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SECURITY, INDUSTRY AND MIGRATION IN EUROPEAN BORDER CONTROL

Martin Lemberg-Pedersen

Introduction

This chapter examines the development and scholarly literature concerning the politics of migration in Europe by paying special attention to a complex of dynamics, practices, policies and challenges that characterize the European borders and movement across them. These are: the securitization and militarization of refugee and asylum policies and the implications this has for humanitarian action; the externalization of border control to private actors or non-European states and the required infrastructure for such control; and the consequences of the increasing involvement of the arms and security industry in European border control policy-making. While all of these dynamics are also observable elsewhere in world, the chapter argues that European politics have followed an exceptional trajectory, which now presents citizens, activists, scholars and politicians with a specific set of challenges. In particular, contemporary European migration politics are characterized by dynamics of both heterogeneity and harmonization born out of internal power asymmetries and struggles. This has given rise to the European externalization of migration governance beyond its own territory, whereby the control of mobility is being manifested in regions linked to Europe through the specific historicity of imperial colonialism. Taken together, this exceptionalism poses uncomfortable questions concerning the European self-

understanding as having shared identity and goals, as well as being guided by the moral affirmation of fundamental rights.

Over the last 20 years, several European countries began to frame the migration of asylum seekers as a security issue. Over the same period, the external European borders have become sites of a historic militarization, a process that targets displaced people in dire humanitarian circumstances. It is, though, far too easy to understand European initiatives, such as Operation Sophia, the deployment of Greek, Turkish and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vessels along the Aegean route towards Europe, or indeed the ripple effect of new fences and border controls spread across and externalized beyond Europe as something new and unprecedented.

This chapter details why this is not the case by examining European border control as a socio-geographic and economic space. It provides an overview of important questions posed about the borders' underlying systemic logic (hereunder securitization), the assumption of a technological potential for pervasive control as well as the many different public and private actors and interests, which intersect to create the specificities of European border politics.

The chapter investigates how the introduction of a host of new security technologies, and the very functionality of the European borders, have created certain lock-in effects further accelerating the restrictive border militarization. While the focus of the chapter is on border security, we need to understand this topic against the backdrop of a 30-year-long European failure to establish a system of relocation and resettlement of refugees between its member states. The political choice to accelerate border militarization is thus also a choice to abandon alternative uses of border technologies, such as safe flight-channels out of conflict zones, protection-sensitive entry-points configured to identifying vulnerable asylum seekers, or the swift exchange of information between national asylum systems. This leads to a critical appraisal of the relationship between technologies of border security and Europe's 'fight against illegal migration'.

Securitizing and externalizing migration control

European border research in the 1990s aligned itself with a global scholarship recognizing that globalization created both fundamental challenges to the sovereign nation-state and novel reconfigurations of border governance. While some narratives heralded the idea of a 'borderless world', others pointed to the existence of a contradiction between the neoliberal ideal of border-free economic spaces and the transversal and deterritorialized border controls implemented by states and the European Union (EU). European integration processes like the Dublin Convention and the Schengen space seem to have yielded patterns not of free movement, but rather of hyper-mobility for some and submobility for others (Massey, 1993, p. 61; Sassen, 1996, pp. 92–93; cf. Pickering, 2004).

By the late 1990s, European human geographers moved away from the classical understanding of borders as territorial dividing lines containing distinct populations, and instead conceptualized them through a 'processual shift' where 'bordering' denotes ongoing socially regulative functions linked to trajectories of racism and power (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002). The assumptions of sovereign states clearly demarcated by borders have also been further problematized by emerging geo- and biopolitical analyses, which examined 'how', 'why' and 'where' borders are manifested. This gave rise to perspectives examining how 'mobile borders', decoupled from national territories, can rely on complex 'microphysics of power'. In this period, European border studies evolved into an inter- and multidisciplinary field, fusing insights from sociology, political science, critical human geography and anthropology, thus opening up the border as a socio-geographic, discursive and economic object of inquiry with intersecting actors, networks and interests.

