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## SOCRATES IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY\*

## INTRODUCTION

In what sense did the Hellenistic philosophers see themselves as the heirs or critics of Socrates? Was Socrates, in their view, a philosopher on whom Plato was the decisive authority? What doctrines or strategies of Socrates were thoroughly alive in this period? These are the principal questions I shall be asking in this paper, particularly the third. To introduce them, and to set the scene, I begin with some general points, starting from two passages which present an image of Socrates at the beginning and at the end of the Hellenistic era. Here first are three lines from the *Silloi* of the Pyrrhonian Timon of Phlius:

From these matters (i.e. the inquiry into nature) he turned aside, the people-chiselling moralising chatterer, the wizard of Greece, whose assertions were sharply pointed, master of the well-turned sneer, a pretty good ironist.<sup>1</sup>

Next Epictetus (*Diss.* 4.5.1–4):

The honourable and good man neither fights with anyone himself, nor, so far as he can, does he let anyone else do so. Of this as of everything else the life of Socrates is available to us as a model (*παράδειγμα*), who not only himself avoided fighting everywhere, but did not let others fight. Notice in Xenophon's *Symposium* how many fights he has resolved, and again how he put up with Thrasymachus, Polus and Callicles... For he kept utterly secure in mind the thought that no one controls another's commanding-faculty (*ἡγεμονικόν*).

In the *Discourses* of Epictetus, Socrates is *the* philosopher, a figure canonised more regularly and with more attention to detail than any other Stoic saint, whether Diogenes, Antisthenes or Zeno. The reader who knew the history of Greek philosophy only from Epictetus would form the impression that Stoicism was the philosophy of Socrates. He would also, by Epictetus' quotations from Plato and Xenophon, learn some of the salient moments of Socrates' life – his divine mission, trial, imprisonment etc. Moreover, what Epictetus says about the elenchus (1.26.17–18, 2.1.32, 2.26.4), the impossibility of *akrasia* (3.3.2–4), removal of the false conceit of knowledge (2.17.1, 3.14.9), and definition (4.1.41) reveals as deep a perception or utilisation of Socrates' philosophy as we find in any ancient thinker after Plato.

Socrates' presence in Epictetus' *Discourses* – which I must pass over here – could be the topic of a monograph.<sup>2</sup> But, to repeat, Epictetus' Socrates is the Stoics' patron

\* This paper was read to a meeting of the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy, held at Cambridge University in September 1986; further versions of it were given at the University of Washington, at Cornell and at Berkeley. I am grateful for the discussion that took place on all these occasions, and particularly to Myles Burnyeat, who also gave me written comments. My principal indebtedness is to Gregory Vlastos, both for the stimulus of his published work and for the time we spent together discussing issues raised in the later part of the paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the award of a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, which gave me the leisure to work on this subject.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. Laert. 2.19 = Timon fr. 799 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum*: ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινεν ὁ λαξόος, ἐνομολέσχης, | Ἑλλήνων ἐπαιδός, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας, | μυκτῆρ ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπατικὸς εἰρωνευτής. For the interpretation of the opening phrase as an allusion to Socrates' disavowal of physics, cf. Sextus, *M* 7.8 and Clement, *Strom.* 1.14.63.3. Details of the whole passage are well discussed by G. Cortassa, *RFIC* 106 (1978), 140–6.

<sup>2</sup> See also 1.9.22–4 (paraphrase of Plato, *Ap.* 29c as in 3.1.19–21), 1.12.3 (S. coupled with Odysseus), 1.12.23 (S. was not in prison since he was there voluntarily), 1.29.16–19 (Plato,

saint. He is no ironist, no sharp talker, no gadfly or sting-ray, no lover or symposiast or philosopher chiefly characterised by self-confessed ignorance (see n. 29 below). If, as I think certain, Epictetus has reflected hard on the Socratic writings of Plato and Xenophon, what he culls from those writings is an ideal of the philosophical life, as he himself conceives of it: ‘Now that Socrates is dead, the memory of what he did or said when alive is no less or even more beneficial to men’ (*Diss.* 4.1.169).

Four hundred years of Stoicism had contributed to the preservation and interpretation of that memory. According to Philodemus, the Stoics actually wanted to be called ‘Socratics’.<sup>3</sup> In the later part of this paper I will show, albeit selectively, how their philosophy in its earliest phase represents a self-conscious attempt to fulfil that wish. But before approaching this topic and the role of Socrates in other Hellenistic schools, let us return to Timon. His lampooning purposes do not cast doubt on the historical interest of his remarks. Timon is a caricaturist who never fails to capture one or two recognisable and dominant features of the philosophers who form his subjects. Hence his evidence is valuable both for what it includes and for what it omits – and all the more so since Timon was writing from a non-doctrinaire perspective at a time when the new Hellenistic philosophies were still in the process of fashioning their identities. His brief remarks deserve closer scrutiny.

Timon associates Socrates’ concentration upon ethics with his repudiation of the inquiry into nature. This, as we shall see in more detail shortly, is the most fundamental characteristic of Socrates in the doxographical tradition. I have the impression that Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.11–16, rather than Plato’s *Apology* or *Phaedo*, was the text that made this mark of Socrates so prominent. Timon’s nicely coined term *ἐννομολέσχη* should mean not, as is standardly supposed, ‘chatterer about laws’, but someone who chatters in an *ἐννομος* way – i.e. a moralist.<sup>4</sup> The expression ‘*Ἑλλήνων ἐπαιδός*’, ‘Wizard of Greece’, could owe something to Plato, *Charm.* 157a, a passage in which the soul’s ‘fair discourses’ are described as *ἐπωδαί*; but it is probably a general reminiscence of the Aristophanic Socrates, to whom Timon is also indebted for *ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας*.<sup>5</sup> In his third line Timon focuses upon Socrates’ powers of wit, censure, and irony.

The witty, sometimes caustic and ironical Socrates – Plato’s Socrates, not Xenophon’s – drops completely out of the early Stoic tradition.<sup>6</sup> The prominence of these features in Timon’s vignette is interesting. As the mentor of Antisthenes, and, through him, of Diogenes and Crates, a censorious and caustic Socrates was cherished

*Ap.* 30c–d, as in 2.2.15–18), 1.29.65–6 (Plato, *Phd.* 116d), 2.1.32 (S. *did* write, for self-examination), 2.12.5 (How did S. behave? He forced his interlocutor to give him testimony, and had no need of any other; cf. *Gorg.* 474a), 3.24.60–1 (S. behaving as a free man, dear to the gods), 4.1.159–60 (S.’s life as a paradigm of making everything subordinate to the laws, drawing on Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.18), 4.4.21–2 (Plato, *Crito* 43d), 4.11.19–21 (S.’s toilet habits, rejecting Aristophanes, *Nub.* 103). Other refs. to Socrates in Plato and Xenophon: 1.26.18, 3.12.15 (Plato, *Ap.* 38a); 2.1.15 (*Phd.* 77e, *Crito* 46c); 2.2.8–9 (Xen. *Ap.* 2); 2.5.18–20 (Plato, *Ap.* 26e); 3.1.42 (*Alc.* 1, 131d); 3.22.26 (Plato, *Clitopho* 407ab); 3.23.20–6 (Plato, *Ap.* 30c, 17c, *Crit.* 46b); 3.24.99 (Plato, *Ap.* 28d–29a); 4.1.41 (Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.1). K. Döring includes a chapter on Epictetus in his *Exemplum Socratis*, *Hermes Einzelschrift* 42 (Wiesbaden, 1979), 43–79, but misses an opportunity to deal with the subject in a searching way; cf. my review in *CR NS* 31 (1981), 298–9.

<sup>3</sup> *De stoicis* cols. 12–13, *Σωκρατ[ι]κοὶ καλεῖσθαι θέ[λο]υσιν*; see G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae* (Naples, 1986) II, Diogenes V B 126.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Plato’s use of *ἐννομος* in combination with *σπουδαῖος*, *Rep.* 4, 424e.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Nub.* 130, where Strepsiades wonders how he will learn *λόγων ἀκριβῶν σκυδαλάμους*.

<sup>6</sup> Irony for the Stoics was exclusively a feature of the inferior man; cf. *SVF* 3.630.

by the Cynics, with whom Timon felt some sympathy.<sup>7</sup> Even Epictetus, in his dialectical practice and choice of vivid metaphors, was implicitly following their lead. Unfortunately the reliable evidence on Cynics is insufficient to provide much material for speculating on the extent to which they had any theoretical views about the connexion between Socratic irony and the way philosophical discourse should be conducted. On this, as on everything else, Socrates was attacked by the Epicureans (see below). But irony cannot be said to constitute a dominant feature of Socrates when we are considering his positive role in the main stream of Hellenistic philosophy.

From our perspective, indelibly coloured by Plato's Socrates, this is remarkable. But the irony of Socrates, together with all the other glittering characteristics of his discourse and argumentative style – what the Epicurean Colotes witheringly calls his *ἀλάζωνες λόγοι* (Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1117d) – was inimitable and quite inseparable from Plato's dialogues. Xenophon's often stodgy Socrates is no ironist. Though Socrates' philosophical principles clamoured for replication and interpretation, there could be no dissemination of the whole man, on the basis of all the sources, either as a paradigm on whom to model one's life or as a more abstract set of theories. Socrates was too complex, too individualistically contoured, to be appropriated in full by any single philosophical school. One of his closest approximations, Diogenes of Sinope, earned the description from Plato, 'a Socrates gone mad' (Diog. Laert. 6.54).

Timon's Socrates and that of Epictetus are composite but partial portraits, derived both from books and from Socrates' philosophical afterlife. A hundred years after Socrates' death – the time of the foundation of the Garden and the Stoa – a living oral tradition concerning the historical figure can almost certainly be excluded. Even if stories about the man himself were passed on by word of mouth, the Socrates of my inquiry is the subject of the 'Socratic discourses' composed by his associates, Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aeschines. In general, it seems, neither Hellenistic philosophers with an allegiance to Socrates, nor biographers and doxographers, addressed the 'Socratic problem' of modern scholarship. If they were aware of discrepancies between Xenophon's accounts and Plato's dialogues, these were not regarded as any reason for having to prefer one account to the other. Control of the material, we can conjecture, was determined not by preconceptions about the superiority in historicity or philosophical sophistication of Plato to Xenophon, but by the need to derive from both of them a well-founded philosophical paradigm that would be internally coherent and consistent with the Hellenistic philosopher's own stance.

