

## RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Are the ethnically tolerant free of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance?

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## Abstract

We hypothesized that the ethnically tolerant (i.e., people who are anti-ethnocentric and score very low on a measure of ethnocentrism) would perceive people with extremely incompatible values and beliefs as out-groups and would engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Experiments among Australian citizens in Studies 1 ( $N = 224$ ) and 2 ( $N = 283$ ) showed that the ethnically tolerant perceived supporters of a message in favour of mandatory detention of asylum seekers as out-groups and consequently exhibited discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Study 3 with 265 U.S. citizens showed that, controlling for liberalism, ethnic tolerance led to prejudice against out-groups. This was replicated with 522 UK citizens in Study 4, which also showed that social identity, and not moral conviction, mediated the link between ethnic tolerance and prejudice. The findings suggest that the ethnically tolerant can be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant against fellow humans.

*'Ironically, the very effort to tolerate and value diversity constitutes a license to hate those who disagree.'*  
—Baumeister, (2001, p. 182)

*'When people ask the rhetorical question 'has tolerance gone too far', what they are saying is that it can be rationed and made available only to those who share our moral universe.'* —Furedi, (2011b, para. 1)

A classic work on ethnocentrism by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) proposed that ethnocentric individuals are intolerant because they perceive the world as concentric circles of superior in-groups and disliked, disrespected and rejected out-groups. Allport (1954) put forward similar arguments and contrasted ethnocentric intolerance with tolerance or 'the friendly and trustful attitude that one person may have toward another, regardless of the groups to which either belongs' (p. 398). A tolerant person is someone who 'makes no distinction of race, color, or creed' and who 'not only endures but, in general, approves his fellow men' (Allport, 1954, p. 398). In a similar vein, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1995) defines tolerance as 'respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human' (Article 1.1). This understanding of tolerance has had a profound influence on social psychological approaches to prejudice, which

have primarily focused on a study of negative ethnic, including racial, attitudes (Bizumic, 2015). Based on the vast literature in social psychology on prejudice, one can conclude that ethnic tolerance has often been seen as the most important, and possibly most difficult to achieve, kind of tolerance. Countless studies have attempted to understand and ameliorate ethnic prejudice, resting on the implicit assumption that ethnic tolerance may equal freedom from any kind of intolerance.

## Ethnic Tolerance and Intolerance

Recent events at college campuses in the United States have sparked a debate about whether activism that was ostensibly designed to increase tolerance of those with diverse backgrounds has actually become intolerant of those with opposing views. Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declined an invitation to speak at the Rutgers University after student protests, which echoed protests during a similar speech at the Boston College in 2006 (Fitzsimmons, 2014). U.S. President Obama (2015), who disagreed with Rice's policies, opined,

*'I do think that there have been times on college campuses where I get concerned that the unwillingness to hear other points of view can be as unhealthy on the left as on the right... there have been times where you start seeing on college campuses students protesting somebody like the director*

*of the IMF or Condi Rice speaking on a campus because they don't like what they stand for. Well, feel free to disagree with somebody, but don't try to just shut them up.'*

Since then, a series of controversies at college campuses around the United States have reinforced these issues. A series of overtly racist events at the University of Missouri led to the resignation of several university officials, which led some to question whether they should rightly be held responsible for the acts of non-university affiliated individuals (Sullivan, 2015). The issue of whether Halloween costumes depicting people of minority ethnicities are implicitly intolerant of those minorities led to the resignation of Claremont McKenna's dean of students (Altman, 2015) and an academic at Yale (Friedersdorf, 2015), leading many to question whether political activism in the name of diversity has become intolerant of free speech (e.g., Kimball, 2015; Shire, 2015).

An empirical question can therefore be asked whether the ethnically tolerant are indeed free of any kind of intolerance and whether there are social groups against which the ethnically tolerant may express intolerance. Before we can answer that question, it is important to note that there are different kinds of tolerance (and intolerance). Traditionally, tolerance has been defined as allowing freedom of expression, often called political tolerance, but more recently, it has been defined as accepting, tolerating and liking particular social groups (see Furedi, 2011a). Intolerance, therefore, could relate to both political intolerance, that is, rejecting freedom of expression and intergroup intolerance, that is, discrimination and prejudice against a social group. Based on the literature, we review below, we argue that ethnic tolerance does not necessarily result in tolerance towards everyone and that it could result in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against those with highly incompatible values and beliefs, who could be categorized by the ethnically tolerant as out-groups who inhabit a different moral universe.

For the purpose of this research, following the conceptualization by Allport (1954), we define ethnic tolerance as low ethnocentrism, anti-ethnocentrism or rejection of ethnocentrism. Recently, Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, and Krauss (2009) and Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) conceptualized ethnocentrism as an attitudinal construct of ethnic group self-centredness, consisting of six bipolar dimensions: ethnic preference, superiority, purity, exploitativeness, group cohesion and devotion. According to this conceptualization and measurement of ethnocentrism, those low in ethnocentrism are ethnically tolerant, or in the words of Adorno *et al.* (1950), anti-ethnocentric: They tend to show full consideration for ethnic and cultural out-groups, value cultural diversity, reject ethnic purity, believe that all cultures are equally valuable, do not show ethnic preference, tend to be critical of and not blindly devoted to their ethnic group and value individual freedoms over cohesion within the ethnic group.

Bizumic and colleagues have also developed measures of the six bipolar dimensions, and participants rejecting ethnocentrism tended to agree with items representing ethnic tolerance, such as 'If I could be born again, it would be fine for me to be born into a different cultural or ethnic group to my own'; 'The values, way of life, and customs of most other cultures are probably just as good as those of my own'; and 'I like the idea of a society in which people from completely different cultures, ethnic groups, and backgrounds mix together freely' (an interested reader can see the full scale, including items representing both poles of the Ethnocentrism Scale, in Bizumic *et al.*, 2009). In contrast, those high in ethnocentrism are ethnically intolerant: They approve of exploiting out-groups, advocate ethnic purity, prefer ethnic in-groups over out-groups, think of the ethnic in-group as superior, are blindly devoted to it and require strong group cohesion. Indeed, researchers have explicitly conceptualized ethnic intolerance in a very similar way to ethnocentrism, such as social distance towards ethnic out-groups, rejection of ethnic out-groups and preference for the ethnic in-group over out-groups (e.g., Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst, & Gerris, 2004; Napier & Jost, 2008; Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 2006; Weiss, 2003). Other researchers have conceptualized ethnic tolerance as accepting ethnic out-groups, promoting cultural diversity and multiculturalism, caring for ethnic out-groups and giving the ethnic in-group and out-groups equal rights (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Frølund Thomsen, 2012; Janmaat & Mons, 2011; Kalin & Berry, 1980). For the purpose of this research, we see those who score low on the Ethnocentrism Scale as ethnically tolerant or anti-ethnocentric, whereas those who score high as ethnically intolerant or ethnocentric. Therefore, we use the terms 'ethnic tolerance', 'low ethnocentrism' and 'anti-ethnocentrism' interchangeably.

