words. For because it is unclear which way the truth lies, you will not appear to be contriving anything, and because they are doubtful about it, you will not appear to be saying something false (for the alteration will make the thesis irrefutable).

Next, for any questions someone foresees, he should take the lead[36] and declare them in advance, for in that way he will hinder the questioner the most.

CHAPTER 18

Since a correct solution is exposing, about a false deduction, the kind of question depending on which the falsehood results, and 'false deduction' has two meanings (i.e. either if it has deduced a falsehood or if it appears to be a deduction but is not), then there will be both the solution just now mentioned and also, for an apparent deduction, the correction of whatever in its questions this appearance depends on. So the result is that you should solve arguments that have actually been deduced by rejecting and those that only appear to have been by dividing. Next, since some arguments that have been deduced have a true conclusion and some have a false one, it is possible to solve those that are false with respect to the conclusion in two ways: by rejecting one of the things asked and by showing that the conclusion is not really like this. Those that are false in respect of the premisses can only be 177ª1 solved by rejecting (for the conclusion is true). Consequently, for those wanting to solve an argument, the first thing is to see whether it deduces or does not deduce and next whether the conclusion is true or false, so that we solve either by dividing or by rejecting (and rejecting in this way or that, as was said previously). There is the greatest difference between solving an argument when being questioned and when not, for it is difficult to foresee it but easy to see it at one's leisure.

CHAPTER 19

So then, of refutations depending on homonymy or amphiboly, some have a question that signifies more than one thing, while in

[36] Reading *προαναστατέον* rather than *προενστατέον*.

others the conclusion has multiple meanings (for example, in 'speaking of the silent' the conclusion has double meaning, while in 'the one who knows is not aware' one of the things asked is amphibolous), and the element with double meaning is so in one place and not so in another, but what the element with double meaning signifies in one place is the meaning that is true and in another the one that is not.

So then, in cases where the expression with multiple meaning comes at the end, no refutation happens unless one has previously[37] assumed the contradictory, as for example in 'the blind one sees'. For without a contradiction there would not be a refutation. But in cases where it is in the questions, there is no need to deny the expression with double meaning in advance, for the argument is not directed at that but by means of that.

Therefore, you should respond in the beginning to a double meaning, whether of word or phrase, by saying that it is so in this way but not so in that way. Thus, answer 'speaking of the silent' with 'in this way it is possible but in that way not', and answer 'The things needed need to be done' with 'some do, but others do not' (for 'things needed' has multiple meanings). But if you overlook this, then it should be corrected at the end by adding an attachment to the question: 'Is speaking of the silent possible?'—'No, but for *him* to speak of silent things is possible'. And similarly with those that have the multiple meaning in the premisses: 'Then are those who know not aware of what they know?'—'Yes, they are, but not those who know in *this* way' (for it is not the same thing to say that they cannot be aware of it and to say that those who know in *this* way cannot). And in general, you should challenge these, even when someone does deduce without modification, saying that he has not denied the thing that was stated, only the word, so that it is not a refutation.

CHAPTER 20

It is obvious how those depending on division and combination should be solved. For if the argument signifies something different when divided and when combined, then when the conclusion has been drawn you should say the contrary. All arguments like

[37] Reading προλάβῃ rather than προσλάβῃ.

these depend on combination or division: 'That with which you saw him being beaten, with that was he being beaten?' And 'What he was beaten with, did you see with that?' (This does, then, have something of the character of questions involving amphiboly, 177b1
but it depends on combination. For what depends on division is not double meaning, for it does not become the same sentence when divided, just as it is not[38] <the word> *óros* ['mountain'] that, when pronounced by accentuation as *horos* ['boundary'], also means something different. Instead, in written texts a word is the same when it is written with the same letters and in the 5
same way—and even there people do already make annotations—but the sounds uttered are not the same. Consequently what depends on division is not double meaning (and it is obvious that not all refutations depend on double meaning, as some people say). The answerer, then, must divide. For it is not the same thing 10
to see with your eyes someone being beaten and *to say* 'to see with your eyes someone being beaten'.

And there is Euthydemus' argument: 'Do you know, now, the triremes being (*ousas*) in the Piraeus, being (*ōn*) in Sicily?

And next, 'Can someone good who is a cobbler be bad? But there might be someone who, being good, is a bad cobbler. 15
Consequently, he will be a good bad cobbler.'

'Is learning those things the knowledge of which is good also good? But learning[39] what is evil is good. Therefore, what is evil is a good thing to learn. However, what is evil is both evil and a thing to learn, so what is evil is an evil thing to learn. But knowledge of evil things is good.'

'Is it true to say now that you have been born? Then you have 20
been born now.' Or does this signify something different when it is divided? For it is true to say, now, that you have been born, but you have not been born now.

'The things you can do and the ways you can do them, might you not do them and in those ways? But while not playing the cithara, you have the ability to play it. You are then able to play the cithara while not playing it.' But he does not have this ability, 25
the ability to play while not playing, but instead he has, while

[38] Reading *μὴ καὶ τὸ "ὄρος", καὶ "ὄρος" τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθέν* (see the Notes on the Text).

[39] Reading *σπουδαῖον τὸ μάθημα* rather than Ross's conjecture *σπουδαία ἡ ἐπιστήμη* (see the Notes on the Text).

not doing it, the ability to do it. Some people solve this in another way: if he has granted that he can do as he is able, they say it does not follow that <he can> play while not playing. For it has not been granted that he can do it in all the ways that he is able, and 'as he is able' is not the same as 'in all the ways he is able'. But it is obvious that they do not solve it well. For the solution of arguments depending on the same thing is the same, and this solution will not fit when applied to all arguments or those asked[40] in all ways; it is instead relative to the questioner, not the argument.

CHAPTER 21

Arguments depending on accentuation do not exist, either written or spoken, unless there might be a few like this argument: 'Is where [*hoû*] you live a house?'—'Yes.'—'But isn't "where [*oú*] you live" the negation of "you live"?'—'Yes.'—'But you said that where you live is a house. Therefore, the house is a negation.' It is clear how this is solved, for the same thing does not signify the same pronounced with higher and with lower pitch.

CHAPTER 22

It is clear how arguments depending on things that are not the same being said in the same way should be opposed, since we have the categories of predications. For one person would grant, when asked, that some term signifying a 'what it is' does not exist, and another person would exhibit something signifying 'in relation to something' or 'how much' that does exist but appears to signify a 'what it is' because of its expression.

(As in this argument:

Is it possible to be doing something and simultaneously to have done that same thing?—No.
—But it *is* possible, isn't it, to be seeing something and simultaneously to have seen the same thing and in the same respect?—Yes.
Is there one of the ways of undergoing that is doing something?—No.

[40] Reading ἐρωτωμένους rather than ἐρωτωμένοις.

—So then, aren't 'is cut', 'is burned', and 'perceives' said in the same way? And all these signify undergoing?
—And again, 'say', 'run', and 'see' are all said in the same way as one another. However, seeing is in fact a kind of perceiving and so it is simultaneously doing something and undergoing something.

Now at this point in the argument, if someone who has granted that it is not possible to do and have done the same thing simultaneously says that to see and have seen is possible, he has not yet been refuted if he does not say that seeing is a kind of doing rather than a kind of undergoing, for that question is needed in addition. But it is assumed by the hearer that he granted this when he granted that cutting is a kind of doing and having cut a kind of having done (and whatever other things are said in the same way, for the hearer will himself additionally grant that the rest are said in the same way). But this is not meant in the same way but appears to be because of its expression.

The same thing happens as in cases of homonymy. For with homonyms, someone without knowledge of arguments thinks that he is contradicting the *thing* he said, not the word. But that requires a further question as to whether he says the homonym with just one thing in view, for it is when he grants it in this way that there will be a refutation.)

These arguments are also like those: 'If someone does not have what he previously had, has he lost it?' (for someone who loses only one chip[41] will not have ten chips). Or rather: *what* someone does not have but did have previously, *that* he has lost, but *how much*—or *how many*[42]—he does not have, he did not necessarily lose *that many*. So, having asked about *what* he has, <the questioner> draws a conclusion about *how many* (ten is 'how many'). Therefore, if he had asked in the first place whether however many someone does not have but did have previously, he has lost that many, no one would have granted it, but instead either that many or some of them.

And that someone could give what he does not have (for he does not have only one chip). Or rather, he gave the one chip, not as *what* he did not have, but *as* he did not have it. For 'only' does not signify *this* or *such* or *so much* but rather *how* he has the one 178b1

[41] *ἀστράγαλον*, literally 'vertebra' (animal bones were used as counters in gambling).

[42] Reading *ὅσον δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἢ ὅσα* rather than *ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἢ ὅσα*.

in relation to something, for example, not with another one. It is therefore[43] as if someone asked, 'What someone does not have, could he give that?' and then, when the answerer said no, asked whether someone could give quickly what he did not have quickly; and then, when the answerer said yes, deduced that someone could give what he did not have. And it is obvious that he has not deduced. For 'quickly' is not giving *this* but giving *in this way.* And someone could give *as* he does not have, for example having with pleasure, he might give with pain.

All these arguments are also like this: 'Can someone hit with the hand he does not have?' or 'Can someone see with the eye he does not have?' (for he does not have only one). Now, some people solve these by also[44] saying that that person who has more than one also has only one eye, or hand, or whatever. Others also say[45] that what someone has is what he received: 'that person gave him only one vote',[46] they say, 'and so he *does* have only one vote (from that person)'. Others reject the premiss directly, saying that it is possible to have what you did not receive, for example, having received sweet wine, to have sour wine when it spoiled while you had it.

But as was said earlier, these people all direct their solutions not to the argument but to the person. For if this were a solution, then if someone gave the opposite answer, it would not be possible to solve, as in other cases. For example, if 'in one way it is, in the other it is not' is the solution, then if someone should grant it said without modification, it comes to a conclusion, but if it does not come to a conclusion, that would not be a[47] solution. But in the aforementioned examples, when all these are granted we still[48] do not say that a deduction comes about.

These further arguments are also like this: 'What has been written, did someone write[49] it? But now it has been written that you are sitting, a false sentence. But it was true when it was being written. Therefore a simultaneously true and false sentence was

[43] Reading ὥσπερ οὖν rather than ὥσπερ ἂν.
[44] Reading καὶ ὡς rather than ὡς καὶ.
[45] Reading καὶ ὡς rather than ὡς καὶ.
[46] ψῆφον, 'pebble': pebbles were used in casting votes.
[47] Deleting Ross's addition ἢ.
[48] Reading πάντων διδομένων οὐδὲ rather than οὐδὲ πάντων διδομένων.
[49] Reading ἔγραφε rather than γέγραφε (see the Notes on the Text for 178b25).

being written.' For a sentence or opinion being false or true does not signify a *this* but a *such* (for the same argument also applies to an opinion). And 'What the learner learns, is that what he learns? But someone learns something slow fast.' However, that did not say *what* he learns but rather *how* he learns. And 'What someone walks, is that what he treads on? But he walks the whole day.' Or rather, this has said not *what* he walks but *when.* Nor does 'drinking the cup' say *what* he drinks, but *from what*. And 'What someone knows, he knows either from learning it or discovering it. But for those things of which he discovered the one and learned the other, he knows the both of them in neither way.' Or rather, 'what' <signifies> *each*, and that is not *all of them.*[50]

And <the argument> that there is a third human besides <the human> itself and the particular humans. For 'human' (and anything common) does not signify a *this* but instead *such* or *so much* or *in relation to what* or something else of that sort. Similarly also in the case of 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus', whether they are the same or different. For the first <part> signifies a *this* but the second signifies *such*, so that this itself cannot be set out. But it is not setting-out that produces the third human but rather agreeing that what is set out is just exactly a *this*. For it will not[51] be possible for a *this* to be just exactly what[52] Callias is and just exactly what human is. And if someone should say that what is set out is not just exactly a *this* but just exactly *such*, it will make no difference (for it—e.g. 'human'—will be the one thing apart from the many). It is obvious, then, that one must not grant that what is predicated in common of all is a *this*, but instead that it signifies *such* or *in relation to what* or *so much* or another one of these.

CHAPTER 23

In general, the solution for arguments depending on the expression will always be in accordance with the opposite of what the argument depends on. For example, if the argument depends on combination, the solution will be by dividing, and if it depends

[50] Reading ὃ μὲν ἅπαν, τὸ δ' οὐχ ἅπαντα (see the Notes on the Text).

[51] Reading ἔσται rather than ἔστι.

[52] Reading ὅπερ rather than Ross's emendation ὥσπερ (see the Notes on the Text).

on division, then by combining. Next, if it depends on high-pitch accentuation, the solution is low-pitch accentuation, and if it depends on low-pitch, it is high-pitch. If it depends on homonymy, then it is possible to solve it by stating the opposite word. For example, if what follows is saying something is animate,[53] then when negating that make it clear how it is animate; and if you meant something is inanimate but <the questioner> has deduced it is animate, then say[54] how it is inanimate. And similarly in cases of amphiboly. If it depends on similarity of expression , the opposite will be the solution. 'What someone does not have, could he give that?' Or rather, it is not *what* he does not have but *how* he does not have, for example one chip *only*. 'Whatever someone knows, does he know it either by having learned it or by having discovered it?' But not *the things* he knows. And if he treads on what he walks, he does not tread on *when* he walks. Similarly also in the other cases.

