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FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO NATIONALISM

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(Translated by Tracy B. Strong)

A RECENT ISSUE OF the radical American journal *Telos* throws a strange light on an unexpected encounter. It takes place between this activist left-wing publication, friend to all the struggles embodied by our century in a utopian left favorable to the diversities of emancipation, and the writer Alain de Benoist, a theoretician of the new French Right whose writings have given rise to sharp polemics in recent years. Not only is the *Telos* issue focused entirely on de Benoist's writings and the recent controversies around him in France, but it finds favor in his cause. Even if bothered by his sour and unnuanced anti-Americanism, *Telos*—by the pen of its editor, Paul Piccone—asserts that “while American multiculturalism acknowledges the irreducibility of different cultural traditions . . . thus coming very close to accepting the French New Right's ‘right of difference,’ it operated entirely within the context of the post-modern liberal state.”¹ Frank Adler, a writer well familiar with the struggles of the French left, follows suit. After deploring what he considers the more than cavalier manner in which certain left French intellectuals treat the writings of de Benoist, he underlines the way in which these writings in fact constitute an essential contribution to the question of multiculturalism, all the more so in that they distinguish themselves from “the universally pejorative sense with which the French today use the term multiculturalism (most often distinguished as a *connerie américaine*).”² The entire issue is a celebration of the works of de Benoist, dealing with the “right to difference.” The whole impressive dossier concludes with several unpublished interviews with de Benoist. In one of them, held with the editorial board of *Telos*, de Benoist declares, “I am not a Jacobin, so I do not believe in assimilation. . . . The dream of a melting pot, as conceived by Israel Zangwill, has also failed in the U.S. That is why it may be better to approach

the problem from an organic, communitarian point of view." Refusing any racist interpretation of the idea of the "right to difference" (which he understands only in its cultural aspect without any biological connotation), he adds, "The 'right of difference' is not different from what you call recognition theory." According to de Benoist, this idea only underscores the "collective dimension of identity." And here, along with Michael Sandel, he cites Charles Taylor as one of the communitarian authors with whom he feels a great intellectual affinity.³

The work of the philosopher with whom de Benoist claims kinship is little known in France. The recent translation of his book *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*⁴ is an important event in that it legitimates the recognition of collective culturally based identities at a time when the Jacobin base of French society, a base shaped by a powerful national state, seems, in our time, almost unsteady. Taylor is aware of the provocative nature of his claims, as when he noted recently in *La Monde* that Jacobinism itself was also subject to critique. This was, he averred, especially true when it claimed to push into the private realm the real differences that individuals feel between themselves. Thus, for the Jacobin model, Taylor concluded in this piece for his French audience, the public domain is open only to that which is part of the republican political culture (e.g., the rights of man and democracy). Hence liberal hegemonialism is linked to a persisting refusal to redefine the center of our public life, of our conception of the rights of man, or of the secular.⁵

By the translation of this book, Taylor, a well-known professor of political philosophy (Hegelian), offers the French a discussion of the multicultural theories that they generally condemn. For many in France, such theories serve only as a kind of countermodel against which one might legitimate the (apparently shaky) French approach to integration.⁶ Taylor is hostile to the contractualist paradigm that issues from the Enlightenment, and he rejects any liberalism that is incapable of offering a place for collective identities. He believes that personal identity is formed in a symbiotic relation with a collective identity and is nourished by the culture that the group shares. He opposes the Rawlsian perspective of a "veil of ignorance" that would exclude from the public space all qualities of personal identity; in his eyes, this kind of separation of public and private space is artificial and mutilating. Cultural identity should rather fertilize any public space. Taylor is thus in opposition not only to liberal contractarian theorists who wish to neutralize public space but also to the partisan of proponents of "a strong" citizenship that would be unattached to the various possible identity groups in society as well as those who, following Habermas, think of public space as where pure rationalities engage each other while excluding the presence of any form of collective

belonging.⁷ Instead, Taylor becomes the spokesperson for the recognition of the equal dignity of cultural identities in a common public space: "The politics of difference is full of denunciations of discrimination and refusal of second-class citizenship."⁸

