The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek–Turkish Relations
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The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek–Turkish Relations

Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy

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In memory of Elias Alexopoulos
...a talented scholar, a beloved colleague
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This book is written primarily with the aim of filling an obvious gap in the literature concerning one of the most important shifts ever made in Greece’s foreign policy. Its main goal is thus to understand and explain the strategies adopted by Greece’s decision-makers. Hopefully, the only bias this study carries is an epistemological one, namely, the author’s thesis that a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations could only take place with a state of affairs in which all major issues separating the two states had been resolved. It is in that sense that the breakthrough initiated in the late 1990s in Greek–Turkish relations remains incomplete. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the favorable mixture of domestic, regional, and systemic conditions of the late 1990s will ever reappear, presenting Greek decision-makers with the chance to embark on a strategy that would succeed in resolving the Greek–Turkish dispute.

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Glossary

AKP  Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ANAP  Motherland Party (Turkey)
AP  Accession Partnership (EU–Turkey)
CBMs  Confidence-Building Measures
CFE  Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC  European Community (pre-1993)
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
ESDI  European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP  European Security and Defense Policy
EU  European Union
FIR  Flying Information Region
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ  International Court of Justice in The Hague
INOGATE  Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (EU-funded program)
IR  International Relations (the discipline of)
JDD  Joint [Greece–Cyprus] Defense Doctrine
KKE  Communist Party of Greece
KYSEA  Government Council on Foreign Relations and Defense, Greece
MHP  National Action Party (Turkey)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF  NATO Response Force
ND  New Democracy Party (Greece)
NGOs  Nongovernmental Organizations
NPAA  National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis
NSC  National Security Council (Turkey)
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK  Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Greece)
PfP  Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PKK  Kurdish Workers Party (Turkey)
SYNASPISMOS  Coalition of the Left and Progress (Greece)
TGI  Turkey–Greece–Italy Interconnector
TRNC  (the self-proclaimed) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜSİAD  Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Turkey)
Glossary

UN    United Nations  
WEU   Western European Union  
YDAS  General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Understanding Change in Strategy

1.1 A “never explored” U-turn

This book is a theoretically grounded treatise of the most significant shift made since the 1930s in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey, the neighboring state which was considered to be Greece’s major security threat over the course of the last thirty years, as well as of the reasons behind Greece’s major foreign policy initiatives. In particular, the decision to lift its veto and grant candidate status to Turkey at the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 was the result of a paramount shift in Greece’s foreign policy that most analysts attributed to Greece’s entry into the European Community in January 1981.

This study places Greece at the center of the analysis in the sense that it considers Greece’s new strategy as the catalyst for the European engagement of Turkey rather than as a reactive policy to Turkey’s decision to pursue EU membership. Particular emphasis should be placed on the fact that, for the cataclysmic events that characterized Greek–Turkish relations in the annus mirabilis of 1999, neither Turkey nor the US nor the EU assumed an active – let alone decisive – role. As recognized by many external observers of Greek–Turkish relations, Greece has indeed been the instigator of the process that managed to bring a substantive change, actually a breakthrough, on Greek–Turkish relations (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 119). For Turkey, most – if not all – of the changes related to its domestic politics and its foreign policy agenda have been attributed to the decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki, through which Turkey became an official candidate for European accession. Moreover, its new status would not have been possible had Greece kept following its traditional policy of conditional sanctions vis-à-vis Turkey’s European path by vetoing various aspects of Turkey’s closer relationship with the EU.

What were the reasons for the U-turn in Greece’s foreign policy in the mid- to late-1990s vis-à-vis Turkey? Was this fundamental reorientation of Greece’s strategy the result of a rational recognition of Greece’s new strategic needs and priorities, of a more in-depth ideational change related to
a collapse of the traditional – and reigning – orthodoxy about how to deal with the “threat from the east,” or of a combination of both? When did Greece’s new strategy to transform the three-decade-long dispute with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally and “arch-enemy” into a less confrontational and more stable relationship reach its climax? What were the particular goals the new strategy was aiming at achieving and, most importantly, to what extent had the new strategy managed through its implementation to affect the behavior of Turkey and/or its definition of national identity and interests? To what extent had the assumption of power by a conservative government, in March 2004, resulted in an alteration for the better – the so-called refinement – or for the worse – the so-called invalidation – of the strategy adopted by the socialists?

Surprisingly enough, all the above central questions that are related to the most important chapter of Greece’s foreign policy in the post-WWII era still remain unanswered in the relevant literature. Most importantly, the dramatic shift in Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey in the mid-90s evolved in the virtual absence of any prior in-depth discussion in Greek academia! It could even be argued that Greece’s new strategy toward Turkey – which the majority of political forces (with the exception of the Communist Party) acclaimed as positive and long overdue – was exclusively the result of mental elaboration and decisions taken by politicians. Indeed, it seems that Greek policymakers and practitioners have not only observed the new circumstances that the end of the Cold War entailed for Greece in a timely manner, but were also effective in integrating them into Greece’s foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, it is indeed quite unfortunate that the very same observations attracted only marginally the attention of the Greek International Relations (IR) community.

The transformation of Greek foreign policy during the first post-Cold War decade offers an outstanding illustration of the IR community’s failure to grasp a unique opportunity to shape Greece’s foreign policy in the coming century (Tsakonas, 2005: 427–37). Indeed, although the need to plan and implement a credible and effective foreign policy toward the eastern “arch-enemy” has been of paramount importance for Greek diplomacy over the last thirty years, the IR community’s efforts – in accordance with the policy followed by all Greek governments after 1974 – focused exclusively on how to militarily deter the Turkish threat, rather than on delivering a comprehensive approach for the management of the two states’ conflict.2

The evolution of Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis Turkey has thus been the most obvious example of the weakness of the Greek IR community to elaborate in a concrete and comprehensive manner the kind of knowledge that would be useful to Greek decision-makers.3 It is truly remarkable that not only was this major shift in Greek foreign policy not “prepared” by the Greek IR community, but it has not even been studied yet through the application of the relevant IR theoretical tools.4
Realizing the absence of the Greek academic community from the preparation, elaboration, and explanation of Greece’s most important foreign policy shift may seem disappointing for social scientists who devote their lives to the creation, refinement, and application of ideas as well as to the exploration of the impact of ideas on foreign policy and on a state’s strategic behavior. The major part of this study attempts to remedy the aforementioned gap in the existing literature and to show that ideas matter and they can influence foreign policy changes.

The framework adopted in this study is a synthetic and multi-level one and it builds upon two particular concepts, namely “strategic culture” and “international socialization.” As further analysis will illuminate, these concepts and the relevant debates over their causal link to a state’s strategic behavior act as the methodological tools for understanding and explaining the U-turn in Greece’s traditional stance towards Turkey.

From a methodological and theoretical point of view, the book’s findings are thus expected to have certain implications for the study of foreign policy of “small–medium” states, the causal linkage between culture and strategic behavior and the study of “socialization” in international relations literature. Specifically with regard to the last issue, this study argues that it is not only institutions that develop strategies aiming at the socialization of states to international norms and rules; states can also pursue socialization strategies – through the use of international institutions – with the aim of better balancing other, more threatening, states. Whether these socialization strategies will be pursued actively or passively depends on those states’ “agentic culture.” More interestingly, the latter may use the very same mechanisms international institutions use to make these socialization strategies succeed.

Although the book is about causes, namely “what were the reasons for a U-turn in Greece’s strategic behavior,” one of its potential contributions is to offer practitioners and academics – to the Greek IR community – a framework that supplements the conventional analysis and conduct of statecraft. It also aims at highlighting the need for a more systematic attention to the role particular realms of a state’s “strategic culture” play, namely a state’s “agentic culture,” in explaining outcomes and/or accounting for change; thus rendering “culture” a prerequisite both for effective policy action and for planning for the future. Hopefully, having an explanatory argument, the book is also expected to offer Greek and Turkish decision-makers the ability to more credibly establish what possibilities the future holds for Greek–Turkish relations, although they may be hard pressed to predict which future is most likely to emerge.

1.2 The framework of analysis

This study is focused on a national strategy conducted by a rational actor whose goals and preferences come from its position in the international, and
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especially the European, structure, and from the legacy of past experiences, and, especially, past choices. Since the mid-1970s successive Greek governments have learned through a realist folklore to address the territorial dispute with neighboring Turkey with power-based responses. Territory, accordingly, was viewed as a critical factor in identity, security, and prosperity of the modern Greek state. On the same line of “realist” reasoning – which views institutions as instruments of policy – this study shows that a particular international institution, namely the European Union, matters greatly to Greece in the sense of being an indispensable means toward goals.

However unavoidable as means, it is also argued that the EU has already, since the mid-1990s, strongly affected the way in which Greece conceives its foreign policy agenda. This is a “constructivist” observation that highlights the need for a “refinement” of any “realist” attempt to understand and explain an actor’s strategic choices, especially an actor’s decision to pursue major shifts to its foreign policy. The best way to understand and explain a state’s foreign policy behavior – this study argues – is by looking into how elites and the public understand or interpret the outside world, how changes in the international environment are interpreted by domestic actors, and how this understanding of the outside world feeds into the arena of state identity formation and foreign policy outcomes through domestic policy debates.

Traditionally, interstate relations have indeed been viewed as a product of strategic rational behavior, the results of which are determined by relative power and interests (Waltz, 1979). Apart from providing a good signal of the importance of systemic and material factors and offering some powerful insights, however, this kind of reasoning should be considered as indeterminate (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007: 732), as well as incomplete since it is limited to predicting how states should react, rather than how states do react in an actual circumstance (Kupchan, 1994: 6). More importantly, by treating state identity as an analytical given and exogenous to the neorealist thinking, the latter lacks a necessary component, namely how states believe they can pursue their desired interests.

To be fair, realist scholars increasingly recognize the indeterminacy of systemic incentives and argue for a greater stress on domestic politics and actors’ interests, while they are also not hesitant in “borrowing” liberal hypotheses. Institutionalists also stress not only power but also “social purpose” in explaining certain phenomena in the domain of international political economy (Ruggie, 1993: 139–74). Indeed, studies on both domestic politics and sociologically oriented models on ideas and norms provide alternative explanations of state behavior, enriching both our understanding of states’ foreign policy and the discipline of international relations. More and more studies are thus conducted in an interdisciplinary fashion, in an attempt to connect the international and domestic levels, or to incorporate the material and ideational variables.
Interestingly, a thorough and critical look at Greece’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era makes clear that an approach that emphasizes the – important, if not catalytic – role systemic imperatives play in shaping a state’s foreign policy is insufficient in explaining certain foreign policy decisions. For example, Greece’s nationalist and counterproductive policy towards its neighboring Balkan countries in the aftermath of the Cold War can hardly be explained by reference to systemic factors only, such as Greece’s international position and material power vis-à-vis the former communist Balkan states. Indeed, domestic imperatives and misperceptions, mostly related to the mishandling of the “Macedonian issue,” seem to better explain Greece’s foreign policy decisions at the time. By the same token, the cooperation that took place between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s, in the aftermath of a period of strained relations when both were embedded in a condition of a “security dilemma,” was highly unlikely and appears quite anomalous to the neorealist model that would have argued for continuity, instead of change – not to mention a major shift – in Greece’s strategic behavior vis-à-vis Turkey.

For dealing with the aforementioned empirical anomalies and in accordance with contemporary attempts in the IR discipline to incorporate material and ideational variables, this study chooses a synthetic methodological approach. This approach offers a multi-level and multicausal explanation of the shift that took place in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey and the implementation of a new strategy. To argue for multicausality, however, is not to suggest that “everything matters.” Instead, what this study offers is a framework that explains how – by acting as a pivot – particular realms of Greece’s “strategic culture” interacted with other systemic, institutional, and domestic factors in specific ways to create outcomes, that is, to bring about change in Greece’s strategic behavior, as well as giving content to the new “socialization strategy” adopted by Greece in the late 1990s. Thus, in accordance with Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s eloquent suggestion that “policy outcomes can be explained only when interests and power are combined with a rich understanding of human beliefs” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 13), this study argues that culture, although only part of the story, does – in conjunction with other factors – influence change in a state’s strategic behavior.

Obviously, the above observations do not mean that conventional accounts related to certain systemic developments are disregarded. However, power-based arguments – for example, certain serious exogenous shocks – are considered as inadequate to explain why states choose to reorient their foreign policies and/or to account for major policy transformations. Instead, an interactive approach that integrates external and internal factors and in which ideas/norms, power, and domestic politics all have a place is considered as the appropriate methodological path in order to go beyond simple realist or liberal explanations and – most importantly – for having a better and more holistic understanding of Greece’s strategic behavior.
It goes without saying that the aforementioned observations acquire additional validity when one aims at studying change in a state’s strategic behavior and/or foreign policy. To this end, a holistic and/or multi-level exegesis (compounding realist, liberal/institutionalist, and constructivist premises) seems to better account for foreign policy transformations. Such an exegesis engages with both the international/systemic and the domestic institutional context in which Greek foreign policy takes place. Most importantly, it engages the role norms and particular realms of Greece’s strategic culture played in the major shift of Greece’s strategic behavior in the mid-1990s. Although a challenge to constructivist and institutionalist theories of international relations, to situate and possibly blend their core insights is indeed a better way to understand foreign policy change, as it allows the former to incorporate a core insight of institutionalism, namely that actors strategize in an institutional setting, and the latter to integrate a central assumption of constructivism, namely that actors are embedded in and circumscribed by a normative structure (Barnett, 1999: 6–7).

Indeed, even if the major shift in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey is to be attributed to a “utility–liberal” foreign policy theory explanation, namely that domestic – dominant and rational – actors have changed their preferences in their attempt to maximize their material and immaterial utility, the issue of “how the preferences themselves changed” pinpoints the need for “bringing agency back in” (Checkel: 1998: 339–40), in order to highlight the sources of contingency and, mainly, change in a state’s foreign policy behavior. For understanding change in Greece’s strategic behavior, this study argues that it is culture, especially “agentic culture,” which is considered as the decisive variable that defines how the dominant actors in Greece’s foreign policy understand or interpret changes in the international environment and how this understanding of the outside world feeds into the arena of Greece’s identity formation and foreign policy outcomes through domestic policy debates. Culture is, moreover, the ultimate arbitrator of how the preferences of the dominant domestic actors are formed, how systemic constraints and/or incentives are interpreted by domestic actors, whether Greece will prefer autonomy-seeking policies (as neorealism would predict) or influence-seeking policies (as the “rationalist variant of institutionalism” would predict), and/or what particular kind of instrumental character institution(s), in this case the EU, will have for Greece.

Two particular methodological tools are employed in this study. The first methodological tool of strategic culture is viewed as the dialectic relationship between its two basic – but interrelated and often clashing – realms, namely “agentic” and “national” culture. Following Paul Krugman’s suggestion for simplification and the use of the “minimum necessary model” approach, two models of “agentic” and “national culture” are developed and discussed. The bifurcation of the notion of strategic culture proves particularly useful in explaining the U-turn in Greece’s traditional stance towards Turkey.
in the mid-1990s. The second methodological tool employed in this study, that of “international socialization” – a concept which has been developed so far along realist, liberal, and constructivist premises – proves also rather useful for understanding the implementation of Greece’s new strategy as it gives content to the goals the new strategy aims at achieving as well as to the means it employed for its implementation. Indeed, the content of Greece’s new “socialization strategy” vis-à-vis Turkey is better understood “only when interests and power are combined with a rich understanding of human beliefs” or, to put it in a more theoretical manner, through neorealist, utilitarian–liberal and constructivist premises. At the end of the day, constructivism will manage to explain why Greece had twice changed its strategy vis-à-vis Turkey, initially by making a major shift and later on by “refining” the adopted new strategy, while rationalism will offer answers as to how Greece proceeded with the new strategy.

1.3 Methodological tools

1.3.1 Strategic culture: A dialectic relationship between agentic culture and national culture

The concept of strategic culture reflects the long-lasting assumptions, sets of shared values and beliefs, patterns of perceptions – rooted in historically unique “early” or “formative” experiences of a state – and modes of behavior of a state’s most important agents and/or influential voices (the political elite, the military establishment, and/or public opinion). These patterns of perceptions and modes of behavior concern a state’s role in international politics and/or its ability to solve problems with respect to the threat or the use of force. As such, strategic culture shapes collective identity, understandings, and relationships and can determine appropriate ends and means for achieving foreign policy goals and security objectives. The most frequently cited sources on strategic culture (both ideational and material) include: geography; history and experience; political structure; myths and symbols; key texts that inform actors of appropriate strategic behavior; generational change; and the role of technology. Strategic culture is thus a concept for an overall logic that “weaves together” the “how” and “why” of a strategy.

Despite the fact that the literature on strategic culture can be traced back to American studies of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and the plethora of pathbreaking books and scholarly articles on the subject, the concept of strategic culture still suffers from a lack of a defined set of assumptions and/or a codified theoretical construct. Although there is a consensus on including culture as a variable in analyzing foreign policy and security decisions, a consensual definition of the concept is still lacking. The lack of a sound definition of strategic culture – or to be more precise the variance of definitions – seems to be blurring the line between preference formation, values, and state behaviors. Furthermore, no consensus seems to exist among
strategic culture analysts as to whether the impact of strategic culture on a state's strategic behavior can be measured.

The general debate about how to study strategic culture and the particular issue under study is to determine whether there is a causal link between strategic culture and strategic behavior. The concept – by and large – has been defined by an exchange between Colin Gray (a prominent figure among strategic culture's “first generation” analysts) and Alastair Iain Johnston (of the “second” and “third generation” strategic culture theorists).18 Unsurprisingly, this exchange of critiques has so far left the question of how to study strategic culture unanswered. Johnston believes that culture is an independent variable to strategy (meaning that culture shapes behavior from the “outside”) and so culture can be tested on strategic behavior (meaning we can measure the impact of strategic culture on strategic behavior) (Johnston, 1995).

By criticizing Johnston’s attempts to measure the impact of strategic culture on strategic behavior, Gray argued that culture is not a variable independent of behavior (as something “out there”), as behavior itself is cultured.19 Gray, however, seems unable to explain how behavior is cultured. Overall, one cannot convincingly argue that there is today one pass/fail test for strategic culture, and there is, therefore, no single way in which strategic culture can be defined or tested (Rasmussen, 2005: 71).

Beyond that common knowledge on strategic culture, however, the potential impact of arguments related to strategic culture is tremendous. Indeed, global theories like neorealism and neoliberalism claim that countries in similar strategic and/or institutional settings act similarly, regardless of their strategic culture. How, then, can major shifts and/or changes in a state’s strategic behavior be explained if the latter is being developed under similar strategic and/or institutional conditions?

Analysts of strategic culture seem to agree, at least, that what strategic culture can do is set the framework of the alternative choices a state has at its disposal in conducting foreign policy. As argued by David Elkins and Richard Simeon, although culture cannot explain why a state decides A instead of B, it can tremendously help foreign policy analysts understand why A and B were the two choices considered, while all other alternatives (C, D, or E) were excluded (Elkins and Simeon, 2000: 36). By implication, there is an inherent explanatory and analytical value to incorporating culture in understanding and explaining major foreign policy revisions. As a matter of fact, culture can be the crucial factor in explaining change in foreign policy by convincingly showing how decisions towards continuity and/or change in foreign policy are determined by the [cultural] environment within which foreign policy decisions are taken. By analogy, Greece's U-turn in its policy vis-à-vis Turkey, when strategic and institutional settings remain about the same, not only highlights the rational need to reexamine culture as a legitimate tool of policy analysis but also makes culture
a central determinant for the adoption of a new strategy on the part of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey.

Although an agreement over a sound definition of strategic culture is lacking and the particular conditions under which strategic culture affects policy outcomes remain unanswered, this book offers a schematic of how strategic culture can be divided in order to provide something more than just indicative correlation between culture and political outcomes, namely an account of an inferred causal connection by which culture shapes policy decisions and can account for change in foreign policy.

It is indeed hard for strategic culture analysts to accurately define the content and function of strategic culture, as the latter is not a monolithic macro variable but the sum – or even a collage – of different cultures, which are activated in different contexts and issue areas. It would thus seem more accurate to define strategic culture as the product of an evolutionary interplay and a constant process of mutual constitution and argumentation between its two basic realms, namely agentic culture and national culture. Obviously, reference to agentic culture and to national culture highlights the existence of multiple cultures within one country. *Agentic culture* and *national culture* are evaluated, however, as two distinct, but interrelated and often opposing and/or clashing, realms of strategic culture. Together they constitute the milieu within which ideas about the state’s standing in international politics as well as its position vis-à-vis the most important foreign policy issues are debated and decided. It is indeed their dialectic relationship that helps to deepen analysts’ understanding of a state’s strategic behavior, as it can restrict both the diagnosis of a threat situation to a limited range of assessments and, most importantly, the policy alternatives to a particular range of choices.

**National culture**

In order to accurately define the content and function of strategic culture analysis one should also look at the societies in which policy makers are embedded. Societies reveal power relationships within and among elites, within and among policymakers and between elites and policymakers and the greater society. Most importantly, they might reveal how some state decisions are shaped more by culture while others show no such influence at all.

*National culture* refers to and reflects the discourses developed within the various parts of a society (the public, the parliament, the country’s influential intelligentsia and others) with regard to the country’s stance in international politics, the definition and promotion of national interests, and the conduct of foreign policy. National culture is thus inherently collective and institutional. It involves a comprehensive way of looking at, understanding, and explaining the evolution of world politics, as well as the state’s status and role in its immediate and distant environment and its vision about the development of the society and the conditions that should be fulfilled for
the state’s further advancement and promotion of its national interests. By implication, this collectively held set of worldviews and foreign policy ideas constitutes a comprehensive set of arguments that are organized around a specific diagnosis of and solution to certain foreign policy issues.

Based on the diagnosis and suggestions of those holding ideas as to the strategic behavior a threatened state should follow vis-à-vis the threatening one, three particular types of national culture may be distinguished (Table 1.1). In accordance with the distinctions made with regard to “agentic culture,” the collectively held set of ideas of national culture can be depicted on a continuum with two extremes.

On the one extreme lies the “underdog national culture,” which is shaped by an excessive reliance on the past in the form of an ancestors’ cult, a sense of pride, which uneasily coexists with a well-covered inferiority complex vis-à-vis the “advanced West;” the latter is perceived as inherently inimical to Greece’s interests and as constantly conspiring to damage them. Ethnocentrism and nationalism, of the ethnic irredentist type, and a sort of defensive, xenophobic nationalism are additional endemic characteristics of the “underdog national culture,” which may feed a tradition of treating most matters of foreign policy as issues of national survival. The role of religion, and particularly that of the Church, frequently reinforces authoritarian elements in the state’s national culture by encouraging fatalism and nonrational attitudes towards life, thus rejecting any idea of rational negotiation or bargaining, not to mention compromise over foreign policy issues. According to the “underdog national culture,” Greece’s major security concern is viewed as inherently aggressive to the state’s territorial integrity and as an “existential threat” to its survival. By implication, the possibility of a decent compromise with “the enemy” is overruled and a policy of containment and deterrence appears as the only option.

On the other end of the continuum lies a “reformist national culture” – embedded in the ideological tradition of “liberal westernism” – which advocates the anchoring of the state to its international environment, that is, the West, and a “deeper” European integration, as a means of achieving modernization and development. This “reformist national culture” is inspired by the industrial West and it identifies itself with the Western and European modernization projects in society, economics, and politics, arguing for the strengthening of the state’s international standing and orientation. The latter facilitates the swift adaptation of the state to international and regional developments and produces a sense of cultural cosmopolitanism and eclecticism, which underscores the state’s identification with Western

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**Table 1.1** Types of national culture

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<th>“Underdog culture”</th>
<th>“Instrumental culture”</th>
<th>“Reformist culture”</th>
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and European norms and standards, especially the ones related to modernization, rationalization, and reform of the state and society.

Interestingly, over time – and particularly under situations where “siege mentality” is the rule rather than the exception – this collectively held set of worldviews and foreign policy ideas, especially the one identified as “underdog culture,” can become the dominant culture in dealing with foreign policy issues in general and the external threat in particular. In the words of Ernest May, these views can become “axiomatic,” that is to say, formulations derived from history that become accepted assumptions of foreign policy (May, 1962: 667).

Between the two ends stands an “instrumental national culture,” a much less stable amalgam of both the “underdog” and the “reformist culture.” This national culture can accept dialogue as a legitimate tool for normalizing relations with the threatening state, yet under the condition either that – at best – the threatened state will gain more or that – at worst – there will be a balanced distribution of gains between the threatened and the threatening state. As a consequence, “instrumental national culture” is affected by various situational variables, such as international constraints, and is receptive to convincing arguments from decision-makers about what strategy best serves the state’s national interests. Indeed, even powerful policymakers, while operating in a national setting that is dominated by a (national) culture that is characterized by different – if not opposing – world and foreign policy views and ideas, face serious constraints in making calculations about their actions. In such cases policymakers have to articulate their views accordingly, namely by making persuasive arguments to a more or less malleable national culture, thus making it vulnerable to transformation. 21

**Agentic culture**

The key decision-makers are the main vehicles of agentic culture. It is, of course, not just a matter of who makes decisions, but more importantly the perspectives that these individuals bring to policy deliberations. As stated by Colin Gray: “...although aberrant, culturally innovative, or just plain eccentric decision making is always possible, there is a tendency for policy makers of a particular strategic culture to make policy in ways and substance that are congruent with the parameters of that culture” (Gray, 1986: 37). Needless to say, highlighting agentic culture as a distinct realm of a state’s strategic culture is particularly important in cases – as the case examined in this study – where foreign policymaking, due to either lack or dysfunctioning of the state’s bureaucracy in the decision-making process, is exclusively made by the key political personalities who happen to be in office (Ioakimidis, 2003: 91–136).

The content of agentic culture can be drawn from various guises in the strategic culture and foreign policy analysis literature. From the strategic culture camp Alastair Ian Johnston refers to “a set of preferences for particular
actions,” while Judith Goldstein focuses on “beliefs about the efficacy of particular strategies for obtaining objectives.” Foreign policy analysis literature analyzes three types of people’s beliefs (worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs) to explain foreign policy decisions (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), or it focuses either on the role leaders’ “operational code” (philosophical and instrumental beliefs) (George, 1969 and 1979) or their “national role conception” (Holsti, 1970: 245–6) play in foreign policymaking. In order to highlight the sources of change in world politics, constructivist scholars in the mid-1990s emphasized the ways in which members of “epistemic communities,” policy elites (Adler, 2005a and 2005b), and “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 887–917) acted as agents of change, managing thus not only to reshape policy framework but even to engender the transformation of identities and interests.

For identifying and assessing agentic culture, this study views it as the key policymakers’ beliefs about cause–effect relationships, which imply and provide guides and strategies on how to achieve their goals. By implication, agentic culture can condition the state’s responses and activities on the world stage. Obviously, the ideas and beliefs held by these policymakers specify not only the goals of the strategy and the means that can be employed to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems that are meant to be addressed. Specifically, agentic culture refers to the notion of how to approach international society (normally by adhering to an integrationist, separatist, and/or revisionist stance), how to interpret international events and behavior of other nations, and how to deal with the most demanding foreign policy issues, that is, what is the appropriate behavior towards the most imminent threat to the state’s security. For the identification of agentic culture, empirical studies usually rest on interviews with the agents of the culture as well as on “fishing expeditions” into relevant archives, speeches, and committee hearings.

Agentic culture thus functions as a filter through which certain situational variables that influence a state’s strategic behavior, such as international constraints and/or domestic politics, are analyzed and assessed. By implication, agentic culture can influence strategic behavior by extending or restricting the scope of search and evaluation, by influencing the diagnosis of a situation, and by highlighting certain policy action alternatives over others. At the end of the day, culture defines the decision-makers’ preferences as well as their state’s interests. Obviously then, change in agentic culture about how to relate with the rest of the world and/or how to deal with the external threat can affect the orientation of foreign policy and account for major policy shifts.

Three types or forms of agentic culture are distinguished with regard to the behavior key decision-makers – the main vehicles of agentic culture – may follow in dealing with the most imminent threat to their state’s security (Table 1.2). It is worth noting that the common denominator of all three
forms of agentic culture is the avoidance of crisis and peaceful coexistence with the threatening state.25

Specifically, policymakers’ culture is depicted on a continuum with two extremes. On the one extreme lies the decision-makers’ framework of ideas and beliefs, refusing to consider dialogue as a means to deal with the state that represents the external threat. Dialogue is moreover viewed as dangerous and as a tool of legitimizing – if adopted – the revisionist and apparently illegal aims the external threat may represent. This “no-dialogue culture” usually emanates from a “defensive,” “static,” and “inward-looking” way of dealing with the state’s external threat and it usually argues for its isolation by all means and at all costs.

At the other extreme of the continuum one would find the policymakers’ beliefs that the state’s national interests are better served via the resolution of the conflict with the state that represents the most imminent external threat. This “resolution culture” represents an “outward-looking,” “confident,” and “dynamic” way of dealing with the state’s external threat(s) and a willingness to take calculated risks. Most importantly, it is based on policymakers’ faith that through a sincere and well-meant dialogue a compromise solution can be achieved, one that would in any case carry more benefits than costs.

In between the two extremes of agentic culture stands an “instrumental dialogue culture,” which represents the decision-makers’ views and beliefs that dialogue is good to the extent that it provides a certain amount of stability in relations between the threatened and the threatening state. It is also good to the extent that it allows the threatened state to “buy time,” thus allowing other situational variables, such as international and domestic factors, to influence the course of events towards the fulfillment of the threatened state’s desiderata (these are, actually, the reasons why adherents to “instrumental dialogue culture” are not willing to accept the costs a compromise solution with the threatening state may entail). Dialogue may, however, prove to be dangerous for and detrimental to the threatened state’s interests if the latter risks, through the dialogue process, being committed to a compromise solution, one that would in any case carry – adherents of such culture argue – more costs than benefits. By implication, the agents of the “instrumental dialogue culture” are expected to pursue dialogue aimed at the resolution of the conflict only if certain – favorable to their expectations – conditions are first fulfilled.

Analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 illuminates how agentic culture change in the mid-1990s was translated into persuasive arguments that led to national

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<td>“No-dialogue/No resolution culture”</td>
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culture transformation. Specifically, in the mid-1990s the collapse of the dominant traditional thinking of how Greece should deal with the “threat from the east” started giving over to a new thinking which appeared to generate success in both short and medium order. In Jeffrey Legro’s terms, a “new replacement idea” seemed to emerge as the reigning orthodoxy about how to deal with the state’s most demanding foreign policy issues.27 Gradually those who sought change – frustrated in the beginning by the lack of support from partisans of the dominant orthodoxy or the disengaged middle – started moving from minority to majority.

More importantly, transformation and/or change in Greece’s dominant national culture, that is, its shift from an “underdog culture” towards an “instrumental” one, about how to interact in the international arena and to deal with the external threats has become the instigator of a different reading of the existing systemic and regional circumstances and finally of a new definition of the state’s collective interest. The dialectic relationship between the two distinct realms of Greece’s strategic culture can thus explain why there was a major change in Greece’s strategic behavior in the mid to late 1990s, when strategic and institutional conditions were not dramatically different from those of the immediately preceding period, that is, the early post-Cold War era. Needless to say, if some light can be shed on Greece’s not-too-distant past, the suggested dialectical relationship between the two basic realms of strategic culture could also be employed to predict decision tendencies in the future.

1.3.2 Socialization: Concept, mechanisms, and strategies

Socialization is the process by which new members come to adopt a society’s preferred ways of behaving. International socialization generally refers to the socialization of states. One of the most common and large-scale processes of international socialization began after the end of the Cold War when the Western community of states embarked – through its main international organizations, that is, the European Union and NATO – on the socialization of the former Communist states.

In international relations literature, “socialization” has been studied by realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist scholars. Giving preeminence to international order, realists have demonstrated that among the principal effects of international socialization are stable patterns of state behavior. They argue that the construction of a stable international order is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international legitimizing principles. Socialization from this perspective is the process of reconciling states’ (especially revolutionary states’) individual aspirations to generally accepted standards.28 Especially during periods of hegemony, a powerful state or hegemon may embark upon the internal reconstruction of a weaker state and transform its domestic institutions as a method of
socializing this weaker state to a particular international order (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 292 and 313–14).

For neoliberals, who view socialization as a theory in which the transnational transmission of ideas matters, the effects of socialization will reflect the extent of convergence or divergence among preexisting domestic institutions and ideas (Ruggie, 1986: 141–8; Spruyt, 1994: 527–57). For example, socialization toward convergent norms stems from convergent domestic institutions and ideas. For neoliberals, domestic preferences are the critical causal link between systemic socialization and state policy. Liberal variables are, moreover, the fundamental ones since they define the conditions under which high rates of communication and transaction alter state behavior (Moravcsik, 1997: 539).

Sociological institutionalists and constructivists have also analyzed how states’ behavior, interests, and identity are shaped by their social environment and as a result of the actions of non-state actors, especially international organizations. At the macro level, sociological institutionalists have examined the general diffusion of world culture to large numbers of states. To this end, they have documented the spread of world culture as a historical process in which countries become members of international organizations and move toward institutional isomorphism as they adopt standard features of the modern state, such as bureaucracies and a variety of social, economic, and military policies (Finnemore, 1996; Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer, and Tuma, 1997: 623–51).

By focusing on the micro-processes of norm diffusion in one or more country case studies, constructivists have studied norms and their global spread by examining socialization processes as peer pressure and persuasion in which states, international governmental organization (IGOs), and other members of the international society, such as international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), “socialize” states to adopt internationally accepted standards and appropriate behavior (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Johnston, 2001: 487–515; Wendt, 1992: 391–426).

From a social constructivist perspective, international institutions can have more profound effects than simply affecting states’ behavior or strategies; they can succeed in changing states’ preferences and even their identities by promoting a “common/collective security identity.” Providing legitimacy for collective decisions, international institutions – according to constructivist premises – transmit, through the “process of socialization” (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 109–39), their norms, rules, beliefs and standards of appropriate behavior (Finnemore, 1993: 556–97) and the subsequent internalization of the institutions’ rules and norms into their members as well as to prospective member-states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999; Muller, 1993: 361–88). Teaching, learning, and/or the use of international institutions as discourse forums that facilitate argumentative goals are the most common
mechanisms through which ideational change might take place (Checkel, 1997: 473–95; Checkel, 2001: 553–88; Risse, 2000: 1–39). Motivated by ideational concerns to join international institutions, namely the legitimization/justification of their national identity (Hurd, 1999: 379–408), states gradually define their national identities and interests by taking on each other’s perspectives, thus building a shared sense of values and identity (Wendt and Duvall, 1989; Wendt, 1994: 384–96).

Based on both institutionalist and constructivist premises, most recent studies have tried to better specify the mechanisms through which institutions are able to socialize states and states’ agents – to transmit their norms both to member-states and to prospective members, thus inducting actors into their norms and rules – as well as the conditions under which institutions are expected to lead to internalization of new roles and interests. In accordance with this line of reasoning, these studies aimed at theoretically highlighting and empirically testing three distinct mechanisms connecting institutions to socializing outcomes, namely “strategic calculation,” “role playing,” and “normative suasion,” and thus identifying the various causal paths leading to socialization.

Building on rationalist and constructivist premises, certain studies have, more specifically, suggested that particular socialization mechanisms are usually at work (e.g., “strategic persuasion” and/or “normative suasion”) and have linked them to particular state behavior and/or policy. Particularly interesting is Schimmelfennig’s work, which seems to bridge rational institutionalism and constructivist premises on socialization by convincingly showing that international socialization in Central and Eastern Europe is best explained as a process of rational action in a normatively institutionalized environment. By acting as selfish and instrumental political actors, states – the argument goes – will decide to constrain their behavior by value-based norms of legitimate statehood and proper conduct in order to reap the benefits of international legitimacy only if their cost/benefit calculation suggests that these benefits are worth the costs and disadvantages of conformity. By implication, the success of international socialization, particularly of its basic strategy of “conditionality,” will mainly depend on the socializee’s domestic politics (with conditionality being effective with liberal and mixed-party constellation and ineffective with antiliberal regimes) (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 109–39; Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 827–60).

In the post-Cold War era, the preeminence of the liberal order as the new standard of legitimacy for all of Europe has led the European Union to primarily use a strategy of political conditionality to promote liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, based more on social influence or reinforcement rather than persuasion, the European Union embarked upon a socialization strategy of “intergovernmental reinforcement,” by offering the government of a target state positive incentives – rewards such as financial assistance or institutional ties/membership – on the condition
that the state adopts and complies with the EU’s norms, namely the basic liberal norms of human rights and democracy (Checkel, 2005: 809).

Needless to say, it is the high material incentive of membership that distinguishes the socialization activity of the EU from that of other European organizations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Council of Europe, although the EU has also used social rewards – and possibly persuasion in some cases (Schimmelfennig, 2005b: 113). More importantly, the study of international socialization of Central and Eastern Europe provides evidence for socialization by reinforcement based on strategic calculation. Indeed, although European regional organizations have used a wide array of instruments, channels, and, mainly, strategies to promote liberal rules and norms, only intergovernmental reinforcement – offering the high and tangible reward of EU membership – had the potential to produce norm-conforming domestic change in norm-violating countries (although membership incentives seemed to work in favor of sustained compliance only when the domestic costs of adaptation for the target governments were low) (Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 827–60). Most importantly, the above accounts of the effectiveness of international socialization highlight the fact that the behavior of actors (be they institutions or states) in the socialization process corresponds to rationalist assumptions of egoism and instrumentalism. They also recognize that actors can be strategic, that they are aware of the culture and social rules that presumably limit their practices, and as knowledgeable actors are capable of appropriating those cultural taproots for various ends (Barnett, 1999: 7).

1.3.3 A state pursuing a “socialization strategy”

The dominant theme in the security studies literature dealing with states’ alignment policies, that is, “balance of threat theory,” suggests that states, especially the small and weak ones, have two “ideal” choices to make when they are confronted with external threats: they can either (a) balance against the threat in order to deter it from attacking or to defeat it if it does, or (b) bandwagon with the threat in order either to appease it or to profit by getting the spoils of its victory. Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat theory” has more importantly succeeded in convincingly demonstrating that balancing is the more frequent response of states to threats, although bandwagoning is generally believed by policymakers to be the case.

As Moravcsik and Legro stressed, nearly all international relations paradigms and theories predict that states align and balance (or bandwagon) against threats to the realization of one’s interests. How they differ, though, is in their predictions about the conditions under which states balance (Moravcsik and Legro, 1999: 36–7). On the basis of the existence of external – and internal – threats, a number of scholars have attempted to explain states’ alignment behavior towards balancing and/or bandwagoning by examining issues stemming from the domestic and individual levels of analysis. These
contributions have demonstrated that a state’s choice between alliances and internal mobilization must be addressed with reference to certain domestic social and political variables (Barnett and Levy, 1991: 369–95; Barnett, 1992; Levy and Barnett, 1992: 19–40); that the examination of state–society relations is crucial for understanding the role the domestic priorities of a state’s elite play in its alignment decisions (Larson, 1991: 85–111); that political and physical survival is the most powerful determinant of alignment for a weak and illegitimate leadership (David, 1991: 233–56); and that a state’s alignment behavior is determined by “experiential learning,” that is, in accordance with lessons drawn from formative historical events and past experiences (Reiter, 1994: 490–526). Particularly from the point of view of the “domestic sources” of alignment behavior scholars argued that a state’s alignment decisions are the product of a trade-off between the internal mobilization of the state’s resources and the formation of an alliance, or, to put it simply, between internal and external balancing, as the classic “balance of power” theory has, much earlier, suggested (Waltz, 1979: 168).

The case study of this book is the strategy developed by a “small–medium” state, which – for balancing threats to its security – has traditionally relied on a combination of “internal” (strong Armed Forces) and “external balancing” (participation in all West European security and political organizations, that is, NATO, WEU, and EU, and signing and adherence to practically all multilateral arms control agreements and international export control regimes). Most importantly, relations between Greece and Turkey – at least from a Greek perspective – are relations between a threatened and a threatening state. From the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974 onwards the Greek political discourse has been dominated by the strong belief – which has also been reflected in a remarkable continuity of the views of all successive Greek governments – that Turkey constitutes the gravest external threat to Greece’s (even Hellenism’s) survival or, in the least, a major security concern. Unsurprisingly, then, and in accordance with Nye’s dictum on the function of security, since the time Greece began losing security “…there was nothing else that it will think about.” Unsurprisingly, this perceptive observation of successive Greek governments since the mid-1970s was further reinforced by more “scientific” observations in the international relations literature demonstrating not only that territorial issues prove to be the most “war-connected” of all issue types (Huth, 1996; Vasquez, 2001; Huth and Alee, 2002) but also that contiguity is the single most important independent variable in predicting the “war-proneness” of a dyad (Bremer, 1992; Vasquez, 1995; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001; Bennett and Stam, 2003).

Regardless of the Greek governments’ beliefs favoring or opposing dialogue with “the threat from the East,” successive Greek administrations have thus embarked upon a series of balancing strategies whose basic element has
been deterrence of the perceived Turkish threat. As analysis in Chapter 2 illustrates, to promote its security interests more effectively Greece has traditionally sought to aggregate its voice and to integrate its policies with those of its European Union partners and its NATO allies (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1993: 52). Both institutions were viewed, however, as “security-providing” hegemons or as levers of pressure to deter Turkey from potential adventures in the Aegean. Especially, the EU was for a lengthy period of time viewed as a precious instrument of a [state] “strategy of conditional sanctions” with regard to Turkey’s European vocation or – in terms of the socialization strategy of “reinforcement by material reward” followed by the EU [institution] – a strategy of “reinforcement by punishment.”

For “offensive realists” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 5–56; Mearsheimer, 1995: 5–49; Zakaria, 1998; Labs, 1997: 1–49), when a state faces an imminent external threat and high security pressures it is expected to follow autonomy-seeking strategies instead of influence-seeking policies. In accordance with this logic, international institutions are regarded as constraints on state autonomy, and states are expected to change their choice and develop influence-seeking policies only in the case that neither gains in autonomy are to be made nor losses in autonomy feared. A different neorealist strand, however, similar to the “rationalist variant of institutionalism” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 23–82), argues that the lower the security pressures, the more a state will be prepared to forgo gains in autonomy for gains in influence. By developing influence-seeking policies a state “attempts to shape interaction processes with other states and the resulting policy outcomes in the state’s own interest, or it attempts to secure and extend the resources enabling them to do so” (Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner, 2001: 47). In accordance with this line of reasoning, international institutions are the most important arenas for influence-seeking policies of states and they can also, to a greater extent than allowed by “offensive realism,” be used by states as forums for converting capabilities into influence.

In accordance with this latter strand of neorealism, this study argues that Greece, a small–medium state which perceives itself as threatened, has chosen since the mid-1990s to develop an influence-seeking strategy vis-à-vis its threatening neighbor by acknowledging the relative importance of influence over autonomy and by accepting the risk of autonomy losses over the chance of substantial gains in influence. By pursuing an influence-seeking policy, the threatened “small–medium” state views a particular international institution as a precious instrument and as an often indispensable means toward goals.

Through this instrumental view of international institutions the state aims at enhancing its voice opportunities (Grieco, 1995), at exercising a certain amount of control over the threatening state, which is also an aspiring
member of the international institution, at using the institution to monitor and sanction compliance of the threatening state, and at imposing obligations on the latter such as the prohibition of certain modes of behavior – both internally and externally – that do not comply with the rules, norms, and standards of the international institution of which it seeks to become a member (Grieco, 1995: 49–57).

The calculations of the threatened state in choosing such an influence-seeking policy vis-à-vis a stronger and threatening neighbor mainly aim at borrowing the “socialization power” component of the international institution, namely the high degree of its normative persuasion. At least in the minds of the decision-makers of the threatened state, the international institution appears as the best available forum for enmeshing the threatening state into its rule-based, institutionalized, and normative context (Shambaugh, 1996: 181–4), by setting conditions and placing prerequisites in accordance with certain principles and standards on those countries that wish to become members. By implication, the engagement of the threatening state in a context where the threatened state has a comparative advantage is expected to engage the former in a short, medium, and long-term process that would better serve the latter’s balancing efforts, that is, by passing part of the buck to the threatening state’s fulfillment of particular institutional conditions. A state’s “socialization strategy” is in fact a policy of “balancing engagement” of the threatening state, which aims to preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring the threatening state from becoming hostile.

Furthermore, a threatened state’s “socialization strategy” aims at linking the threatening state’s strong incentive for closer relations and stronger institutional ties with – and eventual membership in – the international institution with particular conditions, which would facilitate the promotion and realization of the threatened state’s interests. These conditions are not, however, part of a strategy of “conditional sanctions” vis-à-vis the threatening state, that is, a strategy of hindering closer institutional ties between the threatening state and the international institution unless certain conditions are first met, but part of a strategy of “conditional rewards,” that is, one that gives the threatening state material rewards in return for its compliance with the norms and standards of the international institution.

Specifically, Greece’s “socialization strategy” views the EU as the factor which can act both as a framework that can eliminate the bases of its long-standing conflict with a threatening neighbor in the long run through democratization and gradual integration, and, most importantly, as an active player which can impact on border conflicts through direct and indirect ways. Thus the European Union appears as a (necessary) condition that can have a direct (“compulsory” and/or “connective”) as well as an indirect (“enabling” and/or “constructive”) impact on the disputants’ – especially
on Turkey’s – strategies towards cooperation and, by implication, on the positive transformation of the two states’ conflict.

It seems, however, that Greece’s socialization does not always count on the aforementioned dual ability of the EU to act both as a framework and as an active player. Indeed, as analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates, the change in government had also led to a crucial modification in Greece’s socialization strategy followed so far, thus making clear the existence of two distinct types of Greece’s “socialization strategy” vis-à-vis Turkey. The first type can be described as an “active socialization strategy” and the second a “passive socialization strategy.”

Both types of “socialization strategy” aim at the – smooth or painful – integration of Greece’s threatening neighbor into the binding commitments of the EU’s strategy of “intergovernmental reinforcement” and in joining the short, medium, and long-term benefits of Turkey’s compliance with the EU norms and standards. What distinguishes the two strategies, however, is the “active” vis-à-vis the “passive” dealing of the EU’s potential to become the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing dispute between the threatened and the threatening state.

As will be shown in Chapters 3 and 5, the “active socialization strategy” adopted by the Simitis government came into existence when Greece realized that a more constructive use of Turkey’s European vocation would better serve its balancing efforts vis-à-vis the Turkish threat while it would also provide a way out of the long-standing Greek–Turkish rivalry. By implication the socialization strategy of the Simitis’ modernizers included the compromise costs a final agreement with Turkey may entail, due to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) prerequisite the EU’s catalytic involvement had set up. On the other hand, the “passive socialization strategy,” adopted by the Karamanlis government in 2004, called for the emancipation of Greece’s strategy from the commitments entailed by the EU’s active role, namely the responsibility of Greece to come to a compromise solution with Turkey within a particular time frame. Consequently, this strategy of “passive socialization” attempted to allow the EU factor to only act as a framework that, by contributing to the Europeanization of Turkey en route to Brussels, would make the future resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict more favorable to Greece’s interests.

Especially with regard to the ability of the EU to act as a framework, or as an “incubation chamber,” through democratization and gradual integration, Greece’s strategy to “socialize” Turkey into the EU institutional and normative environment unavoidably incorporates the basic premises of the “democratic peace argument.” Interestingly enough, some of the most important findings of the democratic peace literature seem to provide states with the argumentation and, more importantly, the legitimacy their leaders need for embarking on a socialization strategy, especially vis-à-vis a threatening neighbor.
Indeed, with the absence of war between democratic states forming the core of the democratic peace (Russett, 1993), research findings suggest that, given the opportunity, democracies will act peacefully, will not resort to unprovoked attack and will refrain from escalating territorial disputes to war (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, 1999; Mitchell and Prins, 1999: 169–83). Democracies – the argument goes and the empirical findings suggest – rarely, if ever, fight wars on or near their home territory; they tend to cluster together in space and time, creating regional zones of peace (Gleditsch, 2002), and they are more likely than other states to submit their disputes to negotiation and arbitration instead of resorting to force (Dixon, 1994: 1–17; Raymond, 1994: 24–42; Mousseau, 1998: 210–30; Huth and Alee, 2002). More importantly to the argumentation of Greece’s socialization strategy, democracies are more reliable partners and by having a “contracting advantage” they are uniquely adapted to sealing enduring bargains with each other and settling their conflicts by durable agreements (Lipson, 2003).

What one should note at this point, however, is that the above kind of reasoning tends to blur the distinction between democracy as an outcome and democratization as a process. The latter is, however, essential for determining the content of a transitional state of affairs that can last for more than a generation and whose success is not assured. Thus, democracy should be considered as the end-state, while democratization is a process that does not always follow the principles of democracy. In fact, it may even impede democracy. Indeed, alternatives to the democratic peace argument suggest that, especially among newly independent or transitioning states (such as the case of Turkey), both of which are likely to experience territorial disputes (Vasquez, 1993; and Vasquez, 1995: 277–93), new democratic institutions and/or the process of democratization might actually increase the likelihood of disputes escalating to war. Territorial issues might then further impede democratic consolidation in transitioning states (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995: 5–38; Thomson and Tucker, 1997: 428–54; Kozhemiakin, 1998; Gibler, 2007: 512).

The proponents of a socialization strategy on the part of a threatened state generally account for the aforementioned reservations by holding that the pacific benefits of democracy work, indeed, chiefly in “mature” democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624–38). One might indeed wonder why democratization is worth the effort as a means of expanding the zone of peace if the risks to international security posed by failing nascent democracies can be high. In other words, why should Greece keep trying to make Turkey succeed in such an endeavor if the risks involved in the transition period – between the current process of democratization and Turkey becoming a consolidated democracy – would or could pose a serious threat to Greece’s security? Although aware of the risks involved in the fragile
transitional period Turkey has entered since it became an EU candidate state, Greece’s “socialization strategy” seems to have a clear answer to the above dilemma: *democratization*, obviously the one imposed by the EU, that is, the so-called “Copenhagen criteria,” is not only an attempt worth pursuing but a necessary and essential component of Greece’s strategy for reconciling its neighboring state’s individual aspirations with generally accepted, that is, European, norms and standards.

1.4 An overview of the argument

It is the basic thesis of this study that since the mid-1990s an ideational change has occurred in Greece’s foreign policy on how to deal more effectively with neighboring countries. Especially with regard to relations with Turkey, the Imia crisis in January 1996 was not only an exogenous shock for Greece’s decision-makers but, most importantly, it appeared as the ultimate arbiter for the policy followed until that time by Greece vis-à-vis Turkey. Indeed, although the crisis over the islets of Imia had kept the “threat from the east” intact, it has had earthquake-like effects upon Greece’s ability to distinguish between counterproductive or faulty strategic concepts and more effective ones.

In the mid-1990s both post-Cold War systemic and regional developments and relations with Turkey started being “filtered” by and analyzed through a new agentic culture in Greece. This new culture claimed quite different views and ideas from the traditional – and reigning – orthodoxy on how to deal with developments in Greece’s immediate neighborhood, that is, the Balkans, and particularly with the “long-lived” and “omnipresent” “threat from the east.” Indeed, what had actually started to collapse in the mid-1990s was the dominant antagonistic and “offensive realist paradigm” in Greek politics – in the 1980s and early 1990s – arguing for an assertive foreign and defense policy vis-à-vis the presumed revisionist neighbor.

Hence, what appeared in the mid-1990s as an alternative idea in Greek foreign policy was a “pragmatist paradigm” arguing that a stable bilateral relationship with Turkey, based on the successful interconnection of the two states’ interests with legitimate international rules and standards – as for example that of European integration – is both feasible and realistic. While recognizing that states function within an anarchic and competitive international environment, the agentic culture of that pragmatist paradigm also assumes that neofunctionalist strategies can still prove effective at the process level, especially through the actors’ socialization, which limits and shapes behavior.

Viewed through the prism of this new culture, Greece’s efforts to effectively balance the “threat from the east” without undermining its short- and
medium-term strategic priorities in the mid-1990s – with the so-called Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) challenge being the most important one – had to move towards a new position. Unsurprisingly, the adoption of a position and/or strategy where credible deterrence is coupled with sophisticated diplomatic maneuvering and initiatives has also called into question whether Greek decision-makers should continue to adhere to a traditional policy vis-à-vis Turkey or whether a new policy should be adopted, one that would better serve Greece’s national interests in a rapidly evolving international and regional environment.

It is worth noting that the new approach – first visible in the mid-1990s – towards Greece’s most imminent threat was not only due to instrumental thinking on the part of the Greek decision-makers. It was also the result, and an example, of an intended “top-down,” and “bottom-up,” Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy. Indeed, it was Europeanization through the “top-down” approach, namely “policy,” “political,” “societal,” and “discursive” Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy, that led to the Greek adaptation and socialization of the Greek national system, politics, and policies to the European ones. The most immediate consequence of the “top-down Europeanization,” however, has been Greece’s recovery from the traumas of its Balkan policy of the 1991–5 period and the – subsequent – rise of Greece’s credibility in the eyes of the international, mainly European, community by following a parallel process of “Europeanizing” Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernizing domestic reform process. It was also Europeanization through the “bottom-up” approach that allowed Greek decision-makers to actively engage Greek foreign policy objectives and goals in facilitating the realization of the EU’s major project in the late 1990s, namely enlargement.

Particularly on Greek–Turkish relations, the new agentic culture called for a new framework to be adopted, one that would be more active, without, however, abandoning in total the logic dominating the Greek strategy of the previous twenty years. Indeed, it was not until the beginning of 1999 that Greek decision-makers started viewing the European Union as a means of better balancing the “threat from the east” and also turning it into a catalyst for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. From the Imia crisis in January 1996 to early 1999, the central tenets of Greece’s traditional behavior vis-à-vis Turkey stood both because they were supported by an “underdog national culture,” dominant in the internal political discourse, and because bilateral, regional, and systemic developments did not seem to be that receptive to a change in Greece’s strategic behavior towards Turkey. By implication, Greece kept relying on a mixture of “internal” and “external balancing” policies that involved the strengthening of Greece’s deterrent ability vis-à-vis Turkey and the use of the European Union as leverage to promote Greek national interests by excluding Turkey from its European vocation (the so-called policy of “conditional sanctions”).
The Kosovo crisis has made evident to both countries that moving towards a détente would provide some sort of stability in the Balkans, which were about to experience serious problems due to the NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia. The obvious benefit of cooperating to deal with the Kosovo conflict, namely to create a more secure regional environment, seemed vital for both states in the post-Cold War world of constant flux. The Öcalan fiasco in early 1999 was also a “blessing in disguise” as it made clear to both states how dangerous confrontation may prove to be. The official détente introduced by the Greek government was facilitated by the catastrophic earthquakes that shook Turkey and Greece, in August and September 1999, respectively. The so-called “earthquake diplomacy” contributed substantially to an improvement in Greek–Turkish relations by offering policymakers on both sides some latitude in pursuing a détente.

The “top-down Europeanization” on Greek foreign policy affected both the style and substance of Greece’s behavior and made Greece’s key decision-makers feel confident that the new “outward-looking” and “flexible” foreign policy could now be projected onto the EU foreign policy agenda, allowing for the externalization of national foreign policy positions into to the EU level (“bottom-up” form of Europeanization). To this end, a “socialized” and “Europeanized” Greek foreign policy should now embark upon the more ambitious project to “socialize” – by using the vehicle of the EU and its weight in the international arena – Turkey, the state which has remained Greece’s main security concern and the driving force behind most of Greece’s security and foreign policy initiatives.

In late 1999 the European Union appeared indeed as a “window of opportunity” and the most appropriate forum for the adoption of Greece’s “socialization strategy,” which was facilitated by “earthquake diplomacy” and backed by a policy of rapprochement and cooperation at the bilateral level. With the EU preparing itself for the next enlargement phase, the time seemed ripe for a major shift in Greece’s traditional stance of using the Cyprus issue for blocking EU–Turkey relations, for the abandonment of its long-followed strategy of “conditional sanctions” towards Turkey, and for the adoption of a more flexible strategy of “conditional rewards.”

En route to the pivotal EU summit in Helsinki, where the new strategy reached its climax, Greece seemed determined to lift the veto and grant Turkey the status of EU candidate country, if certain conditions were first met. The new “socialization strategy” aimed particularly at a “conditional engagement” of Turkey that would allow Greece to make the best of both worlds, namely preserving the benefits inherent in bringing Greece’s major security concern into the European integration orbit while giving equal attention to deterrence and hedging against the possibility that a strong Turkey might challenge Greek interests.

For the key decision-makers the rationale behind the U-turn in Greece’s strategic behavior was related to the “conditional engagement” of Turkey in
a “European context” advantageous to Greece, where the European norms of behavior and certain European-style “rules of the game” had to be followed by Turkey. Socialization – as a particular type of strategic behavior – became the strategy, since Greece realized that a more constructive use of Turkey’s European vocation would better serve its balancing efforts vis-à-vis the Turkish threat while it would also provide a way out of the long-standing Greek–Turkish rivalry.

Thus, contrary to the strategic behavior Greece had followed from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s (as analysis in Chapter 2 illustrates), the new “socialization strategy” transformed the European factor into a catalytic instrument which would not only strengthen Greece’s balancing efforts towards Turkey but could also lead to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. The EU was thus viewed as the factor which could act both as a framework and, more importantly, as an active player in the resolution of the long-standing bilateral dispute. Moreover, the decisions taken at the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 were considered as a “breakthrough” in relations between Greece and Turkey, as they managed to alter the very logic of Greek–Turkish relations by linking – for the first time over a period of almost thirty years of conflict – Turkey’s EU orientation to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict over the Aegean issues and the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

It is worth noting that en route to the EU summit in Helsinki – and particularly in its aftermath – Greece’s resolution agentic culture gained momentum and, more importantly, legitimacy and gradual consolidation. By making persuasive arguments that would generate success in both the short (keeping the temperature at a low level in the Aegean) and the medium term (securing Cyprus’s entry into the European Union and resolving the long-standing dispute with Turkey), Greece’s resolution agentic culture managed to delegitimize the opponents of the new socialization strategy, whose main characteristics – especially in the aftermath of the critical EU summit at Helsinki – were fragmentation, disorientation, and, mainly, lack of a convincing alternative in regard to Greece’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey. This in turn led to the transformation of the dominant “national culture” from an “underdog” to an “instrumental” one – the latter being receptive to the rational and persuasive argumentation of the “resolution culture” of the key-decision makers. By implication, a strategic consensus in Greece’s domestic politics also emerged with regard to the major shift Greece was about to embark upon in its strategic behavior towards Turkey.

Apparently, Greece’s agentic culture came together in particular ways with certain systemic and regional factors which facilitated change in Greece’s strategic behavior. In addition to the EU’s major policy decision to proceed in its next enlargement phase and Turkey’s strong incentive to join the EU, these factors included the support of the new German government of
Gerhard Schroeder for formal Turkish EU candidacy, with a view to smoothing the forthcoming enlargement process for Eastern and Central European countries, and the United States’ and certain EU states’ insistence on treating Turkey as an essential component of the future European security system, which in the late 1990s became a tangible project.

Although change in Greece's strategic behavior and the genesis of its socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey are explained through the use of the methodological tools of “strategic culture” and the relevant “socialization literature,” the implementation of Greece's socialization strategy is explained through certain neorealist, neoliberal, institutionalist, and constructivist accounts. Interestingly enough, the implementation of Greece's socialization strategy in the EU institutional context as well as bilaterally – through a series of measures and initiatives, such as the confidence-building enterprise and a plethora of bilateral agreements on the so-called “low politics issues” – seemed to succeed in creating a system of relations that could be characterized as a “power-and-interests”-based regime, which is indeed much more viable and closer to the ideal of “genuine peace” than an arrangement that is purely based on military deterrence.

The basic tenets of Greece's socialization strategy, related mainly to Turkey’s conditional engagement in the European integration project, have continued to stand after March 2004, when the New Democracy Party assumed control of the government. Indeed, the Karamanlis government has reiterated its commitment to remain within the context of the socialization strategy inaugurated by its socialist predecessors, although with certain modifications. At the EU Summit in Brussels in December 2004 the Greek government agreed to a series of modifications of the EU Helsinki decisions with regard to rigid timetables that were set up for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute and, especially, to their implicit recognition of bilateral disputes beyond the one regarding the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. Obviously, what lies at the heart of the two versions of Greece’s socialization strategy are two different “agentic cultures,” which in turn affect the way the “old” and the “new” socialization strategy are being formed and implemented.

Empirical illustrations of the methodological tools used in this study are expected to show how the “active socialization strategy” emanating from the “resolution culture” of the Simitis socialist government is distinguished from the “passive socialization strategy” emanating from an “instrumental dialogue culture” of the Karamanlis conservative government. What difference do these two versions of Greece’s socialization strategy make to the potential role of the European Union on the resolution of the two states’ conflict?

Interestingly, Simitis’ “active socialization strategy” – based on a “resolution agentic culture,” which argued that Greece’s national interests were better served via the resolution of the conflict with Turkey rather than through
its continuation or freezing – accepted and, most importantly, incorpo-
rated the compromise costs a final agreement with Turkey might entail.41
On the other hand, Karamanlis’ “passive socialization strategy” – based on
an “instrumental dialogue culture,” which seems unwilling to accept at
an early stage the costs a compromise solution with the threatening state
may entail – has called for Greece’s “emancipation” from the burden and
the commitments the EU’s active role entailed for Greek–Turkish relations,
namely Greece’s “obligation” to come to a compromise solution with Turkey
within a particular time frame.

By implication, “active socialization” highlights and welcomes the EU
potential ability to act both “as a framework” that can eliminate the bases
of interstate conflicts in the long run through democratization and gradual
integration, and most importantly “as an active player,” which can posi-
tively impact on the territorial conflict in direct and indirect ways. On the
other hand, “passive socialization strategy” denies repels the EU’s ability
to act “as an active player” and impose solutions on Greece and Turkey, thus
allowing the EU factor to act only “as a framework” that, by contributing
to the Europeanization of Turkey en route to Brussels, could make a pro-
spective resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict more favorable to Greece’s
argumentation and desiderata.

1.5 The structure of the book

The chapters that follow explore empirically the usefulness – and limits –
of the chosen framework as well as of the methodological tools employed.
Chapter 2 traces Greece’s strategic behavior vis-à-vis Turkey from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s. Apart from discussing the basic determinants of
Greek security thinking, this chapter further explores how the construction
and evolution of the “threat from the east” haunted Greece’s security plan-
ing discourse and also nourished an “underdog” national culture from the
mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Either by strengthening itself through the par-
allel existence and function of a “no-dialogue/procrastinating” agentic cul-
ture or by prevailing over a “resolution” agentic culture, Greece’s “underdog
national culture” remained the dominant factor in Greece’s security think-
ing and the driving force behind its decisions to choose among traditional
balancing policies vis-à-vis a threatening neighbor.

Chapter 3 constitutes the thrust of the book’s argument, as it provides –
through in-depth analysis based on both primary and secondary sources –
an explanation of the major shift that took place in Greece’s strategic
behavior vis-à-vis Turkey. Structured around the “shock” explanation for
ideational change, that is, the Imia crisis, this chapter explores how change
in Greece’s agentic culture can account for the fundamental reorientation of
Greece’s foreign policy as well as for the adoption of a new “sincere sociali-
zation strategy” towards Turkey.
The appearance of a new “resolution culture” due to a “top-down Europeanization” process, its gradual legitimization through particular mechanisms, and the subsequent transformation of the dominant “national culture” – from an “underdog” to an “instrumental” one – are discussed along with other systemic and regional factors that facilitated change in Greece’s strategic behavior.

*Chapter 4* discusses the implementation of Greece’s socialization strategy on two particular fronts: the EU and the bilateral one. More specifically, the chapter explores the extent of European Union backing – through its various organs (summits, Parliament and Councils of Ministers decisions) – of Greece’s socialization strategy, from December 1999, when the Greek strategy reached its climax at the EU summit in Helsinki, to December 2004, when it experienced a major transformation. In addition, the rationale behind the initiation of particular policies on the part of Greece – with the confidence-building enterprise being one of particular importance – and the implementation of those policies are also discussed.

Although the EU backing and/or bilateral implementation of Greece’s socialization strategy seem to be integral parts of a successful socialization strategy, one may wonder how this holds up in the case of the socializee, namely Turkey. Analysis in *Chapter 5* addresses this question by examining how effective Greece’s socialization strategy proved to be from December 1999 to December 2004 with regard to relations between the two neighbors, especially concerning the style and content of Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece as well as on the Cyprus issue. Given that as an instrumental actor Turkey calculates whether the benefits of adaptation are worth the costs of compliance, it is also expected that success of socialization will depend on the socializee’s domestic environment. By implication, the opening of the Turkish black box allows for the exploration of the effects of the ongoing fragile and turbulent Europeanization process – taking place at the domestic institutions, the elite and the societal levels – on Turkey’s external behavior.

The coming into power of a new government in early 2004 was followed by a change in the state’s agentic culture from a “resolution” one to an “instrumental” one. The new conservative government was stuck on the basic rationale and it incorporated the basic pillars of the socialization strategy adopted by its predecessors. However, it chose to remain aloof from the commitments an active EU role would have entailed for Greek foreign policy by adopting a passive socialization strategy. *Chapter 5* seeks to identify both the reasons behind and the consequences of Greece’s decision to refine its socialization strategy with regard to the EU’s ability to act both as a framework that could eliminate the bases of interstate conflicts in the long run through democratization and gradual integration, and as an active player, which could positively impact on the territorial conflict in direct and indirect ways.
Although policymakers on both sides of the Aegean may be hard pressed to predict which future is most likely to emerge in relations between Greece and Turkey, to know the favoring conditions accounting for the success or failure of Greece’s socialization strategy would undoubtedly offer them the ability to more credibly establish what possibilities the future holds for relations between the two countries.
2
The Traditional Strategy

2.1 The evolution of Greece’s security thinking: From internal threat to the “threat from the east”

Greece’s security conceptualization is to a large extent shaped by its geopolitical and geostrategic location, which entails both benefits and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the evolution of its foreign and security policy can be understood within a unique historical and cultural context, given that the legacy of history is heavily discernible in Greece’s relations with its neighbors as well as its Western allies.42

Located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), Greece is an integral part of the Balkans and in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Aegean Sea is also a very important shipping route, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and a major transit route for the transportation of energy products.43 Its position in the Mediterranean further enhances its strategic importance44 given that the Mediterranean, with only two exceptions,45 has been a region endowed with special significance, be it either a familiar route of trade and culture, or a “fault-line” between hostile states and civilizations.46 Historically, the main strategic dilemma for Greek decision-makers was whether to ally themselves with the sea power dominant in the eastern Mediterranean or the land power dominant on the Balkan peninsula. In most cases, mindful of their responsibility for the defence of 2,000 Greek islands, stretching from the Eastern Aegean to the Adriatic Sea, Greek decision-makers have chosen to ally with the sea power (Stearns, 1997a: 64).

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between conservatives and liberals (the communists had been outlawed as a result of the Greek Civil War) on security issues and NATO was one of emphasis. Both groupings basically believed that Greece’s main security threat emanated from its northern borders and that Communism (external and domestic) threatened mutually cherished values. NATO was viewed, therefore, as indispensable for the defense of the country and the United States was treated as Greece’s
natural ally and guarantor. Greek governments, given their dependence on the US, yielded on most issues in the field of national defense (Roubatis, 1980).

Since the years of the Civil War (1946–9), Greek security arrangements have been closely identified with American foreign policy. The Greek armed forces were exclusively equipped with American arms and the hundreds of officers who received graduate military training in the US welcomed the continuity of their host country’s influence on the Greek armed forces (Veremis, 1982: 79). As a Greek analyst has eloquently stressed:

... this led to the limitation of Greek defence and foreign policy options. Greek policy makers were ineffective in capitalizing on Greece’s strategic assets and value, in order to promote Greek national interests. Consequently, the U.S. and NATO took for granted Greece’s commitment and downgraded its strategic significance. Such policies and assessments had negative effects on the Greco-Turkish political and strategic balance. (Coufoudakis, 1993: 1).

The orientation of Greece’s defence until the mid-1960s was thus based on the US credo that the main security concern was of an internal rather than external nature. The Greek Armed Forces (in contrast with the Turkish ones) were primarily supplied and organized to face a domestic communist threat. According to NATO planning, Greece was only expected “through certain limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war” (Veremis, 1982: 74). With the relaxation of international tension in the late 1960s, perceptions of a domestic communist threat, supported by Greece’s communist neighbours (except former Yugoslavia) diminished considerably, while a confrontation between the two Balkan NATO allies became more likely (especially after the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises). Greek security planning could no longer rely on the dogma of the internal danger and NATO’s defence prescriptions.

To be sure, even as early as the late 1950s, NATO’s southeast flank had been experiencing periodic cycles of great tension. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, with the Greek–Turkish crises of the 1960s, the Greek Junta-sponsored coup of 1974 and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in July 1974, had been complicated by a series of Greek–Turkish frictions in the Aegean region, caused by Turkey’s pressure for the revision of the Aegean status quo. This led to the reorientation of the Greek security and defence doctrine, with the official declaration of the “threat from the East” as the main security concern for Greece.

2.2 The dominance of the “threat from the east”

The belief that Turkey constitutes a potential military threat has been reflected not only in Greek public opinion but also in debates between experts and
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in Greek security planning since the 1970s and throughout the 1990s.49 The 1974 Cyprus crisis was regarded as the major turning point in post-World War II Greek security considerations and the basis for “new thinking” in terms of security:50 the Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus was not only a traumatic experience for Greece, but it has further strengthened (and justified to some extent) the Greek mentality about neighboring Turkey’s perennial revisionist attitude.51

The restoration of democratic rule in 1974 was, indeed, a major turning point in Greek security policy. This new period of Greek political history has been characterized by the diversification of Greece’s external relationships, including a relative weakening of its ties with the US in favor of closer economic and political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe. The reorientation of Greece’s security doctrine (followed by the necessary redeployment of forces from the north to the Greek–Turkish border in Thrace and the islands of the Aegean), in the aftermath of the 1974 crisis (a process that began, however, in the mid/late-1960s) led to an instinctive de-emphasis towards developments within the Warsaw Pact.

Following the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey proceeded to a unilateral action and in August 1974 it promulgated NOTAM No 714 (a notice to the ICAO for transmission to all air traffic users) which was dividing the airspace over the Aegean by an arbitrarily drawn line within Athens FIR (Flying Information Region) west of the eastern Greek islands and requiring all aircraft crossing that line to identify themselves to Turkish air traffic authorities. This practically meant that Greek aircraft, in order to fly from the mainland to the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios and/or Rhodes, should ask permission from Turkish air traffic authorities. The NOTAM 714 line was viewed as the first visible indication of the Turkish long-term expansionist plan against Greece (Greek–Turkish Relations, 1987: 4).

During the late 1970s and the 1980s there was little evidence that Greeks were concerned about any danger of direct attack by Warsaw Pact forces on Greece’s narrow and difficult-to-defend land strip in Thrace and Macedonia. On the contrary, Greek security planners were far more concerned about neighboring Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Greece as expressed in official statements, diplomatic initiatives, and military preparation and/or action (including the deployment of its armed forces).52 The crisis which erupted between Greece and Turkey in April 1987 –when a Turkish vessel started conducting a seismic survey in a disputed area in the Aegean sea – further reinforced Greek perceptions about Turkey’s revisionist policies aiming at changing the status quo in the Aegean, which had been established by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947) (Coufoudakis, 1985: 201–4).

According to the Greek narrative,53 Turkish “revisionist actions” include violations of Greek airspace, refusal to submit the delimitation dispute of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, threats of war should Greece extend the territorial waters limit from six to twelve miles
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(as allowed under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention), and challenges to the Aegean status quo as codified by a number of international treaties (the aforementioned Lausanne and Paris Peace Treaties, and the 1932 Agreement between Turkey and Italy). As Professor Christos Rozakis – former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – concisely put it almost twenty years ago:

[T]he mechanisms Turkey opts for in order to achieve a tipping of balance [in the Southeastern Mediterranean region] start with the use of violence (Cyprus), or the threat of the use of violence (as evidenced by the concentration of troops along the Aegean coasts, or with reference to the casus belli, or with the display of power, through the constant violations of Greek air space or the Athens FIR), continue through direct or indirect claims over Greek soil (Turkish officials’ declarations challenging Greek sovereignty over the islands) and conclude with more sophisticated, diplomatic forms for changing the status quo’ (emphasis added).54

In addition, Turkey was seen as backing its “non-friendly” intentions with a significant military build-up. In the late 1980s, Turkey launched an impressive program to modernize its armed forces. In the post-Cold War era when other European countries, the United States, and Russia have been cutting their defense budgets in an effort to benefit from the “peace dividend,” any sizable increase in military expenditure was an additional cause for concern for Turkey’s neighbors, especially Greece (Kollias, 2001: 109–10).55 Turkey’s military build-up has been further reinforced in early 1990s as a result of the Gulf War. Indeed, Turkey’s strong support for and participation in Operation(s) Desert Shield and Desert Storm resulted in a massive increase of US support for what was seen as a solid ally willing to support US interests in the Mediterranean. For Greek decision-makers the fact that Turkey’s rewards were striking in political credit, hard cash, and military transfers was considered as an imbalance in Greece’s security relationship with Turkey.