### Ethnic Tolerance and Treatment of Out-groups

Can the ethnically tolerant be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant towards certain groups? There is a body of research in social psychology to suggest this possibility. Research shows that people can relate to different out-groups in qualitatively different ways. For example, people can hold diverse stereotypes of groups, such as simultaneously believing certain groups to be competent but lack warmth (e.g., rich people) and other groups to be warm but lack competence (e.g., housewives), and this influences different kinds of out-group prejudices (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In addition, people can feel qualitatively different emotions towards various out-groups as a result of disagreements with, or specific threats from, out-groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Intergroup attitudes, such as prejudice, are conceptualized in this body of research as multidimensional, and prejudiced attitudes are seen as specific and relative as they vary across targets.

The question arises whether there are psychological out-groups for the ethnically tolerant, given the assumption that they accept all people regardless of their characteristics, and treat them as individuals and not group members (Allport, 1954). Applying the social identity approach (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Turner & Onorato, 1999), we infer that the ethnically tolerant, sharing similar values and beliefs, can be a psychological in-group, whereas those with highly incompatible values and beliefs to the ethnically tolerant can be a psychological out-group. The social identity approach assumes that categorization into in-groups and out-groups is context dependent. People categorize themselves and others based on category accessibility and the fit between category and stimuli. The accessibility is determined by what people bring with themselves, including values and beliefs, to situations. The fit depends on perceiving similarities and differences between stimuli and how much the category's content corresponds to reality. For example, when the ethnically tolerant compare themselves as a group with another group, differences from that group tend to become larger than differences within their own group, and the in-group members in such circumstances tend to be perceived as more similar to each other than to out-group members on specific normative dimensions relevant to ethnic tolerance.

Nevertheless, in-group-out-group distinctions do not necessarily mean that in-group members would be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant against all out-groups. In fact, research suggests that the relationship of intergroup differences with intergroup attitudes and behaviours is conflicting and affected by various factors (Costa-Lopes, Vala, & Judd, 2012; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Working within the social identity approach, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) shed light on the role of social identity in social discrimination and intolerance. These authors argued that when people's identity-relevant and deeply held values and beliefs are challenged by the perception of out-group differences, in-group members may legitimize negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Social discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against an out-group, therefore, may be seen as relatively more negative treatment (compared with the treatment of the in-group) that is justified by the in-group but not the out-group. According to this reasoning, deeply held and identity-relevant values and beliefs in the ethnically tolerant may be challenged by those who have very different values and beliefs, such as those who advocate for ethnic purity, rejection of ethnic out-groups, or exploiting another ethnic group. As a result, the ethnically tolerant may engage in relatively more discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance because they perceive this treatment as legitimate. The process may be particularly pronounced if the ethnically tolerant and intolerant share a higher-order in-group category (e.g., citizens of one country) and when the ethnically tolerant believe that they are prototypical of this category.

Similar conclusions flow from the work on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990; Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005). The morally excluded are psychologically highly distant from the self and are placed 'outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply' (Opotow, 1990, p. 1). Accordingly, people who have highly incompatible values and beliefs to those of the ethnically tolerant can be placed in a category that is highly distant from the self. They are perceived as an extreme out-group or non-self, and no moral values or fairness apply towards them, and therefore, discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them could be legitimized (cf. Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

### Liberalism, Morality and Ethnic Tolerance

There are other theories and studies related to our arguments. For example, work in moral foundation theory (Graham *et al.*, 2011; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012) suggests that liberals and conservatives may dislike each other because they emphasize different moral concerns. Similarly, research shows that U.S. liberals tend to be intolerant of social groups whose ideology conflicts with liberalism (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). We argue, however, that ethnic tolerance, despite being related to liberalism, is distinct to it, as there may be conservatives lower and liberals higher in ethnocentrism. For example, John Stuart Mill, a founder of modern liberalism, was ethnocentric when he glorified the British Empire, celebrated its civilizing influence and saw other ethnic groups, such as Asians, Africans and the Irish, as uncivilized barbarians (Sullivan, 1983). In contrast, Edmund Burke, an influential 18th century conservative thinker, was critical of the British Empire and on the side of its oppressed ethnic groups (Mehta, 1999). Accordingly, we argue that potential effects of ethnic tolerance on discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance are not due to the association of ethnic tolerance with liberalism. In addition, we argue that conflict over values and beliefs may lead to intergroup, rather than interpersonal, conflict, and that social identity processes create the effects.

Another perspective suggests that people with strong moral convictions may discriminate against those who think differently about a particular issue (Skitka, 2010). Moral convictions are considered to be individualistic and not driven by social identities (Skitka, 2010). It could therefore be expected that the ethnically tolerant may discriminate because of the individual moral convictions associated with ethnic tolerance and not because of social identity. Nonetheless, it appears that moral conviction is not independent from social identification (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). We therefore argue that social identity processes may be important drivers of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance among the ethnically tolerant, even controlling for the role of moral conviction.



## Overview

To sum up, in line with recent research in social psychology (Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Fiske *et al.*, 2002; Mackie *et al.*, 2000), we argue that the ethnically tolerant can engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance because these phenomena are specific and may vary across targets. Following the work in the social identity approach by Turner *et al.* (1994) and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), we argue that the ethnically tolerant can also have out-groups, and that when the ethnically tolerant are exposed to out-groups with extremely different values and beliefs, which challenge identity-relevant values and beliefs of the ethnically tolerant, they may justify increased levels of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against these out-groups. In line with the work on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), these out-groups would be morally excluded and seen as highly distant from the self, and in turn, they would be given much less moral consideration and fairness than the in-group. As a result, the ethnically tolerant would engage in more negative treatment of such out-groups, including social discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance. It should be noted that social identification is usually measured as a dimension, from very low to very high, and the terms in-group–out-group can refer to the degree to which a person perceives a group to be part of their self (in-group) or not (out-group). We expect that the ethnically tolerant would have extremely low levels of identification with people who have highly incompatible beliefs and values to themselves, and that this would predispose them to discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against these out-groups. Finally, although we focus on the ethnically tolerant, the same process should apply to those high in ethnocentrism when they are exposed to people with highly incompatible beliefs and views. We, however, focus here on the generally unexplored phenomenon of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance of the ethnically tolerant.