In his eyes, each "culture" should preserve its "authenticity." The "recognition of the equal value" of each culture permits the public "conversation" between diverse identities. Thus the self can be only "thick," framed (*enchâssé*), anchored in a particular communitarian culture. Everything here sets him in opposition to the "thin" self of liberalism, which exists only as "unencumbered."⁹ With little confidence in the "constitutional patriotism" to which Habermas attaches himself after rejecting tradition, culture, and even language, Taylor holds that

a minority ethnicity does not feel really acknowledged by the majority with which it shares a common political form. The people of this minority are subsumed into a project which is foreign to them because they are not really recognized. This is clearly the basis of a whole series of new nations. It is impossible for us to dictate only on the basis of a philosophical stance whether the principle of identity or that of unity should be that of constitutional patriotism. . . . In Europe, one has perhaps had the "luck" to have suffered the experience of the avatars of nationalism and been led to question the limits of strong national identity; this may have created the need to seek out other principles of collective identity, such as that of constitutional patriotism. However, in other parts of the world, including North America but also the other part of Europe, it is not necessarily the case.¹⁰

Thus we move from a multiculturalism extolling respect for the equal dignity of culture to the construction of new nations and nationalism. For Taylor, the France of the revolution built itself on the bases of a constitutional patriotism.

During the French Revolution, the word patriotism was attached to a certain conception of law (*droit*) and not to an ethnicity. But there has been [a] slide towards the ethnicization of nationalism to such a degree that when we use the word nationalism today and when we think of the unification of a people, what comes to mind first and foremost is unification on the basis of an ethnic culture.¹¹

This transformation, according to him, even affects contemporary French society. Cultural identity thus carries the day over political identity. From that moment onward, popular sovereignty and nationals are so confounded that "the people have their identity outside of the collective structure." From such a univocal interpretation of a people homogenized by its culture, the right to national existence flows from the primacy of a cultural identity in which an ethnicity-people recognizes itself and wants to be so recognized.

It comes as no surprise that Herder is the philosopher to whom Taylor most often appeals to legitimate his claims about identity.

Herder applied his conception of originality at two levels, not only to the individual person among other persons, but also to the cultural-bearing people among other peoples. Just like individuals, a *Volk* should be true to itself, that is, its own culture. Germans shouldn't try to be derivative and (inevitably) second-rate Frenchmen, as Frederick the Great's patronage seemed to be encouraging them to do. The Slavonic people has [sic] to find their own path. And European colonialism ought to be rolled back to give the peoples of what we now call the Third World their chance to be themselves unimpeded. We can recognize here the seminal idea of modern nationalism, in both benign and malignant forms.¹²

In a lecture in Montréal, Taylor recognized the very early influence that Herder's thought had had on him.

When I was a student in Europe, in a foreign country therefore, I felt a very strong affinity with Herder, the eighteenth-century German philosopher and one of the founders of modern nationalist thinking. Herder devoted much thought to language, the difference between languages, and the distortion in the thinking of a given language group when a language claims to be superior and better able to express universality, and when it therefore represses other languages. At the time, that language was French, which was invading the German intellectual world and marginalizing German. In Herder I found inspiration, ideas that were very fruitful to me, precisely because I was from here [Québec]. If one tries to cut oneself off from lived experience in order to reflect on it, one's thinking will inevitably be withered, without depth or interest.

In Québec, he adds that "the danger of a spurious universalism" could have had serious consequences.

We sought to create a *tabula rasa*. I believe that we are beginning to feel the need to revive our tradition. . . . [H]uman sciences seek absolute laws, which are everywhere and always valid, by bracketing out real differences. I have always opposed this way of thinking and in this I have drawn inspiration from Herder.¹³ Using the Hegelian idea of *Volk*, Taylor shows that, differently from France, the United States or even England, all of which became countries before the birth of Herder-type nationalism, the new wave of nationalisms rests henceforth on language. "Language is the normal foundation of nationalism which permits the expression of the character that is natural to each people."

