

Europe's Late-Modern 'Syspondia': A Genus Reduction

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Abstract

What does it mean, and take, for a cluster of 'politeiai' to form and, crucially, sustain a union for their collective symbiosis, even to combine into a larger 'politeia'? How to construe such a demanding exercise through new conceptual lenses? An attempt to an answer in what follows is through the lens of 'syspondia'; a bond shared among diverse coevolving parts to a political association, each forming a unity of its own but all aspiring to a shared life as in Europe's late-modern 'syspondia'.

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Prolegomenon

COLLECTIVE symbiosis is about sharing in *'politeia'*, for which Polybios writes: 'The chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is politeia; for springing from this, as from a fountain-head, all designs and plans of action not only originate, but reach their consummation'¹; 'politics' being its all-embracing quality for, as Heywood writes, 'it literally means "what concerns the polis"'² or, as Miller notes from an Aristotelian optic, 'it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens'³; from Schwartz: 'It is the collective care of our common concerns, by citizens who are self-conscious'⁴, while for Metaxas, it is *'the principle general organizational process of peaceful intervention in the name of most peoples' will*⁵.

¹ POLYBIOS, *The Histories* VI.9.10, translated by W. R. PATON in the Loeb series Vol. III, pp. 294-295.

² A. HEYWOOD, *Political Theory*, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004, p. 49. On the *'polis'*, Kitto writes that 'its affairs are the affairs of all'. See H. D. F. KITTO, *The Greeks*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975 [1951, revised reprint, 1957], p. 71.

³ F. MILLER, Aristotle's Political Theory, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), E. N. ZALTA (ed.), at <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/aristotle-politics> (accessed on 20 May 2021).

⁴ N. L. SCHWARTZ, *The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and Community*, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 106, with reference to S. S. WOLIN, Contract and Birthright, *Political Theory*, 14(2), 1986, pp. 179-195.

⁵ A-I. D. METAXAS, Prerequisite Terms: Epistemological Premises and Research Guarantees, in: A-I. D. METAXAS (ed.), *Political Science: Interdisciplinary and Synchronic Investigation of Political Action*, Vol. I (in Greek), Athens: I. Sideris Publishers, 2016, p. 28 (my transla-

One may extensively add to the above, without decoupling politics from the rewards of symbiosis as the epitome of 'sharing'. Althusius writes: 'Politics is the art of associating (*consociandi*) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called "symbiotics"⁶; and Carney explains: 'Symbiotic association involves something more than mere existence together'⁷. From Buber, 'where *I* and *Thou* meet, there is the realm of "between"⁸, with Arendt invoking the Roman phrase '*inter homines esse*' ('being among men')⁹. K. Tsatsos concurs: 'The isolated human is but a reduction of our thought. In reality, a human has no existence alone, for s/he has no self-sufficiency. The individual is transient; it is an excerpt of life, and becomes fulfilled only where a society of humans exists who mutually complement the imperfections of their physical existence'¹⁰.

tion). See also A-I. D. METAXAS, De l'interaction politique: Essai d'une définition holistique, *Revue Hellénique de Droit International*, 26-27, 1975, p. 275.

⁶ J. ALTHUSIUS, *Politica: Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples*, edited and translated by F. S. CARNEY, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995 [1603, 2nd edition, 1614], p. 17.

⁷ F. S. CARNEY, Translator's Introduction, *in*: ALTHUSIUS, *Politica*, p. xv.

⁸ M. BUBER, *Between Man and Man*, translated by R. GREGOR-SMITH, London and New York: Routledge, 2002 [1947], p. 243.

⁹ H. ARENDT, *The Human Condition*, 2nd edition, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998 [1958], p. 51.

¹⁰ K. TSATSOS, *The Social Philosophy of Ancient Greeks* (in Greek), Athens: Estia Publications, 1993, p. 131 (my translation).

For all its inescapable human imperfections, *'politeia'* has for centuries now celebrated its enduring qualities as the architecture of public symbiosis; its legitimizing referent, the *'demos'*¹¹, directing its democratic claims to and via the public institutions. Whether or not *'politeia'* confirms or transcends (sovereign) statehood, it is an ordering of nested political lives; in Althusius's terms, *'symbiotes'*: 'participants or partners in a common life'¹²; this also applies to a polity setting like the European Union (EU), what Schmitter called 'the most complex polity that human agency has ever devised'¹³, whose synchronic *'politeia/politeiai'* quality invites for insightful conceptions as are, among others, D. Tsatsos's *'sympolity'*¹⁴, Dobson's *'multipolity'*¹⁵, Wind's *'polycentric polity'*¹⁶, MacCormick's *'commonwealth of "post-sovereign"*

¹¹ Tsatsos defines it as 'the *collective subject that arises out of the diversity, the dynamics, and the particularities, of the sum total of the social base that organized itself under the auspices of an institutional power*', and 'democracy' as 'a process of reduction of power to the demos'. See D. TH. TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity: Towards a New Democratic Discourse*, translated by N. CHRYSOLORAS, Brussels: Bruylant, 2009, pp. 49, 19, respectively.

¹² ALTHUSIUS, *Politica*, p. 19.

¹³ P. C. SCHMITTER, *How to Democratize the European Union ...and Why Bother?*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p. 75.

¹⁴ See TSATSOS, *The European Sympolity*.

¹⁵ L. DOBSON, *Constitutionalism and Citizenship in the European Union: A Normative Approach*, *Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB 1/2000*, p. 15, at <https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-sowi/professuren/wiener/dokumente/conwebpapers/pdfs/2000/conweb-4-2000.pdf> (accessed on 20 May 2021).

¹⁶ M. WIND, *The European Union as a polycentric polity: returning to a neo-medieval Europe?*, in: J. H. H. WEILER / M. WIND (eds),

states'¹⁷, Elazar's 'postmodern confederation'¹⁸, Nicolaidis's 'demoicracy'¹⁹, Bellamy's 'international association of democratic states'²⁰, Eleftheriadis's 'cosmopolitan union of peoples'²¹ and Lavdas's 'transnational republic'²².

European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 103-132.

¹⁷ N. MACCORMICK, Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth", *Law and Philosophy*, 16(4), 1997, p. 331.