Timon's observation that Socrates concentrated on ethics and repudiated physics is the best starting-point for viewing the Hellenistic philosophers' attitude and approach to the great man. The point had already been made in similar brevity by Aristotle: 'Socrates occupied himself with ethics and not at all with nature as a whole' (*Metaph. A.* 6, 987b1–2); and it would become the most commonly repeated Socratic characteristic in the doxographical tradition. Here, for instance, is the pseudo-Galenic article on Socrates:

The original philosophers opted only for the study of nature and made this the goal of their philosophy. Socrates, who succeeded them much later, said that this was inaccessible to men (for he regarded secure cognition of non-evident things as most difficult), and that investigation of how one might best conduct one's life and avoid bad things and get the greatest possible share of fine things was more useful. Believing this more useful he ignored the study of nature... and devoted his thought to an ethical disposition that would distinguish good and bad, right and wrong... Observing that authorities in these matters would need to be persuasive and would

<sup>7</sup> Timon's Cynic leanings are discussed in my paper, 'Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and Satirist', *PCPhS* NS 24 (1978). See also A. Brancacci, 'La filosofia di Pirrone e le sue relazioni con il Cinismo', in G. Giannantoni (ed.), *Lo Scetticismo antico* (Naples, 1981), 213–42.

achieve this if they were evidently good at using dialectical arguments in dealings with their interlocutors, he elaborated dialectic.<sup>8</sup>

The incorporation of dialectic in this account will concern us later. For the present I call attention to the passage from Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.11–16, which by the Hellenistic period had become the principal authority for Socrates' exclusively ethical orientation. Xenophon is defending Socrates from the charge of impiety. He supports this by saying that Socrates differed from the majority of other philosophers in not studying the nature of everything and showed up such people as fools. Did they come to the study of nature thinking they had an adequate understanding of human affairs, or did they think they were acting properly in neglecting the human and studying the divine? Socrates found it amazing that they did not find the indiscoverability of these things obvious, and cited in support of this the failure of scientific pundits to reach agreement with one another. Xenophon then develops Socrates' exploitation of discrepant opinions with a brief survey of pre-Socratic theories and indicates his indictment of the uselessness of such inquiries. Finally, says Xenophon, Socrates himself was constantly discussing human affairs, investigating the nature of piety, justice and other ethical concepts: he regarded people who knew them as noble and good, and thought that those who did not would rightly be called slavish (*ἀνδραποδώδης*).

If this passage strikes us as a travesty of the Platonic Socrates, it possibly captures the Hellenistic Socrates more aptly than any single text of Plato. In essence Xenophon is describing the Socrates whom Antisthenes, Aristippus and Diogenes claimed to be following, and whom the Stoic Aristo would take as his model.<sup>9</sup> Probably all of these, like Xenophon's Socrates, premised their interest in ethics on the repudiation of any concern with physics. The sometimes hectoring tone of the passage – e.g., 'slavish' (*ἀνδραποδώδης*) – is redolent of Cynic moralising. Notice too the attribution to Socrates of 'disagreement' as an argumentative strategy for disposing of the physicists' credentials; Socrates is already being represented as a sceptic, so far as non-ethical knowledge is concerned. Ethical expertise, however, is precisely his province. His general confession of ignorance is never mentioned by Xenophon. Nor does that feature of Socrates seem to belong to the most basic Hellenistic portrait. Like his dialectic, it is a characteristic to be mentioned or omitted according to the kind of paradigm his inheritors want him to instantiate.

Ancient writers were well aware of the fact that Socrates, as here portrayed in Xenophon, did not square well with the Socrates of Plato's later dialogues (according to modern chronology) or even with some of Xenophon's remarks elsewhere about his theological interests. By the end of the Hellenistic period it is a commonplace that Plato attributed to Socrates interests and theories which were entirely Plato's own (cf. Cicero, *Rep.* 1.15–16). The same is true implicitly as early as Aristotle. Only in late

<sup>8</sup> Ps.-Galen, *Hist. phil.* ap. Diels, *Dox. Graec.* 597, 1–17: τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φιλοσοφῶντων φυσιολογεῖν μόνον προελομένων καὶ τοῦτο τέλος τῆς κατ' αὐτοὺς φιλοσοφίας πεποιημένων ἐπιγεγονῶς πολλοῖς ὕστερον χρόνοις Σωκράτης τοῦτο μὲν ἀνέφικτον ἔφησεν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχειν (τῶν γὰρ ἀδῆλων κατάληψιν βεβαίαν λαβεῖν τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ἐνόμισε), τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ὅπως ἄμεινον διάγοι τις, καὶ τῶν μὲν κακῶν ἀποτραπή τῶν δὲ καλῶν ὡς πλείστων μέτασχοι, τοῦτο μᾶλλον συνοίσειεν. καὶ τοῦτο νομίσας χρησιμώτερον τῆς μὲν φυσιολογίας ἡμέληκεν... ἠθικὴν δὲ τινα διάθεσιν ἐπινενοηκῶς διαγνωστικὴν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν αἰσχροῦν τε καὶ καλῶν... κατιδῶν δὲ ὅτι δεήσει τοὺς τούτων προσετισσομένους εὐπειθείας μετέχειν, τοῦτο δ' ἂν ὑπάρξειεν εἰ λόγοις διαλεκτικοῖς φαίνοντο πρὸς τοὺς προϊόντας καλῶς κεχρημένοι, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπινενόηκεν.

<sup>9</sup> For Aristippus' repudiation of mathematics, dialectic and physics, cf. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae* I, Aristippus IV A 170, 172. Antisthenes, at least as viewed by the Cynics, disparaged the study of *γράμματα* (Diog. Laert. 6.103).

antiquity do we find Socrates credited with Platonist metaphysics (e.g., by ps.-Plutarch, *Plac.* 878b). The absence of an ancient Socratic problem on this issue will only occasion surprise or difficulty if Plato's dialogues are treated as the standard reference-point for Socrates' philosophy, taking priority over the writings of Xenophon, Antisthenes and others. In fact Plato, or what we call Plato's Socratic dialogues, appear to have been widely regarded as neither more nor less authentic witnesses to Socrates than Xenophon's writings.

The correctness of this last point, if it is correct, should not be interpreted as reducing the importance of Plato's Socrates in the eyes of preeminent philosophers such as Zeno, Chrysippus and Arcesilaus. In the later parts of this paper, I hope to show that it was Plato's Socrates, rather than any other, that stimulated serious philosophy, as we understand it today. But for the fourth century B.C. and for less demanding readers Xenophon had two advantages over Plato. First, it was easier to discover what the opinions of his Socrates were. Secondly, Xenophon's readers, in Antisthenes and Diogenes, had living embodiments of the *ἐγκράτεια* which he so constantly emphasises as Socrates' dominant characteristic. No ancient writer, I think, ever regarded the *life* of Plato as emblematic of Socrates. It was not too difficult, on the other hand, to think of the Cynics as his genuine if one-sided imitators.<sup>10</sup>

Such a perception will have been encouraged by the activities of the Academy immediately after Plato's death and by the direction and style of Aristotle's philosophy. If Plato's later philosophy was readily seen as a considerable departure from that of Socrates, his immediate successors can hardly have struck their contemporaries as Socratic in any sense. Epictetus' Socrates, however Stoicised, is utterly recognisable as the man whose life and arguments and moral passion constituted an ethical revolution. Aristotle, by contrast, is decidedly reticent on all of this. His interest in Plato of course ensures that 'our' Socrates is an important presence implicitly in the ethical treatises; and there is the well-known handful of passages which report and criticise Socrates by name. But Aristotle scarcely even hints at the moral significance of Socrates, as we moderns perceive it, or as it was perceived in the Hellenistic period. In a sense, we learn more about Socrates from this brief remark by Plutarch: 'Socrates was the first to show that life accommodates philosophy at every time and part and in all states and affairs without qualification'.<sup>11</sup>

Possibly Aristotle gave a more rounded account of Socrates in some of his exoteric writings.<sup>12</sup> Even so, the absence of anything comparable from his ethical treatises is remarkable. Did Aristotle himself help to set the tone for the hostile biographies of Socrates that Aristoxenus and other Peripatetics wrote, and that the Stoic Panaetius later contested? The question cannot be answered; but the fact that it can be posed at all is relevant to our inquiry. Socrates was not universally admired by Hellenistic philosophers. Before turning to his positive role in Stoicism and Academic Scepticism, something must be said about his detractors.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. G. Grote, 'Antisthenes and his disciple Diogenes were in many respects closer approximations to Socrates than Plato or any of the other Socratic companions', *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates* (London, 1885), iii.505.

<sup>11</sup> *Moral.* 796c: πρώτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγμασιν ἁπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *On philosophy* fr. I Ross (Plutarch, *Moral.* 1118c), in which Aristotle reported the Delphic 'know yourself' as the starting-point of Socrates' philosophy.

## CRITICISM OF SOCRATES IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

We have no record, so far as I know, concerning any views of Theophrastus on Socrates. That silence may at least suggest substantial lack of interest.<sup>13</sup> Some of his fellow Peripatetics and successors were more outspoken. According to Porphyry, Aristoxenus' life of Socrates was more malevolent than the accusations of Meletus and Anytus (fr. 51 Wehrli). Most famously, it made out Socrates to be a bigamist, and also described him as the boyfriend of Archelaus. The charge of bigamy, repeated by other Peripatetics – Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum and Satirus (Athenaeus 13, 555d) – acquired sufficient currency to provoke the Stoic Panaetius into writing, what Plutarch calls, an adequate refutation.<sup>14</sup> Such tittle-tattle, if it were confined to Aristoxenus, would merit no further comment. The fact that it became a common Peripatetic practice suggests a more studied attempt to undermine the ethical integrity of Socrates' life. We may probably conclude that a good many Peripatetics sought to combat the tendency of the other Socratic schools to set up Socrates as the paradigm of how a philosophical life should be lived. The more Socrates' exclusive concentration on ethics was stressed, the less at home he could be in the research environment of the Lyceum.

