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God, as they can bodies, and that they have joined the name *God* to the images of things which they are used to seeing. Men can hardly avoid this, because they are continually affected by bodies.

25 And indeed, most errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things. For when someone says that the lines which are drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he surely understands (then at least) by a circle something different from what Mathematicians understand. Similarly, when men err in calculating, they have certain numbers in their mind and different ones on the paper. So if you consider what they have in Mind, they really do not err, though they seem to err because we think they have in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe that they were erring, just as I did not believe that he was erring whom I recently heard cry out that his courtyard had  
30 II/129 flown into his neighbor's hen [NS: although his words were absurd], because what he had in mind seemed sufficiently clear to me [viz. that his hen had flown into his neighbor's courtyard].

And most controversies have arisen from this, that men do not rightly explain their own mind, or interpret the mind of the other man badly. For really, when they contradict one another most vehemently, they either have the same thoughts, or they are thinking of different things,<sup>69</sup> so that what they think are errors and absurdities in the other are not.

10 P48: *In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.*

15 Dem.: The Mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by P11), and so (by IP17C2) cannot be a free cause of its own actions, or cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be determined to willing this or that (by IP28) by a cause which is also determined by another, and this cause again by another, etc., q.e.d.

20 Schol.: In this same way it is also demonstrated that there is in the Mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but Metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars. So intellect and will are to this or that idea, or to this or that volition as 'stone-ness' is to this or that stone, or man to Peter or Paul.

We have explained the cause of men's thinking themselves free in

<sup>69</sup> Following Appuhn, whose translation here agrees with that of the NS.

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30 the Appendix of Part I. But before I proceed further, it should be  
noted here<sup>70</sup> that by will I understand a faculty of affirming and deny-  
II/130 II/130 ing, and not desire. I say that I understand the faculty by which  
the Mind affirms or denies something true or something false, and not  
the desire by which the Mind wants a thing or avoids it.

5 But after we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal  
notions which are not distinguished from the singulars from which we  
form them, we must now investigate whether the volitions themselves  
are anything beyond the very ideas of things. We must investigate, I  
say, whether there is any other affirmation or negation in the Mind  
except that which the idea involves, insofar as it is an idea—on this  
see the following Proposition and also D3—so that our thought does  
10 not fall into pictures. For by ideas I understand, not the images that  
are formed at the back of the eye (and, if you like, in the middle of  
the brain),<sup>71</sup> but concepts of Thought [NS: or the objective Being of  
a thing insofar as it consists only in Thought].

15 P49: *In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except  
that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.*

20 Dem.: In the Mind (by P48) there is no absolute faculty of willing  
and not willing, but only singular volitions, viz. this and that affir-  
mation, and this and that negation. Let us conceive, therefore, some  
singular volition, say a mode of thinking by which the Mind affirms  
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

25 This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, i.e.,  
it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For to say that  
A must involve the concept of B is the same as to say that A cannot  
be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation (by A3) also cannot  
be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can  
neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle.

30 Next, this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation,  
viz. that its three angles equal two right angles. So conversely, this  
idea of the triangle also can neither be nor be conceived without this  
affirmation.

So (by D2) this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the

<sup>70</sup> Subsequently (HIP9S) Spinoza distinguishes between will and desire in somewhat different terms; hence Meijer wanted to emend the text so that it would be translated: “. . . it should be noted that by will I here understand. . . .” Gebhardt points out the text of the OP is confirmed by the NS. But while the text is probably not corrupt, the emenders are right to emphasize the provisional character of this distinction. Cf. Gueroult 1, 2:492-493, and Appuhn, 3:358-359.

<sup>71</sup> An allusion to Descartes’ doctrine of the pineal gland. Cf. the *Passions of the Soul* I, 31-32. Akkerman (2, 149) regards what Gebhardt adds to the text from the NS in the next line as the work of the translator, but “an intelligent addition” nonetheless.

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triangle, and is nothing beyond it. And what we have said concerning this volition (since we have selected it at random), must also be said  
35 concerning any volition, viz. that it is nothing apart from the idea, q.e.d.

II/131 Cor.: The will and the intellect are one and the same.