In the late 1990s, the Copenhagen School of security studies developed a conceptual framework that gained popularity among some scholars studying borders. It viewed the security dimension of migration politics through analyses of illocutionary speech acts. Here, migration is understood as securitized through a sequence of discursive steps, namely when certain actors successfully persuade audiences that migration poses an urgent and existential threat to them, their societies or cultures (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). According to this

view, securitization of migration is successful when it becomes removed from the political sphere and situated into the sphere of security concerns. The Copenhagen School thus perceives the link between security technology and migration as intersubjective and socially constructed, and as discursive processes leading to the technological reconfiguration of border control. They argue that this reconfiguration, which is characterized by exceptionalism and securitization, has the effect of depoliticizing the issue of border control. Critical of this development, the Copenhagen School instead underscores the need for desecuritizing border politics, reclaiming migration and borders as a question of politics and not of exceptional security. Accordingly, some scholars have made use of this securitization analysis to examine issues like cross-border terrorism, trafficking and smuggling predominantly in Western contexts, like the US-Mexico and South African-Zimbabwean borders (cf. Ackleson, 2005; Hammerstad, 2012).

However, the Copenhagen School is not very helpful when it comes to understanding many of the European border security processes. First, the framework relies on a 'Westphalian straightjacket' producing Westernized descriptions of security of limited use to non-European contexts (Wilkinson, 2007). Second, its discursive approach fails to theorize how discourses are embedded in particular social practices, sidestepping crucial questions about the origins and relations between border discourses and technologies (Huysmans, 2006, p. 91). Third, the conceptual model seems indebted to a Schmittian grammar to the extent that its understanding of security inadvertently reproduces the problematic *realpolitik* assumption that national governments can decide on states of exception through sovereign speech acts. Yet, it is not evident that the main vehicle behind border securitization is located at the discursive, executive level.

By contrast, the Paris School of security studies developed the more nuanced view that technocratic and bureaucratic day-to-day practices, like population profiling, risk assessment and statistical calculation, communicated within specialist circles, yield bigger influence on border securitization processes than political elites' capacity to speak security to large audiences (Léonard, 2010). This brings to the foreground the 'specific habitus of the "security professional"' with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of

fear and unease' (Bigo, 2002, pp. 65–66). Such an understanding of border securitization trains our gaze at the emergent class of security professionals' successful recoding of borders from mobility channels of labour, trade and protection, to control nodes countering threats.

European research into bureaucratic bordering processes has produced important new clusters of literature. One of these concerns the externalization of European border control, understood as processes whereby nation-states, bilateral or supranational actors complement their policies to control migration across their territorial borders with initiatives aimed at realizing such control beyond their territories (Boswell, 2003; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2012). The year-long European conditioning of Greek border spaces, or the EU's outsourcing of preemptive interception of migrants en route to Europe to Libyan, Moroccan or Turkish authorities provide examples of such externalization. As a result, European borders have increasingly been viewed as transnational, multi-local and mobile systems. Walters (2004, p. 678) has suggested that their function accord to a fusion of geostrategies, dominated by 'the networked border' diffusing, decentring and de-territorializing previously fixed nodes of control. This has been followed by work trying to conceptualize these dynamic socio-political processes as various forms and patterns of assemblages (cf. Ong and Collier 2005; Sassen 2008).

The extra-territorial closure of legal migration routes is correlated with a steep increase in migrant fatalities at Europe's borders (with estimates rising from around 2,000 thousand between 1993 and 2001, to over 31,000 between 2002–2017) (United Against Racism, 2017). The similarly massive growth in migration smuggling indicates that the perception of a contradiction between free trade and border control is only surface-deep: controls do not prevent migration but rather create profit incentives for irregular migration actors and the opening of new and more dangerous routes. Thus, one outcome of European naval operations launched in the Mediterranean in 2015 in order to seize and destroy migrant-carrying vessels has been that many smuggler-networks have switched to cheaper, but unseaworthy, rubber boats. By one estimate, the migration smuggling industry was worth €16 billion globally between 2000 and 2015 (Migrant Files website). Moreover, the

smuggling industry facilitates a vast pool of irregular and precarious labour useful for the European construction, service and agricultural sectors (Cohen, 1987; Anderson, 2010). Recent work and global, local and European dynamics of human smuggling has therefore problematized political assumptions about neatly separated and normatively unambiguous categories of refugees, economic migrants, smugglers and border guards. This calls for caution when assessing political ambitions of enforcing total control over insiders and outsiders (cf. Maher 2018; Zhang *et. al.*, 2018).