We conducted studies in 2010 (Study 1), 2012 (Study 2) and 2014 (Studies 3 and 4) to examine these ideas. In Studies 1 and 2, we experimentally exposed Australian participants with lower and higher levels of ethnocentrism to messages related to mandatory detention of asylum seekers, which is a controversial policy in Australia of compulsorily confining asylum seekers for long periods of time. We expected those lower in ethnocentrism to reject, and those higher in ethnocentrism to accept, this policy. We created two messages: pro-mandatory detention (PMD) and anti-mandatory detention (AMD). The PMD message opposed, and the AMD message supported, the values of acceptance and care for ethnic out-groups, whereas the AMD message opposed, and the PMD message supported, the values of security, cohesion and ethnic homogeneity.

Based on theoretical reasoning, we expected that the PMD message would be highly incompatible with values and beliefs of the ethnically tolerant, and they would view it as an out-group message, whereas they would view the AMD message as an in-group message.

The opposite was expected for those higher in ethnocentrism. So, in line with Mackie *et al.* (2000), groups were formed around support for or opposition to a specific attitudinal issue, as these groups have certain advantages for a study of social identity processes, such as less impact of social desirability issues. We also expected that participants would not only intolerantly reject the out-group message, but, in line with the arguments presented above, would also be intolerant of people who support it, that is, that they would show discrimination (i.e., enhanced social distance), prejudice and political intolerance. We expected the ethnically tolerant would be intolerant of out-groups even when controlling for liberalism, which, although related to ethnic tolerance, is a distinct concept. Finally, we expected that the effects of ethnic tolerance were due to social identification and would hold even controlling for moral conviction associated with ethnic tolerance.

## Study 1a: Pilot Study

We first conducted a pilot study to examine if the ethnically tolerant, that is, those lower in ethnocentrism, would see the AMD message as an in-group message and the PMD message as an out-group message, and whether those higher in ethnocentrism would see the PMD message as an in-group message and the AMD message as an out-group message.

## Method

**Participants and design.** There were 36 Australian participants (33 Anglo-Australians), consisting of students and community members, aged 17 to 54. They took part in a paper-and-pencil study. The design had a single within-subject factor (message: AMD vs. PMD) and ethnocentrism as a measured variable. As with the other studies reported in the paper, ethical aspects of the study were approved by a relevant Human Research Ethics Committee, and participants provided informed consent to participate in the study. The data materials and raw data for all studies are archived in secure locations at the Australian National University Research School of Psychology.

**Materials and procedure.** Participants completed a shortened balanced 12-item version of the Ethnocentrism Scale ( $\alpha = .85$ ; Bizumic *et al.*, 2009), consisting of six ethnocentric statements (e.g., 'The world would be a much better place if all other cultures and ethnic groups modelled themselves on my culture'), and six anti-ethnocentric statements (e.g., 'I like the idea of a society in which people from completely different cultures, ethnic groups, and backgrounds mix together freely'). We averaged the items for each participant, and higher scores on the measure reflected higher ethnocentrism. Participants then read both a strong PMD message and a strong AMD message, which we constructed by compiling arguments from the media. Afterwards, participants completed a



6-item balanced measure of identification with message supporters. The measure included often used social identification items (Haslam, 2004), such as 'I identify with them' (i.e., with message supporters) and 'I feel I have little in common with them' (reverse-scored). We averaged the items, and higher scores on the scale reflected more identification. The measures of identification with the PMD ( $\alpha=.95$ ) and AMD message supporters ( $\alpha=.94$ ) were reliable. All measures used a 9-point scale from -4 (*very strongly disagree*) to +4 (*very strongly agree*).

## Results and Discussion


We conducted a regression analysis using a mixed-effects model with two fixed effects, which included message as a categorical within-subject variable (dummy-coded with 0 for AMD and 1 for PMD), mean-centred ethnocentrism ( $M=-1.08$ ,  $SD=1.32$ ) as a between-subject continuous variable and subject as a random effect. Identification with message supporters was the dependent variable. Main effects of message,  $B=-1.13$ ,  $t(34)=-2.85$ ,  $p=.007$ , *partial r* ( $pr$ ) $=-.44$ , and ethnocentrism,  $B=-0.86$ ,  $t(34)=-4.00$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $pr=-.57$ , were significant and qualified by a two-way interaction,  $B=2.14$ ,  $t(34)=7.02$ ,  $p<.001$ ,

$pr=.77$ . A simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) showed that lower ethnocentrism ( $-1$  SD) related to identification with the AMD message supporters,  $B=-3.93$ ,  $t(34)=-6.99$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $r=-.77$ , and higher ethnocentrism ( $+1$  SD) with the PMD message supporters,  $B=1.67$ ,  $p=.004$ ,  $t(34)=2.98$ ,  $r=.45$ . Figure 1(a) presents the findings and indicates that those lower in ethnocentrism were extremely low in their identification with the PMD supporters, which means they rejected having anything in common with the PMD supporters and saw them as highly distant from the self. The findings supported our expectation that participants lower in ethnocentrism would identify more strongly with the AMD message supporters and much more weakly with the PMD message supporters, whereas those higher on ethnocentrism would identify more strongly with the PMD message supporters and much more weakly with the AMD message supporters. Accordingly, we conducted the main study.

## Study 1b: Main Study

### Method

**Participants and design.** There were 188 Australian citizens (both students and community



**Fig. 1:** (a) Identification with message supporters, (b) intolerant message rejection, (c) social distance on items reflecting intimate relationships towards message supporters and (d) social distance on items reflecting non-intimate relationships towards message supporters as a function of the type of message and ethnocentrism. All values are non-standardized coefficients

members). The mean age was 30.21 years ( $SD=14.12$ ), and the sample had 115 women (61.17%). Participants took part in a paper-and-pencil study. The design had a single between-subject factor (message: AMD vs. PMD) and ethnocentrism as a measured variable.

**Materials and procedure.** Participants completed a balanced 36-item version of the Ethnocentrism Scale ( $\alpha=.92$ ) on a 9-point scale from  $-4$  (*very strongly disagree*) to  $+4$  (*very strongly agree*). We randomly assigned participants to either the PMD or AMD message condition. After reading the same message as in the pilot study, participants completed a manipulation check ('Do you think the message strongly supports mandatory detention of asylum seekers?') on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 9 (*definitely*). Subsequently, they completed measures of: (i) intolerant rejection of the message (the Spearman-Brown coefficient,  $\rho=.69$ ), including two items, which strongly dismiss the message: 'The message does not have a single good point' (1—*some good points* to 9—*not a single good point*) and 'This message is totally worthless' (1—*very worthwhile* to 9—*completely worthless*) (Bizumic, Turner, Reynolds, & Kajtar, 2008); and (ii) a 7-item measure of social distance, which asked whether participants would accept (e.g., as a friend, neighbour or Australian resident/citizen) someone who agrees with the message (1—*not at all* to 7—*completely*).