5 Dem.: The will and the intellect are nothing apart from the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by P48 and P48S). But the singular volitions and ideas are one and the same (by P49). Therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same, q.e.d.

10 Schol.: [I.] By this we have removed what is commonly maintained to be the cause of error.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, we have shown above that falsity consists only in the privation that mutilated and confused ideas involve. So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he  
15 does not doubt, or that he rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination wavers [NS: or to cause him to doubt them]. On this, see P44S.

Therefore, however stubbornly a man may cling to something false [NS: so that we cannot in any way make him doubt it], we shall still  
20 never say that he is certain of it. For by certainty we understand something positive (see P43 and P43S), not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty, we understand falsity.

However, to explain the preceding Proposition more fully, there remain certain things I must warn you of. And then I must reply to  
25 the objections that can be made against this doctrine of ours. And finally, to remove every uneasiness, I thought it worthwhile to indicate some of the advantages of this doctrine. Some, I say—for the most important ones will be better understood from what we shall say in Part V.

30 [II.] I begin, therefore, by warning my Readers, first, to distinguish accurately between an idea, *or* concept, of the Mind, and the images of things that we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because many people either completely confuse these three—ideas, images,  
II/132 and words—or do not distinguish them accurately enough, or carefully enough, they have been completely ignorant of this doctrine con-

<sup>72</sup> I introduce essentially the division of this scholium suggested by Gueroult (1, 2:505). The "common doctrine" regarding the cause of error is the Cartesian doctrine of the Fourth Meditation, that error occurs because man's will is distinct from, and more extensive than, his intellect. The phrases Gebhardt adds from the NS in these first two paragraphs are probably translator's glosses.

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cerning the will. But it is quite necessary to know it, both for the sake of speculation<sup>73</sup> and in order to arrange one's life wisely.

5 Indeed, those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us from encounters with [NS: external] bodies, are convinced that those ideas of things [NS: which can make no trace in our brains, or] of which we can form no similar image [NS: in our brain] are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from a free choice of the will. 10 They look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel. and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.<sup>74</sup>

And then, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation that the idea involves, think that they can will something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm or deny 15 with words something contrary to what they are aware of.<sup>75</sup> But these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words. For the es- 20 sence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought.

It should suffice to have issued these few words of warning on this matter, so I pass to objections mentioned above.

[III.A.(i)] The first of these is that they think it clear that the will 25 extends more widely than the intellect, and so is different from the intellect. The reason why they think the will extends more widely than the intellect is that they say they know by experience that they do not require a greater faculty of assenting, or affirming, and denying, than we already have, in order to assent to infinitely many other things which we do not perceive—but they do require a greater fac-

<sup>73</sup> What Gebhardt adds here from the NS (which might be translated: "and of the sciences") is probably only the translator's attempt to capture the connotations of *speculatio* through a double translation. Cf. Akkerman 2, 89. The variations which appear in the following paragraph, not all of which are mentioned by Gebhardt, are probably translator's glosses.

<sup>74</sup> We have, again, the same comparison as in P43S. Since Descartes generally insisted on drawing a sharp distinction between ideas and images (e.g., at the beginning of the Sixth Meditation, or in his reply to Hobbes' fifth objection), it is curious to see a central tenet of his doctrine of judgment traced to a confusion of ideas with images. On this see Curley 5 and Gueroult 1, 2:509.

<sup>75</sup> Gueroult (1, 2:509) suggests, with some plausibility, that Spinoza has Hobbes in mind here. However, Hobbes rejected Descartes' doctrine of judgment, and criticized it on grounds which might have inspired Spinoza's own criticisms here. In his thirteenth objection to the *Meditations* he distinguishes between the affirmation which is an act of the will—by which he seems to mean an act involving the use of words—and the internal assent which is not.

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30 ulty of understanding. The will, therefore, is distinguished from the intellect because the intellect is finite and the will is infinite.

[III.A.(ii)] Secondly, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment so as not to assent to things we perceive. This also seems to be confirmed from the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. E.g., someone who feigns a winged horse does not on that account grant that there is a winged horse, i.e., he is not on that account deceived unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse. Therefore, experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that the will, *or* faculty of assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding.