The functionality of the European border control system relies on an infrastructure constantly reproducing the circulation of financial, material, corporeal and virtual flows between its different nodes, justified as addressing the phenomenon of forced migration. However, recent scholarship has pointed out that the European border control infrastructure is also itself creating forms of forced migration, a phenomenon that can be conceptualized as ‘border-induced displacement’ (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2017). Exploring this phenomenon unsettles deep-seated assumptions about the relationship between European states and the production of displacement. While events like natural disasters, economic collapses, conflict or resettlement have traditionally been seen as drivers of forced migration, the transnational functionality of European border control produces a different kind of displacement – namely, state-sanctioned practices where already-displaced people are intercepted, detained or deported across territories and between states reluctant to assume the responsibility of assessing their asylum claims. Border-induced displacement thus unfolds at the intersection between regular and irregular nodes of migration and can reinforce existing hierarchies of exploitation and exclusion. The EU’s Frontex Agency also tacitly acknowledges border-induced displacement, for instance, when it referred to state ‘facilitated transportation corridors’ as crucial for the creation of the so-called Balkan route during the 2015 refugee influx to Europe (Frontex, 2016, p. 5).

Borders as sites of humanitarian policing

Another emerging research focus is the fusion of humanitarian and security-driven responses to displacement. Building on a Foucauldian notion of governmentality and work

on the US-Mexico border, Walters (2011) has coined the term ‘humanitarian borders’, denoting sites of inequality and displacement between the Global North and South, which are operationalized as a management tool to handle political crises (cf. Ticktin, 2005; Doty, 2006; Fassin 2011).

Bigo (2002, p. 79) also suggests that ‘discourses concerning human rights of asylum seekers are de facto part of a securitization process if they play the game of differentiating between genuine asylum seekers and illegal migrants’. By helping the first and condemning the second, European states effectively invoke humanitarian reasons to justify border control. This political game of humanitarian differentiation is, notably, widespread. This is illustrated by European governments’ securitization of the mass displacement in Southeastern Europe in 2015 through the Balkan region. At the time, many politicians used the tragic scale of the Syrian displacement crisis to discriminate against other nationalities’ rights to access asylum procedures. Somalis and Nigerians, for instance, were portrayed as less deserving than asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq. Eventually, Iraqis and Afghans were also targeted by ID controls and other forms of border interventions (EurActiv, 2016).

The humanitarian-security nexus is further deepened when military, police or Frontex personnel are integrated in asylum policies due to their emergency-driven predisposition. One example is Frontex’s massive production of quarterly and annual risk analyses and threat assessments since its creation in 2004. As the Agency’s discourses tend to frame any increase in the numbers of asylum seekers along the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes as emergencies, requiring urgent European action, the Agency can be seen as an ‘emergency-driven’ actor (Carrera, 2007, p. 12). Arguing for the need to both fight illegal migration and save lives from ruthless smugglers, the discourses surrounding Frontex and other militarized border operations fluctuate between the political, legal and moral registers of humanitarianism and militarism.

This can make for very inconsistent justifications. One example is European politicians’ attempts to justify the EU’s 2015 Operation Sophia envisioning push back-practices to Libyan military units and direct European military intervention against

smuggling infrastructure on Libyan territory. Sophia too is framed as saving refugees, yet, as restrictive European pre-screening, visa policies and non-arrival policies close down all other legal migration routes, Sophia's targeting of the Libyan irregular smuggling routes, in effect, represents the attempted closure of the only remaining option for thousands of displaced persons. Further illustrating the inconsistency, Sophia was framed as humanitarian despite the fact that the EU's own Military Committee (EUMC) explicitly warned that 'boarding operations against smugglers in the presence of migrants has a high risk of collateral damage including the loss of life' as military personnel will be unable to distinguish smugglers from refugees (EUMC, 2015). This warning was substantiated when a leaked Frontex-report detailed sixteen cases where Greek and Frontex vessels used firearms against 'boat migrants' in 2014–2015 (*The Intercept*, 2016).