By restricting Herder's perspective to a single strain of expressive romanticism, Taylor is careful to distinguish this nationalism from a "nationalism in its chauvinist mode," which leads to Nazism. For Herder, Taylor notes approvingly,

Different *Völker* have their own way of being human, and shouldn't betray it by aping others (in particular Germans shouldn't ape Frenchmen). This is one of the originating ideas of modern nationalism. The expressive view of human life went along naturally with a new understanding of art.¹⁴

Nationalism thus has its origin in a natural identity that should inspire, for example, artists. In Taylor's eyes, it is thus from the work of Herder that the idea of authenticity from which follows that of legitimate nationalism is born.¹⁵

Multiculturalist projects such as Taylor's thus have their distant origin in the work of Herder. In turn, Herder, as one knows, always insisted that "there was on earth only one species of human beings." He is careful to affirm that "the word race refers to a difference in origin which does not exist, or at least contains under these general classifications of country and colors very different races; for each nation has a distinct physiognomy, as well as a particular language." However, while rejecting any kind of racism and affirming the universality of human nature, Herder can still write, "If each people holds as firmly to their own representations, as we see that they do, it is because they are truly particular to them, it is that the work with their earth, their sky, that they derive from their way of living and have been transmitted from father to son without any break."¹⁶ Against Voltaire and the Enlightenment and in prefiguration of counterrevolutionary claims, Herder thus concludes that "prejudice is good, in its place, for it makes people happy. It returns people to their center, attaches them more solidly to their roots, makes their own character more flourishing, more ardent and thus makes them happier in their inclination and goals."¹⁷ In this way, Herder anticipates the German theory of the nation, which, to speak too simply, privileges language and tradition and stands in opposition to the French theory, which, since Renan, has placed the emphasis on "the daily plebiscite."¹⁸ In fact, Herder's project consists in opposing the German language to French universalism, with the aim of rehabilitating German traditions, much in the way that, in our day, Taylor hopes to defend *la nation Québécoise* by preserving French against the similarly false universalizing embrace of English.

This German philosopher who justifies the equal value of cultural identities often appears nonetheless as the founder of modern nationalist theories, for his diatribes against the universalism of the Enlightenment encourage the romantic reaction. The ambiguity of his claims is such that Isaiah Berlin, clearly one of the most important influences on Taylor,¹⁹ links Herder with Fichte and other German theorists as those who show the strongest "aggressive chauvinism" in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasion. In his eyes,

the tradition inaugurated by Herder, and to which Taylor today claims affinity, thus inaugurates cultural relativism and the war of all against all. For Berlin,

The first true nationalists—the Germans—are an example of the combination of wounded cultural pride and a philosophico-historical vision to stanch the wound and create an inner focus of resistance. After Germany, Italy, Poland and Russia, and in due course the Balkan and Baltic nationalities and Ireland, and after the debacle the French Third Republic, and so to our own day, with its republics and dictatorships in Asia and Africa, the burning nationalism of regional and ethnic groups in France and Britain, Belgium and Corsica, Canada and Spain and Cyprus, and who knows where else.²⁰

A little later, however, Berlin revises his judgment and, in a sort of *mea culpa*, proclaims that in his eyes, Herder is not a proponent of cultural relativism but rather, with Vico, tries to justify a “cultural pluralism.” As Berlin recognizes,

Vico’s and Herder’s opposition to the central tenets of the French Enlightenment have commonly been described as a form of relativism. This *idée reçue* seems to me now to be a widespread error, like the label of relativism attached to Hume and Montesquieu, an error which, I must admit, I have in the past perpetrated myself. But for Herder all the various peaks of human endeavor, based on differences in needs and circumstances, are equally objective and knowable. This is anything but relativism.

Berlin insists, “Pluralism—the incommensurability and, at times, incompatibility of objective ends—is *not* relativism.” Berlin admits to having in the past “inadvertently contributed to a purely relativistic interpretation of Herder. Now he insists that the pluralism he finds there cannot lead to nationalism.”²¹

At the very least, these hesitations show a difficulty. Herder’s work certainly partakes of a universalism, but in his praise of various “prejudices,” it can also justify ethnic conceptions of the nation, as opposed to an “elective” theory, just as might narrower notions of nationalism. Its “pluralism” is not self-evident. As Dumont remarks, “The Herderian conception is a Janus. On the one side it is a defense and illustration of German culture and an application of a holistic understanding. On the other it looks at culture simply from the point of view of a transposed individualistic nationalism.”²² Forgetful of its universalistic foundations, it does not impede many nationalist authors from making open use of it in the project to transform an *ethnos* into a newly imagined national community, incarnated in and by traditions and a language capable of ensuring at the same time its rebirth and everlasting duration.