CHAPTER 24

Against arguments depending on accident, there is one and the same solution for them all. For since it is indeterminate when it is that what belongs to the accident must be said of the subject (that is, in some cases people think it is and agree to it, but in other cases they deny that it is necessary), therefore when the conclusion has been drawn you should say similarly against all these arguments 'That is not necessary', and you must be able to bring forward the 'like this'.

All arguments like these depend on accident: 'Do you know what I am going to ask you?' 'Do you know the person approaching (or the one wearing a mask)?' 'Is this statue of yours a work? Or is this dog of yours a father?' 'Is a few times a few a few?' For it is obvious in all of these cases that whatever is true of the accident is not necessarily also true of the subject: for it is only to things that are indistinguishable with respect to substance and one that the same things are always thought to belong. But in the
179ᵇ1 case of the good, what it is to be good is not the same as what it is to be about to be asked, nor is what it is to be for someone

[53] Reading *ἔμψυχον* rather than *ἄψυχον*.
[54] Reading *συνελογίσατο λέγειν* rather than *συνελογίσατο*.

approaching (or wearing a mask) the same thing as what it is to be for Coriscus. Consequently, it is not the case that if I know Coriscus but do not know the person approaching, I know and do not know the same person. Neither is it the case that if this is mine and is a work, then it is my work (but rather my possession or object or something else). It is the same way with the rest.

Some people solve these by rejecting[55] the line of questioning. For they say that it is possible to know and not know the same thing but not in the same respect. Therefore, if they do not know the one approaching but do know Coriscus, then, they say, they know and do not know the same thing but not in the same respect. But in the first place, as we already said, there must be the same correction for arguments that depend on the same thing. And this correction will not be possible if one supposes the same proposition not about knowing but about being or being in a certain relation, for example 'if this is a father and is yours'. For even if this is true about some cases—that is, that it is possible to know and not know the same thing—those cases have nothing in common with the one just stated. And nothing prevents the same argument having several flaws, but a solution is not bringing to light every flaw. For it is possible to show that someone has deduced a falsehood without showing what this depends on, like Zeno's argument that being moved is impossible. Consequently, even if someone tries to conclude an impossibility,[56] he errs in concluding that impossibility, even if he succeeds in deducing it ten thousand times, for that is not a solution (for a solution was exposing that about a false deduction depending on which it is false). So therefore, if he has not deduced—even if what he tries to conclude is true rather than false[57]—making this clear is the solution.

And perhaps in some cases nothing would prevent this from resulting—except that with the present examples that does not seem to be so either. For he knows Coriscus, that he is Coriscus, and he knows the one approaching, that he is approaching. And that may appear to be knowing and not knowing the same thing,

[55] Reading *ἀναιροῦντες* rather than *διαιροῦντες*.

[56] Reading *εἴ τις ἐπιχειρεῖ ὡς συνάγειν ἀδύνατον, συνάγων εἰς ἀδύνατον ἁμαρτάνει, κἂν εἰ* for *εἴ τις ἐπιχειρεῖ συνάγειν ὡς δυνατόν, ἁμρτάνει, κἂν* [*εἰ*] (see the Notes on the Text).

[57] See the Notes on the Text concerning this passage.

metaphorically, and they will not notice the change. Since they do not clearly distinguish between a maxim and any other general statement, they will not think you are employing any artifice (*sophizesthai*), and if the issue is a doubtful one for them, they will not think you are telling them something false.

In 'the alteration will make the thesis irrefutable', the term I translate 'alteration' is *metaphora*, which does often mean 'metaphor' (compare *Top.* VIII.3, 158b12–15, on definitions involving metaphor: 'for since they are unclear, there are no arguments for attacking them; and since one does not know whether it is because of metaphorical use that they are like this, no criticism is available'). But here the point is that under certain circumstances one can get away with *altering* the meaning of a term and thus avoid a refutation. Elsewhere, Aristotle sees metaphorical use as inimical to dialectical argument: 'all metaphor is unclear' (*Top.* VI.2, 139b32–4), metaphor should not be used in argument (*An. Post.* II.13, 97b37–9). For further discussion, see Fait 2007, pp. 181–2.

CHAPTER 18

Aristotle's account of 'solutions' to sophistical refutations, which extends through *SE* 30, is prefaced by a general account of what a solution is and the framework for finding solutions defined by this. In addition, although solecism is distinguished from refutation (and thus deduction) in *SE* 3, he gives a treatment of how to 'solve' solecisms in *SE* 32 (182a8; see also the Notes on the Text for *SE* 34, 183a30, 33).

176b29–36: The definition of 'correct solution' given here has a somewhat confusing structure that translators have struggled to clarify, since it appears first to define a solution to a *deduction* (instead of a refutation) and then, introducing a distinction of senses of the expression 'false deduction', to give either a modification or an additional definition of 'solution'. We can get some help here from *Top.* VIII.10, the only place outside the *SE* where Aristotle says anything substantive about 'solving'. He says there that 'those arguments that deduce a falsehood should be solved by rejecting that depending on which (*par' ho*) the falsehood

comes to be' (160b23–4); that the first way to 'impede' an argument is by 'rejecting (*anelonta*, 'taking away') that because of which the falsehood comes to be' (161a1–2); and that the latter is also 'solving' the argument (161a14). It appears, then, that Aristotle had an established notion of 'solving' an argument *with a false conclusion* in the *Topics* that consisted simply of finding the premiss from which that conclusion resulted (he discusses this at greater length in 160b24–39). If that meaning for 'solve' was already established for him, then what he is doing in *SE* 18 is expanding the concept of solving to include merely apparent deductions, for which it will mean exposing what makes them *appear* to be deductions. Thus, his initial definition in 176b29–30 is provisional, applying only to cases involving false conclusions, and he expands it by making it a disjunction: solving is *either* exposing the premiss depending on which the false conclusion follows (and expunging it) *or* correcting the source of the appearance that there is a deduction. Details of his language reflect the different circumstances of the two alternatives: for a genuine deduction, what is to be 'exposed' is the question (i.e. in a dialectical context, the premiss) that must be rejected, while for a merely apparent one there is instead 'something in the questions' that needs 'correction' (*diorthōsis*). What the second case requires is not rejecting a premiss but 'making a distinction' (*dielonta*), a usefully broad term than can include any of the range of clarifications Aristotle proposes in his solutions. Against this background, the term 'correct' (*orthē*) at the beginning of the definition might better be understood as 'in the strict sense' or 'in the correct sense'.

Some translators (Tricot, Forster, and Pickard-Cambridge) suppose that the definition 'just now mentioned' is the account of apparent solutions in *SE* 17, but as Dorion observes, this is clearly wrong (1995, p. 336 n. 279): an apparent solution of a refutation is not a solution of an apparent refutation.

The definition of 'correct solution' given here is found in almost the same form in *SE* 24, 179b23–4, where Aristotle appears to refer to the present passage (see the Commentary on 179b23–4).

176b36–177a6: The steps spelled out here, in highly general terms, for seeking a solution do not seem to be coherent. Aristotle has just said that there are two kinds of false deduction, those

that are only apparently valid deductions and those that are valid but have false conclusions. If he is now making a distinction of two types of the latter case (i.e. valid deductions with false conclusions), it makes no sense to say that some of those have true conclusions. Commentators since Michael of Ephesus have nevertheless supposed him to be doing just that. Even apart from the fact that Aristotle seems to be contradicting himself, it is not clear what it would mean to 'solve' a deduction (valid or otherwise) with a true conclusion: at the very least one would expect that those who wish to solve arguments wish to reject the arguments' conclusions. Beyond this, the business of determining whether premisses or conclusions are false is, in general, hardly within the purview of the dialectician, since it might involve having factual knowledge about any subject matter whatever.

Aristotle's own procedure in cases of homonymy, amphiboly, and combination/division suggests a different interpretation. As he says in *SE* 19, 177ª9–15, there may be ambiguity about what the conclusion actually is, that is, about which interpretation of the ambiguous conclusion follows from the premisses. Solving a sophistical refutation of this latter sort will then be a matter of showing that the conclusion that actually does follow from the premisses is not the absurd one. Aristotle's text here supports this interpretation. He says that in the case of a valid deduction (one in which the conclusion 'has been deduced'), the two options are rejecting one of the premisses and 'showing that the conclusion is not really like this'. Many translators suppose this last phrase is just a circumlocution for 'false', but some recognize a difference (e.g. Pickard-Cambridge 1928: 'the conclusion is not *the real state of the case*'; Forster 1955: 'the conclusion is not *as stated*'; likewise Tricot 1987 and Saint-Hilaire 1843; Dorion 1995 (in his commentary) says the conclusion 'is not *the one* [celle] that has been deduced'.

177ª2–6: These lines summarize the procedure just described, but the concluding remark 'so that we solve either by dividing or by rejecting' repeats the conclusion already announced in 176ᵇ35–6 but with the added phrase 'rejecting in this way or that'. This implies that 176ᵇ36–177ª2 'Again... therefore' is not an addition to the argument that concluded at 172ᵇ35 but rather an alternative version of it.

CHAPTER 19

Aristotle now turns to the solutions of each of the forms of sophistical refutation, following the same order as in *SE* 4–5 and beginning with homonymy and amphiboly. The analysis in most cases is more detailed than the earlier presentation, particularly as concerns the exact argumentative structure of each sophism. However, the treatment of homonymy and amphiboly is quite brief. Aristotle gives us only three examples, and the brevity of his remarks about them has been a source of difficulty for interpreters.

177ª9–15: 'some have... while in others': the distinction made here between sophisms with an ambiguous conclusion and those involving ambiguous premisses is also sketched in *SE* 10, 171ª8–9, where Aristotle includes a third case not mentioned here, 'in both' (see the Commentary on 171ª1–11). In the first case, the relevant ambiguity is effectively external to the argument: the conclusion deduced contains some ambiguous expression that also appears in a thesis that does not form part of the argument itself. In the second, there is an ambiguous premiss with which the argument forms a valid deduction on one reading but not on the other.

For arguments of the first type, Aristotle says that it is necessary to have made an additional assumption that the conclusion will contradict, or otherwise there will be no refutation. For arguments of the second type, containing an ambiguous premiss, he says that no such prior assumption is necessary because 'the argument is not directed at that but by means of that'. This description is difficult to understand. If the goal of a refutation is to deduce a contradiction of some proposition, then there must for either case be such a proposition to be contradicted: what is it about the case of an argument with ambiguity in the premisses that eliminates the need to suppose such a proposition? Aristotle might mean that in such a case the ambiguity in the premisses makes the argument only apparently a deduction and that it can accordingly be solved by pointing this out.

The construction of this long sentence is difficult. I have treated 177ª11–14 'for example... is amphibolous' as a parenthetical remark giving examples, with the sentence containing it

as a description of homonymy and amphiboly with three clauses: (1) either a premiss or the conclusion is ambiguous, (2) the ambiguity of the ambiguous sentence ('the element with double meaning') is the basis of the apparent contradiction in the refutation (it is 'so in one place and not so in another'), and (3) in one place, that sentence is used in the sense that makes it true, and in the other, in the sense that makes it false. Fait explains this passage as follows:

> when a question contains an ambiguity, in some cases an affirmative reply would be true and in others a negative reply, but in both cases the ambiguous expression has a signification the adoption of which would make the reply true and another the adoption of which would make it false. (Fait 2007, p. 183, my translation)

177ª11–12: In the first example, 'speaking of the silent' (discussed earlier in *SE* 4, 166ª12–14), Aristotle really gives us only a conclusion that can be read in two ways: 'speaking of the silent' may mean either 'a silent person speaking' (which is impossible) or 'someone speaking (saying) things that are silent' (which is possible). The response is simply to point out the sense in which it is possible: 'No, but for *him* to speak of silent things is possible' (177ª26).

177ª13: Interpreting 'The one who knows is not aware (*sunepistasthai*)' is difficult because of the rare word *sunepistasthai*, which I have rendered as 'be aware of'. I reconstruct it as:

> X knows that P.
> X is currently not aware of the knowledge that P (e.g. because X is asleep).
> Therefore, X is not aware of that which X knows.

For analysis of this somewhat obscure example, see the discussion below on 177ª26–30.

177ª16–20: 'where the expression with multiple meaning comes at the end': this recalls, but is not identical to, the distinction in *SE* 10, 171ª1–11 (see the Commentary on that passage).

177ª17–18: 'the blind one sees' presumably employs the same sort of ambiguity about subject and object as in 'To want me

mine enemies to capture' (*SE* 4, 166ª6–7). Aristotle offers it as an example of ambiguity in the conclusion. He does not say what the argument for it would be, and it may just be a free-standing puzzle sentence.

177ª18–20: To 'deny in advance' (*proapophēsai*) would be to take as a preliminary assumption the *denial* of the conclusion being deduced in the argument. To 'deny the expression with double meaning' (*ditton*) would then be to deny the *ambiguous* conclusion. If what is being denied is itself ambiguous, then its denial will be as well, that is, it can be interpreted as the denials of two different propositions on the different readings. If we take Aristotle's division between cases with an ambiguous conclusion and cases with an ambiguous premiss strictly, then he is saying that in cases with an ambiguous premiss there is no ambiguous conclusion to deny. However, Aristotle's definition of a refutation as 'a deduction together with the contradictory of its conclusion' indicates that there will still need to be a 'denial in advance' of the conclusion.