Socrates' repudiation of physics and theological speculation was one, but only one, of the many charges levelled against him by the Epicureans. Thanks to Knut Kleve, evidence of the range and intensity of this Epicurean criticism has now been thoroughly marshalled.<sup>15</sup> In the case of Epicurus himself it amounts to no more than an objection to Socratic irony.<sup>16</sup> Yet if Epicurus was fairly restrained in his remarks about Socrates, his immediate followers were not. From Metrodorus and Idomeneus, extending through Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus down to Diogenes of Oenoanda, a tradition of hostility to Socrates was established that is virulent even by the standards of ancient polemic. In their writings, Socrates was portrayed as the complete anti-Epicurean – a sophist, a rhetorician, a sceptic, and someone whose ethical inquiries turn human life into chaos.

Kleve (249–50) explains this unmitigated hostility with the observation that Socrates and the Epicureans represent 'two different human types'. By this he seems to mean that their views of the world were diametrically opposed. However, this cannot be a sufficiently penetrating explanation. Both Socrates and Epicurus were in the business of curing people's souls. From Xenophon's Socrates especially, the Epicureans could have derived excellent support for much of their ethical practice – their concern with frugality, self-sufficiency, control of vain and unnecessary desires.<sup>17</sup> That they chose instead to attack aspects of Socrates' ethics, and to treat him as a thorough-going sceptic, indicates a view of Socrates as transmitted by contemporary Stoics and Academics.

Early Epicureans wrote books against various Platonic dialogues – *Euthyphro*,

<sup>13</sup> I have noticed only two inconsequential references to Socrates in the material collected by W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam, 1984): L 74 B, and L 106.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, *Aristides* 335c–d (= Panaetius fr. 132 van Straaten), which includes Hieronymus of Rhodes as another of the Peripatetic scandalmongers: *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺτους ἱκανῶς ὁ Παναίτιος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Σωκράτους ἀντίρρηκεν*.

<sup>15</sup> 'Scurra Atticus. The Epicurean View of Socrates', *Suzetesis. Studi sull' Epicureismo Greco e Romano offerti a Marcello Gigante*, edited by G. P. Carratelli (Naples, 1983), i.227–53.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, *Brutus* 292 (Usener 231).

<sup>17</sup> Socrates' hardness and self-control: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.1, 1.2.14, 1.3.5, 1.5.4–6, 1.6.1–3; Socrates made those of his associates who had *πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας* give them up: *ibid.* 1.2.64.

*Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Gorgias*.<sup>18</sup> The latter two, especially the protreptic passage in the *Euthydemus*, were texts which the Stoics seem to have particularly prized (see below). It is legitimate to guess that much of the basis for Epicurean criticism of Socrates should be sought in the central role he was now playing as a paradigm for their Stoic rivals. This suggestion, or rather the general probability that Epicurean attacks on Socrates had a contemporary rather than a historical target, is confirmed by Colotes' criticism in his books against the *Lysis* and the *Euthydemus*. There he maintained that Socrates ignored what is self-evident (*ἐναργές*) and suspended judgement (*ἐπόχως πράττειν*).<sup>19</sup> Here Socrates, au pied de la lettre, has been turned into a prototype of the Academic Arcesilaus. *ἐποχή* at this date points specifically to the Academic sceptics; and the Stoic Aristo commented on Arcesilaus' interest in arguments against *ἐνάργεια*.<sup>20</sup> Arcesilaus and the Cyrenaics (another Socratic school) were the two contemporary targets of Colotes' book, *Conformity to the doctrines of the other philosophers makes life impossible*.<sup>21</sup>

The Stoics and the sceptical Academics were the Epicureans' main professional rivals.<sup>22</sup> Both sets of opponents laid claim to being followers of Socrates. We have yet to see what they meant by this claim, and how, being rivals themselves, they could appropriate a dogmatic Socrates in the one case and a sceptical Socrates in the other. For the present it is sufficient to note their joint concern to establish their identity as Socratics. This justifies the suggestion that Epicurean criticism of Socrates be seen, at least in part, as a means of undercutting the most obvious alternative models of the philosophical life – Socrates as interpreted by Stoics and Academics.

## SOCRATES IN THE ACADEMY OF POLEMO AND ARCESILAUS

Arcesilaus pinned his credentials as one who suspends judgement about everything, and his dialectical practice, on Socrates, and claimed that Plato's dialogues should be read in this light. Cicero, *De oratore* 3.67, gives us this report:

Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, was the first to derive this principal point from various of Plato's books and from Socratic discourses – that there is nothing certain which the senses or the mind can grasp. He is said to have belittled every criterion of mind and sense, and begun the practice – though it was absolutely Socratic – not of indicating his own opinion, but of speaking against what anyone stated as his opinion.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>18</sup> For Colotes' books *Against Plato's Lysis* and *Against Plato's Euthydemus*, cf. W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (Leipzig, 1906), 163–70. Colotes also wrote against the myth of Er in *Republic* 10 (cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* XIV, B. Einarson and P. De Lacy (edd.), 154–5). Metrodorus wrote *Against Plato's Euthyphro* (Philodemus, *Piet.* col. 77, 1 ff.), and Zeno of Sidon, *Against Plato's Gorgias* (fr. 25, Angeli-Colaizzo [*Cron. Exc.* 9, 1979, 80]). Nor was it just Plato's Socrates that was attacked. In his *Περὶ οἰκονομίας*, Philodemus objected point by point to the Socrates of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. On all of this, cf. Kleve (n. 15 above).

<sup>19</sup> For the Greek text, cf. C. Mancini, *Cron. Exc.* 6 (1976), 61–6; and see also Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1118a.

<sup>20</sup> Diog. Laert. 7.162–3. Cf. my remarks in 'Diogenes Laertius, Life of Arcesilaus', *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 442.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1120c.

<sup>22</sup> They fall outside the scope of David Sedley's article, 'Epicurus and his Professional Rivals', *Cahiers de Philologie* 1 (1976), 122–59, which is largely concerned with the attitude of Epicurus himself to earlier philosophers and to his elder contemporaries.

<sup>23</sup> Arcesilaus primum, qui Polemonem audierat, ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit; quem ferunt...aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque iudicium primumque instituisse – quamquam id fuit Socraticum maxime – non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset disputare. Cf. also *Fin.* 2.2; 5.10.

Cicero emphasises Arcesilaus' originality in this reading of Plato and Socrates. He was probably right to do so. What, thanks to Gregory Vlastos, we are becoming accustomed to calling Socrates' 'disavowal of knowledge<sub>c</sub>' – i.e., Socrates' disclaimer to possess *certainty* of any truth whatsoever – must have been chiefly associated, when it was noted at all, with the Platonic Socrates.<sup>24</sup> Xenophon's Socrates, like that of Aristippus and the Cynics, repudiates any interest in the inquiry into nature; and Arcesilaus will have appreciated the passage (mentioned above) from *Memorabilia* 1.1.12–15 in which Socrates supports his indifference to physics by exploiting disagreement between natural philosophers. But I find little evidence that fourth-century interpreters of Socrates outside Plato, with some support from Aeschines Socraticus, attributed to him any scepticism about his capacity for knowledge in general, or that they took his ethical doctrines to involve seriously-held reservations about his certainty that they were true and demonstrable.<sup>25</sup> Antisthenes said that virtue needs nothing in addition to Socratic strength; it pertains to actions, and needs neither a quantity of arguments nor lessons.<sup>26</sup> That this strength included anything like Socrates' disavowal of certainty, as elucidated by Vlastos, is a refinement we may surely exclude.

Other pieces of evidence point in the same direction. Aristotle, once and very briefly, mentions Socrates' 'confession of ignorance', in explaining why he asked questions but did not answer them (*Soph. el.* 34,183b7–8). The complete absence of the same point from all the ethical contexts in which Aristotle discusses Socrates' theses on virtue and knowledge suggests that he did not regard the confession of ignorance as a constitutive feature of Socrates' philosophy, or as something which cast any doubt on the certainty Socrates attached to these doctrines.

Timon, as we saw, makes Socrates into a non-physicist, but he does not treat him as a proto-sceptic. His readiness to praise Xenophanes, Democritus and Protagoras for their sceptical leanings suggests that he would have enrolled Socrates too, if his self-confessed ignorance was already being treated as a fundamental characteristic.<sup>27</sup> In fact, outside the Academy the tradition of the ignorant Socrates never seems to have been taken very seriously. It is mentioned late, and inconsequentially, in Diogenes Laertius' life of Socrates (2.32), and forms no part of the pseudo-Galenic doxography (cited above). Writers from later antiquity, if they mention this feature at all, generally follow the lead of Antiochus, who had removed Socrates from Arcesilaus' list of sceptical predecessors by treating his confession of ignorance as ironical.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>24</sup> 'Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge', *Philosophical Quarterly* 35 (1985), 1–31. Vlastos argues, with great force and originality, that Plato's Socrates disavows certain or infallible knowledge of anything (knowledge<sub>c</sub>), but avows elenctic or fallible knowledge of propositions arrived at and tested by his elenctic method (knowledge<sub>E</sub>).

<sup>25</sup> Two fragments of Aeschines Socraticus should be mentioned. In fr. 3 Krauss, Socrates says he would convict himself of considerable *μωρία* if he attributed any help he had been to Alcibiades to any *τέχνη* rather than to 'divine dispensation'; and in fr. 4, he says he has no knowledge of any *μάθημα* which he could teach a man and thereby help him. According to Demetrius, *De eloc.* 297, the properly Socratic method of instruction, convicting the interlocutor of ignorance, was especially imitated by Aeschines and Plato.