## Results and Discussion

We used expectation maximization to impute missing data ( $<1\%$ ). As expected, participants saw the message to be supportive of the mandatory detention in the PMD message condition,  $M=7.43$ ,  $SD=2.28$ , but not in the AMD message condition,  $M=2.18$ ,  $SD=2.29$ ,  $t(186)=15.70$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $r=.76$ . We then conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the 7-item measure of social distance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (.90) and all Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values for items ( $>.83$ ) were excellent. Bartlett's test of sphericity,  $\chi^2(21)=1435.49$ ,  $p<.001$ , indicated that the inter-item correlations were sufficiently large for EFA. Parallel analysis suggested two factors in the social distance items, and EFA using the unweighted least squares procedure with an Oblimin rotation indicated two correlated factors,  $r=.73$ ,  $p<.001$ , explaining 41.48% and 40.55% of variance. Four items concerning intimate relationships (e.g., friend or romantic partner) loaded on Factor 1, and three concerning non-intimate relationships (e.g., neighbour or Australian resident/citizen) on Factor 2. We formed two measures corresponding to the factors: social distance in intimate relationships ( $\alpha=.93$ ) and social distance in non-intimate relationships ( $\alpha=.94$ ).

We conducted a series of multiple regression analyses (MRA), where the three dependent variables were regressed on the dummy-coded message (0=AMD; 1=PMD), mean-centred ethnocentrism ( $M=-1.32$ ,  $SD=1.09$ ) and their interaction term. When predicting

intolerant message rejection, there were effects of the message,  $B=0.85$ ,  $t(184)=3.28$ ,  $p=.001$ ,  $pr=.23$ , ethnocentrism,  $B=.78$ ,  $t(184)=4.82$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $pr=.34$ , and the interaction term,  $B=-1.54$ ,  $t(184)=-6.41$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $pr=-.43$ . A simple slopes analysis (see Figure 1(b)) showed that lower ethnocentrism ( $-1$   $SD$ ) related to intolerant rejection of the PMD message,  $B=2.53$ ,  $t(184)=6.89$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $r=.45$ , and higher ethnocentrism ( $+1$   $SD$ ) to intolerant rejection of the AMD message,  $B=-.83$ ,  $t(184)=-2.23$ ,  $p=.027$ ,  $r=-.16$ . Next, an MRA predicting social distance in intimate relationships showed an effect of the message,  $B=1.28$ ,  $t(184)=4.80$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $pr=.33$ , no effect of ethnocentrism,  $B=0.32$ ,  $t(184)=1.92$ ,  $p=.056$ ,  $pr=.14$ , and an effect of the interaction term,  $B=-0.77$ ,  $t(184)=-3.15$ ,  $p=.002$ ,  $pr=-.23$ . A simple slopes analysis (see Figure 1(c)) showed that lower ethnocentrism related to social distance towards supporters of the PMD message,  $B=2.12$ ,  $t(184)=5.65$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $r=.38$ , whereas higher ethnocentrism was unrelated to social distance,  $B=0.43$ ,  $t(184)=1.15$ ,  $p=.253$ ,  $r=.08$ . Finally, in an MRA predicting social distance in non-intimate relationships, there were effects of the message,  $B=1.07$ ,  $t(184)=3.94$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $pr=.28$ , and ethnocentrism,  $B=0.47$ ,  $t(184)=2.79$ ,  $p=.006$ ,  $pr=.20$ , but the interaction was non-significant,  $B=-0.47$ ,  $t(184)=-1.90$ ,  $p=.06$ ,  $pr=-.14$ . Nevertheless, given the hypothesized interaction approaching significance, we conducted a simple slopes analysis (see Figure 1(d)). Lower ethnocentrism related to social distance to the PMD message supporters,  $B=1.59$ ,  $t(184)=4.14$ ,  $p<.001$ ,  $r=.29$ , but there were no effects for higher ethnocentrism,  $B=0.55$ ,  $t(184)=1.43$ ,  $p=.16$ ,  $r=.10$ .

The results of Studies 1a and 1b showed that the ethnically tolerant (the participants low in ethnocentrism) tended to perceive PMD message supporters as an out-group whose views they rejected and towards whom they showed enhanced social distance. This supported our expectations that the ethnically tolerant may not only intolerantly reject highly incompatible ideas but also discriminate against people accepting such ideas. Nevertheless, we did not investigate if the ethnically tolerant would show political intolerance (e.g., censorship) and prejudice. Perhaps, the ethnically tolerant may reject out-group views and avoid out-groups but still advocate political tolerance and exhibit no hostility. Further, we did not directly examine if social identification drives the effects. Therefore, we conducted Study 2 to test our expectation that the ethnically tolerant would be politically intolerant and prejudiced, and that social identification would mediate the effects.

## Study 2

### Method

**Participants and design.** There were 283 Australian citizens, consisting of students and

community members. The mean age was 22.67 years ( $SD = 8.73$ ), and there were 182 women (64.31%). Participants took part in a paper-and-pencil study. The design was the same as in Study 1b.

**Materials and procedure.** We randomly assigned participants to the PMD or AMD message conditions. They completed the measure of ethnocentrism ( $\alpha = .91$ ), the manipulation check described in Study 1b and the measure of social identification described in Study 1a. We slightly adapted two measures of political intolerance (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). The first ( $\alpha = .78$ ) included six items in relation to political intolerance of message supporters, such as 'They should be banned from running for public office in Australia'. It used a 9-point scale from  $-4$  (*very strongly disagree*) to  $+4$  (*very strongly agree*). The second measured politically intolerant behavioural intentions ( $\alpha = .87$ ). Participants read a scenario about a judge forbidding a rally of message supporters and reported how likely (1—*definitely would not* to 4—*definitely would*) they would engage in five behaviours, such as 'I would accept the decision of the judge and do nothing' or 'I would sign a petition objecting to the judge's decision' (reversed). Twelve items ( $\alpha = .93$ ; Stephan et al., 2002) measured negative and positive evaluations or feelings towards message supporters on a 10-point scale from 0—*no* (e.g., *hostility and sympathy*) to 9—*extreme* (e.g., *hostility and sympathy*). Six positive affect items were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflect prejudice.