177ª20–4: 'Speaking of the silent' is also mentioned at 166ª12–14. 'What must be' (*to deon*) is given as an example of homonymy at *SE* 4, 165ᵇ34–8, where the two senses are 'what is necessary, which often also applies to bad things (for something bad can be necessary), but we also say that good things are what must be done'. In that context, however, the sophism aims at showing 'bad things are good'. In a note on 165ᵇ34–5, Dorion instead notes *Top.* II, 110ᵇ9–10, where Aristotle distinguishes what is needed as in one's interest versus what is noble (*kalos*), and thus what one ought to do. Translators have proposed a variety of contrasted senses here: 'obligatory' versus 'ineluctable' (Fait 2007), 'unavoidable' versus 'one's duty' (Rolfes 1922), 'what one must do' versus 'what must be'. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not spell out the argument he has in mind.

177ª25–6: The response 'No, but for *him* to speak of silent things is possible' follows the analysis indicated earlier in *SE* 4, though it is expressed with Aristotle's characteristic terseness: word for word, it is 'No, but *him* silent things' (*ou, alla tonde sigōnta*). In fact, the short phrase that Aristotle says will resolve

the ambiguity is itself ambiguous, since *tonde sigōnta* itself could be taken to mean 'him being silent', on which construal it would express the problematic reading again ('No, but it is possible for *him* being silent to speak'). The stress must be on the missing element that distinguishes the two readings 'for the silent to speak' (where 'the silent' is the subject of the infinitive) and 'to say silent things' (where it is the direct object). In the latter reading, there is no explicit subject for 'say', and it must be supplied. That is what Aristotle does: 'for *him* [emphatic: 'this person *here*', ***tonde***] to say silent things'. Dorion supposes instead that the effect of adding *tonde sigōnta* is to make the entire phrase 'this man being silent' (or 'this man, who is being silent') the direct object of 'to say': 'it is possible to speak of this man who is keeping silent'. However, Aristotle would then be giving a different analysis from the one he gave earlier in *SE* 4, and since that earlier analysis can also be seen to apply here, there is no need to suppose that Aristotle has changed his mind.

Somewhat in conflict with her insightful interpretation of the same example in *SE* 4, Hecquet instead (2019, p. 255 n. 6) supposes that Aristotle has in mind a quite different sophism, turning on the difference between 'it is possible for someone to speak while remaining silent' and 'it is possible for this person, who is now keeping silent, to speak' (i.e. at another time). Aristotle does indeed take note of a related issue in *Met.* *Θ*, where he criticizes the Megaric argument that nothing is possible except what is actual, but so interpreted the example no longer illustrates amphiboly but instead combination.

177ª26–30: 'Then are those who know': These lines spell out somewhat the example mentioned earlier in 177ª13, though not at all clearly. From what Aristotle says, we can at least be sure that the sophism in question involves ambiguity in the premisses rather than an ambiguous conclusion and that the ambiguity involves the verb 'know'. The earlier reference in 177ª13–14 called that ambiguity *amphibolon*, suggesting that it is amphiboly rather than homonymy, but some commentators have noted that Aristotle sometimes uses this word in a broader sense. The solution given here (in the form of a recommended reply to the conclusion) concerns the relationship between the two senses of 'know' involved and another verb, *sunepistasthai*: the example

must assume that it would be absurd to say that people might *sunepistasthai* what they know in one of those two senses but not in the other. Following Poste, Forster, and Dorion, I take it to mean 'be aware of' or 'be conscious of'.

The verb *sunepistasthai* is uncommon, and the sense in which Aristotle intends it is unclear. Etymologically, it is 'know' (*epistasthai*) with the prefix *sun-*, which as a prefix has two senses: (1) 'together' (and *LSJ* notes that this 'may refer to the Object as well as the Subject), (2) 'completely'. *LSJ* accordingly lists two meanings for it: 'be privy to' and 'know perfectly'. Translators of the present passage, however, have generally taken it to mean either 'understand' (Pickard-Cambridge 1928; Fait 2007; Hasper 2013) or 'be conscious of' (Poste 1866; Forster 1955; Dorion 1995; and I). Those who take it to mean 'understand' suppose that the sophism Aristotle has in mind follows the pattern first proposed in Michael of Ephesus' commentary: someone who has memorized some lines of poetry by rote (and therefore knows them) but does not understand what they mean (and therefore does not know them); the example is often embellished by supposing that the reciter is a child at school or an ignorant person. However, the earliest evidence of that word being used with this meaning is precisely Michael's twelfth-century commentary itself.

Hecquet and McCarthy instead translate *sunepistasthai* as 'know perfectly'(= *LSJ* sense 2). Hecquet takes one of the senses of 'know' involved in the sophism to be 'know by heart', that is, by rote memory (2019, p. 255 n. 8), suggesting that she effectively follows Michael's interpretation as well. But the evidence *LSJ* cites for the sense 'know perfectly' consists in just two passages, one of which is precisely the present *SE* passage.

The distinction that fits the example invoked here better is that between having knowledge of something and using (or being aware of) that knowledge, which Aristotle himself makes in *An. Pr.* II.21, 67ᵇ3–5, and *EN* VII.3, 1146ᵇ31–3. As examples of people having knowledge without being aware of it he includes people who are asleep, mad, or drunk (*EN* VII.3, 1147ª13–14). Accordingly, an example here could be:

> Sleeping Clinias knows that every triangle has angles equal to two rights.

Sleeping Clinias is not aware that every triangle has angles equal to two rights.
Therefore, sleeping Clinias is not aware of what he knows.

Of course, Aristotle does not give us this example, but neither does he give us the example Michael uses. I can only propose it tentatively, but two points in its favour are that it does not require us to invent an otherwise unattested meaning for *sunepistasthai* and that it reflects a distinction Aristotle makes elsewhere. From a modern perspective, this last interpretation recalls the 'KK principle' of epistemology: if *S* knows that *P*, then *S* knows that *S* knows that *P*.

177ª30–2: Since Aristotle offers no details about the actual structure of an argument and uses the stronger term *macheteon* ('you should fight' or 'you should challenge'), this is a recommendation to *try* the complaint that ambiguity has spoiled the refutation even if your opponent has actually given a valid deduction.

CHAPTER 20

According to *SE* 6, combination and division involve ambiguity not in the meaning of an expression but about what the expression itself is. In *SE* 20 we get some further explanation of what exactly that means, though it is at times difficult to follow. Aristotle's position is generally that such cases involve expressions that are similar to one another except for the way they are pronounced (*to phthengomenon*). In 177ᵇ4–7, this is described in terms of the ambiguity of *written* expressions, where it is ambiguous what is *uttered* in reading the same written string of letters. On the most straightforward picture of this view, it is only what is said—uttered—that can have double meaning because language is essentially spoken language, while written language is not itself language but only a representation of language. To speak of ambiguity of meaning in the case of written words, then, would be a derived use: ambiguity about what words are represented rather than ambiguity of the words themselves. These are not unrelated, but the principles behind them are quite distinct. Ambiguity concerning what language the written string represents results from limitations of the writing system itself. Greek writing as Aristotle knew it had no

established way to mark the difference between aspirated and unaspirated initial vowels or between different pitch levels of syllables, and Aristotle calls attention to this in his remarks about accentuation (see particularly *SE* 23). However, those limitations will only result in ambiguities in the limited range of cases where two alternative renderings of the same written string both produce genuine Greek utterances, and in such cases the utterances will themselves be similar in sound. Consequently, the identity of written representations reflects a similarity of the spoken renditions themselves: they sound enough alike that someone might mistake one for the other.

This sometimes makes the distinction between combination/division and amphiboly a matter of judgement. Aristotle explained the examples of amphiboly in 166ª7–8 and 166ª12 by spelling out two different syntactic construals for the same expression; since the formal terminology of grammatical analysis was still in its infancy when he wrote, this usually involves paraphrase. He treats examples of combination and division the same way (e.g. at 166ª27–30). In all this, he distinguishes the properties of utterances as utterances—their syntactic properties, in a more modern idiom—from their semantic properties or meanings. If the difference in the utterances themselves is small, then we may be deceived by it. Combination and division are possible because of 'thinking that an expression (*logon*) is no different when combined or divided, as in most cases' (169ª25–7); accentuation is possible because 'the expression is not thought to signify something different when lowered in pitch and when raised' (169ª28–9).

177ª34–5: The statement that combination and division involve combining and dividing a *sentence* or *expression* (*logos*) seems to undermine the clear assertion in *SE* 6 (168ª23–8) that they do not involve ambiguous language bur rather ambiguity about what the language is. However, he restates the earlier distinction more clearly at 177ᵇ2–9.

177ª36–8: The argument in this example can be reconstructed as follows:

> That with which you saw him being beaten, with that he was beaten (177ª36–7).

With your eyes you saw him being beaten (cf. 177ᵇ10–12).
Therefore, with your eyes he was beaten (cf. 177ª37–8).

As is often the case, Aristotle only sketches the example and appears to assume that his audience is familiar with it.

177ª38–177ᵇ9: After giving us the first premise and the paradoxical conclusion of this example, Aristotle digresses to discuss whether this is indeed a case of combination or is instead a case of amphiboly. The salient point for him appears to be that if it were amphiboly, then it could be classified as a case of 'double meaning', which might lend support to the thesis of 'some people' that all sophistical refutations rest on double meaning. The digression itself gives us valuable evidence about how Aristotle understood not only the distinction between amphiboly and combination/division but also the relationships among spoken language, written representations of language, and the meanings of expressions.

The ambiguity in this example concerns whether the initial 'what' is taken to modify 'you saw' or 'being beaten': is it that *with which you saw* or that *with which he was beaten*? The ambiguity of this expression is easiest to see if we rewrite it as two sentences: 'You saw him being beaten with something. Was he beaten with that?' This can be construed in two ways:

(1) You saw (him being beaten with a thing). Was he beaten with that thing?
(2) You saw (him being beaten) with a thing. Was he beaten with that thing?

Construed as (1), 'a thing' is what he was being beaten with, while construed as (2), it is what you saw this beating with. To use grammatical terminology unavailable to Aristotle, the ambiguity concerns whether 'that with which' (in Greek, *hōi*) modifies 'you saw' or 'being beaten'. This strongly resembles Aristotle's description of amphiboly: none of the words in the example is homonymous, so the ambiguity is entirely a matter of grammatical construction. Consequently, this has 'something of the character of questions involving amphiboly'. In particular, it appears (to the extent that we can be confident about the pronunciation of Classical Greek) that the only thing distinguishing these examples

from amphiboly is how they are 'said' or 'uttered'. On that basis, we might describe combination/division as amphiboly of a phrase that is (or can be) disambiguated by a distinction in pronunciation.

177[b]2–8: This difficult passage has perplexed commentators and editors. Correctly interpreted, I believe it provides us with insight into Aristotle's concepts of both combination/division and accentuation as well as important evidence about his understanding of linguistic entities. The overall point of the passage is to argue that division does not involve double meaning (*to ditton*) but is instead a matter of one linguistic expression being mistaken for another similar one. Aristotle had already stated this in general terms in *SE* 6, 168[a]23–33, when he distinguished between homonymy, amphiboly, and form of expression, on the one hand (all of which for him involve the same linguistic item having two different meanings), and combination, division, and accentuation on the other (all of which involve two different linguistic expressions that are similar enough to be mistaken for one another). In the present passage, he uses the case of accentuation, which he takes to be relatively obvious, to clarify by example the case of division. In brief, the argument is: the result of 'dividing' a sentence is not that it reveals an alternative meaning for the sentence but rather that it produces a different sentence, just as the result of a change in accentuation is not a new meaning for the same word but rather a new word. To clarify this further, he appeals to a fact about the written language he knew: the same sequence of letters sometimes admits of different pronunciations with different meanings. For Aristotle, these are not distinct meanings assigned to the same expression but distinct expressions each with its own meaning. With this appeal to written representations, he is able to say what it is about them (or at least about a large class of them) that is the same, even though they are different. Aristotle makes it clear that he is distinguishing not only between words or sentences *themselves* and their written representations but also between linguistic expressions and their *utterances*. (See further the Commentary on *SE* 31.)

177[b]3–4: Aristotle's example concerns two Greek words spelled with the letters *OPOΣ* but pronounced differently. There are in

fact three words spelled in that way: *hóros* ('border', or also 'definition'), with initial aspiration; *óros* ('mountain'), with first syllable accented; and *orós* ('whey'), with second syllable accented. Historically, the great majority of commentators have supposed that the two words are *hóros* and *óros*, so that Aristotle is calling attention to the presence or absence of aspiration. However, as Fait notes, Jannaris 1902 argued that the words are *óros*, 'mountain', and *orós*, 'whey', which differ only in the pitch accent on the first syllable. While this does raise interesting historical issues about Greek orthography and pronunciation in Aristotle's Athens, those are outside the scope of this commentary.