<sup>26</sup> Antisthenes ap. Diog. Laert. 6.11: *αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος· τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων.*

<sup>27</sup> See Lloyd-Jones/Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum* 779 (Protagoras), 820 (Democritus), and for Timon's praise of Xenophanes, Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.223.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero, *Acad.* 2.15 (cf. Quintilian 9.2.46, Dio Chrysost. 12.14, Themistius 21, 259b). In *Acad.* 1.16, however, Varro (speaking for Antiochus) reports Socrates' practice of 'saying that

My final reason for making Arcesilaus the effective creator of the totally sceptical Socrates is a belief that this feature must postdate the beginnings of Stoicism. It seems to me most unlikely that Zeno and Aristo would have modelled their philosophy so closely on Socrates if his confession of ignorance was already a dominant part of the standard characterisation. At the beginning of the Hellenistic period, what Socrates most prominently stood for, I think, was the thesis that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance. Or, as Diogenes Laertius' doxography states (2.31), drawing on Plato, *Euthydemus* 281e, 'he said that only one thing is good – knowledge, and only one thing is bad, ignorance'. The Socratic literature, taken as a whole, must have made it extraordinarily difficult to apply these propositions to a completely ignorant Socrates, who would thus by implication be vicious and in possession of all that is bad.<sup>29</sup>

In accounting for Arcesilaus' scepticism, we do best to take Cicero's report seriously. Read literally, it tells us that what drew Arcesilaus powerfully in this direction was in fact his own original interpretation of the Platonic Socrates – the Socrates who, even at the moment of concluding an ethical argument in the *Gorgias* 508e6–509a7, which he describes as 'clamped down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant', confesses that he does not speak as one who has knowledge.<sup>30</sup> Arcesilaus' scepticism, on this view, was actually the outcome of his reading of Plato's Socrates – a fundamentally new reading – and not something he foisted on Socrates and Plato because he was already a sceptic. This tallies with the well-known passage from Cicero's *Academica* 1.44–5, where Cicero treats Arcesilaus' scepticism as a response to the obscurity of the things that led Socrates and earlier philosophers to a *confessio ignorantis*. In that context, Arcesilaus, according to Cicero, took Socrates to have had knowledge of just one thing – his own ignorance. The nearest the Platonic Socrates comes to saying this is *Apology* 21b4–5: 'As for myself, I am not aware of being wise in anything, great or small.' The expression he uses, *σύννοια ἐμαντῶ*, probably means only that Socrates does not think of himself as wise in anything (cf. *Ap.* 21d3–6). But Arcesilaus, we can suppose, interpreted Socrates as making the strong cognitive claim that he *knew* that he knew nothing (for this interpretation of Socrates, see also Antiochus, in n. 28 above.), and then denied that he himself knew even this much.<sup>31</sup>

My suggestion about a genuine causal connexion between Arcesilaus' scepticism and his interpretation of Socrates seems to be novel in modern scholarship. But is it correct? I have given the external reasons for taking it to be so – the absence of any clear evidence of a rigorously sceptical Socrates prior to Arcesilaus. What makes me

he knew nothing except that very thing', and says that he surpassed everyone else in thinking that he knew nothing – an opinion in which he consistently persisted. This passage, unlike *Acad.* 2.15, seems to reflect Antiochus' sympathy for Arcesilaus' interpretation of Socrates (*Acad.* 1.45), which, of course, he will have fully endorsed during his own sceptical phase; cf. the report of Socrates' total disapproval of an *ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae* (ibid. 17), which is hard to reconcile with Antiochus' own mature conception of philosophy, or his bracketing of Plato and Socrates in *Acad.* 2.15.

<sup>29</sup> Epictetus' Socrates *knows* various moral principles, yet 'never said that he knew or taught anything' (*Diss.* 3.5.17; cf. 3.23.22). Andrea Wilson has suggested to me that this may be read as an alternative both to the sceptical Academics' Socrates and to the ironically ignorant Socrates of Antiochus. Epictetus interestingly differentiates Socrates from Diogenes and Zeno, viewing Socrates' special province as the elenchus, Diogenes' as reproof, and Zeno's that of instruction and doctrine (*Diss.* 3.21.18–19).

<sup>30</sup> For the interpretation of Socrates' procedure here, cf. Vlastos (above n. 24), 20–2.

<sup>31</sup> *Acad.* 1.45: *itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset*. For this thesis, Arcesilaus could cite the authority of Metrodorus of Chios, mentioned by Cicero at *Acad.* 2.73.

more confident of its correctness is the belief that virtually everything we know about Arcesilaus indicates his singleminded intent to model himself on the Platonic Socrates – his declining to write books, what Diogenes Laertius (4.33) calls his ‘excellence at stating propositions and deriving conclusions from them, his concern for linguistic precision in conversation, his hard-hitting rejoinders and frankness’,<sup>32</sup> his playing the role of questioner rather than answerer, his elenctic practice, and, quite generally, a life devoted to discussion with anyone he thought it worth talking to. According to Epiphanius – not the most trustworthy witness – Arcesilaus said that ‘truth is accessible only to god and not to man’.<sup>33</sup> Does this reflect a tradition that Arcesilaus said something analogous to Socrates’ disparaging contrast in the *Apology* (23b) between the worthlessness of human wisdom and the wisdom of god?

Elsewhere I have argued that Arcesilaus’ Socratic character was first formed by his encounters with his elder Platonists, Polemo, Crates and Crantor.<sup>34</sup> They presumably had not discovered the sceptical Socrates, but the little that we know about their philosophy suggests (if I may quote myself) that they ‘were already stressing the Socratic side of Plato in contrast with the systematic and theoretical tendencies of Speusippus and Xenocrates’. One of the few substantive reports about Polemo not only points in this direction, but is also remarkably similar to testimonies for Antisthenes and the Stoic Aristo: ‘Polemo was in the habit of saying that people should be trained in practical matters and not in dialectical theorems, like someone who has absorbed some musical expertise and does not practice, and so being admired for their argumentative powers but inconsistent with themselves in their character.’<sup>35</sup>

I think the mature Arcesilaus would have endorsed these educational precepts. Two aphorisms attributed to him are warnings against dialectic and dialecticians.<sup>36</sup> If these refer, as they surely do, to the professional school of Dialecticians, no conflict arises with his own dialectical practice.<sup>37</sup> Like Socrates, he uses argument not for argument’s sake, but to subject the opinions of his interlocutor to critical scrutiny.

Reflection along these lines suggests that we should start to think of Arcesilaus as a sceptical Socrates, where the proper name carries its full resonance – commitment to a life in which nothing can countervail the claims of intellectual integrity. In reporting Arcesilaus’ scepticism in the *Academica*, Cicero on two occasions attaches the highest moral commendation to suspension of judgement. For Arcesilaus, he maintains, opining nothing was not simply the rational response to the impossibility of knowledge, but the only right and honourable response (*Acad.* 2.77). And he insists on Arcesilaus’ complete consistency in refraining from all assertion (*Acad.* 1.45). He might just as well have said Arcesilaus’ ‘Socratic strength’.

There is, of course, a further tradition concerning Arcesilaus’ emergent scepticism,

<sup>32</sup> ἦν [Arcesilaus] δὲ καὶ ἀξιωματικώτατος καὶ συνηγμένος καὶ ἐν τῇ λαλίᾳ διαστατικὸς τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐπικώπτης θ’ ἰκανῶς καὶ παρρησιαστής.

<sup>33</sup> *Adv. Haeres.* 3.29 (Diels, *Dox. Gr.*, p. 592.6): ‘Ἀρκεσίλαος ἔφασκε τῷ θεῷ ἐφικτὸν εἶναι μόνῳ [Diels: μόνον codd.] τὸ ἀληθές, ἀνθρώπῳ δ’ οὐ.

<sup>34</sup> In the article cited above (n. 20), 440–1.

<sup>35</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 4.18: ἔφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι, καθάπερ ἁρμονικὸν τι τέχνην καταπιόντα καὶ μὴ μελετήσαντα, ὡς κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν θαναμάζεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάθεσιν ἑαυτοῖς μάχεσθαι.

<sup>36</sup> *Stobaeus* 2.22, 9 *Wachsmuth*: ‘Ἀρκεσίλαος... ἔφη, τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς εὐκέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκτηις, οἵτινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται. 2.23,13: διαλεκτικὴν φεύγε· συγκυκᾶ τᾶν κατώ. I am grateful to David Blank for suggesting that the second passage may be a reminiscence of Plato, *Phd.* 101e: ἰκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες.

<sup>37</sup> For the Dialectical School, cf. D. N. Sedley, ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy’, *PCPhS* NS 23 (1977), 74–120.

which does not undermine anything I have been saying – his opposition to Zeno’s epistemology. If Zeno, an older pupil of Polemo, was both representing himself as a Socratic, and also advancing doctrines inconsistent, in Arcesilaus’ opinion, with that posture, we obtain a further motive for his advertising Socrates’ sceptical tendencies. At this point, then, we may leave Arcesilaus, the discoverer of the sceptical Socrates, and turn to Socrates in early Stoicism.

### SOCRATES IN EARLY STOICISM

From Zeno to Epictetus, that is to say throughout the history of the Stoa, Socrates is the philosopher with whom the Stoics most closely aligned themselves. The importance of Socrates to the Stoics is regularly acknowledged, but it has never been studied in any detail.<sup>38</sup> One reason for this neglect, I suspect, is a prejudice concerning Plato. We tend to regard Socrates as Plato’s special property, and find it difficult to accept the idea that the early Stoics, who are often hostile to Plato, could have reached independent interpretations of Socrates that deserve a serious place in the history of philosophy.

The Stoics’ use of Socrates is too large a subject to be studied in all its aspects in a single article. What I will do here is first, expand my introductory remarks on his unique importance to the Stoa; then, I will argue that divergent interpretations of Socratic ethics help to explain Aristo’s disagreement with Zeno over the value of *τὰ ἀδιάφορα*.

