD party mean?*, *Los Angeles Times*, 26 September 2017, A. TAUB, *What the Far Right's Rise May Mean for Germany's Future*, *The New York Times*, 26 September 2017 and G. GLASGOW, *Letter from Berlin: German Shame and the Rise of the Far Right*, *The Independent*, 27 September 2017. On the latter issue, see J. HASSING / M. N. FRANKLIN (eds), *The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections: Second Order or Second Rate?*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. It is worth quoting Glasgow's optimism for all democrats to share: 'Walking through Berlin this week it struck me how there's a beautiful flow of multiculturalism here - so many different people, cuisines, languages. It somehow works. This gives me hope'.

new sovereignty restrictions, as in the case of the Eurozone, which project an intergovernmentalism with what Puetter calls a 'deliberative' twist⁴⁶. And so are Teague's 'cooperative intergovernmentalism'⁴⁷ and Bellamy's 'republican intergovernmentalism': 'a picture of the EU in which democratic states negotiate an ever closer union of mutual benefit to their peoples while preserving the civic freedom of their citizens'⁴⁸. But is 'organized synarchy' a permanent condition, even a mirroring of a possible end condition, or is it merely a passing reflection of an evolving state of play? Be that as it may, it is a cultural achievement in its own right, confirming states' disposition to be involved in their partners' affairs; it is now part of states' and citizens' everyday life and thus part of a culture in dealing with shared realities, although these may shake the level of trust as in the different accounts of solidarity⁴⁹; it is an indication, even a conviction, of change in

⁴⁶ U. PUETTER, Europe's deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and European Council in EU economic governance, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(2), 2012, pp. 161-178.

⁴⁷ P. TEAGUE, Europe of the regions and the future of the national systems of industrial relations, in: A. AMIN / J. TOMANEY (eds), *Behind the Myth of European Union: Prospects for Cohesion*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 145.

⁴⁸ R. BELLAMY, "An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe": Republican Intergovernmentalism and Democratic Representation within the EU, in: R. BELLAMY / S. KRÖGER (eds), Special Issue: 'Representation and Democracy in the EU: Does one come at the expense of the other?', *Journal of European Integration*, 35(5), 2013, p. 507.

⁴⁹ Or rather, its limitations, in view of the 'flexible solidarity' proposed by the V4. See Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, Bratislava, 16 September 2016.

states' general dispositions: for all their differences, they are now conscious of their collective predicament that more is to be achieved by joining forces. This accords with Nicolaidis' view of the EU as being 'more than a particularly strong version of a confederation of sovereign states, in that its people are connected politically directly and not only through the bargains of their leaders'⁵⁰. It is also in line with Tsatsos' account of the qualitative properties of the larger order:

The shift from the pure logic of international law to a new rationale that partly resembles the European constitutional culture, signifies an evolution, perhaps a change, or, at least, an expansion of the traditional discipline of general theory of the state, to a novel and original field of legally regulated coexistence of human beings. The issue at hand is therefore an approach to the European Sympolity on the basis of a *post-statist theory*⁵¹.

The European project has come a long way since its inception. It now stands for the ordered symbiosis of codetermined polities. Also, keeping in mind Puchala's prophecy that 'European integration will for the foreseeable future continue to be an ongoing social scientific puzzle'⁵², its theory evolution seems to confirm Rosamond's assertion: 'European integration may well be a totally unique enterprise without either historical precedent or contemporary parallel, but it is a ready

⁵⁰ NICOLAIDIS, *The New Constitution as European Democracy?*, pp. 82-83.

⁵¹ TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity*, pp. 30-31.

⁵² D. J. PUCHALA, *Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration*, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(2), 1999, p. 330.

source for comparative study in some of the most emerging and lively social science currently going on⁵³. Still though, the question is raised as to whether Europeans can form a larger political community, given that, as Castiglione writes, 'our destiny in a political community remains linked to that of others, with whom we live in an inclusive relationship of relative familiarity and identity and on whose solidarity we rely'⁵⁴. As he phrases the question, 'in what sense can the European Union be a society of strangers (even more so than a nation-state would be) and at the same time a "political community"⁵⁵? Arguably, it all comes down to how Europeans think of themselves; how they value their own polities (and politics) in relation to collective civic attachments, allegiances and aspirations; how to inspire a vision for diverse but fellow-citizens. This does not require an integrated, nation-like identity, or for that matter a shared view of an end state; rather, it is about citizens constituting a polity of their own and in its own right.

⁵³ B. ROSAMOND, *Theories of European Integration*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p. 197.

⁵⁴ D. CASTIGLIONE, Political identity in a community of strangers, in: J. T. CHECKEL / P. J. KATZENSTEIN (eds), *European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 49.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* As Honohan writes: 'Since Europe is notoriously marked by diversity of nationality and views of history, interdependence of fate and future can come to be seen as the basis of political community'. See I. HONOHAN, *Civic Republicanism*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 280.

Conclusion

Politically incomplete as it may be and, as the currently unfolding 'Future of Europe' debate reveals, 'architecturally' too⁵⁶, the EU has gained a fair share of authority over time. But can it still inspire? True, Europeans still live their lives in multiple polities; they may not eventually amount to a federal *demos*; they may also fail to acquire their own constitution; but they can and should aspire to a common future. As Castiglione writes, 'the European Union must cultivate its political identity neither in the heroic form of the "ultimate sacrifice", nor in high-principled forms of constitutional patriotism, but in the more banal sense of citizens' growing perception that the Union contributes to a fundamental (though multilayered) institutional and legal order within which they can exercise their liberty'⁵⁷. In that sense, the EU should invest in a civic strategy for uniting, not unifying, Europeans, whose *caritas* towards their common association, this foundational quality of any polity's essential architecture, respects their diversity and invites them to lead their lives as fellow-citizens - with freedom!

⁵⁶ As notably illustrated in Emmanuel Macron's reformist 'Sorbonne speech' of 26 September 2017. In stark contrast, but no less consequential for Europe's future architectural design, comes Theresa May's 'Brexit speech' of 2 March 2018, laying out a framework of choices for a prospective 'partnership'.

⁵⁷ CASTIGLIONE, Political identity in a community of strangers, p. 51.