## Results and Discussion


We used expectation maximization to impute missing data (<1%). Participants in the PMD condition,  $M = 8.16$ ,  $SD = 1.65$ , but not in the AMD condition,  $M = 1.54$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ , saw the message supportive of mandatory detention,  $t(277) = 35.23$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .90$ . As in Study 1, we conducted MRA with the dependent variables regressed on the dummy-coded message (0 = AMD; 1 = PMD), mean-centred ethnocentrism ( $M = -1.67$ ,  $SD = .95$ ) and their interaction term.

First, an MRA predicting identification with message supporters showed effects of the message,  $B = -2.46$ ,  $t(279) = -12.62$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.60$ , ethnocentrism,  $B = -0.83$ ,  $t(279) = -5.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.34$ , and the interaction term,  $B = 2.03$ ,  $t(279) = 9.84$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .51$ . A simple slopes analysis suggested that lower ethnocentrism ( $-1 SD$ ) related to less identification with supporters of the PMD message,  $B = -4.39$ ,  $t(279) = -15.90$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = -.69$ , but higher ethnocentrism ( $+1 SD$ ) was not significantly related to social identification,  $B = -0.53$ ,  $t(279) = -1.90$ ,  $p = .059$ ,  $r = -.11$ . As observed in Study 1a, Figure 2(a) also shows that people lower in ethnocentrism tended to see PMD supporters as people highly distant from the self, given their extremely low identification with the PMD supporters. Next, in an MRA predicting political intolerance, there were effects of the message,

$B = 0.81$ ,  $t(279) = 6.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .34$ , ethnocentrism,  $B = 0.44$ ,  $t(279) = 4.62$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .27$ , and the interaction term,  $B = -.38$ ,  $t(279) = -2.69$ ,  $p = .007$ ,  $pr = -.16$ . A simple slopes analysis (see Figure 2(b)) showed that lower ethnocentrism related to political intolerance towards the PMD message supporters,  $B = 1.18$ ,  $t(279) = 6.23$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .35$ , and higher ethnocentrism also related to it,  $B = 0.45$ ,  $t(279) = 2.37$ ,  $p = .019$ ,  $r = .14$ . Next, in an MRA predicting political intolerance—behaviours, there were effects of the message,  $B = .52$ ,  $t(279) = 6.25$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .35$ , ethnocentrism,  $B = .28$ ,  $t(279) = 4.68$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .27$ , and the interaction term,  $B = -.34$ ,  $t(279) = -3.77$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.22$ . A simple slopes analysis (see Figure 2(c)) showed that lower ethnocentrism related to politically intolerant behavioural intentions towards the PMD message supporters,  $B = 0.84$ ,  $t(279) = 7.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .39$ , but higher ethnocentrism was unrelated to politically intolerant intentions,  $B = 0.21$ ,  $t(279) = 1.72$ ,  $p = .087$ ,  $r = .10$ . Finally, in an MRA predicting out-group prejudice, there were effects of the message,  $B = 2.36$ ,  $t(279) = 16.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .69$ , ethnocentrism,  $B = 0.76$ ,  $t(279) = 7.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .40$ , and the interaction term,  $B = -1.44$ ,  $t(279) = -9.27$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.49$ . A simple slopes analysis (see Figure 2(d)) showed that both lower ethnocentrism,  $B = 3.73$ ,  $t(279) = 18.02$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .73$ , and higher ethnocentrism,  $B = 1.00$ ,  $t(279) = 4.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .27$ , related to prejudice against the PMD message supporters.

Finally, following Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt's (2005) approach, we conducted mediated moderation analyses to examine the role of social identification. We already presented evidence for the first two models necessary for a mediated moderation. More specifically, we showed above a significant interaction between the message and ethnocentrism predicting the two kinds of political intolerance and prejudice (Model 1) and social identification, the mediator (Model 2). Accordingly, we conducted additional MRAs (Model 3), which involved predicting the three dependent variables with ethnocentrism, message, their interaction term, the mediator and the interaction term of the mediator and moderator. To demonstrate mediated moderation, we needed to show that social identification remained a significant predictor in Model 3 and that the effect of the interaction term of message and ethnocentrism would decrease. Indeed, we found that social identification remained a significant predictor of political intolerance,  $B = -0.18$ ,  $t(277) = -4.46$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.26$ , political intolerance—behaviours,  $B = -0.16$ ,  $t(277) = -6.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = .36$ , and prejudice,  $B = -0.40$ ,  $t(277) = -10.34$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.53$ . Effects of the interaction term on political intolerance,  $B = -0.03$ ,  $t(277) = -0.16$ ,  $p = .876$ ,  $pr = -.01$ , and political intolerance—behaviours,  $B = -0.03$ ,  $t(277) = -0.26$ ,  $p = .796$ ,  $pr = -.02$ , became non-significant but not on prejudice,  $B = -0.66$ ,  $t(277) = -4.24$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $pr = -.25$ , although the effect size decreased (from  $pr = -.49$ ), suggesting





**Fig. 2:** (a) Identification with message supporters, (b) political intolerance towards message supporters, (c) behavioural political intolerance towards message supporters and (d) prejudice towards message supporters as a function of the type of message and ethnocentrism. All values are non-standardized coefficients

partial mediation. The findings have, therefore, supported the mediated moderation, that is, that identification with message supporters drives the effects of ethnic tolerance on political intolerance and prejudice.

We conducted Study 3 to investigate if political ideology is responsible for the links between ethnic tolerance and out-group intolerance. As discussed, it is possible that the ethnically tolerant, who may also be liberal, dislike those with incompatible values and beliefs because they tend to see them as ideological enemies (i.e., conservatives; cf. Brandt et al., 2014). If this is true, our results might be spurious findings resulting from the links between liberalism and ethnic tolerance. This could also support an alternative explanation, which focuses on ideological biases. Nonetheless, we believe that ethnic tolerance, although related to political ideology, appears distinct to it. Accordingly, we expected that the ethnically tolerant would be prejudiced against those they perceive as extreme out-groups, even controlling for liberalism.

### Study 3

#### Method

**Participants and design.** There were 265 U.S. citizens who completed online measures of ethnocentrism,

political ideology and feeling thermometer measures (together with other measures unrelated to this project). Participants were sampled by the Qualtrics paneling service. The mean age was 51.33 ( $SD=13.98$ ). There were 183 women (69.06%) and 223 White/Anglo Americans (84.15%).