¹⁸ D. J. ELAZAR, The New Europe: a Federal State or a Confederation of States?, *Swiss Political Science Review*, 4(4), 1998, p. 124.

¹⁹ K. NICOLAIDIS, The New Constitution as European Democracy?, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Thought*, 7(1), 2004, pp. 76-93.

²⁰ R. BELLAMY, "An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe": Republican Intergovernmentalism and Demoicratic Representation within the EU, in: R. BELLAMY / S. KRÖGER (eds), Special Issue: 'Representation and Democracy in the EU: Does one come at the expense of the other?', *Journal of European Integration*, 35(5), 2013, pp. 499-516.

²¹ P. ELEFThERiADIS, Federalism and Jurisdiction, in: G. DE BAERE / E. CLOOTS (eds), *Federalism and EU Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 62 and, more recently, P. ELEFThERiADIS, *A Union of Peoples: Europe as a Community of Principle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, especially pp. 131-138.

²² K. A. LAVDAS, The European Union as Transnational Republic? Consociational, Multicultural, and Post-Territorial Dimensions, in: D. E. TABACHNICK / L. BRADSHAW (eds), *Citizenship and Multiculturalism in Western Liberal Democracies*, Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2017, pp. 137-157.

A Genus Reduction

Why 'genus reduction'? The argument is that the EU can be seen through the lens of the Greek term '*syspondia*' ('*συσπονδία*')²³ as a bond shared among '*politeiai*'. As a 'genus concept' for a plurality of associated units (and unities) that have embraced a common orientation, it allows for a variety of 'species': 'federation' as 'federal state'²⁴, a sovereign unit of constituent unities; 'confederation', a union of (co)sovereigns or, from Ola, '*an extensively decentralized system with sovereign multi-units*'²⁵, and from Forsyth, a 'federal union of states': 'a contract between equals to act henceforth as one'²⁶ – other

²³ It appears in A. BALBI, *Geography*, Vol. I [*Abrégé de géographie rédigé sur un nouveau plan*, Paris: J. Renouard, 1833] (in Greek), translated by K. M. KOUMAS, Vienna: A. Benko, 1838, p. 98.

²⁴ Burgess writes: 'A federation is a particular kind of state. It is a distinctive organizational form or institutional fact the main purpose of which is to accommodate the constituent units of a union in the decision-making procedure of the central government by means of constitutional entrenchment'. See M. BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 2.

²⁵ O. OLA, *Confederal systems: A comparative analysis*, *Civilisations*, 18(2), 1968, p. 282.

²⁶ M. FORSYTH, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederations*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981, p. 16, having noted that 'a confederation manifests itself as a constituted unity capable of making laws for its members, however it is not the constituted unity of one *people* or *nation*, but a unity constituted by *states*'. See p. 15.

terms being 'confederacy' and 'confederance' as treaty-based associations of self-governed units²⁷.

On the distinction between 'federation' and 'confederation', Elazar writes: 'For most of recorded history, federalism meant confederation [...] [which] was considered normative federalism and federation was the newcomer on the block' or, as he also notes: 'Before 1787, federalism was defined as the loose linkage of states within confederations'²⁸. Following Forsyth and Burgess, respectively, 'the terms "confederation" and "federation" were invented in the nineteenth century to distinguish looser from more centralized federal unions' and, on what the latter calls 'the stigma of confederation': 'Since 1789 the term "confederation" has often been used in a pejorative sense. Political scientists and historians have frequently dismissed confederal government as both weak and transient. Indeed there has been a general tendency to regard it as a mere transition on the road toward federation – that more perfect union'²⁹.

²⁷ On the former, see C. HUGHES, *Confederacies*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963. Among its uses, the latter term has been employed by Church as corresponding to the uniqueness of the then European Community. See C. H. CHURCH, *The Not So Model Republic? The Relevance of Swiss Federalism to the European Community*, *Discussion Papers in Federal Studies*, No. FS93/4, University of Leicester, 1995, p. 15.

²⁸ See respectively, D. J. ELAZAR, *Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 40 and D. J. ELAZAR, *The New Europe: a Federal State or a Confederation of States?*, p. 123.

²⁹ See respectively, M. FORSYTH, *Political Science, Federalism and Europe*, *Discussion Papers in Federal Studies*, No. FS95/2, University

'*Sympoliteia*' (or '*koinon*', termed by Forrest a '*pre-polis polis*')³⁰, or 'league'³¹, refers to ancient Greek city-state unions. 'Yet', McInerney writes, 'the federal center was often little more than the symbolic heart of the *koinon* and frequently exerted little real authority except as the place where power was mediated between real power brokers, the towns, tribes, or local elites that dominated the league'³². Moreover, from Walbank: 'It is also used to describe the relationship of two states linked by *isopoliteia* (literally "equality of citizenship"), that is the mutual grant of the political rights of citizenship, which became actual only if and when the citizen of one city took up residence in another'³³. From Beck and Funke, 'in the Hellenistic period, the noun *sympoliteia* is attested, which propels the idea of a joint polity', adding that 'in the first half of the fourth century BCE, the word is introduced by means of a

of Leicester, 1995, p. 15 and BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, pp. 59, 58, respectively.

³⁰ G. W. FORREST, The pre-polis polis, in: R. BROCK / S. HODKINSON (eds), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 280-292, quoted in J. MCINERNEY, *Polis and koinon*, in: H. BECK (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 467.

³¹ See D. YORK, *Leagues of Nations, Ancient, Medieval and Modern*, London: Swarthmore Press, 1919, chapter 1 and H. BECK / P. FUNKE, An introduction to federalism in Greek antiquity, in: H. BECK / P. FUNKE (eds), *Federalism in Greek antiquity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 1-29.

³² MCINERNEY, *Polis and koinon*, in: BECK (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, p. 472.

³³ F. W. WALBANK, Were there Greek Federal States?, *Scripta Classica Israelica*, 3, 1976-77, pp. 32-33.

verb, *sympoliteuein*, which means, literally, to share in politics or in a common *politeia*', and that 'a *koinon*, unlike a tribe or kinship group, is characterized by the existence of a federal center which embodies genuine state-authority (whatever the definition of state may be at the time)³⁴.