Such inconsistencies are caused by the double-sided nature of humanitarian governance: a paradox of protection is created between the dual ambitions of care and control caused by the fact that the subject of humanitarian policing is displaced populations, while the object of border control is to safeguard territorially bounded administrative entities (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, p. 54, 67). Thus, when border operations are increasingly framed as humanitarian events using the normative grammar of universal rights, powerful actors capable of staging such interventions claim to be speaking on behalf of humanity when targeting migrants, depicted as 'problematic peoples' (Agier, 2011). Like the issue of security, humanitarianism, too, seems thoroughly embedded in Western conceptions of states, security and populations. This explains Europe's colonial history may thus help explain why comparatively little research on humanitarian border policing has been done on non-European cases, save for borders in former European settler states, like the US-Mexico, Australian and New Zealand borders (see McNevin, 2014; Williams, 2016).

The border technology fix

A dominant assumption guiding European border-making is that migration issues can be 'solved' through a 'technological security fix'. This assumption, however, is not shared by

researchers who have instead examined the incredibly complex funding structures underpinning the continent's landscape of border technologies, identifying problems, such as lacking cost-efficiency, policy inconsistency and blurred public-private interests.

den Hertog (2016) has conducted an impressive mapping of the funding instruments associated with the EU's external migration control across various instruments. His mapping shows that budgets are massive, that they have been increasing through time, and that border management, readmissions and interventions against irregular migration have remained a top priority for European policy-makers (Ibid., pp. 45–46). The financial flows underpinning the external European borders have evolved: from B7–667 budget line (2001–2003, allocating €59 million), the Aeneas Programme (2004–2006, allocating €117 million), the DCI Programme (2007–2013, allocating €384 million), the SOLID Programme (2007–2013, allocating €3.96 billion), and to the Home Affairs funds (2014–2020, projected to allocate €5.89 billion). However, the mapping also identifies 'rampant incoherence', reflecting inter-institutional strife on cooperation with third countries between home affairs and development networks. When it comes to investment in research and development, another report identified the risk that supplier interests are prioritized over those of the European populations (Bigo *et al.*, 2014).

For instance, Angeli *et al.* (2014) have analysed the cost effectiveness of return, 'stop and search' operations, and practices of surveillance, detention and the Evros fence at the Greek-Turkish land border between 2008 and 2013. The Evros fence, consisting of two cement walls with barbed wire in between them cost €7.5 million, out of which €3.16 million was paid to a private company building it (Ibid.). In 2011–2012, the EU External Borders Fund provided money for a range of control technologies priced at €8.7 million, including items such as portable thermal cameras, x-ray vans, thermal or radar systems, vehicles, police dogs and patrol boats. Also, the construction costs of nine 'pre-removal centres' tallied €38.6 million, with annual operation costs estimated at €57.8 million. In total, the report estimates that in 2008–2013 Greek policies of irregular migration control cost around €500 billion, primarily donated by the EU.

The results of these policies, however, did not confirm the assumption of border technology's strategic importance. While Operation Shield and the Evros fence was followed by a relative 96 per cent decrease in apprehended irregular migrants, the same period offered also a relative 231 per cent increase on the Southern Greek sea border, a tendency multiplied many times in 2014–2016. Rather than blocking immigration, the technologies were found to consume budgets very quickly, creating unnecessary running expenditure and leading policy-makers to ignore alternative policies like awareness-raising, voluntary returns, screening of individual asylum cases and seasonal labour (Ibid., pp. 59–61, 71). Focusing on the Spanish-Moroccan borderlands, Andersson (2014) similarly argues that many border technologies are unable to fulfill the promises made by their suppliers. Instead, he suggests that the attempts to impose massive radar- and surveillance technologies, like the External Surveillance Integrated System (SIVE)-system between Spain and Morocco, on to complex migration dynamics should be seen as enacting a 'border spectacle'. When it comes to North America and Europe, Andreas and Snyder (2000) suggest that these spectacles serve a dual purpose – they try to recraft the image of the border by making migrant illegality spectacularly visible and use this visibility to 'broadcast deterrence' to other potential migrants.