**Materials and procedure.** Participants completed an adapted 12-item version of the Ethnocentrism Scale ( $\alpha = .76$ ; Bizumic et al., 2009), on a scale from -4 (*very strongly disagree*) to 4 (*very strongly agree*), a 7-item measure of political ideology on a scale from 1 (*strong liberal*) to 7 (*strong conservative*), and a feeling thermometer measure of attitudes towards racists and prejudiced people on a scale from -50 (*very unfavourable*) to +50 (*very favourable*). Feeling thermometer measures are frequently used in social psychology to measure out-group prejudice (e.g., Bizumic et al., 2009; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

#### Results and Discussion

To simplify the presentation, we reverse-scored ethnocentrism, with higher scores indicating ethnic tolerance ( $M = .73$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ) and political ideology, with higher scores indicating liberalism ( $M = 3.77$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ). The

two feeling thermometer items correlated strongly ( $r = .53, p < .001$ ), and we created a new measure, prejudice against the intolerant (the Spearman–Brown coefficient,  $p = .70$ ) by calculating the items' mean and reverse-scoring it so that higher scores indicate prejudice ( $M = 37.78, SD = 14.34$ ).

Ethnic tolerance related weakly to liberalism,  $r = .19, p < .001$ , suggesting, as argued in the introduction, that there could be liberals high in ethnocentrism and conservatives low in ethnocentrism. Ethnic tolerance related moderately to prejudice against the intolerant,  $r = .29, p < .001$ . We conducted a sequential MRA, with liberalism entered at Step 1 and ethnic tolerance at Step 2. Liberalism at Step 1 did not predict prejudice, but the effect approached significance,  $B = 1.05, t(263) = 1.95, p = .053, r = .12$ . At Step 2, liberalism did not predict prejudice,  $B = 0.59, t(262) = 1.11, p = .267, pr = .07$ , but ethnic tolerance did,  $B = 3.69, t(262) = 4.60, p < .001, pr = .27, R = .09, \Delta R^2 = .07, \Delta F = 12.57, p < .001$ . These findings, therefore, seem to indicate that out-group prejudice among the ethnically tolerant is not due to the association of ethnic tolerance and liberalism. The present study, however, has not investigated whether identification is responsible for the effects. In addition, it did not investigate if the effect may also be caused solely by moral conviction (Skitka, 2010) or whether it would be possible that moral conviction fully mediates the effect of ethnic tolerance on prejudice against the intolerant. If this is the case, then individual moral convictions would be a better explanation of the effects than the one focusing on social identity processes. Accordingly, we conducted Study 4 to further explore the role of political ideology in a different cultural context and to find out if social identification is responsible for the effects.

## Study 4

### Method

**Participants and design.** There were 522 UK citizens who completed online measures of ethnocentrism, political ideology and feeling thermometer measures (they also completed measures unrelated to this project). The Maximiles panelling service sampled the participants, whose mean age was 53.44 ( $SD = 16.05$ ). There were 248 women (47.51%) and 411 White English (78.74%).

**Materials and procedure.** Participants completed a 12-item measure of ethnocentrism (Bizumic et al., 2009) on a scale from  $-4$  (*very strongly disagree*) to  $4$  (*very strongly agree*). One item did not have a positive corrected item-total correlation in this sample and was dropped from the scale giving an 11-item measure ( $\alpha = .85$ ). We included the same measures of ideology and attitudes towards racists and prejudiced people as in Study 3. In addition, we included two single-item social identification measures (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013), which assessed participants' identification with

racists and with prejudiced people. The measure asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale from 1 (*fully disagree*) to 7 (*fully agree*) how much they identify with these two social groups. Finally, we included Skitka's (2010) one-item measure of moral conviction and related it to ethnic diversity: 'My feelings about ethnic diversity are a reflection of my core moral beliefs and convictions'. Participants indicated their agreement on a scale from  $-4$  (*very strongly disagree*) to  $4$  (*very strongly agree*).


### Results and Discussion

We reverse-scored ethnocentrism and political ideology so that higher scores indicate ethnic tolerance ( $M = .83, SD = 1.29$ ) and liberalism ( $M = 3.91, SD = 1.51$ ). There were strong correlations between the two feeling thermometer items ( $r = .63, p < .001$ ) and between the two social identification items ( $r = .59, p < .001$ ). Accordingly, we created two new measures as the items' means: prejudice against the intolerant (we reverse-scored it so that higher scores indicate more prejudice; the Spearman–Brown coefficient,  $p = .77, M = 34.52, SD = 18.88$ ) and identification with the intolerant ( $p = .74, M = 1.90, SD = 1.23$ ).

Ethnic tolerance related moderately to strongly positively to liberalism,  $r = .42, p < .001$ . The relationship was stronger than in the U.S. sample but still indicated that ethnocentrism and political ideology were distinct. Ethnic tolerance related strongly negatively to identification with the intolerant,  $r = -.48, p < .001$ , moderately to strongly positively to prejudice against the intolerant,  $r = .43, p < .001$ , and moderately positively to moral conviction,  $r = .28, p < .001$ . It should be noted that although the whole sample had very low identification scores, these were much lower among the ethnically tolerant, suggesting that, as in Studies 1 and 2, the ethnically tolerant tended to see people with highly incompatible values and beliefs as highly distant from the self.

Liberalism at Step 1 of a sequential MRA predicted prejudice,  $B = 2.66, t(520) = 5.18, p < .001, r = .22$ . Liberalism, however, entered together with ethnic tolerance at Step 2 did not predict prejudice,  $B = .60, t(519) = 1.15, p = .252, pr = .05$ , but ethnic tolerance did,  $B = 6.04, t(519) = 9.52, p < .001, pr = .39, R = .44, \Delta R^2 = .19, \Delta F = 61.04, p < .001$ . This replicated the findings of Study 3 in a different sample and culture.

As prejudice correlated negatively with both identification with the intolerant,  $r = -.73, p < .001$ , and moral conviction,  $r = -.13, p = .005$ , we tested a mediation model in which both social identification and moral conviction mediated the effect of ethnic tolerance on prejudice, with liberalism as a covariate. Figure 3 shows that the effect of ethnic tolerance on prejudice decreased once social identification and moral conviction were entered as mediators. The effect of social identification on prejudice remained significant, whereas the effect of moral conviction did not, suggesting that perceiving intolerant social groups as



**Fig. 3:** A mediation analysis representing effects of ethnic tolerance on prejudice against the intolerant through identification and moral conviction. Liberalism was a covariate in models predicting the mediating variables and the dependent variable. Both non-standardized and standardized (in parentheses) coefficients are presented. Note: \* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$

out-groups mediated effects of ethnic tolerance on prejudice, but moral conviction did not have an effect. The indirect effect of ethnic tolerance was 4.82 (the standardized effect = .33), and the bootstrap estimate based on 5000 resamplings, of the 95% confidence interval did not contain zero (3.59, 6.19; standardized: .25, .42) suggesting that the effect was unlikely to be due to chance. On the other hand, the indirect effect of moral conviction was .03 (the standardized effect = .002), but the bootstrap estimate based on 5000 resamplings of the 95% confidence interval contained zero (−.20, .29; standardized: −.01, .02), meaning this weak effect could be due to chance. Although, as can be seen in Figure 3, the direct effect of ethnic tolerance on prejudice was significant, the indirect effect of social identification, or more precisely low identification with the intolerant, was much stronger, suggesting that to a large extent perceiving intolerant individuals as out-groups mediated effects of ethnic tolerance on prejudice.