Worth noting is Walbank's skeptical view of Giovannini's thesis: '*Sympoliteia*, he insists, is an activity, not an institution; it means "a sharing of political life". It is a sort of symbiosis, something that is happening within a state that is a going concern. You do not create a *sympoliteia*, you share in (or cease to share in) the *sympoliteia* of an existing state', while Walbank's position is that 'among its various meanings, so it has usually been assumed, are "an act of union" [...] and "the union itself" which results from that act'³⁵.

Lazani paints the larger picture, arguing that 'the causes for the extraordinary expansive force and attractiveness of Greek federal states in the fourth and third centuries should not only be sought in their ethnic cohesion or in their military power, but first and foremost in the codification of a federal *politeia*, which fostered economic and social mobility as much as it guaranteed equality of political rights within the terri-

³⁴ BECK / FUNKE, An introduction to federalism in Greek antiquity, in: BECK / FUNKE (eds), *Federalism in Greek antiquity*, pp. 14, 25, respectively.

³⁵ WALBANK, Were there Greek Federal States?, pp. 33-34, 33, respectively, with reference to A. GIOVANNINI, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (Hypomnemata, Heft 33), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1971.

tory of the whole *ethnos*³⁶, while Hansen depicts the following condition: 'The world of the ancient Greek city-states was never a system of equal independent *poleis*, but a complicated hierarchy of *poleis*, some independent, some not, but all with a good deal of self-government, in internal affairs at least. In the Hellenistic period practically all *poleis* had become dependent states, and thus the *polis* was combined with other types of society, of which some were above and some below the *niveau* of the *polis*'³⁷. On Greek 'federal states' he writes:

'The rise of larger political units took the form of leagues of city-states, which soon broke up again, or federations, which were more stable in structure. A federal state usually comprised all the *poleis* in a region; and when the Greeks chose this solution, it was doubtless because a federal state permitted the retention of the *polis* as the essential political unit. In particular regions small *poleis* were often swallowed up by larger ones, but the result of such unification was always a bigger *polis*, never a territorial state in the modern sense'³⁸.

On the ever-present challenges of political terminology, Walbank asserts that 'it is wrong to assume that because the Greeks had no word which they used exclusively to denote a

³⁶ C. LAZANI, *Politeia* in Greek federal states, in: L. CECCHET / A. BUSSETO (eds), *Citizens in the Graeco-Roman World: Aspects of Citizenship from the Archaic Period to AD 212*, Leiden: Brill, 2017, p. 78.

³⁷ M. H. HANSEN, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 130.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 55.

federal state, they had therefore no concept of that institution³⁹, while from Beck and Funke's standpoint,

'the diversity of federal designs, with many regional variations and multiple moments of adaptation and change, speak against rigid terminological definitions. The breadth of federal experiments clearly exceeds crude dichotomies such as "loose" and "true" state-integration. The scholarly vocabulary today largely avoids preconceived classifications. It is preferable to apply a terminology that is receptive to diversity and allows for a meaningful description of dynamic federal designs in the particular political culture of ancient Greece⁴⁰.

Having also stated: 'The debate over the concept-attribution problem indicates just how much the understanding of ancient Greek federalism owes to the persistent advancement of scholarship'⁴¹.

³⁹ WALBANK, *Were there Greek Federal States?*, p. 35. The ancient Greek term from which the word 'όμοσπονδία' ('federation') derives is 'όμόσπονδος', the person who shares a libation. It answers to HERODOTUS, *Histories* 9.16. For 'όμοσπόνδων' and 'όμόσπονδον', see respectively, AESCHINES, *On the Embassy* 2.163 and DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown* 18.287. The author wishes to thank Charilaos Platanakis for his valuable help with the classical sources.

⁴⁰ BECK / FUNKE, An introduction to federalism in Greek antiquity, in: BECK / FUNKE (eds), *Federalism in Greek antiquity*, p. 13.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 5. See also, E. M. L. ECONOMOU / N. KYRIAZIS, The emergence and the development of the Achaean federation: lessons and institutional proposals for modern societies, *Evolutionary and Institutional Economics*, 13(1), 2016, pp. 93-112.

Other forms include 'homopoliteia' ('ὁμοπολιτεία') as the Treaty between ancient Kos and Kalymnos⁴²; 'symmachia', an alliance of ('poleis'-)states – from Figueira and Jensen's distinction: 'Unlike federal leagues, which aimed to unite culturally related *poleis* into polities that arrayed political functions over several hierarchical levels, interstate alliances were formed for primarily security purposes. Their ostensible purpose was not to create a new political identity which superseded the *polis*, but to harness cooperative behavior among city-states that retained significant political functions locally'⁴³; 'amphiktionia', in York's words: 'An association among independent tribes or City States, whose members met at stated times round a general sanctuary for worship'⁴⁴ or, from Funke: 'Its essential constituent was the creation of a space sanctioned by a common cult that allowed interaction between a certain number of neighboring tribes or *poleis*'⁴⁵; 'in-

⁴² See H-U. WIEMER, *Hellenistic Cities: The End of Greek Democracy?*, in: BECK (ed), *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, p. 57. See also, S. M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Kos: A Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* (Hypomnemata, Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben, 51) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978, pp. 119-129.

⁴³ T. FIGUEIRA / S. R. JENSEN, *Governing Interstate Alliances*, in: BECK (ed), *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, pp. 495. See also, B. MEIBNER, *Ancient Greek Coalition Warfare: Classical and Hellenistic Examples*, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 14(3-4), 2012, pp. 1-16 and F. K. LISTER, *The Early Security Confederations: From the Ancient Greeks to the United Colonies of New England*, Westport, CO: Greenwood, 1999.

⁴⁴ YORK, *Leagues of Nations, Ancient, Medieval and Modern*, p. 2.