What, then, really is the influence of an author as complex as Herder on the thought of someone like Taylor? He is a philosopher who is closely tied

with the political struggles in Québec and who gave up his endowed chair at Oxford University to return to Québec at a crucial moment in its history. He frequently uses the example of Canada to legitimate the right of the recognition of difference. For a long time, he has been an activist in various Québécois political organizations. Between 1961 and 1971, he participated in the founding of the New Democratic Party, of which he was the federal vice president for a time. He ran against Pierre Trudeau in the elections of 1965 and has on four subsequent occasions sought federal elective office without, however, ever being elected. As the holder of the Chichele chair at Oxford, one of the most prestigious in the Anglo-Saxon world, he returned to Montréal in 1979 to participate in the referendum campaign. During the 1990s, he was an expert consultant to the parliamentary commission seeking to define the constitutional and political future of Québec. LaForest has remarked that “like Isaiah Berlin (who was Taylor’s teacher at Oxford), Taylor believes that there are several ways of living in modernity, and that spirit of liberal democracy does not require individuals and peoples to renounce their identity.”²³ In a crucial lecture, Taylor asks himself, in relation to Québec, “why nations should become states.” His answer is unambiguous: to the degree that the “essential viable and indispensable pole of identification is language or culture, and in consequence, the linguistic community, . . . we have the right to ask others to respect the conditions necessary for our language or collectivity to be a viable pole of identification”; that is to say, Québec may transform itself into a state in the framework of a federation with Canada (a solution that Taylor favors because it can “help us to protect ourselves from a brutalizing and repressive nationalism”) or, even more, into an entirely sovereign state.²⁴ Refusing the old liberal theories attached to the notion of a neutral public space, Taylor insists that “wherever patriotism, or otherwise put, the nationalist sentiment, remains an integral part of the political culture of a state—and this is the case in most modern states, including Québec, of course—then the political structures retain an ineradicable dimension of identity.” For Taylor, here at a great distance from Habermas and, paradoxically, also from Rawls, “the identity function cannot be excluded from the public domain as the need to defend and define a national identity still makes itself felt.” In his eyes, a state cannot be neutral, because it is in control of the identity of the nation. “At least with us, one would not know how to conceive of a Québécois state which would not have the task of defending French language and culture, whatever might be the diversity of our population.”²⁵

This establishes the limits of this multiculturalism. Once cultural identity is recognized and transformed into a state, the cultures that are internal to this

community cannot be entitled to benefit from the same right. It is true that Taylor takes care to write,

I recognized the principal commitment of the independentist leadership in Québec is to building an open, tolerant, pluralistic society, with place for minority cultures. But I sense in the dynamic of the independence movement itself, in the passions it feels required to be mobilized, the harbingers of a rather narrower and more exclusionist society. And very much the same can be said, *mutatis mutandi*, of the movements in English Canada which would be glad to see Québec go. Separation would not only mean the failure of the Canadian experiment in deep diversity but also the birth of two new states in some ways even less amenable to diversity than our present condition. The importance of the "people" as an agent of decision has generally come to be construed as requiring uniformity of some or other kind as its only available ground. This presumption has only been strengthened by the considerable role that nationalism has played in the forming and identities of such peoples.²⁶

It is, however, the case that we have here, the case of a true community, that constituted by a new nation-state, which is but little tolerant of its own minorities whose own cultures are expressed in still other languages; this community stands in opposition to the American-style multiculturalism without territory that sometimes (but not always) denies liberal citizenship to some of its members and that poses, at the most, problems of coexistence between "communities" of culture that may deliberately be unequally advantaged in their access to resources. This is all the more significant given that, after the failure of the Meech agreements, it became possible to notice, as Taylor puts it, "the extraordinary euphoria of the crowds who celebrated the national day of Québec, Saint John's day, in 1990. The Québécois knew what they wanted from any possible political structure in the northern half of the continent. Consensus had been recovered, but also a kind of psychic unity." Aside from the notion of "psychic unity," Taylor even calls for the defense of "our ancestral culture," which imposes itself, according to him, in a way that is "not impartial." In this sense, "it is fundamental for the governments of Québec that the survival and flourishing of the French culture of Québec constitute a good."²⁷ The "survival" of the culture of "our ancestors" represents a "collective good" in terms of which "political society cannot remain neutral."