Socrates’ name crops up a good many times in the fragments of early and middle Stoicism. Passing for the moment over Zeno’s biography, we find that his follower Sphaerus wrote a work in three books *On Lycurgus and Socrates* (*SVF* 1.620). The association of these two names must indicate an interest in Socrates’ attitude to law and society.<sup>39</sup> Cleanthes, in Book 2 of his *On pleasure*, said that Socrates on every occasion taught that the same man is just and happy, and that he put a curse on the man who first distinguished justice from utility (*SVF* 1.558). Chrysippus commented on Socrates’ devotion to dialectic in a list of philosophers which includes Plato, Aristotle and their successors down to Polemo and Strato (*SVF* 2.126). Antipater, the fifth Head of the Stoa, reported one of Socrates’ sayings (*SVF* 3 Antipater, 65), and in his work *On prophecy* included ‘very many instances of amazing Socratic prophecies’ (Cicero, *De div.* 1.123; cf. 1.6). Panaetius defended Socrates against Peripatetic detraction (see above), and also restricted the ‘truthful’ accounts of Socrates to the writings of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines, raising doubts about those of Phaedo and Euclides, and condemning all the rest.<sup>40</sup> His effort to establish a canon of the reputable Socratica was combined, if Pohlenz is right, with his responsibility for authorising the doxographical tradition that Socrates, as the

<sup>38</sup> For such acknowledgements, cf. A. Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa* (Berlin, 1897), 320; H. Maier, *Sokrates* (Tübingen, 1913), 610.

<sup>39</sup> Note that Sphaerus, who spent time with the Spartan reformer Cleomenes, also wrote a book *On the Spartan constitution* (loc. cit.).

<sup>40</sup> Diogenes Laertius 2.64: πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφάντος, Ἀντισθένης, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας. Does ἀληθεῖς mean ‘authentic’, in the sense that Panaetius accepted Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines as the authors of the Socratic works ascribed to them? Or does it mean that he regarded their works as genuine or truthful accounts of Socrates? The latter is more likely. ἀληθής does not appear to be Diogenes’ normal word for describing a work’s authenticity, for which he uses μόνος with the genitive, e.g. Σωτίων... ταῦτα μόνον φησὶ Διογένης εἶναι, 6.80 (cf. 7.163), or γνήσιος as distinct from νοθεύονται (3.57, 3.62). At 2.105 he contrasts γνήσιος with δισταζόμενον.

founder of ethics, was the ancestor of all the post-Socratic schools.<sup>41</sup> Posidonius cited Socrates, Diogenes and Antisthenes as examples of moral progress (Diog. Laert. 7.91).

From Cicero we can infer that Stoic philosophers were in the practice of attaching Socrates' name to some of their central ethical theses. For instance, they took from Socrates the view that *omnes insipientes esse non sanos* (*Tusc.* 3.10), or supposed that 'everything goes well for great men if the statements of our school and the leader of philosophy Socrates are adequate concerning the bounty and resources of virtue' (*ND* 2.167).

Material such as this indicates Socrates' authority within the Stoic school, but it does not take us beyond surface impressions. In order to approach the subject in a more penetrating way, we need to reflect on the origins of Stoicism and the various lines its founding fathers developed. According to the biographical tradition, Zeno's decision to devote himself to philosophy was generated by his reading about Socrates. In one version of the story, his merchant father brought the young Zeno books about Socrates from Athens (Diog. Laert. 7.31). In another, he started to read Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Book 2 in an Athenian bookshop, and began to associate with the Cynic Crates because the shopkeeper told him that Crates was a man like Socrates (Diog. Laert. 7.2–3). In a third version, what brought Zeno to Athens from Citium was his reading of Socrates' *Apology* (*SVF* 1.9); whether Plato's or Xenophon's, we are not told.

The literal truth of these stories is unimportant. What they attest to is a tradition, which Zeno's followers must have encouraged, that Socrates was the primary inspiration of his philosophy. The next step is to consider this tradition in relation to Zeno's studies with the Cynic Crates and the Academic Polemo.<sup>42</sup> If I was right in my earlier remarks about Polemo, his view of Socrates, though strongly tinged by Plato, may not have differed in many essential points from what was being propagated by the Cynics. In any case, it may be misleading to think of Zeno's philosophical formation as a Cynic phase, followed by an Academic orientation, leading finally to his own independent position. We should perhaps view him as a Socratic throughout, who looked to the Cynics and the Academy for interpretations of Socrates' philosophy which he could develop or reject according to his own independent reflections. So I proceed to test this hypothesis.

From the Cynics Zeno is likely to have acquired an account of Socrates' philosophy that did not differ essentially from ethical doctrines attributed to Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.10–13). In advancing such propositions as the following – 'the same men are noble and virtuous', 'virtue is sufficient for happiness', 'the wise man is self-sufficient', 'virtuous men are friends', 'prudence (*φρόνησις*) is the most secure fortification', 'what is good is honourable (*καλά*) and what is bad is disgraceful (*αἰσχρά*)' – Antisthenes, we can assume, took himself to be representing Socrates' philosophy. Zeno's agreement to all these propositions, which he could, of course, check against Xenophon, Plato etc., shows the extent to which he appropriated the Cynic Socrates.

Beginning with Antisthenes, a Cynic tradition of hostility to Plato developed. It must in large part have been motivated by a wish to detach Socrates from Plato, and so far as the early Stoics are concerned, the Cynics were successful. Zeno's *Republic* seems to have been overtly anti-Platonic. In his physics he sided with the materialist Giants of Plato's *Sophist* (246a); he reduced Platonic Forms to mere conceptions; he

<sup>41</sup> *Die Stoa* (ed. 2, Göttingen, 1959), i.194–5; ii.10, 98.

<sup>42</sup> For Zeno's studies with Polemo and Crates, cf. Diog. Laert. 7.2, Suda s.v. Ζήνων, Numenius, fr. 25 des Places; and with Polemo in particular, Cicero, *Acad.* 1.35, *Fin.* 4.3.

denied the immortality of the soul; and he denied any value to pleasure. I am not maintaining that Zeno owed nothing to Plato as distinct from Plato's Socrates. But in general the early Stoics' acknowledged relationship to Plato's own philosophy, as distinct from Plato's Socrates, was critical and often hostile.<sup>43</sup>

Such Stoic divergences from Plato as I have mentioned were no barrier to their presenting themselves as Socratics. Antisthenes' anti-Platonic claim that he could see a horse but not 'horseness' could be interpreted as an anticipation of Zeno's reduction of universals to mere thoughts.<sup>44</sup> It is reasonable to suppose that Antisthenes took himself to have Socratic support for rejecting Plato's independently existing 'Forms'. As for ethics, the Socrates of Cicero, *De finibus* 2.90, rules pleasure completely out of account. This is in line with Antisthenes and Stoicism, and against Plato.<sup>45</sup>

But Zeno made physics and theology indispensable to ethics, and an entirely Cynic Socrates should abjure the study of nature. Or, to put the point more strongly, was Zeno in a position to represent himself as a Socratic when the doxographical tradition, drawing on Xenophon and Plato, insisted that Socrates was purely a moral philosopher? At this point we should return briefly to the Academic Polemo. In discussing Arcesilaus, I suggested that his Socratic leanings may have been stimulated by the work of his Academic seniors, especially Polemo. From Polemo, according to Cicero (*Fin.* 4.45; cf. 4.14ff.), Zeno acquired the concept of 'primary natural things' – objects to which we are inclined by our nature – which he, following Polemo's lead, incorporated in his doctrine that the ethical end is a life in agreement with nature. There are problems, to be sure, about accepting Cicero's report at face value since it depends upon Antiochus' distorted account of the continuity between the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno. Still, I side with the majority of scholars in finding it improbable that Antiochus completely fabricated the influence of Polemo on Zeno's ethics.<sup>46</sup> If this has some historical foundation, it allows us to think that Polemo encouraged Zeno to interpret Socrates' philosophy less restrictively than was the Cynic practice.

However, the Polemo connexion is highly speculative, and Polemo was a Platonist. Did Zeno also have access to an account of Socrates' philosophy, independent of Plato, which made ethics depend upon certain truths about nature?

The answer, if we attend to two passages of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, is so strongly positive that one scholar has argued that these passages are interpolations based on the *Timaeus* and even on Stoicism itself!<sup>47</sup> In 1.4.5–18 Socrates demonstrates god's benevolence to man, by detailing man's special advantages over the other animals in sensory equipment, hands, intelligence, and sociability. He concludes with the

<sup>43</sup> For evidence and discussion of these anti-Platonic points, cf. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), i.435 (Zeno's *Republic*), 181–2, 274 (metaphysics and physics), 272, 318 (soul's corporeality and destructibility), 421 (pleasure). A more positive attitude towards Plato himself seems to begin with Chrysippus, who drew heavily on the *Timaeus*; cf. Long/Sedley, i.278.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the anachronistic introduction to this account of Antisthenes' point, fr. 50C Caizzi: ὁ τοῖνυν Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγε τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐν ψυλαῖς ἐπινοίας εἶναι λέγων ὅτι ἵππον μὲν ὄρω, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὄρω, and compare it with *SVF* 1.65. For the Stoic view of universals, cf. Long/Sedley (n. 43 above), i.179–82.

<sup>45</sup> For the various versions of Antisthenes' dictum, 'madness is preferable to pleasure', cf. fr. 108 Caizzi.

<sup>46</sup> On the positive side, see especially K. von Fritz, *RE* XXI 2 (1952), 2524–9, and C. O. Brink, *Phronesis* 1 (1956), 123–45; and on the negative, Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (above, n. 41), i.249–51.

<sup>47</sup> K. Lintke, 'Xenophon und die Stoa', *Neue Jahrb.* 17 (1906), 673–91. Among the many things which vitiate his argument is a chronology of Zeno which places his birth, and the origin of the Stoa, far too early.

observation that the divine is all-seeing, all-hearing, omnipresent and universally providential. In 4. 3. 2–18 the theme is the same, only this time some attention is given to cosmology and to technology through human ability at manipulating fire. Socrates here maintains that the other living creatures were created for man's sake. At section 11, he says:

Since there is abundance of fine and beneficial things, but they differ from one another, the gods provided men with senses suitable to each type of thing, through which we enjoy all goods. Further, they have engendered intelligence in us, by means of which, calculating and recalling what we perceive, we learn the mode of each thing's utility, and make many contrivances through which we enjoy good things and ward off bad ones. They have also given us language, through which we give one another a share of goods, by instruction and association, and establish laws and social life.<sup>48</sup>

This is certainly high-flying stuff for Xenophon. Yet it contains nothing that an early fourth-century writer could not have written and believed to be Socratic. For my own part, I believe it was part of Xenophon's text by the time of Zeno and Polemo.<sup>49</sup> If so, its implications for the Stoic Socrates are considerable. We now have a source, independent of Plato, which credits Socrates with doctrines fundamental to Stoicism – thoroughgoing teleology, divine providence, the gods' special concern for man, and cosmic underpinning for law and society. But we have still more. Reflection on Socrates' remarks here about the structure of the senses, and their capacity, in concert with reason, to enable human life to proceed according to a divinely ordered plan, could have served Zeno well. Not only could it have helped to shape his conception of a life in agreement with nature; it could also have stimulated his efforts to find an account of sense-perception and knowledge which might be given Socratic endorsement.