Furthermore, Greece’s close proximity to Turkey and the fact that it has a much smaller population tend to further increase Greek insecurity (Platias, 2000: 68).56 This should come as no surprise, since Turkey has repeatedly rejected Greece’s proposal for a bilateral non-use-of-force pact. This refusal has reinforced Greece’s perception that, given an opportune moment, Turkey would use military force against a fellow NATO member (Valinakis, 1994: 30). In fact, Greek security analysts believed that Turkey would adopt a fait accompli strategy against its neighbor in the case that two particular conditions were fulfilled, namely the opening of a “window of vulnerability” for Greece and the opening of a “window of opportunity” for Turkey.57

The Muslim minority (ca. 120,000, or just over 1% of Greece’s total population), which lives mainly in Greek Thrace (Northeastern Greece) and consists of 49.9% Muslims, 33.6% Pomaks and 16.5% Gypsies,58 constituted an
additional factor of serious concern for Greek security analysts for most of the 1980s and 1990s. The active propaganda and other “suspicious” activities of the Turkish consulate in the region and the irredentist sentiments expressed by leading members of the Turkish-speaking group of the minority were coupled with memories regarding the expulsion of the Greek minority from Istanbul (and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos). More importantly, Greek decision-makers and analysts share the belief that, under certain circumstances, Turkish territorial aspirations vis-à-vis Greek Thrace may eventually become the most important challenge to Greek security.59 Especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s the region witnessed sharp divisions and escalating tensions along ethnic lines, and it was only in the late 1990s that there was an apparent shift of minority politics in an integrative direction away from an exclusive support for the politics of Turkish nationalism (Anagnostou, 2001: 99–124) as well as from the administrative discrimination of the Muslim minority on the part of the Greek government – the latter occurring mainly due to European pressure.60

It should be stressed at this point that Greek perceptions of the Turkish threat reflect not fear of an all-out war but rather fear of “a well concerted strategy of intimidation manifested through a series of low level threats in a number of issue areas” (Arvanitopoulos, 1997: 154). According to Greek security planners and analysts, over the 1980s and 1990s the possible targets of Turkish military action could be the Aegean islands, Greek Thrace (for the “protection” of the Muslim minority), or Cyprus (with an extension of the occupation zone southwards or even an attempt to control the whole island). It also seemed possible that there could be concurrent conflicts in more than one theater.

Furthermore, a major Greek concern (especially during the 1980s and 1990s) was the possibility of a Turkish seizure of Greek islands or islets in the eastern part of the Aegean,61 as demonstrated by the “westward” order of battle of the Turkish Armed Forces and the high concentration of first-rate, fully-manned military units on the Aegean coast (the so-called “Aegean Army”).62 Such a move could result, for example, if Greece were to extend its territorial waters from the current six nautical miles to the twelve-mile limit permitted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Turkey has repeatedly stated that it would consider such an act a casus belli.63 Particularly worrisome for Greek decision-makers throughout the 1980s and 1990s was Turkey’s insistence that a number of Greek islands in the Aegean and the Dodecanese be demilitarized, ignoring Greek claims of the right of self-defense against Turkey’s First and Fourth (Aegean) armies, special forces units, and large landing-craft fleet.

To make things worse, to the already mentioned burden of history and Turkey’s “revisionist” – as perceived by Greek decision-makers in the 1980s and 1990s64 – policy one may add the two states’ competition for regional influence in the Balkans (apparent in most of the first decade of the post-Cold
War era) and, to a lesser extent, the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Especially in the Balkans, Turkish activism in the early 1990s caused considerable concern in Athens and gave added impetus to Greek–Turkish tensions at the time. As a prominent analyst of Balkan developments put it: “Many Greek officials and analysts saw this Turkish activism as part of a calculated effort by Ankara to ‘encircle’ Greece and create a ‘Muslim arc’ of client states on Greece’s northern border” (Larrabee, 2005: 417). One could, then, be hardly surprised that over the past thirty-five years there have been three major crises in Cyprus, another three in the Aegean, as well as a number of “hot incidents.”

### 2.2.1 The construction and consolidation of an “underdog national culture”

Unsurprisingly enough, the dominance of the Turkish threat remained the driving force behind most of Greece’s security and foreign policy initiatives from the mid-1970s to the early post-Cold War years. Indeed, the fear of a looming Turkish threat has haunted public opinion, parliament, the country’s influential intelligentsia, and others, and has led to an “underdog national culture” that has dominated the national psyche. The belief that there is a potential military threat from Turkey has been reflected not only in Greek public opinion but also in the scholarly approach of the Greek foreign policy phenomenon (Tsakonas, 2005: 427–37).

It is worth noting that, historically, a sense that the country is eternally facing external threats that are directly or indirectly undermining its territorial sovereignty has been deeply rooted in Greek mentality. Unsurprisingly, this strong conviction stems mainly from traumatic historical experiences that are primarily linked to the long and painful process of the construction of the Greek state (Veremis, 1990). It is indicative of this mind-set that the most traumatic event of them all, the Greek–Turkish war of 1919–22, has been dubbed in school textbooks as “the Catastrophe.”

Associating Greekness with classical antiquity, the Byzantine tradition, and Christian Orthodoxy (regarding thus the western liberal ideas as foreign to Greek idiosyncrasy), the “national culture” that dominated Greek politics from the mid-1970s throughout the 1990s has been characterized by the elements of nationalism; introversion; xenophobia; a “siege mentality;” and an inclination for conspiracy theory approaches to, and interpretations of, international affairs. Especially, the introversion, defensiveness and inertia that are typical of the Greek political system and culture were long-established features of Greek foreign policy until the mid-1990s.

It should be also noted that a sort of defensive, xenophobic nationalism – a sense of pride which coexists with an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the advanced West – became an endemic characteristic of this “underdog national culture.” The West, both Europe and the United States, was viewed through a Manichean casting of pro-Greek (“philhellen”) and anti-Greek
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(*anthellen*) – with a political discourse concentrating on the “injustice” caused by “foreigners” – while there was a clear tendency on the part of this “national culture” to identify with groups or persons (e.g., Arabs, Kurds, etc.), who were considered as victims of Western injustice (Diamandouros, 2000: 49). As a result a “schizophrenic” view of the role of the “external factor” (be it the US or the EU) developed. According to this view, both the US and the EU had to be condemned for not offering protection to the Greek state against external threats, while “protection” has been at the same time criticized as a deleterious phenomenon leading to unacceptable interventions in Greece’s domestic politics (Ioakimidis, 1994: 47; Pettifer, 1994: 18).

How does the dominant “underdog national culture” view Turkey, which in the Greek national psyche has been identified as by far the most important threat for Greece and “Hellenism”? It is not by coincidence that the very national identity of the Greeks was built on the basis of specific perceptions of the eastern neighbor, which was branded revisionist, innately aggressive, and violent, and sometimes even as the Devil himself (Theodossopoulos, 2006). These popular beliefs were reproduced in a more scientific and systematic manner by school textbooks (Millas, 1991; Heraclides, 1980) and were eventually legitimized. It was thus inevitable that they acquired a pre-eminent position and they had finally become integral parts of Greece’s “national culture” during the various phases of the Greek–Turkish conflict from the mid-1970s throughout the 1990s.

The twenty-year-old insecurity complex (characterized by a fixation with the Turkish threat) has been further reinforced by other experiences of the new post-Cold War threats and dangers. Indeed, although the end of the Cold War seemed to enhance Greece’s strategic value,73 the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of their surrounding regions have been put in the midst of a rapid geopolitical evolution, without, however, a clear direction.74 Particularly Yugoslavia’s disintegration and civil war released a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social, and economic tensions and challenges and was the subject of considerable concern in Athens, which was faced with fluidity and uncertainty on its northern borders.75 Specifically, the new risks and challenges were stemming mainly from a disintegrating Yugoslavia (creation of a threatening Islamic arc; humiliation of Greece’s traditional allies in the Balkans, such as Serbia; “Macedonian” irredentism; and long-term anxieties about a resurgent Bulgaria) as well as from certain Balkan-made conspiracy theories.

Most importantly, the end of the Cold War has given way to an international structure interwoven with common meanings, experiences, and understandings which helped states make sense of the world around them and define their identities and interests accordingly, producing thus a sense of disorientation and uncertainty as to the role of states and their institutions (Coufoudakis, 1996: 41). Particularly for Greece the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia, did not only mean the
collapse of a secure regional environment. In addition, it brought “a strong amount of lag in adjusting self definition to current circumstances” and “a rear-view mirror self perception.” The fact that the world had changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War did not mean that Greek perceptions about the Turkish threat had also changed.

Moreover, for the first part of the 1990s, Greek security thinking and foreign policymaking have not been in step with the broader meaning of the term “security” that gained currency in Western states. In fact, little attention was paid to the new definitions of security, including a range of softer threats, such as environmental damage, organized crime, and illegal trafficking. By implication, even in the mid-1990s Greece’s view of security was still determined by the traditional, hard security issue of “the military threat from the East.”

Over the course of twenty consecutive years, Greece’s “national culture” seems not only to be standing still on one of the two extremes of the continuum, namely that of the “underdog national culture,” but, more importantly, to be the dominant one in dealing with foreign policy issues and in suggesting what the appropriate behavior towards the state’s external threat should be. In accordance with the narratives of the “underdog national culture,” Turkey – for most of this twenty-year period – was viewed as an “existential threat” to Greece’s survival. As noted by certain analysts, in such a case securitizing moves abound, conflict communication begins to overshadow most spheres of societal life, and the states in conflict widely accept the need to counter the threat posed by the other with extraordinary measures.

Almost by implication, from the mid-1970s throughout the 1990s, Greece’s “national culture” has conceptualized the Greek–Turkish conflict not simply in terms of Turkish revisionism but basically in terms of Turkish “inherent” aggressiveness and expansionism. Difficulties, indeed, appear when one is called upon to distinguish between revisionism and aggressiveness. There are states, for example, which may regard the status quo as unacceptable and they are also willing to pay a high price to change it. In both cases, one may refer to revisionist states, yet it is the second case that can be regarded as being aggressive. Thus, aggressive behavior should not be regarded as entailing only a desire to expand, but a willingness to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts – even risks of the state’s survival – to change the status quo.

Interestingly, since the mid-1970s Greece has viewed Turkey as an atomistic actor who has not only had unlimited aims but who also appeared willing to take risks to achieve them (Schweller, 1996: 114). Considering Turkey thus more as an intensive “power maximizer” and less as a “security maximizer,” such a perception on the part of Greece – as well as on the part of Turkey towards Greece – has framed bilateral relations in a “security dilemma” – and in certain cases in a “deep security dilemma” – situation.
Thus, regardless of the “agentic culture” of the various Greek administrations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, the dominance of the Turkish threat and the subsequent construction – and dominance – of an “underdog national culture” has dictated that any attempt on the part of Greece to normalize bilateral relations should be conditioned by the thesis that Turkey should cease pursuing any anti-status quo and aggressive policies. By implication, military and diplomatic deterrence became indispensable to the Greek concept of survival. Moreover, the stakes seemed extremely high; successful deterrence generated at best an uneasy peace, whereas failure would mean the transformation of Greek islands – and possibly Cyprus – into battlefields (Ifantis, 2001: 29–48).

This “realist” mode of thinking has been central to Greece’s national culture and it has also acquired a scientific argumentation, although with variations. For example, the widely shared consensus over the need to balance the perceived Turkish threat was in certain cases carried to the extreme of suggesting a unilateralist approach to foreign policy whereby Greece ought to turn itself into a “garrison state,” making all the necessary sacrifices to permit it to stand its ground in a most dangerous neighbourhood (Couloumbis, 1999: 421–2).

It should be noted that in the early 1990s – with the leader of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Andreas Papandreou in power – the above kind of reasoning, along with some of its excesses, was not on the fringe of the Greek political discourse. Quite the contrary; it formulated in a decisive way Greece’s security agenda and it dictated a certain way of dealing with Turkey as the appropriate method for effectively deterring the “inherently expansionistic” neighbor. This same reasoning had been also behind particular security and foreign policy decisions of the Greek government towards Turkey during the 1993–5 period, such as the implementation of the doctrine of extended deterrence between Greece and Cyprus, materialized through the establishment of a Joint Defence Doctrine (JDD) in 1993, and the subsequent decision for the purchase of a Russian-made S-300 anti-missile system some years later (Constas, 1997: 41).

It could be indeed argued that, despite differences in style over the course of twenty consecutive years (1975–95), both of the major parties in Greece (New Democracy and PASOK) have shown remarkable continuity in agreeing that Turkey is the country’s major security concern, while the Greek public appeared quite supportive of successive governments’ decisions to keep defense expenditures at a high level, even though this was considered to be responsible for the country’s budget deficit as well as a level of social services that was lower than what was considered desirable. According to Theodore Couloumbis, a prominent figure of the Greek foreign policy analysis, the substance of Greece’s security and foreign policy seemed “to follow since the mid-1970s a steady course oriented toward European unification (the positive challenge) and deterrence of
Turkey based on an adequate balance of forces (the negative challenge)” (Couloumbis, 1997: 51).

2.3 Dealing with the “threat from the east”

Although a democratic, Western, status quo and a sensitive strategic outpost of the EC and NATO in the troubled regions of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean,84 Greece had, first and foremost, been a state severely threatened by a powerful, and mainly revisionist and aggressive – according to the Greek narrative – neighbor. The strategies adopted and followed by consecutive Greek governments from the mid-1970s through the 1990s in order to deal with the Turkish threat had in fact been the product of the dialectic relationship between these governments’ “agentic culture” and the constructed “underdog national culture,” which – due to the dominance of the Turkish threat – had managed to become axiomatic in suggesting what the appropriate behavior towards Greece’s external threat should be. More importantly, the role of international law and, especially, of particular international institutions had become central to the way the various Greek governments chose to more effectively deal with “the threat from the east.”

Traditionally, to balance threats to its security, Greece has relied on a combination of “internal” (strong armed forces) and “external balancing” (participation in all West European security and political organizations: NATO, WEU, EU).85 Since small states have fewer options and less room to maneuver than great powers, Greece has traditionally sought to promote its security interests more effectively by aggregating its voice and integrating its policies with those of its EC/EU partners and NATO allies (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1993: 52).

Specifically, to deter the perceived Turkish threat, Greece has traditionally relied mainly on international law and agreements, as well as on the mediating role of the United States, NATO, and the UN.86 Indeed, both Greece and Turkey have been competing for US attention and have sought to enlist the USA in the role of peacemaker, arbiter, or balancer (Couloumbis, 1983: 133). It is worth noting that, in Greek security thinking, if NATO had abstained from involvement in the Greek–Turkish conflict it would have been considered as impotent, indifferent, or implicitly supportive of the stronger party in the conflict, namely Turkey (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 99).

Moreover, during the Cold War, Greece valued NATO more for its constraint of Turkey than for its contribution to collective security against the Warsaw Pact. It is characteristic of Greek military spending that it has always been more influenced by Turkish military spending than by any considerations of an external threat, for example, the former Soviet Union, common to both countries. In fact, almost since it became a member (along with Turkey) in 1952, Greece has viewed the NATO alliance as a means of balancing Turkey (Mackenzie, 1983: 117).
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The Turkish invasion of Cyprus – an island considered by Greece as both an integral part of “Hellenism” and a part of its territory – in July 1974 led to a major breakthrough in Greek strategic thinking. For the majority of the Greek public, as well as Greek security analysts and decision-makers, the fact that “...a NATO member, using NATO weapons, had taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to occupy another democratic European country” (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 96) was ample proof of NATO’s inability to play the role of guarantor of Greek–Turkish borders in Cyprus.87

Constantine Karamanlis – coming to power again in 1974, after the collapse of the military regime that ruled Greece for seven consecutive years – was faced with severe foreign policy challenges. Karamanlis strongly believed that the values of pluralism, freedom, and democracy could be safeguarded only within the Western community of nations, particularly within Western institutions.88 He was not hesitant, however, in withdrawing from NATO’s military command structure, in protest against the lack of any response by NATO, and for appeasing an infuriated Greek public which resented the passivity of NATO when Turkish forces advanced in August 1974 to occupy 40 percent of the island while the Geneva negotiations were still under way (Pesmasoglu, 1984: 132). Interestingly, Karamanlis also started the first major negotiation on the status of the US military facilities in Greece. It is worth noting that for at least three years (1974–7) Greece did not allow its territory to be used for NATO exercises, nor did it participate in any (Damalas-Hydreaos and Frangonikolopoulos, 1987: 117).

Since reliance on NATO had proved unfounded and Greece realized that it had no institutional safeguards at its disposal and no commitment from the West “to bridle Turkish expansionism” (Borowiec, 1983: 29–81), it began to place more emphasis on “internal” measures, namely strengthening its armed forces (Platias, 1990: 97–105) and less on NATO membership and the bilateral relationship with the United States (mainly as a result of Turkey’s membership of the former and “privileged” relationship with the latter). By implication, NATO’s effectiveness with regard to its involvement in the Greek–Turkish conflict was viewed by Greek security analysts as inconsistent with Greece’s higher expectations either to turn NATO into a security-providing bulwark or to act as a mediator in resolving the Greek–Turkish dispute.89

More importantly, NATO’s “failure” to provide Greece with the expected security guarantees has intensified its search for an alternative. Since the 1970s the European Economic Community (EEC), the EC’s main predecessor, had indeed been seen as a possible candidate. Due to his aversion to communism and his rejection of neutrality, Karamanlis was convinced that Greece’s entry into the European Community would be the most significant event in Greek history for the years to come. As he stated in April 1973: “the
Europeanization of Greece, properly understood, could become the Nation’s new Great idea.”

Greece’s membership in the EC in the late 1970s, though largely economically motivated, was also meant to bolster the existing Greek government and consolidate the newly founded democratic institutions as well as to strengthen the country’s international position, increase its degree of independence, and therefore reduce reliance upon the US (Iatrides, 1993: 150). Equally important, however, to Karamanlis’s reasoning was the strengthening of Greece’s deterrent capability against Turkey. The EC was thus seen as a counter to the US and NATO support for Turkey (Kohlhase, 1981: 128), as a Turkish deterrent, and as a means of forestalling potential Greek–Turkish confrontation.

Karamanlis’s attempt at achieving a higher index of power against Turkey through accession to the EC should not, however, lead to the transfer of Greece’s bilateral dispute with Turkey within the EC, nor should it affect relations between the Community and Turkey. Such a negative eventuality was raised by the EC Commission’s opinion on the Greek application for membership published in January 1976 (Kohlhase, 1981: 128), a few months prior to the Aegean crisis of the summer of 1976. The latter came as a clear example of the adverse consequences Greece’s accession could have on Greco–Turkish relations, and of the risks involved to the community in this situation (Tsakaloyannis, 1983: 125). To smooth Greece’s entry into the EC, Karamanlis provided the Community as well as the EC partners with the necessary assurances, by stating that in no way would Greece raise the Greek–Turkish differences within the Community, pose a request in the EC for backing Greece’s interest, or take any action to block Turkey’s EC path in the future (Verney, 1994: 112–16).

Karamanlis also acknowledged the importance of maintaining good relations with the US, and he thus insisted that facilities for the United States in Greece should be governed by considerations of mutual advantage. Moreover, recognizing the value of NATO and in accordance with Greece’s traditional policy of relying on a combination of internal and external balancing, Karamanlis soon returned to a policy of Greece’s inclusion in, rather than exclusion from, NATO’s structure. Indeed, NATO’s role as a means of minimizing Greek–Turkish confrontation, due to its interest in consolidating operational normality and cohesion on its southern flank, was precisely the reason for Greece’s reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance in October 1980, following its withdrawal in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus six years earlier.

With respect to Turkey, Constantine Karamanlis believed that peaceful coexistence was possible. Moreover, he supported a “resolution culture” vis-à-vis the threatening neighbor, as he believed that from the three means available to states to resolve conflicts – namely negotiation, arbitration, and war – states should exhaust all peaceful means before resorting to war,
while the latter could be avoided by responsible leadership. He argued that a pragmatic approach to politics – a problem-solving perspective – is more flexible than, and preferable to, a purely ideological one (Arvanitopoulos, 1994: 68, 71). Greece would thus support any reasonable and honest process towards the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict based on the following steps: the two states should at first conduct serious and consistent negotiations, which would be based on international law and the international practice, abstaining at the same time from any provocation which might harm the conduct of their negotiations; finally, the two states might resort to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, only for the issues negotiations would leave unresolved (Constantine Karamanlis Archives Vol. 10, 1992–7: 68). He also did not hesitate to suggest that “it is better to accept an imperfect solution to a difficult issue than to hold out for a perfect one” (Arvanitopoulos, 1994: 71).

The aforementioned characteristics of the Karamanlis culture influenced his decision-making in a profound way, as his stance on relations with Turkey in 1974, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the collapse of the military regime in Greece, clearly indicates. Indeed, even at the time relations between the two countries were at their lowest point, Karamanlis chose negotiation (summit meetings with Turkish leaders) and adjudication (his effort to bring the dispute over the continental shelf of the Aegean to the International Court of Justice).96 Specifically, between 1974 and 1979, the whole complex of differences known collectively as the Aegean question was progressively set down. It should be stressed that Karamanlis’s “resolution culture” developed into open and sincere negotiations between himself and his Turkish counterparts ( Süleyman Demirel in Brussels in 1975, Bülent Ecevit in Montreux in 1978); between the Greek and the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs; between high-ranking Greek and Turkish officials (the General Secretaries and/or the Political Directors) of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs; and between Greek and Turkish experts on the Aegean airspace and the continental shelf.97 Indeed, so strong a believer was Karamanlis in a Greek–Turkish resolution perspective that he was not hesitant in unofficially creating channels of conduct and sincere communication – known as “the Parenthetical Dialogue” – with the Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit from October 1978 to February 1979.98 It is worth noting that all the above-mentioned means of official and unofficial negotiations continued throughout the late 1970s in spite of changes in government in Turkey and hot incidents and/or crises erupting in the Aegean, the most notable one being the Sismik-I incident in August 1976.99 More importantly, the object of the official and unofficial negotiations between Greece and Turkey regarded the whole complex of issues known as bilateral differences in the Aegean Sea. Indeed, negotiations were not limited to the delimitation of the continental shelf, but also included the breadth of Greece’s territorial waters, the fortification of certain Greek
islands in the Aegean Sea, and the so-called “Greek paradox” issue, concerning the difference which existed between ten-mile Greek national airspace (territorial sea) and six-mile territorial waters. Karamanlis's choice for dialogue produced some positive results, mostly related to the avoidance of another crisis in the Aegean, to a better understanding of Greek and Turkish parties about the other's positions, and to the highlighting of possible “red lines” in the negotiation process as well as possible “openings” on issues considered as nonnegotiable by each conflict-party. For some optimists involved actively in the negotiations from 1979 to 1980 over the delimitation of the continental shelf, the two sides had even come close to a final solution. Unfortunately, Greece and Turkey had to wait for a couple of decades before experiencing a process similar to the sincerity, depth, and substance of the dialogue that took place during the late Constantine Karamanlis era. It is not a coincidence that the dialogue over the Greek–Turkish differences in the Aegean initiated twenty years later by the Simitis government followed the thread of the basic rules outlined during the Karamanlis epoch.

Although foreign policy formulation was the exclusive prerogative of Constantine Karamanlis, aided by hand-picked professional diplomats (Veremis, 1982: 25; Ioakimidis, 2003: 111), and Greece’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey was strongly affected – if not dictated – by Karamanlis’s “resolution culture,” by the end of the 1974–80 period only the issue of the eastern Aegean air routes had been partly solved. Karamanlis's dedication to the West and his “resolution culture” vis-à-vis Turkey were faced with severe criticism by the late Andreas Papandreou, the charismatic leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Papandreou's criticism not only carried the basic elements of Greece’s “underdog national culture” but had also become – by the end of the 1970s – its most representative political expression.

Taking into account the strong internal opposition, Greece’s entry into the EC in early 1980 – the state’s major foreign policy objective – and its reintegration in the Atlantic Alliance in October of the same year seemed to be approaching the limits of a foreign policy agenda already overburdened by the anti-Western discourse of the political parties in opposition. Indeed, regardless of the existence of a sincere willingness of the Turkish leaders to come to a final solution over the Aegean issues, it would have been too much to expect a compromise deal pursued by Karamanlis over the Aegean issues to stand against an infuriated public and party opposition arguing for an uncompromising stance towards an aggressive and revisionist neighbor.

By retorting “Greece belongs to the Greeks” to Karamanlis's famous slogan “Greece belongs to the West,” Andreas Papandreou came into power in October 1981, a few months after Greece’s official entry into the European Community. Being the absolute master in foreign policy decision-making
(Lyritzis, 2006), Papandreu – who vehemently opposed Greece’s joining the European Community and argued for its walkout from the Atlantic Alliance while in opposition – declared that the EC and NATO were no more than appendages of American capitalism contributing to and feeding on dependency relationships of the Center–Periphery variety. The answer was, then, to search for a “third road” toward socialism that would place Greece firmly in the camp of neutral and nonaligned countries of the European and Third World variety (Couloumbis, 1993: 113–30). Hence, Papandreu was not hesitant in adopting an ambivalent attitude towards the EC during his first term in power (1981–5). The latter took place in the context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as well as with regard to the plans for deepening European integration at the institutional level (Ioakimidis, 1994: 38). By vetoing important EC decisions concerning vital foreign policy issues, such as relations between East and West, the Middle East, terrorism etc., Greece soon became the “maverick” of the EC (Nuttall, 1992: 30; Valinakis, 1991).

With ultranationalist and anti-American sentiments still strong in large sections of the Greek population, the Greek public was very receptive to Papandreu’s “crystal-clear position” about the need to deter the “threat from the east” – one of the two pillars of American policy in the Middle East – on all fronts and at all costs. The exaggeration of the Turkish threat was also a useful tool to divert attention from internal difficulties, as Greece’s economic difficulties were linked to high defense expenditures necessitated by the Turkish threat. The latter eventually became the ultimate criterion for Greece’s foreign policy decision-making and its implementation, as well as the way of assessing foreign policy achievements and/or failures (Valinakis, 2005: 193). In such a highly conflictual climate, in December 1984, Papandreu proceeded to announce the state’s “new defence doctrine,” whose primary concern was no longer the deterrence of the threat coming from the Warsaw Pact, but the one coming from the east, namely from Greece’s NATO ally Turkey (Greece’s New Defence Doctrine, 1984; Clogg, 1991: 19).

Unsurprisingly, dialogue could hardly deserve a place in a foreign policy whose main goal seemed to be limited to the effective deterrence of an aggressive and revisionist neighbor. Indeed, for Andreas Papandreu dialogue – not to mention negotiations – was unacceptable even in regard to the issue Greece traditionally considered as constituting the only difference with Turkey, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf. Given that Greece had no demands from Turkey, involvement in a dialogue with Turkey – Papandreu argued – would sooner or later lead to concessions over Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean (Coufoudakis, 1991: 47; Rozakis, 1989: 30).

Papandreu’s “procrastinating culture” was directly reflected in Greece’s foreign policy formulation by the adoption of the so-called “no-dialogue policy” vis-à-vis Turkey. From 1981 to 1987 not only were negotiations between the two neighbors “out of the question,” but diplomatic initiatives
and actions in international organizations where Greece enjoyed full membership were also pursued with the aim of weakening Turkey’s international standing. For example, in order to compensate for the fact that Greece had not yet removed the US bases or withdrawn from NATO, Papandreou attempted not only to justify NATO as a necessary evil but to enhance Greece’s political and strategic role in regard to Turkey (Constas, 1988: 106). Towards this end, Papandreou during his first participation at NATO’s Defense Planning Committee (DPC) requested a formal security guarantee against another ally,112 and he also tried to regain nearly full operational control over the Aegean, as was the case before 1974. As a prominent Greek security analyst noted: “Although Greece’s activist and pragmatic foreign policy towards the EEC, NATO, the US, the Arabs and Eastern Europe could be considered as a broader policy to isolate Turkey...with such a blackmail tactic, these countries and organizations may be more sensitive to Greek demands and thus indirectly vulnerable to Greek pressures and acquiescent to Greek objectives” (Coufoudakis, 1983: 373–92).113

By adopting such a policy Papandreou aimed at making clear to Greece’s Western allies that the more adventurous Turkey became the more anti-Americanism would mount in Greece.114 By implication, unless the US and NATO put pressure on Turkey, Greece would no longer rely on its traditional Western allies (such an eventuality would of course negatively affect the future of the US bases in Greece as well as its participation in NATO).115 Anti-Americanism, fully consistent with Papandreou’s rhetoric, was too strong a card to be dismissed by the US, which was aware of the support it had given to the Greek Junta and its alleged duplicity in the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

Papandreou’s policy of holding NATO and, in particular, the United States to be responsible for Turkey’s adventurism in the Aegean was made apparent in the manner in which the March 1987 crisis was handled,116 the most serious crisis in Greek–Turkish relations since the one of the summer of 1976. Papandreou’s immediate reaction was to close the US communication base at Nea Makri, and also to dispatch the Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias to a Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria, for “consultations” with President Zhivkov.117 The aversion of war118 led to a “no-war agreement” between Papandreou and the pro-European Turkish leader, Turgut Özal, at a meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, in January 1988. Although the new “Davos spirit” of an improved climate in bilateral relations was coupled with a series of agreements on “low politics” issues (such as tourism, economy, and culture), certain gestures of goodwill by both sides,119 and agreements on particular military confidence-building measures (CBMs), soon enough the old strains came to the surface and the “Davos spirit” evaporated.120

The Davos meeting had, however, witnessed a change in Papandreou’s traditional “no-dialogue policy” vis-à-vis Turkey, as Greece appeared for the first time willing to refer the issue of the delimitation of the continental
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shelf to the ICJ in The Hague. Furthermore, none of the preconditions posed until then by Papandreou would first have to be fulfilled—such as the withdrawal of the Turkish military forces from Cyprus and the renunciation of the self-proclaimed TRNC by Turkey—for a Greek–Turkish dialogue on the continental shelf to take place (Dipla, 1997: 165).

The change in Papandreou’s stance towards Turkey could be considered as a departure from his “procrastinating culture” vis-à-vis Turkey towards an “instrumental dialogue” one. In accordance with the latter type of agentic culture (see Chapter 1), key decision-makers accept that dialogue is good to the extent that it provides a certain amount of stability in relations between the threatened and the threatening state. In the aftermath of the March 1987 crisis Greece was undoubtedly in need of stability and peaceful relations with Turkey. At the same time, adherents of the “instrumental dialogue culture” are aware of the risks involved in a dialogue with the threatening state and are not willing to accept the compromise costs a final solution with the threatening state may entail.

Following this reasoning, the change in Papandreou’s stance could not move from a “no-dialogue policy” to one regarding dialogue on the whole complex of the Greek–Turkish differences in the Aegean but to a dialogue on the one and only issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf. Furthermore, even this slight move in Papandreou’s stance in the aftermath of a serious crisis with Turkey had to inevitably clash with Greece’s dominant “underdog national culture,” with Papandreou being one of its prime supporters and its sole political expression. It would indeed be far beyond Papandreou’s political charisma for his brand new “instrumental dialogue culture” to stand against and survive two of the most firm representatives of Greece’s “underdog national culture:” the patriotic faction of PASOK—which was standing aghast at Papandreou’s change in policy in Davos121—and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which shared most of Papandreou’s strong views with regard to the US, the EC, and Greece’s relations with Turkey.122

It is worth noting that already before Davos, namely during Papandreou’s second term in power, which came to a close towards the end of the 1980s, Papandreou had abandoned the anti-European rhetoric of the late 1970s for a more pro-European, prointegrationist stance. This occurred not only due to the substantial and constantly rising budgetary benefits which were at the time accruing for Greece from the EC,123 but also due to the realization that, by virtue of its membership, Greece came to enjoy considerable bargaining power, especially in relation to neighboring Turkey (Kazakos, 1988: 574–643). Indeed, through its participation in the European integration process, Greece realized that the EC was not only the sole perquisite of the big EC member-states, and that a small state could also exert substantial influence (Ioakimidis, 1997: 123).

By the end of the 1980s, Greece was already looking like “an orthodox EC member,” as the policy followed by Papandreou did not appear dramatically
different from that of the other EC partners, while it also started paying attention to the Community’s structural projects, such as the enlargement. The only point of difference with certain EC members was Greece’s relationship with Turkey (Rozakis, 1996: 297). It is worth noting that during the 1980s Papandreou kept a distance from the assurances given by Karamanlis to the EC Commission prior to Greece’s entry, namely that neither an incorporation of the Greek–Turkish differences nor any action on the part of Greece to block Turkey’s EC path would take place. As a matter of fact, Papandreou was not at all hesitant in making full use of the advantage Greece enjoyed as a full member of the EC vis-à-vis its threatening neighbor, an aspirant country since the early 1960s and a state struggling through the 1980s, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, for closer relations with the European Community.

Papandreou’s successive governments in the 1980s, indeed, showed remarkable continuity in using the EC as a diplomatic lever against Turkey, specifically by using the Cyprus issue for blocking EU–Turkey relations (Kramer, 1987: 605–14; Bahçeli, 1990; Stephanou and Chardanides, 1991: 207–30; Kranidiotis, 1999: 194). By implication the EC collective approach towards the conflict was greatly influenced, if not captured, by Greece’s views and desiderata on Cyprus and Greek–Turkish relations (Couloumbis, 1994: 189–98; Güvenç, 1998/99: 103–30). At the same time, advancement in relations between the EC and Turkey has remained linked to the exercise of Greece’s veto power, unless Turkey first meets particular criteria – related mainly to the state of democracy and the respect for human rights – and/or abandons its revisionist policy in the Aegean.

With Greek–Turkish relations being brought back to a state of mutual suspicion and confrontation by the end of the 1980s, a new conservative government emerged in Greece in April 1990, led by Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Greece’s new Premier was animated by a completely different culture from that of his predecessor in regard to Greece’s relations with the West as well as with neighboring Turkey. Integral to Mitsotakis’s views on foreign policy were the acknowledgment of the need for better relations with the US, its belief in Western institutions as providers of security, and a strong preference for dialogue and compromise with Turkey.

In Mitsotakis’s culture the aforementioned elements of a state’s foreign policy were linked to each other. For example, while in opposition as the leader of the conservative party in the mid-1980s, Mitsotakis criticized Papandreou’s insistence on keeping the defense expenditures at a high level in the name of achieving a balance of power with Turkey. He argued that Greece could not financially sustain in the long run a favorable balance of power with Turkey. By implication a détente with Turkey should be pursued. Towards this end good relations with the West, especially with the United States, constituted a conditio sine qua non, given that US military aid to Greece constituted a prerequisite for a balance of power in the Aegean to
be achieved (Rizas, 2003: 86). Moreover, for Mitsotakis Turkey was not an “inherently revisionist state” and, to the extent that Turkey did not challenge the basic provision of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty concerning the territorial status quo, he was convinced that the two neighbors could proceed to a dialogue with the aim of coming to a mutually acceptable solution over their differences in the Aegean (Dimitrakos, 1989: 70–1).

In fact, already apparent by his stance as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Georgios Rallis government (1980–1), Mitsotakis’s “resolution culture” urged him to conduct a sincere dialogue with Turkey over the whole complex of Greek–Turkish differences in the Aegean. It is worth noting that this dialogue took place amidst strong criticism from Andreas Papandreou – who in the meantime considered the 1987–9 dialogue he conducted to have been a mistake.

Although none of certain confidence-building initiatives – which, Mitsotakis believed, could prepare the ground for the bilateral dialogue – materialized, neither did he hesitate to meet with the Turkish Premier Mesut Yılmaz in Paris in September 1991 or to discuss in detail the central issue of Greek–Turkish differences in the Aegean, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf. By using Turkish maps published in 1973 and 1974, Mitsotakis proposed in Paris the unofficial division of the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea into three zones, with the aim of facilitating the undisturbed exploration and exploitation of the undisputed areas. Although Yılmaz had initially accepted the Greek proposals, he finally backed out (Syrigos, 1998: 275–6). Interestingly, Mitsotakis’s “resolution culture” aimed at a meeting with the new Turkish Premier, Süleyman Demirel, which took place in Davos, in January 1992. Again, although the two leaders had successfully discussed the framework of a future Greek–Turkish resolution endeavour – depicted in Mitsotakis’s proposal for a pact of friendship and cooperation – strong criticism in Greece, and Cyprus, forced the Greek Premier to postpone signing until after resolution of the Cyprus problem.

It is worth noting that Mitsotakis’s “resolution culture” was strongly affected by his belief in Western institutions as “providers of security.” He thus believed that it was not only Greece’s membership in the EC that provided Greece “with more convenience in its dealing with neighboring Turkey” (Rizas, 2003: 71). Rather, he viewed the normative protection provided by the Community to its members to be further enhanced by a member’s participation in the Community’s defense arm, namely the Western European Union (WEU). In December 1991, Mitsotakis proudly announced that, because of Greece’s participation in the Western European Union, “Greece’s borders have now become Europe’s borders” and “Greece’s borders will be protected by the European Union.”

However, clear confirmation that Greece’s expectations with respect to the WEU had been misguided came shortly thereafter in the form of the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. Article 5 of this stated that the WEU
would exempt itself from any involvement in a conflict between a WEU member (e.g., Greece) and a NATO member (e.g., Turkey). Unsurprisingly, the WEU’s position was described by Greek defense analysts and decision-makers as, at best, controversial and costly for Greece and, at worst, completely offensive to a country that was a full member of the European Community (Valinakis, 1997: 312; Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 101). Strongly disappointed by the results of his initiatives towards his Turkish counterparts and the actions of his European partners in the WEU, Mitsotakis felt obliged to keep adhering to the traditional Greek stance of using the EC as a diplomatic lever against Turkey. Thus, apart from vetoing successive packages of EC economic aid to Turkey, advancement in relations between the EC and Turkey remained linked to the exercise of Greece’s veto power.

When Andreas Papandreou resumed power in October 1993 it seemed that little was left of his old radicalism and anti-Americanism. Indeed, the pursuit of income policies to combat inflation domestically and moves towards privatization seemed like going hand in hand with cooperation – rather than confrontation – with the European Union and a pragmatic and eventually businesslike collaboration with the United States (Kitroeff, 1997: 29; Kaloudis, 2000: 75). The picture seemed quite different in regard to Greek–Turkish relations, however, which moved from a stalemate position to further deterioration.

Almost immediately after his election Papandreou proceeded to the adoption of the “Greece-Cyprus Joint Defence Doctrine.” Convinced of Turkey’s aggressive and revisionist attitude in the Aegean, Papandreou warned Turkey that if Cyprus were threatened by Turkish military action Greece would be prepared to come to the island’s defense by threatening retaliation against Turkey. Greece furthermore initiated a major rearmament program designed not only to reduce the strategic vulnerability of the Cyprus island but also to extend Greece’s deterrent ability to effectively cover the Cyprus island and to respond to Turkish aggression by “horizontal escalation,” meaning in a different strategic theater and at another level of the original provocation. Additional initiatives attributed to certain figures in Papandreou’s government had led to further deterioration in the already strained relations between Greece and Turkey. It could be argued that the initiation of the Joint Defence Doctrine in the mid-1990s is but an example of the vicious circle bilateral relations have entered since the mid-1970s. In this context, by initiating the Joint Defense Doctrine in the mid-1990s, Greece “responded” – albeit belatedly – to Turkey’s decision to open a parallel front in the Aegean Sea immediately after its invasion of Cyprus in 1974. By analogy, the Cyprus invasion was for Turkey a response to the Greek-Cypriot attempts, apparently with Greek backing in late 1950s, to promote a union (“enosis”) with Greece.

Papandreou’s new pragmatism thus did not seem able to transgress the characteristics inherent in his initially “procrastinating” and eventually
“instrumental dialogue culture” as well as in Greece’s “underdog national culture” vis-à-vis Turkey. In January 1994, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs announced to the UN Secretary General that Greece recognized the jurisdiction of the ICJ – of course in regard to the only difference between the two countries concerning the limits of the Aegean continental shelf – with the exception of any dispute relating to defensive military action taken by Greece for reasons of national defense. It was obvious that what Papandreou wanted to exclude from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ – if it would ever take place – was the issue of the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands (Syrigos, 1998: 320). Furthermore, in a poll conducted in January 1995, 82 percent of the Greeks polled stated that Turkey constituted Greece’s most imminent threat; fifty-seven percent believed that the “Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Doctrine” was an effective means of dealing with the Turkish threat; while a not negligible twenty-three percent argued for the immediate exercise of Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean.136

Greece’s decision to lift its veto in regard to the customs union between the EU and Turkey in the midst of such a bad climate was obviously not a gesture of good will but a quid pro quo for the provisional deal between the EU and Greece that Cyprus accession talks were to start six months after the intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam, that the Maastricht Treaty would be revised, and that more funds for the Greek textile industry would be available (Theophanous, 2000).137 The EU’s commitment for a specific date for the beginning of Cyprus accession talks created discomfort in Ankara, which was not hesitant to state only some hours after the signing of the customs union agreement on March 6, 1995 that Turkey would annex the occupied north of Cyprus if Cyprus accession talks began before the Cyprus issue was resolved.138
3
The New Strategy

There are no solutions in life; only choices

Stanislaw Lem

3.1 Crisis, agentic culture, and “new thinking”

In January 1996 the most serious crisis in the history of the Greek–Turkish relationship rocked the newly formed Greek government of Costas Simitis and his self-defined “modernizers” faction of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The crisis over the sovereignty status of the Imia islets (referred to as “Kardak” by Turkey) in the eastern Aegean once more brought the two countries to the brink of war (Syrigos, 1998: 345–50). Turkey officially claimed that the particular islets off the coast of Turkey did not belong to Greece but were “grey areas” in the Aegean sea.

For Greek decision-makers (the public and most foreign policy intelligentsia in Greece), it was the first time that Turkey questioned the sovereignty of islets in the broader Dodecanese region. According to the Greek premier, it seemed that there had been “a qualitative change in Turkey’s revisionist behavior towards Greece” (Parliamentary Minutes, May 1996: 5963). For certain Greek analysts, in the case of the Imia crisis, Turkey acted aggressively in order to deliberately manufacture a crisis as a pretext for an intended armed conflict – limited or all-out (Ifantis, 2001: 33–7), and it saw an opportunity “to fabricate a case so as to put forward the idea of ‘grey areas’ and push Greece to the negotiations table” (Athanassopoulou, 1997: 86) in order to revise the status quo in the Aegean. Most importantly, the Turkish challenge was also interpreted as a new Turkish attempt to raise the level of confrontation in the Aegean, “passing from a policy of provoking tension into a policy of provoking controlled crises, in an obvious attempt to impose a fait accompli in the Aegean” (Alifantis, 2001: 187).

Furthermore, for the Greek decision-makers the crisis over the islets of Imia not only demonstrated the minimal role that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could play in crisis management between Greece and
Turkey, it also highlighted the absolute inability of either the European Union (EU) or its “defense arm” (the Western European Union [WEU]) to act as a mediator in a crisis or as a guarantor of borders.\textsuperscript{141} Indeed, both security organizations have played a peripheral role compared to the United States, a sovereign country (i.e., not an international body) viewed by both Greece and Turkey as the most important actor/mediator in the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{142}

By keeping the “threat from the east” intact and further reinforcing it by introducing new territorial claims in the Aegean, the shocking crisis over the Imia islets had a seismic effect on Greece’s agentic culture as “it made thinkable – if not probable – what was until then considered as unthinkable in relations between neighbours,”\textsuperscript{143} namely war. As events following the Imia crisis would demonstrate, the crisis seemed to validate the thesis that some catalytic external event seemed to be necessary to move states to dramatic policy initiatives in line with their interests (Krasner, 1976: 341).

Indeed, given that in international politics either war or crisis is usually the ultimate arbiter of whether a foreign policy idea is feasible or not (Legro, 2005: 84), the Imia crisis made apparent to the new administration the need for a reorientation of Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis Turkey and, most importantly, helped it to distinguish faulty strategic concepts from effective ones.\textsuperscript{144} In other words, the old, dominant ideas about how national objectives can be obtained were questioned by the agentic culture of the Simitis modernizers about cause and effect. Specifically, the new agentic culture seemed incompatible with both the rationale and the conduct of the foreign policy followed by successive Greek governments in the post-Cold War era. By implication, global and regional power configuration was being filtered in a much different way than in the past.\textsuperscript{145}

From the beginning of the new administration term it was made evident that the basic elements of its culture called for a replacement of the old antagonistic paradigm by a new, more rational, one focusing on engagement and cooperation.\textsuperscript{146} This in turn meant that Greece’s decision-makers started adopting a worldview that kept a distance from the traditional realist state of affairs and resembled more a model of complex interdependence. According to such a world politics, economic manipulation and the use of international institutions – not force – are the dominant instruments, and welfare – not only security – becomes the dominant goal.

In accordance with this agentic culture, the post-Cold War era has also brought about a broader definition of the notion of security. New sorts of power emerged in the political sphere beyond the traditional military might (“hard power”), such as diplomatic, economic, cultural, and moral influence (“soft power”). Their placement at the epicenter of interstate relations, and especially the need to use these types of power for the most effective promotion of Greece’s national interests, necessitated the rapid adaptation of its diplomacy in order to meet the new demands.\textsuperscript{147}
The post-Cold War international system, this agentic culture argued, should be viewed as not purely anarchic, but rather moderate, where institutions and channels of communication can provide stable expectations of continuing peace. Moreover, the deeper engagement of international institutions could support the normative system needed by the states of Southeastern Europe: the importance of democratic governance domestically, the rejection of war as a mechanism for dispute resolution, the legitimacy of existing dispute – and conflict – resolution mechanisms, and the preference for multilateral solutions to common security challenges (Simitis, 1996: 94–7).

The agentic culture of the mid-1990s should not, however, be viewed as an idealistic approach to world politics where cosmopolitan assumptions about the real nature and function of politics prevail over pragmatic considerations and policy action. Indeed, apart from keeping a distance from a traditional realist conduct of foreign policy, which was assessed to be ineffective if not actually counterproductive, the new agentic culture was particularly interested in approaching the complex post-Cold War environment in a rationalist and pragmatic way. As a consequence, Greece’s national objectives could be only obtained if both the new instruments of “soft power,” that is, diplomatic, economic, and moral influence, and the dominant instruments of economic manipulation and the use of international institutions were incorporated in Greece’s strategy towards its immediate environment.

Obviously, the new agentic culture has had a huge impact on the way Greece’s national interest should be defined. Indeed, rather than being defined solely in terms of balance of power and in accordance with the country’s position in the international system, Greece’s national interest would now acquire a richer content as well as being more closely tied to the state’s domestic characteristics. According to the new agentic culture, heavy emphasis should be placed on economic welfare, since economic factors are becoming increasingly more important in the enactment of policy. In order to be competitive in the post-Cold War international order, Greece should create a strong domestic economy within the parameters of a globalized competitive market, and not retreat into isolationism. By implication, Greece’s full integration into European structures and the redefinition of Greek identity within the framework of an open, multicultural European society (Simitis, 1995; 1996: 73–81; 1998) was the only way forward.

This in turn meant that the supporters of reformist demands would have to link political choices at home with choices abroad. It is thus not a coincidence that the election of Costas Simitis was followed by a modernization program, which had a complementary policy externally. Indeed, for the Greek administration in the mid-1990s, the modernization of the Greek political system and membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU) were the means to put an end to “Greek exceptionality” and move Greece
from the periphery to the epicenter of European developments. There was thus a purposeful action by the new administration to transfer into the Greek political system a model of governance reflecting the values, norms, and principles upon which the EU system and those of its member states are constructed (Ioakimidis, 2001: 74–5). In other words, there was a systematic political as well as an ideological program for intended change and reform towards a parallel process of “Europeanizing” Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernizing domestic reform process (Economides, 2005: 481) or “towards ‘modernization’, and therefore, Europeanization” (Ioakimidis, 2001: 74; 2007: 35; Featherstone, 2005).

The modernization of the Greek political system inevitably called for Greece’s adjustment to the post-Cold War realities. The main foreign policy goal of the new administration at the time was to restore the country’s profile and credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community and thus overturn Greece’s image of the mid-1990s as “an immature Balkan parvenu in the Western European milieu while its very membership of the EU was [put] in question” (Economides, 2005: 481; Tziampiris, 2000).

It indeed seemed that, over the first five turbulent years of the post-Cold War era, Greece had completely failed to seize the unique opportunities the end of the bipolar confrontation had brought to the country. Most notably, the upgrading of Greece to a beacon of liberty and economic progress for its Balkan neighbors and at the forefront of developments of immense interest to Brussels and Washington alike, such as the EU and NATO expansions to the East, was invalidated as Greece had chosen to develop its foreign policy through the adoption of traditional/nationalist approaches. The mishandling of the Macedonian issue is a strong case in point. Trapped by a progressively nationalist public opinion and a lack of a coherent and long-term Balkan policy, the Greek administration in the early 1990s handled the Macedonian issue in a way that seriously damaged Greece’s international and European standing (Nicolaidis, 1997: 73–8; Veremis and Couloumbis, 1994; Tsakonas, 1997: 139–58).

There is a consensus among analysts of Greek foreign policy that since the mid-1990s the “defensive,” “static,” “reactionary,” “inward-looking” foreign policy —arguing for the isolation of Turkey by all means and at all costs— has been followed by a “postnationalist,” “outward-looking,” “proactive,” “flexible,” and much more confident foreign policy based on long-term planning, a willingness to take calculated risks, and the faith that Greece’s national interests are better served via multilateral efforts (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005: 217–39; Ioakimidis, 2000: 359–72; 2001: 73–94). As this new approach matured, Greece’s relations with its Balkan neighbors were normalized; its membership of the European Union was solidified politically and economically; and its ties with the United States, the sole superpower in the post-bipolar international system, were strengthened, despite the fact
that some occasions, with the NATO air-strikes in Kosovo in 1999 foremost among them, spurred the anti-American reflexes of Greek public opinion; last, but not least, as the analysis that follows will demonstrate, the ground was also laid for a new relationship with Greece’s major strategic opponent, Turkey.152

Apparently, this gradual, yet steady, “metamorphosis” of Greek foreign policy was mainly due to the way in which the systemic changes were integrated into its foreign policy agenda (Tsakonas, 2003: 19–45; 2005: 427–37). The goal of the new administration was at the time clear and consistent with the “modernizers”’ culture: Greek politics should be put back to European normalcy, peace and economic rationality should rule, the Euro-Atlantic structures should be cemented, and, most importantly, the Greek public (“national culture”) should start showing concern for the broader long-term questions of Greece’s future in the context of a highly competitive post-Cold War world.153

Having faced the burden of the counterproductive foreign policy of the early 1990s, the Simitis “modernizers” were thus called upon to overcome nationalist rigidities, adapt to the new post-Cold War environment, recover from the traumas of the Balkan policy of the 1989–95 period and elevate Greece’s role in the Balkans, thus raising the country’s credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community.154 The Balkans, Greece’s immediate environment, was thus viewed as an area of conflict in which Greece should keep asserting its status as a key player in the region. To play such a role Greece should in turn manage to close all “open fronts” in the already turbulent Balkan area and normalize its relations with its [Balkan] neighbors, Turkey included.155

What is clearly highlighted by the preceding analysis is that a “top-down Europeanization”156 of Greece’s foreign policy was not simply on the move in the mid-1990s, but had started producing results to the extent that Greece’s agentic culture was successfully “absorbing” the logic of European unification and thus looking at international issues through the lenses of the EU, bearing in mind the views of all the other member-states. In other words, what started becoming noticeable in the mid-1990s was the “policy impact of Europeanization”, that is, the impact of European integration on policy-making, including actors, policy problems, instruments, resources, and styles.157

At the practical level of foreign policy formation and, mainly, implementation, the effects of Europeanization would become clearer in Greece’s active participation in policing and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans in the 1997–8 periods – which was a reflection of a more equidistant, multilateral, and constructive policy in the region (Couloumbis, 2000: 382) – and in the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999. The effects of Europeanization on Greece’s behavior towards Turkey, however, would not become noticeable before the end of the first post-Cold War decade, as the dominance of an
“under-dog national culture” in the internal political discourse made it rather difficult for the force of Europeanization to decisively affect the substance as well as the style of Greece’s strategy towards Turkey.

3.2 Developing a new strategy towards Turkey

Following the distinction made between the traditional realist state of affairs and the model of complex interdependence, it could be argued that the dominant theme in Greece’s foreign policy agenda, namely Greek–Turkish relations, seemed from 1974 through to the mid-1990s to be closer to the realist end of the spectrum. In accordance with Greece’s new agentic culture, however, Greek–Turkish relations from the mid-1990s started moving to the center and even close to the complex interdependence end of the spectrum. This was due to the way Greece’s agentic culture viewed not only Turkey’s standing and role in a globalized and complex international and regional environment, but also, mainly, the potential role Greece could play by placing at the center of its relations with its neighbors the new sorts of power (both “hard” and “soft”).

Interestingly, most of the conventional assessments of Turkey’s post-Cold War security dilemmas and potential roles were shared by Greece’s new agentic culture. On the geopolitical chessboard of the greater Middle East, Turkey was thus viewed as trying to capitalize on its prominent place in US strategy in the aftermath of the Cold War, namely as a “pivotal state” in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Central Asia region. Particularly in the period following the Imia crisis, Greece viewed the role of the United States and NATO in the Greek–Turkish conflict as primarily determined by Turkey’s geostrategic importance.

In the mid-1990s, the strategic interests of the sole superpower concerned access to the energy sources of the Middle East, the preservation of free and unimpeded navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, the “salvation” of the peace process in the Middle East, and the containment of Islamic fundamentalism (Stearns, 1997b; Gordon, 1997). In the pursuit of these goals, which extend to the three regional subsystems contiguous to Turkey’s geographic position (the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia/Caucasus), Turkey’s strategic importance for American interests was more than obvious, while a series of developments in the area (e.g., the Gulf War, Operation Provide Comfort in Bosnia) have rendered the value and importance of the American cooperation with Turkey even greater (Larrabee, 1997: 143–73; Lesser, 1992b; 2000a: 203–21). Turkey – the agentic culture argued – was actually in search of new roles that would allow it to be “the ally who could provide policing of the Middle East and counterbalance the Islamism of Iran and the expansionism of Iraq. It could also be the bridge between East and West and/or the channel which would
allow NATO to approach the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union” (Simitis, 1995: 159).

The United States had traditionally adopted a foreign policy towards the Greek–Turkish dispute which was mainly based on its interest in consolidating operational normality and cohesion in NATO’s Southern Flank (Stearns, 1992; Mackenzie, 1983; Couloumbis, 1983). The existence and possible escalation of the Greek–Turkish dispute was also recognized as posing a threat to NATO’s southeast flank; thus the primary objective of US foreign policy elites has been to control Greek–Turkish tensions and secure peace and stability in the Aegean and the broader Eastern Mediterranean region. Needless to say, the US approach was always a pragmatic one, with its ultimate objective being to maintain strong ties with Greece and Turkey, as well as constant vigilance, as the US was concerned that the deteriorating Greek–Turkish relationship would make the aforementioned goals unattainable. It is thus not by accident that, for decades, a major failure of US foreign policy has been its inability to get its two allies astride the Aegean to resolve their differences through compromise and cooperation. It was the US diplomatic intervention in January 1996, however, that prevented the crisis over Imia from escalating into violent conflict, securing a return to the status quo ante (Ifantis, 2001: 38). In that context, the outcome of the crisis – in contrast to its management – was satisfactory for Athens.160

The role the United States could play in managing the conflictual Greek–Turkish relationship, the agentic culture of the mid-1990s argued, was – and will remain – important. By implication, Greece should upgrade its relations with the sole superpower and convince it that it would be in its interest to check any Turkish policy that could lead to a crisis in NATO’s delicate southern flank. This would in turn mean that a strong message had to be sent to the Turkish political and military elite that good neighborly relations with Greece would be a prerequisite for the successful tackling of the two states’ domestic challenges as well as for their economic and political development. This kind of reasoning would also mean that Greece, particularly the Greek public, should start distancing itself from the traditional political discourse, namely the recycling of conspiracy theories that ultimately present it as a country whose policies are always dictated by larger and more powerful states and interests – who, unsurprisingly, are always acting in favor of Turkey.161

However, in a world of complex interdependence, it would be far more important for Greece – the new agentic culture argued – to incorporate international institutions in a comprehensive strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Interestingly, the Atlantic Alliance was disqualified from such an endeavor for a number of reasons. First, NATO had always been – and will remain – interested in regulating behavior in individual issue areas, and such a concern reflected the marginal interest that NATO (and the US) had in investing in facilitating the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute. Second, the
norms NATO has exerted were valued as specific and/or regulative, that is, the management of the two allies’ conflict, and, most importantly, as particularly weak, given that the Alliance had always kept a safe distance from emphasizing the necessity of the resolution of territorial disputes among its members as a precondition for the continuation of their membership (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 461). By exerting weak and constitutive/regulative norms on the disputants and by maintaining that the ultimate goal was securing operational stability in the Alliance’s southern flank (i.e., conflict management) NATO acted as a substitute for the more substantive and long-term solutions, namely the resolution of the dispute Greece’s agentic culture was interested at the time.

Third, by maintaining an attitude of detached concern, a hands-off policy and impartiality to the conflict, and by offering to the disputants the certainty the Alliance would do whatever it takes to prevent Greece and Turkey from fighting each other in order for stability in the Alliance’s flank to be secured, the two allies had no incentive to take the responsibility for resolving their own differences. Fourth, and most important in regard to the Greek–Turkish conflict, NATO had not been in the position to clearly declare and enforce its commitment to international treaties and international law and/or to recognize in no uncertain terms the status quo of the territorial integrity of its member-states (Tsakonas, 2007: 23–5).

All the above factors have resulted in NATO experiencing a low level of credibility and a gradual lessening of importance as an institutional platform in which the intra-member cooperation process could result in the mitigation of the anarchic effects of the international system. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era NATO has gradually lost its power of attraction in Greek and Turkish eyes as an institution able to define their collective Western/European identities. In addition, the new priorities of the Alliance, namely the promotion of the normative ideational elements of the Western international community in Central and Eastern European countries through enlargement, reduced the attention paid by the Alliance to Greek–Turkish relations, and both countries became marginal to NATO’s new identity and missions (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 470–1).

Indeed, although the security concerns emerging in the Balkans and the Greater Middle Eastern regions from the second half of the 1990s onwards were pushing Greece and Turkey into a position of “front-line states,” the consequent promise that NATO might start dealing with the Greek–Turkish conflict in a committed manner did not materialize. More interestingly, although NATO started as a pan-European cooperative security organization, it was gradually transformed into “one of the European security organizations” (Aybet, 2000) while, during the 1990s, it was the European Union that started becoming the institutional platform upon which Turkey and Greece could prove their European identities and work out their disputes (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 471).
For the Greek agentic culture in the mid-1990s the identification of Greece's security interests with those of its partners in the EU seemed like a “one-way street.” Thus, Greece's agentic culture advocated the rejection of a strategy of isolationism, complemented by Turkey's seclusion from European developments, while at the same time stressing that “a closer relationship between Turkey and the European institutions and organizations should be pursued – a relationship which would in turn imply Turkey's compliance with the principles and rules of the European institutions” (Simitis, 1995: 161). The latter were viewed as functioning in accordance with particular norms and principles and by implication any notion of revisionism, violation of human rights and/or the use of force for changing the status-quo would be unacceptable for both EU members and EU aspirants (Simitis, 1995: 160).

Greece was thus called upon to develop policies vis-à-vis Turkey that were consistent with its standing as a full member of the European Union and, particularly, with European political civilization and norms of behavior, namely conflict resolution through the application of international law and agreements. By implication, Greece should abandon the reactionary and defensive policies it was trapped into over the first decade and a half of the post-Cold war era and adopt a more flexible and constructive foreign policy, especially with regard to neighboring Turkey.162

In the aftermath of the Imia crisis Greece's key decision-makers were convinced that the traditional strategy of deterring the omnipresent Turkish threat on all fronts and at all costs was at the least ineffective, and at worst counterproductive. By implication, the traditional strategy followed by successive Greek governments since the mid-1970s should be replaced by a new one, which should be based on a completely new argumentation consistent with international law, dialogue, peaceful settlement of disputes, and European norms of behavior. Apparently, at the heart of the new strategy lay the strong belief of their supporters that it was in Greece's interest to resolve its long-standing conflict with Turkey, as its reproduction and endurance would have – both in the short and in the long run – disastrous effects on Greece's economic development and domestic stability.163

After raising its credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community and putting itself back to European normalcy, Greece had to make full use of the benefits stemming from its active participation in the exclusive club of the European Union.164 Especially with regard to Greece's strategy towards neighboring Turkey, the agentic culture of the Simitis “modernizers” shared the belief that a stable bilateral relationship with Turkey, based on the successful interconnection of the two states' interests with legitimate international rules and standards, as, for example, that of European integration, was both feasible and realistic.165 It is worth noting that – in a more IR theory jargon of a neorealist logic – such an approach distinguishes structure from process. By implication, while it
recognizes that states function within a competitive international environment, it also assumes that neofunctionalist strategies can still prove effective at the process level, especially through the actors’ socialization, which limits and shapes behavior.\textsuperscript{166}

Interestingly, based on the conviction that a connection of the Greek and Turkish interests with international rules and standards was both feasible and realistic, the new agentic culture viewed Turkey as a “security maximizer” whose aims should not be regarded as being unlimited. There was indeed a sharp contrast between Greece’s new agentic culture and those of the past, especially that of Andreas Papandreou, as well as the dominant “under-dog national culture,” which viewed Turkey as a “power maximizer,” revisionist, and an inherently aggressive neighbor with unlimited aims. Furthermore, the new agentic culture called upon a move from the traditional discourse of nonnegotiable rights to one of interests in an effort to disentangle the two and find a degree of common ground and possible compromises. It is indeed the element of compromise, as an acceptable and effective way of dealing with the Turkish threat, which was an additional discernible characteristic of Greece’s new agentic culture of the mid-1990s (Simitis, 1995: 161).\textsuperscript{167}

Theory expects that culture would, to a certain extent, define the instruments and tactics that are judged acceptable, appropriate, or legitimate within the broader set of those that are imaginable – thereby placing further limits on the types of policies that can be proposed, defended, and pursued – while certain options are excluded from consideration (Duffield, 1999: 771–2). Unsurprisingly, the selection on the part of Greece’s decision-makers of particular policies over others in developing a new strategy towards Turkey had been defined by, and was in line with, the agentic culture of the dominant “modernizing apparatus” of the Simitis administration.\textsuperscript{168}

Indeed, it could hardly be argued that Greece’s new strategy had been so self-conscious and purposely formed as may be the case in certain theorists of grand strategies conceptualization\textsuperscript{169} or that it fulfilled the criteria used to assess a state’s strategy.\textsuperscript{170} One would be surprised, however, by the fact that the key decision-makers were particularly concerned that the new strategy Greece had to develop towards Turkey should not, at least, clash with Greece’s strategic priorities of the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{171} Therefore, instead of having “exact fears, but abstract hopes,” as Paul Eluard’s dictum suggests, the agentic culture of the mid-1990s was convinced that a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Greece’s most important foreign policy issue should be developed. In the words of the leader of the “modernizers’ camp:”

[T]his “comprehensive strategy” should challenge the bilateral-bipolar character of Greek-Turkish relations as well as the simplistic logic of the use of force (e.g. Turkey’s threat of “casus belli”) as a means of resolving
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The Greek–Turkish differences... [G]reece was in need of a strategy which would go hand in hand with Greece’s strategic priority for membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU);... [a] strategy which would eventually lead Greek–Turkish relations into a peaceful and cooperative context based on international law and agreements. (Simitis, 2005: 75–6)172

Apart from bringing new perspectives to policy deliberations and highlighting the need for a comprehensive strategy to be developed, the new agentic culture was also called upon to set the framework of alternative choices Greece had at its disposal in developing an effective strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. In other words, apart from specifying the nature of the “Turkish threat” and the goals the new strategy should achieve, Greece’s agentic culture was also called upon to specify the means that could be employed to attain the strategy’s goals.

Towards this end – yet before suggesting certain policy alternatives over others – the new agentic culture was catalytic in diagnosing the limits of Greece’s internal balancing efforts towards the Turkish threat and in highlighting the need for a more sophisticated external balancing policy in order for Greece’s short- and medium-term strategic priorities not to be undermined.

In the mid-1990s, it was the EMU – contained in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty – which appeared as the biggest challenge to Greece: either to adopt reforms or to face the prospect of being marginalized (Featherstone, 2003: 928–9). With its reputation at a low ebb, the only way for Greece to join with the EU core was to achieve a major turnaround in the main macro-economic indicators, as the position of the Greek economy was the most divergent of all from the trends apparent in the EU’s core (Christodoulakis, 2000: 93–114; Garganas, 2000: 115–29). To that end, gradual adjustment and reform by consensus seemed to be the only feasible alternative for the “modernizers” within PASOK in order for Greece to insure inclusion in EMU in January 2001, a year before the euro would fully replace national currencies in the European Union.173

By placing Greece’s quest for convergence with the EU economic prerequisites at the top of the agenda,174 the new administration had started putting the basic determinant of Greek–Turkish competition, namely the existing and intensifying arms race, into question. Indeed, Greek and Turkish defense expenditures – the highest among NATO countries – have been kept at extremely high levels, which have very much gone against the average NATO and European trend of falling defense spending.175 Moreover, as a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a ten-year $31 billion armament program, Greece responded in November of that year with a $14 billion (4 trillion drachmas) program for the next five years, 1996–2000.176
Military expenditures constituted a heavy burden for the Greek economy, especially at the time when Greece was completing the implementation of an economic austerity program in order to enjoy the benefits of full membership of the EMU. As a matter of fact, defense expenditures were, to a certain extent, responsible for the country’s budget deficit, as well as Greece’s lower than desired level of social services. It was also believed that the arms race had resulted in an imbalance of power in favor of Turkey and the risk for Greece of distancing itself from EU economic convergence prerequisites. Thus, two important goals had to be achieved by Greece in the mid-1990s: a short-term one, referring to the need of reversing the existing imbalance of power, and a medium and/or long-term one, referring to Greece’s ability to “escape” from the existing interminable arms race in a way that would not deviate from its strategic objective to fully integrate into the European Union.

With a view to satisfying its short-term goal, Greece proceeded with the adoption of a series of internal balancing measures in order to deter the perceived Turkish threat. Based on the fundamental strategic principle that “intentions may change very quickly but [military] capabilities remain,” Greece would have to be prepared to maintain a relative military balance with Turkey. Therefore, to militarily deter the Turkish threat, at least until Turkish policy towards Greece changed in a fundamental way, Greece’s emphasis had to be on the strengthening of its Armed Forces through the adoption of a modern strategic and operational doctrine with emphasis on combined/joint operations, improved personnel training,
and acquisition of modern weapon systems, including smart weapons and force multipliers.

It is worth mentioning that the above measures focused on shifting the country’s arms procurement policy from quantity to quality to an even greater degree than before (Kollias, 1998). Therefore, the internal balancing of the Turkish threat and the strengthening of Greece’s deterrent ability were connected with a series of specific proposals concerning the qualitative upgrading and modernization of the Greek Armed Forces in the context of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs,” the cost-effective use of the available economic resources (“more bang for the buck”), the change in the structure of the Greek armed forces, the optimum use of the human resources available, and the like (Dokos, 1999: 201–24).

Thus, at the level of internal balancing, the qualitative strengthening of the country’s deterrent ability – especially for as long as Turkey showed no limiting of its claims – constituted a sine qua non for Greece to restore the balance of power, mainly in the Aegean Sea, or even attain a favorable balance of power that would convince Turkey that the cost incurred from an eventual attack would be far greater than the expected gains.

Nevertheless, even if the efforts of internally balancing the Turkish threat were crowned with total success and Greece managed to attain its short-term goal of achieving a balance of power with Turkey, the medium/long-term goal for Greece was still to “escape” from the existing interminable arms race in a way that would not cause it to deviate from its strategic objective of economic development and full integration into the European Union. Thus, Greece was facing the difficult “guns or butter dilemma.” The dilemma came down to Greece’s ability to match the need for immediate and considerable defense expenditures with its medium or long-term objective to fulfill the commitments imposed by the terms of the euro-zone’s stability and growth pact. There was, in other words, a quest for the achievement of both deterrence and economic development.180

To achieve both goals, Greece had to undertake a series of initiatives that would convey to the Turkish cost/benefit strategic calculus that cooperation would be far more beneficial for Turkey than the expansionist policy thus far followed. Thus, eventually, Greece started distancing itself from past assessments indicating either that diplomacy alone could moderate Turkish behavior (which, coupled with Turkey’s intransigence, had eroded the credibility of Greek deterrence) and/or that Greece’s “internal balancing” efforts alone could provide the answer to the “guns or butter dilemma” Greece was facing.

In turn, Greece’s efforts to effectively balance the Turkish threat without undermining its strategic priorities had to move towards a new position where credible deterrence, mainly achieved by the strengthening of the Greek Armed Forces, would be coupled with sophisticated diplomatic maneuvering and initiatives. It was indeed evident for the Simitis government,
that unless successful external balancing – through diplomatic means and maneuvering – could offset the Turkish prospective military superiority, the only option for Greece would be to follow Turkey in a costly and destabilizing arms race. Interestingly, as the leader of the “modernizers’ camp” had put it:

...in the long-run, the most effective screen grid for dealing with future crises [with Turkey] is to actively participate in and shape developments taking place internationally, contribute to the resolution of international disputes, not necessarily related to the Greek–Turkish conflict, build up coalitions with states which are supportive to our interests and choices and succeed in gaining the solidarity of our EU partners.181

3.3 A strategy in abeyance

Interestingly, from the Imia crisis in January 1996 to early 1999, the central tenets of Greece’s traditional balancing behavior vis-à-vis Turkey remained unchanged and Greece kept relying on a mixture of “internal” and “external balancing” policies. The latter involved the strengthening of Greece’s deterrent ability and the use of the European Union as leverage to promote Greek national interests by excluding Turkey from its European vocation (the so-called policy of “conditional sanctions”). Therefore, although a new agentic culture in Greece viewed Turkey as a “security maximizer” – whose interests could be linked with legitimate international rules and standards – thus advocating that a brand new strategy be adopted, Greece’s relations with Turkey kept looking like “business as usual.” The maintenance of the dominant role of Greece’s “underdog national culture” and the inability of an “asynchronic” and “autarkic” Europeanization to produce fruitful results, until at least early 1999,182 seemed to pair with a bleak and problematic bilateral relationship, thus making a major change in Greece’s strategic behavior towards Turkey prohibitive.

Key representatives of Greece’s new agentic culture were not hesitant, however, in making particular efforts, already underway in the wake of the Imia crisis, to communicate to the international community a new foreign policy framework based on certain principles, such as respect for international law and agreements, the acceptance of the important role international institutions can play in promoting international cooperation, the promotion of schemes of collective security, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes.183 According to this new framework, Greece should adopt a more active policy towards Turkey and proceed to the inauguration of a dialogue on issues where common views and understanding exist. With regard to the Cyprus issue, particular emphasis should be paid to Cyprus’ accession to the EU in order for its security to be strengthened and its international standing to be enhanced.184
By abandoning the more traditional policies of inertia Greece had been used to following in the past in dealing with Turkey and by adopting an active stance, Greek decision-makers aimed at portraying Greece as a European state with a sincere interest in having cordial relations with its neighbors, especially with Turkey, based on international law and agreements. Specifically, the peaceful settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute by reference to the adjudication of international law, particularly the International Court of Justice in The Hague, seemed to be the only way forward for better and more stable Greek–Turkish relations. Such a stance on the part of Greece would have managed – Greek decision-makers believed – even to make other international actors change their fixed policies of “equal distance” towards Greece and Turkey over their dispute (Simitis, 2005: 76).

Towards this end, a parallel effort of communicating Greece’s argumentation to both the EU members and the United States was undertaken. It included a series of official and unofficial meetings and talks of some of the key representatives of Greece’s agentic culture with the leaders of certain EU member-states as well as the Greek premier’s official visit to Washington in April 1996. With regard to the former, efforts concentrated on linking Greece’s argumentation with certain EU members’ interests, related to the forthcoming intergovernmental conference, the EU’s common policy in the Balkans, and effective dealing with certain pressing social problems the EU was confronted with at the time, such as the issue of employment or that of illegal immigration. Likewise, in Washington Greece’s efforts were directed towards linking the need for stable relations in the Aegean – of which Greece was an ardent supporter – with certain US interests related to the avoidance of crises in the Aegean as well as to NATO’s prime objective to secure of securing operational normality in the Alliance’s southern flank (Simitis, 2005: 76–85).