⁴⁵ P. FUNKE, *Greek Amphiktyonies: An Experiment in Transregional Governance*, in: BECK (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Greek*

ternational union', in Ruta's terms, 'a supranational jurisdiction that may exercise a policy prerogative on behalf of member countries'⁴⁶; '*Eidgenossenschaft*' or 'oath fellowship'⁴⁷, to quote Burgess, 'an association bound together by reciprocal oaths'⁴⁸ or, following Kouma's translation into Greek of Balbi's *Geography*, '*συνορκία*'⁴⁹; '*Staatenverbund*', for which Leibfried, Gaines and Frisina write: 'In a concession to the special nature of the European confederation, the Constitutional Court judge Paul Kirchhof invented another, rather tempered and opaque, version of the intergovernmental view and called the EU a *Staatenverbund*, a composite or network of states'⁵⁰, while the German Federal Constitutional Court

Government, pp. 462-463, having noted: 'In Antiquity, the relatively unusual term "amphiktyony" appears to have described a very specific form of cultic association. Its essential constituent was the creation of a space sanctioned by a common cult that allowed interaction between a certain number of neighboring tribes or *poleis*'. See p. 462.

⁴⁶ M. RUTA, Lobbying and (de)centralization, *Public Choice*, 144(1/2), 2010, p. 275.

⁴⁷ FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, p. 18.

⁴⁸ BURGESS, *Comparative federalism*, p. 200. He explains that 'the notion of *Eidgenossenschaft* refers to a covenant, a moral basis, to preserve and promote the policies of difference and diversity'. See p. 82. Church writes: 'The Swiss *Eidgenossenschaft*, although it maintains elements of its confederal past, is essentially a single nation Federation'. See CHURCH, *The Not So Model Republic?*, p. 14. See also, A. NIETZKE, The Swiss model of federalism: Some lessons for the European Union, *Przegląd Politologiczny*, 19(3), 2014, pp. 23-24.

⁴⁹ BALBI, *Geography* (in Greek), p. 361.

⁵⁰ S. LEIBFRIED / S. M. GAINES / L. FRISINA, Through the Funhouse Looking Glass: Europe's Ship of States, *in*: Special Issue: 'The Law

stated in its 'Lisbon ruling': 'The concept of *Verbund* covers a close long-term association of states which remain sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis of a treaty, whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their Member States, *i.e.* the citizens of the states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation'⁵¹. For all their differences, and there may be many and significant, especially when qualified through different criteria, the above

of the Network Society: A Tribute to Karl-Heinz Ladeur', *German Law Journal*, 10(4), 2009, p. 323, they refer to P. KIRCHHOF, *Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration*, in: J. ISENSEE / P. KIRCHHOF (eds), *Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Vol. VII: *Normativität und Schutz der Verfassung – Internationale Beziehungen*, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1992, pp. 855-887 and P. KIRCHHOF, *The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions*, *European Law Journal*, 5(3), 1999, pp. 225-242.

⁵¹ BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 (30 June 2009), par. 229C, quoted in F. C. MAYER / M. WENDEL, *Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism*, in: M. AVBELJ / J. KOMAREK (eds), *Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 143. English translation at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. On the Court's initial reference to the term in its 'Maastricht ruling', see BVerfG 89, 155 (12 October 1993). Groom and Kinnas take 'association' as 'a flexible, open, decentralized and collaborative system which enables governments and peoples, states and IGOs to work together to the extent and in the form which suits them best individually'. See J. KINNAS / A. J. R. GROOM, *Association*, in: A. J. R. GROOM / P. TAYLOR (eds), *Frameworks for International Co-operation*, London: Pinter, 1990, p. 75.

forms can be said to represent active expressions of 'syspondia's' genus status.

Reviving the collegiate neighborly 'ethos' of combining into 'syspondia', sharing rises to a norm internalized by members for the union's greater good, be it 'confederation' ('συννομοσπονδία') or 'federation' ('όμοσπονδία'); an amicable, even fraternal, bond nested in the normative standards of common life. Doukellis writes: 'It is known that the term *ομοσπονδία* as well as its Latin-derived synonyms, *Föderalismus*, *federazione*, *federation* etc., relate directly to the divine: *σπένδω/σπονδή* and *fides/foedus* [...] They originate from the religious vocabulary of Greeks and Latins, but were used, fairly early on, to declare the conclusion of an agreement, of whichever content, brought under the guarantee of the divine'⁵²; a bond close to 'libation' as a dedicated offering to a whole, or to the Roman '*caritas*' portrayed by Viroli as 'charitable love of the republic [...] and of one's fellow citizens' when he refers to the conjoint civic republican principles of '*caritas rei publicae*' and '*caritas civium*', respectively⁵³. Strabo tellingly articulates in book IX.3.5 of his *Geography*:

'Now the following is the idea which leads to the founding of cities and to the holding of common sanctuaries in high esteem:

⁵² P. DOUKELLIS, Introduction to the Greek Edition, in: L. AIGNER-FORESTI / P. DOUKELLIS / P. SIEWERT / G. ZECCHINI, *Federations in the Ancient World: Ideas and Practice* (in Greek), Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 2004, p. 13 (my translation).

⁵³ M. VIROLI, *Republicanism*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2002, p. 79. The former can also be 'a caring (or affection) for all things public'. The author wishes to thank Dario Castiglione, University of Exeter, for this interpretation.

men came together by cities and by tribes, because they naturally tend to hold things in common, and at the same time because of their need of one another; and they met at the sacred places that were common to them for the same reasons, holding festivals and general assemblies; for everything of this kind tends to friendship, beginning with eating at the same table, drinking libations together, and lodging under the same roof; and the greater the number of the sojourners and the greater the number of the places whence they came, the greater was thought to be the use of their coming together⁵⁴.

The reductive use of *'syspondia'* offers a testing ground for the term's relevance to the EU. It is about the terms and, in the normative facets of the debate, culture(s) of 'sharing'; its relevance lying not in formalized treaty rules, but in embedding the parts' distinct lives into the aggregate's own. It is about the balanced preservation of both: to share other partners' concerns as well as those of the union itself; all the more so, when the EU is construed as an 'organized *synarchy*'⁵⁵, an evolution from its earlier depiction as a 'confederal consociation'⁵⁶; *'synarchia'* (*'συναρχία'*, 'joint administration or government')⁵⁷ answering to Aristotle's *Politics*⁵⁸. Dewey's view of

⁵⁴ STRABO, *Geography*, Vol. 4: Books 8-9, translated by H. L. JONES (Loeb classical Library No. 196), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927, pp. 354-355.