177ᵇ3: 'just as it is not the word *óros*': I take the connecting phrase *eiper mē kai* not as 'unless' (so that Aristotle would be noting a qualification to his general claim: 'not the same *unless* it is in the way that') but as a straightforward comparison: 'if someone pronounces *óros* with accentuation as *horos*, that does not indicate an ambiguity in *óros* or show that it has two meanings; it is instead pronouncing an entirely different word'. Aristotle's subsequent comments make this point clear. What *óros*, 'mountain', and *horos*, 'boundary', have in common is that they are *similar* (but not identical) in pronunciation and *consequently* have *identical* written representations in fourth-century Attic, but they are still distinct words. By implication, then, combination and division applied to the same string of words or letters results, not in different meanings for the same sentence, but in different sentences having different pronunciations.

177ᵇ7–9: The remark that 'not all refutations depend on double meaning, as some people say' may explain the lengthy attention given to the present argument: Aristotle is attacking the same thesis he criticised in *SE* 10. There are only two places in the *SE* where this distinction of combination, division, and accentuation from other forms dependent on expression is mentioned: here and in *SE* 6, 168ᵃ26–8. In the latter passage, he is proposing a revision of the classification of all sophistical refutations that he has just given, replacing it with one based on the unifying principle of a single definition of 'refutation'. See the Commentary on *SE* 6, 168ᵃ26–8, and *SE* 17, 175ᵇ39–176ᵃ18, for more on this topic.

Modern interpreters tend to describe combination and division in terms of the punctuation of written language. Given what is known about Greek writing practice in Aristotle's time, that is anachronistic (text was normally written continuously without even word divisions). However, one passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* seems to describe just such a use of punctuation to disambiguate a written text:

> It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver. This cannot be so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or where punctuation (*diastixai*) is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus. To punctuate Heraclitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, 'Though this truth is always men understand it not', where it is not clear to which of the two clauses the word 'always' belongs. (III.5, 1407b11–18, tr. Rhys Roberts)

In this passage, 'punctuating' (*diastixai*) a written text evidently is a kind of marking-up to facilitate reading aloud. Based on this one passage, we might conclude that Aristotle likewise sees combination and division as a matter of alternative punctuations. However, it is odd to find Aristotle talking here about punctuating as a familiar practice, given that in 177b6 he seems to refer to such signs as a recent novelty. Dorion observes that this passage does not actually mention any specific signs to be used in disambiguation, just the bare verb *diastixai*. Since scholars usually take the *Rhetoric* to have been composed much later than the *SE*, it may be that editorial practices had changed in the interim.

177b10–12: Abruptly, Aristotle returns to the example he began in 177a35 (giving us a clue as to its second premiss). Commentators have proposed elucidations of the distinction he makes here by adding quotation marks in different places, though at best those can only be guesses about what Aristotle was thinking since no such punctuation existed for him. I speculate that what is going on is similar to what we find at *SE* 31, 181b25–30: from the fact that someone has uttered a given string of words, we cannot always infer that that person has asserted a sentence expressed with just that (spoken) string. For example, someone who says 'I did it not' has not thereby asserted 'I did it'. Here, the words 'with

your eyes being beaten' (*tois ophthalmois tuptomenon*) occur in a sentence intended to mean 'seeing, with your eyes, someone who is being beaten', and the sophistical manoeuvre consists in taking the phrase on its own to have 'being beaten with your eyes'.

Aristotle follows this account by mentioning five brief examples (177b12–26) that we would expect to illustrate the same kind of solution, and he closes his discussion with a rejection of alternative solutions (177b27–34). This is a pattern of exposition that he repeats for form of expression (*SE* 22), accident (*SE* 24), and 'in a way and without modification' (*SE* 25), and several times he emphasizes the importance of discovering the one true form of solution corresponding to each form of sophism. However, the explanations of how these solutions apply to the various examples he uses to illustrate them are often cryptic, with no explanation about how the solution works.

177b10: 'The answerer, then, must divide': Aristotle gives a reasonably full explanation of the first example: it is not the same thing to *say* or *assert* an expression and to *utter the words* in that expression. Combination and division, like accentuation, arise when two linguistic expressions resemble one another closely enough that one can be mistaken for the other (as explained earlier in *SE* 8). For the same point taken to an extreme, see *SE* 31, 181b28–31.

177b12–26: Some of the five examples here are easy to follow, while others (particularly the first) are mystifying. Aristotle's quick references to them suggest that he is supposing his audience is familiar with them, which in turn implies that they were already subjects of discussion prior to the *SE*.

177b12–13: Interpreters have found it extraordinarily difficult to figure out what Euthydemus' puzzle was, let alone what its solution might be. Complicating matters is Aristotle's mention in *Rhet.* 1401a28–9, while discussing combination and division, of an 'argument of Euthydemus' that only distantly resembles this one. Unfortunately, the *Rhetoric* passage containing it presupposes a totally different understanding of combination and division from the one in *SE* 6. This obviously complicates the project of reconstructing Euthydemus' sophism and raises the question

whether Aristotle is talking about the same puzzle in both places. I believe that in the end there is a limit to what we can reconstruct with confidence.

Rhet. II.24. consists of brief summaries of sophisms, corresponding in part to those in the *SE*, often illustrated with the same or similar examples. In 1401[a]25–1401[b]3, Aristotle introduces combination and division with these words:

> Another line is to assert of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not. (tr. Rhys Roberts)

This does not describe combination and division in terms of how things are *said*, as in the accounts in *SE* 6 and *SE* 20. Following this, Aristotle gives five examples, beginning with Euthydemus' sophism:

> This is the argument of Euthydemus, that he knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, for he knows each part. (1401[a]28–9)

This is the briefest of explanations, but it appears to mean something like this: whoever knows a trireme and is in the Piraeus both knows a trireme and (being in the Piraeus) knows in the Piraeus, and therefore knows a trireme in the Piraeus. That would best be seen as amphiboly, since 'in the Piraeus' can be taken to modify either 'trireme' or 'knows'. Conceivably, the Greek equivalent of 'He knows a trireme in the Piraeus' might be susceptible to disambiguation by being pronounced with or without a pause in some place, though that is entirely speculative. However, none of the remaining four examples of combination/division in the *Rhetoric* has anything to do with how a sentence is pronounced or with amphibolous syntax. The first, for instance, is 'whoever knows the letters knows the verse, for they are the same'. What this and the other three examples do illustrate is instead what has come to be known as 'composition and division' fallacies in modern textbooks: supposing that the properties of the members of a collection are also properties of the collection itself, or conversely. Such arguments cannot at all plausibly be seen as 'depending on the expression', since they do not rest on the language in which they are expressed. One possible explanation is that in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's purpose is simply to provide orators with

argumentative tactics, not to provide a theoretical account of argumentation or refutation, and that as a result he distorts his own terminology to accommodate a supposedly less sophisticated audience for that work. Alternatively, it might be that as in other cases (e.g. ignorance of refutation), Aristotle inherited the terminology of combination and division from the general environment of discussions about rhetoric but gave it a more precise, or more theoretically interesting, redefinition in the *SE*. Whatever the explanation, we can get no help for understanding *SE* 20 from the *Rhetoric*.

Concerning the reconstruction of Euthydemus' sophism as it appears in *SE* 20, I do not have a significant positive proposal to offer and can only indicate here something of the range of proposals that have been made and the problems affecting them. The usual candidate locus for such an ambiguity is the phrases 'being in the Piraeus' and 'being in Sicily'. In English, the awkward sentence 'You know being in the Piraeus the triremes being in Sicily' could be read as 'You know, being (as you are) in the Piraeus, the triremes, being (as they are) in Sicily' or 'You know to be in the Piraeus the triremes being (as you are) in Sicily'. In Greek, however, this will not work: the participle 'being' (*ousas*) in 'being in the Piraeus' is feminine accusative plural (and therefore can only modify 'triremes') while the participle 'being' (*ōn*) in 'being in Sicily' is masculine nominative singular (and therefore cannot go with 'triremes'). A second alternative would be to take the sentence as it stands as expressing something impossible in practical terms: you, being in Sicily, cannot know simultaneously the triremes hundreds of miles away in the Piraeus (both Fait and Hasper suggest this). But a practical impossibility is not at all the same thing as a logical contradiction, and Aristotle's examples of sophistical refutations always aim at the latter. Such an interpretation would also require the sentence to be the conclusion of some further argument from plausible premisses (which Fait and Hasper do propose). Michael of Ephesus adopts this view and on that basis changes the text, reading its first word as ἄρ' ('therefore') instead of the interrogative particle ἆρ' ('is it the case that?'), and Tricot, Dorion, and Hecquet follow him in this. However, as Bydén 2000 (p. 183 n. 149) points out, in Attic Greek (as opposed to later ancient Greek) usage, ἄρα, 'therefore', is invariably postpositive, that is, never occurs as the first word of a

sentence: the earliest attested occurrences of it as the first word are three centuries after Aristotle.

Michael reconstructs the argument as follows:

(P1) Are you now in the Piraeus? (Yes.)
(P2) Do you know in Sicily the triremes to be? (Yes.)
(C) Therefore you now know the triremes being in the Piraeus, being (yourself) in Sicily.

On this analysis, the contradiction is between the two premisses and the conclusion: you are both in the Piraeus and in Sicily, and likewise for the triremes. According to Michael, it is the inference from P1 and P2 to C that is 'by combination': that is, it is reached by *combining the two premisses* to produce the conclusion. Dorion regards this solution as 'ingenious' and 'unjustly neglected' (1995, pp. 344–5).

Whether or not it is ingenious, it does not fit Aristotle's description of combination or division: the 'inference' is just a matter of disassembling two premisses and reassembling their parts, not a matter of taking one sentence and giving it distinct interpretations based on whether or not it is divided at a certain point.

Hecquet 2019 (p. 259 n. 6) proposes this reconstruction:

(P1) You are now in the Piraeus.
(P2) In Sicily, you know that there are triremes, being now in the Piraeus.
(C) Therefore you, who are now in Sicily, know that there are now triremes in the Piraeus.

Here C corresponds to Aristotle's quoted sentence, though the word order is changed. But in that sentence, 'in the Piraeus' is inseparably attached to 'triremes' because the participle *ousas* ('being') is feminine plural. For this to follow from P2, the same form would have to appear there, but in that case 'being now in the Piraeus' would *also* have to include the plural participle ('*they* being now in the Piraeus'); however, if 'being now in the Piraeus' in P2 is simply an inference from P1, then 'being' must be the singular form ('*you* being now in the Piraeus').

From my perspective, all that I can say is that what Euthydemus' puzzle is remains a mystery. Prior proposals all appear to me either to analyse it as something other than combination/division as Aristotle defines it or to founder on grammatical grounds.

177ᵇ13–15: Aristotle does not explicitly tell us how to solve the puzzle of the good bad cobbler, but following the analysis of the initial example, we would expect it to rest on finding a string of words that can be combined or divided in pronunciation. The string (word for word) 'is good cobbler bad' could mean either 'a good cobbler is bad' or '<someone> good is a bad cobbler'. The string includes no definite articles that could disambiguate, and the word 'good' is simply the masculine singular form of the adjective, with no accompanying noun. Reproducing that ambiguity in English is really not possible, and in order to produce something intelligible, translators supply additional words. But in Aristotle's example, the same sentence is repeated in nearly the same form and with the same word order three times, and disambiguating it would require *pronouncing* it with different internal pauses.

As a final note, this example recalls a passage in *On Interpretation*, though Aristotle takes it there in the direction of 'rambling' instead:

> But if someone is good and a cobbler, it does not follow that he is a good cobbler. For if because each of two holds both together also hold, there will be many absurdities. For if of someone both 'white' and 'a man' are true, so also is the whole compound; expression; again, if 'white' then the whole compound—so that he will be a white white man, and so on indefinitely. (20ᵇ35–40, tr. Ackrill)

177ᵇ16–20: 'Is learning those things...': Commentators have sometimes taken this example to exhibit something quite different from combination/division. Dorion says that it 'has in fact nothing in common with the cases in which the ambiguity arises from needing to ask, in the context of a particular phrase, whether this word must be construed with that one... or whether it must instead be separated' (Dorion 1995, p. 346, my translation). Instead, he sees the sophism as turning on whether 'one can attribute *jointly* (S is PQ) to a subject two attributes that it is true to predicate of them *separately* (S is P, S is Q).... In reality, the issue is more a matter of the *logical* combination of predicates than the simple *syntactic* combination of words' (1995, p. 346; similarly Fait 2007, p. 187). In other words, he sees Aristotle as using combination and division here in the modern sense found in logic textbooks. Hecquet's analysis (2019, p. 261 n. 3) takes note of the argument's division into

two phases, concluding first that the evil is evil to know and then that it is good to know, and construes the argument at 177[b]18–19 leading to the conclusion that the evil is an evil <thing to> know as a sophism of accident. This raises the question why Aristotle has included it as an example of combination/division; her answer is that this 'resides in ... the association of *kakon* and *mathēma* in 177[b]18'.