These findings lend further support to the view that social identity processes predispose the ethnically tolerant to be prejudiced against the intolerant, and that these effects are not due to the association of ethnic tolerance with liberalism. Furthermore, the lack of effect of moral conviction suggests that it is social identification and not moral conviction that drives the effect. Finally, it should be noted that we also explored a serial mediation model (ethnic tolerance → moral conviction → social identification → prejudice; also controlling for liberalism). There was, however, no significant indirect effect through moral conviction on either social identification or prejudice in this model.

### General Discussion

In line with our expectations, the findings suggest that the ethnically tolerant, that is, participants who scored low on the Ethnocentrism Scale, engaged in

discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against people with whom they identified extremely weakly (i.e., those they perceived as a psychological out-group and highly distant from themselves). Study 1 suggested that those lower in ethnocentrism were not only intolerant of out-group ideas but also of people supporting these ideas—not wanting them as romantic partners, friends, neighbours or even fellow citizens. In contrast, although those higher in ethnocentrism were intolerant of out-group ideas, they did not show as much discrimination against them. Study 2 suggested that those lower in ethnocentrism tended to be politically intolerant of and prejudiced against the PMD message supporters, wanting to censor the individuals with different views. The study also showed that identification with message supporters mediated these effects. Those higher in ethnocentrism did not discriminate much, possibly because they did not identify strongly with supporters of either message. Next, Study 3 showed that the link between ethnic tolerance and prejudice was not an artefact of the liberal versus conservative division. Finally, Study 4 confirmed these findings and further showed that the perception of prejudiced and racist people as an out-group, and not moral conviction associated with ethnic diversity, mediated effects of ethnic tolerance on prejudice. Taken together, the current research bears directly on recent U.S. events: Although it cannot definitively say that discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance are widespread among activists on college campuses, it does suggest that such intolerance is certainly possible.

Present research extends past research by showing that the ethnically tolerant can score high on measures of social discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance. Almost all work on prejudice has tended to measure prejudice and social discrimination of those high in ethnocentrism and against ethnic minority and other ethnic out-groups. It appears, therefore, that ethnic tolerance does not inevitably translate into universal



tolerance towards everyone, but towards those perceived as psychological in-groups, that is, those sharing one's own moral universe (Furedi, 2011b) or those who are morally included (Opotow, 1990).

On the other hand, participants higher in ethnocentrism (1 *SD* above the mean) were not intolerant of everyone, as they did not engage in as much discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance as the ethnically tolerant. There are possible explanations for this. First, among those higher in ethnocentrism, explicit attitudes towards supporters of the AMD message might not have been driven by the in-group–out-group processes as those higher in ethnocentrism tended to differentiate less strongly between the AMD and PMD message supporters than those lower in ethnocentrism. Those lower in ethnocentrism were the ones who identified extremely weakly with the PMD message supporters perceiving them as people with whom they have virtually nothing in common and as people who are extremely psychologically distant from the self (Opotow *et al.*, 2005). Next, the findings might have been due to our samples in Studies 1 and 2 having many participants lower in ethnocentrism but not many who were high. In fact, those 1 *SD* above the mean of the Ethnocentrism Scale scored around the midpoint of the scale. For example, only 11% of participants in Study 1b and only 5% in Study 2 scored above the midpoint of the scale, and furthermore, only four participants in Study 1b and three in Study 2 scored more highly than 1 *SD* (roughly equivalent to slightly agreeing with ethnocentric statements) above the midpoint of the scale. Thus, despite our large samples for experimental studies, there are not enough data to make conclusion about those who score very high on ethnocentrism.

Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that participants' scores on interval scales such as the Ethnocentrism Scale do not have any absolute meaning and researchers usually compare those higher and lower on these scales. It is usually the case that participants (from contemporary Western societies that emphasize equality and diversity norms) scoring high on related variables, such as measures of racism, prejudice, sexism and social dominance orientation, typically score below the midpoint of these measures (e.g., see Kteily, Ho, & Sidanius, 2012, for low means of these variables in a non-student U.S. sample). In fact, most of our knowledge in the psychological literature on prejudice seems to be primarily based on samples, primarily undergraduate students, who are generally low on these measures.

Accordingly, the present research cannot say much about those very high in ethnocentrism, and its conclusions relate primarily to those lower in ethnocentrism, that is, the ethnically tolerant. Future research should attempt to study related processes within a highly ethnocentric sample. Nevertheless, given that most published research into prejudice is based on similar populations, it would be unfair to discount our findings due to the low numbers of highly ethnocentric participants. In addition, our conclusions relate to ethnic

tolerance and confirm that the ethnically tolerant can engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance towards out-groups. We used valid and reliable measures of social distance, prejudice and political intolerance and showed that the ethnically tolerant can also have increased scores on these measures in relation to certain groups of their fellow humans.

### Theoretical Implications

The findings give support to the social identity approach (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Turner *et al.*, 1994) and the view that in-group–out-group distinctions are central to understanding discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance among the ethnically tolerant. The results are specifically in line with Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) theorizing about the role of intergroup differences in the creation of negative and discriminatory intergroup attitudes. The ethnically tolerant engaged in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance most likely because they felt that their identity-relevant values and beliefs were challenged, as a result of passionate disagreements, by those who have highly incompatible values and beliefs, and because the ethnically tolerant may have legitimized their negative treatment of the out-group. To our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly investigated the role of social identity processes in generating discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance among the ethnically tolerant.