Such a vocabulary has little to do with contractarianism, and from it one can see how Taylor can foresee the appearance of internal "tensions and difficulties" that might arise in relation to "persons who do not share the definition" of good life in this society even if an adequate protection of "fundamental liberties" is offered them, one capable of ensuring "the respect of diversity."²⁸ In fact, linguistic minorities have little place in this breast of

the “psychic” community. This is all the more the case, as Taylor indicates, because the “statute required to preserve the French language is incompatible with the structures of a culture of immigration, such as it is conceived in North America.” French Canadians struggle so that “their language [will] not be relegated to the status of being just the language of an ethnic minority.” French Canadians do not

belong to the dominant North American culture, nor are they, like immigrants, people who fail to belong to that culture only provisionally and are destined to assimilate to it or see their children assimilate to it in time. On the contrary, they intend to remain separate, and they intend that their children remain separate.²⁹

From this, we get to the passage of Law 101, approved by Taylor, which mandates the type of school to which parents can send their children. Only anglophone children can attend English-language schools; francophone children, and all children of immigrants, are not permitted to attend these schools and are under the obligation to carry out their studies in French. The aim, no doubt, is to reinforce the cohesion of the cultural community and to accelerate the assimilation of immigrants while plunging anglophones into uncertainty.³⁰

One reaches here the limits of multiculturalism when understood in the framework of the cultural homogenization that inheres in the process of nation building. In this perspective, patriotism and nationalism mix together and prevent the survival of an internal multiculturalism and of freedom of action as it also prevents any margin of choice to individuals who are understood as the bearers of a single oppressive and quasi-essentialist idealized cultural identity from which no escape is possible. Such an immutable collective identity is not compatible with the expression of other identities (sexual, religious, etc.) in which some might wish to recognize themselves at certain moments of their existence while retaining the possibility of intentionally changing it at a future time.³¹

This strict interpretation of culture as almost the soul of a people brings Taylor close to Herder but also, in certain ways, to Berlin, who values the pluralism of national cultures as a way of struggling against the danger of relativism³² but does not ask himself about the survival of cultures and languages inside each political community that is so formed.³³ In Berlin’s eyes, “nonaggressive nationalism” rests on the idea of “belonging” proposed by Herder. He adds that, according to Herzen, “for him England was England, France was France, Russia was Russia” and thus internal cultures mattered little. In this sense, one can legitimately claim that Berlin is a theorist of “collectivism” and of “methodological holism” who moves away from liberals who hold the values of actors to be central.³⁴ Even if he distinguishes

repeated “nonaggressive nationalism” from the ultra-nationalism against which he consistently struggles, it is not certain whether his adherence to a collectivism, resting on a unique cultural code, is compatible with the internal pluralism to which he constantly appeals. In this sense, one sees how he could call himself a “moderate populist.”³⁵ Finally, for Berlin, “only in America have a variety of ethnic groups retained at any rate some part of their own original cultures and nobody seems to mind. The Italians, Poles, Jews, Koreans have their own newspapers, books, and, I am told, TV programs.” If also hostile to “loneliness,” Herder was not favorable to “polyethnicity,” observes Berlin. He adds,

Herder, I think, would have looked unkindly on the cultural frictions generated in Vienna where many nationalities were crammed into the same narrow space. It produced men of genius but with a deeply neurotic element in a good many of them—one need only think of Gustav Mahler, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Kraus, Arnold Schoenberg, Stefan Zweig and the birth of psychoanalysis in the largely Jewish—particularly defenseless—society. This was a different kind of cultural expression from that of an earlier Vienna, that of Mozart or Haydn, or Schubert.

Condemning, yesterday as today, “empty cosmopolitanism” and fearing a Madonna-style Americanization, Berlin judges that sooner or later people must revolt against uniformity so as to preserve their national culture.³⁶

We have yet to know how minority cultures, languages, and traditions can survive in this legitimate national whole where the culture invades the totality of public space and conditions the nature of the state. If, in the name of the survival of national culture, one does not wish to arrive at an ethnicization of the world, would it not be important to pay attention to the model (probably in many aspects out of date) of the separation of public and private spaces all the while considering the ambition of a heavily institutionalized (sociologically speaking) state, a state that keeps itself from trailing behind a single culture, however legitimate that culture might be? In what way does the preservation of the cultural code guarantee the place of differences, of the strange as well as the stranger. In this community culture, what whole and full citizen is conferred on the “other”? And is the citizen himself not divided between several loyalties?³⁷ Is a “strong” democracy compatible with a “strong” community and, a fortiori, with a “strong” state?³⁸ In this perspective, does not the “weakness” of a state—its absence of autonomy in relation to society as well as in relation to the culture—by definition accentuate the complete submission of citizens who are too little masters of their own choices? Where might one recognize differences between the external homogenization of cultures produced by the mass media and the internal homogenization of the culture appropriate to each national community rest-

ing on a single language? Is it not urgent that we conceive of a liberal interpretation of multiculturalism capable of preparing us against any form of nationalism in which might flourish an identitarian ideology that met the taste of the day?³⁹

NOTES

1. *Telos* (Summer 1994): 15.
2. *Ibid.*, 29.
3. *Ibid.*, 192, 195. See, on this meeting, *Krisis* (June 1994). At the end of his article, "Communitarians and Liberals," de Benoist writes, "The foundation of their [the communitarians'] message is that if one cannot recover life for organic communities organized around the idea of a common good and shared values, society will have no other choices by authoritarianism or disintegration" (p. 19).
4. Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
5. *Le Monde*, May 14, 1995, 7.
6. On the ironic reception of these theories in France, see Marie-Christine Granjon, "Looking on the Bias: French Attitudes and American Multiculturalism (1990-1993)," *XXième siècle* (September 1991): 18-29.
7. See the strenuous critique of this issue in Habermas in Craig Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
8. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, 39. Daniel Weinstock has called attention to Taylor's opposition to the "requirement of liberal neutrality." See his "The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question*, ed. by James Tully (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 178.
9. See S. Caney, "Liberalism and Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate," *Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (June 1992): 273-89.
10. Charles Taylor, "Quel principe d'identité collective?" *L'Europe au soir du siècle*, ed. by J. Lenoble and N. Dewandre (Paris: Esprit, 1993), 61.
11. *Ibid.*, 67.
12. Taylor, *Politics of Recognition*, 31. See also p. 72.
13. Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*, ed. by Guy LaForest (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 136-38.
14. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 375-77, 415-18, 420.
15. *Ibid.*, 415. See also his *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 28.
16. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Idées sur la philosophie de l'histoire de l'humanité* (Paris: Agora, 1991), 48, 50, 96.
17. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Une autre philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1978), 185.
18. Louis Dumont, *L'idéologie allemande: France-Allemagne et retour* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991).

19. The link of Herder, Berlin, and Taylor is fundamental. As Berlin emphasizes, "Charles Taylor and I share our evaluation of Herder's central idea that to belong to society is an intrinsic human need, that the self-realization cannot be obtained in isolation from social life but only in the framework of, for Taylor much more than me, the organic structure of the culture or society in which they are born and to which therefore they cannot help belong. At this point, we part ways, I think. I do not believe in teleology. I think that Taylor believes in essence, whereas I do not" ("Introduction," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, 2).

20. Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*. (London: Hogarth Press, 1979), 350.

21. Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* (London: Murray, 1990), 76, 81, 87

22. Dumont, *L'idéologie allemande*, 25.

23. Guy LaForest, "Introduction," *Reconciling the Solitudes*, xv.

24. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 62-68.

25. *Ibid.*, 142-43, 145.

26. Taylor, "Articulation and Re-articulation," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, 254, 256.

27. *Ibid.*, 199. (Editor's note: The Meech Lake accords proposed an expansion of provincial powers, an expansion of autonomy, and greater possibility for provinces to opt out of various federal programs. It would have written Canadian duality into the constitution by a recognition of *la nation Canadienne-Francaise*. In part from the pressure of those favoring independence, Québec did not ratify the accords and they never became law. Taylor was in favor of them. See his *Reconciling the Solitudes*, 170ff.)

28. Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes*, 176-77; "The Politics of Recognition," 58-59.

29. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 13.

30. *Ibid.*, 55. For a critique, see Ayse Ceyhan, "Le communitarisme et la question de reconnaissance," *Cultures et Conflits* (Winter 1993). Michael Ignatieff criticizes "Québécois nationalism" and writes, "Many, if not all, Québécois anglophones feel that the language legislation which banishes English from the public sphere and confines it to the private makes them second class citizens" ("Québec: La société distincte, jusqu'où?" *Le déchément des nations*, ed. by Jacques Rupnik [Paris: Seuil, 1995], 152). Paradoxically, these are the very terms that Taylor uses when he hopes that the politics of recognition will avoid the development of "second-class citizens."

31. See the critiques of Taylor by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification," *Political Theory* (February 1994): 152-66, and by Thomas Dumm, "Strangers and Liberals," *Political Theory* (February 1994): 167-75.

32. For Claude Galipeau, Berlin "confuses epistemological relativism with moral relativism and asserts that if the former is untrue [then] so is the latter" (*Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 63).

33. See Jean Leca, "Types de pluralisme et la viabilité de la démocratie," *Papers of the XVth World Congress of the IPSA* (Berlin, 1994), 17. Also in critique of Taylor, Yael Tamir seeks to imagine a "liberal nationalism which leaves to the actor a large margin of choice of his own values such that he may preserve, in the midst of nationalism, the word liberal which is refused to him by the communitarians" (*Liberal Nationalism* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993], 23). Tamir notes that "a national culture is not a prison" and by this comes closer to Renan than to Herder (see pp. 33-37 and 889). Tamir even thinks that nationalism should be pluralist. In his eyes, "individuals have a choice. They can refuse to speak the language of their community, reject its culture and assimilate themselves to another culture" (p. 88). For him, it is not a matter of having a State correspond to each nation. If "a political system reflects a particular national culture, its citizens will be free to follow different cultures and to respect the conceptions of the good." Tamir prefers to return to the traditional pluralist model of consociational democracy as

described by A. Lipjhart and symbolized in the multiplicity of cleavages, where the consensus of elites fashions by itself the only idea of the common interest (pp. 156ff). For once, classical political sociology allows a more empirical way of setting normative questions.

34. Stuart Hampshire, "Nationalism," *Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration*, ed. by Edna Margalit and Avishai Margalit (London: Hogarth, 1991), 127-34. Without relying on a completely convincing demonstration, John Gray judges, to the contrary, that Berlin's nationalism is limited by his adherence to a fundamental internal pluralism. If Berlin is favorable to pluralism, he makes no explicit reference to it in his texts on nationalism. See John Gray, *Isaiah Berlin* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 99-121. See also Steven Lukes, "The Singular and the Plural: On the Distinctive Liberalism of Isaiah Berlin," *Social Research* (Fall 1991): 687-715.

35. Galipeau, *Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism*, 159.

36. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism," *New York Review of Books*, November 21, 1991.

37. A. Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community* (London: Routledge, 1990). On this matter, see Matteo Gianni. "Les liens entre citoyenneté et démocratie sur la base du débat 'Libéraux-Communitariens'" (Etudes de recherches, 1994, no. 26, Université de Genève, Département de science politique).

38. On the ideas of weak and strong, see Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). On their consequences, see Pierre Birnbaum, *State and Collective Action: The European Experience* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

39. Michael Walzer, quite rightly, makes himself the partisan of a more open multiculturalism. For him, "this American civil society is wonderfully multitudinous. This country is not only a pluralism of groups but also a pluralism of individual. It is perhaps the most individualist society in human society. There are no borders around our cultural groups and, of course, no border police" ("Multiculturalism and Individualism," *Dissent* [Spring 1994]: 187, 191). See also his *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

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