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# LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

## The Politics of Indifference

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My business in this state  
Made me a looker-on here in Vienna,  
Where I have seen corruption boil and bubble  
Till it o'errun the stew: laws for all faults,  
But faults so countenanc'd that the strong statutes  
Stand like the forfeits in a barber's shop,  
As much in mock as in mark.

—*Shakespeare*<sup>1</sup>

The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law.

—*Hobbes*<sup>2</sup>

### I

In modern societies, particularly the societies of the liberal democratic West, cultural diversity poses a challenge not only to the makers of government policy, but also to the philosopher looking to understand how it might be possible—in principle—for people of different ways to live together. The challenge is posed because society's institutions have been challenged, as the members of different groups have demanded "recognition." They have demanded not simply recognition of their claims to a (just) share of the social pie but, more important, recognition of their distinct identities as members of particular cultural communities within society. The persistence and, in some cases, the ferocity of demands for recognition have led many to concede that recognize them we must. The problem that arises for a liberal society, however, is that there quickly emerges a conflict between two demands: on one hand, that the dignity of the individual be recognized (by respecting certain fundamental rights); on the other hand, that the claims of the groups

or cultural communities to which individuals belong be recognized. Philosophers such as Charles Taylor, who have viewed the problem in this way, also see that no simple solution to this conflict is available. A more complex, and nuanced, answer must therefore be given to the problem posed by the politics of recognition; and that answer must acknowledge the need for institutions that facilitate public deliberation and for attitudes of openness and tolerance.

The argument I wish to present here, however, is that the problem is not a complex one. Or, at least, it is not a complex problem in philosophical terms. Multiculturalism does not pose a difficult problem for liberalism—or for liberal “political ethics.” This is not to say that it poses no problems for politics; but politics is not philosophy, and my concern here is with philosophy.

The reason multiculturalism does not pose a philosophical problem for liberalism is that liberalism’s counsel is to resist the demand for recognition. Politicians have always found this advice difficult to follow, for the demands of constituents are nothing if not compelling (especially at election time). But philosophers (including many avowedly liberal ones) have also found this advice hard to take, perhaps because it seems to suggest that there is not much they can contribute to making the world a better place. Nevertheless, I wish to argue here, this is what liberalism recommends. In a sense, it recommends doing nothing. But, of course, doing nothing is a very difficult thing to do. The rest of this essay is devoted to explaining what it means to do nothing, and why nothing should be done; although it cannot really say very much—for reasons that will, I hope, become clear—about how nothing is to be done.

To pursue this task, I will begin, in the next section, by examining the analysis offered by Taylor in his discussion of the dilemmas of contemporary multiculturalism in an essay titled “The Politics of Recognition.” I will then offer an argument against viewing the problem of multiculturalism in these terms by arguing against recognition. This will lead me to offer a positive view of my own on what liberalism amounts to: a view that defends a version of what has come to be known as liberal neutrality. In doing this, I shall attempt to draw out the implications of such a view for the character of the liberal polity. I shall conclude with some more general observations on the relations between liberalism and multiculturalism, making clearer why that relationship is not as complex or as troubling as some might imagine.

## II

In his essay “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor argues that the reason why the demands of various groups for some kind of social recognition have

raised the stakes in contemporary debates about multiculturalism is that the issue being debated is not simply material welfare but the identities of the participants in the life of society. In modern society, "the understanding that identities are formed in open dialogue, unshaped by a predefined social script has made the politics of equal recognition more central and stressful."<sup>3</sup> Equal recognition is not just appropriate but essential: "The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized."<sup>4</sup>

The first expression of the politics of recognition came in the demand for equal rights and entitlements. The tendency that Taylor has labeled "the politics of universalism" emphasized the equal dignity of citizens and criticized any separation of the citizenry into first and second classes. And the demand for equal rights was often extended to embrace a more general critique of social inequality—since the possession of equal rights of status still did not allow the poor to escape their second-class condition. Equal dignity required material equality. Out of this politics of universal dignity, however, grew the politics of difference. This latter politics is also a demand for universal recognition. But recognition here, Taylor argues, means something else. "With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique dignity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else."<sup>5</sup> The charge it makes against contemporary politics is that distinctness has been ignored, or assimilated into the dominant majority.