Interestingly, part of the Greek argumentation for better and more stable relations with Turkey put forward in Washington in April 1996 opted for the so-called “step-by-step” approach in Greek–Turkish relations. The latter advocated the initiation of a dialogue between Greece and Turkey on issues of “low politics,” and it was viewed by Greek decision-makers as a means towards the gradual rapprochement of the two countries that would allow for the building of the trust and the confidence needed for high politics issues to be addressed at a later stage.

At least at the EU level, Greek decision-makers felt that Greece’s campaign to inform the EU partners about its sincere interest in having cordial relations with its neighbors and obtaining an expression of their solidarity had been successful. Indeed, following the Imia crisis, some normative pressure was applied to the EU aspirant, Turkey, by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The former expressed the EU’s solidarity with Greece and warned Turkey that its relationship with the EU was supposed to take place in a context of respect for international law and the absence of
the threat or use of force (Syrigos, 1998: 370–3). The European Parliament had also expressed its concern over Turkey’s territorial demands vis-à-vis an EU member and stated that Greece’s borders constituted EU borders as well. On a stricter note, the EU Council of Ministers issued a statement in July 1996 urging Turkey to appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Imia, to show respect for international law and agreements as well as for EU’s external borders, and to declare its commitment to the aforementioned principles. It also considered that disputes should be settled solely on the basis of international law.189

Furthermore, an attempt was also made by Greece for the success of the EU integration process as well as the EU plans to enlarge to the east to be linked with the principles of good neighborly relations and respect for international law and international agreements. Indeed, in early December 1996 and in view of the forthcoming EU Council in Dublin, Greece’s premier sent a letter to his EU counterparts highlighting Turkey’s aggressive behavior and blaming the latter for Greece’s obvious difficulty in promptly meeting the Maastricht economic criteria.190 In early 1997 there was a strong belief in Greece’s agentic culture that Turkey’s European orientation should be the central element of Greece’s strategy towards Turkey in order for Turkey’s assertiveness towards Greece to be constrained. Moreover, as Greece’s premier Simitis had put it: “...[t]he effectiveness of Greece’s strategy depended on the extent Greece would succeed in [imposing through the EU] the rules and conditions which would decisively transform the dispute between Greece and Turkey into an EU-Turkey one” (our emphasis) [Simitis, 2005: 86].

Most interestingly, it was in March 1997 that a “model” of the strategy Greece had finally pursued in mid-1999 started being elaborated by Greece’s decision-makers as a competent response to certain EU members’ efforts to upgrade EU–Turkey relations.191 The exertion of serious Turkish pressure on the EU192 with regard to its granting of a candidacy status, at a time when the EU was making plans for its enlargement, coupled with the favorable stance of certain EU members towards Turkey’s closer relations with the EU, was interpreted by Greek decision-makers as a “pressure waiting to be exerted” on Greece to lift its long-standing veto of the EU’s structural funds to Turkey in the forthcoming EU–Turkey Association Council in April 1997.

Moreover, plans engineered by some of Turkey’s most ardent supporters – with Great Britain leading the way – for granting Turkey a preaccession status by bypassing the normal institutional process had not only alarmed Greek decision-makers; they moreover made evident the need for a comprehensive Greek response that would not make Greece appear as the most fervent of the EU members objecting to the strengthening of Turkey’s relations with the EU.193 Interestingly, the response proposed and elaborated, yet not followed at the time, by Greek decision-makers advocated that Greece should press for a proportional linkage to be made between the degree of the upgrading of EU–Turkey relations and the promotion of particular
Greek interests regarding its dispute with Turkey as well as the Cyprus issue. Simply put, the more Turkey’s relations with the EU were upgraded, the more demanding Greece’s prerequisites for conceding to the upgrading of Turkey’s relationship with the EU would become. Confronted by serious external pressure, this was indeed the first time Greek decision-makers had embarked upon a conscious elaboration of a brand new strategy vis-à-vis Turkey; a strategy that could transform Greece’s dispute with Turkey into an EU–Turkey one.

Actually it was in late 1997 that the rationale of the new strategy was presented in a clear and straightforward way by key decision-makers in the Greek Parliament as the only comprehensive and credible response to the “Turkish issue” and as the only one able to provide Greece with solutions both to its long-standing conflict with Turkey and to the intractable Cyprus problem. Although well elaborated since 1997, Greece’s new strategy remained in abeyance in terms of its implementation throughout the period leading up to 1999. The persistence of the dominance of an “underdog national culture” and Turkey’s counterproductive stance on its relations with Greece had not been the only reasons the new strategy had been “on hold” for a period of almost three years. Most importantly, advocates of Greece’s new strategy were confronted with a serious difficulty in matching up contradicting foreign policy decisions.

Greece’s initiation in early 1997 of a “step-by-step” approach towards Turkey through the establishment of a dialogue between Greece and Turkey on issues of “low politics” seemed to make a “strange bedfellow” with Greece’s backing of the Greek-Cypriot government decision to sign a deal some time earlier for the order of a S-300 PMU-1 anti-aircraft missile system to be installed within the area controlled by the Greek Cypriots. It was indeed hard to see how the positive development regarding the dialogue between Greece and Turkey on low politics issues – initiated after almost a decade since the last hectic collaboration of the Greek and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on certain low politics issues (animated by the short-lived “Davos spirit” in 1988) – could pair with the negative climate of verbal offensives and counteroffensives due to Cyprus’ purchase and planned deployment of the Russian missiles.

It is worth noting that the issue of the purchase and deployment of the Russian-made missile system in Cyprus constituted the most characteristic example of the internal clash which existed within the ranks of the Greek government from 1996 until 1998, among those key decision-makers on foreign policy issues who happened to be the main candidates of the governing party’s, and Greece’s, leadership in early 1996. The key representative of Greece’s new agentic culture, premier Costas Simitis, had not been hesitant to question the Joint [Greece–Cyprus] Defence Doctrine (JDD), arguing for the replacement of the notorious strategic coupling of the “joint defense area” with a “joint economic area.” Although not a strong believer in the
doctrine, Simitis had not, however, openly opposed the doctrine’s operationalization after his coming into office.\(^{200}\)

In early 1997, with the doctrine in place – although more an exercise on paper than an applicable reality – advocates of Greece’s new strategy towards Turkey were faced with the unravelling of a “Gordian knot.” Indeed, they should not only match up the consequences of the purchase and deployment of the missile system with the parallel process of a Greek–Turkish dialogue on “low-politics” issues, but also, most importantly, pair the “militarization” of the Cyprus issue – due to the purchase of the S-300 missiles – with its “politicization,” namely Cyprus’ European accession process, the paramount goal of Greece’s new strategy.\(^{201}\)

At the bilateral level, two other decisions taken by Greece in mid-1997 were mostly viewed by Greek decision-makers as useful gestures of goodwill – aiming either at picturing Greece as a country favoring dialogue and stable relations with its neighbors or at strengthening Greece’s international and European standing – rather than as integral parts of a broader strategy aiming at the resolution of its dispute with Turkey (Simitis, 2005: 88–9).\(^{202}\)

The first concerned an initiative taken by the United States and NATO in May 1997 regarding a set of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which Greece and Turkey could adopt and apply in the Aegean. With the aim of keeping the temperature at the lowest level possible and in order to be able to check Turkey’s perceived revisionist policy in the Aegean, Greece accepted two of the five proposals, namely the monitoring by NATO of Greek and Turkish military flights over the Aegean and the extension of the moratorium on military exercises. The NATO-made CBMs had soon proved unable to serve even the short-term goal regarding the reduction of tension in the Aegean.\(^{203}\)

The second Greek foreign policy decision regards the so-called Madrid Declaration, signed by Greece and Turkey in July 1997 in the backstage of the Madrid NATO Summit and under US pressure.\(^{204}\) It is worth noting that, in contrast to the Greek agentic culture, the agreement did not state that the differences between Greece and Turkey were to be solved according to international law. Neither did it make any reference to the ICJ or any other judicial organ.\(^{205}\) In that sense, the Madrid Declaration was not fully incorporated in – or it even constituted a deviation from – the comprehensive strategy Greece’s agentic culture had envisioned. Furthermore, the Madrid Declaration was considered as preparing the ground for a major shift in Greece’s traditional policy to consider the delimitation of the continental shelf as the only difference between Greece and Turkey, which should be resolved through recourse to the ICJ.\(^{206}\)

Coupled with a strong internal criticism by certain MPs of the governing party, who pointed to the concessions the government had made over Greece’s sovereign rights in the Aegean,\(^{207}\) the Madrid Declaration remained – although it initially appeared as a positive development in the
normalization of Greek–Turkish relations (Papacosma, 1999: 61–2) – far from constituting a critical step in easing an extremely strained relationship. It is not by coincidence that scarcely a month after the signing of the Madrid Declaration Greece was presented with a “negative list” of Turkish responses. These responses included Prime Minister Yılmaz’s statement that the principles of international law cannot be applied to the Aegean Sea, the “Integration Agreement” concluded between Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or the challenge to Greek sovereignty of over one hundred islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, including the island of Gavdos, south of Crete (Kurumahmut, 1998; Turkish War Academy, 1996).

More importantly, it was at the multilateral level that Greece continued to adhere to its traditional policy towards Turkey throughout the period 1996 to 1999. Indeed, the search for security guarantees, the blocking of EU aid to Turkey, and the policy of “conditional sanctions” prevailed over innovative, yet ad hoc and fragmented, European initiatives for conflict resolution, such as the initiative taken by the Dutch Presidency in April 1997, calling for the establishment of a “Committee of Wise Men.”

As noted in Chapter 2, for dealing with the perceived “threat from the east” Greece had traditionally been in search of a “security provider,” be it NATO or the European Union. In accordance with this line of reasoning and as a result of the Imia crisis, a major effort was again made by Greece at the EU’s 1997 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam for the inclusion of a “clause of solidarity and guarantee of external borders,” a request that was again rejected by the WEU (Gordon, 1998: 43). Interestingly, Greece’s quest for “security providers” would remain a primary goal of its foreign policy even after the launching of its new strategy at Helsinki in December 1999, where – as further analysis will demonstrate – a long-term policy of removing the Turkish threat altogether was initiated (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 310–14). Without deviating from the traditional path in its policy towards Turkey, Greece was also not hesitant in maintaining its veto and blocking, during the EU–Turkey Association Council in April 1997, EU aid to Turkey worth 375 million ECUs plus an EU loan of 750 million ECUs. As explained by the then Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the veto was to be maintained until Turkey stopped disputing Greek sovereignty in the Aegean.

Last, but by no means least, Greece kept pursuing its traditional policy of “conditional sanctions” towards Turkey. Moreover, in the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg, Greece’s intended policy of keeping the EU doors closed to Turkey was strengthened by the introduction of the conditionality factor in the EU’s intervention in the Greek–Turkish conflict. Specifically, the settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute – in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice – and the establishment of stable relations with Greece appeared as a necessary condition
for strengthening EU links with Turkey. Needless to say, the decisions taken in Luxembourg were addressed only to the aspirant Turkey – identifying its dispute with an EU member as an impediment to its candidacy and asking Turkey to comply with this norm and/or condition – without offering it the carrot of candidacy. By implication the conditionality introduced by the EU was a negative one, as conditions were not followed by any carrot or reward (Rumelili, 2004b: 17–18).

Greece’s choice to follow a policy of negative conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey’s European path was not without consequences, however. The EU itself was perceived by Turkey as just another platform through which Greece, taking full advantage of its position as a member, could exert pressure on Turkey and pursue its national agenda with respect to Turkey. The perception of an EU captured by Greece was in turn negatively interpreted as a reflection of a European reluctance to take Turkey into Europe. In closing that “vicious circle” of consequences the European reluctance had fueled a dominant conviction in Turkish political culture, namely the “Sevres syndrome,” or the fear of dismemberment as a result of a Western conspiracy (Kirişiçi and Çarkoğlu, 2003). It is, therefore, beyond any doubt that the Luxembourg decision not only reinforced Turkey’s “syndrome of exclusion” but also questioned the country’s European orientation (Wood, 1999: 110).

Interestingly, what was accepted in the December European Council had been recommended in July of that year – as the EU was making plans for its enlargement – by the announcement of the European Commission’s “Agenda 2000” (Ege, 2003: 156–7). In accordance with this recommendation, the EU Summit in Luxembourg confirmed “Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union”. However, at the same time it placed Turkey in a special category by inviting it to the “European conference” of applicant countries. Turkey was not included in the preaccession strategy developed for the so-called “slow track” countries thus allowing ten former communist states to move ahead of it in line, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. To make matters worse, the eleventh officially recognized country was Cyprus, which, along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia, could begin actual accession negotiations.

Undoubtedly, decisions made in Luxembourg and Cardiff, in December 1997 and June 1998 respectively, further burdened the already tense and fragile Greek–Turkish security agenda, as the postponement of Turkey’s accession negotiations remained linked to Greece’s deliberate policy of keeping the doors of the EU closed. Unsurprisingly, in the first “Regular Report for Turkey,” prepared by the European Commission for fulfilling the task given to it by the Cardiff European Council, the emphasis in the political field was again on “human rights violations,” “shortcomings in the treatment of minorities,” and “the settlement of disputes with neighboring countries by peaceful means in accordance with international law” (Ege, 2003: 157).
The closing of 1998 coincided with the clash between the medium and long-term goals of Greece’s new strategy and the consequences of certain choices made by Greece’s traditional strategy towards Turkey. As noted, Greek decision-makers were called upon to reconcile a paramount goal of Greece’s new strategy, namely Cyprus’ European accession process, with the “militarization” of the Cyprus issue, created by the decision of the Cyprus government to purchase and deploy the Russian-made S-300 missile system.

The announcement of the Cyprus government, in late December 1998, that the missile system would be installed instead on the Greek island of Crete should be viewed less as a successful implementation of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” and more as an indication of the difficulty Greek decision-makers were confronted with in reconciling contradicting foreign policy decisions. As it turned out, both Greeks and Greek-Cypriots miscalculated badly by not setting compatible policy goals and by searching for an exit strategy until it was too late. Thus, despite being assessed by the EU as a “wise” decision, the cancellation of the missiles’ installation on Cyprus’s soil was nevertheless a condition sine qua non for the realization of Greece’s new strategy.

With Cyprus’ European accession being an integral part and a paramount goal of Greece’s new strategy, the installation of the Russian-made missile system in Cyprus would not only lead to further “militarization” of the Cyprus issue but also deprive Greece and Cyprus of the international and European backing both governments were so much in need of towards achieving the common cause. The joint Greek–Greek Cypriot governments’ decision for the cancellation of the installation of the missiles in Cyprus became thus a “better-late-than-never” choice, especially after their agreement that Cyprus’s accession into the EU was beyond any doubt both the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot governments’ ultimate objective.

3.4 Prelude to the new strategy: The Greek–Turkish rapprochement

In early 1999, almost a month after the end of the Cyprus missile crisis, relations between Greece and Turkey further deteriorated with the capture of the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, at the Nairobi airport after a brief stay in the Greek ambassadorial residence in Kenya. Turkish government officials accused Greece of supporting terrorism through the harboring of the PKK leader and providing support for PKK operatives. Moreover, for most high officials and analysts in Turkey, the Greek involvement in the Öcalan issue was “interpreted as a sign of direct interference by Greece in Turkey’s domestic politics” (Önis, 2003: 10) and as a clear indication, if not proof, of Greece’s plans to bring about Turkey’s dismemberment (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 38).
Indeed, a series of incidents after the Imia crisis (most notably, the 1997–8 tension over the planned deployment of S-300 missiles on Cyprus and the Öcalan debacle in early 1999) created a perception in both Greece and Turkey that brinkmanship had reached very dangerous levels. By implication, an accident or miscalculation in the Aegean could easily escalate to large-scale warfare. As a prominent analyst of the security affairs of the Mediterranean region put it: “...[t]his sense of peering over the brink, palpable in 1996, was arguably not unlike the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US-Soviet relations more than thirty years earlier” (Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos, 2001: 22).

Ironically enough, it also seemed that the complete mishandling of the Öcalan affair by the Greek government (Dokos and Tsakonas, 2005: 275–85) was – particularly to Greek decision-makers – a “blessing in disguise” as it made clear how dangerous confrontation with Turkey might prove to be. For certain analysts, the Öcalan fiasco also led to another change which proved to be decisive in the months and years to come for Greek–Turkish relations, namely the replacement of Theodore Pangalos by the son of the late Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou.219 Unlike the replaced Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was known for his diplomatic outbursts, George Papandreou was a known fellow modernizer with a quiet manner and moderate in terms of relations with Turkey. Moreover, immediately after taking up his position he made serious efforts to smooth the troubled Greek–Turkish waters “by insisting that Greece had never provided support to PKK and the Greek government had been acting on a purely humanitarian grounds when it had agreed to shelter Öcalan” (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 37).

More importantly, a new front opened in early 1999, just a few hundred kilometres away from the Greek frontiers, which drew the attention of the international community and made Greece and Turkey reconsider their policies towards one another. Indeed, a long-awaited crisis erupted in the Serbian province of Kosovo after the Rambouillet agreement broke down and a NATO aerial bombardment campaign was launched against Yugoslavia in March. Interestingly, despite the widespread opposition among the Greek public to NATO involvement in Kosovo,220 the Greek government supported the campaign against Milosevic. To certain analysts, the Kosovo crisis would not have been dealt with in the same manner if Greece had not accepted the logic of “Europeanization,” thus avoiding a nationalistic and opportunistic policy (Kavakas, 2000: 157–8).

The stance of the Greek government on the Kosovo crisis, in full contrast to the Greek public, made the crisis appear in Turkey as an issue of mutual concern rather than of bilateral tension that could lead to a conflict between Greece and Turkey, as many in the West – the US President Bill Clinton included – were concerned about.221 Thus, regardless of their respective sympathies for the Serbs and Albanians, Greece and Turkey decided to focus on what seemed to pose an extremely serious security threat to both
of them. Joint action seemed indeed the only way for the new risks and challenges – such as organized crime, terrorism, and illegal migration – to be tackled. Both Greece and Turkey seemed to realize that the security of each depended on the security of the other.

Especially with regard to Greek–Turkish relations, the Kosovo crisis made it evident to both countries that moving towards a détente would provide some sort of stability in the Balkans, which were about to experience serious problems due to the NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia (Heraclides, 2004: 75), with a massive humanitarian crisis being the most imminent one. In early April 1999, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey decided to make a joint representation to NATO for the sharing among the Alliance’s members of the financial burden of housing the displaced and, most importantly, to coordinate their policies for dealing with the mass exodus of refugees from Kosovo as well as for the provision of humanitarian assistance (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 41). It was evident that the Kosovo crisis was dictating a normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey, which would help the two countries play a stabilizing role in the Mediterranean and Southeast European region. Indeed, the obvious benefit of cooperation in dealing with the Kosovo crisis was a more secure regional environment, which seemed vital for both states in the post-Cold War world of constant flux, which kept producing a sense of disorientation and created great uncertainty as to the role of states and their institutions (Coufoudakis, 1996: 41).

In the aftermath of the unprecedented cooperation and solidarity Greece and Turkey had experienced due to the Kosovo crisis, and with Greece’s short-term strategic priority for joining the EMU still pending, the Greek decision-makers opted for the introduction of an official détente with Turkey, which would create a better and more secure bilateral environment. In May 1999, İsmail Cem – who kept the external affairs portfolio in the new Turkish coalition government – sent to his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, a letter proposing the conclusion of an agreement to combat terrorism and, more importantly, the development of a plan for reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. Cem’s letter was like music to the ears of Greek decision-makers, who – after serious thought and indeed some delay – responded in a more forthcoming tone. Specifically, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs responded in June with a more extensive letter, which not only accepted Cem’s proposals but, moreover, put forward the broadening of the agenda of an eventual Greek–Turkish cooperation to include other issues of mutual interest, such as tourism, the environment, culture, organized crime, trade, and regional issues.

Greece was in favor of bilateral talks with Turkey on issues which were basic for cooperation between two neighboring states and in sectors from which both states could benefit with the aim of improving the climate in their bilateral relations. Moreover, to certain Greek decision-makers, such as the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yannos Kranidiotis – who had
been the first to propose a bilateral dialogue over issues of “low politics” a couple of years earlier – “...having dialogue and cooperation on issues of “low political significance” can help to solve problems of “high political significance,” in accordance with the view explained by Jean Monnet on how international relations should function. It was this view that led to the formation of the EU.”

Historians of Greek–Turkish relations will undoubtedly point to the breakneck speed with which events unfolded in the second term of 1999. When Papandreou and Cem met – less than a week after Papandreou’s response to Cem’s letter – in the context of a UN Secretary General group of countries called “Friends of Kosovo,” they agreed to put forward their cooperation in a series of “low confrontation” issues. As the Greek–Turkish rapprochement reached a steady pace –with the first round of talks concerning tourism and the environment taking place in Ankara and Athens in late July – two catastrophic earthquakes shook Turkey and Greece, in August and September 1999, respectively. The swift Greek reaction to the Turkish tragedy spectacularly changed the mood and led to a similar Turkish reaction after the Athens earthquake. Each country, either through official channels or through private initiatives, rallied to the side of the other dispatching medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Greeks and Turks.

Ironically, the earthquakes and the disaster they caused in both Greece and Turkey further strengthened Greek–Turkish rapprochement as they managed – by challenging long-lived stereotypes about each other’s goals and intentions – to dramatically change the climate in Greek–Turkish relations for the better. The importance of the shift in public opinion in both countries played a very important role in the relations that developed between the two governments following the earthquakes, and allowed “earthquake diplomacy” to unfold (Vathakou, 2007: 107–32; 2003). The latter should be seen as the latitude offered to policymakers in Greece and Turkey by the popular reaction to earthquakes on both sides of the Aegean to further legitimize their rapprochement and strengthen the official détente they had already embarked upon.

Of particular importance to Greek foreign policy was, however, the fact that both the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and the “earthquake diplomacy” allowed – if they did not push for – a plethora of non-state actors, such as civil society, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), media, and epistemic communities, among others, to enter the stage, initially as agents of exercise and formation of Greece’s foreign policy, and eventually as partners in the management of major foreign policy issues.

During the 1990s there were indeed some isolated and short-lived attempts by certain leading pro-rapprochement intellectuals, journalists, retired diplomats, and artists in both Greece and Turkey arguing for the need for a Greek–Turkish dialogue. The aftermath of the Imia crisis had also witnessed
a tremendous wave of NGOs arguing for rapprochement and cooperation between the two neighbors (Heraclides, 2008: 180). These voices were not sustainable, however, “in the face of an adverse political climate, limited social contacts, high level of biases, and sensationalist press accounts” (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 128).

Similarly, the Greek “epistemic community” of international relations and foreign policy,226 and to a certain extent the Turkish one, were trapped into an analysis of the bilateral conflict based on a shared set of beliefs that were most often overburdened by particular cognitive dynamics (e.g., ethnocentrism, “doctrinal realism,” ideological fundamentalism, strategic reductionism), which forced most members of the Greek “epistemic community” to highlight the structural reasons that made Greece and Turkey become power-maximizing rational egoists who define security in zero-sum terms (Tsakonas, 2005: 427–37).

More importantly, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and the new climate in Greek–Turkish relations seemed to have profound effects on how Greece should think about and deal with the “threat from the East.” To begin with, the rapprochement had started altering the zero-sum thinking in the Greek epistemic community as a conditio sine qua non for approaching the Greek–Turkish conflict, as it made clear that bilateral cooperation between Greece and Turkey was not anathema by definition, but it could indeed be feasible. This in turn meant a different reading of the existing systemic and regional circumstances and finally the recognition of the need of a new definition of the state’s national interest.

In addition, the support the Greek–Turkish rapprochement found for the first time not from above but from the wider public, in both Greece and Turkey, and the networks of cooperation created among various civil NGOs in cultural, scientific, educational, municipal and other fields had started impacting the dominant “under-dog national culture” in Greece, which viewed Turkey as an existential threat to Greece’s survival, thus overruling any idea of rational negotiation or bargaining, not to mention compromise. One of the direct effects of rapprochement was thus its decisive erosion of the dominant feature in the Greek national discourse: the hyperrealist idea arguing for an assertive foreign and defense policy vis-à-vis a presumed revisionist neighbor.

As a consequence, it came as no surprise that in the wake of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement many columnists and media commentators, together with some prominent and esteemed political figures and NGOs, started questioning “the wisdom” of the traditional strategy Greece had followed towards Turkey since the mid-1970s (Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos, 2007: 43–84; Vathakou, 2007: 107–32; Frangonikolopoulos, 2007: 161–85). It is worth noting that in these reformist segments of the Greek “national culture” the Turkish threat was perceived neither as an existential one nor as an “issue conflict,” but rather as a foreign policy issue fully manageable by
rationalist driven policies. Such a view from certain influential segments of the Greek “national culture” allowed Greek collective discourse to enter into a process of gradual change from “chronic enmity and suspicion” towards “cautious” and “step-by-step reconciliation”.

Interestingly – at least to certain “norm entrepreneurs” of the socialization strategy Greece was about to embark upon a few months after the Greek–Turkish rapprochement – the trend towards conciliation and dialogue with Turkey had been there already since the aftermath of the Imia crisis. Indeed, as Christos Rozakis had put it in 1997: “...although the Greek political system is still undergoing a significant maturation process – the dominant trend is for a peaceful solution of the Greek–Turkish conflict” (Rozakis, 1997).

Most notably, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement allowed for “political,” “societal,” and “discursive Europeanization” to take place as it had empowered particular domestic actors to intervene and, most importantly, to affect the formation of Greece’s foreign policy either directly or indirectly, through two interrelated pathways: first, by constructing and determining the context in which foreign policy issues were discussed, and second, by gradually changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues (Tsakonas, 2007: 25–41).

By implication, in the period following the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and, in particular, the period following the development of the “earthquake diplomacy,” the collapse of the dominant traditional thinking of how Greece should deal with the “threat from the east” started giving over to, and most importantly legitimizing, a new thinking. The latter appeared to generate success, especially in the short run, as it was related to fruitful results of the rapprochement and cooperation on “low politics issues” with which Turkey would provide Greece. In Jeffrey Legro’s terms, a “new replacement idea” seemed to replace the reigning orthodoxy about how to deal with the state’s most demanding foreign policy issues.

Indeed, gradually, yet steadily, those influential segments of Greece’s national culture who sought change – frustrated in the beginning by the lack of support from partisans of the dominant orthodoxy or the disengaged middle – started moving from minority to majority as their ideas appeared more and more feasible. The situation seemed the same within Greece’s agentic culture, as modernizers’ ideas on how best to deal with Turkey were also moving from minority to majority with the signs of their dominance vis-à-vis PASOK’s patriotic faction becoming all the clearer in 1999.

It is worth noting that George Papandreou’s contribution to the tipping of internal balance in favor of the modernizers’ ideas was indeed catalytic. This was not only due to the fact that Papandreou was a sincere fellow modernizer committed to the need for Greece’s modernization across the board, but also, mainly, due to the belief of the more nationalist sections of the party – and stern opponents of premier Simitis’s foreign policy
choices\textsuperscript{236} – that as the son of Andreas Papandreou he was a patriot \textit{par excellence} and thus fully legitimimized to follow whatever policy he considered would best serve Greece’s national interests. Thus, interestingly, to the extent that rapprochement with Turkey was being personalized by Papandreou it could also be legitimimized within the governing party, with George Papandreou appearing as the only political figure, or as the symbol, personifying the bridge that could unite the party’s traditional and patriotic base with its new modernizing faction (Karzis, 2006: 166). Moreover, it was not only the governing party’s patriotic faction who seemed receptive to George Papandreou’s foreign policy initiatives towards rapprochement and cooperation with Turkey. The Greek public had also seen in the low-profile and moderate manner of the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs the ideal executant of Greece’s new policy towards Turkey (Karzis, 2006: 164; Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 120).

In October 1999, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement was further strengthened as a second and a third round of talks started producing fruitful results in a series of fields\textsuperscript{237} where cooperation up to then had been either inconceivable or extremely hard to achieve. This new reality provided Greece’s agentic culture with certain convincing arguments for sticking to its efforts to further pursue cooperation with Turkey. This rational argumentation was in turn addressed to a national culture which had started transforming itself towards a more instrumental standing in regard to relations with a much less threatening neighbor\textsuperscript{238} while it was also becoming more receptive to the decision-makers’ arguments about what policy best served Greece’s interests.\textsuperscript{239}

For Greek decision-makers, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement was doomed – even if the “rosy scenario” of the rapprochement evolution materialized – to be limited to the furtherance of the two states’ economic interdependence and/or the normalization of the two states’ relations. As already noted, however, the core thinking of Greece’s agentic culture had envisioned a much more comprehensive strategy to deal with Turkey, able “...[t]o challenge the bilateral-bipolar character of Greek–Turkish relations” and “...[t]o go hand in hand with Greece’s strategic priority for membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU)” (Simitis, 2005: 75–6).

Moreover, its effectiveness would depend on Greece’s success in imposing through the EU “the rules and conditions which would decisively transform its dispute with Turkey into an EU-Turkey one” (Simitis, 2005: 86). For Greek decision-makers, such a comprehensive approach to Turkey “could have only been achieved when the settlement of the Greek–Turkish differences was made compulsory for Turkey, in order for its broader goal regarding progress in its EU path to be achieved” (Simitis, 2005: 89). Thus, the next step seemed obvious: Greek–Turkish rapprochement should be linked with Turkey’s path towards the more secure framework of an open and multicultural European society.
3.5 Launching the “socialization strategy”

Normalization of Greece’s relations with the EU, the increase of the country’s credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community,\textsuperscript{240} and its return to European normalcy had been – as already noted – central goals of Greece’s agentic culture since the mid-1990s. With the end of the first post-Cold War decade approaching, the significance of Greece’s participation in the EU as an active institutional member had been internalized by the Greek government, thus enhancing the country’s sense of security and self-confidence.\textsuperscript{241} In regard to Greece’s relations with Turkey, Greek decision-makers also felt confident enough they had created internationally, and particularly within the EU context, a “diplomatic ballast,”\textsuperscript{242} which had convincingly projected Greece as a European country sincerely interested in solving its differences with neighboring Turkey, in accordance with international law and agreements. Furthermore, apart from the Öcalan debacle being a “bad parenthesis” in relations between the two neighbors, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement had negated the skeptical view of certain EU partners over Greece’s intentions and policies towards Turkey, and it had tremendously contributed to a better, rather positive, climate in Greek–Turkish relations. The latter had in turn affected Greece’s national culture, making it more receptive to the agentic culture argumentation and policy proposals.

In late 1990s there was a clear quest on the part of Greece’s agentic culture to replace the traditional strategy that had been followed by successive Greek governments since the mid-1970s by a new, comprehensive one, which should be based on a completely new argumentation consistent with international law, dialogue, peaceful settlement of disputes, and European norms of behavior. Specifically, the comprehensive strategy Greece should pursue towards Turkey should be based on the successful interconnection of the two states’ interests with legitimate international rules and standards, namely European integration.\textsuperscript{243}

More importantly, at the heart of the agentic culture there was a strong belief that it was in Greece’s interest to resolve its long-standing conflict with Turkey, and that if it did not there would be disastrous effects on its economic development and domestic stability. Furthermore, given that Turkey was viewed as a “security maximizer,” whose aims should not be regarded as being unlimited, Greece should move from the traditional discourse of nonnegotiable rights to one which sought to find a degree of common ground and possible compromise as an acceptable and effective way of dealing with Turkey.

Thus, while paying attention to deterrence and hedging against the possibility that a strong Turkey might challenge Greek interests, Greece’s agentic culture strongly advocated that particular short and medium-term goals should also be achieved. The former concerned calm relations in the Aegean
(a goal pursued – but still not cemented – through Greek–Turkish rapprochement), while the latter was related to the preparation of the ground that would provide a way out of the long-standing Cyprus problem and, most importantly, allow for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish rivalry. Indeed, what kind of strategy could both better serve Greece’s balancing efforts vis-à-vis Turkey and also lead to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict?

For Greek decision-makers, who had been animated by a “resolution agentic culture,” the answer seemed obvious: to realize its short and medium-term goals Greece should adopt and implement a socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. This strategy, also identified as a strategy of “balancing engagement” of Turkey, would mean that Greece should keep balancing what it still considered – regardless of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement – as its most imminent threat with the benefits inherent in bringing its major security concern into the European integration orbit.

3.5.1 Four claims for Greece pursuing a socialization strategy

In the aftermath of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, where the security pressures were indeed lowered, Greek decision-makers felt confident enough to develop “influence-seeking policies,” attempting both to shape the interaction processes with Turkey and the resulting policy outcome in its own interest and to secure and extend the resources enabling them to do so. In full accordance with this line of reasoning, international institutions appear as the most important arenas for influence-seeking policies, as they can be used by states as forums for converting capabilities into influence. Obviously, advocates of Greece’s socialization strategy viewed the European Union as the most appropriate means for a comprehensive strategy to be pursued towards Turkey, and strongly believed that the European factor could be elevated into an instrument which could have catalytic effects in both short and medium order. More specifically, the socialization strategy, which Greek decision-makers were eager to follow en route to the critical EU summit in December 1999, was based on four particular claims.

The first claim advocated that by placing increased importance on its “European card” Greece did not rely solely, as had been wrongly assumed in the past, on the EU’s ability to become a “security-providing” hegemon (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 302–14), nor did it see the European Union “as a system of political solidarity capable of activating diplomatic and political levers of pressure to deter Ankara from potential adventures in the Aegean” (Valinakis, 1988: 55). Instead, by playing the EU card in a more sophisticated manner than in the past, Greece’s medium and long-term policy should endeavor to enmesh Turkey in the European integration system, where the European norms of behavior and certain European-style “rules of the game” had to be followed by Turkey.

Thus, by pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process, Greece’s strategy should aim at successfully linking Turkey’s state (i.e., élite’s)
interests to certain international (i.e., European) ways of behavior. The strengthening of Turkey’s European orientation would thus engage Turkey in a short and medium-term process that would eventually lead to the adoption of a less aggressive behavior vis-à-vis an EU member-state, namely Greece. This way, Greece could expect to borrow the “socialization power” component of the EU, namely the high degree of its normative persuasion.

However, the second claim argues, further engagement of Turkey with the European integration project would not mean “unconditional engagement.” In fact, Greece’s socialization strategy should link Turkey’s strong incentive for closer relations with – and eventual membership of – the EU with particular conditions Turkey should fulfill in order to become a member. Greece would thus become – along with its European partners – one of the “condition-setters” of Turkey’s EU path. Obviously particular care would then be taken to ensure that Turkey’s relations with the EU were linked with the promotion and realization of Greece’s short and medium-term interests.

For Greek decision-makers the European Union, especially through its enlargement project, appeared to be the best available forum for setting conditions and placing prerequisites in accordance with certain “European” principles and standards on countries wishing to become members. By implication, Greece could impose a set of obligations on Turkey, such as the prohibition of certain modes of behavior – both internally and externally – that do not comply with the rules, norms, and standards of the international institution of which it seeks to become a member.247

Moreover, apart from being a “condition-setter” for the EU’s prospective members, Greece – as the third claim of Greece’s socialization strategy advocates – could also exercise a certain amount of control over Turkey’s “conditional engagement” with the European integration system by monitoring and sanctioning compliance with the set rules and conditions. This could be materialized in the event that Greece insisted on a real – instead of a virtual or sui generis – candidacy for Turkey. Greece should thus aim at the engagement of Turkey in an “accession partnership” with the EU. The latter would put Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU mechanisms and procedures, allowing for certain structural changes (i.e., democratization) to take place in Turkey in order for the European acquis to be fully endorsed.248 This “Europeanization” of Turkish politics and society, Greek decision-makers expected, would eventually lead to the abandonment of aggressive behavior by the Turkish elite and to the adoption of policies based less on geopolitical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements.

Furthermore, the “conditional” and “monitored” engagement of Turkey in the “European project” was expected to transform Turkey’s behavior vis-à-vis Greece from a policy based on the “logic of coercive deterrence” to one based on European norms and practices. From this perspective, the notorious “casus belli” issue, namely Turkey’s threat to wage war against Greece if
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the latter extended its territorial waters in the Aegean, would sooner or later be viewed – especially by the “Europeanists” in the Turkish civil–military establishment – less as the “success story” of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” to make Greece refrain from such a move and more as a burden in Turkey’s future relations with the European Union. Indeed, as a result of Turkey’s enmeshment in the European integration system, the former was expected to start reconsidering whether it was worthwhile to keep putting a policy of “myopic optimization” before its medium and/or long-term goal of becoming a member of the European Union.

Greek decision-makers had also estimated that Turkey’s further European integration would entail certain costs for Turkey, especially at the domestic level. Strengthening the democratization process in Turkey was expected to put pressure on the civil–military establishment to make a more rational allocation of the country’s economic resources. Additionally, the “democratization process” would entail that the military would be put under civilian control; the process of elite circulation would also be accelerated, and a new state elite would eventually be forced to start searching for the new “reason of the state” and for new definitions of “national interest.” Furthermore, the deepening of the democratization process and the ability of a broader political participation of the electorate would intensify the pressure exerted on the Turkish foreign policy elite and redefine the strategic priorities of the country towards a more rational distribution of the country’s assets.

The last claim of Greek decision-makers advocated that Greece’s socialization strategy would better serve Greece’s balancing efforts vis-à-vis neighboring Turkey, which, despite the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, remained the state’s most serious external threat.249 Interestingly, the socialization strategy towards Turkey was understood by the key decision-makers who proposed it as a “constructive accommodation strategy,” meaning a strategy of reciprocity, with which Greece sought reconciliation with Turkey on the basis of the equivalence of benefits.250 Moreover, Greece’s socialization strategy was viewed as a strategy of balancing behavior vis-à-vis a threatening neighbor.251 Although not familiar with academic jargon, Greek decision-makers believed – in accordance with Stephen Walt’s assessment of a state’s balancing behavior – that attempts at accommodation should not be confused with bandwagoning, especially when basic security arrangements are maintained (Walt, 1988: 315). Likewise, balancing does not preclude concessions to opponents and does not negate efforts intended to improve relations (Walt, 1992: 454, 471).

In its diplomatic advancement, Greece’s socialization strategy was, moreover, viewed as being a particular amalgam of a “firm-but-flexible diplomacy” and a “conciliatory diplomacy.”252 The former form of diplomacy intends to reciprocate compromising moves and conclude mutually beneficial agreements. It starts with a firm position, but it responds with flexibility to moderate requests. It is, moreover, based on a mix of promises, rewards, and
negative sanctions (Kaplowitz, 1984: 381). It adopts an attitude of “carrot and stick,” which paves the way for the rival to settle disputes in a cooperative way (Leng, 1993: 3–41). With the latter form of diplomacy, a state shows signs of willingness to make concessions. Conciliatory diplomacy overlooks the benefits or the symmetry of satisfaction for the sake of conflict resolution. It may thus prove ineffective in the event that the adversary has infinite demands (Fakiolas, 2006: 70).

For Greece’s socialization or “balancing engagement” strategy, the adoption of a mix of “firm-but-flexible” and “conciliatory” diplomacy meant that Greece would lift its veto on Turkey’s candidacy if certain conditions were first met, that is, putting Turkey in the binding EU framework of monitoring and screening of its external behavior, while conflict resolution was not viewed as a burden Greece should trade off in exchange for another benefit, but rather as the central medium-term goal the proposed strategy should achieve. Thus, proponents of the strategy were not hesitant to argue that the “conditional and monitored engagement” of Turkey in the EU context, where Greece had a comparative advantage, would further enhance Greece’s balancing stance vis-à-vis Turkey, as it would enmesh Turkey in a new binding framework, where only certain European ways of behavior are acceptable. Moreover, through this strategy, part of the buck Greece was traditionally obliged to pay to balance Turkey would now depend on Turkey’s fulfillment of particular European rules and conditions.253

3.5.2 Systemic and regional “ripeness”

With Greece’s national culture experiencing a serious transformation and Greece’s agentic culture gaining confidence, momentum, and legitimacy, the time seemed ripe for the socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey envisioned by Greek decision-makers to be pursued.254 Interestingly enough, particular developments at the systemic and regional levels seemed to further facilitate the adoption and implementation of Greece’s socialization strategy by creating a certain amount of congruence between certain international actors’ interests, on the one hand, and the strategy’s goals, on the other.

Undoubtedly, the first development concerned the EU’s decision to undertake a major policy decision to proceed with its next enlargement phase. In the late 1990s, enlargement to the east constituted the EU’s “big bang” and the most demanding project for an EU that was itself changing to a significant extent. In fact, a radically different European Union – more supranational, more postsovereign, more postmodern, more multicultural and more demanding – seemed to be emerging. The EU’s enlargement process in particular was widely legitimized by arguing that it would bring peace and stability to a part of Europe that would otherwise be in danger of returning to violent conflict, with possible spillover to the old member-states.

Indeed, built on core principles, values, and norms, the EU sought to export its success story to those who were willing and who could meet the
criteria. Pursuing its enlargement task, the new post-Westphalian European Union demanded that the candidate countries undergo a radical transformation process following certain principles and adopting the EU Community Law in earnest. Most importantly, these characteristics were reflected in the norms, rules, and conditions promoted by the European Union in states which sought to become members.

The Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999 made evident to EU member-states that a holistic approach to the region of East, Central and Southeast Europe was needed. Otherwise, countries left out of the EU accession process might see nationalist voices in their respective political arenas strengthened. As a consequence, the first wave of applicants (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) should be joined in the negotiations by the second wave of applicants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia). After such a major decision by the EU to put forward the enlargement process by upgrading the status of the aforementioned countries, and given the inclusive nature of the accession process, it would appear increasingly inconsistent and politically untenable to keep Greece’s neighbor, namely Turkey, in its twilight status (Nicolaidis, 2001: 248–9).

Another crucial development in the European political scene also seemed to have serious effects on a certain part of the “European mind” in regard to the placement of particular prospective members in the EU’s enlargement project. Indeed, the election of Gerhard Schroeder as German chancellor in 1998 brought about an ideological shift in the traditional stance of the European conservatives of having an extensive cooperation with Turkey (i.e., the EU) while limiting the European project to a “civilizing” project, thus making the Turkish candidature for full membership unacceptable (Mango, 1998: 171–92).

Schroeder’s major shift took place mainly due to the cosmopolitan inclusiveness and multicultural tolerance – rejecting narrow geographical interpretations and religious-cultural criteria – that the left wing (namely the Green allies) brought to the newly elected government (Eralp, 2000: 184). Coupled with Germany’s particular interest in smoothing the forthcoming enlargement process of the EU for Eastern and Central European countries, the new government of Gerhard Schroeder was not hesitant in announcing its support for formal Turkish EU candidacy in the name of improved relations between Germany and Turkey.

The change in the traditional stance of the European conservatives also meant a gradual transformation of the traditional view of most EU members that Turkey should be treated as a barrier against instability emanating from the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia (Lesser, 2000a: 207). Indeed, many EU states in the late 1990s started recognizing that Turkey could instead function as a bridge, connecting East and West and promoting EU economic interests to a new vast area full of opportunities. Most importantly, in the late 1990s most EU states’ views of Turkey’s potential
roles seemed to match up with the United States’ conception of Turkey’s importance, by virtue of its location between the European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian theaters, in addressing the new transregional challenges.\(^{258}\)

From Washington’s perspective, the tension between Turkey’s roles as a bridge and as a barrier was an artificial one in the late 1990s, and Turkey was thus viewed as a transregional actor, expected to play multiple roles for promoting US interests in four adjacent areas, namely the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Gulf.\(^ {259}\) Moreover, with a striking number of post-Cold War flashpoints being either on Turkey’s borders or in its immediate neighborhood, the European Union itself was also called upon to define in a more precise way the role Turkey could play in European security arrangements.

It was in the late 1990s that the old theme of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) became a tangible project.\(^ {260}\) At Saint Malo in 1998, Tony Blair agreed with French President Jacques Chirac on a common platform that was to lead to the adoption by the EU of a plan aiming at the eventual integration of the WEU into the EU as well as at the expansion of the existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into the military realm (Joint British–French Declaration on European Defence, Saint Malo, December 1998). However, to alleviate Turkish fears that Turkey would lose its hard-won gains as an associate member of WEU if such a plan materialized, Turkey should be provided with a prominent role in the development of a functional and effective relationship between the European Union and NATO. Indeed, Turkey’s collaboration was considered necessary for the promotion and strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity, and, as a consequence, both the EU and the United States should start treating Turkey as an essential component of the future European security system (Siegl, 2002: 51; Nicolaides, 2001: 257–60; Müftüler-Baç, 2000b: 489–502). It is thus not a coincidence that at the December summit in Helsinki the EU would be offering Turkey the long-awaited candidacy for membership while a more consolidated and efficient European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) would also figure predominantly in the agenda (Eralp, 2000: 185; Cayhan, 2003: 35–8).

For both the US and most EU states in the late 1990s, the primacy of security issues underscored the importance of Turkey’s evolving role in European security arrangements, including strategic geography and a large and increasingly capable military. From a US perspective, the “European anchor” was an effective tool – probably the most effective one – to guarantee Turkey’s establishment in the Western world, while it also coincided with Washington’s interest in the evolution of a stable, prosperous, Western-oriented Turkey, namely a predictable state that “fits” in Western institutions.\(^ {261}\) Unsurprisingly, the Clinton administration was thus not hesitant at the dawn of the critical EU summit in Helsinki in lobbying among European partners for Turkey officially to be granted candidate status.\(^ {262}\)
3.5.3 Pursuing an “active socialization strategy”

En route to the critical – with regard to Turkey’s European path – EU summit in December 1999 and under international conditions quite favorable to Greece’s socialization strategy, Greek decision-makers appeared committed to pursuing a strategy which could trigger the EU’s usefulness in two particular ways. The first regarded the ability of the European Union – predominantly through its enlargement process – to act as a framework which could “socialize” Turkey – through the binding commitments of the EU’s strategy of “intergovernmental reinforcement” – into the EU institutional and normative environment. By acting as a framework, the EU furthermore expected it could eliminate – obviously, in the long run – the bases of Greece’s long-standing conflict with Turkey, through democratization and gradual integration.

As noted, however, Greece’s socialization strategy was also interested in promoting particular medium-term interests, namely a way out of the long-standing Cyprus problem and, most importantly, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. In fact, Greek decision-makers saw the forthcoming EU Council in Helsinki as a “window of opportunity” precisely because it could make Turkey’s engagement with the European integration system conditional upon certain rules, procedures, and deadlines, through which Greece believed it could promote its aforementioned medium-term interests. Towards this end, Greece could make the resolution of its bilateral conflict with Turkey a prerequisite for Turkey’s closer relations with the EU. This way an additional ability of the EU would be brought to the fore, one which was much more important to the promotion of Greece’s interests. This ability of the European Union also to operate as “an active player” could have – in both short and medium order – a direct as well as an indirect impact on Greece’s and Turkey’s strategies towards resolution of their long-standing conflict.

The incorporation of the EU’s ability to operate as an active player in Greece’s socialization strategy would in turn mean, however, that the rules, procedures, and deadlines upon which Turkey’s engagement with the EU would be made possible should also be followed and met by Greece. By implication, Greece’s socialization strategy presupposed that Greece would accept the compromise costs a final agreement with Turkey might entail – in accordance with the conditions the EU’s active involvement had created in order for a resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict to take place and Greece’s medium-term goal to be realized.

Based on the EU’s potential to become the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing dispute between Greece and Turkey, the Simitis government opted in the late 1990s for an “active socialization strategy” vis-à-vis Turkey. This strategy would not only pursue Turkey’s active engagement in the EU integration system and the monitoring and screening of its external behavior, but – more importantly – it would make resolution of the Greek–Turkish
conflict a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession path, thus accepting the costs a compromise deal with Turkey would entail.

Obviously, the launching of Greece’s socialization strategy could not match with Greece’s traditional insistence on keeping the doors closed to Turkey’s EU path and the subsequent exclusion of Turkey from the full benefits of international (i.e. European) society. Instead, a more constructive approach to Turkey’s European vocation should be adopted. It was now evident to Greek decision-makers that the only way for Greece’s socialization strategy to unfold was through a major shift in Greece’s stance towards Turkey’s EU path: a shift from politics of veto to the politics of interest. Indeed, the abandonment of the old policy of conditional sanctions and the adoption of a policy of “conditional rewards” appeared to the Greek government both desirable and efficient.

In view of the Helsinki summit, Greece’s key decision-makers felt confident that that the new “postnationalist,” “outward-looking,” and “flexible” foreign policy could now be projected onto the EU foreign policy agenda, allowing an additional, “bottom-up,” form of Europeanization to take place. It is worth noting that the “bottom-up Europeanization” process, referring mainly to the externalization of national preferences, ideas, and foreign policy positions to the EU level, not only entailed the acceptance of an alignment of national foreign policy positions with those of the EU but also enhanced the international action of the EU as a whole. It is through this process that states use the vehicle of the EU and its weight in the international arena to promote national foreign policy objectives (Economides, 2005: 472). Furthermore, this “bottom-up and sideways process” reflects a realist view that EU policies are the result of competitive and cooperative state bargaining strategies and demonstrate underlying institutional or structural power.

To realize that the EU can be used as the best and most privileged means to promote national interests does not mean that a member-state can “sell its national interests as European interests” (Mahncke, 2001: 229). It means, however, that, particularly due to the successful embedding of Europeanization and the adaptation of a member’s national system to the EU system, the former is in a position to actively engage its foreign policy objectives and goals in influencing the emergence, if not realization, of a more efficient and effective EU policy.

Apparently, it was Europeanization through the “top-down” approach, namely “policy,” “political,” “societal,” and “discursive” Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy, that led to the Greek adaptation of the Greek national system, politics, and policies to those of the EU. It was also Europeanization through the “bottom-up” approach that would allow Greek decision-makers to actively engage Greek foreign policy objectives and goals in facilitating the realization of the EU’s major project in the late 1990s, namely enlargement. To this end, a “socialized” and “Europeanized” Greek foreign policy
should now embark upon the more ambitious project to “socialize” – by using the vehicle of the EU and its weight in the international arena – the state, which remained Greece’s main security concern and the driving force behind most of its security and foreign policy initiatives.

Indeed, with the EU preparing itself for the next enlargement phase, the time seemed ripe for a major shift in Greece’s traditional stance of using the Cyprus issue for blocking EU–Turkey relations, for the abandonment of its long-followed strategy of “conditional sanctions” towards Turkey, and for the adoption of a more flexible strategy of “conditional rewards.” Greece was thus called upon to make a U-turn in the “traditional” strategy followed thus far by consecutive Greek governments vis-à-vis Turkey (as illustrated in Chapter 2), and proceed to the implementation of an active socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. On the road to the critical EU summit in Helsinki, Greek decision-makers were aware of the pros and cons of the new strategy they were eager to embark on. At the same time, they were convinced that it was at Helsinki that the ideal time for their active socialization strategy would occur.
4
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4.1 En route to Helsinki

Although confident that the international climate was receptive and the time ripe for a more forthcoming policy vis-à-vis Turkey, Greek decision-makers\textsuperscript{271} had to test the new strategy against the interests of certain European Union (EU) countries. In other words, the lifting of Greece’s veto and the granting of candidate status to Turkey should be followed by a series of conditions to which Greece’s EU partners should concede. To this end, an unofficial Task Force was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim of sounding out EU partners’ response to an eventual U-turn in Greece’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey,\textsuperscript{272} while a series of diplomatic initiatives (official and unofficial contacts and discussions) were undertaken beginning in September 1999 by some of the key figures of Greece’s new strategy apparatus.\textsuperscript{273} Some of those meetings between Greek decision-makers and key political figures of certain EU partners succeeded in putting forward Greece’s new argumentation in a convincing way and, most importantly, in outlining the conditions that should be fulfilled in order for the Greek government to concede to the granting of a candidacy status to Turkey.

Specifically, the conditions that a U-turn in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey would entail included the active involvement of the EU in the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict – the so-called “communitarization” of the dispute between a member and an aspiring one – as well as the full backing of Cyprus’ EU path towards membership in the EU, regardless of a solution to the long-lasting political problem.\textsuperscript{274} Needless to say, the dominant view in the EU in the late 1990s rejected the idea of a divided Cyprus joining the Union.\textsuperscript{275} The first condition, regarding the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict, was specified with particular reference to the two disputants’ obligation to settle their differences under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague within a reasonable time frame, namely not later than the end of 2004 (Simitis, 2005: 91–3).
Only a couple of months before the December EU summit in the Finnish capital, Germany, Great Britain, and France started appearing more receptive to Greece's conditions for dropping its long-standing veto on Turkey's candidacy. Especially with regard to the Cyprus problem, certain EU partners – most notably France and Great Britain – were eventually tilting towards accepting the Greek argument that the granting of candidacy status to Turkey should be coupled with Cyprus’ accession to the European Union, despite there being no solution of its long-standing political problem. Such a prospect – the Greek argument went – would be a serious blow to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence on the Cyprus issue, which was generally seen to be the primary problem preventing a solution, as it would encourage Turkey to take an active stance in favor of a settlement and provide it with an interest in seeing a resumption of talks. Thus, instead of hindering or complicating efforts to reach a solution, Cyprus’ accession would instead provide an impetus for settlement. At the end of the day, the process of EU enlargement would transform and resolve long-standing and apparently intractable conflicts. Interestingly, the aforementioned argument was followed by the key Greek decision-makers’ assurances that the Greek government would make every effort it could to secure the Greek-Cypriot government’s agreement that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would not derail the Cypriot government’s efforts to find a solution to the island’s political problem.276

Prior to the critical forthcoming EU Council at Helsinki, Greek decision-makers had made vigorous and focused efforts for the rationale behind Greece’s volte-face of its policy toward Turkey to be conveyed to particular key EU figures.277 An attempt was also made for the essence of Greece’s new strategy to be conveyed to Turkey itself, which was not received sympathetically.278 In early December Greece handed over to the Finnish Presidency a memorandum which further specified the conditions which – if fulfilled – would allow a major shift in Greece’s policy towards Turkey, namely the lifting of its veto towards Turkey’s candidacy. The memorandum argued for the acceptance by the forthcoming EU summit and the subsequent incorporation in its Conclusions of the following three conditions: first, Cyprus’ accession to the EU should be decoupled from the prerequisite of a resolution of the thorny Cyprus problem; second, the peaceful settlement of Greece’s dispute with Turkey should take place in accordance with international law and agreements and through the recourse by the disputants to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The EU would review the situation before the end of 2004 and would decide whether the beginning of Turkey’s accession negotiations should commence; third, a European “road map” for Turkey – with specific obligations and deadlines – should be developed.279

Unsurprisingly, negotiations prior to the commencement of the EU Council at Helsinki only partially fulfilled the agenda of the Greek demands.
Specifically, the EU partners seemed willing to accept only the condition regarding Turkey’s European “road map,” in accordance, however, with the strict conditions and deadlines Greece had suggested. The EU partners thus appeared willing to go so far as to grant Turkey the official status of a candidate state, without, however, making any concessions to what they still considered as Greek national interests. When the EU summit negotiations officially started, with the second item of the agenda being the EU’s enlargement to the East, Greece’s Premier threatened to veto the EU’s enlargement project in the event that certain Greek demands were not first met (Simitis, 2005: 97).

It should be noted at this point that this “blackmail tactic” should be put in a completely different context from those Greece – the EU’s “maverick” in the 1980s and early 1990s – had adopted in the past. Indeed, it is this new context which explains why Greece’s demands were finally accepted by its EU partners. Indeed, having been an active participant in the EU integration process since the mid-1990s, particularly due to the successful embedding of Europeanization and the adaptation of its national system to the EU system, Greece felt confident that the new “post-nationalist,” “outward-looking,” and “flexible” foreign policy it adopted could be projected onto the EU foreign policy agenda.

After rehabilitating the reputation of the state as a reliable EU partner, Greece now needed to develop a diplomacy that would enable it to persuade its EU partners that all three conditions it posed for opening the door to Turkey’s EU path should be first met. To achieve the other two conditions, Greece had to put into practice Jean de La Bruyère’s dictum, that “…the shortest and best way to make your fortune is to let people see clearly that it is in their interests to promote yours” (La Bruyère, 1989: 550). In other words, Greece should convince its sceptical and reluctant EU partners that it would actually be in the EU’s interest to adopt the conditions posed by Greece, and adopt them actually as “European conditions.”

As for the Cyprus issue, the Greek argument had first highlighted how unfair it would be for Cyprus’ accession to be related to progress in the negotiations between the two communities for the solution of the Cyprus problem, as such a prospect would give a non-EU country the power of veto over Cyprus’ accession, or over EU enlargement in the Eastern Mediterranean. To this latter issue the EU was very receptive, and thus Greece was, furthermore, eager to stress the impetus Cyprus’ accession would provide for settlement.

On the Greek–Turkish conflict, the peaceful settlement of border disputes was highlighted as a process which had been part and parcel of the EU acquis. Thus, by promoting the idea of the resolution of a border dispute between an EU member and an aspiring one through recourse to the ICJ within a particular time frame, Greece had simply pinpointed the EU’s obvious duty to set conditions and place prerequisites on those countries that
wish to become members in accordance with international law and agreements. Needless to say, the resolution of the long-lasting Greek–Turkish conflict would further enhance the EU’s ability and reputation for transforming and resolving intractable conflicts through its enlargement process.282

Greece’s argument, using its policy objectives and goals to influence the emergence and realization of a more efficient and effective EU policy, had finally managed to get through. It seemed, indeed, that there was not much room for a serious counterargumentation on the part of the EU partners – especially on the part of those who, up to the EU summit in Helsinki, were hiding behind Greece’s objections to Turkey’s candidacy.283 Moreover, facing the risk of at least postponing the EU’s most ambitious project, the EU-14 states chose to pass the buck to the Turkish side, which finally acquiesced to all conditions set out by Greece. Ironically, what most EU states had considered as a clear indication of the Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy and as a courageous decision,284 namely the U-turn made in Greece’s strategic behavior vis-à-vis Turkey, was realized only after the adoption of a blackmail tactic.

4.2 Helsinki: The strategy’s institutional climax

By granting Turkey formal candidacy status, decisions taken at Helsinki managed to reverse the rather negative effects of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit and thus eliminate the “phantom of exclusion.” Indeed, the effects of the decisions made in Luxembourg had not only upset long-standing expectations in Turkey, but also created a psychological barrier between the European Union and Turkey, manifested by a genuinely angry response from the latter, namely, the suspension of all of its political relations with the European Union (except the Customs Union). The new status gained at Helsinki allowed Turkey to take part in all Council of Ministers and European Summits, thus benefiting from all the rights (and obligations) associated with membership.285

From a Greek perspective, the European Summit, held in Helsinki on December 10–12, 1999, represented the institutional climax of Greece’s socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. This was due to the fact that, through the Helsinki decisions, the set of preconditions posed to Turkey by the European Union in regard to its domestic politics and its external behavior had been integral parts of Greece’s socialization strategy.286 Obviously, the set of preconditions highlighted the interventionist character of the “post-Westphalian” European Union, since it became clear to Turkey that the exclusive club it wanted to join was a supranational authority able both to constrain and to empower states in a multiplicity of ways. Thus the Turkish ruling elites, as well as public opinion, were forced to accept that they could not have one without the other.288

More specifically, decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki had managed to incorporate the conditions posed by Greece for lifting its veto and
granting Turkey its much wanted candidacy status. Indeed, in Helsinki the European Union stressed that Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership depended on resolving two issues: its border conflict with an EU member-state, Greece, and the Cyprus issue. With regard to Greek–Turkish relations, Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions states:

[...] the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. (Helsinki Conclusions, 1999)

With regard to the Cyprus issue, the Helsinki European Council, after welcoming the launch of the proximity talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, reiterated that, although a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus’ accession to the European Union, this very settlement would not be a precondition for accession.289 At the same time, the European Council ambiguously stressed that “all relevant factors” would be taken into account for the final decision on accession. On the Cyprus issue the message sent to Turkey by the fifteen Heads of State and Government of the European Union seemed to be a clear one: the division of Cyprus must end by the date of the next EU meeting at the latest. After that date, even a divided Cyprus would become a member of the Union. In that sense, Turkey, which illegally occupied the northern part of the island, could no longer block the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.

Although Greek interests on the Cyprus issue seemed to have been clearly reflected in the EU Council Conclusions290 – creating a clash in relations between the Turkish government and the leader of the self-proclaimed TRNC, Rauf Denktas291 – to what extent would that be the case with regard to the Greek–Turkish conflict? A “rigid interpretation,” from a “Greek perspective,” of the decisions made at Helsinki on the Greek–Turkish dispute – and expressed in the notorious paragraph 4 – would suggest that the EU made clear to Turkey that it had four years to resolve the conflict with neighboring Greece before the rather critical review that would assess its path towards the European Union took place. Moreover, particular reference was also made to the submission of the two states’ differences to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague in order to find a settlement, at the latest by the end of 2004 (our emphasis). It should be noted at this point that Greece’s position had invariably been in favor of submitting the
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dispute (as with all legal disputes) to the ICJ, while Turkey refused a judicial settlement, preferring negotiations instead.\footnote{292}

A more detached approach from a “European perspective” pointed out, however, that, although Greek interests were reflected in the decisions made at Helsinki, this was done in a clearly weakened form. This was due to the fact that, regarding the peaceful settlement of border conflicts, the EU Council did not refer only to Turkey but to all applicant countries: a clear indication of the “relativization” of the expectations the EU raised vis-à-vis Turkey. It was also noted that Turkey was not invited to proceed with Greece to the International Court of Justice, but priority was given to the Turkish preference for political dialogue (Axt, 2006: 4). By implication, the Greek demand only to solve the territorial dispute in court was not fully taken into account. In addition, although the EU accepted that continuation of disputes would have an impact on the candidate state’s accession, “… [i]t vaguely formulated that the European Council will perform a re-examination at the latest in 2004.”\footnote{293}

Last, but not least, reference was also made in the Helsinki conclusions to the resolution of the two states’ outstanding border dispute(s). For skeptics in Greece, the “problem” is whether the definition of “dispute” is singular or plural. It is important to remember that Greece has traditionally stated that there is only one issue between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean that should be dealt with, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf. As a consequence, all other issues Turkey had been raising from time to time were considered as unilateral Turkish claims against Greek sovereignty. Would acceptance of reference – into an EU document – to Greek–Turkish disputes, and not to a dispute, by the Simitis administration imply that most issues Turkey views as points of contention in the Aegean would be included in any Greek–Turkish effort to resolve the conflict? A straight and sincere answer to this would be affirmative, although the Simitis government was rather hesitant in the aftermath of the Helsinki decisions and amidst severe criticism from the opposition to openly accept such an eventuality.\footnote{294} Emphasis was instead put on the benefits Greece would obtain by the EU summit decisions, while the exact process of the resolution of the two states’ dispute was given less attention.

All the aforementioned reservations – emanating either from a balanced “European perspective” or from a domestic critique – could indeed be considered as indications that a compromise had taken place at the EU summit in Helsinki, where – apart from the Greek interests – the interests of the EU partners as well as of Turkey were also taken into account.\footnote{295} One can hardly deny, however, that it was the first time that certain Greek interests had been reflected at the European level, thus making Greece’s socialization strategy success at Helsinki – and particularly through the EU Council Conclusions – its institutional climax.

Indeed, a series of goals of Greece’s socialization strategy seemed to have been fully met at Helsinki. First, certain Greek key foreign policy issues
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(Greece’s relations with Turkey and the Cyprus case) had been externalized into the EU. Second, Greece’s new strategy made the EU an integral and catalytic means not only of obtaining better relations with Turkey, but, most importantly, of resolving the two states’ long-standing conflict. Third, the “magic recipe” of the EU summit in Helsinki was actually the linkage it managed to acknowledge between Turkey’s EU orientation, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict over the Aegean issues, and the end of Turkey’s occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. In other words, Greece managed to enmesh both the Cyprus and the Aegean issues within the context of the European Union, where Greece enjoyed a comparative advantage vis-à-vis an aspiring EU member state, and make both issues closely linked with Turkey’s European accession path (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004: 113). Fourth, through the Helsinki decisions two important goals of Greece’s “socialization strategy,” namely, democratization and compliance with the so-called “Copenhagen criteria,” had also been illustrated as integral parts of Turkey’s accession path to the EU.

It is worth noting that it was not until the fall of 1999 that the European Commission decided to make the fulfilling of the Copenhagen criteria a precondition for starting negotiations – until then, candidates had to have made significant progress towards meeting political and economic conditions (Nicolaidis, 2001). Decisions taken at the December European Council entailed Turkey’s entrance into a preaccession strategy, which in turn required certain political conditions to be fulfilled in order to begin accession negotiations.

Particularly for Turkey, decisions made in Helsinki argued for the further strengthening of the long, painful democratization process, which had actually preceded Helsinki. “Post-Helsinki democratization” asked that certain political conditions be fulfilled in order for accession negotiations to begin and set particular institutional frameworks for “screening” and “monitoring” Turkey’s behavior. It thus involved a series of structural domestic reforms expected to help an unconsolidated “procedural democracy” establish a democracy modeled on the lines of EU member-states.

In such a consolidated or “substantive” democracy, political and societal changes take place (for example, the norms of tolerance, cooperation, and trust have deep and lasting roots and a high level of “civic culture” exists), while democratic norms and procedures will be deeply embedded in the whole of society. Additionally, a post-Helsinki “democratization process” was expected to mean that the military would be under civilian control and that the democratic processes and benefits would be enjoyed by the populace as a whole. It is, moreover, expected that “democratization” will accelerate the process of elite circulation and will redefine most, if not all, state institutions, thus forcing a new state elite to start searching for new definitions of “national interest.” Thus Helsinki constituted both an alert and an incentive for Turkey that “there is a light at the end of the tunnel”
and therefore it must successfully address the issues causing instability in a particular part of the Union.

4.3 Legitimization of the strategy and transformation of the national culture

For Greek decision-makers the EU summit at Helsinki represented the success story of the new thinking in Greece’s foreign policy that was first introduced in the mid-1990s. As analyzed in Chapter 3, the rationale and conduct of Greece’s foreign policy followed by successive governments in the post-Cold War era was questioned and openly challenged by a “new replacement idea,” represented by the new agentic culture of the Simitis modernizers. The latter argued that Greece should move away from a discourse of nonnegotiable rights to one of interests in an effort to disentangle the two and find a degree of common ground and possible compromises. More importantly, it called for a new strategy to be adopted towards Turkey, one viewing the European Union as a means of better balancing Turkey as well as a catalyst for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict.

En route to the EU summit in Helsinki, Greece’s resolution agentic culture gained momentum and, more importantly, legitimacy and gradual consolidation. As noted, in the period following the Greek–Turkish rapprochement the collapse of the dominant traditional thinking of how Greece should deal with the “threat from the east” seemed to legitimize a new way of thinking which appeared – especially in the short run – to be related to the fruitful results rapprochement and cooperation on “low politics issues” had brought to Greece. Moreover, coupled with the Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou’s catalytic contribution to the tipping of balance within the government’s party in favor of the modernizers’ ideas on how best to deal with Turkey, these ideas were moving from minority to majority with the signs of their dominance vis-à-vis Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)’s patriotic faction becoming all the more clear.

With the Helsinki summit approaching – where it was planned that the U-turn in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey would take on an institutional status – Greece’s agentic culture realized it could not simply lead and expect the public to follow. Indeed, after making foreign policy choices, agentic culture should now work to legitimize them as being within the confines of what the national culture would allow. As empirical findings have suggested, although not particularly well informed or concerned about foreign policy issues, the public is usually rational and “pretty prudent” with regard to foreign policy (Powlick and Katz, 1998: 52). Unsurprisingly, this makes it receptive to the agentic culture arguments about the need for a change in the state’s foreign policy, especially when the agentic culture arguments are
persuasive enough. As Stanley Hoffmann had eloquently put it, when assessing the French dilemmas and strategies in the post-Cold War Europe:

... [N]o president could, by breaking [the consensus], undermine his own position or effectiveness, unless he was able to build a new one around a new set of tenets and “sell” it to the public, if not the parliament. The political cost of leaving the safe (if increasingly shallow) harbor for the high seas would be too high for the pilot, unless he could point convincingly to a better harbor and a safe journey [our emphasis]. (Hoffmann, 1993: 134)

Predictably, the Simitis administration preferred to address the need for reform in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey on a rationalist basis to maximize domestic support. It was thus argued that Greece’s traditional stance towards Turkey had failed and the costs of keeping the traditional strategy in place for Greece’s strategic interests were disproportionately higher than any perceived benefits. Greece’s agentic culture thus aimed not only to make the traditional policy Greece followed towards Turkey look like an obsolete – if not a counterproductive – one, but also to highlight the obvious gains the new strategy would entail in regard to Cyprus and the Aegean issues.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki summit, Greek decision-makers argued that – apart from representing “a victory of all actors involved in the negotiations” (Papandreou, 2000: 30) – decisions taken at Helsinki should, first and foremost, be regarded as a victory of Greece’s new strategy, given that, through the summit conclusions, Greece had succeeded in convincing the EU to impose on Turkey a clear and demanding road map, with democratization, compliance with the so-called “Copenhagen criteria,” and respect of international law and international agreements being integral parts of the granting of Turkey’s candidacy. Moreover, Cyprus’ accession to the EU was secured, with or without a resolution of the island’s political problem, while the resolution of Greece’s dispute with candidate Turkey within a reasonable time frame had also become a prerequisite for Turkey’s future accession.

Interestingly, the arguments used by Greek decision-makers in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit “pointed convincingly to a better harbor and a safe journey,” as they had managed to keep the temperature in the Aegean at the lowest level possible; to allow Greece to enjoy the fruitful results rapprochement and cooperation with Turkey on “low politics issues” could provide; to secure Cyprus’ accession to the EU and, last, but not least, to lead to the resolution of Greece’s long-standing dispute with neighboring Turkey. Greece’s agentic culture thus appeared able to offer a comprehensive alternative that could generate success in both short and medium order, with Cyprus’ entry into the European Union remaining the strategy’s most appealing argument, especially when this was addressed to particular elements of Greece’s underdog national culture.
Although they constituted an amalgam of different factions that transcended Greece’s political spectrum from extreme right to extreme left – with an amount of nationalism being shared by certain prominent political figures of New Democracy as well as by PASOK’s patriotic faction – the opponents of Greece’s new socialization strategy towards Turkey had mainly focused their criticism on the abandonment through the Helsinki decisions – of the traditional Greek policy towards Turkey, with keeping the EU door closed being the most notable one. It was also argued that a concrete gesture on the part of Turkey should have preceded any major shift in Greece’s stance towards Turkey, and that the lifting of the Greek veto in regard to Turkey’s candidacy should, in exchange, be followed by assurances from the Turkish side.

At the same time, the arguments used by the opponents of the strategy appeared fragmented and disoriented. Indeed, while Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of Greece’s major opposition party, that is, New Democracy Party (ND), played down the Greek government achievements at the Helsinki summit – although he felt obliged to publicly acknowledge the Helsinki positive provisions concerning Cyprus’ accession to the EU, without making a political settlement of the future of the island a precondition – other liberal voices and leading figures of the same party – including the former premier Konstantinos Mitsotakis – had openly and clearly applauded the decisions taken at Helsinki, characterizing them as a major success of Greece’s diplomacy. Similarly, on the one hand the Greek government was accused of failing to oblige Turkey to resolve its border conflict with Greece by the end of 2004 while, on the other hand, it was alleged of confiding – through the Helsinki conclusions – “Greece’s sovereign rights to the compulsory verdict of the fifteen juries of the ICJ in The Hague.”

With fragmentation, disorientation and, mainly, lack of a convincing alternative being the main characteristics of the opponents of Greece’s U-turn in its policy towards Turkey and the adoption of an active socialization strategy, Greece’s agentic resolution culture did not find it hard in the aftermath of the critical Helsinki decisions to gain strong legitimacy and gradual consolidation. Moreover, the comprehensive, rational, and persuasive strategy proposed by Greece’s agentic culture was based on a realistic logic, suggesting that Greece could indeed promote its foreign policy objectives and deal effectively with the “threat from the east,” without expecting a gesture from Turkey and without making any concessions to Turkey.

Most importantly, the pragmatic stance of Greece’s agentic resolution culture was addressed to a national culture which had, since the mid-1990s, started transforming itself from an underdog national culture to an instrumental one. Indeed, the fundamental change that Greek society had undergone in its social composition, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, from a highly homogeneous society to an increasingly heterogeneous one (Diamandouros, 2001: 71) was coupled with Greece’s growing participation.
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in the dynamics of European integration, which had in turn made Greek society more malleable to the force of Europeanization. Buttressed by the positive climate the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and “earthquake diplomacy” had created in the late 1990s, “political,” “societal,” and “discursive Europeanization” had started producing positive results, with the gradual change in the Greek official political and public discourse on foreign policy issues being the most evident one. Moreover, since the early phases of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, Greece’s agentic culture had attempted to frame the issue of Greece’s future relations with Turkey in terms that resonated with the values and belief systems of those segments of Greece’s reformist national culture (civil society, Nongovernmental Organizations [NGOs], intellectuals, and journalists), which, particularly after the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, had gained momentum and, above all, internal legitimacy.

It should thus come as no surprise that in the aftermath of the Helsinki decisions Greece’s dominant underdog culture became permeable to the persuasive arguments of Greece’s agentic culture about what strategy best served Greece’s dealing with the Turkish threat. As a consequence, and coupled with the lack of a convincing alternative from the opponents of Greece’s new socialization strategy, the national culture had become receptive to the agentic culture arguments about the short and medium-term gains the Greek strategy achieved at Helsinki, with Cyprus’ entry into the EU being the most appealing argument as well as the most tangible achievement of the new strategy. At the end of the day, the dominant underdog national culture started moving from the left end of the continuum towards the center, transforming itself into an instrumental national culture. As noted, instrumental national culture accepts dialogue as a legitimate tool for normalizing relations with Turkey, under the condition either that – at best – Greece will gain more or that – at worst – there will be an equal distribution of gains between Greece and Turkey.

The legitimization and gradual consolidation of Greece’s socialization strategy and the gradual transformation of Greece’s dominant underdog national culture into an instrumental one should be also viewed as a strategic consensus achieved in Greece’s domestic politics in regard to the catalytic role the European Union could play in Greece’s dealing with the Turkish issue. This strategic consensus, however, remained limited to the EU role as a means of better balancing Turkey and of promoting Greece’s national interests in a more effective way, rather than as a catalyst for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict.

To be fair, in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit Greece’s resolution agentic culture remained hostage to the traditional Greek argumentation that the “one and only” issue to be negotiated with Turkey was the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. Thus, to the criticism, if not accusation, of the opponents of Greece’s socialization strategy that – in accordance
with the Helsinki decisions – Greece should enter into negotiations with Turkey over the whole spectrum of the Aegean issues, the key agents of the Greek resolution agentic culture remained on the defensive. Indeed, instead of publicly admitting that, for a resolution of the Greek–Turkish “outstanding border disputes and other related issues” through recourse to the ICJ, the negotiations between Greece and Turkey should also include some of the issues Turkey viewed as points of contention, key decision-makers avoided a clear position in the fear of a clash with the uncompromising – and constantly reproduced by all Greek governments – thesis of the Greek political and public discourse, namely the singularity of the Greek–Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf, with all other issues being Turkey’s unilateral claims against Greek sovereignty. Interestingly, the Greek resolution agentic culture was successful in legitimizing internally the state’s new socialization strategy towards Turkey and in gradually transforming Greece’s national culture – building thus a consensus in Greece’s domestic politics over the state’s major strategic goals as well as the means to achieve them. However, it proved unable to effectively challenge and/or change traditional perceptions in the Greek political and public discourse about “the sanctities” of Greece’s national sovereignty.

4.4 Laying the foundations for a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations

The decisions taken at Helsinki in December 1999 constituted a breakthrough in the Greek–Turkish conflict, as they succeeded not only in strengthening the European Union’s traditional ability to be viewed “as a framework” with potential positive effects in the long run but also, and more importantly, in enhancing the EU’s potential to become “an active player,” able to impact the conflict in both the short and medium term. But how exactly had the Helsinki decisions managed to enhance the EU’s ability to be viewed both as a framework and as an active player, laying thus the foundations for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute?

As noted, by choosing – since the 1970s – to keep out of the Greek–Turkish dispute, the EC/EU had negatively affected its “third-party” capacity as well as its credibility to act as an honest broker for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute, and overall its ability to have a positive impact on the conflict. Likewise, since the early 1990s the EU’s credibility remained at a low level, as the few initiatives taken did not incorporate any membership carrot for the aspirant country (Turkey) and they only served to reinforce the latter’s perception that the EU’s initiatives towards the settlement of the conflict had been “captured” by the disputant, who happened to be a member of the EU (Greece).

Things changed dramatically in the late 1990s, however, especially prior to the EU’s “big bang,” namely, its enlargement to the east. Pursuing its
enlargement task, the new post-Westphalian European Union demanded that the candidate countries undergo a radical transformation process following certain principles and adopting EU Community Law in earnest. By implication, the norms and rules/conditions promoted by the European Union prior to the enlargement in states which sought to become members, such as Turkey, were both constitutive (i.e., democratization, rule of law, respect of minority and human rights, the role of the military in politics, etc.) and specific/regulative (i.e., certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing the state’s internal structures to European standards, etc.). By asking the states which sought to become members to organize their domestic and foreign policies on the premises which underlie liberal–pluralistic democracy, the EU appeared as having a power of attraction stemming from its normative ability to determine the confines of appropriate state behavior in the European theater.

Moreover, apart from insisting on strong rules and conditions to aspirant states – thus enhancing its traditional ability to be viewed as a framework – through the decisions taken at Helsinki the EU had for the first time succeeded in adopting a strong and clear position with regard to the dispute between a member and a candidate for membership. In other words, the EU was for the first time in the position to apply strong norms and conditions to the disputants, thus enhancing tremendously its ability to positively transform and resolve their long-standing conflict. Indeed, EU decisions at Helsinki established the – peaceful – resolution of outstanding border disputes as a community principle [our emphasis] (Rumelili, 2004a: 9). This in turn meant that the EU was not interested in providing a “patchwork” solution that would settle for short-term solutions. Instead, for the first time in the history of the two states’ conflict, there was a clear reference to the final forum and/or mechanism the two states should use for resolving/ending their long-standing conflict. By imposing a particular time framework (2004 was identified as the deadline) and by indicating the final forum to which the disputants might refer for the ending of their conflict (i.e., the ICJ), the EU succeeded in encouraging and, moreover, facilitating substantive and long-term solutions, instead of offering short-run and ad hoc ones.

Moreover, the resolution procedure adopted in Helsinki by the EU, namely, a “two-step compromise structure” involving first negotiations on all issues followed by adjudication of unresolved issues, reflected a compromise proposal, allowing the disputants to perceive the EU influence not as an imposition but as a deal struck on a balanced distribution of gains.321 Most importantly, due to Helsinki decisions, progress on Turkey’s candidacy/membership in the EU was linked to the resolution of its border disputes with an EU member. What is of particular importance here is that the strong carrot of candidacy/membership was incorporated along with a positive conditionality. Thus, the EU’s stance towards the conflict was viewed, especially by the Turkish elite, as a policy of “conditional rewards,” and not – as had been the case
in the past – as a policy of “conditional sanctions.” The incentives for disputants to find a better way of resolving their conflict were also increased. For Turkey, the Helsinki European Council Conclusions constituted both an alert and an incentive that “there was a light at the end of the tunnel,” and therefore Turkey had to successfully address the issues causing instability in a particular part of the Union. They also entailed, implicitly yet clearly, certain commitments for Greece, as the latter would have to enter into a dialogue with the candidate state in order to resolve their dispute and, in the event that failed, also agree with Turkey what the agenda to be brought before the ICJ for its final verdict to their dispute should be.

Last, but by no means least, through the Helsinki decisions and in consequence of the aforementioned observations the European Union could for the first time put into motion a mix of cognitive, normative, rhetorical, and, most importantly, bargaining mechanisms\(^{322}\) for internalizing the aforementioned set of strong norms and rules in the disputants’, especially in Turkey’s, domestic agenda (Tallberg, 2002: 609–43). Thus, apart from agreeing on making the resolution of the conflict a community principle and providing the Turkish elite with the strong carrot of candidacy along with a positive conditionality, the European Union could also actively use the “carrot” of a future membership in order to “convince” Turkey not only to pursue conflict transformation vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict or the contested border issues with Greece, but also to engage in far-reaching constitutional and economic reforms – namely a “small revolution” internally – in order for the European acquis to be internalized.

### 4.5 Active socialization as a “two-tier” strategy

The decisions taken at the EU summit at Helsinki were considered by Greek decision-makers as a catalyst for the future of Greek–Turkish relations (Simitis, 2005: 101), since the strong incentive of Turkey to become an EU member and Greece’s sincere decision to come to a compromise resolution of its long-standing conflict with Turkey had acquired an “institutional status,” that is, they both became European conditions.\(^{323}\) More specifically, the main goals Greece’s active socialization strategy had achieved at the multilateral/EU level concerned Greece’s ability to ensure and further enhance the monitoring of Turkey’s behavior both internally and externally by EU mechanisms. This would, in turn, mean that Cyprus’s smooth accession to the European Union would be secured regardless of the resolution of its political problem.

At the same time Greece’s active socialization strategy was also called upon to deal with the strong suggestions made by the Helsinki decisions to both Turkey and Greece to bring their bilateral dispute to the ICJ by the end of 2004. Towards this end, Greece initiated a process of “exploratory talks” with Turkey. For Greek decision-makers, the initiation of exploratory talks with
neighboring Turkey was viewed as the bridge to link progress achieved on “low politics” issues the two states embarked upon at the beginning of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement with the most demanding next step in Greek–Turkish relations that – according to the Helsinki decisions – should shortly follow, namely, negotiations on the more sensitive “high politics” issues.

However, apart from Turkey’s engagement in the European framework, Greece’s active socialization strategy was also called upon to develop a second – parallel – tier at the bilateral level, namely a strong “institutional safety net.” The establishment of a high degree of institutionalization at the bilateral level was viewed by Greek decision-makers as the best means for the Greek–Turkish rapprochement to be cemented and, most importantly, for the ground for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute to be prepared. Towards this end, Greek decision-makers believed that agreements on low politics issues should be strengthened by the introduction of new fields of cooperation, while a more stable and predictable relationship between Greece and Turkey could be built through the establishment of a “limited security regime,” portrayed through a particular confidence-building enterprise.

Needless to say, Greece’s initiatives at the bilateral level had to be consistent with – and further strengthen – the goals Greece’s active socialization strategy aimed at achieving at the multilateral level, namely to embrace Turkey in a context based on certain rules and procedures. Towards this end, and in order to further facilitate Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis, Greece’s active socialization strategy had also taken the initiative to establish a Joint [Greek–Turkish] Task Force with the aim of providing technical know-how to the Turkish side on various issues concerning the European acquis.

4.5.1 The multilateral level

From the Helsinki Council through to early 2004, when a change in Greece’s government took place, Greek decision-makers’ ultimate objective was to have an active presence and participation in all relevant European Union organs – the EU Councils, the EU Parliament, the European Commission, etc. – in order to ensure that the decisions taken at Helsinki, especially the ones regarding Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU and Cyprus’ smooth path towards EU membership, would be respected. Thus, Greek decision-makers were willing to use the “carrot” of a future membership in order to “convince” Turkey not only to pursue conflict transformation vis-à-vis the Cyprus issue and/or the dispute with Greece, but also to engage Turkey in implementing far-reaching domestic reforms. At the same time, the common EU means of exerting political and normative pressure on a candidate state had also been kept in the quiver of Greek diplomacy, namely, the “stick” of threatening the suspension of financial assistance in the event that certain commitments undertaken by the candidate state were not fulfilled.
Opportunistly – in light of the generality of the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey should meet for opening accession talks with the EU – the European Commission had published since 1998 annual “Progress Reports” assessing “progress” (or lack thereof) in Turkey’s alignment with EU requirements.\textsuperscript{325} Moreover, beginning in 2001, the EU had also published Accession Partnership Documents pinpointing the specific short and medium-term recommendations that Turkey should follow in its attempt to meet the criteria. Since the Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU Councils had also expressed their views every six months. Last, but not least, the European Parliament had also voiced its views, through regular reports, on Turkey’s progress towards meeting European norms and conditions, especially in regard to respect of human rights and the rule of law. As it was rightly put by Nathalie Tocci: “...the most important period of [European] leverage [on Turkey] to date has been between 1999 and 2004” (Tocci, 2006: 132). It was indeed during this particular period that Greece made active and serious efforts to ensure that the EU would bind itself to fulfill its obligations towards Turkey’s candidacy,\textsuperscript{326} backing up in turn particular goals of Greece’s active socialization strategy, mainly the monitoring and screening of Turkey’s behavior both internally and externally.

A particular attempt was made on the part of Greece to ensure that the decisions taken at Helsinki concerning Turkey’s external front would be included in Turkey's Accession Partnership, Turkey’s “road map” to Europe and the key feature of the EU’s enhanced preaccession strategy. The purpose of Turkey’s Accession Partnership (Council Decision 2001/235/EC, March 2001: 13) was to set out the specific short-term and medium-term priorities\textsuperscript{327} and intermediate objectives for political, economic, and legal/administrative reforms in a single framework, and touch upon Turkey’s internal, as well as external, front. The “genesis” of the formula finally agreed upon was achieved thanks to strong diplomatic efforts by both sides, but can also be seen as a characteristic of the “new era” in Greek–Turkish relations introduced by the rapprochement between the two countries (Droutsas and Tsakonas, 2001: 85).

Greece was not hesitant in making clear to its EU partners from the start that it expected both issues of special Greek interest, namely Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, to be included in Turkey’s Accession Partnership.\textsuperscript{328} Moreover, Greece demanded that the provisions on Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue be included in the short and medium-term priorities of the Accession Partnership.\textsuperscript{329} Greece’s insistence in the Council\textsuperscript{330} that Greek–Turkish relations be included in the “Medium-Term Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership led to intense Turkish reactions and a visit of high-ranking Turkish officials to the capitals of those EU member-states Turkey considered as the “key players” in its Accession Partnership decision-making process.\textsuperscript{331} Finally, a compromise at the political level was reached at the General Affairs Council of 4 December 2000, which foresaw
the inclusion of both the Cyprus issue and Greek–Turkish relations in the “Short-Term” and “Medium-Term Priorities” respectively, but under a heading named “Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria.” This way, the Greek demand to include both issues in the “Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership was met, while Turkey’s sensitivities were taken into consideration by the wording chosen at the Helsinki European Council.

Furthermore, by setting out specific short-term and medium-term priorities and intermediate objectives for political, economic, and legal/administrative reforms, the Accession Partnership had also touched upon Turkey’s internal front. By implication, Greece’s active participation in the formation of the internal reforms Turkey would be asked by the EU to pursue was expected also to promote a central goal of Greece’s active socialization strategy, namely, the internalization of the EU norms and standards in Turkey’s domestic politics. Indeed, by the adopted document Turkey was also asked to promote internal reforms related to three broad areas: the Kurdish issue and, by implication, human rights issues; the role of the military in Turkish politics; and certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing the state’s internal structures to certain European standards. Needless to say, all these reforms were of particular importance to the interests of Greece’s active socialization strategy, since they were either directly or indirectly related to the main issue of Turkey’s internal restructuring, namely, the democratization of Turkish politics and the transformation of the state from a republic to a democracy.

The EU Councils’ Conclusions in Gotenborg, Sweden in June 2001, in Laeken, The Netherlands in December 2001 and in Seville, Spain in June 2002 reiterated the decisions taken at Helsinki with regard to Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU and Cyprus’ smooth path towards EU membership. Specifically, in Laeken the EU-15 reaffirmed their determination to bring the accession negotiations with Cyprus and the other nine candidates that were ready to a successful conclusion by the end of 2002, so that those countries could take part in the European Parliament elections in 2004 as full members. At the same time the EU encouraged the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to continue their discussions with a view to an overall solution under the auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, although progress on the part of Turkey to comply with the political criteria established for accession was acknowledged – a development which brought forward the prospect of the opening of accession negotiations – Turkey was encouraged to continue its progress towards complying with both economic and political criteria, notably with regard to human rights (Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, December 2001).

In Seville the EU-15 urged Turkey, along with other candidate states, to take all necessary measures to implement the required political and economic reforms and to bring its administrative and judicial capacity up to the required level so that progress in the implementation and effective
application of the *acquis* could continue and Turkey’s prospects of accession could be brought forward (Presidency Conclusions, Seville, June 2001). It was also stated that the next stage of Turkey’s candidature would be taken in the EU Council in Copenhagen in the light of developments in the situation following the Seville Council, on the basis of the Regular Report to be submitted by the Commission in October 2002 and in accordance with the Helsinki and Laeken conclusions.334 More importantly to Greek decision-makers, the Seville EU Council reaffirmed that “in respect of the accession of Cyprus, the Helsinki conclusions are the basis of the European Union’s position” (Presidency Conclusions, Seville, June 2002). This meant that, although the EU preference was still for the accession of a reunited island,335 accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus – along with other nine candidate states – would be concluded and Cyprus would become a full member regardless of a political settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Decisions taken at the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 made the linkage between Cyprus’ accession to the EU and Turkey’s EU path more apparent, as it was decided that Cyprus would become a member of the EU on May 1, 2004, while Turkey could start accession negotiations in December 2004, if the Copenhagen political criteria were first fulfilled.336 Although the EU-15 confirmed their strong preference for accession to the EU by a united Cyprus and urged the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to conclude a comprehensive settlement by February 28, 2003, so that the terms of the settlement could be accommodated in the Treaty of Accession, they also stated that, in case of the absence of a settlement, the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island would be suspended. At the same time, the EU encouraged Turkey to pursue energetically its internal reform process and address all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation (Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, December 2002: 5).

Evidently the Copenhagen EU Council was of paramount importance to Greece’s active socialization strategy, as one of its main goals had been achieved, namely Cyprus’ accession to the European Union in spite of there being no political settlement of the Cyprus problem. The comprehensive solution of the Cyprus issue had, however, remained on the agenda of Greek decision-makers, who wanted a settlement to be reached before February 2003 in order for a united Cyprus to join the EU. Apparently, such an eventuality would have greatly facilitated Greece’s bilateral negotiations with Turkey, especially in view of the strong suggestion coming from Helsinki that both countries make every effort possible to resolve their outstanding border disputes through the ICJ, at the latest by the end of 2004.

Through Greece’s active participation in the formation of Turkey’s future relationship with the EU, the Copenhagen Council decided to grant increased preaccession financial assistance for strengthening Turkey’s
accession strategy while the Commission was asked to submit a proposal of revised Accession Partnership as well as to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny (Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, December 2002: 6). Implementing the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, the Greek Presidency of the first half of 2003 succeeded in the adoption of a revised Accession Partnership, the cornerstone of the EU–Turkey relations. The revised Accession Strategy asked Turkey to meet the priorities related to the accession criteria, such as pursuing political and economic reforms and ensuring the adoption and effective implementation of the acquis (Council Decision 2003/398/EC, May 2003). Both the revised Accession Strategy and the increased preaccession assistance to Turkey testified to Greece’s willingness to make the most of the time until December 2004, when the Heads of State and/or Government would have to evaluate the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria for Turkey.

Priorities such as the issue of the property of the religious foundations, the reopening of the Halki Seminary or the conclusion of a community readmission agreement were central to Greece’s approach and interests. Emphasis was also given to a clean record of reforms already adopted by Turkey. For the revised Accession Partnership to be effective – Greek decision-makers believed – Turkey’s internal reforms would have to be implemented by executive and judicial bodies at different levels throughout the country, in a new spirit that reflected the drive of the new legislation. By implication, a major issue to be cleared on the way to full compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria was civilian control of the military. In regard to Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, the revised Accession Partnership reaffirmed the Helsinki Conclusions and – in the context of the political dialogue – urged the two neighbors to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues while strongly supporting efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

It is worth noting at this point that, with the Copenhagen deadline of February 28, 2003 for a settlement of the Cyprus issue approaching, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, presented on November 11, 2002 his own plan – the first in a series of five plans – for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, leaving few issues open to negotiation between the government of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriots. As a consequence, two revised versions of the plan followed: the second one, on December 10, 2002, and the third one, on February 26, 2003. More importantly, a change in the Secretary General’s role of “good offices” to one of “binding arbitration” had also taken place, as he assumed authority to dictate the final terms of a settlement in areas where the two sides in Cyprus had not reached a consensus. March 10, 2003 was the new deadline set for an agreement to be reached by the two parties at The Hague in order for the Secretary General’s plan to be brought to a referendum in each of the two communities (Coufoudakis, 2003: 27).
In the closing days of 2002 and through February 16, 2003, Cyprus entered into a presidential electoral period, which led to the replacement of the moderate Glafkos Clerides by Tassos Papadopoulos, another veteran of Cypriot politics, well known for his hard-line positions. It was the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas’s intransigence, however, that brought to an unsuccessful end the UN Secretary General initiatives when the two parties met at The Hague on March 10, 2003. Interestingly, the signing by the Republic of Cyprus of the EU Accession Treaty in Athens about a month later (April 16, 2003) created a paradox doomed to haunt Turkey’s relations with the EU, namely, a candidate for accession to the EU occupying EU territory. To make things worse, Turkey was still facing the December 2004 deadline with the EU, and thus lack of any progress on Cyprus would not strengthen its case.

Under the Greek Presidency of the European Union, the Thessaloniki EU Council conclusions in June 2003 “urged the parties concerned, and in particular Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership” [our emphasis] (Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki, June 2003: 12) to support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. This meant that a new – and apparently the last – deadline for a settlement of the Cyprus issue was set, which, according to all parties involved in the negotiations, could not under any circumstances exceed May 1, 2004, when Cyprus would become a full member of the European Union. In line also with Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU, the Thessaloniki European Council welcomed the commitment of the Turkish government to carry forward the reform process and expressed its support for the latter’s ongoing efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria, a condition sine qua non for the opening of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union. In addition, the need for significant further efforts to this end was stressed, together with the fulfillment of the priorities set by the revised Accession Partnership in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions (Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki, June 2003: 11).

Acting on the basis of recommendations from the European Commission (the Comprehensive Monitoring Report, the November 2003 Progress Report and the Strategy Paper), the Brussels EU Council in December 2003 strengthened Greece’s active socialization strategy at the multilateral/EU level both by further highlighting Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU and by establishing a clear linkage between Turkey getting a date for accession negotiations and the solution of the Cyprus problem (Baran, 2004: 54).

Indeed, after acknowledging Turkey’s considerable and determined efforts to accelerate the pace of internal reforms and the important steps taken to ensure effective implementation, the EU Council stressed that further sustained efforts were needed, in particular as regards strengthening the independence and functioning of the judiciary, the further alignment of civil–military relations with European practice, the situation
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in the southeast of the country, and cultural rights. It was also stressed that Turkey should overcome macroeconomic imbalances and structural shortcomings (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 2003: 12).

More importantly, in regard to Turkey’s “shadow of the December 2004 deadline” with the EU, the Council made clear that “...a settlement of the Cyprus problem would greatly facilitate Turkey’s membership,” while the decision to be taken by the European Council in 2004 on the opening of Turkey’s accession negotiations would be based on the report and recommendations of the European Commission (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 2003: 11).

Although the President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, hastened to clarify in January 2004 that the European Commission would base its final recommendation to the European Council only on the reforms and their implementation – with a solution of the Cyprus problem not being a formal precondition for Turkey’s accession and/or part of the Copenhagen criteria, as Turkey had argued both officially and unofficially (Bahcheli, 2003: 73–88)341 – “...it was more than clear to everybody in Turkey that the EU’s ultimate decision would be a political one and that the absence of a solution in Cyprus would seriously risk the EU taking a negative decision with regard to Turkey’s accession talks” [our emphasis] (Kirişçi, 2005).342 Moreover, in view of a united Cyprus joining the EU on May 1, 2004, the EU would be particularly eager to accommodate the terms of a settlement, while the European Commission would be more than willing to offer its assistance for a speedy solution by taking all necessary steps for lifting the suspension of the acquis (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 2003: 12).

Over the course of the four years following the Helsinki decisions, the implementation of Greece’s active socialization strategy at the multilateral level aimed at enhancing – through the various EU mechanisms – Turkey’s conditional engagement in the European Union and at securing Cyprus’ accession to the EU, regardless of a settlement of the island’s political problem. The goals Greece’s socialization strategy aimed to achieve at the EU level were not, however, limited only to Turkey’s engagement in far-reaching constitutional and economic reforms and to Cyprus’ smooth accession to the EU.

Most importantly, and driven by an agentic “resolution culture,” Greece’s active socialization strategy had aimed at linking progress on Turkey’s candidacy/membership with the resolution of its border dispute with Greece. As explained, the agentic resolution culture of the Simitis administration deduced that the Helsinki provisions – urging the two neighbors to solve their bilateral differences or else agree, by December 2004, to refer them to the ICJ – created a quasi-precondition that must be reasonably met before the EU would decide to offer Turkey accession negotiations. This had, in turn, provided Greece with a potent negotiating leverage for putting an end to what Greece considered as mostly unilateral claims by Turkey against its
sovereign rights in the Aegean. Greece believed it now had the ability to block entry talks for Turkey unless there were concrete progress with Turkey on a settlement of the two neighbors’ border disputes.

For progress to be achieved the initiation of a series of “exploratory talks” between Greece and Turkey was considered by Greek decision-makers as the ideal prelude to the more demanding process of concrete negotiations between Greece and Turkey on the sensitive “high politics” issues. For Greek decision-makers, the talks aimed at sounding out each state’s intentions and positions on the so-called “high politics” issues and at highlighting the issues Greece and Turkey considered to be of primary or secondary importance and as negotiable or nonnegotiable, as well as at an understanding of each other’s perceptions, interests, incentives, constraints, preferences, priorities, bottom lines, etc.343

Although with some delay and under strong criticism by a certain part of Greece’s foreign policy intelligentsia,344 the “exploratory talks” were agreed by the Greek and Turkish governments in February 2002, and the first contacts between the Greek and Turkish representatives started on March 12, 2002 in Ankara.345 It is worth noting that, since their inception, the “exploratory talks” were a procedure of particular importance for Greek decision-makers, since their launching was expected to further enhance Turkey’s engagement in the European context while at the same time managing to delegitimize – and even avoid – surprises on the part of Turkey, which – according to some analysts – might decide to proceed to certain actions (for example, the full annexation of northern Cyprus or military actions against Cyprus and/or in the Aegean).346 Moreover, the “exploratory talks” were viewed by Greek decision-makers as a bridge linking progress achieved since the early days of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement on “low politics” issues with the most demanding next step in Greek–Turkish relations that – according to the Helsinki decisions – should soon follow, namely, negotiations on the more sensitive “high politics” issues.347

4.5.2 The bilateral level

The “European tier” of Greece’s active socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey was complemented in early 2000 by certain initiatives which constituted – along with the signing of a series of bilateral agreements in low politics issues – the “bilateral tier” of the strategy. The first and most important Greek initiative referred to the promotion of a confidence-building enterprise towards Turkey in order for the conflictual bilateral relationship to be stabilized. Second, a bilateral mechanism, called the Joint Task Force for the transfer of the EU acquis to Turkey, would be established. Both initiatives – Greek decision-makers believed – could be harmoniously linked with a third one, namely cooperation between Greece and Turkey on a plethora of “low politics” issues. A bilateral “institutional safety net” could thus be created, with the aim of not only cementing the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, but
also enhancing the trust needed in order for the ground to be prepared for the resolution of Greece’s dispute with Turkey.

Interestingly, from the time the Greek–Turkish rapprochement reached a steady pace, namely in July 1999, when the first round of talks concerning tourism and environment took place, cooperation between Greece and Turkey in “low politics” or “low confrontation” issues had indeed blossomed. By early 2000, and after official visits paid by foreign ministers George Papandreou and İsmail Cem to each other’s capitals, a total of nine bilateral agreements had been signed. These agreements dealt with tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to the Black Sea and Southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegal immigration, drug-trafficking, and terrorism.

Most importantly, it was the first time in the history of Greek–Turkish relations that through these agreements a rather comprehensive legal framework on issues related to low politics had been created (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 128). Moreover, Greek decision-makers saw an opportunity in the blossoming of cooperation with Turkey on particular low politics issues that could be strengthened by the introduction of new fields of cooperation, such as agriculture and electricity. An extension of the bilateral cooperation in the critical field of energy also followed under an EU-funded program, namely, the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program.

Furthermore, due to the positive climate created by cooperation in various low politics issues, business elites in both countries were encouraged, especially through the activation of the Greek–Turkish Business Forum, to actively progress joint ventures and investments. Cooperation between the Greek and Turkish governments in various low politics issues had thus facilitated a boost in cooperation between Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs, who – due to the negative political state of affairs so far – had been excluded from sharing the gains of economic cooperation. Greek entrepreneurs have been especially supportive of Greece’s new strategy towards Turkey. Their eagerness to invest billions of dollars in Turkey in the aftermath of the official Greek–Turkish rapprochement was thus a clear indication of their vote of confidence in Turkey’s EU membership aspirations as well as in the irreversibility of the Greek–Turkish reconciliation (Grigoriadis, 2008b: 159). Starting in the second half of 1999, the favorable political environment and the improvements in the legal framework soon found resonance in trade relations, as the joint business councils in Greece and Turkey became very active in organizing trade fairs and business meetings (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 131). By implication, the Greek–Turkish rapprochement at the political level was given support and legitimacy at the economic level.

The high potential of cooperation was also made apparent at the civil society level in both Greece and Turkey, with a plethora of Greek and
Turkish associations – from business groups and youth associations to environmental groups and professional associations of various types – grasping new grounds of common activity. Interestingly, the role of the various civil NGOs in both countries in creating networks of cooperation in cultural, scientific, educational, municipal, and other fields became an issue of particular importance for the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the early phases of cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs. Indeed, under the leadership of George Papandreou, a “true believer” in the vital role civil society in both Greece and Turkey could play in cementing the official Greek–Turkish reconciliation, the Greek MFA had actively supported cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs (Papandreou, Titania, 2000; Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos, 2007: 43–66).

It is worth noting that the espousal of a new stance on the part of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not only an indirect result of the forces of “political” and “societal Europeanization,” which – as noted in Chapter 3 – were impacting on Greece’s foreign policy over the 1990s; it was also a response to a post-Cold War paradigm shift from a state-led world toward a neoliberal hybrid model that glorified the importance of “civil society” and viewed NGOs as ideal institutions for the right mix of neoliberal economics and democratic theory promoted by the industrialized nations in the post-Cold War world. NGOs were, moreover, seen as vehicles for democratization and as a component of a thriving “civil society” that needed to be nurtured. Unsurprisingly, by the mid-1990s, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) also came to embrace a new pro-NGO norm and began actively promoting the use, participation, and growth of NGOs worldwide. This top-down international promotion of NGOs involved socialization processes of persuading, pressuring, and teaching these states not only to accept NGOs but also to nurture and foster their growth (Reimann, 2006: 60).

Likewise Greek decision-makers viewed the unprecedented engagement of wide segments of Greek and Turkish societies resulting from cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs as an excellent means of promoting Turkey’s Europeanization and of cementing the Greek–Turkish rapprochement. Therefore – apart from the establishment in 1999 of the General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation (YDAS) and the Committee on NGOs – the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a series of initiatives in order to support the activities of Greek NGOs in cooperating with their Turkish counterparts.355

The calculated Greek support for cooperation taking place between Greek and Turkish NGOs was thus aimed at backing a wider tendency to promote NGOs as vehicles of democratization; at cementing the Greek–Turkish rapprochement by creating roots in both states’ societies – which might remain in place in the event a deterioration of bilateral relations took place; and, most importantly, at engaging both Greek and Turkish NGOs in Greece's
determined efforts towards internalizing the European norms and standards in Turkey’s domestic political arena. Towards this end, the assistance of the European Union in the activities undertaken by the Greek and Turkish NGOs was indeed instrumental, as it not only provided – as analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates – the necessary material resources but also acted as a legitimizing actor.

While Greece continued to promote Turkey’s further integration into the European framework, the blossoming of both the official Greek–Turkish cooperation on a series of “low politics” issues and the unofficial cooperation – although under the official Greek backing and support – between Greek and Turkish NGOs had managed to create a positive momentum in relations between Greece and Turkey356 that needed to be consolidated (Papandreou, Metropolitan-Chandris, 2000). The establishment of a security regime357 between Greece and Turkey was considered by Greek decision-makers as the most appropriate complement to the economic interdependence which had started characterizing Greek–Turkish relations and as the best means for gradually driving the antagonistic Greek–Turkish relationship into a more stable and predictable one. Moreover, with the clock of the Helsinki deadline of 2004 ticking, Greek decision-makers had also realized that it would be in Greece’s interest to embark upon an enterprise that would not only provide a more stable relationship with Turkey but would also create the necessary conditions for the more sensitive “high politics” issues to be addressed at a later stage.358

Towards this end, the establishment of a “limited” or “transparent security regime” (Flynn and Scheffer, 1990: 77–96; Rice, 1988: 301–3; and especially Lebow and Stein, 1987: 56–63) – instead of a “comprehensive” one (Craig and George, 1990: 264–5)359 – appeared to Greek decision-makers as the best way for the two countries to avoid the catastrophic losses360 that would result from war, and manage two particular kinds of gains, namely, crisis stability361 and arms race stability.362 It was, moreover, believed that it would be to the benefit of both Greece and Turkey to adopt measures which would eliminate the possibility of surprise attack and promote stability (crisis stability) through the prevention of war caused inadvertently by miscalculations or/and accident (accidental war) (Schelling and Halperin, 1961: 9–17); and Blechman, 1988: 466–81).

From a Greek perspective, the advancement of a limited security regime would more specifically mean the regularization of the two states’ action with regard to a specific “issue area,” that of arms control. Specifically, Greece expected the establishment of such a regime to reduce the uncertainty regarding the intentions of Greece and Turkey towards each other by offering both states the ability to develop communication channels, which in turn allow them to “rationalize” – by establishing the limits of their action through well interlinked and persistent rules and modes of conduct – and manage in the most appropriate manner their conflictual relationship.363
In accordance with rational institutionalism expectations, Greece was interested in creating sets of formal rules with the aim of further strengthening the current status quo, especially in the Aegean, and, more importantly, of enmeshing Turkey in a context based on certain rules and procedures. Greek decision-makers were, moreover, convinced that Turkey would align its behavior with the modes of conduct to be agreed between the two states, since any infringement of the rules and principles established would trigger the reversal of the cooperative relationship and negate the gains Turkey could achieve through cooperation (the so-called “shadow of the future”).

Greece’s preoccupation with the establishment of a limited security regime was also related to certain functions that were expected to take place after the regime’s establishment. Specifically, Greek decision-makers believed that, although the establishment of a limited security regime did not imply the cessation of conflict over basic political issues, it could constitute the appropriate substratum for the next step in Greek–Turkish relations, since it might go beyond the limited field of a stability that would solely concern crisis stability and arms-race stability. Therefore, the establishment – and further advancement and deepening – of a limited security regime was expected to accelerate the “learning process” (Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Nye, 1987: 371–402) in the competitive Greek–Turkish relationship and to lay down the preconditions for the attainment of the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute.

This point is of particular importance in regard to the role and functioning of a limited security regime in Greece’s active socialization strategy. Indeed, the establishment of such a regime was viewed by Greek decision-makers as an integral part of Greece’s active socialization strategy, since it was expected to foster better stabilization of the conflict as well as to facilitate the conditions for its resolution and, thus, minimize the risks inherent in any institutionalization of the conflict, namely, that the states involved might think that the benefits of institutionalization outweighed the benefits of the resolution of the conflict. As analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates, this latter kind of reasoning in regard to the continuation of the confidence-building enterprise by the two states became an integral part of Greece’s “refined” socialization strategy, namely, the “passive socialization strategy” the new conservative government adopted in early 2004.

It is worth bearing in mind that a “relatively developed arms control regime” already existed between Greece and Turkey, in the sense that both countries were particularly familiar with issues of transparency and confidence-building, both having signed a series of arms control agreements, including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) treaty, the treaty of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Vienna Documents, and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Moreover, in regard to the more recent history of the two countries, other
elements that could be mentioned as integral parts of a “relatively developed security regime” are the Papoulias–Yılmaz agreement on confidence-building measures, better known as the Vouliagmeni Memorandum (May 27, 1988, Athens), outlining ways to reduce misunderstanding or miscalculation during military exercises in the Aegean Sea, as well as the agreement concerning the guidelines for the prevention of accidents and incidents on the high seas and in international air space (September 8, 1988, Istanbul).\(^{368}\)

Interestingly all efforts made by Greece, and Turkey, to build confidence after the 1988 agreements failed. Indeed – as already noted in Chapter 2 – Konstantinos Mitsotakis’s government proposed in 1991 the creation of a defensive arms-free zone on the common borders between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey, in the area of Thrace, with the aim of reducing the possibility of a surprise attack; the Greek proposal was rejected by Turkey on the grounds that the latter failed to consider other areas of confrontation, such as the Aegean (Platias, 2000: 79). In early 1997 NATO’s Secretary General Xavier Solana undertook serious efforts to promote certain military confidence-building measures for adoption by the two NATO allies.\(^{369}\)

Although most of the proposals were rejected by Greece and Turkey,\(^{370}\) both countries accepted in February 1997 Solana’s proposal concerning the monitoring by NATO of Greek and Turkish military flights over the Aegean. Through the transmission of a Reconnaissance Aircraft Projector (RAP) image of Greek and mainly Turkish military flight activity in the Aegean to NATO headquarters in Naples, Greece expected the extent and frequency of the Turkish violations over Greek airspace in the Aegean to be confirmed (Syrigos, 1998: 375).\(^{371}\) Thus Greece viewed the particular NATO proposal less as a confidence-building measure and more as a means of engaging NATO in the highlighting of Turkish illegal military activity in the Aegean. The establishment and operation of a “triangular hot line” between Athens, Brussels and Ankara was also agreed.\(^{372}\) Although this direct communication line was established in all three spots, it seemed to fail miserably in ever becoming operational.\(^{373}\)

In the aftermath of Helsinki, Greece embarked upon the elaboration of a particular confidence-building enterprise, which would consist of a series of military as well as political measures. The latter referred to measures of economic, environmental, and/or humanitarian character that a state can pick up from the broader basket of the so-called “all-encompassing type of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).” The initiation of, and active involvement in, a confidence-building enterprise with Turkey was indeed viewed by Greek decision-makers as laying the foundations for the establishment of a limited security regime.

A series of particular prerequisites had thus been set\(^{374}\) by the Greek decision-makers with the aim of ensuring that the necessary condition for the establishment of a limited security regime would be fulfilled: namely, that a balanced distribution of gains would be achieved.\(^{375}\) Indeed, in the aftermath
of Helsinki it was apparent to those involved in the establishment of a Greek–Turkish limited security regime that only if Greek–Turkish negotiations were based on balanced exchange agreements – which would promote the achievement of a balanced distribution of gains (or at least when these gains were perceived as such by policymakers on both sides of the Aegean) – would there be a desire for reciprocity and equivalence.

Two particular types of measures were thus outlined by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the – hectic – help of the Ministry of National Defense, and were considered as constituting the integral parts of a “limited” or “transparent” security regime that could be adopted by Greece and Turkey. Interestingly, steps towards the adoption of these measures were viewed by Greek decision-makers who were leading the process as necessary – but not sufficient – conditions for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict, as it seemed probable at the time that any improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey and the implementation of any of these measures would remain hostage to another incident in the Aegean or on Cyprus.

The first set of measures concerned “tension reduction measures,” most preferably with a formal agreement. Such measures could be agreed upon without extensive negotiations and might include “transparency CBMs,” such as the establishment of a hot line between Prime Ministers, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and/or between Chiefs of Staff (although not between Chiefs of Armed Forces General Staff, because of the different levels of authority); implementation of the Papoulias–Yılmaz Agreement (by agreeing to a more equitable geographical definition) and its use as a basis for further discussions; in the context of this Agreement, extending the moratorium on exercises in the Aegean to four months; the demonstration of additional goodwill by both sides by discussing the NATO Secretary General’s proposals on CBMs; the annulment of casus belli statements for reasons other than violation of sovereignty; and further promoting the tacit agreement between Navies on incident prevention in the Aegean. The second set of measures concerned “environmental CBMs,” and regarded common measures the two states could undertake for the prevention of pollution on the river Evros – which constitutes a common border – as well as its sustainable environmental development.

The aforementioned Greek views of, and particularly the rationale behind, an eventual Greek–Turkish confidence-building enterprise were conveyed to Turkey prior to the official visit the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, was about to pay to Ankara in January 2000; most interestingly, the first since the early 1960s (!) The Greek views on the confidence-building enterprise were received and elaborated solely by the Turkish civil–military establishment. The latter responded by submitting a set of exclusively military CBMs, which could be agreed upon and implemented by the two countries. With the Turkish military urging for
Greece’s positive reply, the Greek side responded favorably to some of the Turkish military proposals while it insisted that the agenda – in line with the more broad definition of security in the post-Cold War era – should not be limited to certain military CBMs but could include certain environmental CBMs.

After several official meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (in Florence, Ohrid, and New York), Greece and Turkey agreed in September 2000 to consider in the months to come a series of CBMs called *Measures for Reducing Tension and for Good Neighbourliness*, which consisted of three particular categories: (i) “Operational CBMs,” concerning measures of technical and operational character; (ii) “Institutional CBMs,” regarding measures of tension reduction as well as measures within the framework of the Papoulias–Yılmaz Memorandum of Understanding; and (iii) “Other Measures,” mostly concerning particular “environmental CBMs” (see Appendix 2). It was agreed that the measures included in the first category would be discussed within the framework of NATO by the Permanent Representatives in Brussels of each state, while the measures included in the other two categories would be examined by the Political Directors of each state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

More interestingly, apart from being consistent with the goals Greece’s active socialization strategy aimed to achieve at the multilateral level, namely, to embrace Turkey in a context based on certain rules and procedures, Greece’s initiatives at the bilateral level were also viewed as a means to strengthen the EU mechanisms’ ability to ensure and further enhance the monitoring and screening of Turkey’s behavior towards Greece. The achievement of this goal was in fact the rationale behind Greece’s attempt to get the European Commission involved in a particular aspect of Turkey’s behavior vis-à-vis neighboring Greece, namely, the tremendous increase in the number of Turkish violations of Greek airspace.

In a letter to the European Commissioner Gunter Verheugen in May 2003, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed Greece’s serious concern – as well as its surprise – about the fact that the numerical increase in violations of Greek airspace by Turkish military aircraft was coupled with a “qualitative” change in the behavior of the Turkish military, namely, the adoption of a more aggressive stance towards an EU member, such as Turkish aircraft overflights within Greece’s territorial waters and the Turkish military visual night flights in violation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules. By highlighting the oxymoron between the ongoing Greek–Turkish rapprochement on the one hand and Turkey’s aggressive behavior towards an EU member who was the strongest supporter of its European orientation on the other, Greek decision-makers aimed to strengthen further the EU’s ability to check Turkey’s behavior in the Aegean and thus make Turkey develop relations of good neighborliness with Greece, in accordance with the EU norms and standards.
Last, but not least, parallel to the Greek–Turkish CBMs enterprise, the two meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey in January and February 2000, in Ankara and Athens respectively, gave further impetus to bilateral relations, by producing ideas that resulted in successful cooperation between the two countries. One of those initiatives was the setting-up of a joint Task Force entrusted with the study and realization of Greek–Turkish cooperation on matters pertaining to the European *acquis*.

After an initial exploratory stage that helped define the main areas of potential collaboration, the Task Force focused on developing seminars in order to provide technical know-how to the Turkish side on various issues concerning the European *acquis*.

The seminars covered fields such as banking, the economy, customs, agriculture, the environment, justice and police cooperation, treasury matters, university collaboration, and partnerships in youth projects. As these seminars were intended to bring the two sides together, they were not based on the “teacher and pupil” model, but focused more on studying each other’s methods and special needs and sharing Greece’s experience in dealing with the various aspects of the European *acquis* (Tsakonas, 2001: 26).

Greece considered such cooperation as a useful means for speeding up Turkey’s accession process to the EU. Indeed, Turkey could benefit from Greece’s experience on how to better adopt and apply the community *acquis* linked with the overall modernization of the structures of its public administration. Greece also viewed the establishment of the Joint Task Force as a means for improving the state of relations between the two countries.387 Indeed, the possibility of functionaries from various fields, such as judges, policemen, civil servants, and so on, coming together had been practically near to impossible in the past. As a consequence, the seminars and other events organized in the framework of such cooperation were expected to strengthen the understanding between the relevant Greek and Turkish authorities, functioning thus as confidence-building devices (Heraclides, 2002: 24). Through the various meetings of the Joint Task Force, and especially through the training seminars, a clear view of Greece’s experience in the implementation of the EU *acquis* would thus be offered, while close working relationships between the specific branches of the two administrations would be developed.388
5
Modifying the Strategy

5.1 Receptiveness to Greece’s “active socialization strategy”

The aim of a socialization process is for those who are being socialized to adopt and internalize the norm set to such an extent that external pressure (e.g., conditions and criteria) is no longer needed to ensure compliance (Flockhart, 2005: 16). By implication, the “success of socialization depends on the socializee’s domestic environment/politics and its effect on its foreign policy style and substance” (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 111). It is thus expected that successful socialization will result in some level of behavioral change on the part of the socializee (i.e., Turkey) vis-à-vis the socializers (i.e., Greece and the European Union [EU]), not to mention change in its attitudes and beliefs.389

After four years of bilateral and multilateral implementation of Greece’s active socialization strategy (see previous chapter) one would obviously wonder how this held up in the case of the socializee, namely Turkey. How had Turkey’s European path influenced its domestic politics? Specifically, how had Turkey perceived and reacted to the EU-imposed democratization and, by implication, what impact had the latter had towards a gradual redefinition of Turkey’s national interest to become closer to European rules and norms of behavior as well as on Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece and on the Cyprus issue? Moreover, apart from the internalization effects of the EU standards and conditions, what were the effects of the implementation of the “bilateral-European” initiatives of Greece’s socialization strategy on making the Greek–Turkish rapprochement a sustainable and productive one? Overall, and to put it more simply, how much and to what extent had the “multilateral” and the “bilateral” dimensions of Greece’s active socialization strategy paid off?

Especially for Greece, whose ability to bring a democratizing nation (Turkey) into the “pacific union” (EU) appeared to present the most viable long-term solution to its security problem, Turkey’s response and, more importantly, receptiveness to Greece’s “active socialization strategy” could
tell much about the ability of Greece's socialization strategy to deliver on the fronts where it claimed to be successful: namely, resolving the long-standing conflict between the two neighbors, achieving a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, and making Turkey follow an internal revolution of structural reforms, which would in turn help an unconsolidated "procedural democracy" establish a democracy modeled on the lines of EU member-states.

Attaching particular value to Turkey's strategic culture, skeptics over Turkey's ability to internalize the European *acquis*, both internally and externally, would argue that traditionally Turkey had been wary of multilateralism and interdependence and that it preferred to deal with other nations bilaterally rather than with international regimes multilaterally (Lesser, 2000a: 219).490 Turkey would thus be expected to cooperate only when it was in its specific national interests to do so, not because of a commitment to international behavioral norms. As a consequence, Turkey would bend only when the quid pro quo was – mainly politically – worthwhile or when the penalties of not compromising or complying (the costs of not adapting to international rules and norms) were unacceptably high.

Interestingly, an assessment of Turkey's response to Greece's "active socialization strategy" – developed both multilaterally and bilaterally – from the strategy's peak in 1999 in Helsinki through to 2004 suggests that Turkey's response could be considered as a rational one in an ever-strengthening institutional environment. Especially with regard to the multilateral dimension of Greece's socialization strategy, it could be argued that Turkey appeared willing to conform to international/institutional norms in order to reap the benefits of international legitimacy while, by acting as an instrumental actor, it kept calculating whether these benefits were worth the costs of compliance and how they could be reaped efficiently. In other words, by following the "logic of consequentiality" and driven by utilitarian calculations, Turkey appeared willing to comply with certain EU-posed conditions and criteria, thus validating the thesis that incentive-based methods, such as membership conditionality, can become catalytic in changing a state's domestic and foreign policies (Kelley, 2004: 425–57).491 At the same time, corresponding also to the "logic of appropriateness," Turkey would gradually manage to internalize the EU value-based norms to the state's domestic political institutions and culture.

Turkey – or even Turkey, as skeptics in Greece would have put it – went through a major transformation following the cataclysmic event of the EU summit in Helsinki, constituting thus an interesting example of change achieved through socialization in international institutions.492 This change, however, did not take place only for the reasons and/or to the extent constructivism would have expected.493 Indeed, as analysis in Chapter 2 suggests, Turkey was moved to a more cooperative stance towards Greece and Cyprus in the late 1990s precisely because this was in its material power
interests; not in the absence of, or even contrary to, such interests. However, over the course of four consecutive years since being granted a candidacy status, Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Greece, and particularly towards Cyprus, went through a major transformation, for reasons related both to rationalist and to constructivist premises.

Indeed, as the empirical analysis that follows demonstrates, from 1999 to 2004 Turkey’s behavior seemed to be more and more constrained not only by the EU’s strict conditionality (the rationalist exegesis), but also by value-based norms of legitimate statehood and proper conduct (the constructivist exegesis). The EU’s normative effects on Turkey – which took place at the “societal,” “domestic institutions,” and “elite” levels – thus impacted Turkey’s foreign policy towards a more rationalized and multilateralist stance as well as towards abandonment of the traditional “security-oriented” approach and a gradual redefinition of Turkey’s national interest.\(^{394}\) Moreover, particular credit for the much more predictable state of affairs – characterized by a sustainable period of rapprochement – which Greek–Turkish relations enjoyed in the four years following the Helsinki decisions should be given to the “bilateral-European” initiatives of Greece’s socialization strategy.

5.1.1 Strategy’s “multilateral face:” EU internalization effects on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus

As noted, at the Helsinki summit the EU had put into motion a mix of cognitive, normative, rhetorical, and, most importantly, bargaining mechanisms for internalizing a set of strong norms and rules in the disputants’ – yet mainly in Turkey’s – domestic agenda. Through these mechanisms and following particular socialization policies institutions exert their norms and, most importantly, impact the domestic landscape of the states to be socialized.\(^{395}\) Making use of its bargaining power means that the EU conducts policies through which it addresses primarily the political leadership of the conflict parties. As a matter of fact, this was the most obvious way by which the EU attempted to exert influence from its Helsinki summit onwards.

Particularly with regard to its relations with Turkey, the EU has, on the one hand, repeatedly used the “carrot” of a future membership in order to “convince” the Turkish government not only to pursue conflict transformation vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict or the contested border issues with Greece, but also to engage in far-reaching constitutional and economic reforms. On the other hand, the “stick” of threatening a suspension of financial assistance has been also used by the EU to exert political pressure and normative power on Turkey.

Thus, apart from only agreeing on making the resolution of the conflict a community principle and providing the Turkish elite with the strong carrot of candidacy along with a positive conditionality, the EU Council decisions
at Helsinki had also actively promoted *Turkey’s democratization* – an integral part of Greece’s socialization strategy – by asking it to proceed with a “small revolution” internally in order for the European *acquis* to be internalized. In other words, it was the Helsinki decisions which managed to join up the “gravity model of democratization” with the mechanisms of Europeanization.\footnote{396} Indeed, although Turkey’s democratization and a particular reform process had started prior to the Helsinki decisions, nevertheless, it was the latter that provided a more powerful set of conditions and incentives for transforming Turkey into a “European-looking” state, with significant improvements in the realm of domestic and – to a certain extent – foreign policy behavior.\footnote{397}

Needless to say, it is a rather difficult enterprise to measure the depth of internalization or salience of the institutional norms, rules, and conditions. In assessing EU normative effects and internalization on Turkey, empirical evidence is used for the exploration of only measurable effects, such as changes in Turkey’s institutions and policies, due to internalization of institutional norms (Cortell and Davis, 2000: 70). It also goes without saying that it is a rather difficult enterprise for changes in the domestic political discourse to be objectively assessed, although they seem to be the most important ones. By implication, an effort will be made in the analysis that follows to assess changes in Turkey’s behavior towards Greece and on the Cyprus issue as “deeper” changes in Turkey’s interests and identity.

Interestingly, as empirical analysis will illustrate, from the Helsinki summit through to 2004 a high degree of receptiveness on the part of the Turkish elite as well as of the Turkish public was revealed with regard to Turkey’s response to the EU conditions on the country’s democratization as well as to Turkey’s policy towards Greece and on the Cyprus issue.\footnote{398} Predictably, these rational as well as normative effects of the EU on Turkey took place on a series of interrelated and interconnected levels, namely, on the “domestic institutions” level, the “elite” level, and the “societal” level.

It was almost immediately after Turkey had been granted EU candidature that it was obliged to adjust to the postmodern, postnationalistic and multicultural paradigm of twenty-first-century Europe. Based on various EU Council Conclusions and specified in the EU–Turkey Accession Partnership documents, the EU kept “demanding” after Helsinki for certain EU norms and rules (in the form of conditions) to be incorporated into Turkey’s domestic institutions. By implication, all EU summit and Council conclusions and decisions from Helsinki onwards established certain procedures and mechanisms to monitor Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the conditions set by the EU. Thus, at the “domestic institutions” level, a “thorough” – although hesitant in its commencement – adoption of the EU’s legislation, norms, rules, and requirements was put into motion by successive Turkish governments from the Helsinki summit onwards.\footnote{399}
Specifically, Turkey was obliged to prepare a National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) following the first EU–Turkey Accession Partnership (AP) in November 2000. The Accession Partnership document outlined the economic and political reforms that had to be adopted by Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey adopted the NPAA – although with some delay – in March 2001, outlining, in response, the reforms to be made in the short and long term. Unfortunately the released NPAA document reflected Turkey’s attempt to strike a balance between the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria and the unwillingness to implement reforms on the most sensitive issues, such as the prospects of TV/radio broadcasting in mother-tongue languages other than Turkish and the reduction of the military’s influence. The NPAA adopted by Turkey largely downplayed the significance of democracy and human rights and showed little commitment to reforms in the fields of minority rights, fundamental freedoms, and the abolition of the death penalty (Rumford, 2002: 59). The wording adopted for the critical reforms was thus vague and ambiguous, falling short of the requirements posed by the Accession Partnership. It does not come as a surprise that most of the issues raised by the AP were not addressed until the first half of 2002 (Kirişçi, 2005).

Likewise, with regard to Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s NPAA referred to them solely in its “Introduction” and used quite vague language. More specifically, by stressing that Turkey would continue to develop its relations with neighboring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy, it is also stated that Turkey “will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue; supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the island.” It could thus be argued that, if Turkey’s NPAA is to be compared with the priorities set in Turkey’s Accession Partnership, a certain amount of consistency was also lacking (Tsakonas, 2001: 9–10).

Interestingly, one of the most dramatic changes came in August 2002, when Turkish MPs voted for constitutional change despite the fact that early elections were imminent. These included the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime and extension of the rights over religious property of the non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and the rights of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish – particularly referring to regional dialects and the Kurdish language (Ulusoy, 2005: 3; Tanlak, 2002). In the October 2002 Commission Regular Report, although the reforms made were praised, it was also stated that Turkey still did not fully meet the Copenhagen criteria. Within less than a month’s time following the report, the political landscape of Turkey was deeply transformed and the
long democratization process dramatically accelerated as a result of the 3
November elections which brought to power Tayyip Erdoğan’s moderate
Islamic party (AKP).

Immediately after his rise to power and amidst domestic opposition from
the “old establishment” (Jenkins, 2003: 45–66), Erdoğan’s government
declared that his priority was economic stability and EU membership (our
emphasis), while he downplayed the social issues at the core of the Islamist
Agenda (Heper, 2003: 127–34; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 51; Aydın and
Çakır, 2007). The strong majority that the new government received in
the elections, coupled with a growing confidence in the ranks of pro-EU
circles, enabled the new government to adopt further reforms during the
second half of 2002 through to June 2003. More specifically, four major
packages on political reform were adopted, thus bringing far-reaching
changes to Turkey’s political system. The most important of these reforms
regarded the lifting of the state of emergency in southeastern Turkey, furt-
her improvement on earlier reforms of cultural rights, the abolition of the
death penalty (also in wartime), increase of Parliamentary control over the
defense budget, and – most importantly – removal of the National Security
Council’s executive powers and its conversion into an advisory council.405
The reforms Erdoğan’s government put forward – recorded in the new
version of the NPAA of July 2003 406 – were in much greater harmony with the
new Accession Partnership document adopted by the EU in May 2003. In
its regular report on Turkey, the EU Commission noted that some of the
reforms carried particular political significance in the Turkish context, and
that many priorities under the political criteria in the revised AP had been
addressed.

One may indeed argue that almost since the aftermath of the Helsinki
summit through to 2004 various political reform packages were adopted
with the most pressing requirement being to fulfill the Copenhagen polit-
ical criteria that resulted in deepening Turkey’s Europeanization process.
Turkey’s efforts to fulfill these conditions had to a great extent been suc-
cessful, as it had managed to regulate the constitutional role of the National
Security Council as an advisory body and in accordance with the practice
of EU member states, 407 to fulfill certain economic and legal conditions (e.g.,
harmonization of the country’s legislation and practice with the European
acquis), and to extend cultural rights of minority groups in practice (allow-
ing mother-tongue broadcasting and education as well as the liberalization
of laws restricting freedom of speech and association) (Müftüler-Baç, 2003:

Having successfully passed the “adoption of the reforms exams,” in 2004
Turkey was expected to demonstrate that the reforms could also be imple-
mented. Indeed, while the Commission’s regular report in October 2003
highlighted the Turkish government’s good intentions to ensure the imple-
mentation of reforms through the establishment of a reform monitoring
group, it also noted that implementation had so far been uneven (European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress, 2003: 43). After undertaking serious measures to ensure the proper implementation of reforms, Turkey seemed to be also passing the “implementation exams.” Although the EU “Commission’s Communication to the Council and the Parliament” in 2004 noted that “the irreversibility of the reform process, its implementation in particular with regard to fundamental freedoms, will need to be confirmed over a long period of time,” it clearly stated that Turkey had fulfilled the political criteria and it recommended the opening of accession negotiations allowing “… [t]he legal reformism of 2003 and 2004 to be mirrored at the level of high politics” (Robins, 2007: 293).

Thus, far from being a “reluctant democratizer par excellence” (Smith, 2003: 127–8), Turkey proved able to adopt and implement a series of groundbreaking reforms which, although having a high domestic political cost – to some they could even challenge the whole political project upon which the Turkish Republic was established in 1923 – were perceived as being worth the costs of compliance with EU standards. Particular credit for the success experienced at Turkey’s institutional level from the Helsinki summit through to 2004 should be given to the EU’s ability to follow a consistent path in demanding domestic reforms while keeping the EU membership an attainable option, by effectively monitoring Turkey’s convergence towards EU standards and seriously and wholeheartedly encouraging Turkey’s efforts in adopting the EU norms and rules. Indeed it was the European Union’s consistent voice which had made both “conditionality” work and the Turkish leaders ensure that compliance with the EU conditions would leave no pretext for the EU to delay the start of EU–Turkey negotiations by the end of 2004.

From the Helsinki summit through to 2004, observers of Turkey’s domestic politics also refer to the EU normative impact on Turkey’s state elite. Indeed, the formal adoption of norms (the transfer of EU norms to national laws) seemed also to have certain internalization effects on the basic political actors in Turkey, thus leading to a reconfiguration of Turkish politics. Especially the Turkish civil–military elite – which had traditionally been the primary “securitizing actor,” able to define the internal and external threats to the state – was observed as having since early 2003 slowly and painfully entered a process of “desecuritization.” It is worth noting that in the aftermath of the Helsinki decisions the prospects of EU internalization effects on Turkey’s political elite and the chances of successful desecuritization were rather dim. The granting of candidacy status to Turkey seemed to further reinforce the internal conflict among the various social and ideological groupings (the Army, the modernizers, the Islamists, the secularists/Kemalists) that have saluted Turkey’s inclusion in the group of candidate countries, each one for its own distinct – and often incompatible with the others’– reasons (Tsakonas, 2001: 11–14).
As noted, the secularist coalition government running the country in the aftermath of the Helsinki decisions started adopting certain EU-demanded reforms through the Turkish NPAA in March 2001, including – inter alia – the regulation of the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body, in accordance with the practice of EU member-states. For the European Union, the absence of real civilian control over the military – the Turkish military was constitutionally granted a degree of autonomy (Sakallioğlu, 1997: 153; Salt, 1999: 72–8) – was an anomaly that no democratic state could tolerate. On top of this, through the State Security Courts (SSCs), the military’s role had been extended into the educational and judiciary system, making Turkey “the only example in Europe in which civilians can be tried at least in part by military judge.”

Particularly the Turkish military – although it considered Turkey’s accession as a conditio sine qua non for the completion of Atatürk’s Revolution (Jenkins, 2001: 82) – feared that any rigid implementation of Turkey’s accession partnership with the EU would result in the loss of its privileged status as the final arbiter of Turkey’s national interest as well as of its “omnipresent” role in Turkish politics. By implication, a selective, à la carte, implementation of the European acquis, one that would not question the critical mass of the Kemalist doctrine, looked the most likely stance to be adopted by the military.

Two years after the EU democratization process had been put into motion, it seemed that only a political earthquake could make Turkey comply in a more sincere and thorough way with the EU’s demand for a radical restructuring of its internal political power-configuration. This earthquake did come with the AKP’s triumph in the November 2002 elections. The comfortable election victory of the moderate Islamist party of Tayyip Erdoğan swept away the nearly derelict center-right and far-right Turkish political parties from the country’s parliamentary scene and resulted in the first non-coalition government since Özal’s first administration in 1983. By openly declaring EU membership as its ultimate priority, the main challenges for Erdoğan’s government in the aftermath of its victory were to improve the efficiency of the bureaucracy without forfeiting its patronage links, to gain control over the high-quality professional bureaucracy without undermining its efficiency, and, most importantly, to deal with the military in Turkish politics (Kalaycioglou, 2003). For the moderate Islamist government, to embrace the goal of EU membership was an effective means to deter any future military interventions, making Turkey’s further democratization and compliance with the EU requirements a “shield” behind which to shelter (Robins, 2007: 292).

As pressure from the EU to bring Turkey’s institutional framework more in line with EU standards was mounting, the military found itself gradually retreating from the battery of constitutional and legal provisions and from the restraint of the Turkish political parties, parliament, and, most
importantly, the government. Thus, although not ready to embrace the European Union’s recommendations in their entirety (Kubicek, 2001), the military decided not to resist changes in civil–military relations that were introduced by the EU. Obviously, the most important of these changes was the reform of the National Security Council – which obtained parliamentary approval in June 2003 – and its metamorphosis into a purely advisory body, with a civilian appointed as its Secretary General in August 2004 (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 69).

The military, a veto-player in the Turkish political system, appeared willing to comply with the EU acquis requirement to give up its preponderant position as the state’s ultimate agent to define Turkey’s national interest, namely the National Security Council (NSC). Acquiescence to that loss of power on the part of the military, which expressed its commitment to further integration with the EU on several occasions since the Helsinki decisions, actually came after the military found itself “rhetorically entrapped” (Sarigil, 2007: 39–57).

Indeed, as the ultimate guarantor of the Kemalist state, the military realized that any attempt on its part to block Turkey’s Europeanization process would cause severe damage to its ideational interests, such as legitimacy and credibility. At least since the initiation of the postmodern coup of 1997, the Turkish military’s ability to ensure that government policy remained within acceptable parameters had been primarily based on its public prestige, rather than the prospect of a full-blooded military coup (Jenkins, 2007: 339–55). As a consequence, the protection of its ideational interests, namely its internal legitimacy and credibility as the guardian of the Kemalist legacy, was considered a goal worth the costs, namely, the loss of power, that compliance with the EU demands would unavoidably entail.

The renewed European perspective that Helsinki carried seemed appealing to a plethora of actors who saluted Turkey’s inclusion in the group of candidate countries, each for its own distinct reasons. Indeed, in early 2000 the European perspective seemed appealing to Western-oriented Kemalists and to a materialistic middle-class as well as to those on the margins of Turkish society and politics, such as the Islamists and Kurds who saw in Europe the possibility of more tolerance and freedom for their own views (Lesser, 2000b: 8). More specifically, the particular short-term and medium-term political conditions included in the first Accession Partnership put the issues of human rights and religious freedoms at the top of Turkey’s agenda while encouraging the development of a civil society. In fact, what the European Union asked for was a redefinition of certain pillars of the Kemalist ideology, especially of the notions of nationalism and populism.

Especially with regard to the Kemalist notion of nationalism, the European Union asked for a workable compromise on the two types of “challenges” to the Turkish state, namely, Islam and the Kurdish issue. By implication, the incorporation of Islam into mainstream politics seemed a must for the
sake of liberal democracy, while the authoritarian nature of political Islam threatened Turkish democracy, according to the Turkish Kemalist perception (Müftül-Baç, 2000: 170). How could it really be possible, one would obviously wonder in early 2000, for the religious movements that threaten the state to be integrated into it because the state has to democratize?

In the EU logic, success in the aforementioned redefinition of certain pillars of the Kemalist ideology would be measured in terms of social pluralization and the emergence of a vibrant, diversified, complicated, and sophisticated civil society outside the reach of the official state. Especially for Turkey, democratization meant overcoming the fundamental internal contradictions of Kemalism and its top-down modernization program and Turkey’s transformation from an elite-driven, top-down, authoritarian movement of officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals to a popular ideology that commanded the support of the Turkish masses and the middle classes in particular.

Again the rise to power of the moderate Islamic party in late 2002, and the subsequent reconfiguration of Turkish politics, was the catalyst for the gradual emancipation of Turkish civil society, which started to appear as “an agent for change.” Thus the conditions for the qualitative impact of Turkish civil society on Turkish political life emerged, namely a more flexible official ideology, the decrease of the control of politics by the military, and – although to a much lesser extent – the reform of the educational system in order that the contribution of civil society to democratization should increase (Şimşek, 2004: 46–74). Indeed, powerful actors in Turkish civil society, such as business elites and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), appeared – with the full backing of the moderate-Islamist government – as the prime actors in redefining the main pillars of Kemalist ideology and in establishing a more decentralized pluralistic democracy, which would stimulate a more institutionalized democratic system (Toros, 2007: 395–415).

Furthermore, the above-noted fast-progressing EU internalization effects on Turkey’s domestic institutions – particularly after the second half of 2002 – empowered domestic actors in Turkish civil society so that they could not only play the role of the buffer – when force-based solutions to internal and external threats were proposed by the “Euro-skeptics” – but also present mediation, consent, and compromise as the civil society’s endogenous preferences to deal with, mainly internal, threats such as the “Kurdish issue.” It is worth noting that, as the adoption of the EU acquis started taking effect with the participation of, and legitimacy provided by, several political and social actors beyond those in government, the conservative Kemalist elite soon found itself being caught “in a pincer” as pressure was coming both from outside and from domestic actors (Kubicek, 2005: 361–77).

More importantly, Turkey’s EU candidacy empowered the domestic actors in both Greece and Turkey who were in favor of promoting Greek–Turkish
cooperation, and allowed them to use the EU to legitimize their cooperative policies and activities. Indeed, the explicit link made by the Helsinki Council decisions between Turkey’s progress on EU membership and the peaceful resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute lent official and private efforts to promote Greek–Turkish cooperation significance, urgency, and, most importantly, legitimacy. Thus, after 1999 a pro-EU coalition (benefiting from the EU’s mixed strategy of conditions and incentives) emerged which gradually and steadily gained ground over another vocal “anti-EU” coalition (Önis, 2003: 9–34). In addition, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy unleashed funding to civil society efforts directed toward Greek–Turkish cooperation, such as the Civil Society Development Program and the Greek–Turkish Civic Dialogue program. The effectiveness of the EU in promoting Greek–Turkish cooperation has thus stemmed not so much from its direct interventions as from the success of various domestic actors in using the EU as a funder, a symbol, and a legitimating handle (Rumelili, 2005: 43–54).

In a more general sense, the more democratization took root, the more diverse societal and political groups could challenge the primacy of the Kemalist understanding of foreign policy. After four years of Turkey’s socialization the normative effects of the EU on Turkey’s domestic politics were indeed discernible. To put it differently, it gradually became more difficult for the National Security Council, the Foreign Ministry, and the Chief of the General Staff, the traditional actors in the Turkish foreign policymaking process, to have the luxury of ignoring what public opinion thought about foreign policy issues.

Overall, from the official granting of Turkey’s candidacy through to 2004 the EU seemed to promote steadily, and, most importantly, with consistency, Turkey’s democratization by asking it to proceed with a “small revolution” internally in order for the European acquis to be internalized. The clear and strong rules and norms the EU exerted on Turkey – supported and transcended by a mix of cognitive, normative, rhetorical, and bargaining mechanisms – managed to achieve a moderate degree of internalization of the acquis by Turkey.

This meant, especially for skeptics in Greece and in the EU, that, although norms appearing in Turkey’s domestic discourse produced some change in Turkey’s national agenda as well as in its institutions, the latter still admitted exceptions, reservations, and special conditions. A moderate degree of internalization also meant that Turkey had not wholeheartedly shared in the idea that the most appropriate thing would be for it to do what the European Union required in the accession criteria (Grabbe, 2002: 249–68; Smith, 2000: 33–46). By implication, after four years of intensive institutional reforms and a new “state of play” between state and society, Turkey was still in need of cultivating a more genuine “Turkish–Islamic synthesis,” which would attain harmonious coexistence between secular and religious
society (Çarkoğlu, 2005: 318), while its biggest challenge – not measured in terms of its ability to meet EU criteria – remained its willingness to change the normative content of Turkish politics (Glyptis, 2005: 410–20).

Obviously, the aforementioned assessment of the EU internalization effects stands far from the strong skepticism certain accounts based either on the “anchor/credibility dilemma”424 or on Turkey’s “domestic turbulence”425 tended to suggest in the aftermath of the Helsinki decisions. It should instead be stressed that the European Union appeared for the said period as able to provide an external anchor for Turkey in three particular ways: first, by tying the hands of the Turkish government, by reducing the scope for discretion and policy reversals; second, by enabling the government to engage in externalization, thus justifying the reform process as a requirement imposed by external constraints; and, third, by allowing both the government and the pro-reform societal groups to legitimize the democratization reforms (Uğur, 2003: 176).

It would thus be fair to argue that during “the golden years of the EU accession process, 2001–2004” (International Crisis Group, 2007: 12), a legitimization of alternative policies at Turkey’s elite level426 gradually took place and the activities of civil society as well as the EU norms retained more and more salience as a guide to behavior and policy choice. More importantly, the normative and internalization effects of the EU on Turkey seemed continuously and steadily to have a positive impact on its foreign policy towards Greece and on the Cyprus issue. To demonstrate this impact on Turkey’s behavior towards neighboring Greece and on the Cyprus issue, one should focus on what seem to constitute clear examples of the Turkish foreign policy transformation towards a more rationalized and multilateralist stance. As a matter of fact, the evolution of Turkey’s policy towards Greece and on the Cyprus issue in the critical years following the Helsinki decisions through to 2004 provides ample proof of the EU’s ability to increase the chances of successful desecuritization of Turkey’s elite interests by being the reference point for legitimizing conflict-diminishing policies.

As a start, one may refer to the militant radicalism that was expected to erupt at the hands of the military, namely the elite’s component that used to enjoy full control of the state’s institutions and whose decisions took priority over those of the cabinet, due to the EU conditions imposed on Turkey after Helsinki and to the subsequent serious reconfiguration of Turkish politics, particularly after the second half of 2002. Indeed, hawkish domestic preferences were not allowed by the emerging – and therefore unconsolidated – democratic principles to shape the foreign policy of the transitional regime, making it more assertive, if not aggressive. It seemed, moreover, that not only could the long-term prospect opened by Helsinki serve as a counterweight to the growth of nationalist sentiment in Turkey, but also the short-term impact of the EU’s democratization on Turkey’s national discourse was negated. More specifically, as Turkey’s basic nationalist dilemma
became more profound after its EU candidacy, it was expected that a reactivation of the “Sevres Syndrome” and the subsequent adoption of a more assertive policy, based on a sovereignty-conscious approach in key areas, would appear more and more appealing.

In addition, Turkey’s sincere interest in Europe was also questioned, as in the period following Helsinki there was among the Turks a feeling, which transcended the whole political spectrum, from the military and most of the business community to the religious and secular right wing, and also on the left, that suspected the European Union of neocolonialism and racism, and which made Turkey appear receptive to the idea of a more sovereignty-conscious and independent state (with regional hegemonic ambitions). Indeed at the time many in Turkey continued to think that a “special relationship” with the US and Israel could be a good alternative to Euro-membership. Even Turkey’s premier, Bülent Ecevit, was not hesitant in repeatedly emphasizing a “regionally based” foreign policy in which Ankara would seek “...to play a more active role in defense of its interests in adjoining areas. Indeed, in practice this meant a more assertive policy towards Syria, Iran, Northern Iraq, and a strong stance on the Aegean, and Cyprus issues” [our emphasis] (Lesser, 2000b: 12).