5 [III.A.(iii)] Thirdly, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, i.e., we do not seem to require a greater power to affirm that what is true, is true, than to affirm that something false is true. But [NS: with ideas it is different, for] we perceive that one idea has more reality, *or* perfection, than another. As some objects are more excellent than others, so also some ideas of objects are more perfect than others. This also seems to establish a difference between the will and the intellect.

[III.A.(iv)] Fourth, it can be objected that if man does not act from freedom of the will, what will happen if he is in a state of equilibrium, like Buridan's ass?<sup>76</sup> Will he perish of hunger and of thirst? If I concede that he will, I would seem to conceive an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man.<sup>77</sup> But if I deny that he will, then he will determine himself, and consequently have the faculty of going where he wills and doing what he wills.

20 Perhaps other things in addition to these can be objected. But because I am not bound to force on you what anyone can dream, I shall only take the trouble to reply to these objections—and that as briefly as I can.

[III.B.(i)] To the first I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, *or* the faculty of conceiving. And indeed, I do not see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite, when the faculty

<sup>76</sup> Buridan's ass was supposed to be perishing of both hunger and thirst, and placed at an equal distance from food and drink. But it seems that neither the particular example nor the doctrine it is intended to support are rightly attributed to Buridan. See Wolfson 1, 2:178, and Gueroult 1, 2:513.

<sup>77</sup> I.e., not a rational being, as the more explicit NS translation brings out.

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of sensing is not. For just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the same faculty of willing (but one after another, for we cannot affirm  
30 infinitely many things at once), so also we can sense, *or* perceive, infinitely many bodies by the same faculty of sensing (*viz.* one after another [NS: and not at once]).<sup>78</sup>

If they say that there are infinitely many things which we cannot perceive, I reply that we cannot reach them by any thought, and  
35 consequently, not by any faculty of willing. But, they say, if God willed to bring it about that we should perceive them also, he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given us. This is the same as if they said that,  
II/134 if God should will to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, it would indeed be necessary for him to give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being, in order for us to embrace<sup>79</sup> the same infinity of beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, *or* idea, by which we explain all the  
5 singular volitions, *i.e.*, it is what is common to them all.

Therefore, since they believe that this common *or* universal idea of all volitions is a faculty,<sup>80</sup> it is not at all surprising if they say that this faculty extends beyond the limits of the intellect to infinity. For the universal is said equally of one, a great many, or infinitely many in-  
10 dividuals.

[III.B(ii)] To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment,  
15 therefore, is really a perception, not [an act of] free will.

To understand this clearly, let us conceive a child imagining a winged horse, and not perceiving anything else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by P17C), and the child does not perceive anything else that excludes the existence of the horse, he will  
20 necessarily regard the horse as present. Nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it.

<sup>78</sup> Part of what Gebhardt adds here, the part I have translated, is probably just a translator's elaboration. Part of it is misplaced, representing words which in fact occur in the NS as translating l. 29.

<sup>79</sup> The NS, in a variation not mentioned by Gebhardt, gloss "embrace" as "be able to bring under a universal being."

<sup>80</sup> Gebhardt notes that the NS reads quite differently at this point: "Because they believe that this universal volition of everything, or this universal idea of the will, is a faculty of our mind . . ." He conjectures that the NS represents the first draft and incorporates the phrase "of our mind" in his text on the basis of that conjecture. Akkerman (2, 149) more plausibly suggests that the divergence comes from the translator's misreading *volitionum* as *volitionem*.

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We find this daily in our dreams, and I do not believe there is anyone who thinks that while he is dreaming he has a free power of suspending judgment concerning the things he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream the things he dreams he sees. Nevertheless, it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, viz. when we dream that we dream.

Next, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, i.e., I grant that the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves, involve no error. But I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of the horse? For if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting, unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of a winged horse was inadequate. And then either it will necessarily deny the horse's existence, or it will necessarily doubt it.

[III.B.(iii)] As for the third objection, I think what has been said will be an answer to it too: viz. that the will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas, and which signifies only what is common to all ideas, viz. the affirmation, whose adequate essence, therefore, insofar as it is thus conceived abstractly, must be in each idea,<sup>81</sup> and in this way only must be the same in all, but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the idea's essence; for in that regard the singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation that the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle.