At the same time, it is clear that the exceptional character of European migration politics also has to do with the heterogeneous implementation of different border technologies across the continent. While most European airports follow the same standards of control, the picture changes when it comes to naval operations, border fences and push back operations. Here, a clear asymmetry has been observable between the practices of Northwestern and Southeastern European countries, save for exceptional places like Calais. This asymmetry has partly been caused by geographic factors, as the European countries with neighbouring regions plagued by displacement receive the vast majority of asylum seekers. But the EU's Dublin system, with its rule of first country of arrival, has also reinforced this dynamic. For years, the concentration of both migrants and pervasive border control operations around Europe's Southeastern regions has been accompanied by vocal

despair of countries like Italy, Greece and Bulgaria, accusing their Northwestern counterparts of lacking in solidarity.

This dysfunctionality of the European migration system erupted during the massive displacement of Syrians because the EU member states disagreed vehemently on the implementation of several resettlement and relocation plans. Consequently, Greece and Italy were once more left with the largest responsibilities and the most pervasive border control interventions, while most north western European countries instead engaged in a competition to deter prospective migrants from arriving, by lowering the rights and living standards of asylum seekers and refugees, and trying to close off migration route from Southern to Northern Europe.

Migrants and facilitators facing high-tech control technologies, like motion sensors, radars, satellites and drones, respond by low-tech solutions and by mobilizing informal and sometimes family-based networks (Ibid.; Düvell, 2008). The technological market thereby inadvertently acts as catalysts for new social relations and sometimes life-threatening solutions. Therefore, combined with the European closure of legal routes for migrants and refugees, the smuggling and border control industries are locked in a self-reinforcing, but highly profitable cycle: the more controls imposed, the bigger the need for irregular routes, which, in turn, is used to justify even more advanced control technologies and so on.

The reconfiguration of social relations connects with another important strand of European border research, evolving since the late-1990s. It argues that such border politics manifest an order of global apartheid, not just at spectacular border sites, but also globally through individual societies (cf. van Houtum, 2010). This points to another exceptional feature in European border research: While American scholarship has been quicker to discuss racial dimensions to border politics than its European counterpart, work on European borders has focused more on postcolonial continuities (cf. Mezzadra, 2006). This is undoubtedly due to the specific European history of colonialism and the way in which contemporary externalization politics rely on the dominance and external governance of former European colonies. This strand of European border studies therefore claims that some border practices, like patrols, deportation and detention, demarcate the external

frontiers, or even the extra-territorial manifestation of European power into other countries. Simultaneously, however, they also internalize processes of racialized differentiation and stigmatization of ethnic minorities in processes that Etienne Balibar (2004) has called the ‘recolonization’ of immigration (see also De Genova, 2010; Fassin, 2011). Postcolonial analyses of European border control is still in its infancy, and in general more work is needed to uncover the intersectionality between migration, extra-territorial sovereignty, racialization and gender (for a perspective on the latter, see however Plambech 2017).

Neoliberal security professionals and systemic border shifts

Another recent strand of literature has focused on other social relations in European border politics, namely, the outsourcing of border control to non-state and third-party actors. Lahav and Guiraudon (2000) suggested that these relations can be understood as interlinked processes of externalization, devolution and privatization of migration control, and that such politics represent ‘the retreat of the state’ and the reinvention of the regulatory exchange of interests between it and private actors. This then runs the risk that interests in profit and industrial competitiveness eclipse those of cost-efficiency and human rights in policy processes. Thus, when the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands introduced carrier sanctions in the 1980s, this obliged transportation companies to enforce European states’ visa regimes at the threat of substantial fines. Subsequently, this restrictive visa regime was further exported to countries applying for EU membership (Geddes, 2001; Gibney, 2006). This globalization of the European immigration priorities to airports all over the world thus shifted burdens of asylum responsibility outwards, from European to non-European countries (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). This literature strand primarily conceptualized visa policies as cases of migration control, but the early 2010s has brought to light more research on visa processing companies (VPCs), such as VFS Global (cf. Infantino, 2010). This focus problematizes the academic tendency to reduce the complex VPC-dynamics of profit and transnational governance through a dichotomy between facilitators and gatekeepers (Sánchez-Barrueco, 2017).

Complementing the earlier work on outsourced borders, a new locus of research focusing more on the economic interests in migration politics. While Andersson (2014) uses the term ‘illegality industry’ to refer to actors involved in smuggling and border control, Lemberg-Pedersen (2013) talks of ‘border-scaping contracts,’ denoting outsourcing processes, which reconfigure border infrastructures. Also, inspired by Hernandez-Léon’s (2005) work on the Mexican-US migration system, Nyberg Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2013) suggest the more general category of a ‘migration industry’ (see also Xiang and Lindquist, 2014; Cranston et al., 2017). For the present purpose, talking of a border control industry, allow us to differentiate between several actors. Some actors pursue contracts for border *enforcement* (for instance, detention or deportation practices), while others compete for contracts on border *infrastructure* (for instance, the building and operation of radar or satellite systems or high-tech research and development (R&D) programmes). Other actors, like consultancy firms and universities, produce border knowledge, and others, again, provide financial services in relation to technology investments (such as export credit agencies, investment firms and credit institutions) (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013).

In different ways, the European control and outsourcing dynamics illustrate how policy-making relies on the assumption that the political challenges of border control can be solved through a technological fix. Thus, it is common that policy-documents echo with ambitions of large, transnational ‘systems of systems’ and costly projects like the Schengen Information System, European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) and European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and an ‘Integrated Border Management-strategy’. This policy drive has been facilitated by the strategic activities of industrial suppliers of technologies through various lobbyism forums, such as border security conferences, where, immigration is framed in terms of risk, surveillance and social control (Baird, 2017). The resulting discourses promise purchasing states ‘full-spectre dominance’, ‘real-time awareness’ and ‘pre-frontier knowledge’ over their borders, but whether or not this represents accurate assessments of realism and cost-efficiency, it has the effect of sidestepping concerns for the human rights of migrants.

The various externalization policies since the 2000s have also facilitated a profitable export market for the European arms industry. The sale of patrol boats, jeeps and planes to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey in 2002; the construction of the SIVE surveillance system in Morocco in 2003–2004; C3 control systems, planes and vehicles to Libya from 2004–2010; and the export of satellites, radar systems and planes to Turkey, Tunisia and Algeria after the Arab Spring – all illustrate the technological and cost-intensive nature of European border externalization.

However, the companies involved are not just exporting border infrastructure, but also conventional weapons. This means that the industry fuels not only the original causes of displacement, but also the spread of surveillance and control technologies used by regimes against refugees, smugglers and their own populations. In 2005–2014, companies from the EU member states granted arms export licenses to the Middle East and North Africa worth of €82 billion (Akkerman, 2016, p. 6). By one estimate, between 2000 and 2014, European countries spent €13 billion on border control technologies and services (The Migrant Files website), while an industrial consulting actor valued the global border industry at €25.8 billion in 2012 and projected an increase to €49.6 billion by 2020 (Frost and Sullivan, 2014).