The Epicureans were not slow to point out that Xenophon was inconsistent in his remarks about Socrates' interest or lack of interest in theological speculation (Cicero, *ND* 1.31). By appeal to such passages as the two I have just discussed, Zeno, if I am right, thought he could combine a Socratic identity with the development of other aspects of his philosophy. I am not suggesting, by way of a rather mindless Quellenforschung, that these two passages from Xenophon were sufficient to shape the impulse of his overall philosophy. Their coherence with Stoicism, however, is sufficiently suggestive to provide further support for my hypothesis concerning the importance to Zeno of finding Socratic support for his doctrines.

Next, dialectic. If Socrates was to be securely distanced from sophists and eristics, his interest in adversary argument had to be carefully interpreted. Plato's *Euthydemus* is the classic text. As dialectic began to take on a life of its own during the early Hellenistic period, with logical paradoxes being eagerly debated, it became the more urgent for philosophers who claimed allegiance to Socrates to insist that he was no supporter of skilful disputation for its own sake. (Recall my earlier remarks about Polemo and Arcesilaus.) As the Cynics seem to have interpreted it, the purpose of

<sup>48</sup> τὸ δ', ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων ἐστί, προσθεῖναι [sc. τοὺς θεοὺς] τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰσθήσεις ἀρμοστούσας πρὸς ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν ἀπολαύομεν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τὸ δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν ἡμῖν ἐμφύσει, ᾧ περὶ ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα λογιζόμενοι τε καὶ μνημονεύοντες καταμανθάνομεν ὅπῃ ἕκαστα συμφέροι, καὶ πολλὰ μηχανώμεθα, δι' ὧν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύομεν καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἀλεξόμεθα· τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐρμηνείαν δοῦναι, δι' ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδιδόμεν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτεύομεθα.

<sup>49</sup> Antisthenes has often been suggested as Xenophon's source, but on the flimsiest of grounds; cf. F. Caizzi, 'Antistene', *Studi Urbinati* 1 (1964), 65–9.

Socrates' verbal virtuosity was not argument in any formal sense but purely moral exhortation and instruction.

Zeno, we can see, thought otherwise. If he did little to anticipate Chrysippus' great contribution to logic, he undoubtedly regarded the subject as an integral part of philosophy. He wrote two books of *Elenchoi* (Diog. Laert. 7.4), and his follower Sphaerus was famous for his 'definitions' (*SVF* 1.628). To Epictetus, at any rate, both these interests were explicitly Socratic (see p. 150 above). I cannot cite any text which proves that Zeno invoked Socrates in support of his logic, but there is negative evidence to point that way – his disagreements with his follower Aristo.

Bearing in mind what I have been saying about the dominant image of the Hellenistic Socrates, consider the following testimonies concerning Aristo.

First, he confined the scope of philosophy to ethics, urging that physics is beyond human powers, and that dialectic is irrelevant since it does not contribute to the correct regulation of life (*SVF* 1.352). In a text of Eusebius (*SVF* 1.353) which mentions Socrates' repudiation of physics, Aristippus and Aristo are referred to as later philosophers who went the same way.

Second, Aristo is reported to have denied that god's form can be known. One of the sources of his thesis – Minucius Felix (*Octavius* 19.13) – appends it to his previous observation that 'Xenophon's Socrates denies the visibility of god's form and therefore says it should not be investigated.'<sup>50</sup>

Third, Aristo accounted for the unity of the virtues in a manner which many scholars take to be the correct interpretation of Socrates' thesis in the *Protagoras*. He regarded the several virtues as alternative characterisations of a single state of mind, knowledge of good and bad, holding that their differences are only accidental differentiations of this state, relative to circumstances. Malcolm Schofield has argued persuasively that Aristo's doctrine should be regarded as a criticism of Zeno: the master, Aristo held, was committed to the Socratic unity of the virtues, and yet misleadingly also spoke as if he believed in a plurality of distinct virtues.<sup>51</sup>

These three points are sufficient to establish Aristo's strong Socratic leanings. But they offer us a further and more exciting suggestion. Aristo, having totally embraced the Socratic identity of the school, as directed by Zeno, becomes disquieted. He sees Zeno, in his support for physics and logic, backtracking on his true Socratic inheritance, and also misrepresenting Socrates on a crucial ethical doctrine. It has been customary to treat Aristo as a Stoic whose deviance is constituted by his Cynic proclivity, and undoubtedly his Socrates is closer than Zeno's to the hero of Antisthenes and Diogenes. But rather than calling Aristo a Cynicising Stoic, it would be better, I propose, to regard him as a Stoic who thought that the Cynic tradition of Socrates was truer to the spirit of the philosopher than tendencies which Zeno was initiating.<sup>52</sup>

#### ZENO, ARISTO, AND SOCRATES IN PLATO, *EUTHYD.* 278e3–281e5

I have omitted what is undoubtedly Aristo's most famous heresy – his insistence that unqualified indifference extends to everything except virtue and vice.<sup>53</sup> Zeno held the

<sup>50</sup> A somewhat garbled conflation of *Memorabilia* 4.3.14–15 and 1.1.13–15.

<sup>51</sup> 'Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue', *Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1984), 83–96.

<sup>52</sup> Anna Maria Ioppolo, in her fine book *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico* (Naples, 1980), though well aware of Socrates' importance to Aristo, does not, I think, suggest this point anywhere. For passages in her book which discuss Aristo's relation to Socrates, see pp. 70, 76, 79, 86–9, 104, 136, 196, 208.

<sup>53</sup> *SVF* 1. 351, 361–9. For the Stoic doctrine of value, and the heresies of Aristo and Herillus, cf. Long/Sedley (n. 43 above), 354–9.

following propositions to be true. First, that nothing is good except virtue and what participates in virtue. Second, that nothing is bad except vice and what participates in vice. Third, that of everything else, which is indifferent, some indifferent things have negative or positive value, while others are absolutely indifferent. Fourth, that the value or disvalue of indifferent things is constituted by their accordance or lack of accordance with nature. Fifth, that those which have positive value give us good reason to prefer them whenever we are faced with choosing between them and their opposites; our happiness and virtue require us to make good use of these materials. Aristo accepted the first two of these propositions, rejected the third and fourth, and thereby eliminated the need for the fifth. In his doctrine, there is no reason in the nature of, say, health or sickness, why one of these should be preferred to the other. Considerations of the relative worth of such things play no part in a virtuous agent's decisions about what he should do. He does just whatever it occurs to him to do, on the basis of his ethical knowledge (*introduxit, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque in mentem incideret et quodcumque tamquam occurreret*, Cicero, *Fin.* 4.43).

Could both Zeno and Aristo invoke Socratic support for their divergent doctrines of value? Diogenes Laertius 2.31, a passage I have mentioned before (above p. 158), attributes to Socrates the statement that one thing alone is good, knowledge, and one thing alone is bad, ignorance. In the next sentence Socrates is alleged to have also said that wealth and noble birth have no high standing (*οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἔχειν*), but, quite the reverse, are bad.<sup>54</sup> Substitute 'utterly indifferent' for the doxographer's absurd 'bad', and we have in effect Aristo's doctrine. Substitute 'second-rank value' for 'bad', and we get Zeno's position.

The basis for the doxographer's garbled account is the conclusion of Socrates' argument with Cleinias in the protreptic passage of Plato's *Euthydemus* (278e–281e5). The first part of the argument may be summarised as follows:

- A Everyone wishes to fare well.
- B Faring well requires the possession of many goods.
- C These goods include (1) wealth, health, beauty, other bodily advantages, noble birth, power, honour; (2) temperance, justice and courage; (3) wisdom; (4) good fortune.
- D But wisdom *is* good fortune, since it never fails to make men act and acquire correctly.
- E The goods enumerated in C cause us to fare well because they benefit us.
- F They benefit us not by being possessed but by being used.
- G The correct use of C (1) goods is knowledge, which guides action and makes it correct.
- H Therefore knowledge not only provides men with good fortune in every action and acquisition but also with faring well.
- I Without prudence and wisdom C (1) goods harm rather than benefit men.<sup>55</sup>

The last part of the argument needs to be presented in full.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> ἔλεγε [Σωκρ.] δὲ καὶ ἓν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ἓν μόνον κακόν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν· πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαν οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἔχειν, πᾶν δὲ τούναντίον κακόν.

<sup>55</sup> The inclusion of courage and temperance as examples within this section of the argument, 281b4–c9, should not be taken to imply that they, as distinct from C (1) goods, could ever be detached from wisdom; cf. Vlastos (n. 56 below), 210 n. 84.

<sup>56</sup> Translation (modified) of G. Vlastos, 'Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory', *PCPhS* NS 30 (1984), 199. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to this outstanding article.