The only commentator I am aware of who tries to reconstruct this example as a case of combination or division in Aristotle's defined sense is Hasper. He proposes that its first sentence has two possible readings:

(1) What is learned about the things, knowledge of which is profitable,[1] is profitable.
(2) The things, knowledge of which is profitable, are profitable things to learn. (tr. from Hasper 2013, p. 39 n. 27)

Here, (1) is the 'separated' reading and (2) the 'combined' reading. Hasper then reconstructs the argument as follows (here I am following the more detailed account in Hasper and Krabbe 2018, p. 166). First, the questioner deduces from (1) that

(3) From (the study of) the bad you can learn something profitable.

The questioner then turns to the combined reading (1) to infer:

(4) You can learn something good from the bad [i.e. the bad is good to learn].

But since the bad is bad and something to learn,

(5) The bad is something bad to learn,

which contradicts (4). The inference in (4) is clearly what Aristotle classifies elsewhere under 'accident', but since the argument as a whole depends on the ambiguous reading of its first premiss, it is an example of combination/division. I believe this is correct, and in fact it is further confirmed by the closing lines of *SE* 20 (see the Commentary below on 177[b]22–34). For Aristotle, there is always just one flaw that is the true cause of a sophistical refutation, and a

[1] The term is *spoudaios,* which Aristotle typically uses as a synonym for *agathos*, 'good'. See the Notes on the Text.

solution must identify that flaw; there may be other errors as well, but Aristotle views those not so much as additional errors but as consequences dependent on the one fundamental cause.

This reconstruction thus has the merit of resting on a genuine syntactical ambiguity. The only remaining question would then be whether there was some way of *pronouncing* it to distinguish between these two alternative readings. I do not have a good solution to this, but I will note what appear to me to be the points where separation in that sense might occur. In Greek, the opening question (with a word for word translation) is:

ar' hōn hai epistēmai spoudaiai spoudaia ta mathēmata
of-those-of-which the knowledges good, good the things-learned?

One ambiguity in this sentence concerns 'knowledges' and 'good': it could be read either 'of which the knowledges are good' (predicatively) or 'of which the good knowledges are' (i.e. as their subject matter). A pause in pronunciation between the two occurrences of 'good' *might* have had the effect of making it clear that the first 'good' is predicative and not attributive. I do not, however, see immediately how that distinction could provide the disambiguation needed for Hasper's particular reconstruction. Alternatively, the genitive plural relative pronoun *hōn* might be construed in two ways: as doing double grammatical duty, with the meaning '*of* those things *of* which' ('the learning *of* those things the knowledge *of* which is good, is good'), or as meaning 'those things of which' ('learning those things the *knowledge* of which is good, is good'). But this would be amphiboly, not combination/division.

177b20–2: The ambiguity here is obviously about whether 'now' modifies 'have been born' or 'say'. Aristotle repeats the same sentence verbatim twice—'it is true to say now that you are born', first with and then without the word ἆρ' (the equivalent of a question mark) at the beginning. While some translators (Fait, Fermani, and Hecquet) accurately reflect this, others (Pickard-Cambridge, Tricot, Colli, Hasper, Dorion, and Forster) instead insert hyphens to differentiate the two readings, which I think obscures Aristotle's point.

177b22–34: This example closely resembles those in *SE* 4, 166a23–30, of being able to walk while sitting or to write while

not writing. The purported contradictory result would be simultaneously doing and not doing the same thing. However, the initial presentation of the sophism here is more general, embracing not simply doing and not doing the same thing simultaneously but a whole range of incompatible actions. Since Aristotle's solution here is no different from his earlier one, he may be changing to that larger formulation in order to reject the alternative solution that follows immediately (177[b]27–34). That alternative sees the solution in making a distinction between '*as* he is able' (*hōs dunatai*) and '*in all the ways* he is able' (*pantōs hōs dunatai*) and arguing that the former does not entail the latter. That solution, interestingly, resembles the non-Aristotelian picture of combination and division as taking what is a property of each to be a property of all (in this context, that an ability to do any one of a list of things is an ability to do all of them together). He rejects it as insufficiently general: it cannot be 'applied to all arguments or those asked in all ways'. If we consider some of his other examples, we can appreciate the force of this. His opening example includes nothing remotely like a collection of things about which we might confuse the properties of the members with the properties of the collection as a whole: indeed, to the extent that they can be reconstructed, none of his examples involve this, and all of them instead concern alternative ways of construing the grammar of a sentence by dividing or not dividing *it*. Likewise in this case, his own solution can be expressed simply by indicating where to insert or remove a division in a sentence. Since that is what all these examples have in common, he concludes, that is their common cause. That is not to deny that in a particular case, the two different construals of the sentence in question will have different meanings in a particular way determined by what those construals are, and in his last example he can agree that what makes this particular ambiguity significant is exactly the distinction between 'applies to any one of them' and 'applies to them all', but that for him is not the true cause of the sophism.

CHAPTER 21

The ambiguity here concerns *ou* (οὐ, 'not', with low pitch) and *hou* (οὗ, 'where', with falling pitch), which differ in pronunciation

(for Aristotle, the important difference is probably the pitch accent rather than the aspiration, though writing as he knew it in fourth-century Athens did not have regular measures for recording either). There is actually a further difference: in 'the place where you reside', *to hou katalueis*, the initial definite article *to* amounts to 'the place', whereas in 'you do not reside', *to ou katalueis*, it is functioning as the Greek equivalent of quotation marks around the phrase. Aristotle's remarks and example make it clear that he regards *sophisms* from accentuation as merely a lecture-room creation.

CHAPTER 22

Aristotle begins his discussion of form of expression arguments in *SE* 22 by stating that the solution to all such sophisms is to be found in 'the categories of predications' (178ᵃ5). He is clearly referring to *Top.* I.9:

> we must distinguish the categories of predications (*ta genē tōn katēgoriōn)* in which the four <types of predications> mentioned are found. These are ten in number: what-it-is, how much, what sort, related to what, where, when, being positioned, having, doing, undergoing. An accident, a genus, a unique property, and a definition will always be in one of these genera of predications, for all the premisses <produced> by means of them signify either a what-it-is, or how much, or what sort, or some one of the other predications. (103ᵇ20–7)

This distinction of kinds of predication plays a central role in Aristotle's articulation of a concept of 'first philosophy' in the central books of the *Metaphysics*, where it becomes the basis of Aristotle's claim that 'be' has 'many meanings' with the sense varying according to the category of what it is that is said to be. Aristotle's reference here indicates not only the importance he attaches to this doctrine but also takes some pride in being its discoverer. It is therefore important to note that in *Top.* I.9, Aristotle connects it with a procedure of 'saying what it is' about a given term:

> an expression signifying the what-it-is will sometimes signify a substance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, and sometimes one of the other categories. For, supposing the example under consideration (*to ekkeimenon*) is a human, if it says that the example is a

> human or an animal, then it says what it is and signifies a substance. On the other hand, supposing the example under consideration is a white colour, if it says that the subject is white or a colour, then it says what it is and signifies a quality. (103[b]27–33)

This procedure of 'saying what it is' would be an important first step in theorizing about a subject, as is illustrated in a smaller way by the contents of Aristotle's *Categories* and in a much larger way by his *Metaphysics*. With that in mind, a detail of the language in *Top.* I.9 is important: Aristotle refers to what is under consideration in the process of 'saying what it is' as 'the thing set out' (*to ekkeimenon*). The verb used there is the passive equivalent of 'set out' (*ektithenai*), a term Aristotle uses later in *SE* 22 in discussing the 'Third Man' argument attacking Plato's Theory of Ideas (see the Commentary below on 178[b]36–179[a]10).

The examples in *SE* 22 are almost entirely concerned with the grammatical-role type of such arguments, and the sole word-form example (178[a]9–28) is in a section that appears to be intrusive (see the Commentary above on *SE* 4, 166[b]1–9, for this distinction). This focus on such cases reflects the earlier claims in *SE* 6 and *SE* 7 that our 'habit' of taking any grammatical subject of predication to be a *this* is the source of much philosophical perplexity: the last section (178[b]36–179[a]10) treats even the much-discussed 'Third Man' argument against Platonic Ideas as arising from it.

178[a]5–8: To show how it is that having the 'categories of predications' provides the solution to all form-of-expression arguments, Aristotle presents a general outline of such refutations. His language is compressed and somewhat obscure, but it depicts an exchange between a questioner and answerer:

(1) An answerer in the exchange has agreed (probably as a result of other questioning) that a *thing* matching a certain description cannot exist, where this *thing* is designated by an expression that 'signifies a what it is'. For example, at 178[a]29–30, the thing in question is '*what* you had but do not have', and what has been agreed to is that 'you did not lose *it*' cannot be true of this: there cannot be such a *thing* as '*what* you had and do not have but did not lose'.

(2) In response, the questioner produces a counterexample of such a thing. However, the counterexample is given by an

expression that only appears to signify a *this* but actually signifies according to some other category of predication. In the example, this is 'ten chips': if you had ten chips and lost one, then 'ten chips' is 'what you had and do not have but did not lose'.

(3) To solve this, Aristotle observes that the purported counterexample does not signify a *this* but rather something corresponding to one of the other categories of predication. In the example, 'ten chips' signifies not a *what* but a *how many*: it is not *what* you had and do not have but did not lose, but rather *how many* you had and do not have but did not lose.

The mechanism of the deception here is quite specific: substituting an expression for the relative pronoun 'what' (*ho*) when that expression does not 'signify a *this*'. This involves the power of language—ancient Greek or modern English—to nominalize: a noun clause may attach an expression of any degree of complexity to the simple relative pronoun 'what', and that complex expression may then be substituted in a context where only something signifying a *this* belongs. Since 'what you had and do not have' appears to designate a *this*, some particular entity that you formerly possessed but now do not, it is plausible to say of any such thing that you lost *it* (reading 'lost' as including the case in which it ceased to exist). But the same flexibility of language that permits the construction of expressions like 'what you had and no longer have' also facilitates substituting any expression that 'appears to signify a *this*' (e.g. 'ten chips') in the place in a sentence where such an expression is found: thus, it appears to make sense to say that '*what* you had and do not have' = 'ten chips'. And since in addition you did not lose ten chips, 'ten chips' is 'what you had and do not have but did not lose'. Thus, Aristotle's solution is to deny that 'ten chips' is a legitimate substitution for 'what you had and do not have'.

Aristotle sees this misleading substitution as deeply ingrained in our use of language. We 'habitually think of everything as signifying a *this*' (*SE* 6, 168ª25–6) and 'assume, whenever something is predicated of something, that it is a *this*' (169ª33–5). In effect, what misleads us is our tendency to take signifying as naming: we suppose that whenever some expression signifies, there is *something*

which it signifies, so that the model for signification is ostension. This picture may be suggested at the beginning of the *SE*, when Aristotle says that we use words as symbols for things and thus 'think that what follows for the words also follows for the things' (165ª7–9). He sees predication as the fundamental linguistic structure (see e.g. *An. Pr.* I.23, *Int.* 5–6); if predication tends to mislead us, then language itself is a potential source of error.

The phrase I translate 'categories of predications' (*ta genē tōn katēgoriōn*) might be rendered literally as 'kinds of predications' or 'genera of predications', as many translators do. However, Aristotle is using it here as a way of referring to a specific doctrine of his (see the Commentary above on 178ª5–8), and in other places he contracts this to just 'the predications': this gives rise to the traditional use of 'the categories' as a name for Aristotle's view that predications fall into different types in this way. Some translators accordingly render *katēgoriōn* as 'categories' rather than 'predications'. My own translation as 'categories of predications' uses 'categories' to translate *genē* and reserves 'predications' for *katēgoriōn*, in an effort to retain the link to predication while also reflecting Aristotle's own use of 'the predications' as a shorthand way of referring to this doctrine (Dorion 1995 similarly translates 'les catégories des prédications').

Central to understanding Aristotle's view is the range of meaning of the verb 'signify' (*sēmainein*). Aristotle does often use it to mean 'refer to' in the Fregean sense ('bedeuten'), but he also uses it more broadly to indicate the *way in which* something is designated, for example some characteristic of what is signified or the grammatical role of the signifying term (e.g. antecedent of a pronoun). For example, he says in *SE* 32 (182ª30) that an occurrence of the word *hautē* (feminine nominative singular form of 'this') 'signifies' *aspis* (nominative singular form of 'shield') rather than *aspida* (accusative singular form). Likewise, the masculine singular form of 'this' (*houtos*) signifies 'male' (*SE* 14, 173ᵇ28–37). In the present chapter, the word 'only' (*monon*) signifies the logically complex condition 'not in relation to something else' (178ª39). In the same way, Aristotle's categories may be seen both as a highest-level classification of the kinds of entity there are and as a classification of the ways in which predicates can apply to their subjects. 'Socrates is human' and 'Socrates is sitting' both predicate something of Socrates, but the first predicate says what he *is*,

while the second says what condition he is in. The doctrine of categories is pervasive in Aristotle's works and plays a crucial role in the account of 'first philosophy' in *Met. ΓEZH*; any full discussion goes far beyond the scope of this Commentary.