⁵⁵ D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *Theorizing European Integration*, 2nd edition, London and New York: Routledge, chapter 8.

⁵⁶ D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *Democracy in the European Union*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998, chapter 7.

⁵⁷ H. G. LIDDELL / R. SCOTT / H. S. JONES, *Greek-English Lexicon* (New Supplement), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1699.

democracy as 'a mode of associated living'⁵⁹ is of relevance here too, for life in a 'syspondia', even in a late-modern one, is reflective of the bond being shared.

A Late-modern 'Syspondia'

In the welcoming address to his non-executive homologues at the 15th Informal Meeting of Heads of State of the 'Arraiolos Group' held in Athens on 11 October 2019, the then President of the Hellenic Republic Prokopios Pavlopoulos called for a "'spondē'" on the European construction⁶⁰. The resulting 'Athens Declaration' captured the spirit of such call: 'There is no contradiction in loving one's village, one's city, one's region or one's Nation and, at the same time, being a committed European'⁶¹; a point informed by the bonds needed to hold the larger polity together in view of its component structures and cultures, raising the question of

⁵⁸ See ARISTOTLE, *Politics* VI.14 1298a14. See also STRABO, *Geography* 5.3.2 and POLYBIUS, *Histories* 27.2.11. The author wishes to thank Charilaos Platanakis for his valuable help with the classical sources.

⁵⁹ J. DEWEY, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1916, p. 87.

⁶⁰ 'Points from the introductory intervention of the President of the Republic Prokopios Pavlopoulos at the Arraiolos Group meeting' (in Greek), at <http://www.presidency.gr/simeia-eisagogikis-paremvasis-toy-proedroy-tis-dimokratias-k-prokopioy-paylopoyloy-kata-tin-synantisitoy-arraiolos-group/> (accessed on 1 June 2021).

⁶¹ 'Athens Declaration adopted by the Heads of State participating in the 15th Arraiolos Meeting, Athens, 11 October 2019', at <https://president.ie/en/media-library/news-releases/athens-declaration> (accessed on 20 May 2021).

how to reconcile the demands of whole and parts, and of how to accommodate this persistent dialectic in the union's life itself.

'*Syspondia's*' reductive quality dismisses the subordination of the parts to a new 'centre' and adds to their preservation as diverse but constituent units; diverse, in retaining their defining properties, despite adjustments made to ways in which these are valued collectively; constituent, in reaching higher levels of symbiosis in a politically ordered union. Thus the challenge to invest in what binds Europeans together to a commonly shared life; one shaped by solidary coevolving units ascribing to an *ethos* analogous to '*Bundestreue*', defined by Leonardy as 'the overarching principle of federal *comity* or *loyalty* (*Bundestreue*) which permeates all institutional and behavioural emanations of federal practice'⁶² or, from Burgess's interpretation, 'of reciprocity, mutual trust and understanding, tolerance, dignity, partnership and respect for and consent above crude majoritarian calculation'⁶³. Europeans may still live their lives within '*politeiai*' and may not eventually

⁶² U. LEONARDY, *Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and their Management Centres in the German Federal System*, paper presented at the Workshop on '*Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations: International Experiences and Challenges for Brazil*', Forum of Federations, Brazilia, 17-18 September 2003, p. 5, at <http://www.forumfed.org/library/mechanisms-of-intergovernmental-relations-igr-and-their-management-centres-in-the-german-federal-system/> (accessed on 28 May 2021), p. 5.

⁶³ BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, p. 82, with reference to B. DE VILLIERS, *Bundestreue: The Soul of an Intergovernmental Partnership*, *Occasional Papers*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg: RSA, March 1995, pp. 1-36.

amount to a 'demos' equivalent to the federal member-publics or acquire their own constitution, but sustaining their collective existence calls them to intensify the rewards of combining into a larger political unit. From Nicolaidis's conceptual take: 'The idea of European democracy is seductively simple: a Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one'⁶⁴.

As EU polity evolution entails a restructuring of modes of symbiosis, the genus reduction proposed here aims at a general but reflective view of union whose self-defined, yet constitutive, units coevolve. 'Syspondia's' reductive lens captures a quality of union: members' acceptance of partner's engagement in each other's affairs through a logic of codetermination, whereby systemic growth –the extensiveness and intensity of shared rule–, at times linear, at others erratic, is not at the expense of units' control of the whole. Codetermination, an intersection of self-standing units, challenges the view that the EU has acquired its own sovereignty; the latter not being a condition of its polity evolution. Rather, furthering the pace and range of union through sharing is a means to the unity of the whole.

This is not a poststatist condition, but rather a poststate-centric quality beyond exclusively states-led synergies: it is about the balanced association of component but shared sovereignties. From Taylor's evolutionary optic, 'sovereignty was now a condition, even a form, of participation in the larger entity' and, as he writes elsewhere: 'Having the right to participate in the management of common arrangements with other states was a much more important consideration in sovereignty than the traditional right to exclusive man-

⁶⁴ K. NICOLAIDIS, *European Democracy and Its Crisis*, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(2), 2013, p. 351.

agement of any single function, even defence and foreign policy'⁶⁵. Thus a discernible pattern of conduct to serve aspirations once dealt by states acting alone. Althusius is relevant here too as discussed by Hueglin:

'For Althusius, the ownership of sovereignty is shared by the narrower and wider political communities constituting the universal commonwealth. It is, in other words, a kind of cosovereignty shared among partially autonomous collectivities consenting to its exercise on their behalf and within the general confines of this consent requirement. The only modern political system coming somewhat close to this notion of confederal sovereignty may be the European Union, the supranational powers of which ultimately rest on negotiated agreement [...]'⁶⁶.

'Ever closer union' still rests, albeit not exclusively, on states' collective capacity to invest in the cumulative effects of shared rule. Challenged by the far-right, Brexit and by those against a solidary response to the refugee crisis or the collective handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, though the EU is not federalist-driven, it is an integral part of members' own culture; it is and symbolizes more than an extension of self-defined interests. And so is its treaty, for which Forsyth notes: 'It is a constitutive treaty which, in the act of creating a

⁶⁵ See respectively, P. TAYLOR, *International Organization in the Age of Globalization*, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 47 and P. TAYLOR, The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty, in: Special Issue: 'Sovereignty at Millennium', *Political Studies*, 47(3), 1999, p. 564.