The conflict between these two forms of recognition arises, at least in part, because "[w]here politics of universal dignity fought for forms of nondiscrimination that were quite 'blind' to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines nondiscrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment."<sup>6</sup> So while the politics of difference defends special rights for aboriginal peoples (say, to self-government) or for certain minorities (say, to preserve their cultural integrity by excluding others), to the original politics of dignity "this seems like a reversal, a betrayal, a simple negation of their cherished principle."<sup>7</sup> Yet, the proponents of the politics of difference reply that simply calling for nondiscrimination is not enough because this outlook "negates identity by forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them."<sup>8</sup> And while the defenders of the original politics of universal dignity claim to be neutral on this issue, the charge they then meet is that their so-called neutral, difference-blind principles, in fact, are hardly neutral at all; they are, indeed, reflective of the standards of the dominant culture. In short, the politics of

difference accuses “liberalism” of being nothing more than another instance of the particular masquerading as the universal.

In Taylor’s analysis, the proponents of the politics of difference are right, and liberalism—at least in this form—is guilty as charged. This is because liberalism is, ultimately, unsympathetic and inhospitable to difference. This is especially clear, Taylor maintains, in liberalism’s attitude toward collective goals such as that of Quebecois, whose concern in the Canadian federation is, ultimately, the *survival* of a distinctive French-speaking society. For this reason, Taylor is highly critical of the solution offered by Will Kymlicka in his own effort to show how liberalism can accommodate difference. Kymlicka’s solution is to maintain a position of liberal neutrality, but to argue that since individuals need certain basic cultural goods to pursue the good life, neutrality requires granting certain groups differential rights (to allow them to maintain their cultural integrity) so that their members have an equal opportunity to pursue the good life.<sup>9</sup> The problem with this solution, according to Taylor, is that it works only “for *existing* people who find themselves trapped within a culture under pressure, and can flourish within it or not at all. But it doesn’t justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generations.”<sup>10</sup>

More broadly, Taylor’s point is that the very idea of liberalism as a procedural doctrine is untenable. Those who put forward this view of liberalism see it as defending a neutral regime of tolerance of different ways. The claim of difference-blind liberalism is that it can offer neutral ground on which people of all cultures are able to meet and coexist. On this view, “[I]t is necessary to make a certain number of distinctions—between what is public and what is private, for instance, or between politics and religion—and only then can one relegate the contentious differences to a sphere that does not impinge on the political.”<sup>11</sup> But this view, he argues, is wrong: liberalism cannot (and should not) claim cultural neutrality. And the controversy over Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* shows how wrong it is, since mainstream Islam refuses to separate religion and politics. “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges.”<sup>12</sup>

In slightly different language, this line of argument is endorsed by Michael Walzer, who suggests that a distinction can be drawn between two kinds of liberalism. The first, which he labels Liberalism 1, is committed to a “rigorously neutral state, that is, a state without cultural or religious projects or, indeed, any sort of collective goals beyond the personal freedom and the physical security, welfare, and safety of its citizens.” The second, Liberalism 2, “allows for a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular

nation, culture, or religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and religions—so long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such commitments at all are protected.”<sup>13</sup> For Walzer, Liberalism 2 is the defensible variant of liberalism, although from within it a liberal society may choose Liberalism 1—on the grounds that it is the kind of society that has a cultural or historical predisposition to eschew collective goals beyond freedom and security. What this gives us, then, is a historicist case for liberal neutrality—for societies like the United States, although not necessarily for other societies.

### III

If liberalism were no more than a particular cultural form—a historical episode in the development of civilization (and European civilization at that)—the case for liberalism would be diminished, at least in its own terms, since it presents itself as a universalist doctrine. But liberalism—or at least that element within it that is philosophically significant—is more than a particular cultural form. Taylor’s way of viewing liberalism is, I wish to suggest, inadequate; and his criticisms of liberalism are, consequently, unsound. If my assessment here is correct, liberalism does not have the problem with multiculturalism its critics suggest.

The reason why liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism is that liberalism is itself, fundamentally, a theory of multiculturalism. This is because liberalism is essentially a theory about pluralism; and multiculturalism is, in the end, a species of pluralism. Liberalism is one of the modern world’s responses—indeed, its most plausible response—to the fact of moral, religious, and cultural diversity. Its response has been to say that diversity should be accommodated, and differences tolerated; that a more complete social unity, marked by a uniform and common culture that integrates and harmonizes the interests of individual and community, is unattainable and undesirable; that division, conflict, and competition would always be present in human society, and the task of political institutions is to palliate a condition they cannot cure. Political institutions would be liberal institutions if they left people free to pursue their own ends, whether separately or in concert with others, under the rule of law. By implication, many liberals have argued, this requires leaving people free to worship as they see fit; but it also requires leaving them free to live by different cultural standards—provided their doing so does not threaten the legal and political order that allows for peaceful coexistence.

But the point is not simply that liberalism does not have any difficulty with accepting some form of multiculturalism. While liberalism is a term that is properly used to identify a particular movement of European thought, it also denotes a philosophical outlook whose primary concern is to articulate the terms under which different ways may coexist. There is a historical liberalism; but there is also a philosophical liberalism. The fact that philosophical liberalism is the invention of particular historical circumstances (or of particular culturally identifiable figures) has no bearing on the coherence or plausibility of liberalism as a philosophical idea.

What is it, then, that liberalism has to say about multiculturalism? In the end, what it offers is not a thesis about individual dignity, or about how that dignity should be recognized. To be sure, thinkers like Kant (drawing inspiration from Rousseau) thought this important; so did von Humboldt and J. S. Mill, among others. But while human dignity may have been an important consideration for such thinkers, it is not central to liberalism. For this reason, liberalism is not troubled by the question of whether respecting human dignity requires recognizing individual identities or recognizing the identities of groups. Liberalism is not concerned with granting recognition to either. It does not offer recognition at all.

In this regard, liberalism is indifferent to the groups of which individuals may be members. Individuals in a liberal society are free to form groups or associations, or to continue their association with groups that they have joined or into which they may have been born. Liberalism takes no interest in these interests or attachments—cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, or otherwise—that people might have. It takes no interest in the character or identity of individuals; nor is it concerned directly to promote human flourishing: it has no collective projects, it expresses no group preferences, and it promotes no particular individuals or individual interests. Its only concern is with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can function peacefully. To be sure, upholding the rule of law may require intervention in the affairs of individuals and groups (and this may, unavoidably, have a bearing on individual and group identity); but liberal politics is not concerned with these affairs in themselves. Indeed, it is indifferent to particular human affairs or to the particular pursuits of individuals and groups. Liberalism might well be described as the politics of indifference.

To assert this, however, is not only to offer a particular view of what liberalism amounts to; it is also to present a view with which thinkers like Taylor take issue. For them, a politics of indifference is neither feasible nor desirable in the face of persistent demands from various groups for recognition. The question, then, is: Can these demands indeed be resisted—if they should be resisted at all?

In one way, thinkers like Taylor are clearly right to suggest that it is difficult for the liberal state—or any state, for that matter—to resist the demands of particular individuals and groups for recognition. Tamil and Basque separatists in Sri Lanka and Spain cannot easily be ignored. And when a *fatwa* is issued against a writer like Salman Rushdie, the conflict between religious traditions seems to require more than indifference. Yet, to describe liberalism as the politics of indifference is not to say that in a liberal state there are no issues of public policy that cannot be ignored. It is, rather, to make a point about the goal of public policy in a liberal state. That goal is not to shape the culture of the polity, or to uphold the dignity of the individual, or to rescue minority groups from their marginalized status in society. Liberalism is indifferent to these matters. Its only concern is to preserve the order within which such groups and individuals exist. From a liberal point of view, it does not matter what happens to the identities of particular groups or to the identities of individuals. Whether some cultural groups fragment into a number of smaller associations or are assimilated into the dominant culture of the wider society, or disappear altogether, does not matter from the liberal standpoint. Of course, it may matter enormously to the groups and individuals in question; but while liberalism does not counsel obstructing those who wish to preserve or enhance their identities, it takes no interest in supporting such endeavors either.

Is this standpoint untenable, as Taylor and others suggest? I wish to suggest that it is not; although it will often be difficult to hold to—for the reason that, in politics, the demands of powerful interests will always be difficult to resist. And the higher the stakes, the more vigorously will the demand for recognition be pressed. Yet, there are two points that should be made. The first is that, while resistance to demands for recognition may be difficult, it does not mean that it is impossible. The second is that the feasibility of adopting the standpoint of indifference should be judged against the feasibility of the alternative, which is to accede to such demands. Attempting to grant recognition to those who demand it, however, is almost always dangerous. This is because demands for recognition are often in conflict with other similar demands, or other interests. For example, when in 1993 immigrants from parts of the former Yugoslavia claimed recognition as Macedonians who formed a distinct ethnic community in Australia, it immediately brought about a challenge from others who regarded themselves as people of Macedonian descent—a challenge that escalated to acts of violence between ethnic communities when the Australian government saw fit to rule on which identification would be officially recognized.

The problem is that, when transformed into the politics of recognition, multicultural politics quickly descends into the politics of interest group

conflict.<sup>14</sup> Groups are themselves not in any way natural or fixed entities but mutable social formations that change shape, size, and character as society and circumstances vary. To some extent, they vary according to economic and political circumstances. Groups do not always demand recognition because they exist; sometimes they exist (at least in their particular sizes and characters) because they have been granted recognition. In the United States, policies of affirmative action for selected minorities supply incentives for people to identify themselves as members of those particular groups.<sup>15</sup> Preferential policies have acted similarly as incentives (or disincentives) in other countries, where the benefits of membership work to increase the size, and strength, of particular groups.<sup>16</sup>

Yet, even when groups are relatively stable, recognition is troubling because it signals an elevation of the conflict between groups over material gains into conflict over the character or the identity of the society. At worst, the danger in this development lies in the fact that it induces a conflict over which compromise is difficult—if not impossible. If the identity of the society becomes an issue—one that cannot be regarded as trivial and, so, a matter of indifference—conflict over it can only become more bitter, particularly since some will be regarded as winners and others as losers.

In this light, I argue that the idea of a liberal polity, understood as one that is, as much as possible, indifferent to such matters as identity (including national identity) and group recognition, has much to commend it. It does not offer a philosophical attempt to reconcile the competing claims of different groups and different identities, all demanding recognition. It assumes, instead, that no resolution is possible in philosophical terms; and it would be better not to try. Its recommendation, therefore, is that political institutions try to resist attempts to put the issue of recognition at the center of political debate.

Yet, there are further objections to the liberal move that need to be considered. The most important argument that Taylor might make here is that this does not get around the problem for the simple reason that the attempt to evade the politics of recognition will have its own, undesirable, implications. For it will, without doubt, favor some people over others. More precisely, it will simply allow the standards of the majority culture to dominate. In such circumstances, the claims of liberalism to be offering no more than a framework of law within which different ways may coexist will ring hollow.

To some extent, this objection is well founded; no political arrangements are neutral in their outcome. The large majority culture will tend to assimilate the small minority culture—although the contributions of the minority will also (to some degree) reshape the dominant culture. While liberalism asserts

that the minority is under no obligation not to resist assimilation (by trying to keep to its own ways), it does not impose upon the majority any obligation to help the smaller cultural community succeed: if people are assimilated, that is the way of the world.

Now, Taylor's objection to this standpoint would be that it does not meet the demand—or satisfy the yearning—of those such as the Quebecois, whose concern is not just to be free to pursue their own way of life, but, more important, to ensure the survival of their particular culture: now and far into the future. Here, however, liberalism can only take a stand that is surely not unreasonable: a stand that says that cultural survival cannot be guaranteed and cannot be claimed as a right. And while this is not to say that members of different cultural communities may not take some measures that increase the chances of that group's enduring, the state should not be in the business of trying to determine which cultures will prevail, which will die, and which will be transformed.

The state, in the liberal view, should not be concerned about anything except order or peace. It cannot accomplish any more—it cannot determine which cultures will survive. The danger in its attempting to do more is, in part, that it may fall down in its primary role. This is, to some extent, what is happening in societies such as the United States, as well as in other divided societies. The state, in trying to shape society (under the influence of its modern monks and clergymen—intellectuals—who in the past tried to influence the state's religious character) has tended to exacerbate conflicts. For the sake of order, it may be preferable that the state stick to its primary function of maintaining the peace.

This does not mean that political institutions should not be sensitive to conflicts over power between different groups. If the goal is peace, political institutions may, for example, have to develop explicit power-sharing arrangements between ethnic or religious groups. In Malaysia, for example, many political parties are racially based, but the government consists of a ruling coalition of such parties (the *Barisan Nasional* or National Front). In many democratic countries, electoral systems are adopted to ensure that minorities are assured of a place in the political structure.<sup>17</sup> Peace may require, among other things, different ways of devolving political power. But for liberalism, the polity would still have to be there, in principle, not to promote any particular collective. Liberalism does not care who has power; nor does it care how power is acquired. All that matters is that the members of society are free to pursue their various ends, and that the polity is able to accommodate all peacefully.

Now, Taylor has objected that this kind of view holds out a promise that turns out to be illusory: the promise that liberalism will turn out to be the

meeting ground of all cultures. This is illusory because liberalism is itself simply the political expression of one range of cultures; thus, it cannot accommodate Islam, which refuses to separate religion and the state. There is something to be said for Taylor's view, since liberalism clearly cannot accommodate all views. But we should be clear, nonetheless, about what liberalism cannot accommodate: it cannot accommodate views that insist a state be dedicated to the pursuit of some substantive goal that is to be embodied in the structure of that political society. This does not, however, mean that it is not capacious enough to accommodate a very wide range of cultures—including some, like certain Islamic traditions. This is very clearly the case in countries with an Islamic minority, such as Britain and the United States. But even in countries with a clear (or even large) Muslim majority—such as Malaysia and Indonesia—it is quite possible for liberal institutions to prevail. In Malaysia, for example, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians—indeed, all religious minorities—are guaranteed freedom of worship under the constitution of what is, essentially, a secular state. This is in spite of the fact that the king of this constitutional monarchy is always a Muslim, as are a preponderance of members of Parliament. Indonesia is populated by an even larger Muslim majority; yet, it also offers freedom of worship. Indeed, it upholds an effective separation of church (or mosque) and state, as well as a formal or principled one. (In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, there is an effective separation of religion and politics, but still an established church.)

To the extent that it is able to accommodate a variety of ways, and does not pursue collective ends of its own, that polity may be described as a liberal one. It is not so because it has members a majority of whom share a particular European heritage. It is so if it may be described as a society, not of majority and minority cultures but of a plurality of cultures coexisting in a condition of mutual toleration. There is much to be said for Joseph Raz's view that "[w]e should learn to think of our society as consisting not of a majority and minorities, but of a plurality of cultural groups."<sup>18</sup> But doing this is best accomplished by refusing, in the first place, to recognize such distinctions between cultural groups as having any relevance to the fundamental purpose of the state.

One problem that will, of course, be raised is that this is easier said than done. Groups will not cease demanding recognition, and rulers will always be tempted to satisfy their demands—whether for material gain, or in an attempt to hold on to political power, or because they regard the claims of the group as just. Thus, there is always the prospect of the liberal state being distracted from its business and induced to pursue particular collective goals. In particular, rulers are always likely to be tempted to reshape society to

promote (even if not exclusively) some particular religion, or culture, or (not unusually) some favored conception of the nation. Yet, while we should recognize that this will always be so, there is no need to make a virtue out of what is unnecessary. And in the liberal view, it is unnecessary; for liberalism's counsel is that the state do nothing. It does nothing not by refusing to engage in any activity at all—it still has a task to perform in securing peace within political society. It does nothing by refusing to engage in activities that have no bearing on that task.

#### IV

Throughout this essay, I have made numerous statements asserting what liberalism demands or describing what liberalism implies. Yet, while I think these statements identify something that is defensible as a liberal view, it is also true to say that it identifies only one view of what liberalism amounts to—and a controversial view at that. It may be important, then, to indicate more clearly what kind of liberalism is being presented here, and why it should be commended to those concerned about the problems and dilemmas raised by the multicultural character of many modern societies.

The liberalism presented here is the liberalism of the limited state. And it conceives of political society as an association of individuals and groups living under the rule of law but pursuing separate ends or purposes. Political society, according to this version of liberalism, is not united by any kind of common culture; nor does it share any collective goals. It is indifferent to the goals pursued by the individuals and groups in society—unless they impinge upon the peace of society—and is not concerned to promote any particular form of the human good. In some accounts of this liberalism, it is described as a political order that is neutral with regard to the human good. And although the word *neutral* does not accurately describe liberal society—since no society is strictly neutral between all competing ways—it does capture the spirit of the idea. A liberal polity of this kind is a political society that accommodates a wide variety of ways of life without attempting to bring about any deep social or political unity.

The foundation of such a liberalism does not lie in any view of human dignity—as is suggested, for example, by Taylor's analysis of liberal thinking. Nor does it lie in any kind of emphasis on the importance of individual autonomy. Under the institutions of liberal society, in this view, ways of life that disvalue autonomy or individuality may still flourish. The foundation of this liberalism lies, rather, in a particular view of freedom: the freedom of

individuals to associate or dissociate from others in pursuit of their diverse—although often shared—ends. A polity is a liberal political society if its institutions sustain this liberty; it is a less liberal society the greater the extent to which it draws its members—directly or indirectly—into collective endeavors with which they neither wish, nor need, to be concerned. It is, in the end, something like the liberalism identified by Walzer as Liberalism 1.

There are many objections raised against his version of liberalism. One of the most frequently mentioned is that no state can be strictly neutral because the institutions of every state must have some commitments that violate the requirement of neutrality by having some historical character. But this objection is not a telling one. Certainly, all political institutions must have some character. Just as the framework of a building must have *some* color (since nothing is colorless), so must all political institutions have some particular features that have more to do with the accidents of history and circumstance than with the point that the institutions serve. Political institutions shaped by European traditions will produce governments and laws that are conducted and written in *some* language that is more likely to be French or Portuguese or Spanish than Arabic or Persian. They are likely, in the modern day, to be republics and to be democratic in the modern sense of the term. Their parliaments will follow particular traditions of procedure, and their laws will recognize certain days as holidays. None of these things alters the character of the state as neutral, since in none of these matters is the state pursuing or promoting any particular ends.

A more important objection, however, is that this kind of liberalism is not enough. The liberal state ought to pursue some collective ends. At the very least, it ought to pursue the task of creating a harmonious and cohesive society—one that makes for a stable social unity that will endure over a substantial period of time. In this view, which is perhaps closer to the view Walzer describes as Liberalism 2, the liberal state should be committed to the survival and flourishing of that nation and its common culture.

In defending the view I have put forward here, however, I would assert, first, that this task lies beyond the capability of the institutions of the state. Laws may be passed in the effort to secure such a social unity—to construct a harmonious order that recognizes and offers freedom to dissent (in word and practice) to the various elements of society that do not share in the collective project. But, especially in a society that refuses to repress minorities, this offer will not be enough. If the state becomes involved in the cultural construction of the nation, the minorities in the society will claim a stake and demand a say in that construction. Laws designed, like “strong statutes,” to bring about social cohesion—far from bringing the state back into some kind of order—will only cause dissension.

Social harmony, I would maintain, is more likely the less vigorously social unity is pursued. In a multicultural society, this, I suggest, is what liberalism offers. It offers the opportunity, under a state indifferent to the ways or the goals of the different peoples living under the law, for people to coexist and for their different arts and letters and sciences to flourish (or die out) with them. It offers this opportunity, however, not because the laws grant them recognition, but because the laws are silent.

### NOTES

1. *Measure for Measure*, act 5, scene 1, lines 314-20.
2. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 21: "Of the Liberty of Subjects," 152.
3. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36.
4. *Ibid.*, 36.
5. *Ibid.*, 38.
6. *Ibid.*, 40.
7. *Ibid.*, 40.
8. *Ibid.*, 43.
9. See Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
10. Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," 41 n.
11. *Ibid.*, 62.
12. *Ibid.*, 62.
13. Michael Walzer, "Comment," in *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, 99.
14. I have discussed this in *The Fraternal Conceit. Individualist versus Collectivist Ideas of Community* (Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, 1991).
15. Recently, in California, the category of Portuguese American was added to the list of officially recognized minority categories, this presenting a substantial incentive for those with any Portuguese ancestry to identify with this group (and secure the substantial funding benefits offered to minority students at California universities).
16. This is discussed in Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), esp. ch. 2.
17. On this topic, see Donald Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," in *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 35-55.
18. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," in *Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, ed. Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 155-76.

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