Next, I deny absolutely that we require an equal power of thinking, to affirm that what is true is true, as to affirm that what is false is true. For if you consider the mind,<sup>82</sup> they are related to one another as being to not-being. For there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity (see P35, P35S, and P47S). So the thing to note here, above all, is how easily we are deceived when we confuse

<sup>81</sup> At this point the NS add an example which is absent from the OP: "as the definition of man must be attributed wholly and equally to each particular man." Gebhardt incorporates the example in the text, but mislocates it, and consequently gives a misleading picture of the variation between the two texts. Cf. Akkerman 2, 81. In l. 4 I follow the punctuation of the OP rather than that of Gebhardt, who follows the NS.

<sup>82</sup> The words Gebhardt incorporates from the NS would make this read: "If you consider only the mind and not the words." Akkerman (2, 149) rejects this as a translator's elaboration.

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universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings.

25 [III.B. (iv)] Finally, as far as the fourth objection is concerned, I say that I grant entirely that a man placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and drink as are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a man should not be thought an ass, rather than a man, I say that I do not know—just as I also do not know how  
30 highly we should esteem one who hangs himself, or children, fools, and madmen, etc.<sup>83</sup>

[IV.] It remains now to indicate how much knowledge of this doctrine is to our advantage in life. We shall see<sup>†</sup>this easily from the following considerations:

35 [A.] Insofar as it teaches that we act only from God's command, that we share in the divine nature, and that we do this the more, the more perfect our actions are, and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, in addition to giving us complete peace of mind, also teaches us wherein our greatest happiness, *or* blessedness,  
II/136 consists: viz. in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and morality advise. From this we clearly understand how far they stray from the true valuation of virtue, who expect to be honored by God with the greatest rewards for their virtue and best actions, as for the greatest bondage—as if virtue  
5 itself, and the service of God, were not happiness itself, and the greatest freedom.

[B.] Insofar as it teaches us how we must bear ourselves concerning matters of fortune, *or* things which are not in our power, i.e., concerning things which do not follow from our nature—that we must  
10 expect and bear calmly both good fortune and bad. For all things follow from God's eternal decree with the same necessity as from the essence of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

[C.] This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at  
15 no one, to envy no one; and also insofar as it teaches that each of us should be content with his own things, and should be helpful to his neighbor, not from unmanly compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand. I shall show this in the Fourth Part.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Wolfson 1, 2:178-179, on this phrase.

<sup>84</sup> Both the OP and the NS read "Third Part" here. But as Gebhardt remarks this clearly comes from a time when the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Parts formed one part.

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20 [D.] Finally, this doctrine also contributes, to no small extent, to the common society insofar as it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led, not so that they may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things that are best.

25 And with this I have finished what I had decided to treat in this scholium, and put an end to this our Second Part. In it I think that I have explained the nature and properties of the human Mind in sufficient detail, and as clearly as the difficulty of the subject allows, and that I have set out doctrines from which we can infer many excellent things, which are highly useful and necessary to know, as will be established partly in what follows.

II/137 *Third Part Of the Ethics  
On the Origin and Nature  
of the Affects<sup>1</sup>*

PREFACE

10 *Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men's way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human impotence, not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually happens) curse. And he who knows how to censure more eloquently and cunningly the weakness of the human Mind is held to be Godly.*

15 *It is true that there have been some very distinguished men (to whose work and diligence we confess that we owe much), who have written many admirable things about the right way of living, and given men advice full of prudence. But no one, to my knowledge, has determined the nature and powers of the Affects,<sup>2</sup> nor what, on the other hand, the Mind can do to moderate them. I know, of course, that the celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the*  
25 *Mind has absolute power over its own actions, nevertheless sought to explain*  
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<sup>1</sup> Akkerman (2, 69) suggests that the title should read "On the Nature and Origin of the Affects." Cf. the title of Part II and II/186/9.

<sup>2</sup> Akkerman (2, 70), appealing to the NS, suggests reading: "But so far no one, to my knowledge, has determined the true nature and powers of the Affects."