⁶⁶ T. O HUEGLIN, *Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism*, Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999, p. 4.

new body politic, alters the constitutions of the partners to it'⁶⁷. Elsewhere, he adds: 'If sovereignty is taken to mean a permanently invested right and power to make law in order to fulfill certain fundamental ends then it seems possible to say the central institutions of the European Union possess this right and power and are to this extent sovereign', and: 'What has happened is that a number of sovereign states have created a new sovereign body (in the special sense of a law making power) whose territorial sphere of authority overlaps but does not coincide with that of its constituent members [...] different but overlapping sovereign powers (the Union and the member states) coexisting with one another'⁶⁸. For Grimm, however, 'with regard to its legal foundation it is hetero-determined and consequently not sovereign' and 'has but a portion of the public powers'⁶⁹; or, from Eleftheriadis's perspective:

'The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is, primarily, a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states, whose equality as jurisdictions it fully respects. But the member states will fail to respect their own constitutional principles if they fail to grant sufficient recognition to the rights and duties created by the EU Treaties they have entered into. They have willingly

⁶⁷ FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, p. 184, with reference to the then Community.

⁶⁸ FORSYTH, *Political Science, Federalism and Europe*, pp. 17, 19, respectively.

⁶⁹ D. GRIMM, *Sovereignty in the European Union*, in: J. VAN DER WALT / J. ELLSWORTH (eds), *Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe*, Baden Baden: Nomos, 2015, p. 46, 50, respectively.

signed and ratified those treaties on the basis of reciprocity and they are bound by them in public international law⁷⁰.

If 'a political association has', as Weale writes, 'the ability to make rules that are treated as authoritative for the members of a collectivity'⁷¹, the EU, still 'a polity without a nation and a state'⁷², to quote Eriksen, meets this general criterion. It also qualifies as 'neo-confederal', to quote Burgess⁷³, or, from Forsyth, as a 'federal union of states'⁷⁴. As he notes elsewhere, 'the closest co-operation and the closest alliance is still not a union, and it is when states form unions, whether it be for economic ends or for security purposes or for both, that they cross the threshold of federalism'⁷⁵. From Avbelj's account of the concept as well: 'A union is a special entity, neither federal nor confederal non-statist, founded upon a hybrid Treaty-Constitution agreement between the Member States for an unlimited period of time', and: 'The union is explicitly a non-statist entity, but by not being placed in the constitutional paradigm, which has traditionally been closely linked to the state, it avoids both the risk and the charge of

⁷⁰ ELEFThERiADiS, *A Union of Peoples*, p. 138.

⁷¹ A. WEALe, *Democratic citizenship and the European Union*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 51.

⁷² E. O. ERIKSEN, Reflective integration in Europe, in: E. O. ERIKSEN (ed.), *Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU*, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 11.

⁷³ BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, p. 263.

⁷⁴ FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, chapter 1 and, with reference to the then Community, chapter 7.

⁷⁵ FORSYTH, *Political Science, Federalism and Europe*, p. 14.

re-introducing statism through the backdoor of constitutionalism. In this way, the concept of union opens up the way for innovation both in theoretical framing and in practical guidance of the political phenomena beyond the state⁷⁶.

As to Taylor's symbiotic notion of whole and parts: 'Each had become essential to the survival of the other', and: 'The states became stronger through strengthening the collectivity'⁷⁷; a reciprocal quality of '*syspondia*' too: sovereignty is key to the symbiotic principle but it is now shaped by joint endeavours and needs. Following Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 'the EU is more than an expression of modified interstate politics: it is the focus for processes that bring together new varieties of identity and need'⁷⁸.

On the question of whether '*syspondia*', taken as a composite but collegiate ordering for the collective symbiosis of '*politeiai*', is a mirroring of what the end condition of union might look like or yet another passing stage, an answer may be that, as a coevolutionary quality, it adds to the EU's greatest cultural, than merely legal or institutional, achievement: members' experience of sharing. And given concerns over the union's viability, it all comes down to (re)investing their collective polity aspirations in each other's willful embrace of their organized existence; following Cohen, 'there can be no

⁷⁶ M. AVBELJ, *Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration*, *Ratio Juris*, 27(3), 1994, pp. 357, 359, respectively.

⁷⁷ P. TAYLOR, *The European Union in the 1990s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 78, 97, respectively.

⁷⁸ B. LAFFAN / R. O'DONNELL / M. SMITH, *Europe's Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 39.

larger part unless the larger part and the smaller parts are indeed parts of one whole'⁷⁹.

But 'in what sense', Castiglione asks, 'can the European Union be a society of strangers (even more so than a nation-state would be) and at the same time a "political community"?'⁸⁰ His answer is that it 'must cultivate its political identity neither in the heroic form of the "ultimate sacrifice", nor in high-principled forms of constitutional patriotism, but in the more banal sense of citizens' growing perception that the Union contributes to a fundamental (though multilayered) institutional and legal order within which they can exercise their liberty'⁸¹.

A 'genus-concept', '*sysspondia*' relates to both confederal and federal units, whose conjoint qualities of '*foedus*' ('pact/covenant') and '*fides*' ('trust/faith') are well noted by scholars⁸². As Burgess writes on the former with reference to Davis, 'it recognised the inherent human condition of both individual and shared needs and identities'⁸³. He quotes Davis: 'Somewhere near the beginning of it all is the idea of "foedus" [...] And the lexicographic association of foedus

⁷⁹ C. COHEN, *Democracy*, Athens, GA: The Georgia University Press, 1971, p. 46.

⁸⁰ D. CASTIGLIONE, Political identity in a community of strangers, in: J. T. CHECKEL / P. J. KATZENSTEIN (eds), *European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 49.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 51.

⁸² See among others, FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, p. 1 and BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, pp. 3, 180.