As Turkey’s candidacy evolved, however, and due to the noted EU multi-level internalization effects, it became clearer to Turkey’s decision-makers that a regionally based role, although fully endorsed by all Turkish governments so far, would prove incompatible with the country’s European orientation and, most importantly, with the demands for compliance with the European principles and standards. As a consequence, Turkey’s behavior towards the two interconnected issues, namely vis-à-vis Greece and on the Cyprus issue, developed within the more rationalist and multilateral context a fast progressing “Europeanization” had entailed. This is not to say that Turkey’s behavior towards Greece succeeded in the period following Helsinki in aligning fully with the norms and practices characterizing a consolidated European democratic state. There were indeed limits to the EU internalization effects on Turkey’s behavior towards Greece, related – inter alia – to Turkey’s casus belli claim against its neighbor Greece, the incessant violation of the Greek minority’s rights related to the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923, and the refusal to allow the reopening of the Orthodox Seminary in Halki. At the same time, however, the EU-induced metamorphosis of Turkey on the institutional, elite, and societal levels had certain constructive effects, as the analysis that follows illustrates, on Turkey’s behavior both towards Greece and on the Cyprus issue.

It is worth noting that the Cyprus issue had for a long time been a nationalist issue par excellence for the Turkish civil–military elite, and – also due to Turkey’s strategic importance for the West – had resulted in a rigid Turkish stance. Furthermore, over the years, Cyprus had become the sole “reason of pride” for the Turkish Kemalist elite (especially the military),
which promoted a modernization project that failed in many respects. Thus, Cyprus appeared as the only “success story” in the state’s long list of failures in its efforts for internal reform and modernization.\(^{435}\) Moreover, the Cyprus issue gave content to the ideology of “pan-Turkism,” which thus managed – although on the fringe of Turkish politics in the 1960s – to become the dominant ideology in the 1990s. Indeed, a consensus – if not a rigid front – was achieved around the Cyprus issue among the conservative and the modernizing members of the civil–military elite,\(^{436}\) while nationalism on the Cyprus issue was also used for legitimacy purposes. This in turn not only negated any “rational approach” to the Cyprus problem on Turkey’s part but also led to the adoption of a more intransigent stance.

In the post-Helsinki era, the Cyprus issue started to become Turkey’s “existential problem.” The Greek-Cypriot government, the only one internationally recognized, had been advancing rapidly in its EU accession negotiations and was ahead of all other candidates in the race to join in 2004. The target date for concluding negotiations seemed to be the end of 2002, leaving 2003 for ratification. At the time, Turkey’s choices seemed limited to the following dilemma: it would either make a sincere, although painstaking, effort to contribute productively to the resolution of its conflict with neighboring Greece and to the end of the occupation of northern Cyprus, or it would adopt instead a policy aimed at the reversal of certain European-style “rules of the game” that had been imposed by its Accession Partnership and had to be followed.

Initially, Turkey’s official, yet solely verbal, policy was inclined towards the second option. While realizing that there was no way Cyprus would not be in the first wave of enlargement, Turkey warned the fourteen EU member-states (excluding Greece) that if the Greek-Cypriot administration were accepted as a full member before the Cyprus problem was solved, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) might be integrated with Turkey.\(^{437}\) Turkey’s warning to the European Union members was coupled with veiled threats to withdraw Turkey’s own EU candidacy.\(^{438}\) In addition, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, reminded Europe that Ankara would do all it could to block the republic of Cyprus’s accession as an independent state,\(^{439}\) while he stressed that Turkey would not sacrifice Cyprus in order to join the European Union.\(^{440}\) It thus seemed that, for the first time in many years, there were timid signs that Turkey had started to realize that its Cyprus policy was leading it headlong toward a crisis\(^{441}\) in which its own EU bid could be the main casualty.\(^{442}\)

To the surprise of many skeptics over Turkey’s candidacy in Greece and Cyprus, as well as in the EU, nothing happened. Moreover, the fact that the rather painstaking “democratization process” Turkey had entered after Helsinki did not lead to the adoption of diversionary policies vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus was evidence of the Turkish foreign policy turn towards a gradual redefinition of the state’s national interest that was closer to an
EU-oriented vocation and to European rules and norms of behavior. It also seemed that gradually a general understanding was being built among the Turkish elite that the Cyprus issue had to a great extent been Europeanized and that Turkey would need to reach *acceptable compromises* with Greece, the Greek Cypriots, and the European Union should it aspire to join the EU. Particularly, Recep-Tayyip Erdoğan and his government did their best to act on the interrelated issues of the Cyprus problem, Greek–Turkish relations, and Turkey’s European path in a constructive way. They did not always succeed, however.

For example, prior to the critical Copenhagen EU Council in December 2002, where Turkey was expecting to get a date for the start of accession negotiations, the Turkish government “freshly in power and facing considerable opposition from hard-liners and the state establishment, argued that it would be political suicide to advocate a compromise on Cyprus and still face the risk of not getting a date for negotiations” (Kirişçi, 2005). It thus fell short of delivering a breakthrough. Likewise, an effort to achieve a last-minute compromise by March 2003 was also unsuccessful as the government, besieged with the crisis over Iraq, failed to win over the rejectionist camp of Rauf Denktas and the like-minded elite bureaucracy – including the military – in Turkey (Robins, 2003: 558–9).

Fully sharing the view of Turgut Özal, the late President of Turkey, that an early settlement of the Cyprus issue through negotiations would favor Turkey, as it would both remove the main obstacle to improved relations with Greece and the EU and bring Turkey’s diplomatic and financial drain to an end (Robins, 2003: 558), the AKP leader, Tayyip Erdoğan, proceeded to make a major shift in its policy over what had become Turkey’s “existential problem” after Helsinki, namely, the Cyprus issue. Particularly given that a certain amount of disharmony existed between the moderate or post-Islamist Turkish government and the Kemalist-dominated state over the Cyprus issue – which resulted in the adoption of an intransigent stance on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas and negated any “rational approach” to the Cyprus problem on Turkey’s part – the change of Turkey’s policy over the Cyprus issue constituted indeed a “paradigm shift” in its foreign policy (Robins, 2007: 297).

With the revision and reenergizing of the UN Secretary plan for Cyprus in early 2004, the EU incentives were too big to be dismissed by either Turkey or the Turkish-Cypriot community. Particularly the AKP government “knew of Cyprus in only one respect: as an obstacle to [Turkey’s] closer relations with the EU, its ultimate foreign policy goal” (Robins, 2007: 297). Furthermore, the immediate prospect of Cyprus’ membership – with the internationally recognized Greek-Cypriot government in Nicosia to be the one who would most probably represent the whole island – and the more distant prospect of Turkey’s membership led to an intense debate among Turkish Cypriots. According to Önis and Yılmaz: “For the first time, there was a realization
in Turkey, as well, that there was a distinct Turkish Cypriot community on the island with a distinct set of interests and concerns about their own future. Cyprus could no longer be seen as simply an extension of mainland Turkey” (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 138). Consequently, first, neutralization and finally replacement of the intransigent Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas seemed the only way out in order for the Turkish-Cypriot community to support the United Nations Secretary plan – known as the Annan plan – for the reunification of the island.446

Particular credit should indeed be given for this to the AKP government, which took a proactive position, different from the hard-liner approaches of the past, thus strongly advocating – along with the European Union – acceptance of the Annan plan as the best way possible for the dispute to be solved and the reunification of the island to be achieved.447 Most importantly, it seemed that the hard-line nationalist Turkish “orthodoxy” of the dominant diplomatic–military establishment was no longer in a position to block the path of a solution of the Cyprus issue along the lines of the Annan Plan, although a certain amount of skepticism over particular aspects of the plan was nevertheless expressed (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 137). Interestingly, one of the declared goals of Greece’s active socialization strategy thus seemed to be achieved, namely, the breach of the Turkish “orthodox view” that the Cyprus issue had been solved already with Turkey’s invasion in 1974 and the transfer of a taboo issue into an open public debate (Papandreou, 2000: 34).

Turkey’s major shift in its policy over the Cyprus issue stood as probably the most interesting example – as well as ample proof – of the change in Turkey’s elite interests over a taboo issue due to both the EU membership incentive and the EU’s normative impact on Turkey’s political elite and society as well as on Turkish-Cypriot society.448 Quite ironically, however, the EU seemed to have less positive impact on the Greek-Cypriot elite and the Greek-Cypriot public, who rejected the UN Secretary’s plan for the reunification of the island,449 leading EU enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen to declare that, regardless of the fact that there was a new President in Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot side had reneged on the 1999 Helsinki summit pledge not to hinder a solution.450

Although the rejection of the plan by the Greek-Cypriots prevented the island from being united, the Turkish-Cypriots set themselves free from a heavy burden, namely, that it was their intransigence that prevented a solution. The deliverance of Turkey’s foreign policy from the long-lasting stigma of being the obstructionist party in Cyprus’ peace negotiations had indeed been the strategic goal the AKP government hoped to achieve and the reason behind its major foreign policy shift over the Cyprus issue. The ball seemed then to be in the court of the EU, which was asked to reward Turkish-Cypriots for their cooperation over the Annan plan (Robins, 2007: 297–8).
On “the Aegean front” Greece and Turkey had been experiencing “ups” and “downs” since the launch of the “exploratory talks” in March 2002 following the strong suggestions made by the Helsinki conclusions. Indeed, after an unfortunate but brief recess – stipulated by the resignation of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, in the summer of 2002 and his succession by a resolute hawk on both Greek–Turkish relations and Turkey’s EU entry, namely Şükrü Sina Gürel – the “exploratory talks” picked up following the AKP’s triumph in the November 2002 elections. As noted by Alexis Heraclides, “The Aegean talks finally reached high gear by the spring of 2003, so much so that a deal was almost clinched by December 2003 – January 2004” (Heraclides, 2008: 122).

It would be fair to argue that both Greece and Turkey were serious in their dealings during the “exploratory talks,” each for its own reason. Animated by a resolution agentic culture, Greece had embarked upon a strategy whose implementation at the multilateral and bilateral levels aimed at a compromise solution to be reached with Turkey by recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. Most importantly, on Greece’s part such a settlement included the compromise costs a final agreement with Turkey would entail. Thus, from the beginning of the talks Greece had indeed meant business, as the preparation and support of the talks – unique in the history of Greece’s negotiations with Turkey – by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek premier’s office demonstrate.

Although Greek decision-makers entered the “exploratory talks” without distancing themselves from the traditional Greek position about the singularity of the Greek–Turkish dispute, they also publicly acknowledged that for an agreement to be reached, and for the submission of the two states’ dispute to the ICJ to follow, negotiations should first take place. These negotiations could also lead to a bilateral agreement on some of the issues related to the delimitation of the continental shelf, while all other remaining issues could be submitted to the ICJ through a joint compromis (Simitis, 2005: 102). Furthermore, given that any judgment by the ICJ in The Hague on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean would be based on a fixed breadth of the two states’ territorial waters, Greece made it clear from the beginning of the talks that it would exercise its right to extend its territorial waters, preferably by an act of the Greek Parliament in accordance with international law and practice, before negotiations with Turkey for a compromis to the ICJ took place.

For Turkey sincere participation in the “exploratory talks” was a prerequisite called for by the Helsinki conclusions, or – to use the words of the former Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tassos Yannitsis – “a non-negotiable duty.” Indeed, through the Helsinki decisions Turkey was for the first time obliged to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in The Hague, to which the two states would resort after reaching a mutual agreement. Furthermore, after acknowledging that progress in “exploratory talks” with Greece was
also linked to the most wanted date for EU accession negotiations, Turkey’s decision-makers were not adamantlly opposed – as the exploratory talks evolved – to resorting to the ICJ in The Hague for the complex issue of the continental shelf, provided, however, that the territorial waters and airspace issues had also been resolved (Heraclides, 2008: 123). Thus, Turkey would be willing to accept the extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean, but in terms of procedure it would prefer first a *compromis* in which the territorial waters issue would be resolved once and for all – in accordance with the basic principle of international negotiations: “nothing is final, until everything is final” – to be followed by any act of the Greek Parliament deemed necessary.455

Interestingly, as the exploratory talks reached their twenty-second round on January 9, 2004, “a great deal of understanding of each other’s intentions and positions had been achieved, procedural issues that could arise had been examined, problems and obstacles in the process had been outlined and substantive preparation at a technical level had been concluded.”456 It thus seemed that the “exploratory talks” succeeded in accomplishing much more than what Greek decision-makers expected, namely, to enhance Turkey’s engagement in the European context and to link the progress achieved on “low politics” issues with negotiations on the more sensitive “high politics” issues. Indeed, after the completion of more than twenty meetings between the Greek and Turkish officials and after a plethora of coordinated, focused and well-elaborated – official and unofficial – preparatory actions by the Greek government, “...the ground for the transition to political negotiations which would lead to a *compromis* with Turkey had been well-prepared.”457 Moreover, according to the former Greek premier, Costas Simitis, “...the successful conclusion of the exploratory talks on a mutually agreed and ‘win-win’ basis was a matter of time, probably of only few months” (Simitis, 2005: 104).

5.1.2 Strategy’s “bilateral face:” Building confidence and promoting economic interdependence

By the conclusion of the first four years after the EU summit in Helsinki, Greece and Turkey were much better off in terms of bilateral relations than they had been prior to the cataclysmic events of 1999. Obviously for this new state of affairs a certain amount of credit should be given – as illustrated by the preceding analysis – to the multilateral dimension of Greece’s active socialization strategy, namely, the EU’s internalization effects on Turkey’s domestic politics and the subsequent impact on its foreign policy behavior toward Greece and, most notably, on the Cyprus issue. Yet, it is the bilateral dimension of Greece’s active socialization strategy which should also get a certain amount of the credit for the noted positive state of affairs between Greece and Turkey, with the elements of *confidence* and *predictability* being the most important ones in the two states’ efforts to build a more stable relationship.
Indeed, by the end of 2001 Greece and Turkey had agreed on a series of military CBMs, including the prior notification of their scheduled exercises in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be conducted on an annual basis, in order for overlappings to be avoided, and the establishment of a hot line between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Although of less importance, Greece and Turkey also agreed in November 2001 on invitations to officers from both countries to attend one annual large-scale exercise on each side; exchange of views between the Chiefs of Joint Staffs of Greece and Turkey on the activities of international organizations relating to military matters, in the margins of meetings of the competent bodies of the said international organizations; and cooperation on the prevention of pollution of the river Evros, by establishing a regime of sustainable environmental development of the river.458

It is worth noting, at this point, the limited role NATO was in the position to play in making clear to its two allies, Greece and Turkey, that there would be costs inherent in any effort of one of the parties to either cheat or defect from the rules agreed within the Alliance’s institutional context. NATO had indeed proved unable to play the role of the guarantor of any confidence-building enterprise taken by the two neighbors, the most characteristic example being a particular confidence-building enterprise, named Destined Glory, which took place within the Alliance’s institutional context in September 2000 (Tsakonas, 2007: 24).459

Of particular significance, however, was the result of a Greek initiative in confidence-building related to anti-personnel land mines. The Greek and the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs made a joint statement in Ankara on April 6, 2001, which stated that the two countries would initiate procedures needed to make both countries parties to the 1997 Ottawa Convention regarding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel land mines and their destruction.460

Most importantly, fast progress in confidence-building seemed to have had positive spillover effects on the more demanding field of “structural CBMs,” namely, defense spending and procurement plans. Indeed, in March 2001 the Greek government had unilaterally decided to postpone a long-awaited $4.5 billion purchase of about 60 of the new multinational Euro-fighter planes by at least four years in order for “a package of social benefits” of about 1.1 trillion drachmas to be funded by these defense spending cuts. Despite strong reservations expressed by the Greek Minister of National Defense on the government’s decision to the first defense spending cut in decades,461 the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, made the announcement of the unilateral Greek defense downsizing during his official visit to Ankara in early April 2001. By mid-April and due to fiscal austerity measures following Turkey’s economic crisis in early 2001, Turkey’s military reciprocated by announcing the postponement of thirty-two short, medium and long-term defense procurement programs worth $19.5 billion.462
Furthermore, the Greek initiatives at confidence-building seemed to reap a good yield, as they managed to create a framework which not only took some of the heat off Greek–Turkish relations but, indeed, advanced them. It was, indeed, the element of confidence and trust built between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the consequent strengthening of communication channels between them, that helped the two countries avoid a serious incident in May 2001. The Turkish vessel, Piri Reis, which was to conduct a seismic survey from June 4 to June 28 in the less troubled waters of the Southeastern Mediterranean (on the Greek and Cypriot continental shelf, according to Greece), was withdrawn after intensive consultations between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that in 1987, when another seismic vessel undertook a similar voyage towards the disputed continental shelf, a crisis had erupted that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war.463

With the aim of building confidence and trust between the two countries, the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed in the margins of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Crete, Greece in May 2003 to adopt three CBMs concerning the mutual exchange of visits by officers of the armed forces’ three branches, mutual visits by students of the armed forces’ academies, and the establishment of telematic medicine offices between two military hospitals of the two countries.464

In addition, two measures concerning the exchange of military personnel between PfP training centers and the inauguration of cooperation between Greek and Turkish National Defense Colleges were agreed and announced in July 2003 after discussions held in the context of NATO. Bearing in mind the need not only to avoid a stalemate in the CBMs enterprise, but also to give a new impetus to the procedure, Greece had also proposed in September 2003 a list of fourteen CBMs, encouraging at the same time its Permanent Representative in NATO to continue along with his Turkish counterpart with their efforts to conclude additional CBMs agreements in the context of NATO. Most importantly, “in the spirit of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and of rapprochement between the two countries” Greece and Turkey agreed in the margins of the “Euro-Mediterranean Forum” in October 2003 to cancel their planned military exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean. The cancellation concerned, on the part of Greece and with the engagement of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, the exercises “Nikiforos” and “Toxotis” (Archer), and, on the part of Turkey, the exercises “Barbarosa” and “Toros” (Bull).465

The institutionalization of Greek–Turkish relations in the area of arms control, through agreements on particular confidence-building measures, seemed to verify the thesis that an arms control regime can increase the security of all participants without affecting their relative power. In other words, CBMs that place constraints on peacetime military activities can lower the risk of an unintended conflict due to mistrust or misperception
without affecting military capabilities. The Greek–Turkish experience at confidence-building in the post-Helsinki era seems also to pinpoint that regimes can promote cooperation by driving antagonists to realize “absolute gains” in cooperation and by helping fearful states obtain greater certainty about others’ behavior, capabilities, and interests.

Mutual realization of “absolute gains” was also the case in the establishment and functioning of the Joint (Greek–Turkish) Task Force for the transfer on the part of Greece of technical know-how to Turkey on a plethora of issues concerning the EU acquis. Indeed, through this particular Task Force, Turkey was provided with the European know-how it was so much in need of, while Greece’s objective to push Turkey further into the EU framework and/or integration project was also served. In late 2003, Turkey was not hesitant in openly recognizing Greece’s efforts for Turkey’s harmonization with the EU acquis, through the functioning of the Joint Task Force. During an official visit to Athens in October 2003, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, underlined the contribution of the Joint Task Force to the tangible and irreversible strengthening of relations between Greece and Turkey, and its role in considerably enhancing mutual understanding and trust between the two administrations.

Most importantly, within three years of Helsinki and after the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ official visits to Athens and Ankara in January 2000 and February 2002, respectively, Greece and Turkey had succeeded in signing more than ten “low politics” agreements in the fields of terrorism, immigration, energy transportation, environment, illegal drug-trafficking, tourism, fisheries, education, sports, etc. (Oğuzlu, 2004b: 342). This was indeed quite an achievement, given that the last major agreement signed between the two countries was the Agreement on International Land Transportation in 1970. As noted by Ziya Önis and Suhnaz Yılmaz: “…[A]fter three decades of dormancy, the signing of twenty-five new agreements and protocols in the 2000–2004 period relating to economic, social, and cultural relations, which provided the legal framework for enhanced interaction, has been a very significant development” [our emphasis] (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 131).

The signing of the Prevention of the Double Taxation Treaty in December 2003 and a bilateral agreement on joint investment projects resolved longstanding problems hindering the advancement of Greek–Turkish economic relations and spurred investments, although mainly from Greece to Turkey and not vice versa. Due to improvements in the political climate, cross-border trade jumped in 2001 to an estimated $1 billion from $700 million in 2000 (Hope, 2001: 44) and $350 million in 1999 (Koutsikos, Greek–Turkish Business Forum, 2000). There was also a significant expansion of trade volume in the period 1999–2004, with the Greek–Turkish trade volume being continuously on the rise from 1999 – with the exception of 2001, during which Turkey experienced a major economic crisis. Bilateral trade increased
almost threefold over the 2001–3 period, reaching $1.3 million in 2003 and with strong potential for further growth, thus highlighting the degree of support the business circles had placed upon the two states’ cooperation (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 87).

Of particular importance for Greek–Turkish bilateral economic relations had also been the two neighbors’ agreement in July 2002 to cooperate in the first common infrastructure project ever launched by Greece and Turkey, namely, to construct a cross-border pipeline, estimated to cost $300 million and to take three years, to carry natural gas from Central Asia to Western Europe (Hope, 2002: 44–7). Indeed, in February 2003 DEPA and BOTAŞ, the Greek and Turkish gas utilities, agreed to proceed with the construction of a natural gas pipeline, 285 km long, which will run from Karacabey, located on the Asian shores of the sea of Marmara, to Komotini, located in Western Thrace (Papadopoulos, 2008: 18).

Overall, the three interconnected and mutually supportive pillars of Greece’s active socialization strategy at the bilateral level – namely, cooperation in low politics issues, the CBMs enterprise, and the Joint Task Force – seemed to have succeeded in late 2003 in creating a tacit security regime (Henderson, 1999: 203–27) between Greece and Turkey, which had a stabilizing impact on relations between the two neighbors in conflict. Indeed, one could hardly deny that, under the spirit of a delicate rapprochement and with the fundamental issues dividing the two countries remaining unresolved, the prospects for a serious crisis that could escalate into a hot war have been drastically minimized while new avenues of cooperation have opened. Likewise, although progress in the political domain paves the way for closer economic cooperation – and not vice versa – the pacific effects of Greek–Turkish economic interdependence seemed to have also affected the likelihood of conflict not just by raising the costs of war, as the conventional liberal argument holds, but also by promoting transparency, facilitating costly signaling (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001: 391–438) and proving resistant to changes in government in both countries.

By the end of 2003 Greek–Turkish relations seemed thus to stand in what is likely to be a sustainable period of rapprochement, with the conflict de-escalated to an issue-conflict and with Greek–Turkish differences being articulated as ones that can be managed, rather than as existential threats (Rumelili, 2007: 106–7). By implication, the “institutional safety net” Greece’s active socialization strategy aimed at creating at the bilateral level in the aftermath of Helsinki seemed not only to successfully complement the strategy’s “European tier” but also to cement the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and, along with the “exploratory talks,” prepare the ground for the resolution of Greece’s dispute with Turkey. In that sense, the bilateral tier of Greece’s active socialization strategy appears to play a helpful, even essential, role for a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations.
5.2 From “active” to “passive” socialization

When one should decide, the best is to do the right, the “second-best” is to do the wrong, and the worst is to do nothing.

Theodore Roosevelt

At the dawn of 2004, Greece’s active socialization strategy seemed to have achieved most of its short and medium-term goals, namely, stabilization of bilateral relations and further advancement of Greece’s economic relations with Turkey, Cyprus’ smooth accession into the EU, and, most importantly, progress on the exploratory talks Greece and Turkey had embarked upon for agreeing on the compromis to be submitted to the ICJ in The Hague.

At the beginning of 2004, however, the chances for the resumption of Costas Simitis’s premiership were rather dim indeed – although for reasons unrelated to his policymaking in the foreign policy domain. After a hurried internal redistribution of power in the governing party – with the popular Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, replacing Costas Simitis in the leadership of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) – the national elections of March 2004 had brought to power the conservative party of New Democracy with a comfortable majority. The assumption of the Greek premiership by New Democracy’s leader, Costas Karamanlis – nephew of the noted former premier and president of the Hellenic Republic, Constantine Karamanlis – was followed by the adoption of the basic elements of Greece’s socialization strategy, although with certain crucial modifications.

5.2.1 The rationale: From “resolution” to “instrumental dialogue” culture

Unsurprisingly, while in opposition, the position of the central political figures of the foreign policy apparatus of Greece’s new governing party regarding Greek–Turkish relations was not too distant from the adage frequently heard in Greek politics: “Greece offered too much for too little.” Especially in the months and years following the critical EU summit at Helsinki, Simitis’s government had been accused of providing Turkey with the so much needed candidacy status without any prior significant gesture on the part of Turkey and/or without any tangible benefits to Greece’s interests. In a more populist form, the U-turn in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey was also assessed as an example of appeasement of “the threat from the east.”

It is worth noting that for both historical and cultural reasons New Democracy had been the political party sharing more than any other political grouping in Greece the ideals and principles of European integration, with its founder, Constantine Karamanlis, considering – in the late 1970s – Greece’s membership of the European Community as “the Nation’s new Great Idea (‘Megali Idea’).” On the other hand, the key foreign policy
agents of New Democracy – including its leader Costas Karamanlis – were used to addressing Greece’s territorial dispute with neighboring Turkey with power-based responses. It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that at the end of the day New Democracy’s foreign policy apparatus acknowledged – and to a certain extent shared – the “realist” part of the Simitis administration’s reasoning, which viewed the European Union as an instrument of policy and as an indispensable means towards goals.

As a consequence, it also appreciated the former administration’s attempt to integrate Greece’s threatening neighbor into the binding commitments of the EU’s strategy of “intergovernmental reinforcement” and to join the short, medium and long-term benefits of Turkey’s compliance with the EU norms and standards. As one of Karamanlis’s foreign policy advisors noted – in the aftermath of the EU summit in Helsinki and prior to Greek national elections in June 2000 – the best choice for the Greek government that would come out of the elections:

...[I]s to content itself with the “tactical benefit” of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, which is the de-escalation of tension [...in the Aegean], and to lead bilateral relations into a period of peaceful stagnation. Meanwhile, the Greek government will expect Turkey’s gradual European transformation and its internalization of the European acquis to render the “strategic benefits” the Greek government had attached to its policy shift in Helsinki. (our emphasis)

Key foreign policy figures of the new government were not hesitant to state that Turkey’s conditional engagement into the EU integration system and the “communitarization” of Greek–Turkish relations – introduced through the Helsinki decisions – should be enhanced and further strengthened. What Greece should not assume, however, the foreign policy apparatus of the new government argued, are the costs inherent in the end-state of the socialists’ active socialization strategy, namely, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict.

As noted, in accordance with the Helsinki decisions, it was not only the candidate Turkey but also the EU member-state Greece which was obliged to make every effort to resolve its differences with Turkey by the end of 2004. Unsurprisingly, for the agentic culture of Karamanlis’s administration, the commitment undertaken by the socialists to come to a compromise solution with Turkey within a particular time frame was considered to be a distortion of the so-called “communitarization” of Greek–Turkish relations achieved at Helsinki. This was due to the fact that the communitarization of Greek–Turkish relations was not limited to Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU integration system, but was extended that far to oblige Greece to negotiate with Turkey over the whole complex of issues in the Aegean, meaning negotiations beyond the delimitation of the continental shelf and
over issues Greece had traditionally considered as Turkish unilateral claims over Greece’s sovereignty.\(^{484}\)

The commitment undertaken by the socialist government – especially on its own initiative\(^{485}\) – to enter into bilateral negotiations with Turkey for fulfilling Helsinki’s quasi-requirement was also considered by the new conservative government as an “unnecessary and rather risky burden,” given that Turkey – not Greece – was the “diligent party” in the quest for EU membership and thus the one obliged to fulfill certain EU conditions for getting the accession negotiations’ “green light.” Greece, on the other hand, should be – the same argument goes – on the side of those EU members who can dictate the rules and conditions of Turkey’s European path while keeping itself a safe distance from any commitment a final settlement of Greece’s dispute with Turkey would entail.\(^{486}\)

Clearly – with reference to available types of agentic culture presented and analyzed in Chapter 1 – Karamanlis’s foreign policy apparatus, views, and beliefs on the pros and cons of the socialists’ active socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey identified with the “instrumental dialogue” culture. As noted, this type of agentic culture represents the decision-makers’ views and beliefs that dialogue with the threatening state is good to the extent that it provides a certain amount of stability in bilateral relations. Yet decision-makers should be aware that dialogue with the threatening state may prove to be dangerous for, and detrimental to, the threatened state’s interests if the latter risks – through the dialogue process – being committed to a compromise solution, one that would in any case carry more costs than benefits. By implication, the agents of the “instrumental dialogue culture” are expected to pursue dialogue aimed at the resolution of the conflict only if certain – favorable to their expectations – conditions are first fulfilled. In the meantime, decision-makers should sham dialogue with the threatening state so as to “buy time,” thus allowing other situational variables, such as international and domestic factors, to influence the course of events towards the fulfillment of their desiderata.

Unsurprisingly, the instrumental dialogue culture of Karamanlis’s administration crucially affected, as analysis that follows demonstrates, the goals and means of Greece’s active socialization strategy initiated by the Simitis administration. Indeed, in the aftermath of the assumption of Karamanlis’s premiership, a new type of “socialization strategy” towards Turkey was introduced, with its main concern being the emancipation of Greece’s foreign policy from the commitments the active socialization strategy of the Simitis administration had entailed, namely, the responsibility of Greece to come to a compromise solution with Turkey within a particular time frame.\(^{487}\)

Specifically, the modified socialization strategy Karamanlis’s administration embarked upon in the aftermath of its coming to power was aimed at benefiting from the positive results of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement and at further enhancing and strengthening stabilization of Greece’s bilateral
relations with Turkey, as well as the blossoming of the two neighbors’ economic collaboration. In addition, by viewing the European Union as an instrument of policy, Karamanlis’s socialization strategy was aimed at further supporting the continuation of Turkey’s conditional engagement into the EU integration system. However, in order to emancipate itself from the political costs a compromise solution of Greece’s dispute with Turkey would entail, Karamanlis’s socialization strategy viewed the European Union only as a framework and/or as an “incubation chamber,” which could eliminate the bases of Greece’s long-standing dispute with Turkey in the long run through democratization and gradual integration. By implication, the EU’s potential to become – by also acting as an “active player” in the short run – the catalyst for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute was purposely disregarded, precisely because such an EU function entailed a commitment the – modified – socialization strategy aimed to avoid.488

Thus, in contrast to the active socialization strategy adopted and implemented by the socialists, yet in full accordance with the instrumental dialogue culture of the new conservative government, a passive socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey was adopted and pursued by the Karamanlis administration after its coming to office.489 In the medium term the normalization of Greece’s relations with neighboring Turkey was the key objective of Karamanlis’s passive socialization strategy. Normalization of bilateral relations was also viewed as allowing Greece to “buy the time” needed for Turkey’s “Europeanization” – en route to Brussels – to take place. Turkey’s Europeanization was, moreover, expected to positively influence and take the edge off the Greek–Turkish dispute and/or allow Greece to come to a final settlement of its bilateral dispute with Turkey sometime in the – inevitably distant – future, when Turkey’s Europeanization would have produced conditions more favorable to Greece’s interests and desiderata.490

Obviously the short-term goals of Greece’s passive socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey, namely, the continuation of Turkey’s conditional engagement with the EU integration system, the stabilization of bilateral relations, and the strengthening of bilateral economic relations, were linked with the prospects – particularly the negative ones – of a solution to the prickly Cyprus problem. Thus, in line with the Karamanlis government’s instrumental dialogue culture, the stabilization of Greek–Turkish relations and the further advancement of Greece’s economic collaboration with Turkey required the avoidance of any potential disturbances the Cyprus issue might cause on the Aegean/bilateral front of Greek–Turkish relations. This in turn meant that the probable lack of a solution to Cyprus’ political problem should not be allowed to have a negative effect on “the tactical benefits” of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, namely, the de-escalation of tension in the Aegean and the positive gains the bilateral cooperation on a plethora of domains had brought about. By implication, the eventuality of a lack of a solution to Cyprus’ political problem should activate – Karamanlis’s
instrumental dialogue culture assumed – the *decoupling* of the Cyprus case from the Greek–Turkish state of affairs.

Last, but not least, the assumption of Karamanlis’s premiership coincided with the outbreak of a series of two interrelated and mutually reinforcing negative trends. The first, which took place within the European Union, regarded its enlargement project in general and Turkey’s future accession to the EU in particular. The second trend, which took place within Turkey, regarded a noticeable retreat in Turkey’s efforts and ability to fulfill the criteria and conditions needed for accession.

Indeed, after the passing of an impressive battery of EU-demanded democratic reform measures, the implementation of reforms in Turkey has been uneven and – as time passed – there was a further slowing down. Besides reasons attributed to election politics and Kemalist institutional resistance to AKP reform efforts (Patton, 2007: 339–58), Turkey’s “reform fatigue” should mostly be attributed to the popular realization in Turkey about the *unpredictability of its future accession*. Indeed, with the actual deliveries of the benefits remaining unknown in the long run – given that membership appeared impossible before 2011 and unlikely before 2014 – there was not much of an incentive for painful reform efforts in the short and medium run (Robins, 2007: 289–304). As luck would have it, comments or vocal objections made by European leaders – as, for example, the French Presidential contender Nicolas Sarkozy suggesting that Turkey should be offered “a privileged partnership,” not membership – fueled a suspicion in Turkey that the EU was not genuine in its offer of the goal of membership (Hughes, 2006: 9).

In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision to reject an appeal to permit women to wear the headscarf in public institutions shocked many members of the post-Islamist government, who questioned the European institutions’ ability to deliver pluralism and democracy. Thus, especially after December 2004, Turkey’s “reform fatigue” and suspicions of the good faith of the EU had a noticeable impact on Turkey’s confidence in the EU membership goal, with the initial Euro-enthusiasm waning all the more as time passed.492

Unsurprisingly, the above negative domestic developments in Turkey had impacted on the EU’s negative political dynamics, leading finally to a noticeable cooling of relations between the EU and Turkey in 2005 and 2006.493 Indeed – besides the introduction of an internal debate about the EU suffering from “enlargement fatigue” – public debates within Europe on EU enlargement seemed to be no longer concentrating solely on the Copenhagen criteria (Aydin and Esen, 2007: 129–39). Especially in regard to Turkey’s candidacy and future membership, public debate in the EU revolved around a rather blurred reasoning about Turkey’s potential to become a bridge, buffer, or border for Europe towards the Islamic world. Furthermore, questions were raised as to whether Turkey is adequately European or European at all; whether Europe has the capacity to absorb Turkey, and where the
borders of Europe end. A negative EU public thus began to emphasize the “non-European” characteristics of Turkey and make representations of a “non-European” Turkey. This bleak picture was complemented by certain negative, “Turko-skeptic,” if not “Turko-phobic,” European federalists, who saw Turkey’s potential EU membership as an obstacle to the realization of the European federal dream due to the country’s poverty, size, and non-European culture.

Most importantly, the perceptions of Turkey’s fit into Europe were coupled both with the fact that the “golden years” of Turkey’s EU accession process (2001 to 2004) had gone and with the specific juncture at which the European integration project found itself in late 2003 – early 2004, namely, a generalized sense of crisis and/or a feeling of impasse. The result was that the virtuous circle of the 1998–2004 period started turning into a self-reinforcing vicious circle of ill will (International Crisis Group, 2007: 17). Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis and the fulfillment of particular European conditions were no longer seen as necessary and sufficient reasons for Turkey’s future accession in the EU. Instead – at least from late 2003 onwards – other factors were actually shaping Turkey’s accession, such as the convergence of member-states’ interests, the public approval and the EU’s internal dynamics. In other words, the interplay of the utilitarian concerns, the ideational factors, and the EU’s internal dynamics became the key conditions under which Turkey’s accession talks were doomed to proceed (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 201–19).

Unavoidably, the instrumental dialogue culture of Karamanlis’s government took into account the aforementioned negative trends developing within the European Union, especially those regarding Turkey’s future membership. It was also affected by a “changing EU,” where escalating “Euro-skepticism” and “Turko-phobia” were gradually – yet steadily – shaping its new physiognomy. More importantly, the transformation of Greek public opinion from high support to a higher objection to Turkey’s membership created a situation the Greek government could hardly ignore. For the Karamanlis government culture, an EU in the midst of an in-depth change – if not a crisis – did not seem a favored context upon which Greece could keep relying and thus following an active socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Indeed, although Karamanlis’s government recognized that the EU context would continue to significantly affect the future trajectory of Greek–Turkish relations (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 130), it increasingly questioned the EU’s utility as an instrument of policy and as an indispensable means towards the promotion of Greece’s desiderata.

Turkey’s slow and painful adjustment to the EU conditions and requirements coupled with the negative trends and developments in the EU had not, however, been the only factors arguing – in accordance with the instrumental dialogue culture of the Karamanlis government – for a modification of Greece’s active socialization strategy towards Turkey. The new conservative
government was also convinced that a modification of the socialists’ strategy towards emancipating Greece from the commitment to a compromise solution with Turkey would blend well with Greece’s instrumental national culture, the most critical element of which — namely the Greek public — was opposed to Turkey’s European ambitions. Indeed, although transformed after Helsinki from an underdog national culture to an instrumental one, Greece’s national culture was still dominated by a prejudice-ridden public opinion which continued to be driven by long-lasting social stereotypes. The Greek public thus remained largely suspicious of Turkey, not to mention a large part of it that was not hesitant in opposing Turkey’s entry into the EU, even if Turkey complied with all the conditions set by the European Union. As a matter of fact, the modification of Greece’s socialization strategy from an active to a passive one seemed to further allow Karamanlis’s new administration to point out convincingly to the Greek public a much “safer journey” in regard to Greece’s national interests, since the costs a final compromise solution with Turkey would entail would be avoided. Moreover, the receptiveness of a passive socialization strategy by the Greek public was also viewed by Greece’s new administration as a welcome input to the new premier’s highest domestic interest, namely, the consolidation of the governing party’s political dominance in Greece’s domestic politics in the years to come.

5.2.2 Implementing “passive socialization”

Unsurprisingly, the “instrumental dialogue” culture of the new conservative government of Costas Karamanlis influenced Greece’s strategy towards Turkey in a profound way and it had certain implications not only for the dealing of Greece’s relations with Turkey but also for Greece’s stance towards the EU and Greece’s policy over the Cyprus issue. An indication of the new government’s foreign policy — in both style and substance — was the appointment of the seventy-six-year-old Petros Molyviatis — close advisor of the new premier’s uncle and former premier and President of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis — to the post of foreign minister. Although an experienced and capable figure — serving in several demanding diplomatic missions, including Ankara and the United Nations — Molyviatis was an agent of the traditional style of foreign policy formation and execution and a firm opponent of the more multilateral approach adopted by his predecessor towards foreign relations, especially towards Greece’s relations with Turkey.

The first test of the new administration — less than two weeks after the Greek national elections — was undoubtedly the negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus issue among representatives from Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, and the three Guarantor Powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) held in the Swiss mountain resort of Burgenstock. The newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petros Molyviatis, was not hesitant to highlight on the day he assumed his duties that his main priority was to have
a Cyprus settlement by 1 May, cautioning both the Greek and the Turkish-Cypriots “that the UN process could not be subverted, nor the timetables changed” (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 239). Besides his verbal warnings, however, the new Foreign Minister – animated by a déjà vu attitude regarding the 1959 Zurich déjà vu London Agreements signed by the late Constantine Karamanlis, who was afterwards blamed by Greek-Cypriots – advised the new Greek premier to adopt a passive stance at the week-long meeting at Burgenstock. Indeed, Karamanlis decided not to put any pressure on the uncompromising Greek-Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, to actively engage in talks so that amendments the Greek-Cypriots might consider essential be incorporated in the fourth version of the UN Secretary General Plan for the reunification of the island. As a result, no formal face-to-face meetings between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots took place, not to mention any discussions involving Greece and Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 239).

Working together with the EU and in close cooperation with the US and Britain, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, drafted the fifth – and final – version of his plan and presented it to the leaders of Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriots, and the Turkish-Cypriots on March 31, 2004. In finalizing his plan, the Secretary General used his discretion – given to him in mid-February in New York by the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot leaders – to “fill in the blanks” and complete the text on issues on which the two sides failed to reach an agreement. Immediately after the submission of the final version of the plan to the two delegations, the Greek-Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, was not hesitant in making public his frustration over the concessions the plan made to the Turkish-Cypriots and in publicly rejecting the plan in advance of the separate, simultaneous referendums scheduled to take place on April 24th in the Republic of Cyprus and its occupied territories.

Without much enthusiasm and concerned about a clash with the Greek instrumental national culture – which shared a negative view about the Annan plan with the Greek-Cypriot national culture – the leader of the new Greek government preferred to adopt an ambivalent stance by stating, inter alia, that “the Annan Plan pros may gradually overcome its cons.” Interestingly, despite some unease and discomfort in relations between the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot governments, the ambivalent stance adopted by Karamanlis’s administration was positively acknowledged by the international community and Greece appeared “to have ceased to be a partisan party to the conflict and had become a positive force in favor of an agreement.”

As expected, in the simultaneous, separate referenda in Cyprus over the fifth and last version of the Annan Plan on the reunification of the island the majority of the Greek-Cypriots voted “No” and the majority of the Turkish-Cypriots voted “Yes.” To the dismay of the international community,
especially the UN, the EU, and the US, the majority of the Greek-Cypriots assessed the plan as being neither fair nor functional. In particular, the provisions for the Turkish settlers, Turkish occupation army, and refugees and the probable ineffectiveness in the decision-making ability of the central government made the Greek-Cypriot voters concerned. Needless to say, the catalyst in regard to the rejection of the plan was the Greek-Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos – who had purposely abstained from making known and/or addressing the Greek-Cypriots' desiderata in the negotiations at Burgenstock. Moreover, after framing the major political force on the island (the communist AKEL) traditionally sympathetic to reunion to join the “No” campaign – in order to keep its place in the coalition government – Papadopoulos convinced the majority of Greek-Cypriots that with EU membership already secured there was not really much reason to support an “unquestionably bad” – to Greek-Cypriots’ interests – reunification plan. Apparently, Tassos Papadopoulos viewed Cyprus’ membership in the EU not as his predecessor Glafkos Clerides had, namely as a guarantee for the functionality of a resolution plan and the success of reconciliation on the island, but as a crucial bargaining chip in a long diplomatic struggle of the Greek-Cypriots to extract maximum concessions from Turkey.

In point of fact, Cyprus’ secured membership of the EU seemed to take away most of the incentives for a compromise solution in accordance with the Annan Plan, highlighting therefore certain “side effects” of the Helsinki decisions in regard to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Indeed, by stating that Cyprus could become a member of the EU without a solution to the political problem, the Helsinki decisions had set the government of Cyprus free from the intransigence of the hard-liners both in the occupied northern part of Cyprus and in Turkey. At the same time, however, the Helsinki decisions provided the Greek-Cypriots with asymmetric incentives, as there were no institutional conditions attached to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Interestingly, therefore, the liberalization and Europeanization of both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot political system seemed to be followed by a resurgence of nationalism on the Greek-Cypriot side, which – as the prospect of EU membership became clear and secure – experienced neither a pressure nor an incentive to vote for the UN Secretary General’s reunification plan.

Clearly, although the Karamanlis administration’s ambivalent stance on the Cyprus peace deal was positively acknowledged by the international community, the deafening rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek-Cypriots undermined, if it did not end, Greece’s active socialization strategy followed up till then vis-à-vis Turkey, as Greece had lost much of its leverage to check Turkey’s European path via its stance on the Cyprus issue. Indeed, as the Turkish government did the best it could not only to “replace” the intransigent Denktas in the leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot community but to also convince the latter to vote in favor of the Annan plan, Turkey’s ability
to secure EU membership could no longer hinge on its – positive – stance on the Cyprus issue. Moreover, the UN Secretary General, the US, and, most importantly, the EU itself became more receptive to prompted calls from the Turkish-Cypriots, who – after voting for an EU-backed and a UN-brokered reunification plan – could legitimately ask for some kind of recognition of the northern part of Cyprus as well as for the lifting of economic barriers imposed on them after Turkey’s invasion in the island.516

Given the interconnectedness of the Cyprus issue with Greek–Turkish relations, Karamanlis’s government was particularly concerned about the negative effects the lack of a solution in Cyprus could have on the “tactical benefits” of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, namely, the de-escalation of tension in the Aegean, as well as on the progress achieved until then in bilateral cooperation. Karamanlis’s administration also remained anxious about the Cyprus government’s declared resolve to use its new membership as a bargaining chip in a long diplomatic struggle to extract maximum concessions from Turkey. As a consequence and in full accordance with the Greek government’s instrumental dialogue culture – which called for the avoidance of any disturbances the Cyprus issue might cause on the bilateral Aegean/Greek–Turkish front – the decoupling of the Cyprus problem from the Aegean dispute and from the Greek government’s direct political relationship with Nicosia appeared as the one-track option for Karamanlis’s administration.517

Specifically, the Greek government’s decision to distance itself from Nicosia’s determination to use its membership to put pressure on Ankara was made evident in November 2004, when the Cyprus government issued a list of demands that it expected Turkey to meet before it would give its consent to allow accession negotiations to start. In spite of the demands’ legitimacy – as they regarded the removal of the Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus and the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey – most of the EU members considered the Greek-Cypriot government stance as an exploitation, if not an abuse, of its new membership. As a consequence, the only condition the EU asked Turkey to fulfill was to sign a protocol extending the Customs Union with the EU to the ten new member-states prior to the date the formal EU accession process was due to begin, namely October 3, 2005. Although the Turkish government had finally signed the protocol in August 2005, it also issued a declaration stating that this did not amount to any sort of formal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, which could only materialize after a comprehensive settlement was reached between the two communities. The EU considered Turkey’s statement as unacceptable and it put forward a counter-declaration.

Unsurprisingly, Greece – which was interested in avoiding the destabilization of its relations with Turkey and continued to assess Turkey’s accession to the EU as the best guarantee for the normalization of bilateral relations – was obligated to align with most of its EU partners who were also interested
in keeping Turkey’s EU accession process on track. Therefore, to the disappointment of the Cyprus government, the counterdeclaration which was adopted by the EU in September 2005 did not pose specific deadlines for Turkey to meet its obligations. It seemed that there was no other way for the Greek-Cypriot government but to accept the agreed EU counterdeclaration, especially after Greece’s decision to remain aloof from Nicosia’s desiderata.\textsuperscript{518} Moreover, both the avoidance of endorsement of any of the statements made by the Greek President Karolos Papoulias during a visit to Cyprus in October 2005 about Turkey’s barbarity or Cyprus’ ability to shape EU–Turkey relations and, most importantly, Greece’s decision to not participate in the annual joint military exercise “Nikiforos” – which the Greek-Cypriot government decided to restage in October 2005 although it had been cancelled every year since 2001 – “sent out a strong message that Athens would not allow Cyprus to shape, let alone destabilize, its relations with Turkey” [our emphasis] (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 240–2).

Likewise, the Greek government also had to proceed to \textit{the decoupling of the negative developments on the Cyprus front from the future prospects of Greek–Turkish relations} on the Aegean front, thus making it clear that improvement of Greece’s relations with Turkey continued to be a central element of its foreign policy while ensuring that Cyprus would not be allowed to intrude on Greece’s bilateral relationship with Turkey. As noted, Karamanlis’s administration believed that in this way the “tactical benefits” of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, namely the de-escalation of tension in the Aegean, and the progress achieved hitherto in bilateral economic cooperation would be attained. As a consequence, the Greek government was not hesitant in corroborating – just a week after Cyprus became a full member of the EU – that \textit{it would not consider resolution of the Cyprus issue to be a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the European Union},\textsuperscript{519} while only a month later the Greek premier reaffirmed during an official visit to Washington that \textit{Greece would not veto the beginning of Turkey’s accession negotiations} with the EU.\textsuperscript{520}

Support of Turkey’s EU bid \textit{regardless of a solution to the Cyprus problem} was also verified by the Karamanlis administration during the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Athens in May 2004 – the first official visit to Greece by a Turkish premier since the late Turgut Özal’s official visit sixteen years earlier. It was during that visit that the Greek premier reaffirmed Greece’s determination to stick to a bilateral rapprochement which – although introduced five years earlier – “it continued very satisfactorily” while bilateral relations “have acquired a directness, which is very important” (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 243).\textsuperscript{521}

Stabilization of bilateral relations and the strengthening of Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization seemed the appropriate means for the achievement of the Karamanlis government’s declared medium-term goal, namely, the normalization of Greek–Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{522} Indeed, the decoupling of the lack of a solution of Cyprus’ political problem from the
advancement of Greek–Turkish relations coupled with Greece’s – unconditional in regard to the Cyprus issue – support for Turkey’s European ambitions seemed to constitute the basic pillars of the Karamanlis administration’s passive socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. It remained unclear, however, how far the Greek government was ready to go in regard to Turkey’s engagement with the EU and to the “communitarization” of Greek–Turkish relations.

Actually not that far, as the EU summit in Brussels in December 2004 had so eloquently pointed up. Indeed, preoccupied with the costs inherent in the end-state of the former Simitis administration’s active socialization strategy, namely, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute, the Karamanlis government decided to emancipate itself from the Helsinki quasi-prerequisite, if not commitment, to come up with a compromise solution with Turkey. Interestingly, it was the European Commission that – by acting as a forerunner of the decisions intended to be taken in the forthcoming EU summit in December – undertook the initiative to prepare the ground for the relaxation of the Helsinki provisions. Indeed, in its “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession,” released in October 2004, the European Commission “no longer saw the necessity to examine the state of bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey until the end of 2004. One explanation may be that the Commission recognized that no dispute can be presented to the ICJ ‘if not both contradicting parties support such a step to appeal to the Court in concerted action’” [our emphasis] (Axt, 2006: 6).

As a matter of fact, with the full consent of Greece, the European Council that met in Brussels on December 16–17, 2004 not only decided that negotiations with Turkey should be opened on October 3, 2005 but also withdrew the Helsinki quasi-prerequisite altogether – regarding mainly Turkey’s, but also Greece’s, commitment to make every effort to resolve their border disputes or else agree, by December 2004 – without replacing it with a new time frame. Most important, recourse to the ICJ in The Hague – the cornerstone of Greece’s active socialization strategy – “was relativized” and downplayed to an “...if necessary” reference. As Hans-Jürgen Axt noted: “...nothing new was added or specified more in detail. Most important, pressure on Turkey was not intensified” [our emphasis] (Axt, 2006: 7).

Undoubtedly, the decisions taken at the December 2004 EU summit – with the full blessing, if not under the prime initiative, of the Greek government – constitute the institutional epitome of the modification of Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis Turkey from active to passive socialization. As a point of fact, by decisions taken at the EU summit in Brussels, the first decoupling of the lack of a solution on the Cyprus political problem from the future prospects of Greek–Turkish relations was followed by a second decoupling of the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute from Turkey’s EU path. Indeed, in full accordance with the Karamanlis administration’s instrumental dialogue culture, the second decoupling was viewed as emancipating Greece from
“the unnecessary and rather risky burden” the former Greek administration had undertaken at Helsinki, namely, to commit itself to engage into negotiations with Turkey over the whole complex of issues in the Aegean in order that a compromise solution with Turkey might be reached by the end of 2004.528

Clearly, in the Greek administration’s thinking, the pressure exerted on Greece – and Turkey – to appeal to the ICJ by the end of 2004, as the stifling Helsinki quasi-requirement entailed, was assessed as being counterproductive to Greece’s interests.529 By implication, the decisions taken by the EU Council in December 2004 were assessed by the Greek government as a refinement and/or a “fixing” of the Helsinki decisions, given that the communitarization of Greek–Turkish relations was not extended so far as to oblige Greece to have negotiations with Turkey within an asphyxiating time frame and over issues beyond the delimitation of the continental shelf, meaning over issues Greece had traditionally considered as Turkish unilateral claims over Greece’s sovereignty. Moreover, the “relativization” of the ICJ by the December 2004 EU Council decisions – the argument runs – had managed to restore the damage caused to Greece’s interests by the Helsinki decisions, which allowed the ICJ in The Hague “and fifteen – undoubtedly decent – foreign jurists to issue a final verdict about Greece’s sovereign rights and security.”530 The communitarization of Greek–Turkish relations – the same argument goes – was thus correctly limited only to Turkey’s conditional engagement in the EU integration system given that, in accordance with the EU Council Conclusions, Turkey was obliged to accept the European norms and standards while its democratization would continue to be closely monitored by the Commission, which was invited to report regularly on it to the Council (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 2004: 5).

It should be noted at this point that the Greek government’s decision to purposely confine its socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey to its conditional engagement into the EU integration system limited the EU role to that of “a framework” and/or an “incubation chamber” in regard to its effects on Turkey’s domestic politics as well as on its external behavior towards Greece and Cyprus. By implication, the EU was allowed only to eliminate the bases of the Greek–Turkish dispute in the long run through Turkey’s democratization and gradual integration. Indeed, the Karamanlis administration’s “pragmatist decision”531 to emancipate itself from the commitment entailed in the Helsinki Council conclusions was not without consequences in regard to the EU’s potential to act mainly as an “active player” and thus become the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing Greek–Turkish dispute. In point of fact, the withdrawal of the Helsinki deadlines, the relativization of the ICJ’s role, and the decoupling of Turkey’s accession from the resolution of its dispute with an EU member undermined the EU’s credibility in regard to its capacity to apply strong and convincing norms and conditions to Turkey and Greece and, by implication, to decisively impact their dispute. Indeed,
by delinking progress on Turkey’s membership from the resolution of its dispute with Greece, decisions taken at the 2004 EU summit decreased the incentive for both disputants to search for a compromise solution. It seemed instead that a resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict could only be sought outside the EU context and be achieved some time in the distant future by a hesitant Greece and a – hopefully – increasingly Europeanized Turkey en route to Brussels.532

From the critical December 2004 EU summit onwards, and with its highest goal being to reach full normalization of Greek–Turkish relations, apparently prior to Turkey’s accession,533 Greece’s passive socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey advanced as a “two-tier strategy.” Specifically, at the multilateral level Greece attempted to enhance Turkey’s conditional engagement into the EU integration system, while, at the bilateral level, Greece’s efforts focused on the maintenance of the institutional “safety net” already operating in the turbulent Aegean theater since 2001 and on the advancement of Greek–Turkish economic cooperation through an extension to new avenues of collaboration.534

However, Greece’s “double-decoupling”535 had certain consequences for the advancement of its strategy at the multilateral level, namely, the conditional engagement of Turkey into the EU integration system. Indeed, the “carrot” of Turkey’s future membership was no longer a strong leverage in Greece’s hands in order for Turkey to “be convinced” to pursue conflict transformation in regard to its dispute with Greece. In addition, the EU’s role was also limited – as already noted – to that of a framework able to eliminate the bases of the Greek–Turkish dispute in the long run through Turkey’s democratization and gradual integration. The Greek government thus soon realized that the EU leverage could remain useful in regard to Turkey’s conditional engagement into far-reaching reforms internally, that is, Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization. In regard to Turkey’s external behavior, though – especially vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus – the most Greek diplomacy could pursue was the incorporation of certain Greek interests and/or conditions into key EU documents related to Turkey’s accession, such as the European Commission Reports on the Progress made by Turkey,536 the EU–Turkey Accession Partnerships and the EU Council Conclusions.

More specifically, the conditions Greece was interested in incorporating into key EU documents concerned Turkey’s unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and to the peaceful settlement of its disputes; Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded; and Turkey’s normalization of its bilateral relations with Cyprus. The latter concerned Turkey’s obligation to fully implement the protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of the ten new member-states, including Cyprus.537
The Greek government considered these conditions as complementary to the Copenhagen criteria and as sufficient for Turkey’s conditional engagement into the EU integration system, especially given the EU Commission’s rigorous system of monitoring Turkey’s compliance with the criteria.\textsuperscript{538} Thus, for the EU–Turkey accession negotiations to proceed, Turkey should not only fulfill the conditions set by the 1993 Copenhagen criteria but also commit itself to good neighborly relations and to the peaceful settlement of its disputes with Greece. Moreover, recognition of Cyprus through the full implementation of the relevant protocol was a necessary component of Turkey’s accession process.\textsuperscript{539} Needless to say – without being limited to the supporters of Greece’s active socialization strategy only – the conditions of Greece’s passive socialization strategy appeared \textit{a far cry from the demanding conditions} Greece posed on Turkey’s external behavior at the EU summit in Helsinki, the most important being Turkey’s quasi-requirement – if not obligation – to concede to the submission of its dispute with neighboring Greece to the ICJ in The Hague.\textsuperscript{540}

By sticking to the rationale of Turkey’s passive socialization from December 2004 onwards, Greek diplomats initiated serious efforts for the aforementioned – “light-weight,” according to the advocates of Greece’s active socialization strategy – conditions to be incorporated into all key EU documents related to Turkey’s EU accession. This was actually the case in regard to the European Commission document concerning the guidelines governing the negotiations with Turkey (Principles Governing the Negotiations, June 2005) and especially to the “Negotiating Framework,” which had officially inaugurated Turkey’s accession talks with the EU after its adoption by the European Council on October 3, 2005 (“The Negotiating Framework for Turkey,” 2005). Interestingly, by making \textit{the incorporation of Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations and the recognition of Cyprus} – although without any reference to a particular time frame – \textit{necessary prerequisites for Turkey’s accession}, the Greek government considered its passive socialization strategy as having “the best of both worlds,” namely, enhancing Turkey’s conditional engagement into the EU integration system without committing itself to any compromise deal with Turkey for the resolution of their conflict before Turkey’s accession to the EU.\textsuperscript{541}

Unsurprisingly, after the inauguration of Turkey’s accession negotiations,\textsuperscript{542} Greece’s passive socialization strategy at the multilateral level kept – with bated breath – focusing its efforts on reiterating the conditions already set as well as on proceeding to the so-called “negotiation inter-linkages,”\textsuperscript{543} namely, the inclusion of particular Greek interests\textsuperscript{544} in the negotiations following the opening of the pertinent negotiation chapters. The EU Commission Enlargement Strategy Paper, the Commission Progress Report, and the “Accession Partnership”\textsuperscript{545} – all released in November 2005 – made particular references to such issues of Greek interest, as, for example, the need for the adoption by Turkey of a law comprehensively addressing all
the difficulties faced by non-Muslim religious minorities/communities as well as religious foundations in line with the relevant European standards. In this way, progress on a series of flagrant issues of an unquestionable “European character” – such as the closing of the Greek Orthodox Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary, the banning of public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch, the confiscation of property rights and the discrimination against cultural rights of the Greek minority in Istanbul and/or in the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) – was made a necessary component of Turkey’s accession process in the negotiations that took place between EU and Turkey after the opening of certain negotiation chapters.

Greece intensified its efforts for the conditions calling for Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations – also appearing as short-term priorities in Accession Partnership with Turkey in January 2006 (Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2006) – to be further strengthened. Indeed, in the November 2006 “Turkey Progress Report,” the European Commission not only reiterated the aforementioned short-term priority of the Accession Partnership, but went a step further by noting “...in this context that the ‘casus belli’ reference in relation to the possible extension of Greek territorial waters in the resolution adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1995 remains unchanged.” Obviously, this was a clear reference to the discrepancy which existed between Turkey’s behavior towards neighboring Greece and the European norms and standards and a direct exhortation of Turkey to effectively deal with this discrepancy. In full accordance with the rationale of Greece’s passive socialization strategy, however, the Commission remained an observer of the evolution of Greek–Turkish relations by noting that both countries continued to pursue the positive development of their bilateral relations and by applauding the continuation of high-level contacts and the exploratory talks between the foreign ministries as well as the two states’ agreement on a new package of confidence-building measures (Turkey Progress Report, 2006: 25).

The full implementation of the Protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of all EU member-states, including Cyprus, was undoubtedly the step most feared by Turkey following its accession negotiations. The EU warned Turkey through the counterdeclaration of October 2005 and again through the EU Council Conclusions in June 2006 (Presidency Conclusions, June 2006: 19) that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters would depend on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all member-states. In November 2006 the warning became an ultimatum through the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Durao Barroso: Turkey would either open its ports and airports to Cyprus-flagged vessels and aviation carriers, respectively, or negotiations talks would be suspended (MacLennan, 2009: 26). Unable to overcome an impasse with Turkey over Cyprus – but still deeply concerned about the serious risks
complete suspension of the negotiation talks might entail – the EU Council decided at its December 2006 summit to proceed to a partial suspension of the EU–Turkey accession negotiations.

Thus, with an eye on the Turkish elections in September 2007, the EU Council conceded to set Turkey free from the serious pressure a complete suspension of the accession negotiations would entail for its internal stability. It was specifically decided that the opening of eight – out of thirty-five – negotiating chapters related to issues which were directly linked to the implementation of the Additional Protocol by Turkey would be suspended while other negotiating chapters would, provisionally, not close until the Commission had verified that Turkey had fulfilled its commitments related to Additional Protocol. The EU Council also decided that the screening process should continue in accordance with the established procedures and in line with the “Negotiating Framework” while Turkey’s compliance with the EU conditions, the implementation of the Additional Protocol included, would be assessed on the basis of the annual reports to be prepared by the EU Commission in the next three years (2007, 2008, and 2009).

By keeping the EU–Turkey negotiation process on track, most EU governments seemed to agree that Turkey should comply with the conditions set, yet no-one – with the obvious exception of the Greek-Cypriot government – appeared eager to either demand a specific deadline for Turkey’s compliance or suggest that for the accession talks to resume Turkey should first fulfill its obligations upon accession, with the first one being the full implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and the recognition of the Cyprus Republic. Interestingly, with Turkey’s obligation of full nondiscriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol still pending, the twenty-seven EU member-states gave the go-ahead in June 2007 for the opening of negotiations on two further new chapters (both with closing benchmarks). Moreover, during a meeting of the intergovernmental conference on membership negotiations with Turkey in December 2008, the EU Ministers and the Turkish Foreign Minister decided to open two more negotiation chapters.

Predictably, during 2007 and 2008, Greece, in the course of implementing its passive socialization strategy at the multilateral level, continued to regard Turkey’s engagement into the EU integration system through the reappearance and the reiteration of certain conditions in relevant EU documents – related to Turkey’s behavior vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus – which Turkey should fulfill upon accession. These documents included the Commission’s Enlargement Strategy of November 2007 (Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007–8), the revised Accession Partnership – the key reference in setting priorities and conditions – adopted by the Council in February 2008 (Accession Partnership, 2008), and the Commission’s 2008 Turkey Progress Report (accompanying the Commission’s Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges) in November 2008 (Turkey 2008 Progress Report).
The references made in all these key EU documents on the conditions Turkey should fulfill vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus upon accession were also reiterated in the biannual Council Conclusions that took place throughout 2007 and 2008. It is also worth noting that, apart from stressing the internal reforms Turkey should adopt and implement, the aforementioned EU documents reiterated Turkey's regional and international obligations towards neighboring Greece and Cyprus. Particular references were also made in regard to other issues of Greek interest (e.g., the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul), and they referred to the establishment of a legal framework so that all religious communities could function without undue constraints, to progress on alignment of Turkish practices with European standards in regard to minority rights, to the upgrading of the Turkish institutional framework for human rights through the ratification of international human rights instruments and in carrying out European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments.

More interestingly, by reporting on the obligations Turkey should meet through its annual reports, the Commission highlighted in its “Turkey 2008 Progress Report” the discrepancy existing between the Turkish threat of “casus belli” against an EU member and Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations. As a consequence – by reiterating the December 2007 Council Conclusions and the February 2008 Accession Partnership relevant references – the Commission called upon Turkey “to avoid any threat or action which could negatively affect good neighborly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Furthermore, the European Commission welcomed the plethora of bilateral agreements signed since 2000 between Greece and Turkey, including two dozen confidence-building measures, as well as the official contacts continuing at military level, and it applauded the Greek–Turkish collaboration in inaugurating a natural gas pipeline as well as the Greek premier’s official visit to Turkey, the first of this kind after almost half a century (Turkey 2008 Progress Report: 28–9).

In parallel with the advancement of Greece’s passive socialization strategy at the multilateral level, namely, the strategy’s first tier concerning Turkey’s anchoring into the EU integration system, efforts were also made for Greece’s bilateral relations with Turkey – the strategy’s second tier – to advance towards particular objectives. In point of fact, the passive socialization strategy of the Karamanlis government seemed to follow the pattern developed by the socialists’ active socialization strategy with the “bilateral tier” of Greece’s passive socialization strategy complementing the “European/multilateral” one. Thus, at the bilateral level, Greece’s efforts focused on the maintenance of the tacit security regime Greece’s active socialization strategy had bequeathed to Karamanlis’s government and, in particular, on the further advancement of Greek–Turkish economic collaboration.

The Karamanlis administration was not only interested in benefiting from the positive results produced by Greek–Turkish economic cooperation
in a plethora of “low politics issues” since the rapprochement days; it was also aiming to advance the level of Greek–Turkish economic interdependence at the highest point possible. Moreover, by realizing that, in commercial terms, Turkey is more important to Greece than vice versa, the Greek government was eager to provide its ardent support to entrepreneurs on both sides of the Aegean, whose economic collaboration heralded a positive spillover effect on Greek–Turkish economic relations. Thus, by making full use of the comprehensive legal framework that was created through the various low politics agreements signed between Greece and Turkey since early 2000, the bilateral trade volume and Greek exports to Turkey kept an upward trend from 2004 onwards.\textsuperscript{555} In May 2006, Prime Ministers Erdoğan and Karamanlis agreed to more than double bilateral trade from the then current US$2 billion to US$5 billion, a goal which appeared not that distant in January 2008, when the Greek premier visited Turkey (Papadopoulos, 2008: 13, especially Ref. No. 43). Likewise, the area of tourism – undoubtedly an important indicator of the two countries’ perception of each other and the subsequent societal level of interaction – had also experienced an upward trend during the Karamanlis administration.\textsuperscript{556}

Furthermore, with the unprecedented opening of the Turkish economy to Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) during the 2003–5 era, major Greek economic firms foresaw an opportunity to become important stakeholders in the Turkish economy (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 133). Thus, the number of Greek firms investing in Turkey rose from forty-four in 2002 to eighty in 2005, and to one hundred and thirty in September 2006. From 2000 to 2006, Greek firms invested about US$6 billion in Turkey, of which US$5.8 billion were invested in the financial sector (Grigoriadis, 2008b: 158). More importantly, by 2005–6 Turkey’s impressive macroeconomic progress and the start of EU accession negotiations made a strong and convincing case for FDIs, allowing Greece’s three largest financial institutions – the National Bank of Greece, Eurobank EFG, and Alpha Bank – to announce that they were investing approximately 4.5 billion euros in three Turkish commercial banks and a brokerage firm, causing Greece to account for about a fifth of Turkey’s already augmented 2006 FDI inflows (Papadopoulos, 2008: 28). Indeed, the acquisition of the Finansbank by the National Bank of Greece – the single biggest foreign investment ever made by a Greek firm – and 70 percent of the shares of the Turkish Tekfenbank by the Greek EFG Eurobank constitute unprecedented examples of the confidence shared among Greek investors on Turkey’s future economic prospects.\textsuperscript{557}

The area of cooperation in which the Greek government saw that a notable advancement of Greek–Turkish economic interdependence could be pursued has undoubtedly been the energy sector. By utilizing the agreement signed between the Greek DEPA and the Turkish BOTAS in February 2003 by the Simitis administration for the construction of the cross-border pipeline to carry natural gas from Central Asia to Western Europe, the
Greek premier, Costas Karamanlis, met with his Turkish counterpart, Tayyip Erdoğan, on the Greek–Turkish border in November 2007 and they formally inaugurated the connection of the pipeline. The pipeline was of major geopolitical significance for the EU, the world’s largest importer of energy, as the initial connection of the 285-km-long natural gas networks of Turkey and Greece would be supplemented by the 212-km-long Greek–Italian leg of the pipeline extended from Hegoumenitsa, on Greece’s Ionian coast, to Otrando in Italy (by most accounts in 2012). Through the planned undersea connection of the natural gas pipeline networks of Greece and Italy, the Turkey–Greece–Italy (TGI) Interconnector would transport natural gas of an estimated annual capacity of 11.6 billion cubic meters further into Western Europe, thus allowing the European gas market to gain direct access to Azeri natural gas supplies, most importantly, bypassing Russia (Önis and Yılmaz, 2008: 133; Grigoriadis, 2008b: 159). By implication, Greece and Turkey were expected to become energy transport hubs, while EU states would reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas.

Although the Greek government had opted for participation in the launch of the joint Russian–Italian South Stream pipeline aiming to circumvent Turkey, Greek–Turkish cooperation in the field of energy – with the construction of the Greek–Turkish leg of the pipeline beginning in summer 2005 and the first gas flowing in November 2007 – seemed not only to constitute ample evidence of the potential of bilateral economic collaboration but also to serve as a promising field for joint Greek–Turkish projects that could produce benefits for Greece and Turkey as well as for the European Union, especially given its voracious demand for energy.

With stability in the Aegean remaining a priority in Greece’s passive socialization strategy in the short run, the Karamanlis administration viewed the confidence-building enterprise – initiated and devotedly followed by the Simitis administration since 2001 – as an appropriate complement to the furtherance and deepening of Greece’s economic cooperation with neighboring Turkey. Indeed, although, in practical terms, the proximate risks to Greek security at the time New Democracy came to power were to be found elsewhere, such as in continued Balkan uncertainties, uncontrolled migration, transnational crime, terrorism, and/or the environment, for Greek decision-makers the Turkish threat continued to remain at the top of the Greek security agenda. By implication, Athens viewed the continuation of the confidence-building enterprise as the most appropriate means of consolidating the positive climate in bilateral relations created through the advancement – and further extension – of the two states’ economic cooperation.

Yet, contrary to the role Greece’s active socialization strategy held for the confidence-building enterprise – namely, to create the necessary conditions for a Greek–Turkish dialogue over high politics issues – for the passive socialization strategy CBMs were only meant to go so far as to gradually drive
the antagonistic Greek–Turkish relationship into a more stable and predictable one. In that sense, the Karamanlis government’s passive socialization strategy kept on track with the implementation of the Simitis government’s active socialization strategy at the bilateral level a minimum goal, namely, the establishment of a “limited security regime” that would enable Greece and Turkey to achieve crisis stability through the prevention of crises caused inadvertently by miscalculations and/or accidents.562

Given that the potential agenda of confidence-building measures between Greece and Turkey remained large and uncompleted, Greek decision-makers soon realized that there was much room for a series of new confidence-building measures to be discussed and adopted. Indeed, amidst Turkish violations of Greek airspace during the official visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Ankara in April 2005, a telephone hot line between Greek and Turkish Combined Air operation centers in Larissa, Greece and Eskişehir, Turkey was set up with the aim of easing military tension in the Aegean and reducing the number of simulated dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter jets.563 The operation of the hot line was officially announced by the Greek Foreign Minister, Dora Bakoyannis, in April 2006 after a meeting with her Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, on the fringe of NATO’s spring summit in Sofia, Bulgaria.564

Two months later, the two Ministers agreed in Istanbul on the establishment of an additional direct phone line between the Chiefs of the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces, the extension of the summer moratorium of the military exercises in the Aegean by one month, so that it would become valid from June 15 to September 15, and the establishment of direct communication channels between the Turkish and Greek Coast Guard Commanders.565 In December 2007, a package of five new confidence-building measures – initially explored by the Chiefs of the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces a year earlier – were also agreed between the Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis and her Turkish counterpart, Ali Babacan, during the latter’s official visit to Athens. Specifically, Athens and Ankara agreed on the creation of a joint unit in the framework of NATO to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations, the creation of a combined land unit to participate in NATO Response Force (NRF) operations, the creation of a joint disaster relief and humanitarian aid Task Force capable of operating in a wide range of missions and areas, the launch of regular visits between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces of the two countries, as well as between other military commanders, and the exchange of visits between the commanders of the units serving at the Turkish–Greek border in Thrace.567

More interestingly, the Greek premier Costas Karamanlis’s official visit to Ankara and Istanbul in January 2008, the first of this kind after forty-nine years, represented the high point of the Karamanlis administration’s passive socialization strategy, with its main rationale being to keep bilateral relations at a “peaceful stagnation” by advancing Greek–Turkish economic
collaboration and by promoting the confidence-building enterprise, its highest goal being the full normalization of Greek–Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{568} At the same time, the Greek government was interested in keeping alive Turkey’s European ambitions, mainly by reiterating its support for Turkey’s European engagement.\textsuperscript{569}

After the completion of four years of Karamanlis's government in office, progress made in bilateral economic cooperation and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed hitherto by the two neighbors seemed to prove \textit{resistant} to various setbacks, both in bilateral relations and in Turkey’s painful path towards EU accession, thus allowing more stable relations.\textsuperscript{570} Economic cooperation and confidence-building measures have not, however, proven \textit{able enough to facilitate the resolution} of the Greek–Turkish conflict – a noted priority of Greece’s active socialization strategy – precisely because they did not hold such a role in Greece’s passive socialization strategy. In point of fact, the latter viewed the development of bilateral economic relations and the maintenance of the temperature in the Aegean at low levels only as a means for stable bilateral relations, and eventually for the normalization of Greek–Turkish relations, and not as a way of increasing the prospects for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute. By implication, economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey was only expected to play the helpful, yet secondary, role allowed by the primacy of politics, the latter purposely not being in favor of a resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. To make things worse, the reluctance of Greece’s passive socialization strategy to resolve the Greek–Turkish conflict was also shared – as time was passing – by a lack of urgency on the part of Turkey, whose political agenda at the dawn of the twenty-first century considered relations with Greece as being of a lesser priority than other more important and pressing issues both at home and in the region (Papadopoulos, 2008: 34).

The most notable example of the purposeful and calculated reluctance of Greece’s passive socialization strategy to resolve the Greek–Turkish conflict, however, has been the manner in which the “exploratory talks” have been handled in the aftermath of the Karamanlis government's coming to power in March 2004. As noted, animated by a \textit{resolution culture}, the Simitis administration viewed the “exploratory talks” as the necessary means for a compromise solution to be reached with Turkey. Thus, by “meaning business” from the beginning of the talks, the Simitis government worked for the “exploratory talks” to progress substantively at the technical level, so preparing the ground for the transition to political negotiations.\textsuperscript{571} However, animated by an \textit{instrumental dialogue culture} – which, as noted, expected dialogue to be pursued with Turkey only if certain conditions were first fulfilled – the Karamanlis government was instead interested in eman-cipating itself from the commitment to come to a compromise solution with Turkey within the asphyxiating time-frame the Helsinki quasi-prerequisite and hence the “exploratory talks” entailed, namely, within less than a year of
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its coming to power. Thus, contrary to the optimism expressed by the Simitis government on the eventual successful conclusion of the “exploratory talks,” Greece’s new premier, Costas Karamanlis, presented a completely different picture in regard to the progress achieved at the talks between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, at first on the occasion of the Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s official visit to Athens in May 2004 and again during the Greek premier’s address to the Thessaloniki International Exhibition in September 2004, Karamanlis was eager to make clear that Greece and Turkey should cease dealing with their differences under the December 2004 asphyxiating deadline – although a quasi one – set up by the Helsinki decisions, given that the continuation of the “exploratory talks” had produced no tangible results so far.573

Unsurprisingly, from the time when the Karamanlis government came to office in March 2004 throughout early 2009, the “exploratory talks” were never really meant to reach a conclusion, for reasons related to the essence of Greece’s passive socialization strategy. Indeed, in full accordance with the Karamanlis government’s instrumental dialogue culture and over a period of almost five consecutive years, the Greek government remained adamant in shaming dialogue with Turkey, so as not only to emancipate itself from the burden of the compromise costs a final settlement with Turkey would entail but also to allow Turkey’s Europeanization to take place and positively affect Turkey’s domestic scene as well as its external behavior towards neighboring Greece. Thus, in spite of the Greek government’s verbal support for the importance of the “exploratory talks,”574 their continuation was aimed neither at linking progress achieved in “low politics” issues with negotiations on the more sensitive “high politics” issues, nor at the two neighbors’ consent to submit their differences to the ICJ in The Hague,575 as Greece’s active socialization strategy had entailed. Rather, with Greece’s faith and confidence in the ICJ’s role seriously undermined, the Greek–Turkish “exploratory talks” were taking place “in the context of a policy of continuity and consistency in regard to the efforts made for the normalization of Greek–Turkish relations,”576 and clearly not for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict.

5.3 What future for Greece’s socialization strategy?

Both socialist and conservative Greek governments seemed to share the view that Greece had rightly abandoned in the mid-1990s the traditional strategy it had followed since the mid-1970s vis-à-vis neighboring Turkey, thus adopting and implementing a new socialization strategy towards what was considered as the most imminent threat to its security. Greece’s socialization strategy was indeed viewed by the Simitis and the Karamanlis administrations as a policy of “balancing engagement,” one which would continue to deter Turkey from becoming hostile while also viewing the European Union as a precious instrument – actually as the best available forum – for
enmeshing Turkey into its rule-based, institutionalized, and normative context by imposing certain obligations and by prohibiting certain modes of behavior.

It was, however, a particular type of Greece’s socialization strategy, namely, *active socialization strategy*, the one that had managed to establish – particularly from the critical EU summit at Helsinki through to early 2004 – the necessary and sufficient conditions for a *breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations*, the most important of which was the elevation of the EU’s potential to that of an “active player,” able to become the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing Greek–Turkish conflict. As is quite usual in Greek politics, the change in government was followed by crucial modifications of Greece’s socialization strategy from an active to a passive one. Although Turkey’s conditional engagement and gradual integration into the EU remained a central goal of Greece’s passive socialization strategy, the intended downgrading of the EU’s role to that of simply a framework – through withdrawal of the Helsinki quasi-requirement regarding the submission of the two states’ dispute to the ICJ – constituted a *smashing blow* to the potential for the breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations.

The modification of Greece’s socialization strategy at the December 2004 EU summit also led to the “re-bilateralization” of the Greek–Turkish conflict, allowing most EU members to keep a safe distance from hard decisions over the prickly dispute between an EU member-state and an aspiring one. In addition, the deliberate delinkage of the progress made in regard to Turkey’s membership from the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute had also decreased Turkey’s incentive to find a resolution of its conflict with Greece. Overall, the adoption and implementation – from 2004 onwards – of a *passive socialization strategy* on the part of Greece towards Turkey had dire consequences for the EU’s ability to play an active – and potentially catalytic – role in the “whereabouts” of the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict. As a consequence, the most important factor that could play a part in the transformation of the Greek–Turkish dispute, by providing the context and by exerting a concrete pressure on the disputants, was scorned.

Interestingly, the strategy of passive socialization meant that the EU was the only agent setting the rules in regard to Turkey’s European path. Thus, in accordance with the metaphor used by the architect of Greece’s passive socialization strategy, Costas Karamanlis: “in regard to the train of Turkey’s European path, the EU installs both the *rails* and the *signalling*, yet it is Turkey, acting as the *engine driver*, who is fully responsible to not let the train go off the rails” (Parliamentary Minutes, November 2006: 764). Paraphrasing the Greek premier’s saying, an advocate of Greece’s active socialization strategy would instead have argued that active socialization would have meant that “the *rails* might have been installed by the EU, but the *signalling* would have been more acute, while Greece would have been more interested in sharing the seat of the *engine driver* with Turkey in order to make sure that the *train’s*
destination would have linked Turkey’s membership with the resolution of the bilateral conflict.”

Almost a decade after the peak of Greece’s active socialization strategy at the Helsinki EU summit, Greece and Turkey are now doomed only to exploring ways towards a better and more stable relationship. Unfortunately, these efforts are to be made in a completely different international environment from the one of the late 1990s – and thus much less favorable to a final settlement of their dispute. This is not to imply that nowadays the status of Greek–Turkish relations resembles that of the 1980s and the most part of the 1990s. Without doubt, after the adoption and implementation of a socialization strategy on the part of Greece, the two neighbors are better off today, with a tacit security regime being further strengthened; a plethora of contacts at multiple levels; a significant change in zero-sum mentality; increased levels of trust; and the likelihood of escalation to military conflict considerably reduced. Yet, Greece and Turkey have missed a unique chance to deal with their conflict in a final way, especially after Greece – the instigator in the late 1990s of the process that managed to create the conditions for a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations – purposely modified its socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey.

It is indeed a question of debate whether the unique combination of systemic and regional conditions of the late 1990s will ever reappear and, most importantly, whether such conditions, if they did reappear, would match with a resolution culture on the part of Greek decision-makers. Obviously, as long as the latter are animated by an instrumental dialogue culture, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute will be purposely kept off the future agenda of bilateral relations, with the normalization of Greek–Turkish relations and the strengthening of Turkey’s Europeanization en route to its EU accession – in regard to both its domestic politics and its behavior towards Greece (and Cyprus) – remaining the primary focus of Greek decision-makers. Almost certainly, also, after emancipating itself from the costs a compromise solution would have entailed, Greece’s passive socialization strategy will continue to suit the, currently dominant, instrumental national culture, which remains largely suspicious, if not hostile, to Turkey’s accession to the EU. Most importantly, in the months and years to come, Greece’s socialization strategy should deal with a series of negative and mutually reinforcing trends which concern Turkey’s accession prospects to the EU as well as Turkey’s internal and external physiognomy.

Deterioration in the atmosphere surrounding Turkey’s candidacy was already evident, as noted, within months of the Brussels EU summit in December 2004. By the end of 2005 the EU public’s fears and certain member-states’ doubts about Turkey’s future accession were also reflected in the European Union decisions and institutional documents. Indeed, particular references in the EU “Negotiation Framework” – most notably the one stating that negotiations with Turkey are “an open-ended process, the outcome
of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”⁵⁷⁸ – constituted a veiled reference to the possibility that, at the end of the day, Turkey could be offered the status of a “privileged partnership,” instead of full and real membership. Moreover, the EU was not hesitant in making particular reference to the possibility of unilateral suspension of membership negotiations – on the EU Commission’s initiative or at the request of one-third of the member-states – in the case of a serious and persistent breach by Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.⁵⁷⁹

Undoubtedly, the sky of EU–Turkey relations became even more cloudy after the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in the referendums held in France and the Netherlands – with much of the internal debate linked to the highly controversial issue of Turkey’s accession – and the rise of Turko-skeptic governments in the “engine countries” of the EU, namely, Germany and France (Grigoriadis, 2006: 147–60).⁵⁸⁰ Moreover, both the EU and certain member-states were not hesitant in making the role of European public opinion much more decisive, as the EU’s ambivalent language in regard to Turkey’s accession (namely that even “if Turkey meets the criteria it’s up to EU Parliaments to decide”) was followed by some EU states’ declaration that further enlargement of the EU should be ratified by national referendums. Unsurprisingly, suspicion of EU citizens towards the enlargement project (the so-called “enlargement fatigue”) thus soon turned into clear opposition to Turkey’s putative accession⁵⁸¹ – although for various reasons, ranging from the idea that the EU is a Christian club, to assessments that Turkey is too big to fit into the EU, to tales about Europe’s battles against the Ottoman empire (Livanios, 2006: 299–311).

To make things worse – apparently with Turkey’s accession in mind – the European Commission was not hesitant also to add a new requirement, referring to the European Union’s capacity to take in new members while continuing to function effectively.⁵⁸² Apart from becoming a useful means to be used by certain EU members for delaying Turkey’s accession on the basis of political and cultural criteria, “absorption capacity” or “integration capacity” undoubtedly enhanced Turkey’s suspicions of the EU’s good faith. More importantly, with the new requirement of “absorption capacity” perceived as an unstable structural position on the part of the EU – if not a “double-standards” approach towards Turkey’s supposed accession – Turkey’s efforts to value the benefits of international legitimacy more highly than the costs of adaptation were undermined and the prospects for Turkey’s successful socialization of the EU norms and standards were diminished.

In addition to the negative trends that had begun to dominate the EU–Turkey relationship, certain developments in Turkey’s domestic politics caused stagnation in the EU–Turkey accession negotiations and did not augur well for Turkey’s future membership. Indeed, throughout the last two years (2007 and 2008), the fragility and unpredictability of Turkey’s political
system was demonstrated in a plethora of ways, further reinforcing skepticism – if not opposition – in various European quarters about Turkey’s membership. More specifically, AKP’s failure to manage the presidential election process and the polarization that followed in Turkey’s politics between pro-secularists and Islamists, the military’s coarse intervention in the election process (through the so-called “e-memorandum”), the mass demonstrations in major cities by pro-secular groups, and the Constitutional Court’s decision to overrule the first phase of the presidential election process were clear signs of a less-than-expected Europeanized country and led to legitimate reaction both by pro-democracy groups within Turkey and, most importantly, by the pertinent agents in the EU (Aydin and Esen (2007: 138).

Fortunately, the final verdict of the Constitutional Court in July 2008 not to close down the AK Party relieved Turkey from an unprecedented level of political uncertainty, social and economic turmoil, and potential chaos. Nevertheless, set-backs in the reform process – already evident since 2005 – were coupled with a neonationalist resurgence in Turkish politics (Uslu, 2008: 73–97), an ever-mounting anti-Americanism, anti-reform attitudes, reappearance of the Kurdish issue (linked to both the unstable situation in northern Iraq and the functioning of PKK terrorist cells), and further social turmoil. Unsurprisingly, these developments in Turkey’s domestic politics were reflected in an aversion towards the European Union, thus shelving deeper the reform process and leaving Turkish public support for EU membership at an all-time low since the beginning of the accession negotiations.

Taken as a whole, the mutually reinforcing negative trends in the European Union and in Turkey’s domestic politics have also eroded the EU’s (traditional) normative ability to act as a framework, as they have intensified European questioning on the validity of Turkish membership and have further disenchanted Turkey’s pro-European political elites. The European Union is aware that dealing with the next two enlargement issues, namely the Western Balkans and Turkey, will be tricky and will require both the ability of the countries seeking accession to meet the strict criteria and the EU members’ ability to digest further expansion. While the EU-27 agree that enlargement towards the Western Balkans should be kept on track – as the only effective way for future ethnic explosions to be averted, democracy to be established, and free market rules to prevail – they also admit that the prospects for Turkey’s EU accession and a new big-bang enlargement, at least of the kind anticipated in the “wider Europe” scenario, are today being retrenched. “Enlargement fatigue” thus seems to go hand in hand with “integration fatigue,” creating, moreover, a climate of negative expectations and contributing further to Euro-pessimism. More importantly, Europe’s political elite, backed by a large majority of the European public, seems convinced that the EU has gone far enough with widening, and that what is now mostly needed is to slow down and digest.
Based on such harsh realities of an “era of diminished expectations,” Greek analysts are called upon to prescribe the kind of socialization strategy Greece should follow at a time when the best available forum for enmeshing Turkey into its rule-based and normative context is being radically transformed. So many “thorns” now affect EU–Turkish relations that Turkey’s accession prospects have been seriously diminished, making a special relationship between EU and Turkey the most probable eventuality. In other words, should Greece, animated by “ideological pragmatism,” keep following its current passive socialization strategy towards Turkey, or would an active socialization strategy, animated instead by a “pragmatist ideology,” better serve its interests? Interestingly, by seeking only the normalization of bilateral relations and avoiding a compromise solution with Turkey, passive socialization strategy seemed to have elevated Greece’s national culture into a blueprint of its foreign policy, thus appearing less costly to the government that decides to pursue it. On the other hand, by pointing to the benefits a resolution of the long-standing Greek–Turkish dispute would have for Greece, as well as for Turkey, active socialization strategy suggested that Greece’s interests would be better promoted if the EU were elevated to an active player, thus becoming a catalyst for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute. Such a course of action would also, without doubt, entail certain costs for any Greek government determined to come to a compromise solution with neighboring Turkey over the Aegean issues.

Undeniably, in the long history of the Greek–Turkish confrontation, it was in the late 1990s that, for the first time, there appeared a “light at the end of the tunnel.” Indeed, the adoption and implementation of an active socialization strategy on the part of Greece was the critical element in establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations, mainly due to the catalytic role the European Union seemed able to play in resolving the bilateral dispute. However, for reasons related mostly to the instrumental dialogue culture of the Greek government that took office in 2004, the EU’s ability to become an “active player” able to exert its influence to transform and resolve the conflict was purposely undermined by Greece’s adoption of a passive socialization strategy, one that is still on track after the Karamanlis administration’s victory, although with some reduction of its parliamentary strength, in the national elections held in mid-September 2007.

As dynamics, dispositions, and directions are bound to change and the EU is in a constant state of flux, security and foreign policy analysts would undoubtedly experience some serious difficulty in envisioning the future of Greece’s socialization strategy. Without doubt, securing the future of the EU–Turkey relationship, a pivotal issue in Greece’s socialization strategy, remains the most challenging task. The issue of a divided Cyprus continues to create tensions in EU–Turkey relations and remains the main reason for the partial suspension of Turkey’s accession talks. Unfortunately, while the
new Greek-Cypriot leader, Dimitris Christofias, abandoned the obstructive tactic followed by his predecessor (namely, to use EU–Turkey negotiations to achieve maximum leverage and concessions from Turkey on Cyprus) and while talks were launched in September 2008 with the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, with the aim of agreeing a compromise solution for the reunification of the island, Turkey, which continued to refuse to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus by opening its ports to Cypriot planes and vessels, decided against pursuing a constructive role.

In the years to come, Europe – as well as the US – will continue to take an interest in the growing Turkish markets, Turkey’s contribution to the war on terror, and the positive role – especially a pluralist and democratic – Turkey can play for the rest of the Middle East and the Muslim world. Indeed, occupying a pivotal position between the Western markets and the Caspian sea energy reserves and bordering Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus, Turkey owns a strong negotiation card (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008; Fuller, 2007), which the EU should undoubtedly appreciate (Davutoğlu, 2008: 93). Thus, regardless of the impact of the Merkel–Sarkozy combination on Turkey’s accession path and the most recent skepticism of the EU public towards Turkey’s membership, Europe’s political elites will be compelled not to let the “European train,” as Turks like to call it, get off the rails.585

Avoidance of a major derailment of the “European train” would, however, not inevitably lead to Turkey’s full membership. As time passes, European political elites, still lacking a comprehensive plan in regard to the EU’s future relationship with Turkey, seem to be gradually – yet steadily – distancing themselves from the declared – yet vaguely supported – goal of Turkey’s full membership and tilting towards the advancement of a “special relationship” and/or a “privileged partnership” with Turkey – although the exact content of such a special relationship remains unknown.586 Besides the potential negative repercussions for the EU’s image in the Islamic world at large and Turkey’s declared opposition to such an eventuality,587 the advancement of a “special relationship” appears today as one of the EU’s potential future schemes.588

The essence of Greece’s socialization strategy – be it an active or a passive one – regards the locking of Turkey into a stable framework of norms, standards and conditions provided by the EU’s acquis communautaire. This in turn means that Greece’s socialization strategy binds itself to maintaining Turkey’s convergence with the EU as well as a credible prospect of eventual integration into the Union in order to help Turkey overcome its current weaknesses and challenges to democratization and to consolidate reforms. By implication, Greece should work towards not only assuring that technical work on EU reforms continues in Ankara and that opportunities to speed up EU–Turkey convergence will come again, but also revitalizing the start of EU–Turkey negotiations, obviously on the road to Turkey’s full harmonization with the EU acquis.
Yet, Greek decision-makers may also be called upon in the years to come to modify Greece’s socialization strategy once more, should the course of events point more convincingly to a “special relationship” between the EU and Turkey as an alternative to full membership. For Greece to either avoid dealing with such an eventuality or view it as an anathema would be a self-delusion. Full membership would indeed best secure Turkey’s full compliance with the EU *acquis* and would thus best promote Greece’s socialization strategy goals. However, an eventual – but unequivocal at a certain point of time – change of Turkey’s European prospects from accession to a “special relationship” may also allow Greece to introduce a series of new conditions Turkey should fulfill before a “privileged partnership” with the EU is granted.

Greece’s active participation in the elaboration of what a special relationship between the EU and Turkey would entail could, in fact, mean a reinstatement of the “Helsinki-type” set of conditions and requirements Turkey should fulfill before a new status of a special relationship with the European Union is granted, namely, Turkey’s obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ for a final settlement of its dispute with Greece. For this to be realized, intense, well-prepared, and comprehensive negotiations with those EU actors who argue for a “special relationship” with Turkey as the EU’s most viable option would undoubtedly be a prerequisite. More importantly, such a modification in Greece’s socialization strategy at the multilateral/EU level can only be realized if, instead of the instrumental dialogue culture of the Karamanlis government, it is animated by a resolution agentic culture, which would acknowledge that Greece’s national interests are better served via the resolution of the long-standing conflict with Turkey and that a compromise solution of the dispute carries more benefits than costs. With the conditions favoring a potential breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations disappearing since 2004, however, the most Greece’s current passive socialization strategy can expect in the years to come is a restoration of the EU’s eroded ability to act as a framework, hoping in turn for Turkey’s further democratization and gradual integration en route to Brussels.

The paramount change in the traditional strategy Greece followed towards Turkey from the mid-1970s and the adoption and implementation of a new strategy in the late 1990s provided a unique empirical case to approach the concept of *international socialization* as a *state strategy*, pursued and implemented by a threatened Greece vis-à-vis a threatening Turkey. By developing a particular type of socialization strategy, namely, *active socialization strategy*, Greece managed to transform over a certain period of time the EU factor into a catalytic instrument able not only to strengthen its balancing efforts but also to lead to the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute. More interestingly, the evolution of Greece’s socialization strategy illustrates that culture is a basic determinant in understanding change in a state’s strategy. In addition, it highlights the causal linkage between culture and strategic
behavior by demonstrating the role particular realms of Greece’s strategic culture – *agentic culture* and *national culture* – play in explaining outcomes and in accounting for change. Taking stock of this book’s findings, namely, that “culture” is a prerequisite both for effective policy action and for planning for the future, Greek-decision makers now do know what it would take for a breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations to happen.
Appendices

Appendix 1  Cultures and strategies

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<td>Establishment of the 1963 Protocol concerning hydraulic work on the basin of the river Evros</td>
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Appendix 2

Measures for reducing tension and for good neighborliness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Turkish Armed Forces are prepared to reduce to the possible extent the number, size, and scope of their exercises in the high seas of the Aegean</td>
<td>1. In addition to naval visits scheduled for NATO exercises, Turkish and Greek Navy vessels could pay mutual port visits</td>
<td>1. Establishment of Environmental Stations for measurement of pollution of river Evros. Such a project might be initially applied by Greece and Turkey and later on Bulgaria might join</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All Turkish military aircraft flying in the international airspace of the Aegean will operate their identification devices, called IFF/SIF, on a reciprocal basis</td>
<td>2. Establishment of direct communication channels between the Turkish and Greek Coast Guard Commanders</td>
<td>2. Exchange of ratification instruments for four Protocols and an agreement concerning the border area of Evros, which were signed by Greece and Turkey between 1969 and 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interim Combined Air Operation Center (ICAOC) in Eskisehir will be operational and ready for communication and</td>
<td>3. Conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the ban of antipersonnel mines in the border area</td>
<td>3. Implementation of the 1963 Protocol concerning hydraulic work on the basin of the river Evros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational

| Exchange of information with ICAOC in Larissa/Greece on a reciprocal basis on flights conducted by the parties in the international airspace of the Aegean |

4. Turkish and Greek military aircraft could fly disarmed over the Aegean

5. Notification, in the framework of the Exercise Planning Conference of NATO, yet on a bilateral basis, of the time schedule of national exercises for the following year, to avoid possible overlapping

### Institutional

| 4. Our military Forces could conduct a joint military exercise and/or PfP exercise in the Aegean or in the Mediterranean Sea |

5. Invitations could be extended by both sides to attend national exercises. Turkish armed forces consider inviting their Greek counterparts to a mine exercise (MINEX) this year

6. Observation trial flights could be conducted on a reciprocal basis within the framework of the Open Skies Agreement

7. Verification of implementation – extension of Papoulias–Yılmaz Agreements (e.g., prolongation of the summer moratorium)

8. Transformation of the triangular communication line between Athens–Brussels–Ankara into a hot line between Athens and Ankara, on Foreign Ministers’ level and, later on, between Prime Ministers

9. Participation of Greek and Turkish Forces in Peace Operations in the Balkans and elsewhere

10. Granting of diplomatic clearances for overflight of Greece and Turkey by fighters (already effective by Greek side).
Notes

1 Understanding change in strategy

1. Certainly, this is not only true for Greek–Turkish relations but for most issues on the Greek foreign policy agenda. Indeed, even in the theoretical discussions that do take place, stereotypes and biases are often elevated into theoretical paradigms, and they occur only after the formation and implementation of Greek foreign policy, either to support it or undermine it. On these observations, see Constantinides (2003: 137–87).

2. Furthermore, it seems that there is still a lack of consensus on the exact content of Greece’s “balancing strategy” vis-à-vis Turkey, while the notion of balancing is getting a different connotation for the various members of the Greek academic community, especially when it has to be translated into a specific policy proposal.

3. An epistemic approach to Greek–Turkish relations would also be of particular importance in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international sources of state behavior and – most importantly – the role ideas play in shaping each state strategy. On the literature on epistemic communities and intellectual communities, see Haas (1992: 1–35) and Adler (1992: 101–46).

4. There have been only very few attempts on the part of the Greek academic and research community at approaching the phenomenon of the Greek–Turkish conflict through the use of specific theoretical and methodological tools. For the first attempts at a theoretical interpretation of Greece’s shift in its policy vis-à-vis Turkey, see Tsakonas (2003: 49–97); Tsakonas and Dokos (2004: 101–26), and Tsakonas (2004: 189–214). For a most recent attempt, see Kotsiaros (2006).

5. According to the conventional wisdom in the IR literature, it is the size that determines small state behavior. Small states are thus distinguished by their military weakness in relation to the strength of others. From a purely structural perspective, functioning within an international system that hardly allows room for defiance, small states should comply with the wishes of the Great Power(s) and abide by international law, although they may manipulate Great Power rivalries to resist unwelcome demands. For these remarks, and the citation of a long list of work – from the voluminous literature on small states – along this line of reasoning, see Fakiolas (2006: 15–16 and ref. nos. 6 and 9). It should be noted that the present study casts doubt on the necessity for homogeneous action that structural explanations expect from small states, arguing that the interplay of external and internal forces (with culture being a catalytic one) produces variations in responses. For other works casting doubt on the structural explanation of small states’ behavior, see – inter alia – Joenniemi (1998: 61–2); Alapuro and Allard (1985); Katzenstein (1985). In addition the present study shows that, apart from institutions, states – even the “small–medium” ones such as Greece – can pursue socialization strategies as a means to better balancing other, more threatening, states.

6. For an analysis along this line of reasoning see Vasquez (1993).
7. By testing the neoclassical realist model against the cases of US strategic adjustment in 1918–21 as well as 1945–8, Colin Dueck found that, although the long-term trajectory of America’s rise to world power is best explained by international pressures, the precise strategies chosen in each period were heavily influenced by the US domestic political–military cultures; see Dueck (2005: 195–231).

8. One should mention, however, that this analytic assumption was modified by certain neorealist works. See, for example, the work of Randall Schweller (1998), who categorizes different types of state identity, which result in different state interests. There are also certain neorealists who have incorporated cognitive factors, particularly perception of states, into their works. See, for example, Jervis (1976) and Van Evera (1999).

9. Consider Gilpin’s concession on the role of ideology and the need for a “dominant liberal power” to enable economic cooperation, see Gilpin (1987: 88); also Ikenberry (1992: 292).

10. As realist Stephen Walt does in his “balance of threat theory,” while he suggests that “intentions” should be included alongside power, proximity, and offence dominance in their specification of “threat;” see Walt (1988). For this remark see Moravcsik (1997: 541).

11. Certain constructivist scholars have paid attention to norms and political culture at the domestic level and have analyzed the evolution of strategic culture in a particular state setting, how it constructs the interests and preferences of the state, and how it affects foreign policy formation. See – inter alia – Katzenstein (1996); Rosecrance and Stein (1993); Berger (1998); Kupchan (1994); and Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes (1999).

12. Rooted in liberal state theory, utilitarian–liberalism explains states’ foreign policy behavior on the basis of domestic factors. By implication, structural utilitarian–liberal approaches to foreign policy deduce predictions about a state’s foreign policy directly from its domestic structures. More specifically, utilitarian–liberalism argues that rational actors choose from among the objectively available alternatives for action the one which maximizes their material (i.e., improves the performance of their financial means) and/or immaterial utility (i.e., increases their policymaking power). See Buchanan (1989: 37–50) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962).

13. Indeed, for constructivism, interests and preferences are not fixed, but are determined by the agent’s identity, since “an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is.” See Wendt (1999: 231).

14. As John Duffield had eloquently put it: “Ultimately, cultural explanations should be accompanied by a better understanding of the sources and determinants of culture itself, just as structural theories of international relations, such as neorealism, must answer the question of how particular international structures arise in the first place.” See Duffield (1999: 793).

15. Recently Andrew Flibbert used a constructivist approach to show that ideas, although not the sole factors setting the course of US foreign policy, are essential in explaining the otherwise puzzling decision of the Bush administration to go to war with Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11. More specifically, he argued that the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in remarkably consequential ways by shaping administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Four particular ideas were central to the Bush administration’s risk-filled gambit in the Middle East: a belief in the necessity and benevolence of American hegemony, a
Manichean conception of politics, a conviction that regime type is the principal determinant of foreign policy, and great confidence in the efficacy of military force. Taken together, these ideas defined the social purpose of American power, framed threats to the United States, and determined appropriate solutions to core problems. See Flibbert (2006: 310–52).


17. For the definition of the concept of “strategic culture,” see – among others – Snyder (1977); Gray (1981) and (1986); Krause (1999: 1–22); and Booth (1990). For assessments of the cultural–institutional context on the security policies of France and China see the contributions of Elizabeth Kier and that of Alastair Iain Johnston in Katzenstein (1996: 186–268).


19. On the same line of reasoning Ken Booth argues that states’ strategic behavior is culturally constructed and culturally perpetuated; see Booth (1990: 121).

20. The term has been coined by Nikiforos Diamandouros; see Diamandouros (1983: 52–3); also Diamandouros (1993: 1–25).

21. As pointed out by Thomas Berger, “In order to pursue their agenda, political actors are compelled to enter into debates and negotiations with other groups, making compromises and concessions along the way. These compromises, however, have to be legitimated, both internally within the group and externally in the rest of the society. Such legitimations often involve a reinterpretation of past events, current conditions and future goals. In this way, politics is a question not only of who gets what but of who persuades whom in an ongoing negotiation of reality” (our emphasis). See Berger (1996: 327).

22. For these observations see Legro (2005: 8).

23. Analysts of agentic culture will be surprised by how clearly analysis of key-decision makers’ declaratory statements under a series of circumstances (Parliament discussions and hearings, speeches and/or interviews) can aptly demonstrate their innermost beliefs.

24. Needless to say that, following the distinction made for a state’s “national culture,” “agentic culture,” in terms of key decision-makers’ worldviews, beliefs, and preferences, can also be either a reformist, an instrumental, or an underdog one. By implication, key decision-makers in different governments may be animated by, say, the same reformist culture, yet their beliefs about cause–effect relationships on how best to deal with a threatening state will be different, thus arguing for completely different strategies. The proposed scheme of agentic culture aims at going beyond how decision-makers think about foreign policy issues, linking thus the beliefs and preferences of those who make foreign policy decisions with particular strategies on how to achieve foreign policy goals.

25. One may distinguish a fourth form of agentic culture and place it on the one extreme of the continuum, next to “no dialogue/no resolution culture.” It is worth noting, however, that this form of agentic culture goes far beyond the common denominator of all three forms of agentic culture proposed, namely the avoidance of crisis and peaceful coexistence with the threatening state. It could be called: “preemptive attack agentic culture,” and argues for a preemptive attack against the threatening state with the aim either to change its regime or to neutralize it. Interestingly, certain policy-elites, members of epistemic communities, and certain “norm entrepreneurs” in Greece were animated, especially in early
1990s, by such a culture, suggesting thus a muscular and tough stance as well as recourse to preemptive measures not just towards Turkey but to a number of neighboring states. These factions of Greece’s agentic culture remained – along with their framework of ideas and beliefs – on the fringe of Greece’s foreign policy behavior, however. I am indebted to Theodore Couloumbis for drawing my attention to this fourth type of agentic culture.

26. The content of the “no-dialogue”/“no-resolution culture” proposed herein identifies with what Christos Rozakis names “procrastinating culture” – as opposed to the “resolution culture” – for describing the ideas, views, and beliefs of Greece’s key decision-makers over the last thirty years about how to deal with Turkey. See Christos Rozakis, “Coherence and Incoherence in Foreign Policy,” *Vima Idevn* (supplement of the Greek daily/weekly *To Vima*), October 5, 2007.

27. In Jeffrey Legro’s words, “...a reigning idea will collapse only if a state acts in accordance with its prescriptions, and this leads to foreign policy failures.” See Legro (2005: 84).

28. See Kissinger (1957). In this work Kissinger shows how international norms became salient in domestic political struggles as states were socialized to the Vienna system. See also Waltz (1979: 74–7, and 127–8).

29. Although such work does not explicitly address the linkage between institutional effects and interstate conflicts, its findings on the ways states’ behavior changes due to the internalization of institutional rules and norms can also tell much about the changes that may follow in states’ positions over a border conflict.


31. In the aforementioned special issue, see the contributions of Schimmelfennig (2005a: 827–60) and Gheciu (2005: 973–1012).

32. Thus, balancing is alignment against the threatening state or alliance of states (not the most powerful state or alliance of states, as balance of power theory claims) while bandwagoning is alignment with the most threatening state or alliance of states. According to Stephen Walt, the concept of threat incorporates both states’ power capabilities (i.e., the elements of power, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities) and, in particular, the perceived intentions of others. Thus, “states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone.” See Walt (1987: 5). As is widely known, “balance of threat theory” has managed to refine the “too one-dimensional” classic “balance of power theory” by adding into the equation the element of threat, the latter defined as a state’s aggressive and dangerous intentions and, most importantly, by explicitly separating powerful capabilities and expansionist intentions as independent sources of threat.

33. Greece has signed all major international agreements including, inter alia, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Ottawa Treaty for the Prohibition of Landmines, etc. Greece has also been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.

34. According to Nye: “Security is like oxygen – you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.” See Nye (1995: 91).

35. According to this strategy of conditionality, an EU member state not only withholds the reward (financial assistance, institutional ties) to a state aspiring to
membership but inflicts extra punishment on the noncompliant state in order to increase the costs of noncompliance beyond the costs of compliance.

36. For the positive transformative impact of the EU on a series of border conflicts (the Greek–Turkish being one) through four particular “pathways,” see Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006: 563–93); Çelik and Rumelili (2006: 203–22).

37. This term was suggested to the author by Professor Theodore Couloumbis and it is mostly related to the positive (normative and internalization) effects the EU has on candidate states through their gradual integration into EU norms, rules, and standards.

38. Charles Lipson’s work shows that democracies are more reliable partners because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments. Democracies cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks. While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible – and more durable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states.

39. Most recently Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder convincingly argued that states in the early phases of transitions to democracy are more likely than other states to become involved in war. See Mansfield and Snyder (2007).

40. The use of the terms “conditional sanctions” and “conditional rewards” is attributed to Theodore Couloumbis; see Couloumbis (1997–8: 11–17).

41. Due to the two states’ obligation, in accordance with the Helsinki decisions, to submit their differences to the International Court of Justice in The Hague before the end of 2004, if other efforts for a compromise solution have failed.

2 The traditional strategy

42. For similar remarks on the evolution of the foreign and security policies of Turkey, see Karaosmanoğlu (2000: 199–216).

43. As the construction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus throughout the post-Cold War era aptly demonstrate.

44. Needless to say, a country’s strategic significance is not static. It is affected by the evolution of military technology and its impact on defense doctrine; by the constantly changing international and regional political environment; by the way influential states assess a country’s strategic value and define policies to account for their strategic interests in that region; and finally by the willingness and ability of the states in that region to utilize their assets to advance their national interests. For these remarks see Coufoudakis (1993: 1).

45. Its strategic importance was eclipsed twice in history, once by naval technology, which shifted the traffic of sea commerce to the Atlantic and the other, during the Cold War, when the central front of the continent attracted most allied attention. In the past, NATO and the West had generally regarded the Mediterranean as a peripheral strategic theater. According to Van Coufoudakis: “In the 1970s and 1980s, the strategic importance of NATO’s Southern flank increased significantly with the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the growing tensions and instability in the region of the Persian Gulf, following the fall of the
Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and the increased involvement of the U.S. in the vital task of protecting sea lanes under the Carter and Reagan doctrines.” See Coufoudakis (1989: 19).

46. In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean region constitutes a crucial area of contact (a “fault-line”) between what is seen by many analysts as the emerging great division of the world: the North and the South.

47. According to Dimitri Constas, Greece, along with most European World War II participants, made its fundamental decisions concerning bilateral and collective defence commitments in the period up to 1955. The legacy of the civil war and American direct involvement in this war left little room for a reconsideration of the future evolution of Greek security interests in a regional rather than a global context. External dependency and the resulting security perceptions, the banning of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and the marginal role that other forces of the Left could play in the political process all but eclipsed domestic political debate over the terms and conditions of adherence to such arrangements, not to mention consideration of alternative collective security options. In turn, access to Western defence organizations and bilateral agreements with the U.S. perpetuated Greece’s introverted security orientation long after external and internal realities had shown a growing incompatibility between national and allied security needs. See Constas (1995: 73).

48. Indeed, in the 1960s the threat from the north diminished to the point of disappearing, while the threat from the east increased to the point of becoming imminent. As a result, the probability of a war between the two NATO allies became more likely than the chances of a military exchange with the Warsaw Pact countries. See Constas (1995: 92).

49. A poll conducted in June 1994 provides a typical example. Although Greek public opinion considered the “issue of Skopje” to be the main foreign policy problem faced by Greece (60.2%), the main threat was still believed to come from Turkey (68.3%). For specifics on the 1994 MRB poll, see Loulis (1995: 121–39).

50. For further discussion, see Valinakis (1994: 27). The Cyprus problem – which emerged in the 1950s and increased with the Greek–Turkish crises of the 1960s, the Greek junta-sponsored coup of 1974, and the Turkish invasion and continued occupation of the island – has been complicated by a series of Greek–Turkish frictions in the Aegean region. These led to a reorientation of the Greek defense doctrine and the official declaration of the “threat from the East” as the main security concern for Greece.

51. For a reference that the threat perception is “justified,” see Rozakis (1996).

52. As one analyst pointed out: “Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in the Greek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. Moreover, direct challenges (e.g. “the group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast... should belong to Turkey”), as well as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands have been viewed with great alarm.” See Valinakis (1994: 30). For an anthology of revisionist statements of high-ranking Turkish officials and politicians – indicative of the revisionist and aggressive intentions of Turkey against Greece in the Aegean – see: Threat in the Aegean (1984) and Turkish Officials Speak on Turkey’s Aims (1985). See also the English translation of a 54-page text of the Turkish General Staff entitled “The Turkish-Greek Relations and the Great Idea,” which – although first published in Turkish in 1975 – was presented to the Greek public in 1987 as an official document of the Turkish expansionism. See Turkish-Greek Relations
and the Great Idea (1975). In 1996 the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller expressed the view that “there are approximately one thousand little islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean … which are Turkish territory.” Other, more modest, Turkish officials claimed that “there are hundred islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean and their status remain unclear.” Turkey specifically renounced in Articles 12 and 16 of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 – which established the territorial status quo in the Aegean – all its rights over all the islands which are more than three miles from the Anatolian coasts. By implication, the total number of the islands and islets that are less than three miles from the Anatolian coasts is sixty-two. Unsurprisingly, then, Turkish official claims after a long period of time (1923 to 1996), when no protest or act or objection had ever been raised by Turkey, about hundreds or even thousands(!) of islands were perceived as hostile acts and set off alarm bells in Athens. Unfortunately, some of Turkey’s claims were repeated in both the 1999 and the 2000 White Papers of the Turkish Armed Forces; see White Paper of the Turkish Armed Forces (1999: 21–2) and White Paper of the Turkish Armed Forces (2000). See also Platias (1990: 92–5).

53. Based on the oral and written comments and analyses of various Greek security analysts and policymakers. For a detailed account of Greek threat perceptions in the 1970s and early 1980, see Coufoudakis (1985: 201–4).

54. See Rozakis (1989: 65). Interestingly this definition of the threat from one of the closest advisors to the former Greek Premier Simitis and a “norm entrepreneur” of Greece’s socialization strategy in the late 1990s is very telling about how deep and apparent the threat from the east had been in the late 1980s even to those who felt confident enough to opt for a major change in Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey about a decade later. Needless to say, the perception of the threat from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s had been through a constant transformation and change. This last observation was stressed by Professor Rozakis to the author during a personal interview.

55. According to Kollias: “Over the past one and a half decade Turkey has been implementing a massive armament program. In real terms, Turkey’s equipment expenditure has arisen by about 345 percent in the period 1987–2000. The corresponding increase for Greece was about 142 percent. During this period, the average annual growth rate of equipment expenditure for Greece was 4.1 percent and 11.8 percent for Turkey. For the post bipolar period, that is, 1990–2000, the average annual growth rates were 1.6 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. Even if this weapons build up by Turkey is wholly driven by factors not associated with security concerns and military needs vis-à-vis Greece, it nevertheless increases the military insecurity felt by the latter.”

56. According to Platias: “... [G]reece has a population of 10 million with corresponding limited human, military and economic resources. In contrast, Turkey’s population is approximately 60 million. It is projected that by the turn of the century there will be 11 million Greeks to approximately 70 million Turks. Furthermore, Turkey has been able to maintain very large standing army of approximately 650,000 (excluding paramilitary forces).”

57. A “window of vulnerability for Greece opens when Greece is not either capable or willing to resist Turkish encroachment, and a ‘window of opportunity’ for Turkey opens when it is unlikely that major powers with interests in the region will oppose a Turkish invasion.” For these remarks, see Platias (2000: 67).

58. According to official figures released by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
59. Bulgaria’s attitude towards its own Turkish minority (which is heavily concentrated close to the Greek–Bulgarian border) may prove to be an additional factor in this issue. See Valinakis (1994: 39–40).

60. Due to pressure emanating from the Council of Europe and human rights NGOs, the Simitis governments addressed in the late 1990s the need for reform of minority rights legislation, mainly on a rationalist basis, by arguing that the costs of minority repression for Greece’s international image and strategic interests were disproportionately higher than any perceived benefits. They have thus managed to achieve a political consensus to promote Europeanization in the field of minority rights. For this argumentation, see Grigoriadis (2008a: 37). Along with the weakening of the discrimination practices at the end of the 1990s in Greek Thrace, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, had hinted that the right to individual self definition would have to be granted. See Mouzelis and Pagoulatos (2005: 95).


62. In 1975 a new Turkish Army corps (the Aegean Army) was created, which was equipped with a large number of landing craft, was excluded from NATO command, and was positioned primarily along Turkey’s Aegean littoral.

63. This became official policy through a resolution of the Turkish National Assembly. On June 9, 1995 the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved a resolution that empowered the Turkish government to take all measures “including those that may be deemed necessary in the military field” for safeguarding “the vital interests” of Turkey in the Aegean. Moreover, since 1975 Turkish officials warned that a possible extension of the Greek territorial sea would constitute a casus belli. The Greek national culture attaches particular importance to these threats perceived as intending to prevent the implementation of rules and rights deriving from international law, namely Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean.

64. For remarks on a trend towards a more assertive and a more interventionist Turkey than was the case during the Cold War, see Lesser (2000a: 219). For a completely different assessment of Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, namely as “determinedly committed to a multilateral political orientation,” see Robins (2003: 8).

65. According to a former US Ambassador to Greece, “it would be only a slight exaggeration to say that Greek foreign policy for 160 years has taken no major initiative that was not, directly or indirectly, intended to create a more favourable balance of power with Turkey.” See Stearns (1997a: 60).

66. A poll conducted in June 1994, at a time the emotionally loaded “Macedonian issue” had become the centre of Greece’s political and diplomatic concern, provides a typical example. According to this poll, although Greek public opinion considered the main foreign policy problem faced by Greece to be the “issue of Skopje” (60.2%), the main threat was still believed to come from Turkey (68.3%). For specifics on the 1994 MRB poll, see Loulis (1995: 121–39).

67. It is worth noting that since its national independence (1829–30) the Greek state has engaged in a process of representing itself as a nation whose historical trajectory was traced in a linear form and without any ruptures or discontinuities from antiquity to modernity. The aim was the continuity, unity and
homogeneity of the Greek nation for more than 2,000 years to be affirmed, despite the different political formations – such as the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman empires – it had taken over the centuries. See Kitromilidis (1989: 149–92).

68. Many researchers of modern Greek political culture have observed that, in public discourse, Greek national identity tends to be linked with classical antiquity and Byzantium, rather than with the modern Greek state of the past two centuries, despite the fact that its accomplishments are far from negligible. By rejecting the present and romanticizing the distant past, almost creating an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the “noble ancestors” of the modern Greeks, certain political figures, such as a former President of the Greek Republic, have even ended up enforcing the public’s introversion and fatalism, and have fostered the reproduction of the groundless argument of the “brotherless nation.” Indeed, in accordance with a neologism used by Christos Sartzetakis (President of the Hellenic Republic in the 1980s) in a speech delivered in Northern Greece in 1989, the Greek nation should define itself as *anadelphon*, namely as a nation deprived of brothers or allies. Apparently, it is this kind of perception which sets the foundation for and highlights another popular national myth, namely the “distinctiveness of Greekness.” See Papaconstantinou (1997: 11). This comes as no surprise, as the Greek national identity is still driven – as in the nineteenth century – by romantic views of the nation as an immutable and eternal cultural community and “psyche.” For a more detailed analysis, see Lipovats (1993: 54–8) and Demertzis (1993: 53). For similarities between the popular myth of the “distinctiveness of Greekness” and the notion of “national exceptionalism,” as an ideational framework through which the Greek policymakers perceived Greece’s position in the European and global sphere during the 1980s, see Pagoulatos (2004: 45–70).

69. According to Campbell and Sherrard, the anti-European attitude of Orthodox Greeks was influenced – if not determined – by “the sack of Constantinople by the ‘crusaders’ in 1204” and “left a legacy of extreme suspicion if, not to say hostility towards the presence of Western Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean and the adjacent lands.” See Campbell and Sherrard (1968: 33).

70. It also includes a strong state orientation, and a preference for small and weak administrative structures that are linked to clientelism and are compatible with the direct exercise of power. See Diamandouros (1993: 1–25). Nikos Mouzelis notes that the Greek political culture is “...dominated by personalized treatises which conceal or isolate vital questions of social reform.” See Mouzelis (1995). For an excellent treatise of the evolution of Greek nationalism in the post-World War II era, see Stefanidis (2008).

71. For an analyst’s argumentation, that in the early post-Cold War era Greece appears to swing between a feeling of inferiority and an attitude of superiority, see Lipovats (1991: 276).

72. Needless to say, the discourses developed within the various parts of a society, the “underdog national culture,” like the “reformist” one, cuts across political divisions, political institutions, and social classes of the Greek society. For the “permeability” as a defining characteristic of the “national culture,” see Diamandouros (2000: 40).

73. The Gulf crisis confirmed that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf formed a common conflict system, while the collapse of Yugoslavia pointed to Greece's
pivotal position in Southeastern Europe and the approach to the Adriatic. Both regions posed new challenges for the role of Greece, NATO, the EU, the WEU and the US in regional crises. See Coufoudakis (1993: 9).

74. Analysts discerned an “arc or triangle of crisis,” extending from the Balkans, to Central Asia-Transcaucus and the Middle East. The list of problems and threats to regional security and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is indeed long; it includes the slow or negative economic growth, the demographic explosion in many countries, the spread of religious extremism (of special concern is Islamic radicalism), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of sophisticated conventional weapons, the lack of democratization and of respect for human rights, the scarcity of water resources, the pollution of the Mediterranean as a potential threat to the economies of Mediterranean states and to the quality of life of their people, and the large number of regional conflicts, the most important of which are the Kurdish problem, the occupation of Cyprus and the Greek–Turkish conflict, and, of course, the apparently unending Arab–Israeli conflict. Some of the above problems have a synergistic effect.

75. Proximity and the fear that Balkan instability, whether limited to former Yugoslavia or more general, would inhibit the integration of Greece within the European mainstream created a sense of vulnerability. The economic consequences have also been quite significant. Greece had relied on road and rail communications through Yugoslavia for some 40 percent of its trade with the European market. Prolonged disruption of this vital link has had direct economic consequences for Greece, as had the imposition of EU sanctions against the Yugoslav federal government. Greek authorities estimated that the imposition of sanctions resulted in losses of up to $10 million per day. See Lesser (1992a: 75). Furthermore, it was feared that a violent disintegration of the southern part of the former Yugoslavia could engage outside powers into the conflict, or trigger the flight of waves of refugees into Greek territory. Since the mid-1990s more than half a million economic immigrants from Southeastern and Eastern Europe were in Greece, nearly two-thirds originating from Albania. In a period of recession and high unemployment, large numbers of illegal workers have added an extra pressure on the strained Greek economy.


78. As Jervis reminds us while explaining the US/Soviet rivalry through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma, “the Soviet leaders were not willing to risk what they had achieved in order to get more, yet they did want, expect and seek more. However, the American belief that the Soviet Union was ‘inherently expansionistic’ ruled out cooperation, precluded the adoption of a purely defensive posture by the US and led to the conclusion that demonstrations of resolve were crucial while the only way to underscore US resolve was by prevailing in crisis.” See Jervis (2001: 58–60).

79. Interestingly enough and characteristic of the “security dilemma” the two states were embedded in after the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s National Security Policy Paper (NSPP) in 1997 – prepared by the National Security Council (NSC)
Secretariat, headed by a four-star General, and adopted by the NSC and the cabinet – declared Greece and Syria as Turkey’s two main external threats. As quoted in Aydin (2003: 174–5). On Turkey’s war ability to fight two-and-a-half wars at the same time, with one of the war-fronts being Greece, see Elektağ (1996: 33–57).

80. The first attempt, and the only attempt so far, by a group of Greek and Turkish international relations experts and security analysts to examine particular case studies that fall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek–Turkish conflict in the first post-Cold War decade (namely arms race, crises, and competitive alliances formation) have shown that the Greek–Turkish conflict reflects a blend of “inadvertent” (the “arms race” cases) and “deliberate security dilemma” (the “crises” and “preemptive alignment” cases) ending up in certain episodes in a “deep security dilemma” state of affairs. The unavoidable result was, thus, that even if one of the two states might primarily seek security these efforts were indistinguishable in their effect from expansionism. See the contributions of Greek and Turkish security analysts in the special issue of the Hellenic Studies/Etudes Helléniques (2001). See also Tsakonas (2002: 5–14). Robert Jervis has described the situation of a “deep-security dilemma” as “a state of affairs where, unlike one based on mistrust that could be overcome, there are no missed opportunities for radically improving relations. In such a situation, both sides may be willing to give up the chance of expansion if they can be made secure, but a number of other factors – the fear that the other’s relative power is dangerously increasing, technology, events outside their control, and their subjective security requirements – put such a solution out of reach.” See Jervis (2001: 41).

81. As stated by Constantinides, in a balanced and critical survey of conflicting streams of thought on matters of the Greek foreign policy, “...many scholars of international relations in Greece have been strongly influenced by the realist school; nevertheless, this influence is not always clear and is not often acknowledged. What brings Greek scholars close to the realist problematic is undoubtedly nationalism. In a country with major problems from what is seen as the threat of Turkish expansionism, and an unstable Balkan region, nationalism is a kind of ideological defense.” See Constantinides (1996: 45).

82. See also Theodore Couloumbis, “A Country Worth-Copying: Israel or Finland?”, Athens News, 4 April, 1996.

83. “With Papandreou in power, realism became the dominant paradigm, influencing the approach of Greek foreign policy. [...] It can be argued that there is now in Greece a well-established realist school of thought, composed of scholars, journalists and other intellectuals.” See Constantinides (1996: 52).

84. Although significant on a regional level, Greece’s economic capabilities and political–military posture constitute no major (present or future) components of the European or global security system. See Constas (1995: 72).

85. As well as signing and adhering to practically all multilateral arms control agreements and international export control regimes, it is worth noting that Greece has signed all major international agreements including, inter alia, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Ottawa Treaty for the Prohibition of Landmines, etc. Greece has also been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.
86. Such a reliance of Greece’s foreign and security policy on diplomacy has been criticized by certain strategic analysts as counterproductive. According to one analyst, “the mistaken belief, shared by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership, that diplomacy alone can moderate Turkish behavior and minimize as much as possible Turkey’s political and military gains from the 1974 invasion, coupled with Turkey’s intransigence, has eroded the credibility of Greek deterrence.” See Arvanitopoulos (1997: 157).

87. Moreover, the Turkish invasion in Cyprus was interpreted as a situation where Greece found itself both dependent and insecure; see Platias (1990: 91–108).

88. For an account of the belief system of Constantine Karamanlis and its impact on Greek foreign policy, see Arvanitopoulos (1994: 61–83).

89. As Monteagle Stearns has noted: “...instead of enabling them to reconcile their differences by direct negotiation, their [Greece and Turkey] common alliance with the United States and Western Europe often appears to act as an impediment. Bilateral disputes acquired multilateral dimension.” See Stearns (1992: 5).


91. Membership in the European Economic Community was seen in the long run as beneficial for the Greek economy, and as an added assurance for the country’s democratic institutions. See Tsoukalis (1981: 120–6).

92. According to Christos Rozakis, “For the state’s modernization forces, Greece’s entry into the European Community represents not only a model of social and economic organization but also an international agent with particular abilities and, mainly, potential which, soon or late, will intervene in-between the two Great Powers as a autonomous pole of power.” See Rozakis (1984: 33).


94. A recent study on NATO and the Greek–Turkish conflict gives credit to NATO for the fact that the Greek–Turkish dispute has never erupted into a full-scale war. See Krebs (1999: 343–77).

95. Although the chief objection to the reentry from the political forces of the opposition was one of principle, namely that the reason for withdrawal – the military occupation of 40 percent of the Cyprus soil by Turkey – had not been resolved, see Veremis (1982: 32).

96. According to Arvanitopoulos, “Negotiation and arbitration occupy a pivotal place in Karamanlis’s operational code...[t]he slow, deliberate process of negotiations, rather than war and violence, is the best means of advancing a nation’s interests....[n]egotiations are necessary in order to establish trust between nations, an essential step toward peace...[C]haracteristic examples of this approach have been his foreign policies towards Greece’s Communist neighbors and Turkey.” See Arvanitopoulos (1994: 68, 73).

97. For the negotiations taking place through all and on all these forums, see Constantine Karamanlis. Archives (1992–97, Vol. 10).

98. There have been three private meetings, with the retired ambassador Dimitris Kosmadopoulos acting as the unofficial representative of the Greek premier Constantine Karamanlis. See Kosmadopoulos (1988) and Constantine Karamanlis. Archives (1992–97, Volume 11: 55–8); as quoted in Heraclides (2008: 128).
In August 1976 the Turkish seismic research vessel Sismik-I was sent into the Aegean in order to conduct seismological exploration of the Turkish territorial sea as well as of disputed portions of continental shelf areas under the high seas. At the time the Greek government was under strong pressure from the most influential voice of the opposition, Andreas Papandreou, who accused the Karamanlis government of lacking the courage to sink the Turkish vessel. See Syrigos (1998: 126). With the aim of de-escalating the crisis, Karamanlis proceeded to make two particular diplomatic moves. First, he requested a meeting of the UN Security Council with the claim that there was an imminent danger to peace in the Aegean. Second, Greece appealed to the ICJ in The Hague for an interim judgement restraining Turkey from carrying out further explorations in disputed waters until the delimitation of the continental shelf had been defined. While the UNSC urged restraint, the ICJ declared itself incompetent to pronounce judgment on the Aegean continental shelf issue. By the Berne Declaration/Agreement in November 1976 both sides agreed in refraining from actions that might impede a resolution of bilateral issues through peaceful means.

Karamanlis’s response to Andreas Papandreou’s request to terminate dialogue with Turkey – since there are no bilateral differences between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea, only Turkish unilateral claims – is characteristic of the Karamanlis conception of the Greek–Turkish dispute. In Parliament Karamanlis stated the following: “[A] dispute, every dispute can be created by anyone who disagrees with you, challenges your right and intends to be unfair to you. Since that very moment, however, a problem is being created that you cannot simply ignore. You are in fact obliged to deal with it. The way you will deal with it is, however, a completely different thing.” See Constantine Karamanlis. Archives (1992–97: 145–7).

See the remarks of Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, General Secretary of the Greek MFA and Greece’s chief negotiator in the talks which took place from July 1978 to February 1980, in Theodoropoulos and Afentouli (2005: 321–2).

See the remarks of Ambassador Ioannis Tzounis, Political Director of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was involved in the Greek–Turkish negotiations between experts of the two countries concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf. As quoted in Heraclides (2008: 133).

Interestingly, according to Professor Rozakis, “in regard to Greek–Turkish differences, the Simitis government decided to follow the thread of the late Constantine Karamanlis’s stance on these issues.” Based on the author’s interview with Professor Christos Rozakis (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, from September 1996 to November 1997, and one of the architects of Greece’s “socialization strategy” pursued in the late 1990s).

In February 1980, after negotiations between the two countries, Turkey announced that, as a “good will gesture,” it would cancel NOTAM 714, while Greece, in response, withdrew NOTAM 1157, and the airspace of the Aegean was opened again to international air navigation. See Syrigos (1998: 171).

It is worth noting that, in an opinion poll undertaken in 1980 about Greece’s reintegration into NATO, 58 percent of the Greeks polled favored neutrality, and only 12 percent favored reentry. See Melakopides (1983: 78). On the negotiations for Greece’s reintegration into NATO, see Valinakis (1987: 101–27). On the rationale of Greece’s reentry into the Alliance presented by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantinos Mitsotakis, see Rizas (2003: 61–7).
106. Since May 1980 Karamanlis had moved to the position of the President of the Greek Republic, with Georgios Rallis taking office as Greece’s new Premier.

107. It seems that Karamanlis was fully aware of the fragile political situation Turkey had been experiencing over the 1974–80 period, and of the negative consequences on Turkish leaders’ ability to conduct a comprehensive and responsible dialogue. See Constantine Karamanlis. Archives (Vol. 10: 68), as quoted in Heraclides (2008: 138). On Turkey’s fragile domestic politics, see Zürcher (1993: 274–6).

108. There are a number of foreign policy initiatives indicative of Andreas Papandreou’s “anti-Western” and “Third Worldist” character. Instead of condemning the establishment of a military regime in Poland along with its NATO and EEC partners in December 1981, Papandreou was the first Western premier to visit Poland; not only did Greece refuse to condemn the destruction by the USSR of the Korean airliner in August 1983, but the Greek Foreign Minister also managed – as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC – to prevent debate on the subject, thus vetoing condemnation of the Soviet action. Apart from supporting an anti-Israeli stance, Papandreou developed good relations with radical Arab states, such as Libya and with the Syrian Baathist Party. For these remarks see Loulis (1985: 27–8).

109. Papandreou considered Turkey and Israel to be the two pillars of American policy in the Middle East; see Veremis (1982: 24).

110. In 1983–84, inflation was about 20 percent, unemployment about 10 percent, and the foreign debt about $11 billion. Government allocation for defense expenditure in 1984 was 2.2 billion – with a total budget of approximately $14 billion defense expenditures amounting to 15.7 percent. See Damalas-Hydreaos and Frangonikolopoulos (1987: 123).

111. It is worth noting that bilateral relations were further exacerbated due to the unilateral declaration of the occupied territories in Cyprus in November 1983 by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas and the Turkish Cypriot Assembly of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

112. See Grimmett (1984: 4). The rejection of such a request by the Alliance led to Papandreou’s refusal to sign the particular NATO summit final communiqué; the same request was posed again in 1990 to the US government in return for its access to military bases and other facilities in Greece; see Dimitras (1985: 134–50); also Tsakonas and Tournikiotis (2003: 301–14).

113. Interestingly enough, some of the Greek demands, especially the ones concerning the United States, were eventually met. The most important ones were the increased military aid to Greece, the maintenance of the 7:10 ratio of military aid to the region, and the conclusion of the 1983 Defence and Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the US.

114. According to public opinion polls conducted in Greece in the mid-1980s, more than 90 percent of the respondents believed that the US and Turkey posed the greatest threat to Greece. See Dimitras (1985: 136–7) and Mango (1987: 147).

115. During the Cold War, Greece provided an essential link in NATO’s southeastern flank. Moreover, from the very first days of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were considered to be strategically interdependent. Turkey, for example, could have been isolated from the other NATO members if Greece had not also participated in the Alliance. The country’s strategic importance to the West and value for the Alliance has thus high, although it had been, at times, underestimated. It is worth noting that, during the last years of the Cold War era, Greece had ranked first among NATO countries in military expenditures in relation to
GDP (6.6% in constant prices compared with a 5.6% figure for the US), and, as noted by a DPC report, “[Greek’s] defence effort in terms of inputs was one of the best in the Alliance.” See Enhancing Alliance Collective Security (1988: 13, 50). See also Coufoudakis (1989: 19).

116. In March 1987, the seismographic vessel Seismic-I set sail, under naval escort, for oil explorations in disputed waters in the Aegean. At the time, the Turkish government granted exploration and exploitation rights to the National Petroleum Company in international waters near the Greek island of Samothrace.

117. Interestingly, the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact states in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO counterparts (emphasis added). See Clogg (1991: 20).

118. After Turkish premier Özal’s declaration that Seismic-I would operate only in Turkish territorial waters and Papandreou’s declaration that no drilling would take place in disputed waters.

119. According to Clogg: “the Turkish government rescinded the 1964 decree restricting the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey. In return, Greece lifted her objections to the reactivation of the 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community, which had been ‘frozen’ since the 1980 Turkish military coup.” See Clogg (1991: 21).

120. For an evaluation of the Davos meeting and its impact on Greek–Turkish relations, see McDonald (1988: 99–102).

121. According to the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yannis Kapsis, a prominent figure of the patriotic faction of PASOK, later in 1988 Papandreou himself described the Davos communiqué as “shameful”. See Kapsis (1990: 133–6).

122. Nationalism and anti-Americanism, the two integral parts of Greece’s “underdog national culture,” were shared by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and functioned as serious constraints in Papandreou’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. For this observation see Loulis (1984–85: 380–2).


124. It was not until March 1995 that Greece decided to lift its veto towards the EU–Turkey Customs Union agreement. In exchange for the removal of the Greek veto on the Customs Union, accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would begin in March 1998. Cyprus would thus be included in the next round of enlargement accession negotiations.

125. In 1986, Greece vetoed the resumption of the Association relationship between Turkey and the EC and the release of frozen aid to Turkey. A year later, when Turkey applied for EC membership, Greece was the only member that openly opposed referring the application to the EC Commission for an Opinion. See Güvenç (1998/99: 103–30).

126. Materialized by Greece’s active participation in the Gulf War in 1991, the official recognition of the state of Israel, and the exchange of official and unofficial visits to the US and meetings with the then US President George W. Bush.

127. Certain analysts attribute Mitsotakis’s preference for dialogue and, especially, compromise solutions to his background, in particular to his contribution to the avoidance of a civil war in Crete in the aftermath of the Second World War. See Dimitrakos (1989: 198–206).

128. Mitsotakis made two proposals to Turkey. First, he officially proposed to Turkey and Bulgaria the creation of a defensive arms-free zone on the common borders between the three countries in the area of Thrace. Second, he proposed the

129. See Papandreou's statement in the Greek daily Eleftherotypia, September 13, 1991: “Mr. Mitsotakis discussed issues which should never constitute the subject of a dialogue between Greece and Turkey and he had taken on unacceptable commitments;” quoted in Rizas (2003: 167).

130. Protection of Greece's territorial integrity was the reason for its application for admission to the WEU in 1987. The WEU was thus viewed “as a system of political solidarity capable of activating diplomatic and political levers of pressure to deter Ankara from potential adventures in the Aegean.” See Valinakis (1988: 55).


133. Especially Mitsotakis's statement in September 26, 1991 that: “Greece is not opposing Turkey's European orientation. However, for as long as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved, my country will keep objecting the advancement of relations between the Community and Turkey. Especially, after the negative outcome of my meeting with Mr. Yılmaz in Paris and Turkey's backing out of what had been agreed.” As cited in Rizas (2003: 175–6).


135. According to Philip Robins, the conclusion of a Greek–Syrian defense accord in summer 1995, and the Greek Minister of Defense Yerasimos Arsenis's desire to form an anti-Turkish bloc to embrace Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, Russia, and Bulgaria, are to blame for Eletdağ's influential proposition on the “two and a half wars strategy.” See Robins (2003: 171–2).

136. See the results of the poll conducted from 19 to 27 January 1995 by ALKO/ICAL in Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, March 25–6, 1995: 16.

137. Cyprus submitted its application to become a member of the European Communities in July 1990. In October 1993 the Council of Ministers adopted the European Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, which stated that “...the Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership.” See Commission Opinion on the Application by Cyprus for Membership (1993: para 48).


3 The new strategy

139. Costas Simitis became Greece's Prime Minister after the seriously ill Andreas Papandreou was convinced to step down. As luck would have it, the Imia crisis reached its peak on January 28, ten days after Simitis's election as Prime Minister after PASOK held internal party elections (January 18) and six days into his premiership (January 22, 1996).
140. Stelios Alifantis served from September 1996 to September 2001 as special Advisor to the Minister of National Defense, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, and has been one of the inspirers of “flexible retaliation,” which became an integral part of Greece’s defense doctrine by the end of 1996 through to 2004; see White Papers of the Hellenic Armed Forces (1996–2004).

141. For Greece’s misguided expectations that both the Atlantic Alliance and the European security and defense projects could turn into security providers, see Tsakonas and Tournikiotis (2003: 301–14).

142. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke was rather sarcastic over the role the European Union played during the crisis which had erupted between an EU member and an aspirant country, as he stated: “[...] Europeans were sleeping through the night as President Clinton mediated the dispute over the phone,” quoted in Gordon (1997/8: 74). Interestingly, Holbrooke was the veteran mediator who, fresh from negotiating the Dayton Accords, was dispatched shortly after the January brinkmanship in the Aegean by President Clinton to assess the prospects for shuttle diplomacy in the region.

143. The catalytic effect the Imia crisis had on both the way Greece had been dealing so far with the “threat from the East” and the need for the adoption of a more effective strategy towards Turkey is highlighted by the then premier Costas Simitis; see Simitis (2005: 73). As noted by a prominent analyst of Greek foreign policy in the aftermath of the Imia crisis: “The Imia/Kardak islets and Cyprus crises of 1996 underscore the ease with which a state of protracted tension between the two countries may degenerate into organized violence and warfare. With any luck, leaders in both countries will have realized by now that a Greek–Turkish war is unthinkable, because it will isolate both belligerents from their Western institutional affiliations. Furthermore, even if Greece or Turkey were to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high-risk zones, with a devastating impact on their economies and societies.” See Couloumbis and Clarevas (1997: 36).

144. It is worth noting that the stimulating and/or shocking effects of the Imia crisis on the reorientation of Greece’s strategy towards Turkey were stressed to the author by all government agents being interviewed.

145. Author’s interview with Costas Simitis, Nikos Themelis and Christos Rozakis. The dominant impression in successive Greek governments since 1975 was that Turkey should be exclusively handled through military deterrence and the application of international law to the two states’ differences.

146. See Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5962–3).

147. See Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (March 1996: 4816, 4817).


149. I am indebted to Nikos Themelis for this clarification.


151. See Simitis’s arguments in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5969) and (December 1996: 1672).
152. As noted by many observers, since the mid-1990s Greek foreign policy appears more mature and relatively flexible, with positive consequences for the country’s international credibility and its role in the Balkans. See – among others – Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini and Vlachos-Dengler (2001).


155. Surprisingly, one of the most attractive policy proposals of Greece’s “national culture” (certain factions in the Greek academia and the public) in the early 1990s was the creation of an “orthodox arc” to counterbalance the emerging “Muslim arc,” promoted by certain Balkan states, namely Turkey, as well as the “omnipresent” Americans.

156. The common view is that Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policymaking, discourse, identities, political cultures, and public policies. See Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) and Börzel and Risse (2000).


158. According to Chase, Hill and Kennedy, “geopolitical pivots” are the states whose significance emanates from their sensitive geographic location and from the consequences of their pivotal vulnerable condition on the behavior of geostrategic players. The latter are the states that have the capacity to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter the geopolitical state of affairs. See Chase, Hill and Kennedy (1999: 1–11).

159. A 1995 Pentagon Report defined Turkey’s importance to US interests as follows: “Turkey in particular is now at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the US in the Eurasian continent, including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, sanctions on Iraq, relations with the Newly Independent States (NIS), the Middle East peace process, and transit routes for the Central Asian oil and gas.” See Department of Defense (1995: 25).

160. In a speech in the Greek Parliament in the aftermath of the Imia crisis and amidst severe criticism from the opposition, Greece’s Prime Minister Costas Simitis expressed his gratitude to the United States administration for its help in the successful management of the crisis. See Pretenderis (1996: 194).

161. Author’s interview with Nikos Themelis and Costas Simitis.

162. Author’s interviews with Nikos Themelis and Costas Simitis. See also Simitis (1992).

163. This argument had not only been persistently put forward to the author by most of the “norms entrepreneurs” of Greece’s socialization strategy being interviewed, but had also been highlighted as the key difference in approaching the Greek–Turkish conflict between Simitis’s and Karamanlis’s agentic cultures.

164. Author’s interview with Nikos Themelis.

165. Based on interviews with Nikos Themelis, Costas Simitis, and Christos Rozakis.

166. As has been noted by Kenneth Waltz: “In itself a structure does not directly lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within the
system, but does so indirectly. The effects are produced in two ways: through socialization of the actors and through competition among them...a process of socialization that limits and moulds behavior” See Waltz (1976: 74–6).

167. See also George Papandreou, “Isolation or a Historic Opportunity for Turkey?” To Vima, December 21, 1997.

168. Including at the time, apart from “the pillars” of the PASOK modernizers’ camp in foreign policy, namely Nikos Themelis and Christos Rozakis, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, and the then Alternate Ministers of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou and Yannos Kranidiotis. It should be noted that none of Greece’s strategy “norm entrepreneurs” being interviewed had wholeheartedly included the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, in the group of “the modernizers” who inspired and implemented the new socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. As noted by Kazamias: “…[H]aving resigned his ministerial position in 1994 to stand for Mayor of Athens, an election he failed to win, Pangalos found himself outside a PASOK cabinet for the first time since the early 1980s. He then decided to join Simitis’s modernizers’ faction in PASOK and soon became known as one of the “group of four” who led it. Ever since then, he has become, with Simitis, a fierce critic of Papandreou's populism and has discovered the virtues of modernization, about which he speaks eloquently, albeit in his own idiosyncratic style” (our emphasis); see Kazamias (1997: 85–6). Moreover, in a personal interview with the author, a prominent figure of the modernizers’ camp was not hesitant in putting the blame for the delay in the initiation of the new strategy on Pangalos’s stark opposition to any dialogue with Turkey in the aftermath of the Imia crisis. Pangalos’s opposition was based on the fact that “…Greece had not lost a war to allow itself to drag into negotiations with Turkey” (these words were attributed to him by one of the inspirers of Greece’s socialization strategy). Needless to say, Pangalos was seen by Turkish decision-makers as being irreconcilably opposed to any improvement in Greek–Turkish relations. His statement that “…a man can’t discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves,” almost in the aftermath of the Madrid Declaration between Greece and Turkey in July 1997, did not leave much room for any kind of constructive dialogue; see Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, September 27, 1997. Therefore, his inclusion in the aftermath of the Imia crisis into a group of decision-makers who were sharing common views on the need for development of a new strategy towards Turkey should be seen as the result of his preeminent position on foreign policy issues in the Simitis government and of the fact that Pangalos was the main architect – along with the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yannos Kranidiotis – of Cyprus’ accession strategy into the EU. Given that Cyprus’ accession was in the mid-1990s one of the main pillars of Greece’s new strategy towards Turkey, Pangalos should be present at and with a strong say on the strategy’s initial phases of implementation. It should be noted that Pangalos’ preeminent role in the development and implementation of Cyprus’s accession strategy – especially during the emblematic European Communities (EC)–Turkey Association Council in 1986 when the Cyprus issue was for the first time linked to Turkey’s European path – has been given particular credit by Greek political and academic circles. See, inter alia, the contributions of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot politicians and academics in the collective volume: In Memoriam of Yannos Kranidiotis (2005). The contribution of Theodore Pangalos in Cyprus’ accession strategy was candidly
recognized by the ex-President of the Cyprus Republic, Glafkos Clerides, in his most recent book: Documents of an Epoch (2007).

169. As, for example, in Barry Posen’s conceptualization, which, according to Legro’s sophisticated remark: “...invokes images of wise leaders cloistered in a map room charting a nation’s overall plan;” see Legro (2005: 204). After all the discussions with the “norm entrepreneurs” of Greece’s strategy, the impression remains that the story of Greece’s socialization strategy is that of a group of articulate decision-makers and intellectuals who, sharing the same views about cause and effect, embarked upon a process of developing a more productive and effective strategy towards Greece’s main security concern. Needless to say, instead of being charted as Greece’s overall plan, the development of the new strategy had been under constant elaboration and/or refinement on the part of the key figures involved in the strategy’s genesis and implementation.

170. The criteria used to assess a state’s strategy are: (i) “compatibility,” (ii) “internal coherence,” (iii) “efficiency,” and (iii) “linkage between means and ends.” The first criterion refers to the strategy’s compatibility with the domestic and international environment, and, by implication, to the strategy’s internal and, most importantly, external legitimacy. The second criterion refers to the absence or presence of a certain amount of coherence between the strategy’s main pillars, that is, a state’s foreign and defense policies. The third criterion assesses a state’s chosen strategy on the basis of a low cost–high result assessment, that is, two different strategies may achieve the same goals, yet one of them at a much higher cost than the other. The last criterion refers to a strategy’s ability to achieve its goals in the medium and long run with a parallel strengthening of its means; the reverse, namely the dwindling of a strategy’s means and the subsequent undermining of its long-term goals, is generally known as “over-extension.” For this sophisticated and useful categorization of grand strategy criteria, see Papasotiriou (1991: 34–7).