The case of Saudi Arabia illustrates this. Tallying €25.8 billion during this period, the petro-autocracy has been the single largest buyer of European arms and a prime export site for border control technology. Since 2009 the Saudi Border Guard Development Programme (SBGDP) has initiated the upgrade of all Saudi land and sea borders spinning off several subprojects, such as the militarization of both the Red Sea borders, the 900 km Northern and 1,800 Southern borders in order to contain displacement from, respectively, the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The prime contractor is the German arms consortium Airbus. Just the 900 km Northern border infrastructure required three fences, seven C2 (Command and Control) centres, ten surveillance reconnaissance vehicles, 32 response stations and 240 response vehicles. Linked to the C2 centres are a further network of 40 surveillance towers and 32 communications towers. The former towers are equipped

with Airbus DS TRGS-SEC radars and day/night-cameras, while the latter towers are connected to the C2 centres through fiber-optic cables (UPI 23 September 2014).

This export of control infrastructure can be supported by private investment funds, but also public providers of export credit, like the British Export Credits Guarantee Department, the German Hermes, the Italian SACE, and the French Coface. For instance, Italy lobbied heavily for the EU to lift its arms embargo against Libya in 2004, arguing the need to militarize the external EU borders. After the embargo, Finmeccanica (now Leonardo) landed several such contracts with the Gaddafi-regime, supported by SACE-guarantees, and financed through a revolving credit line provided by a conglomerate of 24 European credit institutions, headed by BNP Paribas and including Bank of Scotland, Unicredit, Barclays, JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs. European externalization policies must therefore be seen in connection with trade and financial policies, and the desire to create export markets for the European security, weapons and IT-industries. (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013, Lemberg-Pedersen 2015).

The blurred boundaries between public and private interests in European border politics can be understood as processes of neoliberalization, heralding shifts in the systemic logic guiding border-making. This poses questions about lobbyism, informal networks and ‘revolving doors’ through which officials blur the boundaries between public institutions, the financial sector and the arms industry. But it also points to other risks: one is ‘lock-in effects’ where the role of specific actors and technologies in border management becomes self-perpetuating, and difficult to reverse at the political and administrative level. Another is that governments use the complexity of the border control market, with its dynamics of branching off, merging and sub-contracting, to distance themselves from controversial practices. This obscures states’ legal responsibilities, accountability and liability (cf. Bloom, 2015).

Conclusion

Inquiring into the opaque relations between European border control policies and the public and financial interests facilitating them illustrates the importance of examining border

control from a vantage point capable of transcending methodological nationalism and simplistic binaries of open/closed borders. It is necessary to trace the multiple intersections between migration and border politics and a range of other policy areas.

The industrial promises of bestowing totalitarian full-spectre dominance of migration through advanced, cost-intensive system of systems are aligned to the European political agenda's simplistic assumptions about the strategic importance of border technologies, migration and border dynamics. Rather than providing a technological fix, and very far from being cost effective, this dynamic enables both the smuggling and control industries, but creates insecurity for both migrants and European populations. Moreover, the massive export of weapons and control systems associated with externalization fuels not only the original causes of forced migration, but also strengthens repressive states by spreading surveillance technologies used to contain citizens and migrants fleeing violence through the channels of border-induced displacement and the inhumane and degrading conditions associated with this existence. As decision-makers increasingly fuse security- and humanitarian-based discourses, a humanitarian practice of policing problematic populations experience a postcolonial revival in European border politics, becoming dominant at Europe's external borders and externalized interventions in African and Middle Eastern countries. With these policies come an increased risk of so-called 'collateral damage' as a powerful combination of security concerns, profit-interests, lock-in effects and racism overshadow civil-oriented border policies based on protection, international cooperation and mutual long-term interests.

The exceptionality of European migration politics is then the particular manner in which power asymmetries and internal disagreements between countries has created a group of diverse local border practices, marked by a Northwestern/Southeastern divide, which at the common-European level has resulted in a dysfunctional system forced to rely on externalization rather than internal cooperation. Moreover, this securitized and externalized migration control generates a particularly stark dilemma with respect to European governments and their affirmation of fundamental rights, including the principle of asylum. This tension has opened up a rift revealing a series of unresolved inconsistencies

in European migration politics. It has put on display that Europe's self-understanding is still unresolved with respect to the morality of racism, colonial and imperial governance.

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