⁸³ BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, p. 3, with reference to S. RUFUS DAVIS, *The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning*, London: University of California Press, 1978, p. 216.

with covenant, and of cognate "fides" with faith and trust, provide us with the first crucial clue⁸⁴. As Riker put it, 'foedus is also fides or trust'⁸⁵. In view of Forsyth's 'federal union of states' as 'a profound locking together of states themselves as regards the exercise of fundamental powers'⁸⁶, 'union' can be considered a 'polity'⁸⁷. Aravantinos wrote back in 1897: 'When politeia has political authority, even limited, and exercises it through its own law and not through delegation (par déléga-tion), this polity may not be sovereign, but this does not mean it is less than a politeia'⁸⁸.

'Syspondia' is about sharing in a whole, not in a 'centre' detached from the parts' own. Even if, as Taylor argues, 'there is to be no imaginative re-shaping of the nation state in Europe for the foreseeable future'⁸⁹, sharing stands as the

⁸⁴ DAVIS, *The Federal Principle*, p. 3, quoted in BURGESS, *Comparative Federalism*, p. 180.

⁸⁵ W. H. RIKER, *European Federalism: The Lessons of Past Experience*, in: J. J. HESSE / V. WRIGHT (eds), *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 10.

⁸⁶ FORSYTH, *Unions of States*, p. 15.

⁸⁷ See K. A. LAVDAS, *Great-power confederalism: European republicanism at a crossroads*, in: D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU / C. V. GORTSOS / V. G. HATZOPOULOS / A. G. PASSAS (eds), *European Governance in Times of Uncertainty/Gouvernance Européenne en temps incertains. Liber Amicorum Constantine A. Stephanou*, Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2021, pp. 50-63.

⁸⁸ J. ARAVANTINOS, *Greek Constitutional Law* (in Greek), Vol. I, Athens: Palligenesia, 1897, p. 36 (my translation).

⁸⁹ P. TAYLOR, *The European Union in the twenty-first century: an accretion of doubts*, in: CHRYSOCHOOU / GORTSOS / HATZOPOULOS /

normative referent of the union's own 'soul'; a catalyst for combining into a '*politeia*', not as an extension of external conduct but as a bond internalised. In the triptych '*syspondia*'-'*symbiosis*'-'*syndiathesis*' (as 'codetermination'), the solidary qualities of the former two are sustained through the collective rewards brought by the latter. Exclusion, fragmentation, detachment and self-centrism are the exact opposites of '*spondē*', even in a large-scale '*koinon*'. Perhaps, '*syspondia*' is not a theory of union *per se*, but a theory of what a theory of union can reveal about the bonds being shared among constituent unities: their disposition to a common life. Thus emerges a unit(y) with a transcendental quality: an ordered whole retaining its distinctive pluralism. Still though, Europe's present and end condition are unlikely to be construed through familiar lenses⁹⁰. Schmitter writes: 'We are familiar with the properties of states and intergovernmental organizations – even if we recognize that they come in various shapes and sizes – but we would have to go far back in European history to recapture a more diverse language about political units. And, even if we could recover these ancient labels or invent new ones to describe other political forms, we might still find it difficult to accept them as stable solu-

PASSAS (eds), *European Governance in Times of Uncertainty/Gouvernance Européenne en temps incertains*, p. 37.

⁹⁰ See CHURCH, *The Not So Model Republic?*, especially p. 15. On the 'n=1 problem', see the contributions of J. CAPORASO, G. MARKS, A. MORAVCSIK and M. A. POLLACK in 'Does the European Union represent an n of 1?', *ECSA Review*, 10(3), 1997, pp. 1-5, at <http://aei.pitt.edu/54/1/N1debate.htm> (accessed on 30 May 2021).

tions to the problem of political order'⁹¹. Challenging as this exercise is, its intellectual rewards make it worth taking.

Reconnections

D. Tsatsos is right to assert: 'Concepts do not create history. History either creates new concepts, or assigns new meaning to existing ones'⁹². But they do shape our '*theaseis*' and, eventually, judgments; as Allison put it, 'different conceptual lenses lead analysts to different judgments about what is relevant and important'⁹³. Concepts also inform human conduct itself; how we learn from each other, or fail from learning. From Church: 'We need to be aware of the conceptions we use since they determine our perception of things'⁹⁴, with Hamlyn noting that 'one cannot get at reality except from within some system of concepts'⁹⁵, and Groom stating: 'There is a sense in which one can be pragmatic, but behind every 'pragmatic' approach lies a theory of conceptualization – no matter how inchoate. All social activity requires choice and that choice cannot be exercised without some criteria for

⁹¹ P. C. SCHMITTER, Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories, in: G. MARKS / F. W. SCHARPF / P. C. SCHMITTER / W. STREECK, *Governance in the European Union*, London: Sage, 1996, p. 2.

⁹² TSATSOS, *The European Symptomology*, p. 89.

⁹³ G. ALLISON, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, p. 253.

⁹⁴ C. H. CHURCH, European Integration Theory in the 1990s, *European Dossier Series*, 33, University of North London, 1996, p. 8.

⁹⁵ D. W. HAMLYN, *Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 31.

judgment – in short, a theory, a conception, a framework⁹⁶. Thus concepts as crucial connections to theorizing as ‘*theasis*’ through ‘*thesis*’ and *vice versa*. ‘*Syspondia*’ combines both: a ‘*theasis*’ of the whole through a ‘*thesis*’ on ‘sharing’ and *vice versa*. It enhances variation in theorizing about union as a culture shared among ‘*politeiai*’ in dealing with common concerns.

EU members may at times shake the ‘*fides*’ part of the equation as with the demise of its quasi-constitutional ‘*foedus*’ or the V4’s ‘flexible solidarity’⁹⁷, but they are aware that ‘sharing’ is now part of their own life and parlance. Keeping Schmidt’s point that ‘[m]odern people’s hopes are founded on an independent international body with full authority’⁹⁸, future projections of the EU are likely to refer less to the subordination of the parts to a ‘centre’ and more to their preservation through, not despite, membership. Figure 1 helps to summarize some of the above:

⁹⁶ A. J. R. GROOM, *The Setting in World Society*, in: GROOM / TAYLOR (eds), *Frameworks for International Co-operation*, p. 3.

⁹⁷ See ‘Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries’, Bratislava, 16 September 2016, at <https://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-the-160919> (accessed on 4 June 2021).