Although we did not measure prototypicality, it is plausible that, in line with Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) reasoning, the conflict between those who are PMD and AMD is part of a broader conflict dealing with which Australian subgroup is more prototypical of the superordinate group (Australians). One subordinate group is represented by the ethnically tolerant (e.g., those advocating multiculturalist policies) and the other by those intolerant of ethnic diversity (e.g., those advocating Anglo/White dominance). Similar processes may operate in the United States and UK, where multiculturalism, immigration and ethnic tolerance are hotly debated, and where different groups are in conflict about which better represents the country. This explanation is, of course, speculative, and future research should measure the role of relative prototypicality in explaining discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance among the ethnically tolerant.

The findings also give support to theorizing on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), which assumes that any kind of treatment is justified towards those categorized as very distant from the self. The results are also consistent with the broader approach in social psychology that assumes that prejudice is a multidimensional process and that it can vary across targets (Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Fiske *et al.*, 2002; Mackie *et al.*, 2000). It should, however, be noted that once social identification was controlled for, the relationship of ethnic tolerance with prejudice and political intolerance became non-significant in two, and was largely reduced in two other,

mediation analyses. This suggests that ethnic tolerance that does not lead to the creation of in-group–out-group distinctions may not necessarily result in negative intergroup attitudes.

Our findings are also broadly consistent with research on how liberal ideology (Brandt *et al.*, 2014) and moral convictions (Skitka, 2010) may drive intolerance towards those who think differently about an important issue. Research suggests that political extremists and those with strong moral convictions are likely to engage in different types of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance. In line with that research, we showed that those most extreme on measures of ethnic tolerance tended to engage in the most discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against the out-groups. Nevertheless, our research suggests that the effects were not due to liberal ideology and moral convictions but appeared driven by social identity processes, suggesting that categorizing those with very different values and beliefs as an extreme out-group predisposes the ethnically tolerant to discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance. These findings are consistent with Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) explanations, as described above. Our research, therefore, suggests that the work that investigates biases of liberals and those with moral convictions may benefit from further integration with the work on social identity and moral exclusion (*cf.* van Zomeren *et al.*, 2012).

The findings appear to be in line with past research showing that intolerance may be due to social norms. For example, research has shown that as a result of the normative social influences of ethnic tolerance, students may propose that their fellow students should be expelled from college due to their ethnically intolerant views (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991). Perhaps, in Western societies, where we conducted studies, the norms of ethnic tolerance are even stronger and more salient than the norms of political tolerance, and this resulted in the highly ethnically tolerant giving less freedom of expression to those with whom they have disagreed (possibly because of the norms, the ethnically tolerant saw themselves as more prototypical of the superordinate category; *cf.* Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). This may have led certain authors to argue that particular norms of tolerance, especially among those on the left, have become so hegemonic in Western societies that they endanger the freedom of speech (*cf.* Furedi, 2011a).

### Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

In this research, we focused on broad concepts of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance, but further research is needed to isolate specific kinds of prejudice, emotions, behaviours and political intolerance that may be elicited in the ethnically tolerant due to different conditions, such as social norms, stereotypes and threats (Blanchard *et al.*, 1994; Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Fiske *et al.*, 2002; Mackie *et al.*,

2000). In line with the theoretical models that we tested, we have primarily focused on the role of social identification, but future research may investigate how social identification may interact with out-group stereotypes, specific threats and social norms in predicting discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance among the ethnically intolerant. Nevertheless, our findings broadly support the conclusions of past research. For example, they are in line with the findings of Mackie *et al.* (2000), who demonstrated the independent role of identification as a mediator of effects producing negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours in the context of value conflicts.

It should be noted that we described the findings to reflect out-group negativity. This is primarily because we wanted to stress the discriminatory effects among the ethnically tolerant, and this is consistent with Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) focus on discrimination as a relatively more negative out-group treatment (in relation to the treatment of the in-group), which is perceived as legitimate by the in-group but not by the out-group. We showed that when it comes to intergroup disagreements between the ethnically tolerant and intolerant, the ethnically tolerant discriminate between in-groups and out-groups and may often score very high on certain measures of out-group prejudice and political intolerance. At times, however, the ethnically tolerant score as high as those higher in ethnocentrism; we believe, however, that this is likely due to our sample having a small number of participants who score very high in ethnocentrism.

It is important to point out that we measured the dependent variables of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance with a limited range of measures. These were relatively short self-report measures. These kinds of measures are usually widely used in the literature in social psychology and especially in political science. Nevertheless, future research into this area should include a wider variety of measures—especially longer self-report measures—but also physiological measures of emotional reactions, behavioural measures of social discrimination and behavioural measures of political intolerance.

Further, in Studies 1a and 2, we explicitly asked participants to indicate how much they identify with message supporters: The AMD supporters were indeed an in-group for most ethnically tolerant as suggested by the data. On the other hand, in Studies 3 and 4, we did not measure in-group identification explicitly, although rejection of identification with the ethnically intolerant may imply identification with the ethnically tolerant. Nevertheless, researchers in the future studies should further explore the role of lower identification with out-groups and higher identification with the in-group.

Although Allport (1954) admitted that the tolerant could develop prejudices against the intolerant, he did not attempt to explain this and argued that distinct cognitive processes underlie tolerance and intolerance. The present research, however, does not support this and

suggests that more general social cognitive processes are at work, given that the self-professed ethnically tolerant could engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance of certain fellow humans. Future research should, however, investigate if fully tolerant individuals do exist, that is, whether there are people who accept, like and value all humans regardless of their values, beliefs and group memberships (cf. Allport, 1954). Perhaps, only highly religious people, such as certain Buddhists, Taoists or Quakers and highly morally advanced individuals could tolerate, like, value and accept all people equally regardless of these people's values and beliefs or even actions.

Future studies should investigate whether the ethnically tolerant would be intolerant of people from other ethnic groups who have highly incompatible values and beliefs to their own. Additionally, other political issues should be studied. For example, in Studies 1 and 2, we focused on a specific political issue because of its high salience and divisiveness in Australia, but other issues may entail different consequences. Although we conducted studies with diverse populations in Australia, the United States and the UK, these are all English speaking and democratic countries, with largely ethnically tolerant norms, and these processes should be studied in other non-English speaking countries and ethnic groups, which may have different social norms.

### Concluding Remarks

To conclude, this research shows that the ethnically tolerant can also see the world in in-group–out-group categories. Consequently, they can be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant towards people with whom they identify extremely weakly and who are seen as psychological out-groups very distant from the self (as these appear to be outside the moral universe of the ethnically tolerant). These effects do not seem to be due to the association of ethnic tolerance with liberalism or moral conviction. One of the conclusions of our research is that the whole of psychology needs to view the concept of intolerance in a more nuanced way: as a more general process that extends even to those who profess ethnic tolerance because they are not necessarily free of discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance towards their fellow humans.

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