In the *SE*, the most important distinction among the categories of predications is that some signify a *this* and some signify in some other way. *SE* 7 describes this as a major source of philosophical confusion that is difficult to resolve (see 169ª33–5 and the associated Commentary). The examples he considers in *SE* 22 exhibit this in two ways. In the great majority of them, the source of confusion can be traced to the versatile meaning of the pronoun 'what' (*ho*), which appears to signify a *this* but can also have as its antecedent a term of a different sort, one signifying one of the other 'categories of predication' or even a more complex logical construction (see his remarks on 'only' at 178ª36–178ᵇ7).

On Aristotle's categories, see further M. Frede 1981 and Studtmann 2021 (the latter includes a bibliography).

178ª9–28: Although this example appears immediately after the general form in 178ª6–8 and is introduced by the words 'As in this argument', it does not illustrate that form: taking something from another category to be a *this* plays no role in it, and Aristotle's attention is instead on matters of word form (in particular, conjugational endings of verbs). Commentators since Michael of Ephesus have therefore proposed rearranging the text. Most recently, Hecquet takes the general outline in 178ª6–8 to be a marginal note of Aristotle's that has become mislocated here and relocates it to follow the example in 178ª28 and the words 'These arguments are also like those'. I think it is more likely that the opening example itself is a later insertion. Aristotle gives it an exceptionally detailed treatment, and it employs a distinction between productions (which necessarily have a termination and cannot be continued after reaching it) and activities (which can continue indefinitely as the same activity). The detailed analysis in 178ª16–24 is almost unparalleled in the *SE*'s treatment of examples, and the closing remarks about the analogy with homonymy suggest reflection on whether revisions to the classification structure should be considered, again implying a later origin. I have put all of 178ª9–28 (including the introductory

'As in this argument') in parentheses to reflect this parenthetical character.

The full argument can be reconstructed as follows (the italicized steps are my additions to clarify its structure):

(1) It is not possible to do and to have done the same thing simultaneously.
(2) It is possible to see and have seen the same thing simultaneously.
(3) No undergoing is also a doing.
(4) 'Is cut' (*temnetai*), 'is burned' (*kaietai*), and 'perceives' (*aisthanetai*) (a) all have the same form of expression and (b) all signify undergoing.
  (4a) *Thus to perceive is to undergo* [not stated but later assumed].
(5) 'To say' (*legein*), 'to run' (*trechein*), 'to see' (*horan*) all have the same form of expression.
  (5a) ... *and all signify doing* [again, tacitly taken as given].
  (5b) *Thus to see is to do* (from 5).
(6) To see is to perceive, *so that* (*hōste*) it is both to undergo and to do.

Step (4) is itself logically complex. Referring to a form of expression, namely the passive-voice verb ending *-etai*, it argues (perhaps inductively) that all words with this ending signify undergoing. Aristotle includes *aisthanetai*, 'perceives', in his list: this is a deponent verb (a verb that has only middle- or passive-voice forms but an active meaning). Aristotle's own position in *On the Soul* is in fact that every form of perceiving is actually an undergoing. Consequently, it appears that Aristotle would endorse the argument from form of expression implicit in (4) as valid and thus conclude that to perceive (and therefore to see or to hear) is to undergo, not to do.

To understand the rest of the argument, we need to attend to the exact form of (5). It begins with a series of expressions and asserts that they all have the same form, in this case that of the present active infinitive, indicated by the ending *-ein* or *-an*. However, no conclusion is drawn from this: all we have is 'similarly', suggesting that there is something here resembling the argument in (4). Step (6) then draws two conclusions from (4) and (5): seeing is undergoing and seeing is doing. The first of

those follows from 'to perceive is to undergo' (explicit in (4)) together with the additional premiss 'seeing is a kind of perceiving'. However, the inference to 'seeing is doing' is not explained. Aristotle then steps back from presenting the argument to comment on it:

> Now at this point in the argument, if someone who has granted that it is not possible to do and have done the same thing simultaneously [i.e. (1)] says that to see and have seen is possible [i.e. (2)], he has not yet been refuted if he does not say that seeing is a kind of doing rather than a kind of undergoing, for that question [i.e. 'Is seeing a kind of doing?'] is needed in addition. (178ª16–19)

Steps (1) and (2), which Aristotle mentions here, have not actually played any role in the argument so far. However, he evidently envisages a continuation of the argument along these lines:

(7) Seeing is a kind of doing (assumed by but not stated in (5)).
(8) To see and have seen the same thing simultaneously is to do and have done the same thing simultaneously (from (7)).
(9) So it is possible to do and have done the same thing simultaneously (from (2) and (8)).

Thus, in order to reach (9), which contradicts (1), we need (7), which Aristotle observes has not actually been obtained in the course of the argument as a premiss, that is, has not been presented to the answerer as a question. The questioner's use of it is instead deceptive: the answerer will think it has been granted because of a similarity of expression that is quite subtle:

> it is assumed by the hearer that he granted this when he granted that cutting is a kind of doing and having cut a kind of having done... But this [i.e. 'to see'] is not meant in the same way but appears to be because of its expression. (178ª22–4)

The last sentence is puzzling: how can something *only appear* to be 'meant in the same way' on the basis of language? However, the sense of 'same meaning' here is not 'signifies the same *thing*' but rather 'signifies *in the same way*' (cf. *Cat.* 3ᵇ14 'though it appears so from the form of the appellation'). The notion of a *way* of signifying is in fact exactly the right notion for word-form type arguments: the endings attached to a verb stem in conjugating, for instance, indicate not what the verb

itself signifies but *in what way* it signifies it (e.g. as an undergoing if the ending is passive-voice). And as he has just illustrated, they may sometimes mislead on just that account. By contrast, this involves no appeal to the notion that some expression is wrongly taken to designate a 'this' when it falls under one of the other categories.

178ª24–8: Aristotle does not say that homonymy itself is like form of expression but rather that the same argumentative detail arises in arguments resting on either. The detail appears to be a matter of securing an additional premiss from the answerer explicitly agreeing to the relevant conflation: that the active voice ending on *horan* 'to see' really does make it a matter of doing something, or that the identical forms of the two occurrences of a homonymous word really do indicate it has just one meaning. Aristotle developed this point in greater detail in *SE* 17, 175ᵇ39–176ª18, arguing that cases of homonymy should really be seen as cases of 'making two questions one'.

In conclusion, 178ª9–28 is hardly a paradigm for the beginner in recognizing form-of-expression cases: it is an advanced study in applying Aristotle's theoretical understanding to a difficult case. The role of form of expression in it is secondary and subtle: Aristotle makes a point of saying that the questioner does not actually present the inference from 'seeing has the same form as talking or running' to 'seeing is doing' but simply takes it for granted that the answerer will make this inference. There may be a similar tacit inference from '*aisthanetai* is like *temnetai*' to 'perceiving is undergoing'. The argument seems to need yet a third step, from 'perceiving is undergoing' to 'seeing is undergoing' by way of an intermediate premiss 'seeing is perceiving', though Aristotle does not mention this even indirectly. He is thus dealing with quite a complex argument—perhaps discussing an example that had been produced in an actual dialectical exchange. This would not be the only instance in the *SE* where the first example Aristotle considers in discussing a particular form of sophism is a difficult one to follow: cf. *SE* 5, 166ᵇ32–6. Speculatively, it might be the record of an exchange in a live debate that Aristotle found worth recording as a marginal note but that subsequently became incorporated into the text.

178ª29–179ª10: The rest of Aristotle's examples result from taking an expression to 'signify a *this*' when it does not. What the person who had ten chips no longer has is not *what* but *how many* (ten chips); what the person who does not have 'only one chip' does not have is an 'in relation to' (i.e. to another chip); the 'quickly' that someone gives is not *what* but *in this way*; the 'only one hand' with which someone who does not have it strikes is not a *what* but an 'in relation to', as is the 'only one eye' with which someone who does not have it sees; the 'slowly' that someone learns is not *what* he learns but *how*; the 'whole day' someone walks is not a *this* but a *when*. These last two examples involve terms in the accusative case used adverbially ('the whole day', 'slow'); similarly, when you drink a cup, 'cup' is not *what* you drink but *from what*. Two further examples involve plurals, where Aristotle regards grammatical number as misleading: if I learn *these things*, then they are *the things* (*ha*, plural) I learn, not *what* (*ho*, singular). This series is followed by a philosophically important example, the 'Third Man' argument attacking Plato's Theory of Ideas. Comments on these examples follow below.

178ª29–36: The first example was discussed above:

(1) Someone who does not have *what* he previously had has lost *it*.
(2) But someone who previously had ten chips and lost only one will not have ten chips.
(3) Therefore, *what* he previously had and does not have is ten chips, but he did not lose *that*.
(4) Therefore, he does not have what he previously had but did not lose it.

To show that this is indeed the solution, Aristotle adds that if the questioner had said 'how many' instead of 'what' from the beginning, no answerer would have granted (1) in the first place.

178ª36–178ᵇ7: The next example is superficially similar, but Aristotle's analysis is different. He does not state a refutation in full, but it would go something like this.

(1) You cannot give *what* you do not have.
(2) But suppose that you do not have only one chip (i.e. that you have more than one).

(3) Then you could give only one chip (i.e. give one chip).
(4) Therefore, 'only one chip' is *what* you do not have and *what* you can give.
(5) Therefore, you can give *what* you do not have.

As in the previous case, the cause is that 'only one chip' is taken to designate *what* when it does not (on Aristotle's analysis, it is a relation: 'does not have a chip that is not with another'. This formulation is telling because it reveals that 'only one' characterizes not the chip itself but how you have or give it.

A modern logician might instead see a scope ambiguity in (3), which could mean 'You are able to (give only one chip)' or 'You are *only* able to (give one chip)'.

178ᵇ1–7: This is also the point of the further example Aristotle gives in 178ᵇ1–7, which offers a different purported counterexample to the same initial claim:

(1) What you do not have, can you give it? (No.)
(2) Can you give something quickly (*ti tacheōs*) without having <it> quickly? (Yes.)
(3) Therefore, you can give what you does not have.

Commentators sometimes complain that 'having it quickly' is nonsense, but that is probably just the point: if you have something, then you might give it quickly, but it would be absurd to say that you 'had it quickly'. A detail in Aristotle's language indicates that he is aware of this: in (2), he includes 'something' (*ti*) before 'quickly'. As a result, 'something quickly' appears to be the direct object of 'give': giving 'something quickly' is comparable to giving 'something red'. Of course, 'You gave me something quickly, so therefore what you gave me is quickly' would be nonsense. For Aristotle the root cause of that is the form of the expression 'something quickly' itself, which has the appearance of signifying a *this*. Accordingly, Aristotle says in conclusion '"quickly" is not giving *this* but giving *in this way*', adding for good measure the example of 'having pleasure but giving with pain', in which there is no 'something' to confuse by separating the adverbs from their verbs. If this analysis is also meant to apply to the previous example, then 'only' will be functioning like 'quickly' as a modifier of 'give' and 'have', respectively, rather

than 'one chip': *what* you gave was one chip, but *how* you gave it is indicated by 'only' (i.e. not with another), as is how you did *not* have it (i.e. did not have it 'not with another').

178ᵇ8–10: Two further puzzles involving 'only' embedded within a negation (the eye or hand that someone does not have is 'only one', and thus for Aristotle a relation). Aristotle offers no details about his solutions to these, though he immediately discusses and rejects alternative solutions to them. The examples are similar in form to those that precede, but involve a further grammatical device: the phrase '*with* the hand he does not have' contains the dative-case relative pronoun *hēi* doing double duty both as the direct object of 'has' and as the complement of 'hit'. There are in fact two references to a hand here: the hand is *what* he does not have and *that with which* he hits. In fuller form in English, this might be 'hit *with* the hand *that* he does not have'; in such cases we often dispense with the second pronoun ('hit with the hand he does not have'). Greek similarly disposes of one of the pronouns, but it does so in a wider range of cases by letting a pronoun in one case also represent one in another: 'hit with the hand he does not have' (*tuptoi* ***tēi*** *cheiri* ***hēn*** *mē echei*) thus becomes *tuptoi* ***hēi*** *mē echei cheiri* ('hit with the he-does-not-have-it hand'). This double-duty pronoun then is falsely taken to designate a *this*: the 'hand he does not have' is 'only one hand'. As in the case of 'can give only one', this can instead be understood from a modern point of view as a matter of scope: in 'you do not have only one hand', 'not' has the entire sentence in its scope ('it is not the case that you have only one hand'). However, Aristotle sees the solution through a category distinction: 'only one hand' is a relational term like 'a hand not in relation to [i.e. together with] another hand' rather than a *this*.

178ᵇ11–23: These dozen lines are concerned with rejecting alternative solutions (compare *SE* 20, 177ᵇ27–34, and *SE* 24, 179ᵇ7–33, 179ᵇ34–7, 179ᵇ38–180ᵃ7). Aristotle first adds two more examples and then gives a general criterion for what counts as a solution. However, the text is in places quite obscure and possibly corrupt, and the criterion stated in 178ᵃ18–19 obviously has a close connection with the general account of solving sophisms dependent on expression found in *SE* 23 (which in turn refers to

one of the examples here: see below on *SE* 23). Although the first rejected solution (178a10–11) addresses the example that immediately precedes it, the second and third (178b11–16) instead concern an argument not found in Aristotle's text. Editors and translators both ancient and modern have struggled to make sense of the whole of it, often emending the text itself. All this suggests that something has fallen out of the text here and that its present state may reflect attempts at repairing it, but I have tried to interpret it as it stands.

178b10–11: The first alternative solution to the two sophisms in 178b8–10 can probably be reconstructed thus:

(1) Can you hit with a hand you do not have or see with an eye you do not have? Reply: No.
(2) But you do not have only one eye, and you can see (look) with only one eye.
Reply: But whoever has two eyes has only one eye and also has another.

This response effectively denies a premiss: if you have two eyes, then it does not follow that you do not have only one eye, since you *do* have only one, and another besides. This simply bypasses the original puzzle by ascribing a new meaning to 'You do not have only one eye.' Once again, there is a scope distinction from a modern point of view: 'can (see with only one eye)' versus 'can only (see with one eye)'.

The second and third rejected solutions instead appear to be addressed at an argument something like this:

(1) Whatever someone has, that is what he received.
(2) This person, who had only one vote, gave it to that person.
(3) Therefore, that person received only one vote.
(4) Therefore, that person has only one vote.

But we need a little more to see an actual refutation here. I suggest that Aristotle has in mind a sort of complement to the example in 178a29–31:

(1′) Whatever someone has, that is what he received.
(2′) This person had only one vote and gave it to that person, *who had ten votes*.

(3′) Therefore, that person *who had ten votes* has only one vote.

The rejected solution instead tries to show that the conclusion is not impossible:

(4′) And he *does* <have only one>—he has only one from this person.

(The word I translate 'vote' is *psēphos*, 'pebble': pebbles were used as voting tokens.) As Hecquet observes, this appears to treat the example as 'without modification and in a way'. The third rejected solution instead denies the first premiss by giving an example of someone who has something (sour wine) that he has not received (since he received sweet wine).

Aristotle does not comment on these solutions themselves. Elsewhere, when he rejects alternative solutions (177b27–34, 179b7–33, 179b38–180a7), he explains in some detail what is wrong with them. In the present passage, however, he instead turns immediately to a generalized criterion for recognizing a solution. Just a few lines later in *SE* 23, when discussing solutions to all the forms of refutation depending on the expression, the one case he treats in detail is form of the expression (179a20–5). In doing so, he refers to just three examples from *SE* 22—giving what one does not have, learning something versus some *things*, and walking the whole day—and he spells out exactly what is meant by 'opposite' for each of them.

178b16–23: Aristotle's remarks here and elsewhere (177b33–4; cf. *Top.* VIII, 161a7–9) indicate that solutions directed 'to the person' rather than 'to the argument' fail by not being sufficiently general: they point out flaws in the specific presentation of the argument but fail to cover all of the sophisms under the classification being considered. The correct solution to a sophism *of a particular type* then must be applicable all sophisms *of that type*.

The solution and its opposite are directions to an answerer for responding to a questioner: answer in this way and you can solve, but answer in the 'opposite' way and you cannot. Looking ahead to *SE* 23, we might take this to include such things as responding to a questioner's homonymous or amphibolous question by distinguishing the ambiguity and indicating which sense you grant. Aristotle is then saying that if you fail to isolate that critical point

of ambiguity in the argument and respond accordingly, then solution is impossible. But he says more: in that case, the argument '*comes to its conclusion*' (178b20), whereas if you apply the solution, it will not. This is a loose sense of 'come to a conclusion', since presumably the sophism relies on a surreptitious switching of senses to reach its conclusion.

178b24–9: 'What has been written' in this example is a proposition: 'that you are sitting'. Propositions (and opinions, as Aristotle adds) are the things that can be called true and false. However, he argues in *Cat.* 5, 4a10–21, this creates the deceptive appearance that they are actually things (substances). In that passage, he has just claimed that the most distinctive characteristic of a substance is that one and the same substance can remain the same thing while accepting contrary properties at different times (4a10–21) and he then (4a22–4b13) considers a possible objection: one and the same sentence or opinion can be true at one time and false at another. (This picture of propositions as changing in truth value across time is common to ancient logicians.) In response, he argues that change of truth value in a sentence is not really a change in the sentence itself but a reflection of a change in the subject (*pragma*) that the sentence is about (in later terminology, it is a 'Cambridge change', like becoming a grandparent).

The sophistical refutation in 178b24–9 appears to be this:

(1) Someone wrote what was written.
(2) What has been written now is that you are sitting.
(3) What has been written is now a false sentence.
(4) What has been written was a true sentence when it was being written.
(5) Therefore what has been written is simultaneously a true and a false sentence.
(6) Solution: a sentence being true or false signifies not a *this* but a *such*.

This resembles the 'musical Coriscus' of 178a39–179b3, who is said to be a *such*, by contrast with Coriscus, who is a *this*. However, what would correspond to 'Coriscus' in this example is the proposition 'You are sitting'. This raises the question whether Aristotle's position on the substantiality of propositions here

differs from that expressed in *Cat.* 5. We can get some clarification of what he is up to, however, by considering premiss (1) in the above reconstruction: what purpose is it serving? I suggest that Aristotle (or Aristotle's imagined sophistical reasoner) is appealing to the fact that the object of 'wrote' can be understood as a written inscription as well as a proposition: I can write 'You are sitting', and in so doing I also write *that* you are sitting (this is perhaps more obvious in Greek, since the verb *graphein* means both 'write' and 'draw'). Thus, what has been written is 'what someone wrote' (i.e. that written inscription there). But that same inscription that was true at the time when it *was being written* (see the Notes on the Text for 178b25 concerning this) is false now, just as the self-same Coriscus can be musical today and not musical tomorrow. And just as 'musical Coriscus' and 'Coriscus' both signify the same *entity* (Coriscus) but in different ways—one as a *this* and the other as a *such*—so 'what has been written' designates an inscription that is a 'true sentence' at one time and a 'false sentence' at another because 'true sentence' and 'false sentence' are *suches* in the same way 'musical Coriscus' is. But if the case is exactly like that of 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus', where the former is a *this* and the latter a *such*, that would imply that the proposition 'you are sitting' *does* signify a *this*, which conflicts with Aristotle's argument in *Cat.* 5. I return to this issue in the Commentary on 178b36–179a10.

178b29–31: The example here seems to be similar to the one at 178b1–4 concerning 'quickly', though its exact form is unclear. I suggest the following:

(1) What S learns is what S learns. (Premiss)
(2) S learns the slow quick. (Premiss)
(3) S learns the slow = What S learns is the slow quick (From 2)
(4) S learns quick = What S learns is quick (From 2)
(5) Therefore, the slow is quick. (By substituting 3 and 4 in 1)

Some interpreters take (2) to be the paradoxical conclusion of the sophism, but it is not clear just how this is paradoxical or, if it is, how form of expression is involved. Aristotle's solution is to point out that 'quick' (*tachu*) can be used adverbially: 'learns quick' can mean either 'learns something that is quick' or 'learns quickly'. Since 'learns quick' has the superficial form of a verb

plus direct object, it can be seen as having the form 'learns *this*', leading to the conclusion that what is slow is quick. Thus, the error is to confuse a *how* with a *what*. It is not very clear what 'the slow' might be that is learned here. Hecquet suggests that 'the slow' may refer to the theory of hearing suggested in *De An.* II.8, according to which low pitches are (as in modern acoustical theory) connected with slower movements.

178b31–4: These two examples involve 'accusatives of respect': in 'walks the whole day', the accusative-case expression 'the whole day' is not the direct object of the verb 'walks' but rather indicates the time of the action, and likewise 'drinks the cup' means 'drinks *from* the cup'. Aristotle classifies these under 'form of expression'. That is important for two reasons. First, it shows that the 'categories of predications' are a classification of *acts* of predication, not only of predicates in themselves. We can be misled by 'drinks a cup' because a cup really is a *this*, though not something that can literally be drunk. Second, it shows that Aristotle's system of categories is rather fluid: he never lists 'from which' as a category.

The first example is difficult to render in idiomatic English. Roughly, it is:

(1) What someone walks, he treads on.
(2) Someone walks the whole day.
(3) Therefore he treads on the whole day.

Aristotle uses two verbs, *badizein* and *patein*, each of which means, broadly speaking, 'walk'. However, *badizein* is intransitive, while *patein*, 'tread on' or 'walk on', is usually transitive, with a direct object indicating what is trod on. In connection with *badizein*, however, 'the whole day' can only be an 'accusative absolute' indicating *when* someone walks.

178b34–6: Here the form-of-expression culprit is grammatical number. The argument begins with the premiss

(1) Someone knows *what* (*ho*) he knows either by learning it or by discovering it.

The conclusion deduced from this is presented as a contradiction of (1):

> For *those things of which* (*hōn*) he discovered this one and learned that one, he knows the both of them [*ta amphō*] in neither way.

Aristotle's text does not explain how this contradiction is reached (or indeed why it is a contradiction), but I believe the most likely reconstruction begins by substituting the expression 'those of which (*hōn*) he discovered this one and learned that one' for 'that which' in (1):

(1a) Someone knows *those of which* (*hōn*) he discovered the one and learned the other either by discovering *them* or by learning *them*.

The questioner then derives a contradiction roughly in this way:

(1b) He does not know *those* by discovering *them*, since he did not discover *the both of them* [but only some of them].
(1c) He does not know *those* by learning *them*, since he did not learn *them* [but only some of them].
(2) Therefore, he does not know them both by discovering them both or by learning them both.

Aristotle's solution is in effect that the inference by substituting a plural term for a singular one is invalid. His statement of this is terse, even cryptic:

> Or rather, 'what' <signifies> *each*, and that is not *all of them* (*ho men hapan, to d' ouch hapanta*).

His solution would then be that (1a) does not follow from (1) because it substitutes a plural expression for a singular one. It can be true that I know *each* thing by learning or discovering *it*, but saying that I know *them both* or *all of them* in this way is problematic, since it creates the appearance that 'them both' designates one thing. In *SE* 23, 179[a]23–4, Aristotle refers to this same example, summarizing the solution tersely as 'but not the things (*ha*) he knows'. As in other cases, it is the flexibility of the singular pronoun 'what' (*ho*), allowing the substitution of a plural term for it, that is the source of deception. Aristotle's brief solution therefore focuses on expressions (in accordance with the subject of *SE* 22): the cause of the misdeduction is substituting a plural expression (here *those some of which*: in Greek this is just

the word *hōn*) for 'what'. As Aristotle says in *SE* 7, we have a natural tendency to treat each single expression as naming a *this*, and for that reason we suppose 'those some of which' can be substituted in (1) above for 'what'. (Greek syntax perhaps assists this by allowing a pronoun like *hōn*, 'of which', to do double duty as 'those things of which'.

Commentators have observed that this example sounds very much like an example of 'two questions as one' (as e.g. in *SE* 5, 168[a]5–16). Hecquet, for instance, says, 'Strangely, this example could be analysed more simply as infringing the rule according to which one premiss can only assert one predicate of one subject' (2019, p. 275 n. 1). On my interpretation, Aristotle sees that not as the cause of the sophistical inference but as a consequence of its cause: taking a grammatically plural expression as having the same form as a singular one causes us to make the problematic inference, which in turn gives rise to the appearance that 'those of which you discovered some and learned others' designates a single entity. (The text here is problematic: see the Notes on the Text for 178[b]36.)

178[b]36–179[a]10: The concluding lines of *SE* 22 have occasioned an enormous amount of discussion, and for more than one reason. The main thread of this section concerns an argument, known since ancient times as the 'Third Man',[2] that Aristotle himself used to attack Plato's Theory of Ideas. Aristotle mentions this argument several times in the extant treatises (*Met. A* 9, 990[b]17; *Z* 13, 1039[a]2–3; and *M* 4, 1079[a]13), but those references are in general brief mentions; Alexander of Aphrodisias includes a more substantial summary in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, taken from Aristotle's lost treatise *On Ideas* (see the Appendix for more on this). Overall, Aristotle's purpose here is not to present the Third Man—he evidently assumes his audience is familiar with it—but to use it for the purpose of illustrating 'form of the expression'. In particular, he finds an instance of

[2] In the translation, I render the phrase *tritos anthrōpos* as 'third human' both to reflect the fact that Greek *anthrōpos* applies alike to men and women and because in English, the word 'man' is almost unique grammatically in that it can be used without a definite article, as if it were a proper name, in generic constructions ('Man is a mammal', but 'The horse is a mammal'). However, I keep 'Third Man' as the traditional name for the argument.

'form of the expression' in the reasoning used by Platonists to establish the Theory of Ideas itself. Thus, the solution he gives here is a solution to that reasoning, which in brief is that the Platonists wrongly suppose that a 'common' term like 'human' signifies a *this*—an individually existing thing—rather than a *such* (178ᵇ37–9). Although Aristotle does not say so explicitly, this error falls under the remark in *SE* 7 that we are misled by the form of predication itself, which 'seduces' us to think that 'whenever something is predicated of something, that it is a *this*, and we understand it to be one thing' (169ᵃ33–5). Therefore, Aristotle concludes (179ᵃ8–10), to avoid such sophistical refutations, we 'must not grant that what is predicated in common of all is a *this*, but instead that it signifies *such* or *in relation to what* or *so much* or another one of these'.

This much is straightforward. However, what intervenes between the solution in 178ᵇ37–9 and the advice following from it in 179ᵃ8–10 raises several difficulties and has been the subject of extensive debate. First, immediately following his statement of his solution, Aristotle gives a second example that he says is similar: the problem whether 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus' are the same (178ᵇ39–179ᵃ3). His presentation is compressed, however, and it is less than clear both how this example is similar to the first one and how Aristotle solves it. Second, in discussing this example, he introduces (179ᵃ3) the verb 'set out' (*ektithenai*), a term that he also uses in connection with arguments concerning Plato's Ideas; the meaning of this term in this context is disputed. Third, immediately after mentioning setting out (179ᵃ3), he proceeds to deny that it is what 'produces the Third Man', saying that what produces it is instead what he said in his original solution (taking a *such* to signify a *this*), but the language with which he explains this is obscure and has been amended by some commentators. Fourth, despite having said that what produces the Third Man is taking a *such* to signify a *this*, and *not* 'setting out', he says that it would 'make no difference' even if someone were to take the 'thing set out' to be a *such* rather than a *this*.

These difficulties have exercised the ingenuity of a range of commentators, especially in the last eight decades; a full survey of the range of opinion would exceed the scope of this present work. Below I present what I hope is at least one coherent picture of what Aristotle is arguing.

178[b]37–9: Aristotle gives us his 'solution' at once: no 'common' term (i.e. universal or predicate) signifies a *this*. From this solution, we can deduce what it is he is solving. In *SE* 7, he said that we are often misled by our tendency to suppose that whatever is predicated of something designates a *this* (169[a]33–5). In his view, it is this that underlies the Platonists' supposition that any common term like 'human' must designate a *this*—in the example, a human. That error is the starting point of the Third Man: since 'human' designates a *this*, what it designates is a human. However, if it is a human, then it must be so in virtue of its relation to *another* human—a 'Third Man'—which gives rise to a fourth, and a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*. Aristotle's solution reveals the problem, not with the Third Man argument itself, but with the initial step of supposing that a common term like 'human' signifies an individual substance.

178[b]39–179[a]1: Aristotle introduces the second example, concerning whether Coriscus and musical Coriscus are the same, as 'similar' to his first example. In the case of the Third Man, the solution consisted in detecting an error in the Platonists' reasoning, that is, supposing that a 'common' term signified a *this*. The second example concerns a different sort of problem: do the expressions 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus' signify the same thing? There is no question about what 'Coriscus' signifies: it signifies the man Coriscus, a standard Aristotelian example of a *this*. The error contained in the 'musical Coriscus' puzzle must therefore concern what 'musical Coriscus' signifies versus what it appears to signify: since 'Coriscus' signifies a *this*, the error must be taking 'musical Coriscus' also to signify a *this*. That much seems clear. What is less clear is what 'musical Coriscus' actually does signify, for Aristotle (see the Commentary on 179[a]39–179[b]33).

179[a]1–3: 'the first <part> signifies a *this* but the second signifies *such*, so that this itself cannot be set out': Understanding this requires determining the antecedents of 'the first' and 'the second' (in Greek, the colourless pair *to men/to de*). Some suppose that for 'the first' it is the first occurrence of 'Coriscus' in the example and for 'the second' it is the compound expression 'musical Coriscus'. On this interpretation, Aristotle will be saying

that 'musical Coriscus' (as 'the second') signifies a *such*, so that the error is identical to that in the 'Third Man' example. However, what Aristotle actually says is not parallel to 'Third Man', where he says explicitly that a 'common term' cannot signify a *this*: instead, he says '*so that* it cannot be set out'. For this to be parallel to the 'Third Man' example, 'be set out' would have to mean 'be taken to signify a *this*'. But that would conflict with 179ª5–7, where Aristotle seems to speak of setting out a *such* (*poion ti*) as in itself unproblematic. In addition, it is not at all clear that Aristotle thinks a compound like 'musical Coriscus' signifies a *such*: the status of such 'accidental unities' or (in Matthews's phrase) 'kooky objects' is not clear in Aristotle, and it is in particular unclear how 'musical Coriscus' can be viewed as a 'common' term predicated of multiple things. However, an alternative rendering is possible: Aristotle means that in 'musical Coriscus'—in Greek, 'Coriscus musical', *Koriskos mousikos*—'the first' refers to 'Coriscus' and 'the second' to 'musical'. Aristotle will then be saying that this expression cannot be 'set out' *because* its first part signifies a *this* and its second part a *such*. That would give an answer at once to the question in the example: 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus' are not the same because one signifies a *this* and the other does not (whatever it may signify).

Moreover, there is a plausible reason why Aristotle might say that an expression like 'musical Coriscus' cannot be set out. As noted above, Aristotle opens *SE* 22 with a rather proud declaration that it is clear how to solve cases depending on form of the expression 'since we have the categories of predications', an obvious reference to *Top.* I.9. In that same place, after presenting his list of ten such 'categories', Aristotle illustrates how they may be used in a kind of dialectical exchange in which it is asked, about various expressions put up for consideration, 'What is it'? What is expected in each case is determining what category each falls under.

> It is evident at once that the person signifying the 'what it is' will signify now a substance, now a how much, now a what sort, now one of the other categories. For when what is set out (*ekkeimenou*) is a human and he says what is set out is a human or an animal, he says what it is and signifies a substance; when a white colour is set out and he says what is set out is white or a colour, he says what it is and signifies a such... (103ᵇ27–33)

The verb used here for 'set out' (which occurs six times in the passage) is *ekkeisthai*, a verb that functions as a passive-voice form of *ektithenai* (and not common elsewhere in Aristotle). An expression like 'musical Coriscus' would not fit at all into this kind of exchange since its components fall under different categories, and Aristotle could reasonably say that therefore it 'cannot be set out'. Consequently, Aristotle is not denying here that a term like 'musical' (or for that matter 'human') can be 'set out': he is only saying that an 'accidental unity' like 'musical Coriscus' falls outside the whole scheme of categorial classification.

This interpretation has an important consequence: the reason why 'musical Coriscus' cannot be 'set out' is specific to a cross-categorial expression like 'musical Coriscus'. It is not relevant to the further remarks about 'setting out' in the rest of *SE* 22. White (1971b, p. 166) supposes that these lines represent the position of 'an (actual or imagined) interlocutor' with whom Aristotle is arguing here. On my interpretation there is no need for such an assumption.

179ª3–5: 'it is not setting-out that produces the third human': Aristotle's declaration that 'setting out' does not produce the Third Man has again been a problem for commentators who suppose that 'setting out' implies, or even means, 'taking to signify a *this*'. However, on my interpretation it is a natural clarification for him to make because he has just said that 'setting out'—or more precisely, the error of trying to set out what cannot be set out—*is* what gives rise to the puzzle about 'musical Coriscus'. However, there is a distinction between 'setting a term out' and supposing that it signifies a *this*. Setting a term out is taking it as a subject of discussion. The error that makes the Third Man possible is supposing that anything that can be referred to or made a subject of discussion must signify a *this*. That supposition is the result of the same cause identified in SE 7, 169ª30–6. Aristotle is not disavowing an alternative view of the source of the Third Man that someone else, or he himself elsewhere, has espoused. The explanation he offers here makes it clear that his view is the same one he expressed in 178ᵇ37–9: the Third Man arises from supposing a general term like 'human' signifies a *this*. Thus, he says that it is *agreeing* that general terms signify a *this* that 'produces' (i.e. sets the stage for) the Third Man. In a way, that is my

interpretation, though I see the agreement as the result of how we are 'seduced' by language.

179ª4–5: 'it will not be possible...': 'just exactly what Callias is', for Aristotle, is a human; just exactly what a human is cannot be a *this*. (See the Notes on the Text on this passage.)

179ª5–7: Aristotle's statement that it will 'make no difference' if someone says 'what is set out is a *such*' creates an interpretive problem for those who suppose that he has previously said common terms that 'signify a *such*' cannot be set out. White (1971b) proposes that 'make no difference' here does not mean 'will make no difference with respect to the Third Man' (i.e. that it will not avoid the Third Man regress) but 'will make no difference to your *ekthesis* [setting out]', that is, will make no difference concerning whether you have set something out: you can 'set out' a *such* as well as a *this*, but the Third Man arises when you infer simply from the fact that something has been 'set out' that it must be a *this*. I believe Aristotle's point instead concerns what those who advance the Third Man say about their own argument, and indeed how they may have responded to Aristotle's use of it: it seems clear that the Third Man was already a subject of discussion during Aristotle's first period in Athens, especially given that a version or ancestor of it is already found in Plato's own *Parmenides* (see the Appendix). He envisages those who object to the Third Man responding to his criticism that they are taking what signifies a *this* to signify a *such* by denying that they are doing that: if 'someone should say' (*ei tis... legoi*) that what is set out is not a *this*, it will not matter because the thing set out will still be 'one thing apart from the many'. That language recalls once more what Aristotle said in *SE* 7, 169ª33–5: whenever something is predicated of something, 'we understand it to be one thing'; and since, as Aristotle adds, '*that* and *being* seem most to accompany what is one' (169ª35–6), that still remains as a source of error leading to the Third Man.

In a carefully argued position, Fait (2007, pp. 196–7) makes several objections to White's view, among them that the expression 'set out' is strongly connected with 'separation' (i.e. asserting the separate existence of universals) in the *Metaphysics*. Instead, Fait takes Aristotle to mean that setting out, which he thinks

does imply the separation of what is set out, is not *necessary* for generating the Third Man regress because there is an alternative way to generate it: precisely the 'semantic confusion' of taking a term that expresses a *such* to signify a *this*. Fait connects this with Aristotle's general concern to determine definitively, for any type of sophism, its unique cause: from Aristotle's perspective, he argues, 'setting out and semantic confusion are two possible "triggers" for the same argument' and thus lead to two forms of what is ultimately the same sophism, not two distinct sophisms.

My summary remarks here do not address the full detail of Fait's position, largely because I find his argument convincing. If there is a significant point in which I disagree, it concerns the role of our tendency to be misled by the structure of predication itself. Both Fait's 'semantic confusion' (that is, form of expression) and 'setting-out' involve contexts in which a general term is taken as a subject of discussion, which would provide the occasion for supposing 'that it is a *this*' and thus to be one and a substance (169ª33–5). There is then ultimately just one 'trigger' for the Third Man.

CHAPTER 23

In systematic fashion, Aristotle proposes a general formula for solving all sophisms depending on the expression: identify the cause and then respond with its opposite. What this means is straightforward in cases of combination/division and accentuation, and perhaps also homonymy, but it is less obvious in the cases of amphiboly and form of expression. In fact, *SE* 23 continues and expands the argument of *SE* 22, 178ᵇ18–23. Although he explains how this applies to each of the six types dependent on expression, the explanations are cursory except in the case of homonymy and, especially, form of expression; the last of these also includes explicit reference to three previous examples.

179ª14–15: Aristotle includes accentuation in this survey despite having previously acknowledged (*SE* 21) that *arguments* or *refutations* depending on accentuation are only a lecture-room creation. We can easily supply the implied response to the sophism of *SE* 21, of course ('I said *to hou katalueis*, not *to ou katalueis*'), but it is significant that Aristotle includes this purely notional

creature at all: his interest in developing categories for logical and grammatical analysis extends well beyond practical aims.

179ª17–19: Some editors have found this example incomprehensible as it stands and have therefore proposed emendations (see the Notes on the Text). However, a straightforward interpretation is possible if we note that after discussing homonymy, he says, 'the same holds for amphiboly': the animate/inanimate distinction fits rather well with at least two of the examples of amphiboly in *SE* 4, 166ª7–11 (is it the animate knower or the inanimate thing known that knows? If an animate person sees a column, does the inanimate column see?). There is no reason to suppose that the meanings of the *words* 'animate' and 'inanimate' themselves play any role in the argument: 'What someone knows, *touto ginôskei* [does *he* know *this* (animate subject)] | [does *this* know (inanimate subject)]?' The ambiguity is perhaps impossible to replicate in English, but it is clear in Greek. What Aristotle said about that example is 'both the one who knows (*ton ginôskonta*) and what is known (*to ginôskomenon*) can be signified by *ginôskonta* in this argument' (166ª8–9). The distinction he makes is precisely that between something animate (a knower) and something inanimate (a thing known). A similar analysis would fit for the person seeing a column and the case of speaking silent things. Aristotle's examples of homonymy in *SE* 4 also include animate/inanimate pairs, for instance 'dog' (an animal and a star) or 'eagle' (a bird and a pediment).

Other interpreters have overlooked the examples of amphiboly in *SE* 4 in this connection. Perhaps with too much ingenuity, Michael of Ephesus sees an allusion to a specific sophism: 'Is what teaches alive? But a book teaches, and a book is not alive. Is what teaches not alive? but Plato teaches, and Plato is alive.' While some commentators do follow this, it is difficult to see it as Aristotle's intent here.

CHAPTER 24

Sophisms depending on accident are those depending on the 'accident schema' (see the Commentary on 166ᵇ28–36):

*A*1 belongs to *S*; *A*2 belongs to *S*; therefore, *A*1 belongs to *A*2.