⁹⁸ K. SCHMIDT, *Peace of Antalcidas and the idea of the koine eirene*. A Panhellenic Peace Movement, *Revue internationale des droits de l’Antiquité*, XLVI, 1999, p. 95.

Figure 1. Typology of 'syspondia'

		Authority-sharing	
		Latent	Constituted
Bond-sharing	Nascent	<p><i>Sympoliteia</i> (coexistence)</p>	<p><i>Synarchia</i> (codetermination)</p>
	Formed	<p><i>Symbiosis</i> (coevolution)</p>	<p><i>Politeia</i> (commonwealth)</p>

The EU occupies the upper right box: authority-sharing is constituted without a deeper sense of bond-sharing among units; a mix of variables needed for the transition 'from *synarchia* to *politeia*'.

But the persisting question is how Europeans value their own '*politeiai*' in relation to that being constituted by them. '*Syspondia*'s' synchronic '*politeia/politeiai*' quality contributes to an answer by refuting such takes on the EU as being either 'post-statist' or 'states-owned'. And so does Castiglione, noting that 'the solution may lie more in imagining how an interlocking political space may need interlocking systems of trust, solidarity, and allegiances – none of which may need to be absolute – than in the assumption that we can reproduce the absolute demands of national citizenship at a European

level⁹⁹. As put by Preuß: ‘The vision is, rather, the idea of solidarity grounded on the mutual recognition of otherness and the development of modes of cooperation and, yes, also of collectively binding decisions taken by “others” whose bindingness is rooted in institutional devices which encourage civic solidarity and the tolerance for otherness’, or of ‘an institutional realm in which different peoples form a political “We” without giving up or pressed to give up their differentness as peoples with their respective national histories, cultural traditions and particular mentalities’¹⁰⁰; from Nicolaidis, a ‘democracy’, ‘predicated on the mutual recognition, confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our respective and separate identities – not on their merger’¹⁰¹; from Bellamy, an ‘international association of democratic states’ that ‘negotiate an ever closer union of mutual benefit to their peoples while preserving the civic freedom of their citizens’¹⁰²; and from MacCormick’s optic, ‘both member states and the Union are commonwealths, one more intensive and

⁹⁹ CASTIGLIONE, Political identity in a community of strangers, in: CHECKEL / KATZENSTEIN (eds), *European Identity*, p. 51.

¹⁰⁰ U. K. PREUß, Revisiting the Rationale Behind the European Union – the Basis of European Narratives Today and Tomorrow, in: VAN DER WALT / ELLSWORTH (eds), *Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe*, pp. 219, 218, respectively.

¹⁰¹ NICOLAIDIS, The New Constitution as European Democracy?, p. 84.

¹⁰² BELLAMY, “An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe”, p. 507. He writes: ‘Such associations guard against the domination of one people by another by preserving the capacity of the associated peoples for representative democracy’, taking the EU ‘as the product of a process of republican integration’. See pp. 499, 513, respectively.

localised, more strongly rooted in a sense of tradition and personal identity and loyalty, the other more extensive and broadly inclusive'¹⁰³. But there emerge, as the study of union as '*politeia*' and as '*politeiai*' reveals, wider dialectics between such 'commonwealths' that may recast, even shatter, certain premises. From Hansen's thesis:

'But while the dependent *polis* existed in a great variation of types in ancient Greece, the state hierarchy in the modern world has until recently been kept at two fairly distinct levels: independent states and member states of federations. In recent years, however, the two-tier hierarchy seems to have broken down and intermediate forms to be developing, as with many *poleis* in ancient Greece: the members of the EU are no longer sovereign states; nor are they members of a federation. A new fluent concept of state is developing, one in which sovereignty and independence are concepts that have to be either redefined or dissociated from the concept of state. A new parallel between the concepts of *polis* and state is emerging, one which did not exist a few decades ago, but one which might be of importance in our re-evaluation of the concept of state in the years to come'¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰³ MACCORMICK, *Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth"*, p. 339. He defines 'commonwealth' as 'a group of people to who can reasonably be imputed some consciousness that they have a "common weal", something which really is a common good, and who are able to envisage themselves or their political representatives and governing authorities realizing this or striving after it through some form of organized political structure, embodied in some common constitutional arrangements'. See p. 339.

¹⁰⁴ HANSEN, *Polis*, p. 65.

Epilegomenon

Europe has come a long way since Lindberg and Scheingold spoke of a 'would-be polity'¹⁰⁵, or since Elazar's depiction of 'a new-type polity'¹⁰⁶. Through time, also, a republican dynamic has been provoked. As Lavdas asserts: 'Ulysses' constraints weaken without a degree of republican commitment to the European project: they are in doubt at the domestic level and they also appear increasingly untenable as viewed from abroad'¹⁰⁷. From Bellamy's optic, 'Europe long ceased to be Holy, but its future may be Roman' or, as he and Castiglione put it, 'a future multinational European polity could be a "Republic, if you can keep it"'¹⁰⁸.

But while a 'Republic of Europeans'¹⁰⁹ is yet to emerge, another classical language can be equally telling on how to construe and sustain a late-modern 'koinon' by inviting a

¹⁰⁵ L. N. LINDBERG / S. A. SCHEINGOLD, *Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

¹⁰⁶ ELAZAR, *The New Europe*, p. 125.

¹⁰⁷ K. A. LAVDAS, *Theorizing Precommitment in European Integration: Mending the Constraints of Ulysses*, *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, 1(1), 2012, p. 24.

¹⁰⁸ See respectively, R. BELLAMY, *Una Republica Europea?*, *Europa*, Anno VII, 2000, p. 19 and R. BELLAMY / D. CASTIGLIONE, *Democracy, Sovereignty and the Constitution of the European Union: The Republican Alternative to Liberalism*, in: Z. BAŃKOWSKI / A. SCOTT (eds), *The European Union and its Order*, London: Blackwell, 2000, p. 190.

¹⁰⁹ K. A. LAVDAS / D. N. CHRYSOCHOOU, *A Republic of Europeans: Civic Potential in a Liberal Milieu*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011.

dialogue in honor of this fascinating aggregate called '*syspondia*'.