171. Although policymakers can hardly view their policy decisions as fitting particular analytical concepts or criteria, most of the Greek key decision-makers interviewed were concerned that the new strategy to be developed towards Turkey should, at least, not clash with Greece’s particular needs and priorities of the time. This was mostly evident in the author’s interviews with Costas Simitis, Nikos Themelis, Christos Rozakis, and Yannos Papantoniou, as well as in discussions with George Papandreou.

172. See also Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5962).

173. Because it failed to achieve the nominal convergence criteria that were stipulated in the Maastricht treaty, Greece was not included in the group of eleven European countries that proceeded to adopt the new currency, the euro, in January 1999. According to Greece’s former Premier, “The Madrid EU Summit in 1995 had made clear that in order to fully participate in the European Monetary Union on January 1st 1999, five particular criteria should be met by the end of 1997 by the interested EU members. This would, in turn, mean that in order for Greece to become a member of EMU on January 1st 2001 those five criteria should be met by the end of 1999. As a consequence, the time available for Greece’s core objective of achieving nominal convergence was three years (e.g., 1997, 1998 and 1999), at the maximum.” See Simitis (2005: 182).

It is noted that the average defense expenditure, as a percentage of GNP, for the period 1985–98 of the other NATO member-states was 3.1% and of the EU 15 member-states 2.6%. It is characteristic that in the period of 1989–99 there was a 30% increase in Greece’s defense spending (from $5.001 million to $6.543 million) and a 110% increase in Turkey’s defense spending (from $4.552 million to $9.588 million); see also Figure 1.

See the White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces (1996–7: 107). According to this document: “1.95 trillion drachmas is expected to be disbursed until 2000, immediately after the placing of orders, and the remaining according to deliveries.”

As the Greek premier Costas Simitis stressed: “Greece is neither Ireland nor Portugal. It is the current government, which is implementing the most extensive armaments program in Greece’s modern history in order to secure the country’s national interests.” See Simitis (2000).

As Kerin Hope has stressed while reporting from Athens about Greece’s decision to spend $4.9 billion on buying 60–90 Eurofighters for its Air Force “...the decision is controversial because of fears that high defense outlays would undermine Greece’s chances of achieving a budget surplus by 2003 in line with future commitments to the terms of the euro-zone’s stability and growth pact” (our emphasis). See Kerin Hope, ‘Greece to purchase $5bn European fighters’, Financial Times, March 9, 2000.

The most acute reference of Greece’s Prime Minister on the need for the achievement of these short-term and medium-term goals was made in his address to the Organizational Congress of PASOK in December 2000, where he stressed, that “...Greece is neither Ireland nor Portugal. It is the current government, which implements the most extensive armaments program in Greece’s modern history in order for its national interests to be secured”; see Simitis (2000).

The 1998–9 White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces has aptly demonstrated the defense–economy linkage by stressing that “...defense and economy constitute the basis, the two main pillars on which the national strategy of the nation stands...their interweaving plays a determining role in the achievement of the goals of national strategy. The harmonious linking of the two ensures Greece’s ability to successfully face the long-term antagonism with Turkey” (emphasis added). “Without a powerful, dynamically developing and prosperous economy, sooner or later the allocation of resources for the defense shall become very difficult with all that it means to the security of this country” (emphasis added). See White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces (1998–9: 150).

Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5962–3).

Although a systematic political as well as ideological program for intended change and reform towards “modernization,” and therefore “Europeanization,” was undertaken from the mid-1990s, Europeanization was limited to the institutional and procedural levels and to “agenda-setting,” while Greece kept rejecting the idea of incorporating central issues of its foreign policy, that is, issues of national significance or the so-called “national issues,” into the “logic of Europeanization.” For these remarks see Ioakimidis (2007: 37). For the asynchronic and autarkic forms of Greece’s Europeanization, see Ioakimidis (1994: 34).

Author’s interview with Nikos Themelis. Reference to a “foreign policy of principles” gradually became an essential part of most key decision-makers’ addresses to domestic and international audiences. See Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5964) and his address to the Woodrow Wilson Institute, Washington DC, April 22, 1999, p. 10. Greece’s former Minister of Foreign
Affairs, George Papandreou, used to describe Greece’s new foreign policy, most often right at the beginning of his speeches, to international (and Turkish) audiences, as one animated by and based on certain principles. Author’s personal notes from preparation of the Minister George Papandreou’s speeches to various international audiences, including – inter alia – The Paul-Henry Spaak Lecture, Harvard University, 2000; Address to the “Taksim Circle,” Istanbul, 2000; etc. See also Papandreou (2001: 1–10). As noted by George Papandreou in The Paul-Henry Spaak Lecture: “...[W]e have one message, a good and virtuous message and we support it in every country in our region, for every community in our region...we have a stand on Cyprus, on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on Yugoslavia, and on Turkey: we want the country united, peaceful and democratic, we want it multi-cultural and we want it to join the European Union.”


185. Author’s interview with Nikos Themelis. The Greek government remained hesitant to a Turkish proposal in March 1996 – while the Turkish “casus belli” remained intact – calling Greece to enter into unconditional negotiations with Turkey and not to apply exclusively international judicial methods, with a view to settling all the Aegean questions as a whole. For an assessment of the Turkish premier Mesut Yılmaz’s proposal on March 24, 1996, see Syrigos (1998: 365–70). For Greek decision-makers, the Turkish premier’s proposal was viewed as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” particularly due to the fact that the new (created after the Imia crisis) Turkish claims about the existence of “grey zones” in the Aegean were included in the Turkish proposal. See Costas Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5963).


187. Simitis (2005: 86). Also author’s interview with Christos Rozakis. Yannis Kranidiotis, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (February 1997–9), had been the inspirer and a strong supporter of the initiation of a dialogue with Turkey on issues of “low politics.” In November 1997 the Greek premier Simitis informed the Greek Parliament that his government’s “step-by-step” approach to Greek–Turkish relations was considered as the only approach that could produce concrete results. According to the Greek premier, the first step considered the renunciation of the threat of war, the respect of international law, and the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the part of Turkey. The second step considered the Greek–Turkish agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf to be submitted to the ICJ in The Hague, and the third step considered the initiation of official contacts between the two states for the exchange of views in areas of mutual interest and the promotion of cooperation on tourism, commerce, illegal migration, etc. See Parliamentary Minutes (November 1997: 1244–5).

188. See Simitis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (March 1996: 4824). According to Greece’s premier, “...it was the EU members’ invariable tactic to call upon Greece and Turkey to bilaterally negotiate over their differences. Indeed, our partners had not so far accepted that these differences should be settled in accordance with international law nor had they officially acknowledged the states’ [Greece and Turkey] obligation to submit their differences to the International Court of Justice.”

189. It also stated that dialogue should be pursued along the lines which had emerged in previous contacts between the interested parties and called for the
establishment of a crisis prevention mechanism. See Declaration adopted by the Fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU at the General Affairs Council on July 15, 1996, Brussels, SN 3543/96. Needless to say, the only result of the normative pressure exerted by these two prominent EU organs and the EU Council on the conflict was the further justification of the dominant perception in the Turkish elite, namely that the EU was being captured by Greece. See Rumelili (2004b: 13). The official acknowledgement by the EU on the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague had been an issue of paramount importance for the Greek decision-makers, and it was assessed as a major achievement of Greece's foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. See Simitis's remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1997: 2822).

190. See Office of the Press, Office of the Prime Minister of Greece, December 4, 1996.

191. Author's interview with Christos Rozakis. Greece's former premier Costas Simitis states that Greece's new strategy towards Turkey "started being implemented after 1997." See ibid., p. 86. Empirical findings do not, however, seem to verify this point. It would be more accurate to argue that Greece's new strategy towards Turkey started being elaborated more thoroughly in 1997, when it was made evident to Greek decision-makers that the traditional policies Greece followed vis-à-vis Turkey proved ineffective, if not counterproductive, if not counterproductive, although certain domestic, bilateral, and regional prerequisites for the strategy's adoption were still lacking.

192. The Turkish pressure on the EU for granting it a candidacy status had been coupled with veiled threats that Turkey's exclusion from the EU's enlargement project would have certain negative repercussions on NATO's enlargement project.

193. As noted, Greece's agentic culture already highlighted, in the wake of the Imia crisis, the need for a reorientation of Greece's strategy towards Turkey, while it also described, although in a general form, the basic goals and means of this strategy. It was, however, the pressure coming from developments in the European Union in view of the EU's next enlargement phase, most notably certain EU members' interest for upgrading EU–Turkey relations, which created an immediate need for a forthcoming and productive, instead of a defensive and negative, Greek stance on the future of Greek–Turkish relations. Author's interview with Christos Rozakis.

194. The positions of certain EU members, namely Great Britain, France, and Germany, along with the Commission's views on the upgrading of EU–Turkey relations, were presented and assessed in a confidential document released on March 4, 1997 by a high official of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who happened to have been playing a prominent role in all the phases of the elaboration and implementation of Greece's new strategy towards Turkey. Interestingly, the document – which triggered the genesis of an intense debate among high officials in the Greek MFA – proposed a U-turn in Greece's traditional policy vis-à-vis Turkey by suggesting Greece's concession to the upgrading of Turkey's role (through the lifting of its veto on Turkey's closer relations with the EU) under the condition that Greece will "...link the eventual upgrading of EU-Turkey relations with the normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey." Furthermore, the document argued that in the event that British ideas for granting Turkey – along with other Southeast European states, namely Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia – the status of a "special relationship" with the EU were to prevail, Greece should link its concession to a more demanding set
of prerequisites, mostly related to certain Greek interests, such as the obligation of Greece and Turkey to submit their differences in the jurisdiction of the ICJ in The Hague, the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute on the basis of an agreed schedule, the inclusion of the issue regarding protection of human rights in Turkey into the “preaccession process” that would be set up for Turkey, and the resolution of the Cyprus issue in accordance with the UNSC resolution and within a particular timeframe. Surprisingly, the core of the forthcoming ideas presented in this document became the central elements of Greece’s new strategy, which reached its climax in the EU summit decisions at Helsinki in December 1999.

195. For a detailed presentation of the rationale of Greece’s new strategy towards Turkey, see the remarks made by the then Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1997: 2840–5).

196. See Simitis (2005: 86) based on proposals made by the then Secretary General for European Affairs, Yannis Kranidiotis.

197. The Cyprus government announced its decision to purchase the Russian-made missile system on January 6, 1997 after a recommendation made – according to the Greek-Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides–by the then Greek Minister of Defense, Yerasimos Arsenis. In addition, during the negotiations between the Cypriot government and the Russian defense company over the purchase of the missile system, namely from March to December 1996, premier Simitis was not personally involved in the said decision, nor was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called upon to express its support over the Greek-Cypriot government decision to purchase the system. See Konstantinos Angelopoulos, “The Clear Responsibility of Athens,” Kathimerini, December 20, 1998.

198. The Prime Minister Costas Simitis, Yerasimos Arsenis, Minister of Defense (January 1996–September 1998), and Akis Tsohatzopoulos, Minister of Defense (September 1998–April 2000). Unlike Arsenis and Tsohatzopoulos, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, seemed also to be a member of the camp of the skeptics over the usefulness of the Joint Defense Doctrine. See Yannis Kartalis, “Time for Decisions,” To Vima, November 22, 1998: A34.

199. See Costas Simitis’s speech on September 19, 1995 in Lefkosia, Cyprus, as cited in Triantafyllos Dravaliaris, “By the Simitis hand, through the mouth of advisors,” Imerisia, December 22, 2002: 6. In that speech Simitis also stresses that “...[c]ertain political figures insist that the solution of the Cyprus problem should precede Cyprus’s accession to the European Union. Our efforts should be directed towards the tipping of that thesis.”


202. Also former premier Simitis’s interview with the author.

203. The other three CBMs proposed, but rejected by Greece, regarded the disarming of military aircraft taking part in training flights; the use of the IFF/SIF electronic system for the identification of aircraft in order to avoid engagement; and the setting up of a center for direct communication between Greece and Turkey. See Syrigos (1998: 374–6).

204. Interestingly, the Madrid Declaration or Communiqué was issued as a statement by the US Department of State, and it was entitled: “Meeting of Secretary of
State Madeleine K. Albright with Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos and Turkish Foreign Minister Cem,” July 8, 1997.

205. According to the Madrid Declaration, Greece and Turkey agreed to pursue efforts to promote their bilateral relations based upon six particular points: (i) a mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighborly relations; (ii) respect for each other's sovereignty; (iii) respect for the Principles of International Law and International Agreements; (iv) respect for each other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean, which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty; (v) commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force. See Syrigos (1998: 380).

206. In an interview with Newsweek on August 11, 1997, only a couple of months after the Madrid Declaration, the Greek premier Costas Simitis stated that the issue of the continental shelf is ‘the more substantive’ Greek–Turkish difference, implying that there are also other differences between Greece and Turkey; as cited in Karzis (2006: 274).

207. On July 11, 1997, twenty-two PASOK MPs signed a document which severely criticized the Madrid Declaration. Their criticism was mainly focused on the commitments Greece undertook to respect Turkey’s vital interests and concerns and to refrain from unilateral acts in the Aegean. According to the criticism, the acceptance of the former can be explained in politics and not in law, and therefore it constituted an important retreat from the traditional Greek approach to the Aegean dispute, which was viewed as a purely legal one. By the latter Greece conceded to refrain from its right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean, given that such an eventuality presupposes a unilateral act on the part of the state willing to exercise its right. Interestingly, the MPs’ fear came true when the spokesman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “...extension of the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean beyond the current limit of six nautical miles would mean violation of the Madrid Declaration on the part of Greece.” See statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, Necat Utan, Directorate of Information and Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 28, 1998. Although the “Document of the 22” was considered as the most important homogeneous and “institutionally expressed” opposition to premier Simitis’s choices over foreign policy issues, there were many other examples of PASOK MPs who were not hesitant to express their opposition publicly. Anastasios Peponis, a leading figure of PASOK’s patriotic faction, stated in the aftermath of the Madrid Declaration that the government’s decision to sign the agreement “was taken in full opposition to assurances given in the PASOK Parliamentary Assembly,” while “...the commitments taken also lack popular legitimacy.” See his interview to Yannis Diakoyannis in Ta Nea, July 11, 1997.


209. Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) signed an agreement calling for an association council to work towards the partial economic and defense integration of Turkey with the occupied northern part of the island. The Greek foreign ministry strongly condemned the agreement.

210. The Dutch Presidency took the initiative for the establishment of a “Committee of Wise Men” (where Greece and Turkey would propose a “wise man” from a
third party), who would study the Greek–Turkish problems, identify possible solutions and then refer the problems which could not be resolved to the ICJ. See Rumelili (2004b: 15–17). Although the Dutch Presidency initiative reflected a move of the EU from its traditional stance of hesitancy or indifference to a new innovative stance towards the Greek–Turkish dispute, it was eventually diluted precisely due to what was considered its comparative advantage in its involvement as a typical “third party,” namely the lack of an explicit link either to Turkey’s membership prospects or to Greece’s status within the EU.

211. In almost every debate taking place in the Greek Parliament over foreign policy issues from 1996 to 2001, there were references made by the two representatives of Greece’s new agentic culture, namely Costas Simitis and George Papandreou, to the promotion of Greece’s interests and the furtherance of its security through the advancement of the EU’s foreign and security policy. See – inter alia – Parliamentary Minutes (May 1996: 5969; December 1996: 1678–9; December 1997: 2809–10 and 2841–2; and January 2001: 4036–8).

212. Premier Simitis described as particularly positive the agreement reached in Amsterdam that foreign policy decisions of strategic importance to the EU would be made unanimously. This meant that any member state could veto a common action if it felt its vital interests would be harmed. According to the Athens News Agency, Simitis told reporters that, on common foreign and security policies, “the references concerning respect of the EU’s integrity and external borders and on the development of a mutual policy of solidarity among the member states were also satisfactory.” See Athens News Agency, June 18, 1997.


214. Luxembourg Conclusions of December 1997 on how EU–Turkey relations should evolve states that “…strengthening Turkey’s links with the European Union also depends on that country’s pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions” (our emphasis). See Luxembourg Conclusions (1997).

215. Turkey remained highly anxious due to Cyprus’ purchase and planned deployment of the Russian S-300 missiles, and responded with a verbal counteroffensive, emphasizing that such actions would destabilize the security of the region and only provoke a military response by Turkey. Mistakenly, for certain Turkish analysts the announcement of the Cyprus government in December 1998 that the missile system would be installed instead on the Greek island of Crete constituted a clear indication that Greek-Cypriots had taken into account that Turkey was serious about its war threats as well as its statement that it would possibly go ahead with the annexation of northern Cyprus if the missile system were installed in Cyprus. See Aydin (2004: 33).

216. As an influential Greek intellectual of the modernizers’ camp suggested in a vitriolic way, “…it may be more appropriate to dub this policy ‘the Integrated Self-Destructive Doctrine’”, a nickname which fits the original Greek acronym. See

217. See the EU Commissioner for External Affairs, Hans van der Brook’s interview with Christina Poulidou in Ependytis, February 13–14, 1999. Needless to say, the cancellation of the missiles deployment was welcomed by the US, the Austrian Presidency of the EU, and certain EU members, notably Great Britain, France, and Germany.

218. The Greek-Cypriot Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Yannis Kranidiotis, had presented in a clear-cut and courageous way the reasons which dictated the cancellation of the deployment of the S-300 missile system on Cyprus soil. After relaxing the Greek-Cypriots’ concerns about the willingness of Greece to defend and guarantee their security through the JDD – by explaining that the Greek-Cypriot JDD was not limited to the purchase of the S-300 missile system and that its deployment in Greece still serves the goals of the doctrine – Kranidiotis highlighted the need for the Cyprus issue to be disentangled from a “militarization” logic and for Cyprus’ accession process to further advance with full backing of the international and European community. See Yannis Kranidiotis, “The Three New Goals of Greece and Cyprus,” *To Vima*, January 3, 1999 (A 20).

219. All Greek high officials closely involved in the Öcalan fiasco were dismissed by premier Simitis. These included Philippos Petsalnikos and Alekos Papadopoulos, the ministers of Public Order and Justice, respectively; Charalambos Stavrakakis, the chief of the Greek Intelligence Service (EYP); and Theodore Pangalos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

220. According to an opinion poll 96 percent of Greeks supported Serbia, while 60 percent supported the Serbian leader Milosevic; see Ker-Lindsay (2007: 38).

221. On March 25, 1999, President Clinton addressed the nation to explain why US and NATO action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo was critical to US national interests. Pointing to a map, Clinton said “Let a fire burn here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key US allies could be drawn into the conflict.” The US allies he referred to were NATO partners Greece and Turkey; as cited in Migdalovitz (1999: 1).

222. Interestingly, this was part of the argumentation used by the former Greek Premier Costas Simitis during the official talks he had with the US President Clinton in the White House on April 9, 1996. It was during this meeting that Greece proposed a “step-by-step” approach to be followed in Greek–Turkish relations; see Simitis (2005: 82).

223. See Yannis Kranidiotis’s interview in Ependytis (Greek weekly), July 10, 1999; as cited in Ker-Lindsay (2007: 53). Christos Rozakis confirmed to the author that Yannis Kranidiotis had elaborated and proposed to the Greek government in 1997 certain proposals regarding bilateral talks Greece and Turkey could undertake on a series of the so-called “low-politics issues.”

224. For a detailed account of the Greek and Turkish official and unofficial reactions to the earthquakes that shocked İzmit, in the Marmara province, and Athens, see Ker-Lindsay (2007: 57–72) and Evin (2004).

225. The newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, was a strong believer in the positive contribution NGOs can have in the development of Greek civil society and, more generally, in Greece’s modernization. He was thus not hesitant to immediately proceed into the institutionalization of relations between Greek NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1999 a
General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation (YDAS) was established at the Greek MFA, with the aim of financing and monitoring development assistance, emergency and post-humanitarian aid programs initiated by NGOs and directed towards developing countries. A “Committee on NGOs” was also established with the aim of providing information to Greek NGOs about the ways in which they could acquire a consultative status in international institutions such as the EU, NATO, the UN, and the OSCE. The Committee also attempted to create a network for effective communication and collaboration among NGOs and the MFA Directorates. See Frangonikolopoulos (2003: 453–4).

226. The network of professionals (academic community members, intellectuals, journalists, retired diplomats, etc.) with recognized expertise in foreign policy issues.

227. Indeed, as the results of a poll conducted in Greece in the autumn of 1997 showed, a very high percentage of the Greek people favored rapprochement with Turkey. See “Most Greeks Want Rapprochement with Turkey,” Reuters, October 30, 1997; as cited in Ker-Lindsay (2007: 118).

228. Interestingly enough, Rozakis has been less optimistic with regard to the same degree of unanimity one could find on the other side of the Aegean. In his words: “...[in Turkey] the use of force, or at least the threat of its use, seems to constitute an integral part of any internal or external policy for tackling difficult situations and solving problems.”

229. “Political Europeanization” refers to the impact of European integration on domestic institutional structures (national executives and administrative structures) as well as on political actors (such as political parties and parliaments), interest groups (such as civil society, epistemic communities, the media, and the church), and processes (such as immigration). The development of foreign policy in a globalized environment also demonstrated the connection and interdependence of the various means of exercise of foreign policy, such as the economy and defense. On the bureaucratic and institutional adaptation of Greece’s “foreign policymaking structures,” see Ioakimidis (2001: 87–9); and Kavakas (2000: 145–8). For an assessment of the impact of Europeanization on the national party systems of the member states of the European Union (EU), see Mair (2000: 27–51). On the Europeanization impact on particular interest groups, see Cowles (2001).

230. “Societal Europeanization” is defined as a process of change in the “construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings” within the context of European integration; see Cowles and Risse (2001: 219). In other words, the EU becomes a reference point in the construction of social identities and alters the way in which such identities are constructed and represented. Societal Europeanization can thus be understood as a process of international socialization, entailing the internalization of the EU constitutive beliefs and practices, in a state’s international environment; see Schimmelfennig (2000: 111). By implication, societal self-perceptions evolve and change in accordance with the EU norms and practices, and coordination and synchronization with other member-states is encouraged, even in domains such as foreign policy. Needless to say, although operating on a fundamental level, this type of Europeanization is rather difficult to identify and/or measure. See Glarbo (2001: 140–57).

231. “Discursive Europeanization” refers to a more in-depth internalization of the EU norms and practices in the public discourse, thus making key actors as well as
secondary political actors, interest groups, and processes make reference to the EU, that is, to specific EU actors and policies. Thus, “a perfectly Europeanized public discourse” would see all political actors routinely make reference to the European level.

232. As an analyst exploring the role of experts in Greek foreign policy observed in the same volume: “Although Greek–Turkish relations have not been dealt with through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or other EU foreign policy tools, ‘soft’ mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place and the EU has played an important role in Greece’s strategy shift. The observable change in Greece’s policy style reflects a more consensual and more multilateral strategy towards Turkey.” See Ladi (2007: 78).

233. In Jeffrey Legro’s words, “a reigning idea will collapse only if a state acts in accordance with its prescriptions, and this leads to foreign policy failures.” See Legro (2005: 84).

234. See remarks made under the eloquent phrase “The triumph of liberalism or where did realist go?” by Keridis (2003: 317–22). See also the remarks of Hercules Millas, a well-known expert on Greek–Turkish relations, about the self-restraint demonstrated by the segments of the Greek national culture “permanently concerned over the Greek national issues” in the aftermath of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement; Hercules Millas, “Greece-Turkey, Communication!” To Vima, July 17, 1999.

235. Author’s interview with Costas Simitis.

236. Interestingly in the 2004 national elections only five of the MPs who had signed the “Document of the 22” in the aftermath of the Madrid Declaration had been reelected, with one of them, namely Stelios Papathemelis, being elected with the flag of New Democracy’s conservative party. See Karzis (2006: 139). It is also worth noting that, according to the para-state nationalist and amateurish agents who invited the PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan to Greece, the invitation was made in response to a plea made by 180 Greek parliamentarians – including all the MPs of PASOK’s patriotic faction – who signed a memorandum asking the Greek government to officially provide Öcalan with political asylum; see Dokos and Tsakonas (2005: 278).

237. The second round of talks took place in Athens on September 9–10, 1999 and in Ankara on September 15–16, 1999. The discussions focused on tourism, environment, economic and commercial relations, culture, cooperation in the multilateral regional field and combating organized crime, illegal immigration, drag trafficking, and terrorism. The third round of talks took place in Ankara on October 21–22, 1999 and in Athens on October 25–26, 1999. For the first time officials from other pertinent Ministries and Directorates of the public sector were participating in the Greek and Turkish delegations. The discussions focused on the drafting of a series of agreements related to tourism, culture, environment, economic-technological and scientific cooperation, double taxation, the protection of investments, organized crime, terrorism, etc. It is also worth noting that, on the fringe of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1999, Greece and Turkey agreed to further broaden bilateral cooperation in the field of energy and dealing with natural disasters.

238. A poll conducted by a leading Greek newspaper in mid-September 1999 showed that feelings in Greece towards Turkey had improved significantly. Specifically, 74 percent of Greeks supported direct discussions with Turkey. Turks had also received an average sympathy score of 4.4 on a scale of one to ten, being thus
ahead of two other neighbors, who have also been demonized – although for different reasons – in popular Greek thinking, namely Slav-Macedonians and Albanians, who scored 4.3 and 2.8, respectively; see Ta Nea, October 5, 1999.

239. Greece’s national culture – since the late 1980s and early 1990s – had undergone a fundamental change in its social composition from a highly homogeneous society to one that is increasingly heterogeneous. See Diamandouros (2001: 71). Also, due to its growing participation and involvement in the dynamics of European integration, it had started being more malleable to the force of Europeanization and thus more receptive to arguments from the Greek decision-makers.

240. The EU summits in Cologne and Berlin in June 1999, which secured a vast amount of EU structural funds through the 3rd Framework of European Support, have strengthened Greece’s confidence in the EU forums. See Simitis (2005: 91) and interview with the author. Premier Simitis presented the agreement Greece achieved in March 1999 over the EU funding of Greece with more than 24 billion drachmas for investment and development projects as a “gigantic development boost, that will turn Greece from a developing to a developed country.” See Parliamentary Minutes (May 1999: 7140).

241. An additional reason of confidence for Greece’s agentic culture was the fact that by the end of 1999 Greece had managed to reduce the budget deficit to 0.9 percent, indeed an unprecedented figure in Greek postwar history. See Christodoulakis (2000).

242. The term was used by Nikos Themelis to describe the climate which was gradually created in the various European partners with regard to their receptiveness to Greece’s sincere willingness to solve its differences with neighboring Turkey in accordance with international law and agreements.

243. As noted, such an approach distinguishes the structure of the Greek–Turkish relationship from its process; while it recognizes that states function within a competitive international environment, it also assumes that neofunctionalist strategies can still prove effective at the process level, especially through the actors’ socialization, which limits and shapes behavior.

244. The term is attributed to Ifantis (2005: 391). Ifantis attempts to explain the dilemmas of Greece’s two traditional strategies vis-à-vis Turkey: those of containment and engagement. He posits that neither strategy fully satisfies Greece’s foreign policy concerns and he thus opts for a third one, which he names “balancing engagement.” This study identifies “socialization strategy” with the proposed “balancing engagement” policy, and argues that it is actually the strategy adopted by Greece in the late 1990s.

245. Based on author’s interviews with Costas Simitis, Nikos Themelis, Christos Rozakis; extensive discussions with George Papandreou and Nikos Kotzias; participation in a series of meetings at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborating Greece’s new strategy vis-à-vis Turkey from July 1999 to late 2002; and articles written by certain key figures of Greece’s socialization strategy in the Greek daily press, such as Costas Simitis and Christos Rozakis. See also Simitis (2005) and Papandreou (2000: 28–35).

246. The Greek decision-makers’ dilemma resembles, ceteris paribus, the dilemma policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic faced during the latter stages of World War II when they were called upon to decide what to do with a war-ravaged Germany. Among a range of policy prescriptions put forward at the time – including the reduction of Germany to a state of quasi-feudalism, its
demilitarization, and the withdrawal of US troops from the duplicitous institutions of European power politics – the most unlikely one prevailed, namely the institutionalization of Germany at the heart of the Western alliance and its transformation from “enemy of the West” to “cornerstone of Western civilization.” See Jackson (2006).

247. As the former Greek premier stated during the presentation of the former Cyprus President Glafkos Clerides’s book on the Cyprus issue: “...opportunity is not a stroke of luck or a godsend. The enlargement of the EU was, indeed, the initial opportunity. Nevertheless, it would not have been an opportunity had the Greek government not succeeded – along with other interested EU partners – in demanding the fulfillment of the same criteria for all candidate states; had it not succeeded in showing – along with the Greek-Cypriots – the Turkish intransigence over the Cyprus issue; had the Greek government not insisted at the EU summit in Helsinki that the solution of the Cyprus problem should not constitute a prerequisite for Cyprus’ accession in the EU. Opportunity can thus be built, systematically and with pertinacity.” See Simitis, text released to the media in the presentation of Clerides’s book (2007).

248. Obviously, at the epicenter of Greece’s “socialization strategy” lies the assumption that the EU is not something “out there” and that it can only affect national (i.e., Turkey’s) policymaking after its membership. On the contrary, it is also in the preaccession process that Europeanization can be effective, mainly with regard to Turkey’s democratization. For a theoretical treatment of this view see Irondelle (2003: 223). For the opposite argument see Radaelli (2001: 107–42).

249. Albeit the Turkish threat was not considered as an existential one, but as a foreign policy issue manageable by rationalist-driven policies. Based on author’s interviews with Nikos Themelis and Costas Simitis.

250. Shimsoni uses the term “constructive accommodation strategy” to denote “the pursuit of ‘conciliation’ where deterrent threats are relevant and appropriate.” See Shimsoni (1988: 7).

251. Based on author’s interview with Nikos Themelis and Costas Simitis. See also Simitis’s and George Papandreou’s remarks on Karamanlis’s criticism of the strategy followed by the Greek government towards Turkey, especially with regard to decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki, as being one of appeasement to Turkey’s expansionist policy. See Parliamentary Minutes (January 2001: 4039–40 and 4047–50).

252. For a useful categorization of the various forms of diplomacy, as an essential component of a state’s grand strategy, see Fakiolas (2006: 69–70).

253. Author’s discussions with Nikos Themelis. See also Nikos Kotzias’s (Chief Advisor to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou) editorials in the Greek daily Imerisia, November 1997 to December 2000.

254. Author’s interview with Costas Simitis; see also Simitis (2005: 91).

255. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, will not be hesitant to openly state “...there is no doubt that the Helsinki decision was a strategic decision, a geopolitical decision. It had to do with Europe’s security and Europe’s capacity to guarantee peace and stability in that part of Europe. It was not so much an economic decision or a decision for European integration.” See Gunter Verheugen interview to international media after his meeting with the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, in Washington DC, April 7, 2000.

256. Gunter Verheugen was revealing about the catalytic role played by the German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in the change of EU’s strategy en route to
Helsinki. He stated that “...the strongest momentum for the change of the EU’s Luxembourg strategy came after a meeting, here in Washington, in August 1998 between the then chancellor candidate of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and President Clinton. The candidate status of Turkey was one of the three issues the two politicians discussed and Gerhard Schroeder made a very strong commitment at that meeting by promising the American President that he, as chancellor, would change the German position in regard to Turkey’s candidacy status. And the German position was crucial for the European position, and as you know, it happened.” See Gunter Verhüegen interview to international media, Washington DC, April 7, 2000.

257. According to a 1998 publication of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey was considered globally as “an important player;” its economy stood sixteenth on a global scale while it had the most attractive market in the broader area. For these remarks see Turkey and the World (1998: 3, 20).

258. These transregional challenges included some of the most fashionable topics on the post-Cold War security agenda, especially in the United States, such as missile proliferation and defense, refugee movements, transnational crime and terrorism, and energy security in an era of new transport routes. See Lesser (2004: 84).

259. For the variety of roles – with a key one being in “energy geopolitics” – Turkey was called upon to play in its periphery, see Lesser (2000a: 204–13), and Lesser (2004: 84–6). For an enlightening presentation of Turkey’s potential roles in its immediate neighborhood and its characterization as a key state in the overall transatlantic partnership, see the address of the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mark Grossman, to the Middle East Forum of Philadelphia on March 13, 2000. Also US Department of State (1999: 339). In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski analyzed Turkey’s important role for US interests by referring to Turkey as a “critically important geopolitical pivot;” see Brzezinski (1997).

260. It was as early as 1996 that NATO agreed to build a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, which would permit and support autonomous military operations led by the EU. At the Washington Summit of 1999, NATO launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to equip its forces for new tasks of crisis management and intervention.

261. In the late 1990s, Washington viewed Turkey as a “pivotal state,” in the sense that Turkey’s political evolution could have wider consequences for Turkey’s regional and international environment. See Makovski (1999: 8–119).

262. Obviously, this was neither the first nor the last time the US lobbied for Turkey in the European capitals. In 1995 the US government gave Turkey enormous diplomatic support in winning the EU Parliament’s approval for establishing a customs union between the EU and Turkey. See Abramowitz (2000: 179). The US will again raise the Turkish issue on every occasion the EU takes decisions on future relations between Ankara and the Union in 2002, 2004 and 2005. See Morton Abramowitz, “An American Perspective on Turkey and the EU,” Zaman (English edition), December 30, 2005.

263. This phrase was used by Greece’s former Premier Costas Simitis during an interview with the author.

264. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, George Papandreou had stressed: “the heart of the European ethos lies in building the institutions and practices of inclusiveness.” See Papandreou, “Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade,” International Herald Tribune, December 10, 1999.
265. As already noted in Chapter 1, the use of these terms is attributed to Theodore Couloumbis.
266. Under the condition, of course, that certain prerequisites would have first been met; see Simitis (2005: 92).
267. After raising Greece’s credibility in the eyes of the European community Greece had to make full use of the benefits stemming from its active participation in the exclusive club of the European Union. Based on author’s interview with Nikos Themelis.
268. This point has been accepted and further verified by the former premier Costas Simitis in an interview with the author.
269. For the “bottom-up” process as the second dimension of Europeanization, see Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005: 221–3).
270. Wong calls this “bottom-up and sideways process” of Europeanization: “national projection;” see Wong (2006: 7 and 12).

4 Implementing the strategy

271. Including at the time, apart from “the pillars” of the PASOK modernizers’ camp in foreign policy, namely Nikos Themelis and Christos Rozakis and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou. It is worth noting that one of the key architects of the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, the then Alternate Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yannos Kranidiotis, was killed in a plane accident on September 15, 1999.
272. Based on the author’s personal involvement in the said Task Force from June to September 1999. According to Stella Ladi: “... neither MFA in-house experts, nor government-funded research institutes such as EKEM, had an impact on the shift of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. Their role was limited to in-house experts who participated in the epistemic community due to personal interest or through their good relationship with George Papandreou. [...] Interestingly, although no institutions participated in the preparation of the foreign policy shift, many agree that a network of experts (an epistemic community) was formed around the Foreign Minister.” See Ladi (2007: 77–9).
273. Apart from the then Prime Minister Costas Simitis, these key political figures included: George Papandreou, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Professor Christos Rozakis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Dr Nikos Themelis, Head of the Prime Minister Office for Strategic Planning. In addition, a network of official and unofficial figures was formed around the aforementioned core of key decision-makers, which included, among others, Professors Panagiotis Ioakimidis, Nikos Kotzias, and Harris Pamboukis and Ambassadors Aristides Agathoklis and Theodore Sotiropoulos. Reference to certain individuals is also based on the author’s personal involvement in the elaboration of Greece’s new strategy towards Turkey while serving as Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the official diplomatic initiatives undertaken and contacts made by Greek decision-makers – especially those of the Greek premier, C. Simitis, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Papandreou – to convey Greece’s new stance toward the prospects of Turkey’s EU candidacy to EU partners, see Simitis (2005: 93–4); Nikos Marakis, “Crisis...Building Measures: What Prospects for Greek–Turkish Relations?,” To Vima, October 17, 1999; and Ker-Lindsay (2007: 84).
274. The conditions Turkey should fulfill for Greece to drop its long-standing veto on Turkey’s candidacy were again made known to the Greek public in May 1999
during the address of the Greek premier Costas Simitis to the Greek Parliament; see Parliamentary Minutes (May 1999: 7139).

275. It is worth noting that already since June 1993, and in an effort to put pressure on the parties involved in the Cyprus issue, the Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership issued by the European Commission stressed that “...the need to promote a political settlement is all the more paramount as the current situation would make it difficult for Cyprus to accept and implement commitments made under the European Union Treaty” (author’s emphasis). See Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, June 30, 1993, paragraph 22. Apparently, Cyprus’ accession path to the EU was tremendously strengthened by the EU Council’s conclusions in Corfu, Greece in June 1994 and in Essen, Germany in October 1994, when the EU made a commitment that both Cyprus and Malta would be included in the EU’s next enlargement phase.

276. Personal interview with Professor Christos Rozakis, one of the key decision-makers who had been in the process of conveying Greece’s position to the EU partners prior to the EU summit in Helsinki.

277. See scheduled meetings in Brussels of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, with the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, on November 15, 1999, and with the EU Commissioner on EU Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, on the following day. Also Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs scheduled meeting with the ambassadors of the EU-14 in Athens, on December 3, 1999. Based on author’s personal notes and information provided by the Diplomatic Office of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou.

278. On the fringe of the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, Greek premier Simitis attempted to convey to his Turkish counterpart, Ecevit, that Greece’s decision not to veto the granting of Turkey’s candidacy in the forthcoming EU summit in Helsinki should be followed by certain assurances on the part of Turkey, namely, that Turkey would not return to its previous disruptive policies. See Simitis (2005: 95); and Ker-Lindsay (2007: 90).

279. Simitis’s interview with the author; also Simitis (2005: 96).

280. For these remarks, see ibid., and author’s interview with Nikos Themelis and Christos Rozakis.

281. Namely, Cyprus’s accession to the EU without the resolution of the thorny Cyprus problem being a precondition and the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict through reference to the ICJ in The Hague.

282. The line of Greece’s argumentation prior to and at the EU summit in Helsinki is based on the author’s interviews with most of the persons interviewed or those exchanged views in the period 1999–2004. It is also based on the work of a small Task Force created at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to the Helsinki summit and dissolved after it, whose main task was to elaborate on the position the Greek government should take towards EU members as well as towards the Greek public.

283. Certain EU states, most notably Germany, found the Greek–Turkish dispute, and particularly Greece’s objections over Turkey’s candidacy, a very convenient pretext for their own objections to Turkey’s closer relations with the EU. For reference to a plethora of examples in the period 1997–8, see Arikan (2003: 168–9). For statements made by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs in the aftermath of the Madrid Declaration and ahead of the EU summit in Luxembourg
over certain EU states’ stance to hide behind Greece in regard to Turkey’s EU path, see Celestine Bohlen, “At Long Last, Greece and Turkey Tiptoe Toward Reconciliation,” New York Times, July 21, 1997.

284. Interestingly, certain Heads of EU member-states were not hesitant to candidly express their gratitude to Greek premier Simitis for Greece’s courageous stance with regard to Turkey’s candidacy. These included, among others, the British premier Tony Blair, the French President Chirac, the German Chancellor Schroeder, the Italian premier D’Alema, and the Spanish premier Aznar. Based on author’s interview with a Greek diplomat who was present at the discussions which took place during the second meeting of the morning session of December 10. See also the statements made by Schroeder, Blair and Aznar in the discussions which had taken place over the EU summit in Helsinki in the German (December 16, 1999), British (December 13, 1999) and Spanish (December 15, 1999) Parliaments, respectively.

285. In Helsinki, the EU leaders had also made Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Malta official candidates. These states would join Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus, who had already begun formal entry talks in 1998.

286. In a letter sent by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, on December 16, 1999 to all Greek Embassies and Permanent Missions around the world, as well as to the Offices and Directorates of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a detailed presentation of the goals achieved at the EU summit at Helsinki was presented, particularly with regard to the “communitarization” of the Greek–Turkish dispute, the monitoring and screening of Turkey’s behavior both internally and externally by the EU, and the unblocking of Cyprus’s accession from the resolution of the Cyprus political problem.

287. As many EU members made explicit on many occasions, the set of political preconditions posed to Turkey by the European Union are not additional preconditions for formal candidacy, as Turkey argued in many instances, but simply conditions posed to and fulfilled by other applicants in the past, therefore constituting a conditio sine qua non for eligibility, not for membership.

288. As Buzan and Diez stressed: “The EU is, by its entire logic, ‘post Westphalian’: that is, it represents a model of relations between states that goes significantly beyond the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Part of the price to be paid even for partial association with an international organization, such as the European Union, is tolerance of a high level of mutual interference in domestic affairs, aimed at harmonizing a wide range of legal, moral and institutional practices;” see Buzan and Diez (1999: 50–1).

289. Specifically, Paragraph 9a of the Conclusions reads as follows: “The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”

290. For an analysis of how far forward the EU leaders went at Helsinki compared with decisions taken in the past over the Cyprus issue, see Nugent (2000: 147). Interestingly, viewed from a Turkish perspective, “…[i]t became apparent that the EU had endorsed the Greek view by not linking the Cyprus accession to a political settlement of the Cyprus issue...[t]his is what Greece and Cyprus
291. In his first reaction to Helsinki Conclusions, Denktas described the EU decisions as “erroneous.” On the same line of reasoning, supporters of the Turkish-Cypriot leader policy on the Cyprus issue described the decisions taken at Helsinki as a defeat for Turkey, since “[t]he Aegean issues and Cyprus have now become ‘European problems’. These issues are slipping out of Ankara’s control, becoming involved in processes that promise uncertain results.” See former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mümtaz Soysal’s letter to Hürriyet (reprinted in Turkish Daily News, January 8, 2000). In an appearance on the state TV show “Praise of Politics” on Sunday December 12, 1999, Turkish premier Bülent Ecevit admitted that “...Denktas was justified in being concerned over the results of the Helsinki summit,” but added that “…TRNC would never be in any danger as long as Turkey continues to exist,” while he also added the warning that “...if there arises a divergence of opinion about TRNC being a national cause, that will be dangerous.” See “Ecevit: Turkey capable of attaining harmony with Europe,” Turkish Daily News, December 13, 1999.

292. The Turkish dislike of recourse to the ICJ was also made evident in the discussions following the EU’s decision to grant Turkey a candidacy status between the EU’s High Representative of Foreign Policy and Defence, Javier Solana, and the Turkish Premier, Bülent Ecevit, and Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, on December 11, 1999 in Ankara. According to Solana, the Turkish side also asked for a series of revisions in the draft of the EU Conclusions presented by the High Representative, including: the deletion of the set date of 2004; the removal of the phrase stating that all candidates’ compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Council will be a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and the basis for accession to the Union (paragraph 4, last phrase); the deletion of the last two phrases of paragraph 9 (b), particularly the one stating that resolution of the Cyprus issue will not be a precondition for Cyprus’ accession to the EU; and the deletion of reference made in paragraph 12, stating that an accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council Conclusions. Based on author’s interview with a Greek diplomat who wants to remain anonymous and who was present at the discussions made at the EU summit in Helsinki between the Head of States and Governments on Saturday December 12, 1999.

293. See Axt (2006: 5). As the reference to ICJ caused considerable concern in Turkey, the EU had taken particular initiatives to relax Turkish anxieties. Specifically, the EU High Representative for Defence and Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, flew to Ankara while the EU summit President and Finnish Premier, Paavo Lipponen, sent a letter to his Turkish counterpart, Bülent Ecevit, stating that 2004 was only a set out date for revision by the EU Council of the situation related to Turkey’s outstanding disputes, the dispute with Greece included, rather than a rigidly set requirement for bringing the Aegean dispute to the ICJ. See the Press Statement of the Prime Minister of Turkey following the decision at the EU summit in Helsinki on Turkey’s candidacy, December 10, 1999. Interestingly, this interpretation of the Helsinki decisions and Lipponen’s letter was put forward by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, in a letter addressed to the EU-15. For Greek decision-makers, Lipponen’s letter to the Turkish premier was a personal initiative taken by the Finnish Premier, who was running the Presidency, and it could not thus be considered as constituting part of the
EU acquis. Based on particular reference made in the aforementioned assessment report of the Helsinki summit by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou (December 16, 1999).

294. Apart from certain exaggerations in some of Turkey's claims (the challenge to Greek sovereignty over more than one hundred islands and islets in the Aegean, including the island of Gavdos, south of Crete, etc.), most issues Turkey views as points of contention in the Aegean will undoubtedly be included in any Greek–Turkish effort to resolve the conflict. Such a list could in fact include the issue of Greece's extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean (in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention), sovereignty rights over the continental shelf and airspace (where the existing difference over Greece's exercise of sovereignty between six-mile territorial sea and ten-mile airspace is also known as “the Greek paradox”), and the issue of the militarization of Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. However, one should note that even if Turkey accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ the issue of the militarization of the Greek islands would not be considered by the ICJ, given that since 1994 Greece has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in all legal disputes, except the ones concerning the undertaking of military measures of a defensive character for reasons of national security. See Strati (2000: 98).

295. Philip Gordon describes the balance achieved at Helsinki between the Greek and Turkish interests as follows: “The Helsinki outcome is a masterly diplomatic document that manages to give Greece what it wanted without going so far as to lead the Turks to conclude that they were being given lessons and lectures. It was enough to protect the Greek government but also not so much that Turkey would not accept the offer.” See Gordon (2000: 49) as cited in Arikan (2003: 172). In the words of Greece’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou: “Helsinki was not the victory of any one against the other; rather it was a victory of the common interest...[i]t serves Greece's national interests, EU interests, and Turkey’s national interests.” See Papandreou (2000).

296. Interestingly, this linkage was widely acknowledged by Turkish analysts, although it was seen as merely a new version of the linkage politics Greece traditionally followed towards Turkey. As Harun Arikan put it: “...Greece’s approval of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki Summit of the EU did not imply that Greece had changed its linkage politics in any way; that sought to link the prospect of Turkish membership with the settlement of Greece’s bilateral issues with Turkey, including the Cyprus question. Rather, Greece aimed to make a stronger link between the settlement of these issues and the issue of Turkey’s candidacy through the EU’s declaration at the Helsinki Summit. Consequently, Greece succeeded in attaching political conditions to the approval of Turkey’s candidature, including recognition of the ICJ’s jurisdiction in resolving the disputes between Greece and Turkey and an assurance that Cyprus would join the EU without political settlement at the Helsinki Summit.” See Arikan (2003: 171).

297. As Birand put it: “...at the EU’s Helsinki summit, it [Greece] changed its policy of obstructing Turkey’s entry into the EU at all costs. And, instead of a bilateral struggle, it opted for drawing Turkey into the EU and having the Aegean and Cyprus problems solved via Brussels.” See Mehmet Ali Birand, “Greece Gains Initiative in Diplomacy,” Turkish Daily News, April 6, 2001: S.

298. It is worth noting that Helsinki has made evident that democratization is a prerequisite for membership. This clashed with the dominant perception in Turkish
politics in the 1990s, namely, that the EU should first incorporate Turkey as a full member and it would then help foster democratization. See Tsakonas (2001: 31).

299. The EU Council, held in Copenhagen in 1993, adopted the following criteria for the evaluation of candidate countries for membership of the European Union: (a) political conditions, that is, the state of democracy and the respect for human rights; (b) economic conditions, that is, macroeconomic stability, ability to deal with competitive pressure; and (c) the ability to adopt the European acquis. The Copenhagen EU Council stated that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities.” See Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions (1993).

300. The term “procedural” serves mainly to emphasize democratic procedures and institutions, in other words the democratic “method,” rather than cultural or socioeconomic characteristics typically associated with a democratic regime.

301. To be sure, this reconceptualization of the “national interest” is inevitably linked to the outcome of domestic political debates and struggles while it constitutes a typical phenomenon in the countries that experience the turbulent process of democratization.

302. Jeffrey Legro provides the example of Germany, which after the Second World War shifted away from a belief system promoting armed expansion toward a set of ideas calling for pro-Western integration. Interestingly, Germany only adopted a pro-Western integrationist position after 1945, when the idea of integration into the West had substantial support, and because its implementation coincided with the Federal Republic’s economic miracle. See Legro (2005: 84–121).

303. As noted by Legro: “The consolidation of a new approach in a society depends not only on the collapse of the old ideas but also on the existence of a leading replacement concept that has social support (our emphasis). Hence consolidation depends in part on the number and nature of alternative ideas.” See Legro (2005: 15).

304. As Berger had put it: “...[p]olitics is a question not only of who gets what but of who persuades whom in an ongoing negotiation of reality...[i]n order to pursue their agenda, decision-makers are often compelled to enter into debates and negotiations with other groups, making compromises and concessions along the way. These compromises, however, have to be legitimated, both internally within the group and externally in the rest of the society.” See Berger (1996: 327).

305. According to Yannis Loulis, the guru of New Democracy Party (ND) ideological standing since Kostas Karamanlis became its unquestionable leader, “...either center-right or center-left parties may dominate in politics but only under the condition they are adjustable, pragmatist, stand in the so-called ‘medium-political space’ and, most importantly, their leaders present the public with persuasive arguments” (our emphasis). See Yannis Loulis, “Where Fights for Political Dominance are Decided,” To Vima (New Epoch Supplement), May 11, 2008: A20.

306. See the interventions made by the Greek premier, Costas Simitis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, and the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christos Rokofyllos, in the parliamentary debate on “Foreign Policy” in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit; see Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2362–6, 2397–9, 2402–3). See also Christos Rozakis, “Why Helsinki is Positive for Greece and Turkey,” Eleftherotypia, December 14, 1999.
I am indebted to Panagiotis Ioakimidis for raising the importance of this issue for the delegitimization of certain parts of the Greek academic intelligentsia, which were not hesitant in characterizing the new strategy as naïve and, particularly, risky for the goals it aimed at achieving.

Interestingly, the abandonment of Greece’s traditional stance towards Turkey constituted the common denominator of the criticism stemming both from New Democracy’s official discourse and from certain figures in PASOK’s patriotic faction, such as Anastasios Peponis and Stelios Papatheopolis. See Karamanlis’s remarks in the parliamentary debate on “Foreign Policy” (December 1999: 2379) and Karamanlis’s statement after his meeting with the President of the Hellenic Republic, George Stephanopoulos, on December 14, 1999, available at: http://www.nd.gr/deltia.asp?epipedo=001D01002012020; also Anastasios Peponis, “The Helsinki Secrets,” Ta Nea, January 8–9, 2000. More interestingly, other figures of PASOK’s patriotic faction adopted a generally positive, although with some minor reservations, stance towards the Helsinki decisions. See “Positive Stance Towards Helsinki by Gerasimos Arsenis, Yannis Kapsis and Panagiotis Sgourides,” Eleftherotypia, December 11, 1999.

See Karamanlis’s remarks in the parliamentary debate (December 1999: 2379). Also Petros Molyviatis (2000: 74–5); and Yannis Valinakis (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Karamanlis government in 2004) (2000: 97). It is worth noting that prior to the Helsinki summit there was a widespread concern in Greece about the implications of giving up the veto in expectation of a later Turkish move. Indeed, in an opinion poll conducted in October 1999, more than 50 percent of the Greek public believed that Turkey should make a significant gesture – such as lifting the casus belli resolution of the Turkish National Assembly – before the Greek government conceded to granting Turkey a candidacy status. See Athens News Agency, October 20, 1999. In an interview with the author, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Karamanlis government, Petros Molyviatis, was very adamant in negatively highlighting the public statement by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, that Greece would be prepared to drop its veto without a gesture from Turkey. Interestingly, Papandreou’s alleged statement in October 1999 was reproduced by CNN-Turk and forced the Greek Ministry to issue a formal denial. See Ker-Lindsay (2007: 85–6). In the discussion that took place in the Greek Parliament after the EU Helsinki summit, George Papandreou stated that “…[a]ll political parties were aware that negotiations taking place were not aimed at any gesture on Turkey’s part…[W]e are not interested in gestures from Turkey. What we aimed at is a resolution of our differences with Turkey.” See Papandreou’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2398). For the importance of a gesture on Turkey’s part after the Helsinki summit in order for the Greek government to maintain domestic support for the rapprochement and to keep the process moving, see Larrabee (2000).

See Karamanlis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2377) and Molyviatis (2000: 74–5).

See Karamanlis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2375–9).

Karamanlis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2378) and Karamanlis (2000: 9).

domestic political scene was that New Democracy appeared abashed and frag-
mented in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit with most of its prominent
figures – including former premier and honorary Chairman of New Democracy,
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, as well as Stephanos Manos, Dimitris Avramopoulos,
and George Souflias – adopting a rather positive stance vis-à-vis the decisions
taken at Helsinki. See Dimitris Tsiodras, “Embarrassment in the New Scene,”
Eleftherotypia, December 12, 1999; Yannis Politis, “Embarrassment and Different
Assessments of the Helsinki Decisions by the Opposition,” Ta Nea, December
13, 1999; Dora Dailiana, “Helsinki Drives New Democracy into the Corner,”
Eleftherotypia, December 13, 1999; and Yannis Pantelakis, “Five Reservations
from Karamanlis, Many Voices within New Democracy,” Eleftherotypia,
December 13, 1999. In an interview with Greek daily Kathimerini, Konstantinos
Mitsotakis assessed decisions taken at Helsinki as “the Greek government’s
acknowledgement and justification of a strategy introduced by himself.” See
Kostas Fafoutis, “Mitsotakis’ Diversification from New Democracy’s Official
Position,” Kathimerini, December 15, 1999; also “Helsinki: Total Justification
of Mitsotakis’ Policy towards Turkey,” Eleftheros Typos, December 13, 1999.

314. Karamanlis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2377–8). On
contradictions of Kostas Karamanlis’s intervention, see the remarks made by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, and the Alternate Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Christos Rokofyllos, in Parliamentary Minutes (December

315. An analysis of the statements made by members of Greece’s National Parliament
about Turkey from 1995 to 2003 reflects the major shift introduced in Greece’s
policy towards Turkey in the official political discourse. Interestingly, in the
period 1996–2003, the Greek official political discourse seemed to be domi-
nated by references to Turkey’s regional role, while the role of the US and the EU
presented a high priority in the national discourse. In the period 1999–2003,
however, the Greek official discourse changes and Turkey no longer presents an
existential threat to Greek sovereignty. Furthermore, Greek parliamentarians
refer to Turkey as a stabilizing factor in the region and as an important regional
player. Turkey’s Europeanization is further supported, as a “Europeanized
Turkey” is considered less dangerous. By implication, Greek Parliamentarians
are more interested in developments related to Turkey’s internal reforms, ref-
ences to Turkey are more positive when compared with previous years, and
either offensive or insulting references to Turkey are missing (with the excep-
tion of the parliamentarians of the communist party, who keep referring to
Turkey in negative and offensive terms). See Kotsiaros (2006).

316. Author’s interview with Nikos Themelis; also based on author’s discussions
with George Papandreou and Nikos Kotzias. See also Bistis (2000: 84).

317. See Karamanlis’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (December 1999: 2377).
The first Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kostas Karamanlis’s government, Petros
Molyviatis – and representative of the traditional Greek saga – pointed out in
the aftermath of the Helsinki summit that “...Greece’s foreign policy goal at
Helsinki should have not been the resolution of the Greek–Turkish differences
but the abandonment on the part of Turkey of its claims against Greece” (our
emphasis). See Molyviatis (2000: 75). For a reproduction of the traditional Greek
thesis and the expression of strong skepticism over the launching of any kind
of dialogue with Turkey on any other issue except “the one and only” Greek–
Turkish difference, see the remarks made by Karolos Papoulias, Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Andreas Papandreou’s successive governments in the 1980s as well as in early 1990s, in Papoulias (2000: 7). To certain analysts, Karamanlis’s decision, after his coming to power, to propose Papoulias for President of the Hellenic Republic is related to the fact that Papoulias had been representative of the traditional Greek approach in regard to Greek–Turkish relations. Incidentally, also, Papoulias’s skepticism and reservations over the decisions taken at Helsinki were expressed through New Democracy’s official magazine, namely Liberal Emphasis. For these remarks see Karzis (2006: 149).

318. The honorary Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, a close foreign policy advisor of the late Constantine Karamanlis, General Secretary of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chief negotiator in the Greek–Turkish talks (from July 1978 to February 1980), had been the “one and only” Greek personality who was not hesitant in openly and clearly challenging the traditional Greek thesis by arguing that a dialogue with Turkey over the whole complex of issues known as bilateral differences between Greece and Turkey did take place in late 1970s without causing any damage to Greece’s national interests; in fact, there were some positive results (for author’s similar remarks see Chapter 2); Byron Theodoropoulos, “Beyond Helsinki,” Kathimerini, December 19, 1999.

319. Not by coincidence, the Greek government characterized the dialogue stipulated by the Helsinki decisions on their Aegean dispute and launched in March 2002 not as negotiations, but as “preliminary contacts” and as “exploratory talks.”

320. Both the Helsinki conclusions and the provision on Greek–Turkish relations, in the “medium-term priorities” of the Accession Partnership, refer to the resolution of the two states’ outstanding border disputes.

321. According to Rumelili, the approach adopted by the EU in the Helsinki Summit was different from past approaches. For example, the EU Council of Ministers stated in July 1996 (after the Imia crisis) that “the cases of disputes created by territorial claims, such as the Imia islet issue, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” Similarly, the Luxembourg Council Decisions of December 1997 urged “the settlement of disputes, in particular, by legal process, including the ICJ.” See Rumelili (2004b: 14).

322. As suggested by the relevant literature, the mechanisms institutions use to exert their norms are not competing or mutually exclusive and can be differentiated according to the logic of action they follow. Thus, the mechanisms following the “logic of appropriateness” (when actors do what is deemed appropriate) can be either “cognitive” (they teach domestic actors what is deemed appropriate in a given situation) or “normative” (they seek to convince states of their norms). On the other hand, the mechanisms following the “logic of consequentiality” (based on a cost/benefit analysis actors choose the action that maximizes their individual utility) may either be “rhetorical” (institutions use social–psychological rewards for compliance and punishment for non-compliance) or “bargaining” (institutions use material threats and promises either directly to coerce a state to follow their norms or indirectly to alter the domestic balance of power in favor of actors that support their norms). See Schimmelfennig (2002: 12–13); also Checkel (1999).

323. Interestingly, the new policy adopted by Greece vis-à-vis Turkey was also given by a Turkish observer the name of “facilitative conditionality.” See Öğuzlu (2003: 56).
324. The “engagement of Turkey into a broader framework of incentives and constraints” had been a catchphrase for the architects and “norms entrepreneurs” of Greece’s active socialization strategy. Based on author’s interviews and/or exchange of views with most key figures of Greece’s socialization strategy.

325. Interestingly, after the launch of the accession talks between the EU and Turkey, the Commission’s annual reports became much more detailed.

326. Based on the Helsinki decisions, the EU – investing money, effort and reputation – set up proper monitoring mechanisms to measure progress in Turkey’s compliance with the objectives, principles, and priorities of the EU–Turkey Accession Partnership. These included the mixed EU–Turkey bodies in a chain of command that led up to the Association Council as well as the European Commission itself, which undertook the lead in thematic subcommittees and the drafting of a Regular Report that forms the mirror of Turkey’s efforts.

327. Short-term priorities have been selected on the basis that it was realistic to expect that Turkey could complete or take them substantially forward by the end of 2001. The priorities listed under the medium-term priorities were expected to take more than one year to complete, although work should, wherever possible, also begin on them during 2001.

328. Based on discussions with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who undertook the tour des capitales with the mission of conveying this message to Greece’s EU partners, namely Ambassador Adamandios Vassillakis (Director of the G1 Directorate of European Affairs) and Dr Dimitris Droutsas (Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Greece’s demand was partly fulfilled at the meeting of the Commission’s College adopting the draft proposal of Turkey’s Accession Partnership on November 8, 2000, while – besides the reference to Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in the chapter on the “Principles” – the Cyprus issue was also included in the “Short-term Priorities” Turkey was called upon to meet.

329. For both issues, Greece could refer to precedent cases contained in the Accession Partnerships of other Candidate States. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the Accession Partnership of Cyprus includes a specific reference in the “Short-term Priorities:” “Maximize efforts to support a settlement [of the Cyprus problem] under the auspices of the UN.” With regard to Greek–Turkish relations, an analogous provision can be found in the “Medium-Term Priorities” of the Accession Partnership of Slovenia: “Continue efforts to resolve outstanding border issues with Croatia.”

330. In principle, the Council adopts the Accession Partnership, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. As a consequence, no Member-State alone has the ability to block this decision. In order to adopt the very first Accession Partnership of a Candidate State, the Council needed a legal basis, which was provided by a Regulation requiring unanimity for its adoption. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 390/2001 (February 2001: 1). Without the consent of Greece to this Regulation, the Council could not proceed to the adoption of Turkey’s Accession Partnership. It was also decided that any future amendments of Turkey’s Accession Partnership would be decided by the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

331. As a characteristic example of the “new era” in Greek–Turkish relations, one may refer to the fact that Athens was included in the Turkish tour des capitales; the visit paid by Turkey’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 30, 2000.
332. The provision on the Cyprus issue in the “Short-Term Priorities” reads as follows: “In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.” The provision on Greek–Turkish relations in the “Medium-Term Priorities” reads as follows: “In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, as referred in the point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions.” See Pre-Accession Strategy for Turkey (December 2000: 11). It is worth noting that strong criticism was expressed by Greece’s major opposition party, including also the liberal voices who welcomed the Helsinki decisions – as for example Dora Bakoyannis – arguing that the agreed Accession Partnership had further undermined the already blurred Helsinki provisions in regard to the Cyprus issue and the normalization of Greek–Turkish relations. See Parliamentary Minutes (January 2001: 4039, 4049).

333. In order to prepare for membership, the Accession Partnership called upon Turkey to prepare a National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). This program had to be compatible with the priorities established in the Accession Partnership.

334. In this connection, the European Council welcomed the Commission report on the specific action plans in this area and on the follow-up of commitments entered into during negotiations.

335. It was also stated that the EU would accommodate the terms of a comprehensive settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded: as a Member-State, Cyprus would have to speak with a single voice and ensure proper application of European Union law. In addition, the EU would make a substantial financial contribution in support of the development of the northern part of a reunited island.

336. According to Copenhagen Conclusions: “...[I]f the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.” See Presidency Conclusions (Copenhagen, December 2002: 5). The next step for Cyprus becoming a fully fledged member of the Union was a formal one, and concerned the completion of the drafting of the Accession Treaty for signing in Athens (!) on April 16, 2003.

337. Excerpts from the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou’s “talking points” prior to his meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, in Istanbul, Turkey on July 14, 2003.

338. It is worth noting that, during the official visit of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, to Athens on October 21, 2003, his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, was not hesitant in highlighting “the particular attention Greece paid to the monitoring of the correct transposition of the acquis by Turkey, as well as to the fulfillment of commitments undertaken in the negotiations.” Based on author’s notes from the Greek and Turkish Ministers meeting in Athens, October 21, 2003.


341. It is worth noting that already, since the elaboration of the first Accession Partnership text by the EU-15, Turkey had attempted to remind the EU that, in accordance with the clarifications made by the EU term President Finnish President Lipponen in December 1999 to Turkish premier Ecevit, “...it is obvious that the Helsinki conclusions brought about no linkage whatsoever between the progress of Turkey towards membership and the Cyprus issue.” See the official letter by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member-states (September 1, 2000: 2).

342. See also Hakki (2006: 457).

343. Based on the author’s personal involvement in the incorporation of the exploratory talks’ rationale in Greece’s broader socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. See also Simitis (2005: 102).

344. Unsurprisingly, the “exploratory talks” between Greece and Turkey were viewed by certain foreign policy circles in Greece – especially the ones that remained hostage to the Greek traditional discourse that the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf is the only issue to discuss with Turkey – as, at best, costly and, at worst, dangerous for Greece; see Stavros Lygeros, “Greece-Turkey: Thorny Dialogue,” Kathimerini, March 17, 2002.

345. The Greek representatives in the “exploratory talks” were Ambassador Anastasios Skopelitis (Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the beginning of the talks) and Professor Argyris Fatouros (a respected scholar of international law and former participant in the “Wise Men” process initiated by the Dutch Presidency of the EU in 1997). Turkey was represented by Ambassador Uğur Ziyal (Undersecretary at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşi (an expert on the Aegean issues and head of the legal department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). See Nazlan Ertan, “Ankara, Athens Determined to Continue Talks,” Turkish News, March 13, 2002; and “Secret Diplomacy for Turkish-Greek Exploratory Talks,” Turkish Daily News, March 13, 2002.


347. As noted by certain observers and analysts, “...[t]here is the substantive question of when and how to progress from relatively non-controversial matters to the central issues in the bilateral dispute–the Aegean and Cyprus...[t]he dialogue must eventually move toward the resolution of central issues for the détente to be durable.” See Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini and Vlachos (2001: 23).

348. For a first assessment of the pros and cons of the Greek–Turkish economic cooperation, see Vidalis (2000: 373–9); Karafotakis (2000: 381–9); Koutsikos (2000: 391–6); Chardanides (2000: 407–19); Ververidou (2001). It is worth bearing in mind that in early 1999, due to the Öcalan fiasco, the Chairman of the Turkish–Greek Business Council, Rahmi Koç, announced the canceling of all planned joint meetings of the Council after noting that Greek–Turkish relations had been brought to a level which “could not be repaired.” See Anadolu Agency, February 24, 1999.

349. For the full text of the agreements concerning economic cooperation, mutual promotion and protection of investments, sea transportation, tourism, sup-
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port between Customs Unions, scientific and technological cooperation, cultural cooperation, cooperation between the Greek Ministry of Internal Order and the Turkish Ministry of Interior against international crime, illegal trafficking, narcotics, and illegal migration, see Couloumbis and Dokos (2000: 423–67).

350. By 2001 most of these agreements had been ratified by the Greek Parliament. Based on data provided by the A4 Directorate (Greek–Turkish Relations) at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2001.

351. A Protocol of Cooperation on Agriculture was signed in June 2000; see Tsakonas and Dokos (2004: 114).

352. In March 2002, DEH and TEIAS, Greece’s public power corporation and the Turkish Transmission System Operator, agreed a single, high-intensity power line (380–400 kV) 264 km long across the Thrace border (of which 200 k will be on Greek soil), with a total transmission capacity of 1,000 MW, built to enable the two countries to trade electrical power. See Papadopoulos (2008: 24).

353. In 2001 Greece and Turkey agreed to cooperate on a feasibility study under the EU’s INOGATE program – which concerned the construction of a series of pipelines to transfer natural gas from Central Asia to Western Europe – with the aim to interconnect, under a $ 10 billion project, Greek and Turkish networks. See Hope (2002: 44–7).

354. The “Economic Cooperation Agreement” signed between Greece and Turkey in February 2000 facilitated the formation of the Turkish–Greek Joint Economic Council.

355. YDAS was responsible for financing and monitoring development assistance, emergency and post-humanitarian aid programs initiated by NGOs and directed towards developing countries. It also aimed to encourage the development of Greek civil society. Another aspect of the institutionalization of the relations between Greek NGOs and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerned the establishment of the Committee on NGOs, which provided information to Greek NGOs about the ways in which they could acquire a consultative status in international institutions. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs played an instrumental role in providing support for “demonstration dialogue” activities in the EU-funded five-year program, called “Civic Dialogue,” by three Greek NGO networks. See Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos (2007: 57–8). For a presentation and assessment of the collaboration established between the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek and Turkish NGOs, see Non-Governmental Organizations and Improvement of Greek–Turkish Relations (2002).

356. It goes without saying that most of the “low politics” agreements signed between Greece and Turkey – especially the ones regarding culture, trade, illegal trafficking, and tourism – and cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs on a plethora of issues could be regarded as “soft security” confidence-building measures, with emphasis on the so-called “bottom-up approach,” and/or “people-to-people” contacts.

357. Obviously, Greek decision-makers were not interested in the “security regimes” discourse. They were fully aware, however, of the need for a mechanism to be created to meet – regardless of its name – the goals of Greece’s active socialization strategy. Moreover, Greek decision-makers were neither naïve about nor unaware of the difficulty inherent in any effort aiming at the rationalization of a conflictual relationship, such as the one between Greece and Turkey, in the extremely sensitive politico-military arena – where the eventual cost for
a state in the contingency of nonmutuality in cooperation is high. Indeed, Robert Jervis identifies “four plus one” reasons for a security regime to form: first, the great powers must want to establish it; second, the actors must believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation – if a state believes it is confronted by a Hitler, it will not seek a regime; third, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion; fourth, war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly; last, the most propitious condition for regime formation is the case in which offensive and defensive weapons and policies are distinguishable but the former are cheaper and more effective than the latter, or in which they cannot be told apart but it is easier to defend than attack. See Jervis (1983: 176–8).

358. Based on the author’s discussions in the aftermath of the EU summit in Helsinki with the most active figures of Greece’s socialization strategy at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, and certain foreign policy advisors and diplomats.

359. Security regimes do not constitute any form of agreement or contract, but rather refer to a coincidence of interests between opposing countries. Nevertheless, in order for even tacit cooperation to be maintained between the countries that will create a security regime, it is necessary that quite a high level of reciprocity with regard to participating states’ intentions and the integrity of their communication channels, as well as specific values, be attained in advance. See Lipson (1991: 495–538); Garfinkle (1995: 202). To paraphrase Janet Gross Stein, in the aftermath of Helsinki certain negative characteristics of Greek–Turkish relations made the prospects for the establishment of a comprehensive security regime remain poor, as Greece and Turkey – inter alia – “...view politics as a zero-sum struggle, cannot seek joint gains for domestic political reasons, fail to recognize that their policy choices are interdependent, ...and they cannot distinguish each other’s offensive and defensive weapons and military deployments.” See Stein (1985: 599–617), as quoted in Lipson (1995: 21).

360. One may argue that the catastrophic losses for both Greece and Turkey, as well as other outside powers, in case of a war would, inter alia, entail the serious undermining, if not collapse, of NATO’s Southern Flank and a negative impact on the implementation of the EU’s Mediterranean policy. In addition, in the event of armed conflict and widespread destruction in the nonmilitary sector, there would surely be a need for additional economic assistance to be provided to Greece by the EU. Furthermore, as Couloumbis and Clarevas stress, “Even if Greece or Turkey were to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts will surely follow, classifying both countries as high-risk zones with a devastating impact on their economies and societies.” See Couloumbis and Clarevas (1997: 36).

361. Crisis stability refers to the ability of an adversarial military system to remain under political control, even when decision-makers take the possibility of war into account.

362. Arms-race stability refers to the propensity of a system to avoid a spiralling armaments dynamic. Needless to say, the lower the degree of arms-race stability, the higher the probability that the states involved will carry out an arms race against one another, with the amount of available resources constituting the only limit to their military expenditures. See, among others, Jervis (1978: 167–214).
363. As two international regimes theorists put it, “[regimes] limit and ‘regularize’ the behavior of the participating states, define which state activities are legitimate or illegal and punishable and have an influence on whether, when and how the conflicts between the states will be resolved.” See Puchala and Hopkins (1982: 299).

364. Obviously, a limited security regime, such as the one envisioned by Greece, could come about either as a result of an official agreement signed between the two governments or as a tacit arrangement based on unofficially agreed rules and norms of conduct. It is worth noting that from the beginning of the confidence-building enterprise the Greek side was preoccupied with ensuring that any confidence-building agreement with Turkey would appear in the form of an official agreement signed and monitored by the two countries.

365. According to rational institutionalism, a “limited security regime” can be very useful after its establishment, particularly during periods of relatively unconstrained rivalry, because it can – inter alia – provide regulation; encourage and institutionalize cooperative outcomes; play a moderating role; codify mutual vulnerability and parity; solve the defection problem; provide (and promote) balanced and reciprocal agreements; aid in the negotiation of cooperation in another issue-area; and, last but not least, intensify the learning process in the conflict, which, in turn, will allow each side to redefine its goals and means in the conflict, and, most importantly, dismiss the use of war as a legitimate political means to accomplish its incompatible objectives in a conflict. See Keohane (1984); Keohane (1986); Haas (1990); Duffield (1992: 819–55); and Duffield (1994).

366. Based on author’s personal notes, these were the main lines of the argumentation put forward in successive meetings at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2000, elaborating the Greek initiative regarding the advancement of a confidence-building enterprise vis-à-vis Turkey.

367. These are agreements that compel both countries to exchange detailed information on the stockpiles and procurements of their weapon systems.

368. For the assessment that a relatively developed arms control regime already exists between Greece and Turkey, see Tuck (1996: 23); Dokos and Tsakonas (1998). It is also worth noting that similar elements of security regimes existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, according to which each party was committed to show self-containment and respect for the vital interests of the other. See especially the Agreements on Basic Principles (May 1972), and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed in 1973; see George, Farley and Dallin (1988) and Kanet and Kolodjiej (1991).

369. NATO’s Secretary General submitted the following five proposals: (i) extension of a moratorium on military exercises in the Aegean from June 15 to September 15, 1997; (ii) monitoring by NATO of Greek and Turkish military flights over the Aegean; (iii) disarming of military aircraft taking part in training flights; (iii) the use of the IFF/SIF electronic system for identification of aircraft in order to avoid engagements; and (iv) the setting up of a center for direct communication between Greece and Turkey. See Syrigos (1998: 374).

370. Greece also accepted NATO’s proposal for the extension of the moratorium on military exercises in the Aegean, which was rejected by Turkey.


373. When George Papandreou took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1999, he was informed about the “phone-device” on his Ministerial desk. To his surprise, this device had once rung and a feminine voice asked in Greek for a person(!) After sharing this unique experience with his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, Papandreou was taken aback to hear that Cem had also been through exactly the same awkward experience(!) The author had been an ear-witness of this interesting example of technology dysfunctioning in confidence-building.

374. The confidence-building initiatives Greece was planning to pursue vis-à-vis Turkey in the aftermath of Helsinki should: (i) be mutually beneficial, and not be intended to offer short-term political gains. In this framework, it should also be made clear that the measures would pursue neither the acquisition of comparative advantage vis-à-vis Turkey nor the conclusion of “cooperation for cooperation's sake.” On the contrary, their goal should be to demonstrate that the benefit from the promotion of particular confidence-building measures would be for both countries far greater than the cost entailed by the abstention from a rapprochement prospect; (ii) envisage the establishment of an integrated elaboration and application program of the proposals submitted, and provide for a “symmetrical effect” of the stipulations on the security interests of both countries; (iii) provide for the agreements concluded between the two parties to include verification processes at the stages of both elaboration and implementation of eventual CBMs, and to include specific references and guidelines with regard to their application so as to reduce the risk of either selective compliance with the stipulations or efforts to behave deceitfully by the party using the CBMs with a view to giving false indications of peaceful intentions; (iv) ensure that, with regard to the elaboration or/and implementation of the CBMs, neither feelings of insecurity nor threatening appearances to third (neighbor) countries would be created; and (v) ensure that any CBM enterprise is not to the detriment of other political initiatives, such as the adoption of an “all-encompassing type of CBMs,” namely, measures that would include a series of economic, environmental, humanitarian, and social issues. The list of the above-mentioned preconditions was included in a confidential report released in January 2000 among certain key figures of Greek decision-makers at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

375. In the neorealist line of reasoning, states are always seeking to compare their absolute gains with those of other states (relative gains argument). Cooperation is therefore difficult, even when all sides can achieve absolute gains, because no state wants to realize fewer absolute gains than any other. See Grieco (1990). This in fact seems to be the case with Greek–Turkish relations and the essence of their “security dilemma” relationship; namely, that both states' central concerns are fear of cheating and, most importantly, fear of strengthening the other.

376. It is worth noting that certain formal military “constraint CBMs” had been proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but were incontestably rejected by the Ministry of National Defense. These included – inter alia – particular
naval arms control measures between Greece and Turkey, with the two sides conceivably agreeing to a ceiling of large surface units (for example, fifteen) and submarines (for example, eight to ten). Constraint CBMs constitute a category of arms control measures. Since they actually limit military operations, as opposed to the “transparency” CBMs, which merely subject these operations to prior notification or observation, they are more intrusive and inherently more difficult to negotiate; see Hansen (1990: 61–76); also Sloan and Mikela (1988).

377. Prime Minister Simitis and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou – plus a small circle of policy advisors – have had the “upper hand” in the confidence-building enterprise which Greece viewed as an integral part of its active socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Interestingly, the obvious involvement of the Greek Ministry of National Defense in the elaboration of the CBMs enterprise had never been a smooth one, mainly due to the following reasons: first, the then Minister of National Defense, Akis Tsohatzopoulos – who lost internal elections over the leadership of PASOK about four years earlier – was not a “true believer” in the strategy adopted by the Simitis’s modernizers towards Turkey; second, Tsohatzopoulos was not hesitant to openly express his reservations and concerns about the side effects a confidence-building enterprise Greece might initiate towards Turkey would have for Greece’s national interests.


379. As noted in Chapter 2, since September 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width up to twelve miles, the then Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, and other senior government officials explicitly and repeatedly stated that such an extension by Greece would be considered a casus belli. This then became official policy through a Resolution of the Turkish National Assembly.

380. Turkey’s proposals regarded two sets of measures. The first set referred to the establishment of a Joint Military Group in the context of the Political Consultation Mechanism existing at the time, which was headed by the Political Directors of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The second set consisted of nine particular measures under the heading Military Good Will Measures in the Aegean. Based on the author’s personal notes and archives.


382. For a presentation and analysis of the CBMs included in these three categories, see Tsakonas and Dokos (2004: 113–37). Unsurprisingly, most of the Greek press remained a “doubting Thomas” in regard to the CBMs enterprise, highlighting thus the risks and dangers inherent in any CBMs enterprise Greece would attempt to develop with Turkey. For example, see Stavros Lygeros, “The Hidden Traps of CBMs,” Kathimerini, November 5, 2000; Angeliki Spanou, “Measures of Subjugation in the Aegean,” Eleftheros Typos, November 2, 2000; and Angeliki Spanou, “Our Sovereign Rights ‘on the Table’?” Typos ths Kyriakis (Greek daily/Sunday edition), November 5, 2000.

383. Greek decision-makers were aware of the difficulties Greece’s active socialization strategy faced at the tactical level, as it failed from Helsinki onwards to dissuade Turkish illegal policies in the Aegean, namely day-to-day violations of
Greek airspace, and in Cyprus, most notably the forwarding of Turkish troops to the UN-protected area of Strovilia in July 2000.

384. According to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs’ letter, the number of Turkish violations of the Greek airspace in one specific month, namely in April 2003, outweighed the total number of Turkish violations in a whole year(!). According to data provided by A4 Directorate of Greek–Turkish Relations at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the year 2002, but also in the first months of 2003, the total number of violations of Greece’s national airspace, as well as of infringements of the Air Traffic Rules within Athens FIR by Turkish military aircraft, was overwhelmingly the highest during the last fifteen years, with a parallel increase in numbers of violations of Greek national airspace at great depth and over Greek islands.

385. For the full text of the letter sent by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, to the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, on May 17, 2003, see Annie Podimata, “Papandreou’s Letter to Verheugen,” To Vima (weekly edition), May 18, 2003.

386. At the back of the Greek decision-makers’ minds when they took the unusual step of informing in writing the European Commission – the latter being, in the words of the Greek MFA spokesman, “the competent institution to evaluate the behavior of countries that want to join the EU” – seemed to be a progress report being prepared by the Commission on the status of Turkey’s Accession Partnership with the EU, and due to be discussed at the forthcoming General Affairs Council.

387. Author’s discussions with two prominent officials running the Joint Task Force from its inauguration through to February 2004.


5 Modifying the strategy

389. Although the latter is difficult to assess, since the socializee may change its behavior for strategic reasons, for example, to gain promised benefits.

390. On the dominance of realpolitik thinking on Turkey’s security culture, see Karaosmanoğlu (2000).

391. Conditionality is indeed extremely important for domestic elites, who require credible external support to continue their advocacy of democracy while the European Union combination of carrots and sticks can deeply affect many constituencies in candidate states. One should also not forget that, unlike NATO, the EU has always had a commitment to democracy and has never had a non-democratic member, and that democracy was a condition for membership in article 237 of the treaty of Rome that began the integration process in 1950.

392. Thus the EU acted as both a “trigger” and an “anchor” for Turkey’s democratization; see Tocci (2005: 72–81). For a good account of the role of international actors, particularly international organizations, in spurring democratization, see Pevehause (2005); Vachudova (2004). For a comparative examination of the role of the EU in promoting democratization in Europe’s periphery, see Kubicek (2003).

393. One of the most interesting and well-elaborated analyses of international socialization along the constructivist premises is Johnston’s latest book. By examining three microprocesses of socialization, namely “mimicking,” “social influence,”
and “persuasion,” as they have played out in the attitudes of Chinese diplomats active in certain international conferences and institutions, Johnston finds that Chinese officials in the post-Mao era adopted more cooperative and more self-constraining commitments to arms control and disarmament treaties, thanks to their increasing social interactions in international security institutions (our emphasis); see Johnston (2007).

394. For the gradual fading of the “national security approach” and Turkey's move towards adopting more liberal approaches on foreign policy issues due to Europeanization effects, see Kirişçi (2006). For the development of a new national security discourse in Turkey from the second half of the 1990s, one that sacrifices security over democratic and developmental objectives, see Cizre (2003: 213–29). Most recently, the notable softening in Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria and Iran was attributed to a process of desecuritization taking place within Turkey as a result of the European Union accession process and concomitant steps toward democratization, the transformation of the political landscape, and the appropriation of EU norms and principles in regional politics; see Araş and Polat (2008: 495–515). For a more skeptical view, see Drorian (2005: 255–75).

395. A useful categorization of the “domestic impact” distinguishes between normative effects and the depth of internalization. The former refers to the kind of institutional impact and includes the “formal conception of norms” (mainly seen in the transfer of institutional norms to domestic laws or in the creation of formal institutions that enforce the institutional norm), “the behavioral conception of norms” (measured by the extent to which the behavior of the states under socialization is consistent with the behavior set by the institutional norm), and the “communicative conception of norms” (related to the ways the communication or discourse among the domestic actors is being affected). See Schimmelfennig (2002: 9–10). The depth of internalization or the “norm salience” refers to the extent to which the international norm has been transposed into a state's domestic political institutions and culture. By implication one may refer to degrees or levels of internalization and/or salience (high/intermediate/low internalization or high/moderate/low degree of salience). Needless to say, different kinds of normative effects (formal, behavioral, communicative) may also be detected at different levels of internalization or norm salience. See Cortell and Davis (2000: 70–1).

396. An examination of twenty European states that were recently nondemocratic, and which have various integrative relationships with the European Union, reveals that democratization progresses fast and deeply in those states for reasons that can be linked to the political conditionality and socialization mechanisms of Europeanization; see Emerson and Noutcheva (2004).


398. Especially the latter – being illustrated in the emergence of a civil society in Turkey – had given official efforts to promote Greek–Turkish cooperation a certain amount of legitimacy; see Rumelili (2005: 45–56).

399. For a good account of the political and legal reforms which have been stimulated since Turkey's EU candidacy, see Müftüler-Baç (2003: 17–31).

400. The Accession Partnership called upon Turkey to adopt the NPAA “before the end of the year [2000].” Turkey referred to the delay of the European Union in
formally adopting the legal basis for the Accession Partnership – the Council had to wait for the (non-binding) Opinion of the European Parliament to be submitted. The economic crisis that shook Turkey at the beginning of 2001 also did not ease the intense discussions in the Turkish interior on the necessary reforms.

401. According to Kirişçi, the Turkish coalition government “who – in the first three years of the process that started with the release of the Accession Partnership in November 2000 – was divided within itself, ... [h]as had to negotiate the issue of EU membership on the one hand with the EU (in particular the European Commission and the member countries as well as occasionally the European Parliament) and, on the other hand, with various constituencies within Turkey itself.” See Kirişçi (2005).

402. Günter Verheugen, the Commissioner responsible for enlargement, described the package of proposed reforms as “an important landmark in Turkey’s preparation for EU-membership and the first stage in a far reaching program of political reform,” but yet as only “a starting point for the fundamental transformation of Turkey into a modern democracy” (our emphasis); see Verheugen’s remarks in Financial Times, March 27, 2001.

403. To be fair, though, one should mention that in October 2001 the Turkish parliament adopted a series of critical amendments to the Turkish Constitution to facilitate political reforms that meet the Copenhagen criteria. This comprised thirty-four amendments to the Constitution in line with the Accession Partnership’s quest for short-term measures to strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for a range of human rights. These reforms were welcomed by the progress report published by the European Commission in 2001, although the report also noted that there was still a lot of ground to cover before the Copenhagen political criteria would be met.

404. It should be borne in mind, however, that the parameters of EU–Turkey relations had been laid down by the commonly accepted document, Turkey’s Accession Partnership, and that Turkey’s progress would be evaluated on the basis of Turkey’s implementation of all the priorities and the fulfillment of the criteria set in this document.

405. Some of the major political reforms adopted in these packages also included: changing the anti-terror law use to restrict freedom of thought and expression; paving the way for private schools to teach Kurdish and private television and radio stations to broadcast other languages commonly used in Turkey; granting partial amnesty to Kurdish militants; and improving the rights of non-Muslim minorities. See Ulusoy (2005: 5).

406. In July 2003, the Turkish government revised its National Program on the Adoption of the Acquis in line with changes and political reforms adopted since 2001.

407. A development that has had certain repercussions for the Turkish military’s ability to solely define the issues which concern the country’s national interest.


409. See the statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in May 2004 in the Turkish daily Milliyet, as quoted in Ulusoy (2005: 3).

410. It was indeed ironic that, in the early 2000s, the norms of modernity were imposed on a civil–military establishment by the European Union, which in the past had been the modernizing actor that imposed the Kemalist “modernization project” on nineteenth-century Turkey.
411. It is worth noting that, in August 2001, the Motherland Party (ANAP) leader and Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, stated, in a speech at his party congress, that Turkey must reconsider its national security concept and that a national security syndrome was hampering progress in the country and negatively affecting Turkey’s democratization process. Yılmaz’s statement was considered as an attack on the state’s military, which responded by stating that it was not only unfortunate but also dangerous to blame the national security concept for negative developments in the country. See “Military to Yılmaz: Don’t Exploit National Security,” Turkish Daily News, August 8, 2001.


413. The military intervened in Turkish politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, as well as in the “soft” or “postmodern” coup in February 1997, when the military put an end to the coalition government headed by an Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan. More significantly, the 1982 constitution itself, drawn up by the military, which had seized power two years earlier, grants the military a degree of autonomy that no democratic state could tolerate. On the role of the military in Turkish politics see, among others, Vaner (1987: 236–65); Hale (1994) and Jenkins (2001). Greece should probably ask itself why the heavy-handedness of the Turkish military is detrimental to Greek–Turkish relations, when none of the numerous Greek–Turkish crises of the last forty years occurred while Turkey was under military rule.

414. For a good account of the endemic – domestic and inherently structural – obstacles Turkey has to overcome on its EU path, see Yallourides (2007: 46–59).


416. Interestingly, the first civilian appointed as the NSC’s Secretary General was a diplomat and a former ambassador to Greece.


419. At the time certain private sector associations, such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), seem frustrated by the tendency of the Turkish democracy and administration to lag behind. See Stephen Kinzer, “Business Pressing a Reluctant Turkey on Democracy Issues,” New York Times, March 23, 1997. In TÜSİAD’s report, entitled “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey and the EU Copenhagen Criteria,” it was noted that the malfunctioning political structure was one of the fundamental reasons behind the recent economic crisis in Turkey, while ten areas of political reform and restructuring process that it viewed as imperative for a full-scale and rigorous democratization were outlined; see TÜSİAD, Press Release on Democratization in Turkey, May 24, 2001.

420. According to Oneal, Onéal, Maoz and Russett: “political and economic freedoms allow individuals to form transnational associations and to influence policy in light of the resulting interests, inhibiting their governments from acting
violently toward one another” (emphasis added). See Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett (1996: 13). It is worth noting, however, that this argument might apply to consolidated and stable democracies only.

421. In the late 1990s it was indeed debatable how a workable compromise could be achieved between the EU’s position, regarding the Kurds as an ethnic minority that deserved protection of its distinct identity, and the dominant view of both the elite and general society, that the only solution to the problem was to stop terrorism. See Kubicek (1999: 172). Particularly with regard to the completion and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, a major breakthrough was achieved in June 2004 when Leyla Zana and her colleagues were released from detention, and broadcasting started in ethnic minority languages, including Kurdish. These developments were acknowledged by the European Council summit in June 2004, leading it to reiterate its earlier decision to open negotiations “without delay” when and if the European Commission reported that Turkey “fulfills the Copenhagen criteria.” By 2005, and thanks to the EU pressure, Turkey had achieved a tolerance of Kurdishness unimaginable ten years earlier (e.g., the word Kurd, and more importantly an acceptance of a legitimate concept of Kurdishness, had become common in the media, the use of the language and culture had become far more widespread and confident, the Kurdish question was far more readily debated, etc.). At the same time, the more open-minded approach to the Kurdish issue by the AKP was not formalized, partly thanks to nationalist criticism. Yet, Turkish society had moved closer to the EU position with regard to the ways a democracy should deal with its ethnic minorities. For an account of the progress made on EU–Turkey relations with regard to the Kurdish issue, see International Crisis Group (2007: 12–14).

422. On the various civil society programs funded by the EU, see Önis and Yılmaz (2008: 134–5).

423. It is also worth noting that particularly after 1999, again slowly but steadily, one could notice, within both Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the surfacing of a plethora of political parties, business associations, and civil society organizations that have challenged the “orthodox” well-established Turkish policy on Cyprus and started demanding that Turkey and TRNC cease adopting a skeptical view of the EU and the accession of the island to the EU.

424. This problématique argues that an anchor/credibility dilemma, reflecting two tendencies working at cross-purposes, has recurrently characterized the EC/EU–Turkey relationship due to the former’s insufficient and mismanaged anchoring capacity and the latter’s noncredible political and policy commitments. See Uğur (1999).

425. According to this account of the effects of the EU’s imposed democratization on Turkey’s domestic politics, Turkey was expected to experience a problematic process of democratic transition – being portrayed as “elite turbulence,” “societal turbulence,” and “economic turbulence” – that is highly likely to provide rather fertile ground for the rise of militant radicalism, the reactivation of Turkey’s “Sevres Syndrome,” and the adoption of a more regionally based role; see Tsakonas (2001: 1–40).

426. On elite receptivity as a factor essential to the socialization process, see Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 284).
427. This was mainly due to the interventionist character of the “post-Westphalian” European project. As Lesser has eloquently stressed, “even candidacy implies that significant sovereignty constraints (i.e., greater scrutiny, convergence and compromise) will be posed by the European Union from the most mundane (e.g., food regulations) to high politics (human rights, foreign and security policy), a closer relationship with formal EU structures will threaten Turkish sovereignty at many levels.” See Lesser (2000b: 8).

428. In the late 1990s – early 2000, the fear of containment and dismemberment (“Sevres syndrome”) was caused by the consequences of the European Union’s “imposed” modernization project on an anachronistic Kemalist elite and a fragmented society. By publicly expressing their concern for the state’s unity due to the EU’s imposed conditions regarding human and minority rights, the Turkish military did not hesitate to declare that “in case Europe obliges them to take a decision, their preference will, undoubtedly, remain in the unity of the country and the Turkish nation.” See the statement made by the Commander of Turkish Military Academies, General Senogul, as quoted in “What the Military Says about EU,” Radikal, January 15, 2001.

429. Certain events, especially in the past (e.g., the European Union decisions in Luxembourg in 1997), made even the most Western-oriented Turkish elites feel disillusioned about Europe. It is worth noting that this tendency was reinforced internally, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a series of new Turkic states due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The will of the Kemalist elite to develop an active role in Turkey’s western and northern frontiers led to the fading of the dividing line between nationalist Kemalists and those in favor of Pan-Turkism.

430. In fact, the Turkish–Israeli axis or “strategic alliance,” reemerging dreams of Turanism, Turkish military operations in Iraq, and the threat of force against Greece and Cyprus in the case of deployment of the S-300 missiles on the latter’s soil as well as against Syria over the PKK’s leader have been clear examples of Turkey’s “regional activism.” See, among others, Hunter (1999: 63–78) and Önis (1995: 48–68).

431. See Panayotis Tsakonas, “Riding Two Horses at the Same Time,” To Vima, December 22, 1999; also Tsakonas and Dokos (2004). Certain analysts, although admitting that Turkey’s decision to follow a more independent power role (e.g., in the Middle East) will further reduce the likelihood of gaining membership of the European Union, do not necessarily see a contradiction between that role and continued close security links between the European Union and Turkey. For this argument see Buzan and Diez (1999: 51–5).

432. It goes without saying that the Greek–Turkish conflict and the Cyprus issue are closely linked, in the sense that the situation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice versa. For a layman’s point about the self-proving interconnectedness between Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, see Douglas Frantz, “Cyprus limits Greece-Turkey warming,” International Herald Tribune, December 19, 2000.

433. These examples are the ones most often cited by Greek analysts as a clear indication, if not proof, of the structural inflexibility of Turkey’s political system in wholeheartedly accepting the European norms and ways of behaving. See Yallourides (2007: 52). Along the same line of reasoning, the most striking example of Turkey’s inability to fully incorporate the EU norms is Turkey’s refusal – although it started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005 – to recognize
another EU member, namely Cyprus, by refusing to implement the Ankara Protocol that extends the EU–Turkey Customs Union of 1995 to Cyprus.

434. On the position of the Cyprus issue in the Turkish national psyche and political culture, one will find the address of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, at the UN General Assembly in September 2000 rather enlightening; see Cem (2000). Brey points out that Turkish politicians have never before expressed their determination to defend the Turkish presence in Cyprus more vigorously than during the years 1997–9; see Brey (1999: 111–21).

435. Some even argued that in late 1990s Cyprus was still the most vivid proof of Turkey’s role as a regional power and the testing ground indicating what, how, and how much Turkey can do for Turks living outside Turkey’s borders. See Kizilyiurek (1999).

436. President Sezer’s full alignment with the Government’s stance on the Cyprus issue is characteristic of the consensus the issue enjoys internally. Note that Sezer was not hesitant to openly confront government decisions on issues of human and individual rights violations, respect of religious freedoms, and, in general, Turkey’s adjustment to certain EU standards.


438. The National Security Council (NSC) noted in a statement released at the end of May that “[the full membership of Southern Cyprus in the European Union] will make Turkey speed up its efforts to strengthen and deepen the cooperation with the TRNC.” See “NSC releases a statement,” Anadolu Agency, May 29, 2001.


441. For many analysts a crisis seems inevitable in the eastern Mediterranean within the next eighteen months. See Paul Taylor, “Cyprus bid for EU membership a moment of truth for Turkey,” International Herald Tribune (Kathimerini), May 23, 2001.

442. In Foreign Minister Cem’s words: “...if the Greek Cypriot administration is accepted to the European Union as a member as the only governor of the island, this would result in a serious crisis. Such a crisis would affect all relations and no one would benefit from it.” See “Cyprus joining EU could cause ‘serious crisis’,” Financial Times, May 22, 2001.

443. For examples demonstrating the increasing pressure by Erdoğan on Denktas to accept any kind of solution on the Cyprus issue, see Kinacioglu and Oktay (2006: 261–71).

444. After the 1974 invasion of Cyprus a strict and rigid consensus was achieved among the conservative and the modernizing members of the Turkish civil–military elite. This coalition also proved effective in securing the continuity of the state’s policy over the Cyprus issue prior to the critical Copenhagen summit as well as in early 2003. The Turkish position on Cyprus seemed thus to be divided into two camps: on one side, President Sezer, the TRNC President Denktas, and the Turkish military; on the other side, the AKP and the opposition parties in the TRNC; see Kinacioglu and Oktay (2006: 265).

445. According to Kemal Kirişçi, the shift made in Turkey’s Cyprus policy “was no less than revolutionary ... and, [i]t is probably one of the most striking illustrations
of the transformation that Turkish foreign policy has gone through recently.” See Kirişçi (2005: 18).

446. In the April 2004 referendum, 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan plan. This was the fifth version of the UN Secretary’s plan for the reunification of the island, with the first one presented in 2002. It is worth noting that the Turkish Cypriot community had been receptive to AKP’s decision to replace the intransigent and “spoiler” Denktas. Already, prior to the EU Copenhagen summit, opposition parties and civil society organizations rallied through successive demonstrations against the Turkish Cypriot leader while they also made appeals to the AKP government to overrule Denktas “the dinosaur.” For these remarks see Robins (2003: 559).

447. On the restructuring of Turkey’s policy towards the Cyprus issue, mainly as a means for the AKP to strengthen its domestic position vis-à-vis the other major political actors in Turkey, see Çelenk (2007: 349–63). However, other factors also seem to account for the major shift in Turkey’s policy over the Cyprus issue, such as the improvement of Turkey’s image in the international arena, Turkey’s EU membership process, and past foreign policy choices.

448. A full account of the dramatic turnabout in Turkey’s foreign policy over the Cyprus issue should take into consideration the role that civil society and the media played, both in Turkey and in the self-proclaimed TRNC. Particular reference should be made to the December 2002 and January 2003 Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations in support of a solution and EU membership as well as to the unprecedented public debate initiated by various NGOs, Associations and Universities with the aim of demonstrating the impossibility of Turkey continuing with the “old” policy over the Cyprus issue. For these remarks see Kirişçi (2006: 44–5).

449. In the April 2004 referendum, 76 percent of the Greek-Cypriots voted against the plan.


452. A series of expert opinions related to the delimitation of the continental shelf was received by the Greek government, including – among others – world-known international law experts such as professors W. Michael Reisman (former ICJ Chairman), Stephen Swebel, Prosper Weil, and Thomas M. Franck. The international law consultancy firm Freshfields, which was involved in the delimitation of the continental shelf between Qatar and Bahrain, and a particular European institute with expertise in conducting delimitation of continental shelf scenarios and simulation projects were also engaged by the Greek government in the preparation enterprise. Certain Greek international lawyers, including professors Christos Rozakis, Argyris Fatouros, Emanuel Roukounas, the late Nikos Valtikos, and George Kasimatis, had also played a catalytic role. This information comes from the testimony of the foreign Minister, George Papandreou’s closest advisor, Professor Harris Pamboukis, whose role had been instrumental in the coordination of the plethora of actors involved in the preparation of

453. Simitis (2005: 103–4). According to the then Greek premier, Costas Simitis, “...in exercising its right to extend its territorial waters, Greece would however take into consideration the interests of third countries for free naval and air navigation in the Aegean... [s]elective differentiations of the limits of the Greek territorial waters are also not excluded in order for the international naval and air navigation not to be hindered.” The last remark meant that in certain instances the Greek territorial sea would extend beyond the existing six miles, to eight and/or to ten miles (especially in the case of island westwards or in mainland Greece eastwards), provided there was no closure of the high seas from the Straits to the wider Mediterranean sea. In this way a harmonization of the Greek airspace with the territorial waters would be achieved and the so-called “Greek paradox” would be tackled.


457. Ibid.

458. Information and data provided by the A4 Directorate [Greek–Turkish Relations] at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

459. It is worth noting that a few months before “Destined Glory” another military exercise, named “Dynamic Mix,” had taken place in the Alliance’s southern region with chief participants Greece and Turkey. Interestingly, the whole exercise was conducted very smoothly, although according to the exercise’s scenario Turkish troops (wearing a NATO hat) landed on Greek soil.

460. According to the Greek–Turkish joint statement: “...while Greece initiates ratification process, Turkey will start accession procedures. It is also agreed that the instruments of ratification and accession will be simultaneously deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in due course.” See Joint Statement by Cem and Papandreou on Anti-Personnel Landmines (2001).

461. See “Akis [Tsohatzopoulos] insists on his opposition on procurements cuts,” Ta Nea, April 4, 2001. Tsohatzopoulos was not hesitant in opposing views expressed by the political party of Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos) for cuts in Greek military procurements in view of the Government Council on Foreign Relations and Defense (KYSEA) meeting in January 2000 to discuss Greece’s new five-year procurement program. See “Helsinki is one thing; and military procurements is another,” Ta Nea, December 20, 1999: 5.

462. It is worth noting, however, that the Turkish General Staff had carefully avoided detailing which programs had actually been postponed due to that new line of fiscal austerity measures. See “TSK Halt $ 19.5 bbl Modernization Projects,” Turkish Daily News, April 12, 2001 and “Turk Army Halts $ 19.5 bbl Modernization Projects,” Reuters, April 11, 2001. Moreover, to many skeptics in Turkey and abroad, such a move by the Generals should be seen less as a sincere effort to provide “more butter” for Turkey and more as an attempt to further advance their position by denouncing pledges of defense cutbacks according to
IMF conditions as well as by reviving major procurement programs as bailout money flowed from global lending organizations. See, for example, the statements made by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Huseyn Kivrikoglu, who denied that in Turkey’s Letter of Intent to the IMF there were references to the military cutbacks Turkey should make in order for economic aid to be granted. See “Turkey Denies Any Pledges on Military Cutbacks,” Middle East Newsline, April 11, 2001. In addition, Kivrikoglu stated that Turkey suspended or postponed (but not cancelled) lesser priority procurement programs, and that the General Staff would revive those programs once the economic situation improved. See “Contractors See Hope in Turkish IMF Bailout,” Defense News, May 14, 2001.


465. See “Greek and Turkish FMs Announce Cancellation of Greek, Turkish Military Exercises,” Athens News Agency, October 10, 2003.

466. From the beginning of the confidence-building enterprise, it was crystal clear to the Greek and Turkish negotiating teams that confidence cannot be built if one side attempts to get an advantage over the other. Author’s personal notes based on several meetings between the Greek and Turkish negotiating teams entrusted with the confidence-building measures enterprise.

467. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed that within three years since the Task Force establishment ten bilateral coordination meetings had taken place with the participation of more than five hundred Turkish officials. See Abdullah Gül, “What Greece and Turkey Had Achieved,” To Vima (weekly edition), October 21, 2003: A4. See also “Gül in Athens,” Anadolu Agency, November 21, 2003. In January 2004, The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Panos Beglitis, stressed that since the inauguration of the Joint Task Force in 2000 nineteen seminars had taken place and more than six hundred officials of the Turkish public administration sector had been trained. See Panos Beglitis, Statement on the 11th Regular Meeting of the Joint Greek–Turkish Task Force (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2004).

468. According to data provided by the A4 Directorate of Greek–Turkish Relations, in May 2003 cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs – conducted at Political Directors’ level – was enhanced by periodic meetings of six working groups and resulted in fifteen bilateral agreements (thirteen already in force, and two under ratification).

469. By 2004, seventy-six Greek companies had invested more than $60 million in Turkey (concentrating mostly in the fields of information technology, agricultural, pharmaceutical, fishing, and tourism) while Turkish investments in Greece – limited to four Turkish companies – remained at a very low level of about $480,000 (with investments regarding mainly transportation and services sectors); see Önis and Yılmaz (2008: 132); also Ege (2003: 117–32) and Liargovas (2003: 133–48).

470. According to a more modest estimation, the trade volume was $694 million in 1999 and, despite the brief setback in Turkey’s economy in 2001, it showed a steep rise of 47 percent over 2002, reaching $1.3 million. See Önis and Yılmaz (2008: 131).
471. It is worth noting that in 1995 trade between Greece and Turkey – with a combined population of over 75 million people – was a mere $411 million, while in 1998 it was $690 million. See Nachmani (2003: 190).

472. As noted by Önis and Yılmaz: “...[B]ilateral trade has mainly an inter-industry character with a high concentration of Turkish exports to Greece in capital-intensive industrial sectors, while the Greek exports to Turkey encompass resource-intensive sectors in general. In that respect, there is a similarity between Greek–Turkish trade relations and Greek-EU ones in terms of their inter-industry character.” See Önis and Yılmaz (2008: 131).

473. See also “Bids Unveiled for Gas Pipeline Linking Turkey and Greece,” Kathimerini, October 22, 2002.

474. For an attempt to theorize systematically about the causal mechanisms linking interdependence to conflict, see Mansfield and Pollins (2003).

475. See relevant references in Chapter 4; also Valinakis (2000: 95–101). In March 2004, Yannis Valinakis undertook the portfolio of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

476. See Costas Karamanlis’s strong criticism of the Greek government’s U-turn in its policy towards Turkey at the EU Helsinki summit in Parliamentary Minutes (January 2001: 4048–9).

477. To certain analysts, the fact that both PASOK and ND agreed on Greece’s strategic shift provided evidence that the various forms of Europeanization kept producing some positive results; see Grigoriadis (2008b: 160).


479. This was made apparent on a plethora of occasions when the Greek premier acknowledged the productive role the EU could play in better Greek–Turkish relations. See his remarks in two main parliamentary debates over Greece’s foreign policy in October 2005 and in November 2006, in Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 643–4, 656) and Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 762–3). In response to a plea made by the leader of Synaspismos, Nikos Konstandopoulos, for a parliamentary debate on Greek–Turkish relations, the Foreign Minister, Dora Bakoyannis, stated: “...often some people jump to question one of the central strategic choices Greece had ever made, namely its support to Turkey’s European orientation. I must remind this is Greece’s strategic choice that is being supported by the majority of the Greek people” (our emphasis). See Parliamentary Minutes (June 2006: 7120).

480. It is worth noting that, prior to the critical – in regard to Cyprus’ accession – EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, Costas Karamanlis, then leader of the opposition party of New Democracy, put pressure on a reluctant European Republican Party to accept Greece’s position over the Cyprus issue and over EU relations with Turkey. This backing by Greece’s major opposition party had been publicly acknowledged by the then Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou. For these remarks see Keridis (2003: 316).

481. See Constantine Arvanitopoulos, “Greek–Turkish Relations after Helsinki,” Ependytis (Greek weekly), February 26–7, 2000, reprinted in Arvanitopoulos (2007: 124). An advisor to Costas Karamanlis and General Director of the Institute for Democracy: Constantine Karamanlis, the author served at the time as a forerunner of Karamanlis’s thinking on Greece’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey.
482. According to the Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis: “...the procedure which was agreed at Helsinki in regard to Turkey’s European path was not abandoned. It was instead strengthened and improved by the government.” See Parliamentary Minutes (June 2006: 7120). In an interview with the author, the Foreign Minister of the first Costas Karamanlis government, Petros Molyviatis, noted that it was the government of New Democracy which had worked since its early days in power for the actual “communitarization” of Greek–Turkish relations. According to Molyviatis, Greece’s EU partners had never really shared the former Greek government’s reasoning about the “communitarization” of Greek–Turkish relations. For similar remarks see Molyviatis’s statements in the press conference following the EU Council summit in Brussels in December 2004 in To Vima, December 19, 2004.

483. See the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Professor Christos Rozakis’s interview with Christina Poulidou in Avgi (Greek daily, Sunday edition), June 4, 2006.

484. Author’s interview with Petros Molyviatis.

485. In an interview with the author the former Foreign Minister Molyviatis assessed the Simitis’s government commitment to enter into negotiations with Turkey as a “self-entrapping” one.

486. Author’s interview with Petros Molyviatis.

487. A member of Karamanlis’s foreign policy apparatus specifically warned that the government that would come out of the 2000 national elections should avoid “...to move forward with bilateral negotiations over the whole complex of issues, meaning negotiations beyond the delimitation of the continental shelf, which is being traditionally regarded as the only bilateral difference between Greece and Turkey.” This option was regarded not only as one badly serving Greece’s interests but also “...as the one upon which particular pressure will be put on Greece from its EU partners and NATO allies” (our emphasis). See Arvanitopoulos (2007: 124).

488. Greece’s modified socialization strategy vis-à-vis Turkey could also be termed Stability Plus strategy, with the first term, namely stability, referring to the maintenance of a “low-temperature” Aegean front in the short run and the normalization of bilateral relations in the medium run, and the latter term, that is, plus, referring to the positive results Greece expected to be produced by the strengthening of Turkey’s engagement with the EU. The socialization strategy of the former socialist government aiming at conflict management, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution was thus transformed into a socialization strategy which aimed at conflict management in the short run, and conflict transformation in the medium and long run.

489. Consistent with the Karamanlis government’s instrumental dialogue culture, the strategy of passive socialization was not interested in undertaking the political resolve necessary for finishing up the breakthrough achieved in Helsinki. This does not, however, mean that the modification of Greece’s socialization strategy downgraded the Greek strategy towards Turkey from a visionary strategy with clear ends and means (what strategic analysis calls a “realized strategy”) to an “emergent strategy” with much less clarity in ends and means. Instead, Greece’s passive socialization strategy seemed to consciously and deliberately put Greece’s relations with Turkey on a paradigm of relations, which clearly suggested that to remain aloof from hard decisions in regard to a dispute with a neighboring state would, in fact, be the wisest strategy a state may pursue.
Interestingly, such a claim was explicitly made by a key foreign policy figure of the Karamanlis government, namely the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yannis Valinakis, when – with reference to the Cyprus issue – he stated that “the government’s lack of a position can in fact constitute a position.” See relevant criticism made on that claim by Greece’s former premier, Costas Simitis, in “The End of a Strategy,” Ta Nea, April 23, 2004 as well as by the leader of the opposition party, George Papandreou, in Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 647).

490. Author’s interview with Petros Molyviatis. In a more forthcoming version of this reasoning, when Turkey is about to enjoy full accession – in the very distant future, indeed – Greece will make its final trade-off consenting to Turkey’s accession to the EU by taking in return from Turkey a favorable response to the Greek desiderata on a final settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute.

491. Patton argues that three key factors account for the flagging fervor of the AKP government: modalities of EU behavior toward Turkey, election politics, and Kemalist institutional resistance to AKP reform efforts.

492. Since 2004 there has been a dramatic drop in the support expressed by the Turkish public for the EU and Turkish membership. Indeed, whereas in 2004 73 percent of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership, that percentage dropped to 54 percent in 2006 and to 40 percent in 2007. See Transatlantic Trends (2007: 22). For the downward trend of Turkish people’s perceptions of the EU, see Bardakci (2007).

493. In a speech to the European Parliament, European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn noted that “[A]fter more than three years of substantial legislative reforms (2001–4), I am concerned that the reform process has lost its momentum...a development that could affect the pace of negotiations. “ See Rehn (2006).

494. It was specifically argued that the enlargement process should be halted so that there could be calm reflection on the way to reconcile, on the one hand, the deceleration in membership negotiations and, on the other hand, the promises made and the expectations generated. See Lecha (2006). See also Eurobarometer (2004: B.92, B.93) According to Eurobarometer 2004, when the largest enlargement in the European Union’s history was looming, only a relative majority (42 percent) of EU-15 citizens claimed that they supported the membership of the ten new members, while 39 percent opposed it (with German, Austrian, and Finnish citizens being the most opposed to further enlargement in future years).

495. Public debate in France seemed to suggest that most French opinion-makers had a very vague idea about Turkey’s history and the realities of its current situation, while French political groupings appeared divided on the issue of Turkey’s “Europeanness.” Turkey’s EU accession was a matter of concern also for Germany, but on more functional and technocratic grounds, given that Turkey was viewed as a large country whose accession was expected to be costly and to affect the balance of power in the Commission and the Council. Germany also feared that it would be the target of potential migratory flows from Turkey. Party positions on the issue also varied, while public opinion tended to adopt an emotional stance on the issue. On the public debates in France and Germany, see Chenal (2003) and Schultz (2003), respectively. For certain EU member-states the major obstacle seemed to be Turkey’s “unproductive and unstable economy, and the related threat that Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU would mean
that millions of Turks in search of jobs and higher wages would emigrate to Germany and elsewhere in Europe.” See Teitelbaum and Martin (2003: 102).

496. Especially after the rejection of the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the referendums held in France and The Netherlands. It is worth noting that 52 percent of the people in the EU-25 member-states were against Turkey’s membership in 2005. See European Commission, European Barometers (2002) and (2005).

497. The most typical example of this line of reasoning is the former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who claimed that Turkey was not a European country and that Turkey’s entry into the EU would be “the end of Europe.” See his interview in Le Monde, “Pour ou Contre l’Adhésion de la Turquie A l’ Union Européenne,” 8 November 2002. In a similar vein, Frits Bolkenstein, the Dutch European Commissioner for Internal Market 1999–2004, was not hesitant to state that “the liberation of 1683 would have been in vain” if Turkey joined the EU. See his speech at the University of Leiden on September 6, 2004. According to International Crisis Group, “…since 2002, a combination of short-term factors, mostly internal matters like immigration, enlargement and unemployment worries, has caused politicians in several EU states to voice public doubt about the EU’s often-repeated promise of accession in the long-term. Turkey’s disillusionment began later from 2005.” See International Crisis Group (2007: 17).

498. For a good account of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses to deal with future challenges see Tsoukalas (2005).

499. In 2002, Greece was among those countries that mostly favored Turkey’s EU membership (Greece: 59 percent, EU-15: 31 percent); see European Barometer (2002). Three years later things changed dramatically. Indeed, Greeks, as well as the majority of European citizens, expressed rather negative views regarding the possible accession of Turkey (Greece: 70 percent, EU-25, 52 percent). Interestingly, Greeks – as well as European citizens overall – justify their views concerning the accession of Turkey not only by identifying the negative effects of such an event, but also by not citing any positive outcome resulting from Turkey joining the European Union. Fifty-one percent of Greeks (EU-25, 33 percent) do not consider that Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography. Greece also records the highest percentage – after the Republic of Cyprus (69%) – in the total sample. It is also worth noting that a significant part of the Greek sample (46 percent), as well as the majority of the overall European sample (55 percent), agrees with the statement, with Greeks (76 percent) and citizens of the Republic of Cyprus (91 percent) recording the highest percentages in expressing their total disagreement that Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history. See European Barometer (2005). According to Hans- Jürgen Axt, polls carried out exclusively in Greece in 2004 confirm the results of the Eurobarometer poll of 2005, namely, that 53.6 percent of the respondents were against Turkey’s membership in the EU. See the sources cited in Axt (2006: 19).

500. One should not forget that any resolution or settlement of the Greek–Turkish dispute, either on a bilateral basis or through the ICJ, carried a political risk domestically, since any agreement between Greece and Turkey would require compromise. Faced with a Greek public educated into the uncompromising position that all other issues besides the delimitation of the continental shelf are considered as unilateral Turkish claims, it is hard to think of a Greek government willing to deal with the political cost entailed in any compromise agreement with Turkey.
501. In 2006, 67 percent of Greeks maintained their opposition to Turkey’s membership; see Eurobarometer (2006: 71). Interestingly, these results occurred regardless of the positive results produced by the increasing cooperation of Greek and Turkish civil societies and NGOs, and the steps taken towards better mutual understanding.

502. According to Ker-Lindsay: “...[r]ather than view relations with Turkey in a wider regional context, which would allow for mutual cooperation on a number of issues and open up opportunities to find common ground on non-contentious ones, relations would be defined in terms of direct interests. Some observers felt that this also raised the possibility of renewed antagonism between Athens and Ankara” (our emphasis). See Ker-Lindsay (2007: 238). For the vast difference in the style and substance of the approach followed by Molyviatis and his predecessor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, see Alexis Papahelas, “From ‘Networking’ to ‘Busybodism,’” To Vima (weekly edition), March 6, 2005.

503. Just two weeks prior to the Greek national elections, in mid-February, a new phase of negotiations was resumed between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Unsurprisingly, in view of May 1, 2004, when Cyprus would officially join the EU, the negotiations were organized around a very tight schedule. Thus, following several weeks of discussions held in Cyprus, a second phase of negotiations was scheduled to take place in Lucerne, Switzerland; particularly in the Burgenstock resort.

504. Both the former Greek premier, Costas Simitis, and the new PASOK leader and former Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, criticized the Greek government’s stance in the negotiations held at Burgenstock as indifferent. In the presentation of the book by the former President of the Cyprus Republic, Glafkos Clerides, the former Greek premier Costas Simitis stated that “while reading the part [of the book] concerning the negotiations [at Burgenstock], the reader will plausibly wonder what were the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot positions for refining or improving the Annan plan. Obviously there weren’t any” (our emphasis); see Simitis, remarks on the presentation of Clerides’ book (2007). Also according to Simitis: “...Greece had simply ‘followed’ the Greek-Cypriot government. Neither in Burgenstock nor afterwards had the Greek government played an active role. Its position on the [Annan] plan was not addressed either to other EU member-states or to the UN Secretary General or to the European Commission. Neither had it decided to make his position known to other states.” See Simitis, “The End of a Strategy,” Ta Nea, April 23, 2004. Former Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, was not hesitant to characterize the Greek government presence at the Swiss resort as “touristic.”


506. Interestingly, to certain Turkish analysts, the nationalist line of Tassos Papadopoulos seemed to appeal, moreover, to the more conservative sector of the Greek public opinion, which the Karamanlis government did not want to alienate. See Önis and Yılmaz (2008: 136). Along the same line of reasoning, another Greek analyst argues that Papadopoulos’s argumentation seemed to have a certain appeal to the right-wing, nationalist faction of the Greek government’s party electoral clientele, thus raising the political cost of any Greek initiative supporting a compromise resolution of the Cyprus problem and of the Greek–Turkish dispute. See Grigoriadis (2008b: 163). There is no doubt that a good deal of such
cost was experienced and moreover paid by the leader of the opposition, George Papandreou, who was not hesitant in adopting a forthcoming position, favorable to the Annan Plan, prior to the April 24, referendum in Cyprus.

507. In late February 2004, two polls conducted in Cyprus showed that Greek-Cypriots were against the UN Secretary’s plan. In the first poll, conducted by CBS, 61 percent of the Greek-Cypriots voted “No,” under the condition that no substantive changes would be made in the plan before the referendum, 27 percent voted “Yes,” and 12 percent were undecided. According to the poll conducted by Evresis, 42 percent voted against the plan, 22 percent favored the plan, and 36 percent were the floating vote. See A. Chatzikyriakou, “The Cyprus Issue: The Obstacles to Negotiations,” To Vima (weekly edition), February 22, 2004. As expected, these – as well as other – poll results had tremendously affected a newly elected government whose utmost interest was the consolidation of its political dominance internally. In an interview with the author, former Foreign Minister Petros Molyviati admitted that the Greek government was fully aware of the rather negative feelings the Greek-Cypriots shared about the Annan Plan.

508. As a cultured advisor of Greece’s premier confided to the author, Karamanlis seemed to share Oscar Wilde’s dictum, from his novel The Importance of Being Earnest, that “In matters of grave importance, style, not sincerity, is the vital thing.”


510. The results of the two separate referendums were as follows: Greek-Cypriots, “Yes”: 75.83 percent; “No”: 24.17 percent; Turkish-Cypriots, “Yes”: 64.91 percent; “No”: 34.09 percent.

511. For a detailed and balanced assessment of the evolution of the Cyprus issue and of the attempts made for its resolution, see Liakouras (2007). For a discussion and assessment of the various versions of the plan for the reunification of the island submitted by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, see Liakouras (2007: 347–502).

512. For a good account of the considerable power the institution of the presidency wields in Cyprus, allowing the President to be both the head of state and the head of the government, thus exerting greater control over domestic politics than any other EU leader, see Ker-Lindsay (2006: 21–37).

513. EU membership was, moreover, viewed as providing the Greek-Cypriot side with the institutional advantages that would allow it to search for – if not to impose – a solution favorable to the Greek-Cypriots’ desiderata. It was not a coincidence that the Greek-Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos’s argumentation along those maximalist positions had been very attractive to the Greek-Cypriot public, which opposed Turkey’s EU membership. By implication, support for Turkey’s EU accession was expected to be followed by the Greek-Cypriots to the extent that and for as long as it would allow Cyprus to extract concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus issue.

514. See the former premier Costas Simitis’s remarks in an article published on the eve of the Greek-Cypriot referendum; Costas Simitis, “The End of a Strategy,” Ta Nea (Greek daily), April 23, 2004.
515. As noted, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community rejected a version of the Annan plan in March 2003. In December of that year and under the Turkish government’s catalytic involvement, Denktas lost power in an election to the pro-reunification Mehmet Ali Talat.

516. Only two days after the twin referendums, the European Council stated that it “...is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community” (General Affairs Council Conclusions at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/80142.pdf) Starting from April 2004, both the EU and certain EU members adopted a series of measures aiming at the end of the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and at the facilitation of its economic development. These measures included the Green Line Regulation (aiming to give native Turkish-Cypriots full EU rights and access at least to export routes through the internationally recognized Cyprus government), the dispersion of funds from the 259 million Euros package (approved by the EU in 2002 in the event of unification), and – mainly – British initiatives for the launch of direct flights to the main Turkish-Cypriot airport, Ercan. Unsurprisingly, most of these measures did not materialize – while the aid package was passed two years later, in February 2006 – mainly due to the Greek-Cypriot government objections and the subsequent respect of other EU members of the Nicosia claim of a “vital national interest.” As a consequence, a sense of injustice in EU policies has set back the trust Turkish-Cypriots placed in the EU with their 2004 vote. For these remarks see International Crisis Group (2007: 19). Note also the statement made by the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verhuenegen, that “...the Greek-Cypriots would join the Union under ‘a shadow’.” See “A Chance for peace and unity wasted,” The Economist, April 25, 2004.

517. It is worth noting that neither Karamanlis himself nor any prominent member of his government had publicly and clearly accepted the decoupling of the Cyprus issue from Greek–Turkish relations. See Foreign Minister Petros Molyviati’s remarks to the Greek Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs in Dimitris Tzathas, “We did not delinkage the Cyprus issue from Greek–Turkish relations,” Ta Nea, June 24, 2004. PASOK’s leader, George Papandreou, lashed out against the decoupling pursued by the Karamanlis administration on several occasions and he characterized it as a “Pontius Pilate” stance. The Greek premier had instead accused Papandreou’s decision to openly adopt a favorable stance over the Annan plan of being tutelary. See Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 765–76, 776–7).

518. For a detailed account of the use of the Greek-Cypriots’ membership to put pressure on Turkey and the Karamanlis government’s reaction, see Ker-Lindsay (2007: 240–2).


522. Besides various high-ranking foreign policy figures of the Karamanlis administration, the Greek premier Costas Karamanlis himself had on various instances
and in many ways declared that normalization of Greece’s relations with Turkey remained the most important foreign policy goal of Greece’s policy towards Turkey. See Karamanlis’s remarks after his meeting with his Turkish counterpart in Athens in May 2004, and in Ankara in June 2006. See also his remarks in various parliamentary debates over Greece’s foreign policy; see – among others – Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 644, 656) and (November 2006: 763–74). See also the Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis’s statements at the government cabinet meeting on March 7, 2006; available at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage.

523. After making some general references to the progress achieved thus far in Greek–Turkish relations, such as the signing of numerous bilateral agreements in a variety of different areas and the adoption of several confidence-building measures, the EU Commission Regular Report stated that “...In May 2004, the Turkish General Staff highlighted that any unresolved issues should be settled in line with the acquis and referred to the International Court of Justice.” See Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress (October 2004). According to Axt, “…not a single word in this report recalled what was written in the final conclusions of the Helsinki Council.”

524. According to the Greek premier, Costas Karamanlis, “…December 2004 was not set as a deadline of a particular time-framework. What was mentioned at the Helsinki decisions was that the European Council will review the situation. Well, the review was done and new conditions and criteria had for the first time been added.” See Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 657). Interestingly, the leader of the opposition party and one of the architects of the Greece’s active socialization strategy, George Papandreou, explained the December 2004 deadline in the following way: “...[Th]rough the Helsinki decisions Greece did not secure that Greek–Turkish differences will be solved by December 2004. What Greece secured however was a solid and concrete time-frame to be established in regard to Turkey’s procrastination policy. If Turkey wanted for its accession to evolve without obstacles, the only way forward was to concede by December 2004 to the resolution of its differences with Greece by accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Hague” (our emphasis). See George Papandreou’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 648).

525. This term is attributed to Axt (2006: 7).

526. In regard to the Aegean dispute, paragraph 20 reads as follows: “The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate” (our emphasis). See Presidency Conclusions (Brussels, December 2004: 5).

527. The change in Greece’s strategy towards Turkey was assessed by certain analysts not only as a deviation from the strategy adopted at Helsinki but mainly...
as reminiscent of the older realist readings of Greek–Turkish relations. See Grigoriadis (2008b: 160).

528. The Greek premier defended the Council conclusions referring to Greek–Turkish relations in the press conference following the December 2004 EU summit by arguing that the Helsinki term referring to “... other related issues” was withdrawn and that “there is not anymore a time-frame or a deadline for the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute or its submission to the ICJ in The Hague,” which he characterized as being “a rather asphyxiating condition, especially for Greece” (our emphasis). See Irene Karanasopoulou, “Greece lowers the ‘Helsinki bar’,” Ta Nea, December 18, 2004, p. N 11. In a parliamentary debate over foreign policy issues, the Greek premier, Costas Karamanlis, explained his government’s decision to downplay the Helsinki decisions’ reference on the two countries’ recourse to the ICJ in The Hague to an “if necessary” one as a wise decision taken by his government “... to not a priori accept the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction over every single issue Turkey decides to raise in the Aegean. In such a case, Greece would provide Turkey with the benefit to define the content and the number of the Greek–Turkish differences.” See Parliamentary Minutes (October 2005: 656–7).

529. Author’s interview with former Foreign Minister, Petros Molyviatis.

530. Author’s interview with Petros Molyviatis. See also Molyviatis (2000: 15). See also Costas Karamanlis’s remarks – while in the opposition – in the debate made at the Greek Parliament in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit; Parliamentary Minutes (December 15, 1999).

531. Echoing the culture and rationale of the conservative Greek government decision to modify Greece’s socialization strategy, Costas Iordanidis – a noted Greek journalist – pointed out that “... the new premier, along with the Foreign Minister Molyviatis restored Greece’s international affairs to a normal pulse... [t]he policy of the current government is more pragmatist because it focuses on developments that will take place in the coming December [regarding EU–Turkey relations] and it rightly supports Ankara’s European ambitions fully and without asking for an exchange... [w]hat the Greek government should mainly care for is Turkey’s anchorage into the EU in order for – for the first time after decades of crises – the daily agenda of the Greek–Turkish relations follow the European principles without any blackmailing time-frameworks and deadlines” (our emphasis). See Costas Iordanidis, “The goal is the coming December,” Kathimerini, September 5, 2004.

532. For an assessment of the EU’s performance with respect to the Greek–Turkish dispute, see Tsakonas (2009: 107–20).

533. Author’s interview with former Foreign Minister, Petros Molyviatis. See also statements made by the Greek premier as well as by the Foreign Minister Bakoyannis on numerous occasions, such as during the Turkish premier Tayyip Erdoğan’s official visit to Athens in May 2004; the Greek premier’s participation in the context of the Black Sea Cooperation (BSEC) in Istanbul in June 2006; and the Greek premier’s official visit to Ankara in January 2008. See also Ifantis (2007: 6).

534. For a full presentation of the four pillars of Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis Turkey, see the Greek premier’s remarks at the parliamentary debate over Greece’s foreign policy; Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 764). According to the Greek premier:

... [G]reece implements a policy aiming at the gradual normalization of Greek Turkish relations. Firstly, we support the full adaptation of Turkey to
European standards and its full accession to the EU; secondly, we strengthen our efforts to further advance our bilateral relationship with Turkey in the fields of energy, banking, tourism, commerce, and entrepreneurship; thirdly, we aimed at the strengthening and implementation of confidence building measures, which can contribute to the avoidance of tension as well as to the improvement of the climate in relations between the two neighboring states; fourthly, we keep on the continuation of the exploratory talks, which were initiated by the former Greek government, and we put forward the need for the respect of international law and international agreements. In that context, we also view positively the productive role the ICJ in The Hague can play in regard to the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.

535. Through the “double-decoupling,” Turkey was set free from any commitment linking the lack of a solution on the Cyprus problem with Greek–Turkish relations (first-decoupling) and the resolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute with Turkey’s future membership (second-decoupling). For the negative consequences of Greece’s “double-decoupling” see George Papandreou’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 765–6).

536. Based on the mandate of the EU member states, the European Commission prepares all the draft common positions of the European Union during the accession negotiations. More important, the Commission monitors the progress made by the candidate country and publishes a comprehensive report on the state of play every year. This report includes a thorough assessment of the candidate country’s compliance with all the EU criteria: political, economic, and for each of the negotiating chapters.

537. As noted, although Turkey had signed the protocol in August 2005, it also issued a declaration stating that this did not amount to any sort of formal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The EU considered Turkey’s statement as unacceptable and in September 2005 it put forward a counterdeclaration, which did not, however, pose any specific deadlines for Turkey to meet its obligations.


539. In her first address to the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis – who replaced Petros Molyviatis in February 2006 – noted that: “... [T]he Greek government succeeded in transforming, for the first time, those issues upon which Greece had a special interest in order to become European ones and constitute the criteria Turkey should meet for accession. Turkey’s EU path is being monitored, not only as an end-state but also during the various intermediate phases. One of those phases is Turkey’s full implementation of the Customs Union (our emphasis).” See Tziovaras (2006: 27).

As a prominent analyst of Greek-Turkish relations had put it, after assessing the EU Commission document on the principles governing the EU negotiations and the “Negotiation Framework:” ... [A]lthough Turkey was obliged to accept international standards and norms, the ICJ was relativized... no new aspects were raised on the Cyprus issue...[Turkey’s] obligations were made more flexible, instead of being hardened and specified...the EU left room for bilateral effects of reconciliation instead of putting herself at the center of respective ambitions...no pressure was put on Turkey and Greece to proceed with special measures...nothing was mentioned to intensify negotiations or to pave the way to the ICJ.

540. See Axt (2006: 6–7). Seriously concerned about the new Greek government decision to modify Greece’s socialization strategy at the approaching December EU
summit, the former Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, sent an open letter to the Greek weekly  *To Vima* where most of the aforementioned points were stressed and the risks posed by the abandonment of the strategy pursued at Helsinki were noted. See George Papandreou, “Deeply concerned about Greek national issues,”  *To Vima* (weekly edition), December 5, 2004.

541. Author’s interview with the former Foreign Minister, Petros Molyviatis.

542. EU–Turkey accession negotiations concern thirty-five separate chapters and focus on how and when Turkey will adapt to the EU acquis, namely, the more than 100,000-page body of European legislation accumulated since the foundation of the EEC. See Rehn (2006: 5).

543. This appears as a “catchphrase” at the Greek Ministry of Foreign affairs. Series of discussions of a Greek diplomat with the author from March to September 2006.

544. These issues included restrictions on the freedom of associations and state interference in the activities of associations, restrictions on the right of non-Muslim religious communities to establish associations with legal personality in order to promote and protect their religions, discrimination based on ethnic or social origin, membership of a national minority, property, etc.


546. Based mostly on “wishful thinking,” to certain Greek government officials the successful address of those issues could remove the steam from opposition to Turkey’s membership and ameliorate, if not reverse, the stance of Greek public opinion.

547. See Turkey 2006 Progress Report (2006: 25). Undoubtedly, this was a small step further from the one made in the Commission’s 2005 Progress Report, which stated that “In April 2005, the President of Parliament expressed the view that Turkey could drop the reference to the ‘casus belli’ versus Greece in relation to the possible extension of territorial waters, as stated in the resolution adopted by the Turkish Parliament in 1995. Foreign Minister Gül mentioned that he had no objections to erasing this reference. However since then there has been no follow up.” see Turkey: Progress Report (2005: 41).

548. See Presidency Conclusions (December 2006), especially reference to decisions taken at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (December 2006: 8–9).

549. Ibid.

550. For the talks held between the Greek-Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos and the Greek premier Costas Karamanlis in October 2006 in view of the approaching December EU summit and the formation of a common negotiation strategy, see Vassilis Chiotis, “A common plan of action between Greece and Cyprus,”  *To Vima*, October 20, 2006: A12.

551. Namely Chapter 18: “Statistics” and Chapter 32: “Financial Control.” See “Third Meeting of the Accession Conference at Ministerial Level with Turkey” (2007). It is worth noting that, contrary to original plans, the 27-EU members did not vote for the opening of the “economic and monetary policy chapter,” since the German Presidency of the EU at the time decided to withdraw it from the agenda, notably at France’s request.

553. See relevant analysis in Chapter 4, especially 4.5.2: “The bilateral level.”

554. Through cooperation in low politics issues, the CBMs enterprise and the establishment and functioning of the Joint (Greek–Turkish) Task Force. See relevant analysis in this chapter, especially 5.1.2: “Strategy’s bilateral face: Building confidence and promoting economic interdependence.” Interestingly, although the work of the Joint Greek–Turkish Task Force entrusted to provide technical know-how to the Turkish side on various issues concerning the European acquis was assessed by the Simitis government as an integral part of the “bilateral tier” of Greece’s active socialization – by being a useful means for speeding up Turkey’s accession process to the EU and for enhancing mutual understanding and trust between Greece and Turkey – it was not kept alive and active by the Karamanlis administration.

555. Bilateral trade volume rose from US$1,391 billion in 2003, to US$1,908 billion in 2004, to US$2,124 billion in 2005, and to US$2,700 billion in 2006. Also Greek exports to Turkey increased from US$210 million in 2000 to US$1 billion in 2006. In the same period Turkish exports to Greece increased from US$430 million to US$1.7 billion. For these data see Grigoriadis (2008b: 158).

556. While the number of Greeks who visited Turkey was 146,000 in 1999, it grew to 393,517 in 2003, to 585,000 in 2005 (placing Greek visitors in eighth position overall) and to 399,694 during the first seven months of 2008. However, the number of Turks visiting Greece was considerably smaller, with a total of about 68,000 visiting Greece in 2006 and 161,858 in 2007. It is worth noting that in November 2006 the Greek and the Turkish Ministers of Tourism signed in Antalya a memorandum providing – among other things – for easier travel for third-country visitors from one country to another, the launching of new ferry-links, the strengthening of air links, cooperation in sea tourism, and the encouragement of private initiative. For these remarks and the above cited data, see Papadopoulos (2008: 16–17). Also Stathis Kousounis, “Turkey won the bet on tourism; Greece keeps its strength,” Kathimerini, September 22, 2008.

557. In the first quarter of 2007, Finansbank contributed over a third of the National Bank of Greece profits of 381 million euros, itself a historic high and representing a 52 percent increase over the corresponding period of the previous year. See Papadopoulos (2008: 31, Ref. No. 132). Dresdner Kleinwort financial assessment in July 2008 confirmed the impressive rate of increase of Finansbank profits, stating that 25 percent of NBG’s profits come from Finansbank. See Leonidas Stergiou, “Greek investments to Turkey exceed 14 billion euros,” Kathimerini, August 3, 2008.

558. In June 2008, the Greek DEPA and the Italian EDISON announced the setup of their joint venture IGI Poseidon SA, the company that would construct the Greek–Italian undersea leg of the pipeline. See Grigoriadis (2008b: 1). See also “Greek–Turkish energy links growing,” Kathimerini (English edition), June 6, 2007.

559. As of 2011, 8 billion cubic meters are expected to be carried on the Greek–Italian segment, of which 20 percent will be reserved for Greek DEPA for a 25-year period and the rest for the Italian Edison. See Papadopoulos (2008: 18, esp. Ref. No. 69).

560. In June 2007, the Italian energy company ENI and the Russian energy company Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the construction of the 900-km undersea South Stream pipeline aiming to transport about 30 bcm per year of natural gas from the Russian coast in the Black sea to
the Bulgarian coast. The northern branch of the pipeline was designed to cross Serbia and Hungary and reach Austria, while its southern branch would cross Greece and the Ionian sea and reach Italy. The Greek premier signed a relevant agreement in April 2008 during an official visit in Moscow. See Grigoriadis (2008b: 3); “Pipeline Ignores Turkey,” Kathimerini (English edition), June 25, 2007. To some analysts, South Stream would pare down Turkey's aspiring status as an international energy hub, as it would reduce its role as the new transit corridor for Russian gas to Southern and South-central Europe, and it would upset its role as the sole transit conduit of Central Asian gas; see Papadopoulos (2008: 21).

561. As noted, the strengthening of the confidence-building enterprise with Turkey appeared as the third pillar of the Karamanlis strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. See the Greek premier’s remarks in Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 764).

562. See relevant discussion in Chapter 4.

563. According to the Deputy Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ülker Başıbü, this particular confidence-building measure was proposed by Turkey with the aim “issues that could be escalated into serious problems in the Aegean airspace to be solved.” See Aris Abatzis, “Ankara makes it clear,” Eleftherotypia, April 14, 2005. The hot line was agreed to operate at a strictly bilateral level, without any interference by NATO, and be activated at times of illegal activity in the Aegean airspace. For Greece this would in turn mean that in the case that there was a Turkish violation of Greek airspace and before the interception procedure was put into motion, the air force command center in Larissa would communicate with the air force command center in Eskisehir asking for the “revocation” of the Turkish fighter jets. See George Bourdaras, “A hotline is being activated in the Aegean,” Kathimerini, April 29, 2006. In the Commission's 2005 Progress Report on Turkey particular reference was also made to additional confidence-building measures taken by both Greece and Turkey in 2005, “…such as cooperation between military disaster response units, the organization of joint exercises, the participation of both countries’ personnel in language courses of military institutions and the organization of military sport competitions.” See Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey: 2005 Progress Report,” November 9, 2005: 40.

564. See “Greek–Turkish dialogue. Erdoğan to visit Thessaloniki as hotline between Greek and Turkish air forces is opened,” Kathimerini (English edition), April 29, 2006.

565. See “Hot-line between the Greek and Turkish Chiefs,” Kathimerini, June 11, 2006.

566. Responding to an invitation extended by the Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces, Panagiotis Chinofotis, the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yasar Buyukanit, paid an official four-day visit to Greece in November 2006. For the discussions held during the visit in regard to military confidence-building measures that could be adopted by the two countries, see “Package of measures of Greek–Turkish cooperation,” Kathimerini, November 4, 2006; also Loukas Dimakas, “Creation of a joint battalion for NATO peacekeeping operations,” Ta Nea, November 3, 2006: N07; and Aronis (2006: 72–3).

567. Based on author's discussion with certain diplomats at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military officers at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. See also “Turkish ties get a boost. Confidence-building steps, with joint military actions, unveiled in Athens,” Kathimerini (English edition), December 5, 2007; also Mavridis (2007: 18–19).

569. For an assessment of the Greek premier Costas Karamanlis’s visit to Turkey, see Spanou (2007: 16–17); also Dora Antoniou, “Karamanlis in Turkey with minor expectations,” Kathimerini, January 13, 2008; George Terzis, “A historical visit without any tangible progress,” Kathimerini, January 24, 2008; Vassilis Chiotis, “A meeting in the shadow of the Turkish Generals,” To Vima, January 24, 2008: A15.

570. Including, at the bilateral level, the death of a Greek pilot in May 2006 after a collision of two fighter jets in international airspace near the island of Karpathos, and, at the multilateral level, the partial freezing in December 2006 of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

571. See remarks made by the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tassos Yannitis, and by the Greece’s former premier, Costas Simitis, in relevant analysis in this chapter, especially 5.1.1: Strategy’s multilateral face: EU effects on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

572. Most interestingly, the “instrumental dialogue” culture of both the former Foreign Minister, Petros Molyviatis, and Greece’s premier, Costas Karamanlis, seemed quite divergent from the “resolution culture” of their mentor, the late Constantine Karamanlis. The latter was a firm supporter of any reasonable and honest process towards the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict, and he did not – as noted – hesitate to suggest that “it is better to accept an imperfect solution to a difficult issue than to hold out for a perfect one.” Thus, even at the time when relations between the two countries were at their lowest point, Constantine Karamanlis chose negotiation over the whole complex of differences known collectively as the Aegean dispute and adjudication (his effort to bring the dispute over the continental shelf of the Aegean to the International Court of Justice).

573. During the visit of the Turkish premier to Athens, Karamanlis stated that: “The ‘exploratory talks’ started only some years ago, they continue, they have not been completed and no one can predict whether they will be completed any time in the immediate future.” See George Bourdaras, “No deadline for the delimitation of the continental shelf,” Kathimerini, May 8, 2004. In his address to Thessaloniki International Exhibition, the Greek premier stated that: “…the talks continued with no tangible results so far and with the two parties stuck on their positions… I doubt that the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf should be dealt with under the logic of the December 2004 deadline” (our emphasis). See Costas Karamanlis’s address to Thessaloniki International Exhibition, September 10, 2004 (General Secretariat of Communication, medainfo2004).

574. See Greece’s premier Costas Karamanlis’s remarks during his official visit to Ankara and Istanbul in January 2008 on the two states’ decision to intensify their efforts in regard to the “exploratory talks” in George Terzis, “A historical visit without any tangible progress,” Kathimerini, January 24, 2008; and Vassilis Chiotis, “A meeting in the shadow of the Turkish Generals,” To Vima, January 24, 2008: A15.

575. Interestingly, while referring in November 2006 to the “exploratory talks” as the fourth pillar of Greece’s strategy towards Turkey, the Greek premier not only undermined the ICJ’s role in the resolution of the Greek–Turkish conflict but also limited the latter to the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf only. See Parliamentary Minutes (November 2006: 764).
576. See the statement of the spokesman of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, George Koumoutsakos, in view of the forthcoming thirty-third round of the “exploratory talks” scheduled to take place in Ankara in George Bourdaras, “In Ankara the 33rd round of the ‘exploratory talks’,” Kathimerini, February 21, 2006.

577. The negative state of French and Austrian public opinion in 2005 was reflected in the announcements made by France and Austria that they would hold a referendum so that their citizens could make their voices heard before an eventual Turkish membership took place. See Lecha (2006: 116). Also in November 2005 the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came to power in Germany, pledging to downgrade the goal of Turkey’s EU negotiations to “privileged partnership.” See International Crisis Group (2007: i).

578. It was also stated that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.” See The Negotiating Framework (2005: 1).

579. Ibid, p. 2; apparently, a reference that could be linked more to a setback as severe as a military coup than to the non-fulfillment of Turkey’s Customs Union obligations.

580. The Treaty of Lisbon has generated the hope that the EU will eventually exit the two-year period of introversion caused by the failed Dutch and French referendums. Yet the June 2008 “No” vote of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty cast doubts on the EU’s ability to continue its enlargement process in 2009, as was originally scheduled.

581. There was indeed a profound collapse in popular support for Turkey’s EU accession from 70 percent in October 2005 to 40 percent in November 2006, with the Germans being among Europe’s front runners. See Yilmaz (2007: 294–5). In particular, Christian Democrats in Germany perceive massive influxes of Turkish workers into Germany as a threat in three ways: wages and employment could be negatively affected; new Turkish Germans could become SPD and Green Party voters, as 500,000 Turkish German citizens were in the 2002 elections; and Turkish mass migration would accentuate the cultural and religious differences among Europeans. See Nuria Font (2006: 204).

582. The June 2006 Brussels EU summit reinstated “absorption capacity” as more of a requirement than a criterion for accession. See Presidency Conclusions (June 2006). Based on the European Commission’s recommendation, the December EU Council Conclusions replaced the more negatively charged term “absorption capacity” with the term “integration capacity.” see Presidency Conclusions (December 2006). For a Turkish point of view, see İçener and Phinnemore (2006) and Gidişoğlu (2007).

583. It also seemed to have certain positive implications for all protagonists in Turkish politics as well as for Turkey’s efforts towards democratization. Indeed, while trying to strengthen its democratic and secular credentials through a reform policy in keeping with the EU accession process, Erdoğan is also expected to be more restrained, and to promote Turkey’s modernization responsibly and with great care. The verdict also made clear to all protagonists in Turkish politics that “deviations” from the Kemalist normalcy could no longer be dealt with by recourse to action by the traditional guarantors of Kemalism. Given that both the AK Party and Erdoğan’s government could not be toppled by the Court or by pressure from the military, the opposition parties in Turkey, especially the
CHP, are almost obliged now to develop more down-to-earth policies instead of relying on a mere secularist discourse against the AK Party within the political sphere. This would in turn have certain positive effects on Turkey’s efforts towards democratization and modernization. See Dağı (2008).

584. Most recently due to the revelation of the “Ergenekon issue,” a clandestine crime network operating inside state institutions, including the armed forces. For a good account of Turkey’s most recent internal turmoil, see Turan (2007: 319–38) and Özel (2008: 5–13).

585. Unsurprisingly, a complete rupture in EU–Turkey relations would not even have been in the strategic interests of the EU “hard-liners” in regard to Turkey’s membership, namely, Germany, France, and to a certain extent Greece and Cyprus.

586. For most European political elites the advancement of a “special relationship” and/or a “privileged partnership” between the EU and Turkey could secure the Turkish markets as well as Turkey’s geostrategic position and role.

587. For an account against the advancement of a “special relationship” between EU and Turkey, see Hakura (2005); also Aybet (2006: 529–49).

588. For a good account of the special parameters of a future special relationship of the EU with the surrounding countries and regions in its neighborhood, see Bechev and Nicolaidis (2007); also Emmanouilidis (2008).
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Over one hundred individuals involved – directly or indirectly – in the development and implementation of Greece’s socialization strategy exchanged their views with the author on numerous occasions over a period of eight consecutive years (1999–2007). In the period from September 1999 to January 2004 discussions, exchanges of views, and brief interviews took place in the context of Working Groups, Task Forces and formal or informal Committees the author had joined as Special Advisor at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What follows herein is a selective list of those key figures of Greece’s strategy who have had a governmental position or affiliation and with whom the author had lengthy discussions, and/or close collaboration, from 1999 to 2004. Names are listed in alphabetical order and reference is made to the period of time these individuals held the said government positions. Greece’s former Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Christos Rozakis, and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petros Molyviatis, have been the only individuals interviewed by responding to a particular questionnaire.

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