J 'In sum', I said, 'it would appear, Cleinias, that in the case of all those things which we first said were good, our account is that (i), it is not their nature to be good just by themselves, but the position, it seems, is as follows: (ii) if ignorance controls them, they are greater bads than their opposites to the extent of their greater power to serve their bad leader; while if they are controlled by prudence and wisdom they are greater goods, though in neither case do they have any value just by themselves.' 'Evidently, as it seems', he said, 'it is just as you say'. 'What, then, follows from what has been said? Is it anything but this: that of the other things, none is either good or bad, but of these two things, one – wisdom – is good, and the other – ignorance – is bad?' He agreed.<sup>57</sup>

Diogenes' garbled doxography is an indication of the importance of this passage for those who wanted a clear and authoritative statement on Socrates' ethics. Consider it now in relation to Zeno and Aristo. (The assumption that they knew the text intimately will, I hope, be fully justified by my following remarks.) They both accepted its conclusion: 'Of the other things, none is either good or bad, but of these two things, one – wisdom – is good, and the other – ignorance – is bad'.<sup>58</sup> Socrates arrived at this conclusion by arguing (J i), that health, wealth etc. are not of a nature to be good just by themselves (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*); and (J ii), that such so-called 'goods' are actually greater bads than their opposites in cases where both of them are controlled by ignorance, and greater goods in cases where both of them are controlled by wisdom, but in neither case do they have any value just by themselves.<sup>59</sup>

Before discussing the two Stoics' interpretation of these premises, a word must be said about Socrates' conclusion. Gregory Vlastos has recently argued that it is misleadingly formulated.<sup>60</sup> It should be read, he proposes, not as an unequivocal assertion to the effect that nothing at all is good except wisdom, and nothing at all is bad except ignorance, but rather as follows: 'None of those other things is either good or bad [just by itself], while wisdom alone is good [just by itself] and ignorance alone is bad [just by itself]'. The '[just by itself]' interpolations are necessary, he argues, in order to make the conclusion square with Socrates' views about non-moral goods elsewhere in Plato; they are also necessary on the logical ground that the conclusion stated at 281e2–5 only makes sense if it is treated as a deduction from what is explicit at 281d4–9: 'no non-moral good is good *just by itself*, and no non-moral evil is bad *just by itself*'.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> *Euthyd.* 281d2–e5; 'Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτὰ γε καθ' αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν ὡδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσω δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι, ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἀξία εἶναι. – Φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. – Τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτων δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων ἢ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν; – Ὡμολόγει. Cf. *Meno* 87e–89a for a strikingly similar argument.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. 292b, where Socrates reminds Cleinias of their agreement that only *ἐπιστήμη τις* is good.

<sup>59</sup> I take it that τῶν ἐναντίων in 281d6 must mean 'the opposites of health etc. when these opposites are controlled by ignorance', and μείζω ἀγαθὰ, 281d8, 'greater goods than the opposites of health etc. when these opposites are controlled by wisdom'. This is what the argument requires, and it receives support from 281b6–8: 'Would a man be benefited who had acquired much and does much without intelligence, or rather one who had [acquired and does few things] with intelligence?' The upshot of what immediately follows this question is that opportunities for doing wrong and thereby faring badly are diminished the less the wrongdoer has or does. Sickness provides less of an opportunity for doing wrong or for doing right than health.

<sup>60</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 56 above), 199–201.

<sup>61</sup> Vlastos writes (n. 90, 211): 'From "x is F only in conjunction with W" it would be crazy to infer "x is not F". The sober inference from that premise would be "x is not F in disjunction

Putting aside for the moment the matter of consistency with Socrates' views elsewhere, I tend to think that the suggested interpolation is a weakening, and not a logical improvement, of the argument.<sup>62</sup> To be sure, Socrates has allowed a so-called 'good' of the C (1) type, such as health, in conjunction with wisdom to be a greater good than sickness in conjunction with wisdom. But he combines this thought with the proposition that such a so-called 'good' in conjunction with ignorance is a greater bad than sickness so conjoined. What, then, is his view about the goodness of health where health is treated universally or without any indication from the context of how it is being used? If health, considered simply as health, is not good by its nature, and health can under one condition be better than sickness and under another condition be worse than sickness, it seems that health in general is no more good than it is bad. Goodness is not a property that can pertain to health, in virtue of anything that health is. Health can be better than sickness, but its superiority in such cases is entirely to be chalked up to the credit of wisdom.

If this is the point for which Plato's Socrates is arguing here, I think it would be misleadingly redundant to include the words 'just by itself' in his conclusion (last lines of J above). What he takes himself to have established is that so-called 'goods' such as health, and so-called 'bads' such as sickness, strictly speaking are neither good nor bad. Strictly speaking, goodness pertains solely to wisdom and badness to ignorance.

The Stoics welcomed this conclusion. In addition, the reasoning by which it was deduced seems to have decisively influenced their doctrine of the 'indifference' of such things as health and sickness. Thus, at Diogenes Laertius 7.103 the non-goodness of wealth and health is inferred from the propositions (1) that they no more benefit than they harm, and (2) that they can be used well and badly. On this point, there was no disagreement between Zeno and Aristo. Returning now to the section of the *Euthydemus* immediately preceding the conclusion, I want to ask how they responded to J (i), so-called 'goods' such as health are not of a nature to be good just by themselves; and J (ii), such things when controlled by wisdom are greater goods than their opposites, though in neither case do they have any value just by themselves.

I suggest that Aristo fully accepted J (i), and interpreted J (ii) simply as the justification for Socrates' conclusion concerning the sole goodness of wisdom. I.e., he did not take Socrates to be attributing even conditional value to such things as health. It was Zeno's doctrine, on the other hand, that health is naturally preferable to sickness, and that it does possess value (*ἀξία*) 'just by itself'.<sup>63</sup> He could agree to J from *W*", i.e., "x is not F just by itself". For my response to this, see main text below and n. 62.

<sup>62</sup> Vlastos, op. cit. 200, argues that this is how Socrates' conclusion must be read, in order that (a), 'none of those other things is either good or bad', should be entailed by the previous claim that no non-moral good is good 'just by itself'; and (b), consistency be secured with the trichotomy of *Gorgias* 467e1–468b4, in which health is classified as a 'good'. With regard to (b), see main text below and n. 70. (a), on Vlastos' reading, turns out to be not a significant inference, but a repetition of what it is said to follow from. In 281d3–5, Socrates has already asserted that 'the things we first said were good are not good just by themselves.' If this is all that he is asserting in the first part of his conclusion, 'none of these other things is either good or bad', his ostensible conclusion is reduced to a summary, which contributes nothing new. I find it more plausible to suppose that Socrates takes the non-goodness/ total valuelessness of health, wealth etc., just by themselves, together with the claim that what confers value on them (if anything does) is wisdom alone, to sanction the conclusion that wisdom, strictly speaking, is the only good. I.e., wisdom alone is good, because all other so-called 'goods' like health, in cases where they can be truly called good, owe all their goodness to wisdom.

<sup>63</sup> I am assuming that Stobaeus, 2.82,20–83,4 represents a position Zeno pioneered: health is *καθ' αὐτὸ ληπτόν*. This is in line with Stobaeus 2.84,18–85,11, where the *προηγμένα* (Zeno's original term) are likened to courtiers whose rank is second to that of the King.

(i), the non-goodness of health just by itself, but not to the second part of **J** (ii), its lack of all value ‘just by itself’. How did Zeno react to **J** (ii) taken as a whole? Socrates maintains that health is better than sickness if and only if it is used wisely. Zeno would say that health has value (*ἀξία*), however it is used, but is never something good. In his ethics, ‘value’ is the genus of which ‘good’ (*ἀγαθόν*) and ‘preferred’ (*προηγμένον*) are two distinct species. Does this mean that Zeno has to reject the first part of **J** (ii), in which Socrates makes the greater *goodness* or *badness* of the so-called ‘goods’ over their opposites depend upon wisdom or ignorance respectively?

It would certainly be un-Stoic to maintain that someone who uses health wisely will be happier than someone who uses sickness wisely. If that is Socrates’ point here, Zeno was bound to disagree. Quite probably, as Vlastos has argued, it was Socrates’ point. Yet, given the final clause of **J** (ii), the conclusion of the whole argument, and basic Stoic doctrines, we can see why Zeno may have been less troubled by the comparatives *μείζω ἀγαθά* and *μείζω κακά* than he ought to have been.

According to Diogenes Laertius’ summary of Stoic ethics (7.104), the indifference of such things as health and wealth consists in the fact that they do not contribute to happiness or unhappiness; for one can be happy even without them. He then adds the following qualification: ‘the kind of use made of them is constitutive of happiness or unhappiness’ (*τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὐσίας ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς*).

For a gloss on this passage, we may go to Seneca, *Ep.* 92.11–13. He is clarifying the relationship between the thesis that virtue is the only good and the value of such things as health. His imaginary interlocutor asks: ‘If good health, rest and freedom from pain are not going to thwart virtue, will you not pursue them?’ Seneca answers:

Of course I will. Not because they are good, but because they are in accordance with nature, and because they will be taken on the basis of my good judgement. What then will be good in them? Just this – being well selected. For when I put on the right sort of clothes, or walk as I should, neither the dining nor the walking nor the clothes are good, but the intention I display in them by preserving a measure, in each thing, which conforms with reason... So it is not elegant clothes, which are a *bonum per se*, but the selection of elegant clothes, since the good is not in the thing but in the quality of the selection.<sup>64</sup>

Socrates, in his summation of the argument from the *Euthydemus*, stated that only wisdom’s control confers any degree of goodness or positive value on such things as health. The orthodox Stoics, following Zeno’s lead, maintained that the wise use or wise selection of health etc. is good *per se*. They agreed with Socrates that the mere possession of health is not something good. Is there, then, any disagreement between them on the relation between goodness, wise use and health? Socrates is committed to the proposition *p*: ‘Health is good – a constituent of happiness – if and only if it is wisely used’. Zeno endorses proposition *q*: ‘The wise use of health is a *per se* good – a constituent of happiness’.

I think Zeno thought there was no material difference between these propositions. He took Socrates’ denial of any intrinsic goodness to health etc., together with Socrates’ conclusion, ‘wisdom is the only good’, to confirm his own view that health as such could never merit the predicate ‘good’. Hence he interpreted Socrates’ implicit claim that wisely used health is good as a judgement not about health as such but about its wise use. Socrates, however, just before his conclusion, had indicated his assent to the following proposition: ‘health etc., wisely used, is a greater good than sickness,

<sup>64</sup> Translation by Long/Sedley (above, n. 43) text 64J. The notion of ‘good selection’ reflects formulations of the ethical end by Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater (see our commentary *ad loc.*). But there is no reason to think that these depart in substance from the spirit of Zeno’s philosophy.

wisely used'. Hence, Zeno reasoned, Socrates was misleading in denying any intrinsic value to health and such like things (*αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι*, *Euthyd.* 281d8). Only a value properly predicable of health as such could account for Socrates' immediately preceding judgement that the wise use of something like health is a *greater* good than the wise use of its opposite. Treat health as such as naturally 'preferable' to or more 'valuable' than sickness, but not as 'better' or 'more constitutive of happiness', and Socrates' confusing remarks could be satisfactorily interpreted. In Zeno's view, the man who uses health wisely does have more of what is valuable than the wise user of sickness. Thus the Stoic doctrine of 'preferred indifferents' would allow Socrates to keep his stated conclusion that wisdom is the only good, while also making sense of his claim that the wise user of health has more of what is good (Stoically reinterpreted as 'valuable') than does his sick counterpart.

More could be said about this argument from the *Euthydemus*. In particular, a reader who thinks my interpretation of it assimilates Socrates too closely to Stoicism will find a powerful ally in Vlastos.<sup>65</sup> What I hope to have shown is an ambiguity in its closing lines which helped to feed the disagreement between Zeno and Aristo, while enabling each of them to think he was being faithful to Socrates' basic ethical doctrine. For Zeno, Socrates could be pressed into support for his own view that, while only virtue and what participates in virtue is good, there is a real difference of value between health and its opposite, attention to which is essential to any moral agent. Aristo, on the other hand, could urge against Zeno Socrates' statement that, just by themselves, health and such like things have no value whatsoever.

At *Crito* 48b8–9, Socrates secures Crito's agreement to the proposition that living well is the same as living virtuously.<sup>66</sup> Vlastos has argued that 'is the same as' should not be interpreted as positing identity between virtue and happiness.<sup>67</sup> Rather, we should take it to signify that 'virtue and happiness are necessarily interentailing'. So interpreted, the proposition allows Socrates to acknowledge the existence of non-moral goods, such as health, which, if virtuously used, make a tiny increment to happiness that it lacks without them. Vlastos has two principal reasons for crediting Socrates with the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness rather than identical to it. First, he finds the latter outlandish.<sup>68</sup> Secondly, he thinks that the Platonic

<sup>65</sup> See his article, cited in n. 56 above.

<sup>66</sup> *Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει; – Μένει.*

<sup>67</sup> *Op. cit.* 191–201.

<sup>68</sup> This paper is not the place to deal adequately with Vlastos' detailed arguments, but one issue must be mentioned. Vlastos writes (*op. cit.* 196–7): 'If the Identity Thesis were true, we would have no rational ground for preference between alternatives which are equally consistent with virtue – hence *no rational ground for preference between states of affairs differentiated only by their non-moral values*. And if this were true, it would knock the bottom from eudaimonism as a theory of rational choice. For most of the choices we have to make throughout our life have to be made between just such states of affairs, where moral considerations are not in the picture at all: Shall I walk to my destination or ride the bus? Shall I have my hair cut today or next week?... We do make such choices all the time... and the grounds on which we have to make them are clearly non-moral: hedonic, economic... or whatever. This being the case, if the Identity Thesis were true it would bankrupt the power of eudaimonism to give a rational explanation of *all* our deliberate actions by citing happiness as our final reason for them. On that theory, if happiness were identical with virtue, our final reason for choosing anything at all would have to be our concern for our virtue; so the multitude of choices that have nothing to do with that concern would be left unexplained.' Zeno's doctrine of the *προηγμένα*, I would respond, was formulated precisely to reconcile the Identity Thesis with the need to have rational grounds for preference between states of affairs differentiated only by their non-moral values. (Contrast the position of Aristo.) A Zenonian wise man will make happiness = virtue the only ground for any choice he makes. But, unlike Vlastos, he takes non-moral differences of value to form the

evidence for Socrates' views about goods – especially *Gorgias* 467e, *Lysis* 218e – indicates Socrates' lasting commitment to the existence of non-moral as well as moral goods. In order to bring the argument from the *Euthydemus* into line with the sufficiency thesis, he interprets its conclusion not as a statement denying the existence of any non-moral goods *simpliciter*, but as a denial that anything non-moral is good 'just by itself'.

I suggest that the Stoics reflected on Plato's statements in very similar ways, but arrived at the conclusion that what Socrates was really after was the Identity Thesis. This, they could say, was the obvious sense of the passage from the *Crito* and of *Euthydemus* 281e4–5. True, Socrates elsewhere included moral and non-moral items in a single list of 'goods'. But the import of his discussion in the *Meno* 87e–88d, like that of the *Euthydemus*, was that only virtue or wisdom bears the necessary relation to benefiting that anything good, properly speaking, must have: i.e., always benefiting and never harming.<sup>69</sup> In the *Gorgias* 467e1–468b4, Socrates had introduced an 'intermediate class' – things neither good nor bad, which partake now of the one now of the other and at times of neither; they are exemplified by sitting, walking, running, sailing, stones and logs. In terms of the arguments from the *Meno* and the *Euthydemus* the intermediate class should include things like health, which in the *Gorgias* are assigned to the class of goods.

There are, then, as Vlastos too acknowledges, at least surface inconsistencies in statements put forward by Socrates on the value of things like health.<sup>70</sup> They are spoken about (1) as goods in a list that includes wisdom (*Gorg.* 467e; cf. Glaucon at *Rep.* 2, 357c); (2) as sometimes good and sometimes harmful (*Meno* 88d); (3) as good solely in consequence of virtue (*Ap.* 30b 2–4); (4) as without value just by themselves (*Euthyd.* 281d); (5) as falling outside the class of what is good (*Euthyd.* 281e). I am not out to challenge Vlastos' impressive thesis that (3) was actually Socrates' position, and that his other formulations can be brought into line. My interest here is in what Zeno took Socrates to be searching for.

The answer, I propose, was the Zenonian distinction between moral and non-moral value. Assign the former to virtue and the latter to things like health, and the true spirit of Socrates' position became plain. Socrates, Zeno reasoned, was right to suppose that non-moral so-called 'goods' can be used well or badly. Two conclusions, true to the spirit of Socrates' philosophy, were to be drawn from this: (1) goodness properly speaking, which is exclusively moral, can never be predicated of something

very material (*ἄληθ*) to which the virtuous agent must attend. His concern for happiness = virtue involves a concern for every detail of his life. (Was not this also Socrates' concern [cf. n. 11 above]?) Given the choice, he prefers health to sickness, not because he would be less happy if he could not avoid sickness, but because, if he can be healthy, he *should* prefer health because of its naturalness to the human condition. So although, considered just by itself, health is not a constituent of happiness for Zeno, he would expect anyone concerned for happiness in his sense to prefer health to sickness etc. *for the sake of happiness*. Vlastos (n. 77, 209) thinks the Stoics would have done better to adopt 'the multicomponent model of happiness' he attributes to Socrates. For what can be said for and against the Stoic position in general, cf. Long/Sedley (above, n. 43), vol. 1, commentary on 64.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. the Stoics' use of the following proposition as a premise in an argument concluding to the non-goodness of wealth and health: *ὡς γὰρ ἴδιον θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν, οὐ τὸ ψυχεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ὠφελεῖν, οὐ τὸ βλάπτειν*, Diog. Laert. 7.103.

<sup>70</sup> I say 'statements put forward by Socrates', since the question of his assent to such statements must be distinguished from the role they play in his arguments. Thus it is surely evident that the status of the 'goods' initially proposed to Cleinias at *Euthyd.* 279a–b is radically altered by the conclusion of the argument at 281d–e; and the same is true if we compare *Meno* 78c with 88d.

valuable but non-moral; (2) the *use* of such a thing (as distinct from its mere possession) can be good and a constituent of happiness. Socrates found himself speaking of health etc., sometimes as good, and sometimes as totally without intrinsic value. The inconsistency could be resolved, and the significant insight of Socrates' thought clarified, if health, just by itself, were accorded non-moral value, promoted above the position set out in the *Euthydemus* but below what it is apparently assigned in the *Gorgias* and *Lysis*.

If my approach is correct, it will not show that Zeno's analysis of these Platonic passages should be preferred to Vlastos' interpretation of Socrates. What I hope to have proved is that Zeno (and Aristo) did read and reflect on them carefully, and that their own ethical theory should be viewed as an actual elucidation of Socrates' philosophy. In other words, what the Stoics made of Socrates remains an option that anyone interested in reconstructing his thought should take seriously.

### CONCLUSION

By applying similar methods of analysis, I think it would be possible to show that the Stoics thought of their moral psychology, with its pronounced differences from Plato and Aristotle, as a development of Socrates' purely intellectualist account of virtue and vice. The Peripatetics took Socrates' thesis, 'virtue is knowledge', to commit him to an implicit denial of the irrational part of the soul since it treated the virtues (so they put it) as exclusively resident in the soul's rational faculty, and thereby ignored *pathos* and *ethos*.<sup>71</sup> On another occasion it would be worthwhile to consider how the orthodox Stoics welcomed this interpretation of Socrates, and fully developed its implications in their own account of the mind's faculties and moral states.

But, to conclude the present paper, let my last word pass back to Arcesilaus. We should not suppose that Plato was the only author who shaped his view of the sceptical Socrates. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Arcesilaus was fully cognizant of the way Zeno and Aristo wanted to interpret the *Euthydemus* passage as a guide to Socrates' and their own ethics. To cast doubt on the legitimacy of attaching Socrates firmly to any conclusions, he had only to set Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4. 2. 31–5 against the other text. Xenophon is reporting Socrates' refutation of Euthydemus. The latter claims that he knows what sort of things are good and bad, if he knows anything at all. He cites as instances health and sickness. Forced to admit that such things are no more good than bad, since health can be harmful and disease beneficial, he offers first wisdom and then happiness as unequivocal goods. Socrates disposes of wisdom by arguing that it ruined figures such as Daedalus and Palamedes. As for happiness, its claims are wrecked by enumerating various of its possible constituents, any one of which can bring unhappiness to people.

This is an ad hominem argument, strictly intended to show up Euthydemus' false concept of knowledge. None the less, it stands as a warning against committing Socrates' assent to any firm conclusions he elicits by means of propositions assented to by his interlocutor.

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<sup>71</sup> *MM* 1. 1182a15–17: γίνονται οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορίῳ· συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἥθος.