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To the memory of Burkhard Tuschling, teacher, mentor and friend of many years.
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The project for this volume, commissioned in 2008 by the Bloomsbury Philosophy Editor Sarah Campbell, took shape in October 2009 through lively exchanges between the participants of a three-day Hegel Companion workshop hosted by the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Germany. (The project took its definitive shape as the result of even more lively nightly exchanges in the Wolfenbütteler Ratskeller.) Our special thanks for considering, criticizing and rejecting a number of possible approaches and foci for this volume, and for affirming the final plan that now informs it, go first and foremost to the editorial board members who participated in the workshop: Manfred Baum, Burkhard Tuschling†, Kenneth R. Westphal and Michael Wolff. We are also grateful to Angelica Nuzzo, Adriaan Peperzak, Paul Redding and Tom Rockmore for their willingness to serve as editorial board members at large.

Without the financial support for the Wolfenbüttel workshop by the Office for International Cooperation of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), and without the generous involvement of Dr Volker Bauer, Petra Hotopp and Uta Rohrig of the Biblioteca Augustana’s Conference Programs in Wolfenbüttel, the project would not have gotten off to such an encouraging start. The Bibelsaal that Dr Bauer put at our disposal proved to be an oddly apt environment for debating the virtues and vices of Hegel’s grand philosophical project.

As Editors, we have been very lucky in being able to rely on the enthusiastic cooperation and competent help of a formidable group of graduate students from our Philosophy Doctoral Program at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Cynthia Paccacerqua and Katie Wolfe constructed the first comprehensive index for the then fledgling volume. Javier Aguirre contributed valuable bibliographical information. Frances Bottenberg and Wesley Nolan provided expert translations of Martin Bondeli’s contributions. Soren Whited compiled – almost single-handedly – the entire volume bibliography. Emiliano Diaz, Harrison Fluss, Landon Frim, Miles Hentrup, Ethan Kosmider, Jenny Strandberg, Daniel Susser and Patrick Welsh delivered swift, meticulous and efficient editorial help, technical advice and exhaustive answers to rather impromptu inquiries of a bibliographical or philosophical kind. To all go our heartfelt thanks.

† Deceased contributor
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Antrittrede 1818</td>
<td>Konzept der Rede beim Antritt des philosophischen Lehramtes an der Universität Berlin</td>
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<td>Briefe 1,2,3,4.1,4.2</td>
<td>Briefe von und an Hegel (Bd. 1 – 4.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differenzschrift</td>
<td>Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissertatio</td>
<td>Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enc</td>
<td>Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830)</td>
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<td>Enc 1817</td>
<td>Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817)</td>
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<td>Gl&amp;Wi</td>
<td>Glauben und Wissen</td>
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<td>GW</td>
<td>Hegel, Gesammelte Werke</td>
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<td>JS I, II, III</td>
<td>Jenaer Systementwürfe I, II, III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kritisches Journal</td>
<td>Kritisches Journal der Philosophie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahli</td>
<td>Hegels theologische Jugendschriften</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhG</td>
<td>System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPh</td>
<td>Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts</td>
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<td>Scepticismus</td>
<td>Verhältniß des Scepticismus zur Philosophie</td>
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<td>SS</td>
<td>System der Sittlichkeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systemprogramm</td>
<td>Ältestes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus</td>
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<td>TWA</td>
<td>G. W. F. Hegel. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte</td>
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VRel₁ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Einleitung. Der Begriff der Religion (1824, 1827, 1831) (V 3)
VRel₂ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Die bestimmte Religion (V 4)
VRel₃ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Die vollendete Religion (V 5)
VRPh Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie (1818–31) (Ilting edition)
W Sämtliche Werke
WBN Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts
WL Wissenschaft der Logik
WVAesth Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik (in W)
WVGPh Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (in W)

DESCARTES
AT Descartes Oeuvres. Édition Adam et Tannery

FICHTE
FGA J. G. Fichte. Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
Naturrecht Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre
Wissenschaftslehre Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre

KANT
AA Kants gesammelte Schriften (=Akademieausgabe)
Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (in AA 9)
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (in AA 4)
KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (in AA 5)
KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (in AA 5)
MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften (in AA 4)
MS Metaphysik der Sitten (in AA 6)
Prol Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als wissenschaftlich wird auftreten können (in AA 4)
Rel Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (in AA 6)

MARX, ENGELS
Kap Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie
MEGA Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe
MEW Marx-Engels Werke

SCHELLING
STI System des Transcendentalen Idealismus (1800)
SW Schelling Werke
SsW Schellings Werke

SPINOZA
Ethica Ethica more geometrico demonstrata
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INTRODUCTION
Allegra de Laurentiis and Jeffrey Edwards

Our goal in this volume has been to provide Hegel scholars and Hegel readers with a handbook on Hegel’s work that is true to his stated aim, which was to produce a philosophical account of natural and human reality in systemic form. The principles of Hegel’s own arrangement of his subject matters have therefore furnished the natural criteria for structuring Part II, dedicated to ‘The System of Philosophy’ (Chapters 4–10). The same principles also form the guideposts for the contributions on ‘Substantive and Interpretive Questions’ in Part III (Chapters 11–24) as well as for those on ‘Hegel’s Forms of Argument’ in Part IV (Chapters 25–27). Hegel’s systematic account of reality was not conceived in a moment of intuitive insight. Nor was its influence exhausted upon its completion by Hegel. Thus, Part I, dedicated to ‘Hegel’s Path to the System’ (Chapters 1–3) focuses on the laborious philosophical developments leading up to the mature shape of his thought, and Part V on ‘Hegel’s Philosophical Influence’ (Chapters 28–31) treats some of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century movements that were deeply affected by Hegelian philosophy.

The unity and the relative simplicity of this volume’s underlying plan are not meant to conceal the pronounced interpretive and methodological differences between the philosophical approaches exhibited in the various contributions. Apart from our wish to offer a historically defensible and intellectually sober overview of Hegel’s mature philosophy, we have also sought to bring together diverse perspectives on Hegel’s doctrines, contrasting assessments of his arguments, and distinct philosophical styles through which contemporary theoretical concerns can be addressed in connection with solutions put forward by Hegel. An additional objective of ours has been to offer first translations of some of the most advanced research in Hegel studies that has so far been unavailable in English. In our view, the result of this 3-year project demonstrates that an illuminating and productive dialogue is possible on the basis of quite disparate readings of Hegel’s thought – as long as the participants share, as is the case in this Companion, a scholarly interest in Hegel’s thesis that truth is systematic, hence also holistic, in nature.

Part I: ‘Hegel’s Path to the System’, begins with two chapters by Martin Bondeli, who traces Hegel’s intriguing – at times almost paradoxical – intellectual development from the Tübingen years to Frankfurt and then to Jena. Bondeli first focuses on Hegel’s Kantian phase in Bern, his concerns with theology, his critique
INTRODUCTION

of ‘positive’ religion, his interest in moral reason, and eventually his engagement with those who, like Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling, took themselves to be completing Kant’s philosophical project. Bondeli then contextualizes the Frankfurt writings in the framework of Hegel’s increasingly revolutionary (and Fichtean) concern with dissolving what Marx would later call ‘all fixed, fast frozen relations’. Bondeli’s second chapter, recounting the Jena years, presents Hegel’s repudiation of Fichteanism, his criticism of Kant, Jacobi and Reinhold, his involvement with Schelling’s transcendental philosophy, and finally his divergence from the latter. Readers interested in researching any aspect of Hegel’s progression from the criticism of contemporaneous ‘philosophies of reflection’ to the conceptualization of ‘speculative’ philosophy in Jena’s multiple system drafts will find in Bondeli’s contributions both a careful reconstruction of these decisive phases of Hegel’s development and a helpful interpretation of Hegel’s early epistemological concerns.

Kenneth R. Westphal’s conspectus of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit centres on this work’s role in providing the epistemic justification of the standpoint of pure thinking that is embodied in the Science of Logic – thus on the Phenomenology’s function as a proper, that is, non-external, introduction to Hegel’s philosophy. Along with a detailed treatment of Hegel’s original epistemology, Westphal follows each of the decisive steps in Hegel’s analysis of mind as well as Hegel’s portrayal of the spirit of human, historical communities while engaging with central concerns of contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology in the analytic vein.

Part II: ‘The System of Philosophy’, opens with Ardis Collins’s investigation of Hegel’s various introductions to – or inductions into – his philosophical system, beginning with the Phenomenology. Collins discusses contemporary interpretations of the status of Hegel’s introductions as either propedantic, or systematic, or both. Her response to these contemporary readings is based on the examination of three decisive factors: the Encyclopaedia’s explicit characterizations of thought’s relation to experience; the Encyclopaedia’s account of the three fundamental ways in which thinking positions itself vis-à-vis objectivity; and Hegel’s proof procedure in both the Lesser and Greater Logics. Collins’s final sections consider the relation between logic and phenomenology in light of their shifting role as ‘first part’ of the system of philosophical sciences.

Hegel’s conception of a science of logic is the subject matter of Michael Wolff’s chapter. Through detailed critical exegesis that is both historical and systematic in character, Wolff presents Hegel’s conception of logical science as an originally Kantian project that, though revised and transformed, always remains in dialogue with Kant’s conception of logic. Wolff traces Hegel’s division of logic into its ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ parts to his understanding of Kant’s general and transcendental logics. He explains Hegel’s idea of ‘speculative logic’ as stemming from his notion of the self-critique of reason, and shows how Hegel’s characterization of logical categories as ‘objective thoughts’ denotes a subject matter that is necessarily intrinsic to pure, that is, logical, thinking. Wolff also relates Hegel’s account of the formal, absolute and abstract character of logical determinations to a key aim of logical science, namely, to provide direct proof of absolute cognition (as opposed to the indirect proof provided by the Realphilosophie). Wolff then turns to Hegel’s solution to the problem of a ‘presuppositionless’ beginning of science; to Hegel’s theory of the necessarily dialectical
pattern of thought’s inquiry into the subject matter of logic; to Hegel’s conception of ‘immediacy’ as resulting from ‘mediation’; and to Hegel’s account of ‘concept’, ‘concept of concept’ and ‘idea’ as the fundamental elements of logical cognition. Combined with George di Giovanni’s new translation of the Science of Logic, Wolff’s succinct but deeply probing reconstruction of the origin, context, method and results of logical science should prove indispensable for future research into this area of Hegel studies.

Dieter Wandschneider’s chapter investigates the Philosophy of Nature in view of the strengths and contemporary relevance of early nineteenth-century theories of natural philosophy as well as in view of the neglect and ‘interpretive prejudices’ to which these theories have been subject over the past two centuries. In his first six sections, Wandschneider explains the logical roots of Hegel’s concept of nature, the theoretical strengths of objective idealism and the meaning of the process of ‘idealization’ that Hegel attributes to natural systems. In the remainder of the chapter, Wandschneider reconstructs the architectonic intricacies of Hegel’s natural philosophy. In this context, Wandschneider examines Hegel’s criticisms of Kepler’s and Newton’s mechanical conceptions of the universe; his debt to Schelling’s notions of gravity and light; his anticipations of later scientific theories of light’s ‘absolute’ velocity; and his position that ‘the chemical process’ harbours organic life within itself. Finally, Wandschneider discusses the conceptual transition that Hegel provides from nature’s prose to nature’s poetry, that is, from mechanical and physical systems to living ones.

Cinzia Ferrini treats one of the most difficult conceptual-systematic transitions in Hegel’s philosophy: the transition from the world of nature to the realm of spirit. She outlines the internal connections between logic, nature and spirit, as conceived by Hegel. She then determines the meaning of ‘external nature’ in the 1807 Phenomenology. Finally, by considering Hegel’s various lectures on logic, nature and spirit, as well as the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature, Ferrini elucidates Hegel’s challenging account of the separation of self-external nature from nature as the externalization of spirit.

We thus arrive at the Philosophy of Spirit. Willem deVries takes on the task of reconstructing and assessing Hegel’s theory of Subjective Spirit. After a comprehensive discussion of the paradigm shifts implied by Hegel’s rejection of pneumatology and contemporaneous empirical psychology, deVries guides us through the various stages of subjective spirit: the so-called Anthropology of spirit as natural, feeling and ‘actual’ soul; the Phenomenology of spirit as consciousness, self-consciousness and reason; and the Psychology of spirit as theoretical, practical and free mind. Throughout his contribution deVries engages contemporary interpretations of Hegel’s subjective spirit – rightfully regretting the paucity of studies on this subject – and relates Hegel’s conception of human cognitive and emotional capacities to contemporary scientific accounts.

Kenneth R. Westphal’s chapter on Objective Spirit consists of two parts. The first supplies the theoretical framework for understanding Hegel’s moral and social theory in terms of what the author calls Natural Law Constructivism. In a tight series of steps, Westphal reconstructs fundamental historical debates that centred on the question of the objectivity of moral values and juridical principles – a question to which Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is meant to respond. Westphal leads us from Plato’s Euthyphro’s dilemma to the Humean distinction between
artificiality and arbitrariness; to Hobbes’s arguments for the freedom-limiting and public nature of justice; to Rousseau’s and Kant’s conceptions of moral autonomy; to Hegel’s distinction between the ‘truly historical’ view of right and the ‘merely historical’ view taken by the historical school of jurisprudence. Part two of Westphal’s contribution offers a carefully reasoned outline of the Philosophy of Right and its explication as a work that integrates Montesquieu’s and Kant’s views on the objectivity of moral and political principles that are historical in nature.

Walter Jaeschke’s chapter on ‘Absolute Spirit’ elucidates Hegel’s contention that art, religion and philosophy are all forms of the same content: the objectifications of self-comprehending human spirit (in other words, the forms of ‘absolute knowing’) that we attain in relative independence from the external constraints of social existence. The first section, ‘Art’, offers a comprehensive examination and appraisal of the ‘intuitive’ form of self-comprehension embodied in all artworks. Starting from the analysis of the basic concept of the beautiful in art (das Kunstschöne), Jaeschke guides us through Hegel’s historical and logical systematization of art forms (symbolic, classical and romantic) and the art types that run through them (from architecture to poetry). Jaeschke’s exposition rectifies various misconceptions of Hegel’s aesthetic theory – for example, the (in)famous thesis of the ‘death of art’. Given the imposing character of Hegel’s body of work on the fine arts, Jaeschke also points out that ‘the range and depth’ of Hegel’s treatment of the arts is unmatched in art history and aesthetics. The following section on ‘Religion’ explicates this ‘representational’ form of human self-knowledge, its self-alienating character and thus its cognitive limitations. Jaeschke delineates Hegel’s theory of the structure shared by the concept religion with all ‘determinate’ religions. Breaking with tradition, Hegel considers all religions as expressions of spirit’s historically diverse forms of self-knowing. The reason why he singles out Christianity as the ‘consummate’ religion is not, as often alleged, that it is a superior actualization of the concept of religion, but rather that Christianity makes this very concept into its own object. The final section treats Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as sublation of art and religion in conceptual self-comprehension, as well as Hegel’s closely related thesis that the history of philosophy is the history of self-conscious reason itself.

Part III, on ‘Substantive and Interpretive Questions’, includes Chapters 11 to 24 that succinctly clarify key concepts of Hegel’s philosophy in connection with their historical origins and systematic functions.

Michael Inwood contributes four essays. In ‘Logic – Nature – Spirit’ Inwood explains the tripartite division of Hegel’s system as rooted, on the one side, in the philosophical tradition that begins with Greek Stoicism and, on the other side, in Hegel’s dialectical understanding of what counts as a rational account of reality. The section on ‘Determination, determinacy’ offers an overview of Hegel’s use of these key-concepts in the Logic and in the Realphilosophie. In ‘Spirit, Consciousness, Self-Consciousness’ Inwood clarifies Hegel’s uses of Geist and Bewußtsein with reference to the ancient meanings of pneuma, nous and spiritus as well as with reference to the uses of ‘spirit’ and ‘consciousness’ in modern (including Kantian) philosophy and psychology. In his fourth contribution Inwood focuses on the distinction between ‘Reason and Understanding’ that pervades Hegel’s mature philosophy. Highlighting Hegel’s changing assessments of the relationship between
reason and understanding in the course of his intellectual development, Inwood discusses Hegel’s mature view of this relation in connection with corresponding views of Kant, Jacobi, Schelling, Schiller and Goethe.

Angelica Nuzzo’s first contribution examines the relation of ‘System and History’ in Hegel’s thought. Nuzzo scrutinizes the conceptual relations between spirit, world spirit, consciousness and the history of consciousness that characterize Hegel’s thinking during his Jena period. She then moves on to the 1807 Phenomenology’s treatment of history as a pivotal (if at times only implicit) category for grasping the development of spirit; to Hegel’s preoccupation with the systematic locus of history in the Nürnberg lectures; and, finally, to Hegel’s distinction between ‘historical history’ and ‘philosophical history’ – the latter having world history proper as its subject-matter. Nuzzo’s second contribution, ‘The Finite and the Infinite’, analyses the treatment of this conceptual pair as it is found in the Science of Logic. Nuzzo argues that the relation between the finite and the infinite, when rightly understood, is in Hegel’s own view the key to grasping ‘true’ (and that means, non-dualistic) philosophy.

The logical and ontological relations that obtain between ‘Concept, Object and Absolute Idea’ in Hegel’s system are examined by Burkhard Tuschling in three steps. First, he presents their function in key passages from the Lesser and the Greater Logic; second, he traces in outline the dialectical transformations of these three basic categories in Hegel’s accounts of logic, nature and spirit; third, Tuschling reconstructs what Hegel calls ‘the hardest of all transitions’, namely, the transition from the concept of substance to the concept of subject.

Marina Bykova’s first essay clarifies Hegel’s criticism of the uses to which the concepts of ‘Thinking and Knowing’ were put by his predecessors, especially by Descartes, Spinoza and Kant. Bykova provides here a précis of Hegel’s explicit treatment of ‘thought’ and ‘cognition’ in the Introduction and Preliminary Conception of the Encyclopaedia. She also examines the definition of the ‘pure form’ of thought at issue in the Logic, and the treatment of thought’s relation to reality that Hegel gives in the Phenomenology. Bykova’s second contribution explicates the pivotal methodological notions of ‘Mediation and Immediacy’. She shows that, in Hegel’s dialectic, mediation and immediacy are not related as a pair of opposites, but instead feature in a conceptual triad: simple immediacy, first mediation and mediated immediacy. Bykova’s third piece centres on ‘Will and Freedom’ as the crucial and most basic notions for understanding Hegel’s moral and political philosophy.

George di Giovanni contributes four essays. ‘Truth’ provides a historically informed response to standard discussions of this Hegelian concept that contrast coherence with conformity, as if these could be separated in Hegel’s philosophy. ‘Moment’ analyses in detail Hegel’s metaphorical use of this term (which originates in the language of the physics of motion) in connection with ‘sublation’ and ‘idealization’. In ‘Negativity, Negation’ di Giovanni first presents the most relevant historical antecedents (in Parmenides and Fichte) of Hegel’s peculiar use of these concepts. Di Giovanni then traces the role played by negativity and negation in pivotal transitions of the Science of Logic and in epistemological arguments from the Phenomenology of Spirit. Finally, di Giovanni’s ‘Identity and Contradiction’ gives readers a comprehensive map of Hegel’s often misunderstood and misapplied theory of the relation between these two concepts, which
are of equally fundamental significance for logic and Realphilosophie.

Part IV, ‘Hegel’s Forms of Argument’, is dedicated to critical examinations of key aspects of Hegel’s method. It opens with a chapter by Italo Testa, who, in a detailed discussion of Hegel’s original and nuanced response to the challenges of modern epistemological scepticism, argues that Hegel’s solution is found in the theoretical and practical dimensions of the process of recognition.

‘Dialectic’ is the theme of Manfred Baum’s chapter on Hegel’s method. Relating Hegel’s notions of ‘dialectic’ and ‘the dialectical’ to Kant’s, Baum first introduces us to Hegel’s close link to and simultaneous rejection of his predecessor’s definition of dialectic as a logic of illusion. Baum’s chapter then elucidates Hegel’s opposing thesis that dialectic is the only adequate method of true cognition: the absolute method of absolute knowing. The section ‘Dialectic in Greek philosophy’ examines the reconstruction of the history of dialectics found in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Analysing Hegel’s portrayals of Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Heraclitus, Gorgias, Plato and Proclus, Baum presents Hegel’s account of how dialectic came to be understood both as a method of thought and as the essence of thought’s object. The section ‘Dialectic in the absolute idea’ leads us through Hegel’s determination of the subject matter of logic as the ‘pure method’ itself. According to Baum, Hegel’s subjective logic, qua logic of the concept (Begriffslogik), provides a solution to the problem of the inverse relation between the logical extension and intension of concepts: Hegel’s notion of the concept (i.e. the ‘concrete universal’) is the idea of ‘pure personality that . . . holds everything within itself’.

It is, in other words, the notion of an absolutely self-determining subjectivity, whose nature can only be the ‘absolute dialectic’ or pure method that is the true subject matter of the logic.

In the third and final chapter of Part IV, Kenneth R. Westphal investigates what counts as ‘Proof, Justification, Refutation’ in Hegel’s philosophy. The first section relates Hegel’s notions of ‘deduction’ and ‘science’ to Hegel’s appropriation of Kant’s reply to Cartesianism as well as to his rejection of Kant’s transcendentalism. The second and third sections expose the role played by the Pyrrhonian ‘Dilemma of the Criterion’ in Hegel’s overall strategy for addressing modern scepticism’s denial of the objectivity of cognitive criteria. The Phenomenology’s approach to assessing cognitive validity claims is examined in the fourth section, and Westphal devotes his final section to what he calls the ‘transcendental logic’ at work in the Science of Logic and the Philosophy of Nature.

Part V of this volume treats aspects of ‘Hegel’s Philosophical Influence’. Tom Rockmore contributes two chapters. The first gives us a meticulous outline of the intellectual and political movement of the Young Hegelians. L. Feuerbach, B. Bauer, K. Marx and F. Engels stand here as main representatives of this multifaceted group. Among other insights, Rockmore shows how the discrepancies between Marxian theory and historically emerging Marxisms are due largely to the philosophical stances of Marx’s first editor (Engels) and to the publication history of Marx’s work. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the contrast between Marx’s theoretical roots in German Idealism and Engels’s positivistically tainted scientism. Rockmore’s second chapter, ‘Hegel in France’, demonstrates how the peculiarities of the reception of Hegel’s thought in
France would eventually produce an original ‘French’ reading of Hegel that is rather independent of Hegel’s extant work. The chapter begins with the nineteenth-century initiator of French Hegel studies, V. Cousin, and traces his influence on a number of French philosophers (L. Herr and G. Noël among others), historians (e.g. H. Taine) and political thinkers (socialists like J. Jaurès). Rockmore then turns to twentieth-century scholars like J. Wahl, J.-P. Sartre, E. Levinas and A. Kojève, to whose powerful and controversial influence Rockmore dedicates two sections. The chapter concludes with a learned and helpful synopsis of ‘Recent French Hegel scholarship’ (much of which appears to originate in Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel) from J. Hyppolite, J. Vuillemin, R. Aron and G. Bataille, to more recent Hegel interpretations inspired by Catholicism and communism.

Paul Redding’s ‘Hegel and Analytic Philosophy’ provides a thoughtful critical analysis of analytic receptions of Hegel that is grounded in his thorough familiarity with both the Anglophone tradition and ‘continental’ Hegel scholarship. Redding directs our attention to Russell’s fateful conflation of ‘idealism’ with (Berkeleyan) ‘immaterialism’ and to Sellars’s subsequent rectification of this conflation. Following in Sellars’s footsteps, contemporary analytic philosophers like McDowell and Brandom now recognize Hegel’s early critique of ‘givenness’, his idealist ‘objectivism’, conceptual ‘holism’, ‘analytic’ procedures and the social dimensions of his epistemology. They have thereby made productive and original efforts to overcome the alleged irreconcilability of analytic philosophy and absolute idealism.

In the final chapter of the volume, Fred E. Schrader opens up new avenues of research into ‘Marx’s Hegelian Project and World History’. After giving an overview of the main aspects of Hegel’s general influence on Marx’s thought, Schrader focuses on Marx’s most explicit statements about his work’s relation to Hegel’s method, which are found above all in the Grundrisse. Scholarly appreciation of Marx’s ‘Hegelianism’ in the Grundrisse, however, has seldom gone beyond the detection of strong analogies between systematic arrangements of concepts in Hegel’s logic and the presentational organization of materials in Marx’s critique of political economy. Any future attempt to understand Hegel’s deeper influence on Marx, Schrader argues, will have to begin with Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy of world history. Indispensable to this sort of investigative project will be a study of the unpublished manuscripts on world history that Marx composed at the very end of his life, between 1881 and 1883. According to Schrader, these manuscripts show Marx’s commitment to a comprehensive account of world history that would repudiate Eurocentric provincialism in favour of genuinely global history, and offer a realistic alternative to Hegel’s theory of the inevitable role of private property and civil society in world history.

NOTE ON CITATION

Apart from references to his Encyclopaedia (which is always designated by ‘Enc’), Hegel is generally cited according to volume and page numbers of the various German editions of collected works and lectures mentioned in the List of Abbreviations and specified in the Selected Bibliography. For example, ‘WL GW 12:244’ refers to page 244 of the Wissenschaft der Logik.

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INTRODUCTION

(Science of Logic), as published in volume 12 of Hegel’s Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968–). Kant, Fichte, Schelling and (with minor variations) Marx are similarly cited. Wherever feasible, passages from ‘classic’ primary sources are located according to methods that have long been accepted in the scholarly literature. (Aristotle, for instance, is cited according to the page, column and line numbers of the Bekker edition of the relevant Greek text.)

For works other than those mentioned in the List of Abbreviations, we have used an ‘author-title’ system of citation as well as an ‘author-date’ system. Authors’ names are keyed to the two lists of works (Primary Sources; Secondary Sources) comprising the Selected Bibliography. In keeping with the Companion’s focus on original historical texts, works listed under Primary Sources are generally cited by authors’ names and abbreviated titles (e.g. Hume, Treatise) in conjunction with either page numbers or another standard way of locating the passage(s) at issue. Works listed under Secondary Sources are cited by authors’ names, publication dates and page numbers; for example, Horstmann, 2006, pp. 16–20.
PART I:
HEGEL’S PATH TO THE SYSTEM
TÜBINGEN, BERN AND FRANKFURT:
1788–1800
Martin Bondeli

The phase of Hegel’s life and work stretching from his formative years in Tübingen (1788–93) to his private tutorship in Bern and Frankfurt (1793–1800) marks a peculiar contrast with the later image of the great and sovereign philosopher. Hegel’s fragments, notes, excerpts and letters up to 1800 (GW 1, 2 and 3) make it difficult to discern their connection with the thinker who will one day write the Science of Logic (WL) or the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) and who will lead post-Kantian systematic philosophy to a momentous culmination. For long stretches, the young Hegel is indecisive; he struggles to secure a professional and intellectual orientation. His literary output, devoted largely to theological and political matters, advances slowly and remains limited to wide-ranging collections of materials and unfinished reflections. Compared to his friend Schelling, five years his junior and in the philosophical limelight from the outset, Hegel’s is a solitary intellectual path. His relationship to post-Kantian philosophy, centred in Jena for two decades, long remains ambivalent. As a sympathetic and willing observer, yet without genuine enthusiasm, Hegel witnesses the completion of Kant’s philosophy begun in 1789 by Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy (Elementarphilosophie) and carried forward in Fichte’s Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) and in Schelling’s sketches for a transcendental and natural philosophy. Not until his Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (Differenzschrift) of 1801 does Hegel garner some acclaim, thus becoming linked to Jena’s intellectual movement, the royal road of German Idealism. This is not to say that Hegel’s work and thought prior to 1800 should be regarded as insignificant. For they give us insight into substantive and conceptual continuities that stand to inform our understanding of his later thinking. Moreover, some peculiarities of his thought can only be grasped by appreciating that the young Hegel arrives at post-Kantian philosophy through a theological and political detour. It is especially noteworthy that his thinking is distinguished in all phases by pronounced political and pedagogical orientations. From the time of his tutorship in Bern, Hegel persists in taking a stand on the political events of the time.
THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT IN TÜBINGEN (1788–93)

For an adequate understanding of Hegel’s path it is helpful to consider some facts about the intellectual milieu at the Tübingen Stift, the university in the protestant duchy of Württemberg where Hegel studies as a fellow during his formative years (see Rosenkranz, 1844, pp. 25–41; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 19–44; for the philosophical and theological contexts of the Tübingen years, see Franz, 2005, 2007).

During this period he earns a Master of Philosophy and sits for his qualifying exam in theology. He belongs to a circle of friends that includes several later luminaries. Among these are Hölderlin and Schelling, influential companions during his philosophical development. A regular topic of conversation in this circle is the conservatism of official Tübingen theology. The more enlightened among Hegel’s friends impugn the dogmatism of their teachers Storr and Flatt with its combination of classical rationalist content and belief in miracles and revelation. The students regard this mixture as typical of the dominant positive religion – the antithesis of the natural, rational and tolerant religion endorsed by prominent thinkers like Rousseau, Herder, H. S. Reimarus, Lessing and Kant. Another topic of fervent conversation is the French Revolution of 1789. News of its developments lead to high expectations and to mounting sentiments of liberty and fraternity among students of the Stift. Indeed, many see themselves on the threshold of a new epoch. Hegel is an outspoken advocate of the revolution. Even afterwards, he would remain convinced that this event, despite its excesses, marked a crucial juncture of progress in mankind’s history. The friends embrace and debate everything that prompts change and renewal. Each has his favourite writers – for Hegel, Rousseau above all (see Nicolin, 1970, p. 12). In the context of the circle, he reads with special fondness Jacobi’s novels (see Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 40). These are clearly congenial to the perceived need for a religion of the heart and sentiment as opposed to traditional religious ritualism. Of enduring impact is the shared reading of Jacobi’s On the Doctrine of Spinoza (Über die Lehre des Spinoza). This has a peculiar effect on Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling. It directs their attention not just towards Jacobi’s philosophy of being, enriched by elements of docta ignorantia and Humean scepticism, but also towards the pantheistic doctrines of Spinoza and Bruno, for which Jacobi has both sympathy and scorn. Spinoza’s and Bruno’s monism and their religion-critical aura make them attractive to the Tübingen friends. Undeterred by the fatalism attributed to Spinoza, they regard this as a reason for re-interpreting Spinozian substance as the unity of nature and free subjectivity.

Finally, there is the influence of Kant’s philosophy. After 1789, his philosophy comes to be regarded at German universities as the spiritual and philosophical counterpart of the revolution. In his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (Briefe über die Kantsche Philosophie) Reinhold revered Kant as the new Messiah and provided a detailed account and generalized application of Kantian ‘results’, especially those of Kant’s moral theology. From this ‘gospel of pure reason’ Reinhold hoped to usher in the ‘reformation’ of all the sciences as well as one of the ‘most remarkable and beneficial revolutions’ of the human spirit (see Reinhold, 2007, vol. 2/1, pp. 70–3). Also swept up in this fervour are those who debate Kant in the Stift. Flatt teaches Kant’s first Critique as part of the Tübingen curriculum, although...
he himself is less than enthusiastic about the rise of moral-religious Kantianism. The idea of the ‘invisible church’, re-interpreted in Kant’s *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion)* as ‘ethical state’ (AA 6:94, 101), circulates among radical students of the *Stift* as a revolutionary formula. In a sermon, Hegel appeals to the ‘duties’ imposed by Jesus on the disciples and refers to a ‘kingdom of God’ to be established not through a ‘visible church’ but through a living religious spirit (cf. *GW* 1:70; see Nicolin, 1996, pp. 42–69).

On the whole, there is scarcely anything to indicate that in Tübingen Hegel has his own philosophical programme. His philosophical activity consists primarily in the enthusiastic dissemination of religious ideas of freedom and community. The background and sources of these ideas play secondary roles. Yet the soil on which his later philosophy would thrive is now staked out. Kant, Jacobi and Spinoza have become crucial landmarks on Hegel’s path towards post-Kantian systematic philosophy.

KANTIANISM IN BERN (1793–6)

Hegel’s programmatic reflections on theology and philosophy first emerge in Bern and Tschugg (see Bondeli, 1990, pp. 17–83; Schneider and Waszek, 1997; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 45–69).

At the end of the Tübingen period, he had developed original thoughts on the relation between ‘objective’, or ‘positive’, and ‘subjective religion.’ He resumes these reflections at the beginning of his stay in Bern. The earliest fragments (*Studien 1792/3–1794, GW* 1:73–114) display a distinctive critique of objective or positive religion, understood as a religion that appeals to the understanding or demands blind faith in truths of revelation. Its fixation on exterior practices and rituals, Hegel writes, serves as ideological instrument of a particular class. Against this, he demands a return to a subjective religion that satisfies the understanding as much as the heart and conscience – a religion not geared towards private interests but one that serves as popular religion. In Bern, Hegel sharpens and concretizes this theoretical approach. Employing the keyword ‘positivity’, he launches a polemical attack against religious and political currents that he thinks are formalistic, legalistic, particularistic and hostile to sensibility. His polemics are primarily directed against Christian religion and theology. Seeking to seize Christianity by its roots, he combines a sober account of the life and teachings of Jesus (*Das Leben Jesu, GW* 1:205–78) with in-depth inquiry into how Jesus’ moral lessons and religion of the heart could have mutated into a positive religion and contributed to the development of a theocratic state. He concludes that the spread of Christianity, shaped by the Judaic religion of laws and by Jesus’ sacrifice, is nothing less than calamitous. In this scathing indictment, the history of Christianity figures as a series of schisms, falsifications and failed attempts at reconciliation (*Studien* 1795/6, *GW* 1:329–31). While gathering source materials for his novel religion, Hegel expands his account of the opposition between subjective and objective religion to include religious and cultural history, thus linking this opposition to a ‘difference between the Greek religion of the imagination and the Christian positive religion’ (*GW* 1:365). Bolstered by Herder’s and Schiller’s work, he maintains that subjective religion should seek its historical model neither in current nor in original Christianity but in ancient communal religion.
Hegel’s aim in Bern is to ground both the critique of positive religion and his ideal of subjective religion. In Tübingen, he did not align himself with Shaftesbury, Rousseau, Spinoza or Kant. He held them all to be equally exemplary. This now changes abruptly. The Bern fragments are distinctly oriented towards Kant’s doctrine of morals and his philosophy of religion, and Hegel’s affinity with Kantian ideas on the moral religion of reason becomes more prominent. Central to Hegel’s discussion of the subjectivity of subjective religion are Kant’s ‘moral law’ as well as the feelings of ‘respect’ and ‘duty’ necessary to its fulfilment. To Hegel, the higher ranking that Kant gives to moral reason in relation to sensible and empirical moral representation is self-evident. The Bernese fragments from 1795 and 1796 are characterized by a radical Kantian stance on moral reason (see Kondylis, 1979, pp. 235–56).

Hegel is at first reluctant to explain his strong Kantian leanings. One might say that his thoughts are framed by a basic idea from the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV) namely the idea that pure concepts of morality must be integrated with human nature so that ‘objective practical reason’ is also made ‘subjectively practical’ (AA 5:151).

A thorough study of Kant and of subsequent philosophical developments furnishes Hegel in Bern with new insights into the prospects, aims and tendencies of his Kantian philosophizing. Of special interest to him is Kant’s doctrine of the postulates (cf. Hegel: The Letters [Briefe] 1:16, 24) and the light it sheds on the relationship between moral theology and physico-theology (GW 1:195; Briefe 1:17). Paying close attention to Reinhold’s concept of free will (GW 1:195–6), Hegel dedicates himself to a revolutionary and practice-oriented moral Kantianism. In April 1795 he writes to Schelling: ‘From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany, which will proceed from principles that are already at hand and need only to be applied to all hitherto given knowledge’ (Briefe 1:23–4). Like Reinhold, Hegel has evidently become convinced that the employment of Kant’s moral philosophy in religion, psychology, history, natural right, aesthetics, etc., provides the proper path to a contemporary philosophy of enlightenment and revolution accessible to a wider public. He stands here in intellectual proximity to Bernese Kantians and Fichteans who, having broken with the ancien régime, develop reforming ideas inspired by critical philosophy (see Bondeli, 2001).

The post-Kantian philosophy inaugurated by Reinhold’s Essay on a New Theory of the Human Capacity for Representation (Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens) and carried further by Fichte and Schelling still strikes Hegel as suspect. He is not impressed by Fichte’s and Schelling’s central conviction that philosophy must proceed from the unconditioned, thus making ‘the idea of God as the absolute I’ the necessary first principle of all philosophizing. He thinks that the sublimity and radicalism of this appropriation of Kant by Fichte’s and Schelling’s ‘esoteric philosophy’ (Briefe 1:24) is unparalleled. Yet he also holds that their philosophy fails to account for the needs of the age and for enlightened pedagogical requirements. He certainly does not wish to distance himself entirely from this esoteric Kantianism beyond Kant. After all, his friend Schelling had vigorously embraced this cause and Hölderlin had given an enthusiastic account of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre as well as of the relation of Fichte’s ‘I’ to Spinoza’s substance (Briefe 1:19–20). Thus in Bern Hegel decides to study Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Schelling’s most...
recent works (Briefe 1:25, 32). In this way, Hegel hopes to satisfy both his interest in the idea of God and the need to counter, with Schelling, uncritical interpretations of Kant’s postulates of pure practical reason (Briefe 1:12–14, 16–17).

Hegel’s engagement with the postulates – principally that of God’s existence – continues to influence his theological and political thinking. The late Bern fragments feature an autonomy-centred interpretation of Kant’s doctrine oriented towards the idea of the moral world’s self-actualization. On this view, moral reason must be understood as ‘absolute’ (GW 1:358), that is, capable of realizing by itself moral ends or the highest good. The notion of God as judge of the moral world is replaced by the idea of God as absolute practical reason. Hegel’s proximity to Fichte’s interpretation of the postulates according to the idea of self-positing – a view that after 1796 would be subject to charges of atheism – is here undeniable.

Quite likely, Hegel’s reading of Kant’s postulates during the late Bern period prompts him to clarify his own Kantian position. But this can be neither proved nor disproved until it is determined whether the extant sketch for a forthcoming system of Kantian postulates and ideas is indeed Hegel’s own product. This sketch, found in Hegel’s Nachlass, has come to be known as Oldest System Programme of German Idealism (Systemprogramm). It dates from the end of 1796 or the beginning of 1797. Although written in Hegel’s hand, its intellectual authorship has been vehemently disputed since its first publication by Rosenzweig (1917).

This double-sided document of roughly 70 lines combines the plan for a system that exhibits ideas linked to Kant, Fichte, Herder and Schiller, with a campaign program for aesthetic and religious reform. The author begins by stating that ‘all future metaphysics will be subsumed under the theory of morals – for which Kant with his two [sic] practical postulates has provided only an example and brought nothing to its full conclusion.’ Moreover, it is necessary to establish an ‘ethics’ that contains ‘a complete system of all ideas’ or ‘of all practical postulates’ (Jamme and Schneider, 1984, p. 11, lines 1–5). The first idea must be the representation of myself as ‘absolutely free being’ (l. 5–6). This must be understood as immediately connected with the idea of the creation of a world: ‘there emerges at once a whole world – from nothing – the only thinkable creation from nothing’ (l. 6–8). Then, starting with the question ‘How must a world be constituted for a moral being?’ (l. 9–10), the first programmatic step will be the project of a creative ‘physics broadly construed’ (Physik im Großen: l. 13). The second step, which proceeds from the ‘work of man’ (l. 16), will involve ideas such as the ‘history of mankind’, ‘state, constitution, and government’ and ‘perpetual peace’ (p. 12, l. 22–5). It must be shown that a state conceived as a mechanical ‘wheelwork’ contradicts the idea of human freedom and must therefore ‘cease’ (l. 21–2). The third step will involve the articulation of moral and religious ideas conducive to human autonomy, since free spirits will not want to seek the ideas of ‘God’ and ‘immortality’ outside themselves (l. 30–1). Finally, one must provide the all-unifying ‘idea of beauty’ (l. 32) and give voice to the conviction that ‘truth and goodness are sisters only in beauty’ (l. 35–6). The reverse side of the document contains reflections on the preeminence of art, especially poetry, at early social and cultural stages of spirit. The task of philosophers and poets is to sensualize the religion of reason, to engender a ‘new mythology’ (p. 13, l. 17–18) and to establish a ‘new religion’ (p. 14, l. 31).
Significant evidence suggests that this document is Hegel’s transcription of Schelling’s system programme. The conception of the ‘I’ as free being and the discussion of the practical postulates is characteristic of Schelling’s Fichteanizing thought during 1796/7. This is when Schelling mentions plans for an ‘Ethics’, begins his transition to natural philosophy or speculative physics, and eventually focuses on a philosophy of art and mythology. Yet there is also evidence to suggest that Hegel himself might be sketching here his own Kantian programme as strengthened by his study of the postulates and by post-Kantian inquiries inspired by Schelling and Hölderlin. The conception of a complete system of ideas or postulates based on the theory of morals sits easily with Hegel’s Bernese ‘applied’ Kantianism. While modifying Kant’s conception of morals, Hegel has not yet abandoned the idea of a metaphysics derived from the theory of morals in favour of speculative metaphysics. The radical critique of the state, the conclusion concerning an all-encompassing aesthetic idea, and the claims pertaining to poetry, mythology, and a new religion are certainly consistent with Hegel’s views. Consider for example that at this time he agrees with Herder’s account of folk religion and mythology as well as with Schiller’s idea of an aesthetically grounded theory of morals (Briefe 1:25). Also noteworthy is Hegel’s intensifying affinity with Hölderlin, as is shown by his lyrical letter ‘Eleusis’ (GW 1:399–402). It is of course possible that the Systemprogramm’s inspirer was Hölderlin or someone from Fichte’s circle in Jena. The claim that Kant ‘has brought nothing to its full conclusion’ with his postulates, the talk of a creation ex nihilo, and the anarchistic demand that the state should cease, can be found almost literally in Fichte’s 1796 lectures, which may suggest authorship by a student of Fichte. Finally, the Systemprogramm may originate not just in Tübingen and Jena but also in Bern. With it, Hegel may well be countering Bernese Kantianism – a movement that he considers neither radical nor revolutionary enough (see Bondeli and Linneweber, 1999, pp. 365–94; Bondeli, 2001, pp. 205–13). In any event, there currently exists an almost unmanageable variety of interpretations of the content and authorship of this document (for details, see Hansen, 1989; Bondeli and Linneweber, 1999, pp. 295–428). At present, there is no conclusive evidence that Hegel is its intellectual author.

**FRANKFURT: TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF UNIFICATION (1797–1800)**

The Frankfurt fragments reveal a thinker still harshly critical of Christian religion and theology – a thinker vigorously confronting the ‘tragedy’ and ‘destiny’ of the Christian world. At times, Hegel seems to find some aspects of the Christian heritage to be congenial to his reflections on a new religion. His transcription of portions of the Johannine Prologue (cf. Nobl, pp. 305–8), for example, shows that Hegel takes St. John’s discourse on divine logos, life, light and love to be a conceptual model for overcoming the schisms of objective religion. On the whole, however, he is still far from his later view according to which the spirit of Christianity is a prelude to the most progressive epoch in history: the realization of the principles of reason and freedom.

What markedly changes in Frankfurt is Hegel’s conceptual-structural account of the religious ideal and its opposite, that is,
objective or positive religion. Increasingly, he specifies his previous understanding of the opposition between subjective and objective religion in terms of a relation between whole and part, between unification and separation. He goes so far as to make this latter relation into the blueprint for developing the contrast between subjective and objective religion. He now pins all hopes on a new religion characterized primarily by the unity of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ (cf. Nobl, p. 376). Accordingly, it is not only the unrealized potential of subjective religion that Hegel conceives as an expression of dichotomizing positivity, but also a new kind of subjectivity incapable of integrating or sublating objective religion into itself. He also turns against the sort of positivity that he characterizes as subject’s fatal ‘flight’ from the object, and hence as a ‘fear of unification’. Successful unification must be understood as a relation of ‘love’ (ibid.). This cancels his plea for a moral religion of reason based on individual virtue and moral conviction. Hegel thinks that the religious moment of free community will have a firmer grounding in concrete ethical relations of love and friendship than it can have in a universalized principle of subjective morality.

What is required is not the replacement of objective conditions with subjective ones, but the universal dissolution of separations and calcifications. Henceforth, this becomes Hegel’s new credo in matters of religion and a guiding theme of his political thought. In his draft Über die neuesten inneren Zustände Württembergs (On the Internal Conditions of Würtemberg in Recent Times) and in Die Verfassung Deutschlands (The Constitution of Germany) composed in Frankfurt, Hegel appears eager to break up petrified relations. He yearns for life and change, and hopes that the ‘power-wielding universality’ of the state will end the people’s lack of rights as well as the hegemony of particularistic powers (Vorarbeiten und Entwürfe 1799–1801, GW 5:18). To understand these changes one must realize that Hegel’s thinking is now shaped not just by the new intellectual context in Frankfurt, but also by the perception in revolutionary circles that a certain subjectivist strain of radical enlightenment thought is bound to fail.⁶

In Frankfurt, Hegel’s entire paradigm finally shifts in tandem with the development of the philosophical ideal of unification in religion and politics. This ideal can no longer be adequately articulated on the basis of a practical or even an aesthetic Kantianism. What is needed is a new philosophy of unification centred upon a principle of indivisibility and unity, a principle that is in turn connected to a primary structure of reflection. These are ideas familiar to Hegel from neo-Platonic sources (see Halfwassen, 1999). But Hegel may have rediscovered them through Jacobi and Hölderlin. His philosophical affinity to Hölderlin is most significant in this regard (see Henrich, 1975, pp. 9–40; Jamme, 1983). The order of the day in the Bund der Geister, a fraternity to which belong Hölderlin, Hegel, von Sinclair and Zwilling (see Jamme and Pöggeler, 1981, 1983; Brauer, 1993, pp. 140–64; Waibel, 2002, pp. 24–55) is a debate about the ideal of subject–object unity and about one singular whole subsisting independently of reflection. In April 1795 Hölderlin proposes to replace the philosophy of the unconditioned that begins with the absolute ‘I’ with a new philosophy of being. According to Hölderlin, the ‘I!’ signifies nothing but ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘I am I’. Thus the ‘separation’ (Ur-Theilung) of the one into a ‘subject-I’ and an ‘object-I’ is always already given. The inseparable, indivisible and un-reflective principle of all philosophizing must therefore be called ‘being as
such’ (see Hölderlin, 2004, IV, p. 163). Like Schelling, Hölderlin has in mind a synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza. Yet he diverges from Schelling in that, instead of a modified philosophy of the ‘I’, he arrives at a philosophy of being inspired by Spinoza and Jacobi.

As Hegel achieves clarity about the philosophic conception of unification, he becomes increasingly convinced that he must part ways with Kant and criticize the results of Kant’s moral philosophy as forms of positivity (see Bondeli, 1997, pp. 116–59). Hegel previously held that Kant’s idea of a free ‘morality’ was clearly distinguishable from legalistic representations of the moral law and hence from coercion and punishment. He now claims that Kant’s understanding of morality amounts to ‘subjugating the individual to the yoke of the universal’ (see Nohl, p. 387). While he formerly thought that respect for the moral law and the duty to follow it furnish uniquely valid moral incentives, Hegel now sees ‘respect for duty’, as opposed to ‘inclinations’, as a contradictory or barren feeling (see Nohl, p. 266). And while an idea of community derived from the moral law formerly appealed to Hegel, Kant’s duty of love towards one’s neighbour (cf. KpV AA 5:83) now strikes him as nonsensical, since ‘in love, all thought of duty vanishes’ (Nohl, p. 267). Hegel thus seems to regard Kant’s understanding of morality as outmoded. Not only does he disapprove (like Schiller in his aesthetic reflections) of its rigoristic character, but he also has obviously come to hold the view that the very stage of morality is problematic and ought to be sublated into higher stages of spirit, namely the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres. In accordance with this radicalization of his criticism, Hegel goes on to impugn Kant’s concept of morality because it can only provide an ontology of the ‘ought’ and not of the ‘is’. Moreover, the existence of moral objects derived from Kant’s concept of morality can be postulated solely in form of a weak certainty of faith. Given Kant’s postulate of God’s existence and his moral philosophy in general, Hegel now extends his criticism of positive religion to any attempt at reducing the absolute to an ‘ideal’, that is, to what ‘we ought to be’, or to belief in an object of faith (see Nohl, p. 385).

Initially, Hegel’s project in Frankfurt is still dominated by the idea of an absolute practical reason that has distinctly Fichtean traits (see Nohl, pp. 374–5). But he now develops an approach that does justice to the centrality of subject–object unity. He understands this unity not merely in religious and political terms but as a metaphysical category which he comes to regard as a principle of knowledge and volition and which he calls, like Hölderlin, ‘being’. The result of his 1798 reflections on faith and being is: ‘Unification and being are synonyms’ (Nohl, p. 383).

Hegel’s move towards a philosophy of unification and being will have systematic implications for the entirety of his thought. The term ‘being’ (emerging around 1798) characterizes for him a philosophy that responds to theories developed at ‘lower’ stages of reflection and judgement. Like Hölderlin, Hegel has reached the conclusion that every judgement is at its core an original dividing, that is, an original unity that divides itself into a subject and a predicate. He sets forth the thesis, reiterated in later years, that the copula of the judgement – ‘the binding word is’ – expresses a unification that opposes that subject–predicate division (see Nohl, p. 383). Moreover, wherever ‘being’ is meant to connote ‘love’ and ‘life’, it also stands as a cipher for overcoming all subject–object dualisms as well as the sort of monism which, when confined to practical reason, raises an absolute ‘I’ existing beyond nature to the status of supreme
principle. ‘Being’ thus becomes the basic term in Hegel’s forthcoming philosophy. This will be, first, a new post-Kantian metaphysics; second, a metaphysics that has overcome Fichte’s monistic subjectivity. Finally, ‘being’ will come to signify Hegel’s distanciation from a philosophy that privileges ‘representation’, the ‘ought’ or an ‘ideal’, that is, a philosophy of belief in the pejorative sense: a philosophy of positivity. I say ‘in the pejorative sense’ because the epistemic side of Hegel’s philosophy of being is still anchored in a notion of belief. In his book on Spinoza Jacobi maintains that the philosopher’s task is to ‘uncover and reveal being’ and that the strongest certainty attainable lies in ‘belief’ (Jacobi, *Schriften zum Spinozastreit*, pp. 29, 115). In a similar vein, Hegel claims that reflection gives us no access to ‘being’ and that ‘being can only be believed’ (*Nohl*, p. 383). Hegel is here disavowing the type of philosophy that recognizes only belief in the object of faith or, in Kant’s case, belief in a postulated absolute that defies the certainty of faith. All this shows that Hegel has not yet developed the concept of speculation as a higher form of reflection that makes it possible to speak of knowing, cognizing and comprehending being. Yet we already encounter several attempts on Hegel’s part that lead in this direction: he characterizes the structure of reflection aimed at (extra-reflective) being as a dialectical ‘antinomy’ (*Nohl*, p. 383). Reflection on being perforce triggers reflection on both unification of and opposition between the *relata* at issue. In this sense, Hegel grasps each pole of an antinomy as an opposite per se that, in order to be recognized as such, must already be united with the other. Hegel is not alone in reflecting about these figures of thought. In Hölderlin’s circle, Zwilling attracts attention on account of his discussions of a fundamental, quasi-antinomial relation between ‘relatedness and non-relatedness’ (see Henrich and Jamme, 1986, pp. 63–5).

We can only approximately reconstruct the final developments of this project of a philosophy of unification and being that eventually leads to Hegel becoming tied to post-Kantian philosophy in Jena. We must assume that, along with his closeness to Hölderlin, Hegel turns increasingly to Schelling, closely monitoring the latter’s plans for a dual system of transcendental and natural philosophy. By integrating the philosophy of the ‘I’ with Spinoza’s concept of substance, Schelling had come to develop a distinct subsystem of natural philosophy and science. Hegel presumably worked on this sort of project already in Frankfurt (see Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 100). For without a philosophical and scientific study of celestial mechanics, he would have hardly been in a position to submit his *Philosophical Dissertation on Planetary Orbits* (*Dissertatio*) (*GW* 5:221–53); and without prior study of the general elements of natural philosophy, Hegel’s impending involvement with Schelling is scarcely conceivable. By the end of his stay in Frankfurt, he appears to begin drafting a systematic philosophy of being, as is indicated by the system fragment of 1800 (see *Nohl*, pp. 343–51). In this two-sheet text, probably a coda to what was originally a 45-sheet manuscript, the author sketches a system of ‘life’ or ‘nature’. Life or nature, which constitutes a ‘being outside reflection’ or the indivisible, is supposed to mark the beginning and end of a system of reflection – a system of ‘organizations’ of the living. Hegel emphasizes nature here because his rejection of the absolute ‘I’ as first principle has turned into a more radical criticism of the hostility towards nature that this principle represents. What is fatal to freedom is not the dependency of the ‘I’
on nature but the human being’s dependence on a being ‘above all nature’ (Nohl, p. 351). To account for the logical dynamics of his new system, Hegel again takes up the idea of unity-in-antinomy. He proposes an antinomial progression whose basic structure he now characterizes as a ‘union of union and disunion’ (Nohl, p. 348), thus prefiguring the Jena formula of the ‘identity of identity and non-identity’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:64). Clearly, he does not yet envisage his system of nature as one part (alongside logic and the philosophy of spirit) of an overarching system – this will become the signal feature of his Jena philosophy. Instead, he has in mind a system of nature that is also a system of spirit. It consists of a succession of spatial-temporal, physical (celestial) and spiritual-religious determinations. Religion, not philosophy, is the most complete activity of spirit, the most rigorous approximation to the infinite. In keeping with the dictum that being may only be believed, Hegel claims that philosophy must ‘cease where religion begins’ (Nohl, p. 348).

NOTES

1 See also Nohl (1907), Nicolin (1970) and Jamme and Schneider (1984). The Frankfurt fragments will be published in GW 2.


4 Cf. Hegel’s farewell to Schelling in early 1795: ‘Reason and freedom remain our parole, and our locus of unification is the invisible church’ (Briefe 1:18).

5 Hegel’s contribution to the Cart-Schrift (cf. Hegels erste Druckschrift, 1970) points to his collaboration with the Republican movement of Kantians and Fichte’s followers in Bern.

6 Given this atmosphere, one can agree with Lukács (1973, vol. 1, p. 174) that Hegel in Frankfurt falls prey to a ‘crisis-ridden groping for novelty’. This crisis, however, is not primarily a personal one. Actually, after his lonely years in Bern Hegel begins to flourish in Frankfurt in the circle of his friends.

7 On the view that Hegel again came to grips with Jacobi’s book on Spinoza in connection with this thesis, see Baum, 1989, pp. 55–6.

translated by Wesley Nolan
Hegel’s years in Jena are characterized both by his connection to post-Kantian systematic philosophy in its then most advanced form, namely Schelling’s transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, and by his gradual elaboration of a system derived from Schellingian premises (see Henrich and Düsing, 1980; Pinkard, 2000, pp. 153–202). In 1801, after his father’s death and the settling of his inheritance, Hegel secures a position as academic instructor at the University of Jena. He must prove his qualifications by the submission of his *Philosophical Dissertation on Planetary Orbits* (Dissertatio) and the defense of this habilitation thesis (*GW* 5:221–31). His acceptance at Jena is made easier by the fact that two alumni of the Tübingen Stift, Niethammer and Paulus, already hold office there as theology professors. In the following years, the three will form a close friendship. Above all, Hegel has Schelling to thank for his successful transition from private tutor in Frankfurt to philosophy lecturer in Jena. Schelling, the leading figure in Jena after Fichte’s departure for Berlin (1799), encourages his former Tübingen colleague to join him once again in close collaboration, a fact that contributes to the smooth completion of Hegel’s habilitation. Aside from collegial like-mindedness, there are also strategic reasons for their close cooperation. In 1800, the relationship between Schelling and Fichte had suffered a philosophical and personal rupture. On account of the atheism controversy, Fichte had to leave Jena. The break was caused by the shattering of Schelling’s plans to start a journal with the author of the *Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science* (Wissenschaftslehre). Fichte had not been able to warm to his successor’s suggestions to extend the principle of the active ‘I’ to the realm of nature, thus embracing the philosophy of nature as a systematic part equivalent to the philosophy of the ‘I’. Hegel however, due to his work in Frankfurt, is now very much open to this undertaking. He lets this be known together with his views on Fichte’s erroneous path, in the polemical work *The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy* (Differenzschrift, 1801), published prior to his dissertation. Schelling thus seizes the opportunity to establish the journal with a new partner. The *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (Kritisches Journal), co-edited by Schelling and Hegel, runs from 1801 to 1803. This publication, characterized by its repudiation of Fichteanism and driven by the endeavour to become the leading philosophical voice of the nascent century, is principally devoted to criticizing the editors’ philosophical rivals.
Kant and Jacobi, along with Reinhold and Fichte, pioneers of post-Kantian philosophy, land in the journal's polemical crossfire just as often as a slew of other allies and opponents. The collaboration grows less intense when Schelling is called to Würzburg in 1803 and Hegel's intellectual development becomes more self-sufficient. Towards the end of Hegel's Jena period, there emerge the first philosophical and personal rifts between the two thinkers.

Hegel's drafting of the system of philosophy is closely linked to his teaching activity, which begins in the winter semester 1801. The curriculum of his Jena lectureship, lasting until 1805, and of his subsequent adjunct professorship covers the following areas: introduction to philosophy, logic and metaphysics, natural right, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit, philosophy of history and arithmetic. The increasingly far-reaching and deeply penetrating lecture drafts from this period must be viewed as decisive advances on Hegel's path towards the encyclopaedic system and also as signposts of Hegel's first major project, the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG). Fragmentary lecture manuscripts are extant (Fragmente 1801/2, GW 5:255–75; Fragmente 1803, GW 5:363–77; Aus den Jenaer Vorlesungen, GW 5:455–75) along with the body of extended drafts known as the Jena System Sketches (JS GW 6–8) and a transcript (by I. V. Troxler) of Hegel's first lectures on logic (see Düsing, 1988, pp. 63–77). An early fragment (Die Idee des absoluten Wesens 1801/2, GW 5:262–5) shows that Hegel, in terms of both content and structure, pursues his future encyclopaedic system right from the start. The 'extended science of the idea' must begin with 'logic', which in turn ascends to absolute determinations of metaphysical categories. Thus, the task is to attain the 'reality of the idea' and to work through various celestial and terrestrial systems. 'Natural philosophy' must then move to 'philosophy of spirit'. Spirit's structure of development includes 'representation and desire', 'right', 'absolute ethical life' (absolute Sittlichkeit) and, finally, the spheres of the 'philosophy of religion and art'. Hegel's intense concern to realize his plans for a system does not hinder him from continuing to work on the political issues of the day. Until 1803 he carries on with the studies that he had begun in Frankfurt on a German constitution. While he shows his competence in seemingly peripheral factual issues in politics, he is equally capable – as is attested by the 1802/3 System of Ethical Life (SS) – of elucidating social and political issues from the perspective of highly abstract distinctions and concept relations.

**THE CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION**

In the Differenzschrift and in the Kritisches Journal Hegel and Schelling attack various forms of the so-called philosophy of reflection. According to Hegel's Faith and Knowledge (Gl&Wi), the Reflexionsphilosophie represents a further chapter in the failed emancipation of enlightened reason from faith and mere understanding (Gl&Wi GW 4:315–24). From a systematic point of view, the philosophy of reflection is a stage of spirit where the understanding, along with cognition based on judgements about finite objects, is the measure of all things. Reason, understood as the higher stage of spirit whose object is the infinite, is only poorly comprehended (though not altogether ignored) by the philosophy of reflection. In this type of philosophy the infinite is not an
object of cognition but merely a postulated one, an object of faith, of longing or of ironic speech. Moreover, in cognizing finite objects the philosophy of reflection either reduces these to mere products of the understanding or else locks them into a form–matter relation. Finite objects or nature itself therefore appear either as governed by subjective activity or as amorphous dead matter, that is, as a homogeneous stuff or a contingent content added to an empty form. The misapprehension of the infinite and the flawed treatment of finite nature must be taken as symptoms of a type of dualistic thinking that misunderstands the genuine identity or unity of subject and object. In other words, the basic defect and the real scandal of the philosophy of reflection is ‘dualism’, understood here as entailing division, ossification, particularism, incomplete wholeness or failed unification. In providing this diagnosis Hegel opposes a number of contemporaneous theories. His primary target is the predominance – initially established by Kant and fully instituted by Fichte – of the subject of mere understanding over nature and reason. Hegel also strongly opposes the reduction of philosophy to logic and formalism, which he considers to be the end of the trail leading from Kant to Reinhold and the newer Kantians. His polemics against any empty or futile striving for the infinite are meant to put in their proper place Fichte and Jacobi as well as two leading figures of Jena Romanticism, namely, F. Schlegel and Schleiermacher (see Pöggeler, 1999, pp. 121–67). Finally, Hegel also rejects common-sense philosophy, especially G. E. Schulze’s empiricism and scepticism, which he considers one of the low points of the philosophy of reflection.

Seen from a developmental perspective, the polemical characterization of Reflexionsphilosophie just described marks the prelude to a historical account of systematic philosophy, according to which the former systematic philosophies beginning with Kant are interpreted as developmental stages leading to Hegel’s own. This interpretation is an essential feature of Hegel’s subsequent philosophical development in the sense that the criticized theories come to be correlated with specific stages of his system.

Hegel’s criticism of Reflexionsphilosophie in Bern and Frankfurt must ultimately be seen as self-criticism. It embodies the overcoming of convictions that he once shared with Kant and Jacobi. Having said this, of course, the critique of Reflexionsphilosophie must also be understood as a critique in its own right, since it clearly lays claim to a standpoint deemed superior to the standpoint at issue in Kant and Kantianism. And in this respect Hegel’s arguments are anything but unassailable. For scholars thoroughly familiar with the Cartesian and Kantian tradition – and hence its essential distinctions between thought and extension and between concept and intuition – it is not easy to see why ‘dualism’ should designate an inferior mode of thought. Moreover, to those who (following Locke and Hume) are convinced that knowledge is limited to objects of experience and who (following Kant) understand and accept as meaningful the anti-dogmatic assumption that things in themselves are unknowable, it will hardly be obvious why we should assume that we can have knowledge of the unconditioned. Finally, adherents of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, who understand the ‘form’ of something as signifying its essence or its necessary medium of articulation, will not discern any immediate connection between the form–matter relation and the grip of ‘formalism’.

The critique of Kant plays a key role in Hegel’s discussion of the philosophy of reflection. At a basic level, Hegel holds that...
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the ‘spirit’ of Kant’s philosophy must be separated from its ‘letter’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:5). This demand is in keeping with his subsequent portrayal of a twofold Kant (Gl&Wi GW 4:325–46). On the one hand, there is the Kant whose treatments of the original synthetic unity of apperception, reflecting judgement, the transcendental power of imagination and intuitive understanding prepare the way to a genuine grasp of the absolute. On the other, there is the Kant of anti-speculative doctrines and principles such as the transcendental deduction of the categories, the limitation of knowledge to sensible intuition and experience and the non-cognizability of the thing in itself. With these, Hegel contends, Kant excludes himself from access to what he is most concerned with. While Hegel praises Kant’s conception of moral autonomy, which he thinks heralds a new philosophical epoch, he also chides Kant for positing the moral law as a categorical imperative – thus giving autonomy a shape that destroys all efforts to improve moral conditions. From Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s conception of moral freedom either serves as an instrument of moral coercion or is reduced to a wholly ineffectual moralizing.

Hegel thus advances in his criticism of the moral law already begun in Frankfurt. His main objection is that the intrinsic demand of the categorical imperative, namely that maxims be selected by means of a universality test, amounts to a ‘formalism’ leading to arbitrary choice (Willkür) (On the Scientific Treatments of Natural Law [WBN] GW 4:434–9). According to Hegel, Kant’s categorical imperative is the ‘law of non-contradiction’ applied to the practical realm. The effect of this imperative must therefore be such that ‘maxims’ are to be chosen with complete indifference to their ‘content’ or ‘matter’ – the imperative leads, in other words, to an ‘absolute abstraction from all matter of the will’ (WBN GW 4:435). Thus, any given content may be added to the abstract, empty will and validated through universalization or with the aid of the law of non-contradiction.

Seen from a distance, of course, Hegel’s account of a twofold Kant – the speculative and the anti-speculative – is by no means unproblematic (for discussion, see Bondeli, 2004). Hegel’s criticism continually foists upon Kant implications contrary to the latter’s aims. For example, Hegel interprets the famous question ‘How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?’ as if Kant wanted to show that the heterogeneous structure of subject and predicate, particular and universal, is ‘at once a priori, that is, absolutely identical’ (Gl&Wi GW 4:328). On this interpretation, Kant was unable to articulate sufficiently this absolute identity on account of his Verstandesdenken, that is, on account of the limitations intrinsic to the understanding mode of thought. For Kant himself, however, this question had nothing to do with identity. Instead, it concerned the substantiation and proof of a particular form of knowledge. Even the details of Hegel’s critical analyses are problematic. For instance, his criticism of the formalism of the moral law ignores the fact that Kant was not concerned with abstractions from maxims or with contents of the will but rather with the testing of maxims – a testing that indeed involves criteria of content. Likewise, there is no such thing in Kant as the positing and universalizing of arbitrary contents. Kant’s aim is rather the ascertainment of a universal content.2 Of course, these shortcomings do not preclude that some of Hegel’s objections may prove to be, to some extent, productive when they are specifically directed to the actual concerns of Kant.
Of equal weight is Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre* as *Reflexionsphilosophie*. Adopting Schelling’s view that Fichte misjudges the necessity of a ‘second’ system of natural philosophy alongside the philosophy of the ‘I’, Hegel rates Fichte’s Doctrine as dogmatic or ‘absolute’ subjectivism. On the one hand, he thinks that Fichte is far more rigorous than Kant in articulating the absolute unity of subject and object. For it follows from Fichte’s ‘I’-monism that it is nonsensical to think of an external object that may not be grasped as a modification of the ‘I’, that is, to think of a thing-in-itself. On the other hand, Fichte’s subject–object unity remains in Hegel’s view a one-sided one. The Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge only acknowledges a subjective unity of subject and object, a ‘subjective subject–object’. But the absolute unity of subject and object also contains an ‘objective subject–object’ (*Differenzschrift* GW 4:63). Furthermore, Fichte’s ‘I’-monism lacks the elements needed for a philosophy of unity. For Hegel, the relation of ‘I’ and ‘not-I’ underlying Fichtean monism is no symmetrical or positive bond between subject and object. The unity of ‘I = I’, conceived as the system’s beginning and end, is thus only thinkable as an ‘ought’ or as a ‘striving’ but not as being (*Differenzschrift* GW 4:45). In addition, Hegel detects in Fichte’s Doctrine a stronger version of Kant’s formal idealism. As a first principle of philosophy, the ‘I = I’ signifies an abstract, empty unity. By ‘abstractness’ Hegel means here that this principle is won by abstracting from nature, thus destroying it and leaving it behind as something ‘dead’ (*Differenzschrift* GW 4:50). At the same time, ‘abstractness’ also means that ‘I = I’ results in something merely negative. Accordingly, every transition from this first principle to further determinations consists in the affirmative positing of a formerly negated content, a ‘transformation of a minus into a plus’ (*Gl&Wi* GW 4:401).

Hegel also wants to show that Fichte, while correctly identifying the opposition of ‘I’ and ‘not-I’ as a self-opposition of the ‘I’, cannot fully unpack this idea of self-opposition because of his assumption that the ‘I’ is divisible. As a result, the activities of positing and counter-positing are presented as being merely contained in a ‘common vessel’ (*Gl&Wi* GW 4:397). As is true of his critique of Kant, Hegel’s Fichte critique is not primarily concerned with a faithful rendering of the views and aims of his chosen opponent. That we reach the absolute ‘I’ only by means of striving, or that the unity of positing and counter-positing can be demonstrated only through the concept of divisibility, are not deficiencies from Fichte’s own perspective. Instead, they represent the only meaningful approach to understanding the relation between the absolute and the realm of finite determinations. Moreover, Hegel does not do justice to Fichte when he barely acknowledges the extent to which the latter’s notions of self-consciousness and self-realization serve as lasting models for his own system. To be sure, for Hegel the ‘I’ is not supposed to serve as the beginning of a philosophical system. Yet the self-referential structure that would become pivotal in Hegel’s treatment of spirit is objectively connected to Fichte’s theory of subjectivity. In the end, the fact that Hegel is more strongly influenced by Fichte than he is prepared to admit is evident in the emphasis that he places on the relation of ‘recognition’ in his texts on social spirit after 1802. Pioneered by Fichte’s *Foundation of Natural Right According to Principles of the Doctrine of Science* (Naturrecht, 1796), the concept of this relation connoted a structure of intersubjectivity understood as the paradigm of all relations of right (see *FGA*...
I/3, pp. 340–60). Hegel does not mention this point in his writings on Fichte’s theory of natural right, but instead draws attention to his disagreement with Fichte’s concept of freedom (Differenzschrift GW 4:55–8). In Hegel’s view, what Fichte proposes as freedom is something merely ‘negative’. As an abstractive activity that contradicts every intuition of communal freedom, its positive meaning can only be ‘tyranny’. It is not by accident, Hegel argues, that Fichte links his conception of freedom to that of a ‘state of need’ (Notstaat) eerily reminiscent of a police state.

Further crucial steps in Hegel’s criticism of the philosophy of reflection involve Jacobi, Reinhold and G. E. Schulze. While Jacobi is presented as the paragon of a philosophy restricted to non-cognitive faith in the absolute, Reinhold and Schulze stand for an impotent mode of thought that remains trapped in transcendental and empirical facts of consciousness. Hegel, however, does not reject Reinhold’s and Schulze’s positions as uncompromisingly as it may seem at first glance. He does accuse Reinhold of working with a hopeless dichotomy between the form and matter of thinking; of exhausting the powers of thinking in an unproductive ‘tendency to justify and ascertain’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:81); and – in opposition to the dogmatism of Reinhold’s earlier philosophy of principles – of adhering to a baseless method of ‘running up against the absolute’ while engaging in merely hypothetical philosopising (Differenzschrift GW 4:82–3). But Hegel’s harsh polemics against Reinhold should be evaluated mainly as a courteous nod in Schelling’s direction. While in Tübingen, Schelling held Reinhold in high regard. But from the 1790s onward, he vehemently opposed the founding figure of post-Kantian system philosophy – especially when, in ca. 1800, Reinhold and Bardili began to espouse a philosophy of ‘logical’ or ‘rational realism’ that was publically perceived as a competitor to Schelling’s philosophy of identity. Significantly, it is after the end of his collaboration with Schelling that Hegel begins to appreciate subject matters discussed by Reinhold, such as the idea of an introduction into philosophy or the grounding of philosophical cognition. Hegel is thus likely influenced by Reinhold’s objections to Schelling’s claim (found in the System of Transcendental Idealism [STI] of 1800) that knowing something is always already knowing ‘the true’ and consists in the ‘agreement’ or ‘identity’ of something ‘objective’ and something ‘subjective’ (SW I/3, p. 339). Reinhold had noted that such a definition of truth amounts to very little unless one defines ‘truthful knowing’ or explains what ‘true knowledge’ actually involves (see Reinhold, 1800, p. 362). In order to speak of true knowing one would need a method for distinguishing between merely subjective or apparent knowledge and something objective. The process of differentiation and comparison within consciousness that Reinhold described for this purpose (Reinhold, 1800, p. 364) clearly serves Hegel as a template for the idea, proffered in the Introduction to PhG, that true knowing can be achieved only on the basis of a ‘dialectical movement’ performed by consciousness through self-examination (PhG GW 9:60) (for extended discussion, see Bondeli, 1995, pp. 73–82). As for Schulze: Hegel’s polemics against a new form of scepticism that he considers shallow, unphilosophical and dogmatic when compared with the ‘genuine scepticism’ of the ancient Pyrrhonians (in On the Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy [Skepticismus GW 4:213–14]), cannot obscure the areas of objective agreement between himself and
Schulze. Hegel holds Schulze's scepticism to be genuinely productive when it works as a necessary corrective to contemporaneous speculation. Not least, Hegel also endorses Schulze's critical comparison of Schelling's 'indifferent one' and 'intellectual intuition' with the night in which all difference vanishes (see Meist, 1993, pp. 202–4).

THE STANDPOINT OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Hegel's outlook in Jena at first clearly overlaps with Schelling's. This is true not only of Hegel's criticism of *Reflexionsphilosophie*, but also of his understanding of his own philosophical project. Schelling and Hegel see themselves as representatives of a philosophy of the highest order. They call it the philosophy of reason, or philosophy of identity, to distinguish it from philosophies beholden to the understanding and entrapped within dichotomizing thought. Against the backdrop of this dissociation from the philosophy of reflection they often describe their shared vantage point as 'speculative' philosophy. Among the characteristics of speculative philosophy is a strict monism on the basis of which subject and object, 'I' and nature, willing and knowing, freedom and necessity are seen as modifications of a single ground. The empiricist and Kantian thesis that our knowledge extends only to the sphere of finite objects is cast aside. Schelling and Hegel defend the possibility of there being knowledge of the infinite or absolute – albeit with the caveat that this requires absolute knowing, that is, a cognitive process that transcends the stage of reflection. If we wish to speak of the roots of speculative philosophy, then the name 'Spinoza' comes first and foremost to mind. The presence of Spinozism in Schelling's work is already evident before he undertook to complete Fichte's 'I'-philosophy through his own philosophy of nature. 'I have meanwhile become a Spinozist!' (*Hegel: The Letters [Briefe] 1:22*), he confesses to Hegel in February 1795. Well into his final years, Schelling would continue to regard Spinoza as a catalyst for his own thinking. By the end of his Frankfurt period Hegel, in turn, viewed his just concluded transition from Kantianism to a philosophy of being and unity as a journey from Kant to Spinoza. In his view, this path corresponds to a systematically relevant insight: Kant's doctrine of the postulates of practical reason, if properly thought through, sublates itself and becomes an ontological account through a Spinozistic principle of the unity of antinomial determinations. This reasoning is adumbrated in the eighth thesis of Hegel's dissertation, which states that the content of the rational postulate advanced by critical philosophy (i.e. the idea of the absolute demanded by reason) destroys that very philosophy and reveals itself as a principle of Spinozism: ‘*Materia postulati rationis, quod philosophia critica exhibet, eam ipsam philosophiam destruit, et principium est Spinozismi*’ (*Dissertatio GW* 5:227). In Jena, Hegel discerns Spinoza's exemplary role also in this thinker's intrepid resolve to begin 'philosophy with philosophy' (*Differenzschrift GW* 4:24), that is, to place the unconditioned at the apex of his system. Moreover, Hegel's contributions to the Paulus edition of Spinoza's works testify to his intense interest in Spinoza at the beginning of his Jena years (*Beitrag zur Spinoza-Edition von H. E. G. Paulus GW* 5:513–16).

At a certain point, Hegel's notion of speculative philosophy begins to diverge from that of Schelling due to his different conception of
the faculty that enables us to know. In 1801, after overcoming his belief-centred Frankfurt perspective in favour of a knowledge-based standpoint, Hegel still shares Schelling’s conviction that knowing is primarily characterized by a rational faculty of intuition. At that time, Hegel speaks of ‘transcendental knowledge’ as uniting ‘reflection and intuition’. Since intuition here stands for the constructive, positive and unifying power between these two factors, this sort of knowing may also be called ‘transcendental intuition’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:27–8). This perspective can in part be explained by the fact that Hegel and Schelling do not correlate the distinction between understanding and reason with the distinctions between category and idea or between judgement and syllogism (as Kant had done). Instead, their distinction between understanding and reason is drawn primarily in view of the opposition between reflection and speculation, which in turn – borrowing from Spinoza’s third and highest order of knowledge: cognitio intuitiva (Ethica II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2) – is traced back to the opposition between discursive and intuitive knowing (see Baum, 1989, pp. 77–8). Yet only one year later we notice a sea-change in Hegel’s thought. By 1802, evidently on account of his increasing efforts to clarify the system’s dynamics using logical and conceptual tools, Hegel questions the straightforward correlation of speculation with intuition. It is explicitly a form of discursivity, not intuition that becomes central to Hegel’s understanding of speculation in JS II (1804/5). Thus, reflection is brought closer to speculation and re-evaluated (see Baum, 1989, pp. 248–58). This trend will eventually lead to Hegel’s rejection of Schelling’s claim that the absolute can only be known through intellectual intuition. Another shift in Hegel’s terminology of the absolute bolsters the trend. The concept of substance had long been pivotal in Hegel’s metaphysics. After 1804, the concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘spirit’ occupy the position of that concept. This revision may be portrayed as the turning of Hegel’s Spinozism towards a philosophy of subjectivity (see Düsing, 2004, for the definitive account). For Schelling, the preeminent philosophical paradigm continues to be one furnished by the concepts of substance and nature. For him, Spinoza – understood as a philosopher of freedom – remains the decisive model figure.

Hegel’s increasing interest in systematic questions during the Jena years results in a refinement and reassessment of the nature and tasks of speculative philosophy. In the early Jena texts, the motif of unity, born of intellectual proximity to Hölderlin in Frankfurt, is still unmistakably present: philosophy’s core task is the sublation of a condition in which ‘ossified oppositions’ have rendered all ‘living relation and reciprocal action’ impossible (Differenzschrift GW 4:12–16). Philosophy’s original impulse stems therefore from the ‘rupture’ of what is supposed to exist as one: philosophy’s ‘need’ lies in bringing together what has been sundered. The function of philosophy is not to prepare the way to or to introduce the sciences. Philosophy stands for itself, it exists so that ‘through it’ we ‘may learn to live’ (Fragmente 1801–2, GW 5:261). Hegel will never renounce this position. Yet at the closing of the Jena period he comes to think that besides satisfying a vital need, philosophy also has a genuinely scientific task. It concerns not only unity or the good life but also the establishment and grounding of a system of scientific knowing. This scientific orientation of philosophy motivates Hegel’s increasing concern with the problem of an introduction to his system. During the early Jena years, Hegel’s conviction that
philosophy stands for and begins with itself had prompted him to declare that ‘philosophy as science neither needs nor may countenance an introduction’ (GW 5:259). But as soon as he gains insight into the relation between logic and metaphysics that is crucial to his systematic project, he holds that logic may ‘serve as introduction into philosophy’ (GW 5:272). The idea of an introduction into philosophy as science comes to full fruition about 1805, when Hegel decides to devote his efforts to a science of the experience of consciousness that must take on the role previously assigned to logic.

Finally, Hegel reorients his views on philosophy’s historical development. Behind the contrast between philosophy of reflection and speculative philosophy lies the idea that there are qualitatively different stages and epochs of advancement and decline in philosophical spirit. The question that remains to be answered is whether the consideration of spirit’s developmental history requires a hierarchical ordering of stages within speculative philosophy itself. Hegel’s response is at first negative (see Kimmerle, 2004). He denies that there can be progressive ordering within speculative philosophy since it merely brings forth different forms of the absolute, each of which epitomizes its own epoch. As a historical phenomenon, speculative philosophy does not involve the perfecting of a given content. Instead, it works through the ‘interesting individuality in which reason has fashioned a shape for itself from the building material of a particular epoch’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:12). Thus, expressly opposing contemporaneous thinkers who view philosophy as a ‘craft’ and busy themselves with the improvement of philosophical ‘techniques’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:10), Hegel likens philosophy to ‘the artwork’. The works of earlier and later masters are not related to one another as earlier and later practice exercises. They must instead be grasped as historical moments of a common creative process. They give expression to a ‘kinship of spiritual powers’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:12). In his later Jena years, Hegel will abandon this non-teleological stance in favour of a philosophical-historical model centred, like world history, on the progress of the spirit of philosophy.

MAIN FEATURES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM

The philosophical system developed in Jena stems partly from Hegel’s own projects and partly from Schelling’s ideas for a system. Starting in 1796, Schelling had published sketches for both a systematic ‘I’-philosophy (revising Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre) and a systematic natural philosophy. Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (STI) is a detailed and complete philosophy of the ‘I’, but one that also incorporates segments of natural philosophy. It follows the dynamic development of nature and spirit through the progressively higher stages of sensibility, consciousness and self-consciousness. Nature’s highest principle is the organism. Spirit, with its individual and social as well as theoretical and practical stages, epochs or potentialities, reaches its highest development in religion and art. Both the focus of Schelling’s system and its criterion of knowledge or truth is here the union, identity or coincidence of subjectivity and objectivity. Nature’s highest principle is the organism. Spirit, with its individual and social as well as theoretical and practical stages, epochs or potentialities, reaches its highest development in religion and art. Both the focus of Schelling’s system and its criterion of knowledge or truth is here the union, identity or coincidence of subjectivity and objectivity. Intellectual intuition stands above reflection and is the most perfected means or ‘organ’ of knowing; an ‘inner sense’, also called the ‘aesthetic’ sense (SW I/3, pp. 350–2). Schelling’s 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy (Darstellung
des Systems meiner Philosophie) portrays nature and spirit as belonging to a single system and as deriving from one foundation. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity, articulated from various perspectives, is now understood at its fundamental level in terms of the rational concept of ‘total indifference’ (SW I/4, p. 114). Schelling now emphasizes the concept of ‘identity’ as the indifference of the subjective and the objective and as the unity of thinking and being. He also argues that logical identity of the type ‘A=A’ has its ground in ontological identity. In doing so, he wants to distinguish his views on the question of identity from similar views held by Bardili and Reinhold (see Bondeli, 1995, pp. 55–65). Hegel is undoubtedly influenced by Schelling’s system blueprints of 1800 and 1801. Like Schelling, he presupposes that his system must issue from a principle of absolute identity and then develop through the different stages of nature and spirit. What separates Hegel and Schelling is their difference in focus. While Schelling maintains his concentration on natural philosophy, Hegel’s focus is objective spirit, the sphere of social relations and institutions. Beyond this, Hegel distances himself from Schelling by seeking to provide a logic that is consonant with the idea of system.

As Hegel conceives it in Jena, logic furnishes the first part of the system. As mentioned above, logic is assigned a propedeutic role with respect to philosophy as science. All this changes in 1805, when Hegel hands over logic’s introductory role to PhG. While logic retains its position as the system’s first part, as ‘speculative’ logic it is now raised to the level of philosophical science itself. During the phase in which Hegel thinks of logic as a preparatory discipline, it is directly linked to metaphysics. As the fragment on logic and metaphysics of 1801/2 (Logica et Metaphysica GW 5:267–75) shows, he specifies the relation between logic and metaphysics as a relation between a negative (or destructive) and a positive (or constructive) exercise (for an in-depth treatment, see Baum, 1989, pp. 166–73). Logic exhibits finite thought forms and shows how, through a process of self-destruction, they lead up to the realm of the infinite. Accordingly, logic belongs to the ‘negative or destructive side of reason’ (GW 5:274). But as we learn from the fragment on metaphysics of 1804/5 (JS II GW 7:126–78), metaphysics claims that these and other concepts or principles of logic are themselves infinite forms. The latter include the core ideas of Wolff’s ‘metaphysica specialis’ (soul, world, god) that Kant had treated in his doctrines of ideas, antinomies and postulates and postulates. Metaphysics gives all these concepts a speculative shape conducive to the method of cognition.

The contents of logic revolve around Kant’s doctrine of categories as well as the doctrines of concept, judgement, inference, and method ordinarily found in contemporary works on logic. The logic fragment of JS II (GW 7:3–125) shows that Hegel already organizes these materials in keeping with his future triadic division of logic into the logic of being, essence and concept. His analysis of ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ as concepts of being is followed, first, by explanations of Kant’s categories of relation – later subsumed under the logic of essence – and then by the determinations of concept, judgement and inference in the framework of a logic of the concept. What is remarkable here is that categories are presented in terms of relational concepts, that is, ‘reference’, ‘relationship’ and ‘proportion’. This suggests that Hegel aims to anchor the entire ordering structure of logical key-concepts in the categories of relation. At this point, the opening conceptual sequence
of the Science of Logic (WL) – ‘being’, ‘nothing’ and ‘becoming’ – is just beginning to emerge and does not yet have a particular systematic position. Hegel’s Jena conception of logic appears to be a part of the system still steeped in a philosophy of reflection, both because of the matters treated and because of its declared aim of bringing finite forms up to the level of infinity. Nevertheless, one should not link this conception to contemporaneous accounts of formal and transcendental logic. For Hegel, logical forms must be presented as emerging from an ontology that rests on the principle of the unity of thinking and being. Moreover, Hegel’s interest lies in the critical exposition of logical forms, which for him is tantamount to assuming that these forms must be conceptually apprehended on the basis of a dynamic logic, that is, a logic suited to the dynamic quality of a system characterized by stages and transitions.

In the Jena system, the philosophy of nature figures as metaphysics in its application to a domain of realized ideas. It does not yet form, as in the later Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc), the system’s second part after the logic. Up to JS II, its overall structure is still determined by the distinction between heavenly and terrestrial natural systems already present in the system fragment of 1800. Part one accounts for the dynamic solar system (System der Sonne) that in part two transitions to a terrestrial system initially characterized by inertia, gravity and mechanical motion. The fragments on natural philosophy in the 1805/6 JS III (GW 8:3–184) introduce Hegel’s articulation of the terrestrial system in terms of Mechanics, Chemism and The Organic – an arrangement which, with some modifications, will become integral to the encyclopaedic system to follow.

A comprehensive look at the Jena system sketches shows Hegel pushing hard to develop his philosophy of nature. Its architectonic, in any case, appears to be largely completed at this time. Even the opening of the later philosophy of nature is already well defined. Hegel begins with the concept of an ‘absolute matter’ that determines itself to existence (Daseyn). Among the immediate determinations resulting from this beginning are space and time (JS II GW 7:193–205; JS III GW 8:4–22). These opening moves underscore how Hegel parts ways with Kant’s transcendental conception of space and time. Whereas for Kant space and time are a priori forms of sensible intuition and thus necessary conditions for material things to be perceived, Hegel thinks of space and time as resulting from matter and motion, and thus as incomprehensible if taken in abstraction from matter and motion. Moreover, Hegel – like Schelling – emphasizes the primacy of organic nature, which leads to the rejection of Newton’s mathematical-scientific paradigm. And just like Schelling, Hegel portrays nature as developing through stages towards spirit. That said, however, Hegel operates with a developmental model for the nature-spirit relation that differs markedly from Schelling’s. For Schelling, nature is a primal force (Urkraft) that becomes spirit at its higher levels of potency. For Hegel instead nature is both a manifestation of spirit and spirit’s otherness (das Andersseyn des Geistes). As spirit’s manifestation, nature must be understood as part of spirit. As the other of spirit, nature is ‘spirit concealed’ (JS II GW 7:185) – or spirit in its ‘being-other’ (Fragmente 1803 GW 5:370). Hegel clearly wants to counter the exaggerated rehabilitation of nature by establishing that spirit not only affirms nature but is also the ‘liberation from nature’ (GW 5:371).

The Jena system of the philosophy of spirit is not yet explicitly partitioned into the
subjective (individual), objective (social) and absolute (cultural-scientific) spheres known to us from the encyclopaedic system. Yet in substance this structure is already recognizable. From the time of the Bern and Frankfurt fragments, Hegel uses the expression ‘spirit’ broadly to denote individual, social, religious, epistemological and moral aspects of thought. Even the concept of ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit), whose importance increases during the Jena period, comprises individual, social and cultural phenomena of consciousness and self-consciousness. Yet ‘ethical life’ applies to an increasingly separate domain of social, juridical and political relations that eventually becomes divorced from that of cognitive and practical activities of consciousness and self-consciousness at the individual level. The new treatment of these two subject areas entails compositional and terminological changes. Gradually, the materials and concepts pertaining to consciousness, self-consciousness and the theoretical and practical ‘I’ as well as intelligence and volition cluster around the term ‘spirit’. In the frame of subjective spirit (JS II GW 7:157–65) Hegel begins to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical ‘I’, thus separating processes of perception and cognition from those of volition (JS III GW 8:185–222). This may be interpreted as a qualified return to Kant. The basic division of philosophy into a theoretical and a practical critique of reason, associated with Kant’s name and directed against the old (Wolffian) metaphysics, attains new currency within Hegel’s system.

Hegel’s reflections on objective spirit form a major focus of passages dedicated to Sittlichkeit. This concept provides not only a substantive ethical position that counters the formalistic and subjectivist ethics of morality (for which Kant is criticized). Especially in Jena, Sittlichkeit stands for the entire realm of social, institutional, juridical and moral relations. All of these relations, which according to Hegel are characteristic of the modern state, fall within the scope of Sittlichkeit. While in Bern and Frankfurt, Hegel was a champion of the rights of the people and the rights of citizens. When he praised the spirit of ancient Republicanism and argued against entrusting the ‘government of the state machine’ to a ‘small number of citizens’ (Studien 1795/6, GW 1:369), he must have meant that the people – or at least a large number of citizens – should participate in government. But early on in Jena Hegel no longer sides with progressives on the question of the best form of government for a modern state. Although he still appeals to the unifying power of the people in view of a fractured German reality, this does not mean that the people should rule. Instead, the people should express its vitality and common will by representation through its estates on the basis of a constitutional guarantee of individual and social rights. Hegel now reserves the function of governing for the ‘absolute’ or universal estate. In SS he initially connects this estate with ‘priests’ and ‘elders’ (SS GW 5:342), but subsequently links it to an officialdom whose pinnacle is the ‘hereditary monarch’ (JS III GW 8:263). Thus, Hegel comes to consider aristocracy and monarchy the most appropriate forms of government (see Rosenzweig, 1920, I, pp. 135–46, 186–92).

Given this view on government, Hegel in Jena appears all the more progressive when it comes to providing an exhaustive and updated concept of the state. It is obvious to him that the modern state’s dynamics and its potential for change can be adequately grasped only if the state is understood as an integrated ensemble of social and cultural relations. The state is not an aggregate sum but an organic whole of relations. It consists
not only of government, estate representation, constitution and administrative power. Family, civil society, the system of material and spiritual needs, social relations pertaining to productive work, together with art, religion and science – all these belong to the architectonic levels of the state. This conception, eventually found in its mature form in the 1821 *Philosophy of Right* (*RPh*), is already largely developed in Jena. Family, civil society and the state in the strict sense (i.e., the constitution and estates’ representation) take centre stage in Hegel’s account of ethical life. Civil society is understood essentially in terms of modern (i.e., economic) civil society. Drawing on the science of political economy – the pertinent works of James Steuart and Adam Smith, among others – Hegel provides a conceptual explanation of the ‘system of needs’, the labour process and the means (instruments, division of labour and means of communication) required for the satisfaction of needs. At the same time, ‘exchange’, ‘commodity’, ‘value’, ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete work’, the ‘price’ of labour’s products, ‘money’, ‘trade’ and the juridical relations of ‘property’ and ‘contract’ that accompany economic exchange are expounded as a sequence of categories and concepts (*SS GW* 5:281–309, 350–6; *JS I GW* 6:282–326; *JS III GW* 8:223–31). In all of this, Hegel is quite certain of the following. On the one hand, the economic sphere of civil society is the indispensable motor of technical progress, the civilizing process and prosperity. On the other, this same sphere is fraught with undesirable consequences. The division of labour and the replacement of simple tools with ‘machines’ lead to the desolate uniformity of labour processes, and the accumulation of wealth comes about through the impoverishment of the working classes. The resulting general wealth ‘condemns many to crudeness, to dullness in work – and to poverty, so that others may amass wealth’ (*JS III GW* 8:252). Hegel takes these factors to be outgrowths of the prevailing principles of civil society: individualism, atomism, abstract right and abstract freedom. For this reason, his account of the state in its narrower sense is that of a powerful state. The state must not only be in a position to guarantee constitutionally anchored individual and social rights. It must also be powerful enough to resist the destructive force of individualism and to act on behalf of universality and community. All in all, Hegel’s aim is to balance modern liberalism and individualism with the communally oriented political thought of the ancients, that is, to combine contractualistic natural right with an organic conception of the state.

The pivotal concept for understanding Hegel’s idea of *Sittlichkeit* as a counterpoint to *Moralität* is the concept of recognition (*Anerkennung*). As was mentioned above, in Fichte’s doctrine of natural right this concept denoted a normatively appropriate relation between self-conscious persons. When two persons (acting with consciousness of mutual understanding) accord one another equal freedom, they stand in a relation of recognition. According to Fichte, this relationship must be determined explicitly as an ideal relation of right based on loyalty and faith. From 1802 on, and especially in *SS* (*GW* 5:294–5, 304–5), Hegel speaks of recognition as an interpersonal relation at the level of work and contract as well as at the level of linguistic communication. In *JS III*, the state of being recognized (*das Anerkanntseyn*) emerges as a conceptual leitmotif that spans several stages of objective spirit (*JS III GW* 8:223–36). Although Hegel works with a concept of recognition that is structurally as sophisticated as Fichte’s, he is not willing to
restrict his overall account of recognition to
an ideal juridical relation. For Hegel, the rela-
tion of recognition encompasses not only the
level of contract right anchored in loyalty and
faith. It must also include right as manifested
in coercion and punishment. Moreover, both
economic exchange and the fundamental per-
sonal relations at issue in the family and civil
society must be conceptually accounted for as
forms of recognition. The quality and content
of recognition differ depending on the sys-
tematic contexts of its account. Recognition
can be more or less emotional, more or less
conceptual or cognitive, and more or less for-
mal. It may appear not only as mutual respect
or sympathy, but also as friendship and love.
Recognition even exists where the struggle
for its achievement results in an asymmetri-
cal relation of reciprocity. For two persons
can recognize each other as differing in rank,
as exemplified in the relationship of lordship
and bondage (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft)
treated first in SS (GW 5:305) and later devel-
oped in PhG.

At the time of publication of PhG, Hegel
employs a subtle and differentiated notion of
recognition. But he restricts its scope to a sin-
gle stage of self-consciousness and hence no
longer connects it, as in 1805/6, to a broad
range of phenomena of objective spirit. In
later works, Hegel prefers to use ‘recognition’
in the ordinary sense of a juridically struc-
tured relation among states superseding their
state of war. As for the project of an ethics of
Sittlichkeit that is distinguished from the
ethics of Moralität: such a project is intrin-
sic to Hegel’s considerations on recognition
because these imply that the demand for the
institutional establishment and protection of
symmetrical relations of recognition should
replace Kant’s demand that will and action
be determined in accordance with the moral
law. Neither in Jena nor later, however, did
Hegel concretely realize this sort of ethical
project.

Beyond its elaborate expositions of objec-
tive spirit, JS III contains first contribu-
tions to the stages of subjective and absolute spirit.
The practical parts of the treatment of sub-
jective spirit, centred on the ‘will’, lead to the
description of an intersubjective relationship
of self-conscious persons. At the same time,
the concept of ‘absolute free spirit’ subsumes
the state complex formed by ‘ethical life’ and
‘recognition’. Hegel maps here this third stage
of spirit (later articulated as art, religion and
philosophy) as that component of the state’s
constitution which is divided into ‘art, reli-
gion and science’ (JS III GW 8:277–87). We
find here the first outlines of Hegel’s later
classification of the arts (architecture, sculpt-
ture, painting, music, poetry) as well as his
famous view that art sublates itself into reli-
gion, and religion into philosophy or science.

From the perspective of Hegel’s development,
however, the most interesting feature of these
considerations is the following. Under the
heading ‘absolute religion’ Hegel speaks of
the ‘speculative idea’ of the unity of thinking
and being as well as of being and essence.
He compares this idea with the thought ‘that
God, the transcendent absolute being, has
become human’ – that God has been sublated
and is now ‘the spirit of the community’ (JS
III GW 8:282). Nowhere does Hegel men-
tion the Christian religion by name. Yet there
is no doubt that his treatment of absolute
religion is meant to refer to the Christian
Trinity. He thereby elevates Christianity to
the highest form of religion.

As before, Hegel is convinced that an
improvement of social and cultural condi-
tions can only come about on the basis of
an alliance between state and religion. He
does not change his opinion that neither a
new state church nor a state-ordered religion
help to achieve this end, for only an ethical religion in harmony with the modern principles of freedom, reason and tolerance can accomplish that. Yet, quite obviously, he now thinks that only Christian religion is suitable to the task at hand. To be sure, he has in mind here a philosophically imbued Christian religion centred on community and reconciliation, not the positive Christianity of the past. Nevertheless, the change in Hegel’s view of Christianity has radical significance. Like his plans for creating a ‘new’ religion, Hegel’s youthful predilection for a popular religion cut from ancient Greek cloth belongs to bygone days (see Jaeschke, 1986, pp. 191–8). The cornerstone is now laid for his forthcoming theory of world-historical reason and freedom finding fulfilment in the Germanic-Christian era.

CONCEPTUAL AND EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM

In developing the Jena system, Hegel has confronted multiple problems concerning the division and architectonics of its subject matters: logic, nature and spirit. The ambitious aim of providing a logic that not only leads into speculative philosophy but also serves to structure its entire system is one that raises difficult theoretical issues. These range from the problem of finding a suitable conceptual framework for the logically grounded system to the problem of devising ways of charting the system’s dynamics. In line with post-Kantian conceptions of systematicity, accounting for a system implies foundational and epistemic claims. These in turn call for justification. If one presupposes that the system must be considered as both the object presented and the presentation of the object itself, then not just any presentation will suffice, but only one that is itself epistemically sound.

As mentioned earlier, the Jena logic develops a sequence of categories from the concepts of reference, relation and proportion, which indicates Hegel’s tendency to attribute primacy to categories of relation. When defending Schelling’s system of transcendental and natural philosophy, Hegel had mostly presupposed the subject–object terminology of the philosophy of unification. In the Jena system sketches, however, he favours the relations between concept and intuition, between totality and individuality and between universality, particularity and singularity – all of which belong to a logic of the concept, judgement and syllogism. This change and the new formulation (emerging about 1804/5) of a relational structure of cognition centred on identity and difference (see Horstmann, 1980, pp. 187–9) show that relational models of conceptuality are of increasing significance for Hegel in Jena. The starting point in the subject–object relation shifts from the \textit{relata} to their relation. As a result, the subject–object terminology must be decentred. This change undoubtedly amounts to an adaptation of the entire system to the conceptual frame of the logic.

It is not easy to discern what further consequences Hegel may have drawn from this reorientation towards relational categories. Since the 1960s, Habermas has repeatedly defended the thesis that Hegel in Jena abandons the subject–object paradigm typical of modern mentalistic philosophy. Habermas has argued that Hegel’s account of reason’s development gives pride of place to intersubjective relations in language, labour and interaction instead of to the subject, the ‘I’, or self-consciousness (see Habermas, 1968; 1999, pp. 221–2). Habermas contends that
this innovation is reversed in *PhG*, and that a central subject that regulates social processes is once again made to govern the course of spirit. To be sure, if one considers Hegel's Jena treatment of recognition, it cannot be excluded that he links his basic relational model to a relation among subjects. Yet it remains questionable that this model actually originated in any notion of self-regulating intersubjectivity.

Hegel's concern with providing a conceptual account of the system's dynamics is directly connected with the abovementioned task of speculative philosophy, namely, to explain speculation not as intuition but as a discursive capacity, and hence as a kind of higher-level reflection. We encounter here a significant step forward in the formation of what may be called Hegel's dialectical thinking. Hegel first uses the expression 'dialectic' in 1802 (*WBN GW* 4:446), when referring to logic's negative task of showing that finite determinations are self-destructive (see Baum, 1989, pp. 229–30). But it is also during his stay in Jena that Hegel begins to operate with logical figures of thought that are characteristic of his later understanding of dialectics. The idea of reflective thinking described in the system fragment of 1800 is a case in point. ‘Reflective thinking’ is here the type of thinking that refers to being as that which is external to all reflection. It progresses by way of antinomies and is ultimately self-destructive. Early on in Jena, this view underlies Hegel’s claim that while reflection is directed at the absolute it is unfit for its comprehension. The ‘highest law’ of reflection can therefore be nothing else than the law of its self-destruction (*Differenzschrift GW* 4:18). The main insight here at issue, which Hegel shares with Hölderlin, is this: that which separates (and which is therefore untrue) inheres in every assertion that has the form of judgement. A variation of this view is found in one of Hegel’s habilitation theses: ‘*contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio, falsi*’ (*Dissertatio GW* 5:227). He directs this thesis against false and formalistic ‘identity thinking’ when he maintains the following: the absolute (the true) can only be expressed as antinomy or contradiction since whenever it is expressed in the form of an identity statement (or more generally, in propositional form) it misses its point and becomes a falsehood.

Yet progress in matters of dialectic takes place only when, in the course of his Jena development, Hegel begins to understand what he calls antinomy or contradiction as a connection between self-reference and negation. He begins to link the two in such a way that relation to self appears as self-negation. But if self-relation negates itself, then it is, first, no longer self-relation in virtue of its being negated, but has become its opposite, namely relation to an other. Second, it is once again self-relation precisely in virtue of having negated itself. Self-relation is therefore relation to an other, and is in turn relation to self in this relation to that other. Hegel deploys this figure of thought in a truly exemplary manner in his treatment of ‘absolute spirit’ (*JS II GW* 7:173–8). Being-self (*Selbstsein*) as being-other (*Anderssein*) is here expressed by the formula of the ‘other of itself’ (see Henrich, 1982). Beyond this, Hegel connects self-relation with negation in such a way that it gives rise to the notion of self-referential negation. If negation negates itself, then it becomes a negation that at the same time sublates itself, that is, in its role as negation it becomes an affirmation. This is illustrated in the fragment on logic from 1804/5. Hegel goes on to discuss the unity of being-self and being-other in terms of double negation, namely in terms of being ‘the *duplicitis negationis*, that is again
affirmatio’ (JS II GW 7:34 – see Baum, 1989, p. 249). Clearly, it is only with this more refined account of antinomy that Hegel acquires the logical means for explaining the unfolding of antinomies not just as reflection’s process of self-destruction, but also as the self-preservation and progress of reflective thinking itself. It is only in this way that reflection’s constructive movement becomes a significant theme. Whether this logical device suffices to account for what is at stake is of course an entirely different question.

At the start of his Jena period, Hegel polemicizes against the suggestion that an ‘absolute and highest principle’ must be placed at the ‘pinnacle of a system’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:24). This attack is above all directed at Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy (Elementarphilosophie) and at Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. In these works, Reinhold and Fichte wanted to build systems that, based on Kant’s results, would provide complete accounts of knowledge derived from one or more apparently incontrovertible ultimate principles. Unlike other contemporaneous critics of Reinhold and Fichte, Hegel does not think that a further development of Kant’s philosophy based on ultimate principles should be rejected just because it would replace Kant’s transcendental grounding of knowledge with a new Cartesian model. For Hegel refuses to endorse the philosophical strategy pursued even by Kant himself in his transcendental deduction and proof of objectively valid cognition in accordance with the principle of possible experience. Nor does Hegel concur with the results of contemporaneous scepticism, although he shares with the latter the notion that any attempt to begin philosophy with an ultimate principle is bound to fail. Yet Hegel rejects scepticism for its inability to contribute a constructive solution of the problem of knowledge. What, then, is Hegel’s procedure for grounding knowledge?

At the beginning of the Jena period Hegel evidently does not yet have such a procedure at his disposal. It appears that he brings to bear merely a kind of intuitive evidence that is supposed to accompany speculative knowing. Like Fichte (after 1794) and Schelling, Hegel holds fast to the assumption that grasping the absolute through the medium of intellectual intuition immediately provides us with self-evident knowing. It is only through the fragment on metaphysics from JS II (GW 7:128–78) that we learn that Hegel has meanwhile been pondering a quasi-procedural approach to the grounding of knowledge. It becomes clear that he sets out from the following assumption: the dialectical structure of negative self-relation is something in play at the level of cognition – and indeed perhaps primarily at this level. Given this assumption, what Hegel understands by cognition, that is, justified knowing, can be characterized as follows: (i) Since cognizing must emerge from the structure of negative self-relation, it is eo ipso cognizing of self. Every cognition is therefore also self-cognition. (ii) Second, since negative self-relation is conceived as self-movement, cognizing is essentially a process. (iii) Since negative self-relation is a double negation, the cognitive process is a return to itself. According to Hegel, this process can be represented as a ‘linear movement’, but one that ‘bends back upon itself in a circle’ (JS II GW 7:127). (iv) This self-returning process runs through multiple stages, ascending from simple to complex determinations. The fact that this process takes place in the form of an ascending motion is due not only to the negativity of the self-relation, but also to the fact that this constellation simultaneously implies a holistic ideal of completeness. (v) That which becomes known in a cognitive process characterized as negative self-relation
must also be thought of in the same terms. This means that in this process one and the same content, regarded from the perspective of ever greater complexity, comes to be viewed as a ‘totality’. (vi) Accordingly, accomplished cognizing, that is, justified knowledge of content, occurs when the latter is grasped in accordance with this entire progression and its result.

It would be exaggerated to call this approach to cognition as a process, in which the ground of the thing cognized is sought in the totality of the cognitive process, a Hegelian invention. Fichte and Reinhold had prefigured this approach in significant ways. Yet it ultimately falls to Hegel to think it through radically and with stunning meticulousness, and to rework it in a fitting theoretical form. In *PhG* this approach will return, enriched by systematic reflection on the relation between concept and object as a relation of truth.

NOTES

1. The view that newer philosophy had succumbed to formalism through Kant and the Kantians was quite common around 1800. An excellent example is Herder’s *Metakritik* of 1799 (*Sämtliche Werke*, 1877–1913, vol. 21).

2. For critical discussion of Hegel’s complaint against formalism and other Hegelian objections to Kant’s categorical imperative, see Sedgwick (2007).

3. For reservations against Hegel’s criticism of Fichte, see Siep (2000, pp. 40–3).

4. On Hegel’s incipient (1804/5) criticism of Schelling’s interpretation of the absolute as the indifferent that only allows for a quantitative dimension, see Baum (1989, pp. 245–7).

5. One already finds musings on this beginning of logic in *Differenzschrift* (*GW* 4:16). In the logic fragment of 1804/5, however, Hegel appears to understand the relation between ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ not as logic’s initial move but as the result from an investigation of quantity and quality that leads to infinity (*JS II* 7:32–4). Pertinent considerations, also carried out in the context of a philosophy of spirit, can be found in 1805–6 as well (*JS III* 8:185–7).


7. This narrowing, which one can also interpret as Hegel’s repression of his earlier Jena notion of recognition, is a familiar theme in the literature on Hegel’s social and philosophical thought. The thesis of repression is espoused in Theunissen (1982).

8. Above all, Hegel opposes Reinhold who, in his dispute with Schelling, points out that what matters is ‘to find something true not merely *materialiter* and *per Regulam falsi* – but to discover the truth *formaliter* in its fountainhead, the *Regula veri*’ (Reinhold, 1800, pp. 373–4).

9. See FGA I/4, 204–5; Reinhold *Beyträge Heft* 1, pp. 73–5.

translated by Frances Bottenberg
Hegel's first major book, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhG*) of 1807, quickly established his philosophical prominence. Though neglected in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholarship after the Second World War re-established Hegel's *PhG* as a philosophical landmark; it is as philosophically vital today as ever. For example, anti-Cartesianism has become a major theme in recent analytical philosophy, yet the first thorough anti-Cartesian was Kant, whose lessons in this regard were further developed by Hegel. On a surprising range of philosophical topics, Hegel has already been where we still need to go. For example, rather than debating which is more basic, individuals or social groups, Hegel argues that both options are mistaken because individuals and their societies are mutually interdependent for their existence and their characteristics; neither is 'more basic' than the other. The Enlightenment bequeathed to us the idea that if our knowledge is a social or historical phenomenon, then we must accept relativism. Hegel criticized this dichotomy too, arguing that a judicious social and historical account of human reason and knowledge requires realism about the objects of knowledge and strict objectivity about practical norms. All of this and much more is achieved or initiated in Hegel's 1807 *PhG*.

In 1812 Hegel retracted the status of *PhG* as the 'first part' of his philosophical science, presented in his *Science of Logic* (*WL*) and in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (*Enc*) (see *WL* GW 11:8; 21:8–9), though he did not thereby disown his first masterpiece, which provides the sole proper 'justification', 'deduction' and 'proof' (*Rechtfertigung*, *Deduktion*, *Beweis*) of the standpoint of *WL*. In his later books Hegel cites *PhG* both for support and for further analysis of important substantive points. In 1830, Hegel called it a 'peculiar early work' written for a time dominated by 'an abstract conception of the absolute' (*GW* 9:448). Nevertheless, he contracted and began preparing its second edition (*GW* 9:476–7). Though Hegel suggests that one may begin philosophizing (and begin the science of logic) by resolving to think purely by thinking solely about thinking itself, he suggests this during his philosophical ascendancy, when he had banished that 'abstract conception of the absolute'. The subsequent eclipse of Hegel's philosophy, however, has left us with no more than an abstract conception of the absolute, thus placing us within the intended readership of *PhG*. Today's readers need *PhG* as much as
any of Hegel's first readers or successors, not least because commentators often approach his works in terms of conceptions, distinctions and views Hegel critically examined, rejected and superseded in PhG. It is not enough simply to want to think purely (whatever that may be), one must actually succeed at it. The prospects of self-deception in this regard are manifest, also in the diversity of interpretations of Hegel's WL.

Although PhG is not the first part of Hegel's philosophical system, it remains the proper introduction to and into his system, because PhG aims to justify philosophy’s competence to know ‘the absolute’, that is, to know ‘what in truth is’ (GW 9:53). To justify this competence without petitio principii, Hegel presents an internal critique of each of a complete series of forms of ‘knowing as it appears’, that is, of accounts of, or approaches to knowing the truth as such, whether philosophical, scientific, common sense or cultural. These accounts purport and appear to provide for genuine knowledge. Hegel’s critical questions are: To what extent do they? To what extent can this be determined through internal critique of each such account? What positively can be learned about genuine knowledge from each such critique, and from their series? The forms of knowing as it appears considered in PhG, both theoretical and practical, are so heterogeneous – from naive realism to Fichte’s early version of transcendental idealism, from contemporaneous natural and psychological sciences (whether established, nascent or pseudo), to the Attic Greek polis, the French Revolution and forms of religion from Zoroastrianism to an enlightened form of ‘manifest religion’ – that readers may be pardoned their bewilderment and commentators their frequent despair about the presumptive unity of Hegel’s book. Fortunately, recent scholarship has said a good deal about the integrity of Hegel’s PhG.

HEGEL'S REVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY

Understanding Hegel’s PhG requires starting where he started, with his Introduction, not with his notorious Preface, which prefaces his philosophical system, not only PhG. Central to Hegel’s Introduction is the most severe challenge to the very possibility of rational justification: the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion (PhG GW 9:58–9). Briefly, this is the problem of how (if at all) to justify criteria for justifying claims to knowledge in the midst of controversy not only about substantive issues but also about proper criteria of justification. Hegel addressed, analysed, diagnosed and solved this problem with extraordinary acuity (see Westphal, 1989, 1998b, 2011a). As a result, Hegel understood far better than other philosophers both the difficulties confronting, and the strategies for obtaining, sound rational justification, both in theoretical and in practical philosophy. One of his key insights is that both of the standard accounts of justification, known today as foundationalism and coherentism, cannot resolve the Dilemma of the Criterion because instead they are refuted by it. A further insight is that strict deduction is necessary, though not sufficient for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry, which include both empirical knowledge and moral philosophy. Rational justification in non-formal domains requires logically contingent, substantive classifications (concepts, categories), premises and principles of inference. These are rationally justified to the extent that, and so long as, they survive careful self-criticism and mutual critical scrutiny, in view of their adequacy to their intended and actual use or uses within their proper domains, and their superiority in these regards to their alternatives.
Rational justification in non-formal domains is in part, and inherently, social and historical. However, Hegel demonstrates that these social and historical aspects of rational justification are consistent with, and ultimately justify, realism about common sense and scientific knowledge as well as strict objectivity about practical norms, though this latter domain is reserved to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (*RPh*) (cf. Neuhouser, 2000, 2008; Westphal, 2010b). Rational justification in non-formal domains is not hostage to counterexamples consisting in mere logical possibilities, because no proposed alternative has cognitive status until it has at least some positive justificatory support. This very important point favours justificatory fallibilism and refutes scepticism, whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or Empiricist. (Justificatory fallibilism is the view that justification indicates truth but does not entail truth.) Fallibilism is justified by Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference, which he adopted from Kant, though Hegel argues for it independently in the first three chapters of *PhG* (see Westphal, 2009b). The key point of their cognitive semantics is that, conceive things as one may, one hasn’t even a candidate predication, nor candidate cognitive judgement or claim (within a non-formal domain), unless and until one ascribes one’s conception (or description) to some particular(s) one has located within space and time. In non-formal domains, this is required for any judgement, proposition or claim to have a determinable truth-value. If an assertion cannot be evaluated as either true or false, then neither can its justification be assessed, in which case it is not even a candidate cognition, however good a suggestion it may ultimately prove to be. Accordingly, within non-formal, substantive domains, mere logical possibilities as such are not relevant *cognitive* alternatives and so cannot defeat justification.⁸ In non-formal domains, ‘logical gaps’ are not automatically justificatory gaps. To suppose otherwise presupposes the deductivist ideal of *scientia*, which Hegel wisely rejected by 1806. By analysing these points about singular cognitive reference, Kant and Hegel achieve one of the key aims of verification empiricism – to rule out cognitively transcendent metaphysics and also global forms of scepticism – while dispensing (for good reasons) with both verification empiricism itself and concept empiricism.⁹

Hegel, in other words, is the philosopher *par excellence* of immanence; his ‘idealism’ is a form of moderate ontological holism which is, as intended, consistent with realism about the objects of common sense and scientific knowledge (see Westphal, 1989, pp. 140–8; Wartenberg, 1993; Stern, 2009). Hegel further realized that this semantics of singular cognitive reference suffices to achieve all of Kant’s key aims in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*KrV*), both critical and constructive, without invoking Kant’s transcendent idealism. Hegel was the very first to understand how to disentangle Kant’s transcendent analyses and proofs from his transcendental idealism. Indeed, Hegel criticizes Kant’s transcendental idealism for violating the key insight of Kant’s own cognitive semantics, namely that unless and until concepts are referred to localized particulars, they lack fully determinate meaning and significance (*WL GW* 12:26–7). Hegel further claims that a thorough and consistent development of transcendental idealism results in rejecting the ‘ghost’ of Kant’s thing-in-itself (*WL GW* 21:31).¹⁰ These claims from Hegel’s *WL* have precedents in his early Jena essays, in which he identified two key features of a sound internal critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism (see Westphal, 2009d). These claims

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cannot be examined here, yet they indicate that the links between Kant's and Hegel's philosophy do not lie in transcendental idealism, but instead in the semantics of singular cognitive reference, and in Kant's systematic, critical approach to philosophy.

One of the principal unifying elements of *PhG* – particularly deserving emphasis because it is so widely neglected in the literature – is Hegel's epistemological analysis. Briefly, Hegel argues in chapter one, ‘Sense-Certainty’ (in the first main section, ‘Consciousness’), by *reductio ad absurdum* against naive realism, that our conceptions of ‘time’, ‘times’, ‘space’, ‘spaces’, ‘I’ and ‘individuation’ are a priori because they are necessary for identifying and knowing any particular object or event, on the basis of which alone we can learn, define or use any empirical concept. Hence these concepts are presupposed, rather than defined, by concept empiricism. Hegel further argues that localizing any particular object or event in space and time and ascribing characteristics to it are mutually complementary components of predication, which is required for singular cognitive reference, which in turn requires singular sensory presentation. Hence conceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ or sense certainty is humanly impossible (see Westphal, 2002–3). Positively, Hegel argues in the closing paragraphs of this chapter that no matter how detailed, descriptions as such cannot provide for cognitive reference to particulars, because they cannot determine whether any, or one or several particulars satisfy the description. (Hence neither is there any Russelian ‘knowledge by description’.) Instead, cognitive reference to particulars – a core aspect of empirical knowledge – requires both correctly (if not exhaustively) describing them and ascribing the indicated features to some particular(s) which one has localized within space and time. So doing requires competent (if implicit) use of the a priori concepts indicated just above (see Westphal, 2002–3). This result is central to Hegel's justification of his semantics of singular cognitive reference.

In ‘Perception’ (chapter two), Hegel further argues against concept empiricism that observation terms plus logic do not suffice for empirical knowledge because our concept ‘physical object’ cannot be defined in accord with concept empiricism; it is a priori and is necessary for identifying and knowing any particular object or event. Hegel’s analysis in ‘Perception’ exposes the inadequacy of modern theories of perception (and of sense data theories) which lack a tenable concept of the identity of perceptible things. Hegel demonstrates that this concept is a priori and integrates two counterposed sub-concepts, ‘unity’ and ‘plurality’. Accordingly, the ‘thing/property’ relation cannot be reduced to, replaced by, nor adequately analysed in terms of the relations ‘one/many’, ‘whole/part’, ‘ingredient/product’ nor set membership. Hegel’s examination reveals his clear awareness of what is now called the ‘binding problem’ in neurophysiology of perception, a problem only recently noticed by epistemologists (see Cleeremans, 2003). Hegel further shows that the integrity of any physical thing is due to its causal powers, and our capacity to identify any one thing amidst its variety of manifest characteristics requires competent (if implicit) use of a concept of cause (see Westphal, 1998a).

In ‘Force and Understanding’ (chapter three), Hegel argues that our conception of ‘cause’ is a priori and is necessary for identifying and knowing any object or event; that statements of laws of nature are conceptual and at the same time express actual structures of nature; that the identity conditions...
of spatio-temporal particulars are mutually interdefined on the basis of their inherent causal relations; and that our consciousness of objects is possible only if we are self-conscious. Hegel justifies these results, in part, by appeal to his semantics of singular cognitive reference, which undermines infallibilism and justifies fallibilism about empirical justification, and also undermines empirical scepticism (including causal scepticism), whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or empiricist, while supporting Newton's Rule Four of scientific method (see Westphal 2009b, 2011c).\(^{13}\)

In the introductory discussion to 'Self-Consciousness' (i.e. in chapter four: 'The Truth of Self-Certainty'), Hegel argues among other things that biological needs involve classification and thus entail realism about objects meeting those needs. In its first sub-section 'Lordship and Bondage' he shows that the natural world is not constituted by will, a second important lesson in realism. In its second sub-section 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness' he argues that the contents of consciousness are derived from a public world, and that self-consciousness is humanly possible only if we’re conscious of mind-independent objects.

The first two major sections of PhG, 'Consciousness' and 'Self-Consciousness', are thus a counterpart to the first Critique's transcendental deduction, that is, to Kant’s proof that we can and must use a priori concepts in legitimate cognitive judgements about spatio-temporal objects and events, if we are at all self-conscious. However, Hegel’s justification of the conclusion to Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, that ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (KrV B277, cf. B275), does not appeal to Kant’s transcendental idealism (nor to any view remotely like it). In ‘Self-Consciousness’ Hegel argues (in part) for what analytic philosophy now calls ‘mental content externalism’, the non- and anti-Cartesian view that the contents of at least some of our experiences or thoughts can only be specified by reference to spatio-temporal objects or events. His argument for this result strongly counters infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification, in ways which directly undermine both Pyrrhonian and Cartesian scepticism. This is a key reason why the Cartesian ego-centric predicament does not appear as a form of consciousness within PhG (see Westphal, 2011c).

In ‘The Certainty and Truth of Reason’ (chapter five, under the general heading ‘Reason’), Hegel argues that classificatory thought presupposes natural structures in the world which must be discovered (rather than created or legislated) by us. In the first section, ‘Observing Reason’ he argues that classificatory, categorial thought is not merely a natural phenomenon. In the two subsequent sections of ‘Reason’ (‘The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness by Itself’ and ‘Individuality that is Real in and for Itself’) Hegel argues that categorial thought is not merely an individual phenomenon. The implicit epistemological result of these reductio arguments in ‘Reason’ is that individual thinkers can exercise rational judgement because they are embedded within their natural and social context. Hegel’s express result is that each of the preceding sections of PhG have analysed different aspects of one concrete social whole, including its natural environment. Furthermore, in ‘Force and Understanding’ (see Westphal, 2008a) and much more extensively in ‘Observing Reason’ (see Ferrini, 2009b), Hegel argues that any tenable philosophical theory of knowledge must take the special sciences into very close consideration. This
is a hallmark of Hegel’s entire philosophy, though it is rarely given its due.

In ‘Sprit’ (chapter six), Hegel analyses the tension and interaction between individual reasoning and customary practice. In the section: ‘True Spirit. Ethics’, Hegel argues that categorial and justificatory thought are not constituted or justified merely by custom or fiat. In the following sections (‘Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture’ and ‘Self-Certain Spirit. Morality’), Hegel argues that categorial and justificatory thought are not corrigible merely a priori, and so individualistically. In the concluding sub-section of ‘Sprit’: ‘Conscience. The Beautiful Soul, Evil and Its Forgiveness’, Hegel argues that the corrigibility of categorial and justificatory thought is a social phenomenon, and yet is consistent with realism about the objects of human knowledge and strict objectivity about practical norms. This conclusion is reached by the two moral judges Hegel analyses in ‘Evil and Forgiveness’. Here an agent and an observer dispute who has proper, legitimate authority to judge the agent’s behaviour. After struggling over this issue in various ways, these two moral judges finally each rescind the presumed supremacy and self-sufficiency of their own antecedent convictions and standpoint, and recognize that they are both equally fallible and equally competent to judge particular acts (whether their own or others’), and that each of them requires the other’s assessment in order to scrutinize and thereby assess and justify his or her own judgement regarding any particular act (PhG GW 9:359–62; see Westphal, 1989, p. 183). With this insight, the two judges become reconciled to each other, and to the fundamentally social dimensions of genuine rational, justificatory judgement. Expressly, this is the first instance of genuine mutual recognition in Hegel’s PhG (GW 9:229–30). Significantly, Hegel indicates that this achievement is the advent of ‘absolute spirit’:

The word of reconciliation [between the two judges] is the extant spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself as universal essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself as the absolute individuality existing in itself – a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit. (PhG GW 9:230)

The ‘universal essence’ mentioned here is the knowledge, principles, practices and context of action (both social and natural) shared within a social group. All of this is required, and understanding of all this is required, in order rationally to judge that ‘I judge’, and not merely to utter the words ‘I judge’, thereby only feigning rationality (see Westphal, 2009b, 2011b).

In ‘Religion’ (chapter seven), Hegel contends (very briefly, and among much else) that the history of religion is the initial, allegorical, premature recognition of the social and historical bases of our categorial comprehension of the world.

These three major sections of PhG, ‘Reason’, ‘Sprit’ and ‘Religion’, thus form, from an epistemological standpoint, Hegel’s replacement for Kant’s ‘subjective’ deduction of the categories, which explains how we are able to make the kinds of legitimate, justifiable cognitive judgements analysed previously in Hegel’s objective deduction (in ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Self-Consciousness’), which shows that we can make such judgements, because if we couldn’t, we could not be self-conscious.

Hegel draws these strands together in his concluding chapter eight, ‘Absolute Knowing’, in which he highlights how the PhG provides us with reflective conceptual
comprehension of the social and historical bases of our comprehension of the world.

The result of *PhG* is a very sophisticated version of socio-historically based epistemological realism. Hegel’s ‘idealism’ is a moderate holism, according to which wholes and parts are mutually interdependent for their existence and characteristics (see Westphal, 1989, pp. 140–5). Accordingly, as we obtain ever more comprehensive knowledge of the world-whole, the world-whole obtains ever more comprehensive self-knowledge through us. Yet the world-whole is not simply there for us to pluck; there is only the present, though presently there are old objects, phenomena and systems which persist into and continue to function, develop or deteriorate into the future. Only through our investigation, reconstruction, knowledge and understanding can the world-whole expressly exist as spirit over time.

The scope, issues and content of Hegel’s epistemological analysis in *PhG* are vast and unparalleled. If Hegel is right that concept empiricism, verification empiricism and transcendental idealism are false, that the Dilemma of the Criterion puts paid to both coherentism and foundationalism, that epistemology must heed our cognitive finitude and our mutual interdependence as cognizant beings, that epistemology must attend very closely to the special sciences and that (to avoid *petitio principii* and to solve the Dilemma of the Criterion) positive theses must be justified by strictly internal critique of all relevant alternatives, then an epistemological project like Hegel’s *PhG* is an urgent priority. 14

A second major contribution to epistemology is to solve the Dilemma of the Criterion, a third is to show that genuine transcendental proofs can be provided without appeal to Kant’s transcendental idealism and that they can be used to justify realism, in part by justifying mental content externalism. Hegel’s fourth contribution is to support Newton’s Rule Four of scientific method by means of his cognitive semantics. Finally, lingering suspicion of causal notions among contemporary philosophers of science because causal relations cannot be ‘perceived’ is a relic of Hume’s concept empiricism and theory of perception. Hegel’s trenchant critique of these two views shows how ill-founded such suspicions are. Allegations about Hegel’s neglect of epistemology or misunderstanding of natural
science do not survive scrutiny of Hegel’s actual views. Hegel’s epistemology is more vital today than ever; it behoves us to mine its philosophical riches.

THE STAGES OF HEGEL’S ANALYSIS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

Enough has been said about the first main part of PhG, ‘Consciousness’. The second, ‘Self-Consciousness’, contains two parts. Part A considers desire, mutual recognition and the relation between lord and bondsman. Its central theme is how, through phenomenological experience, the self-conscious subject makes progress towards its goal of uniting into a coherent conception of self and world the two seemingly contradictory self-descriptions inherited from its experience in ‘Consciousness’: as the essential, law-giving pole of the subject–object pair and as a subject that, at the same time, necessarily stands in relation to an object, to some reality other than itself (see Neuhouser, 2009). Hegel argues that a subject cannot satisfy its aspiration to achieve a self-standing existence in the world by relating to its objects in the mode of desire – by destroying an other which is not regarded as a subject – and shows why its aspiration to embody self-sufficiency can be achieved only by seeking the recognition of its elevated standing from another being whom it likewise recognizes as a subject. In ‘Lordship and Bondage’, Hegel examines in detail the advances and shortcomings of the reciprocal though asymmetric pattern of recognition that characterizes the development of recognition. The failure of these practical strategies for achieving self-sufficiency thus yields to a series of theoretical strategies for achieving it in the remainder of ‘Self-Consciousness’ (see Houlgate, 2003; Redding, 2005, 2009, 2010; Siep, 2006; Schmidt am Busch and Zurn, 2010). 16

Part B of ‘Self-Consciousness’, on ‘Freedom of Self-Consciousness’, is sub-divided thrice: ‘Stoicism’, ‘Scepticism’ and ‘Unhappy Consciousness’. In his introductory discussion, Hegel presents his account of thought. The activity of thought expresses the unity of being and of knowledge, of the subject and the object and of the multiplicity of aspects of any individual into a totality which is articulated in itself and by itself – a view for which Hegel argued in ‘Consciousness’. Hegel here argues that none of these three forms of self-consciousness realizes these features. Stoicism proclaims its freedom of thought, but only attains an abstract thought of freedom. Pyrrhonian scepticism cannot escape its own dialectic which is merely negative, destructive and self-destructive. Finally, unhappy consciousness produces its own unhappiness because it divests from itself and ascribes to an unreachable ‘beyond’ everything which is essential to itself, thereby degrading itself into abject nullity and utter dependence upon a deus absconditus. Actualizing freedom of thought thus requires an entirely new strategy, exhibited by ‘Reason’ (see Chiereghin, 2009).

As Hegel’s PhG proceeds, its main parts grow both in size and in sub-divisions. The third main part, ‘Reason’, begins with an important introductory chapter (five), ‘The Certainty and Truth of Reason’, followed by three sub-sections. The central issue of Hegel’s introductory section is the proper significance of reason’s ‘idealism’, namely its initial abstract certainty of being all reality. In PhG Hegel frequently uses the term ‘certainty’ to designate the core aims and presumptions of a form of consciousness, signalling that these merit critical internal examination to reveal
the ‘truth’ about that ‘certainty’, that is, its insights and deficiencies. Here Hegel argues that, both by instinct and in truth, reason is the universality of the things and events it identifies and experiences. However, the initial form of reason attempts to grasp itself directly in natural things opposed to itself, and believes that truth lies in their sensible being. It may appear that Hegel attributes this form of reason to Fichte, or perhaps also Schelling. However, Hegel here addresses as well the general modern insight that thought progresses freely in its classifications, specifications and explanations, taking its own thought-determinations to be the intrinsic, objective substantiality of nature, thus linking the principle of realism to the movement of absolute liberation of self-consciousness. This thought is shared in common by the empirical side of rationalism, the idealistic side of ‘concrete’ empiricism, and by subjective idealism, although the latter seizes upon only one pole of this relation (see Ferrini, 2009a; cf. Harris, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 447–72).

In the first sub-section of ‘Reason’, ‘Observing Reason’, Hegel’s central concern is to expose the contradiction between reason’s self-conception and its actual procedures in the special sciences (see Ferrini, 2007, 2009c). In empirical science, reason in fact rises conceptually above the diversity of sensible phenomena by seeking to identify laws, forces, purified chemical matters and genera. Hegel – who in 1804 was appointed Assayer of the Jena Mineralogical Society (see Ziche, 1997) – critically examines scientific description, classification and the quest for laws in contemporaneous mineralogical, biological, psychological and phrenological literature, in order to account for the methodological self-understanding of working scientists and to partake actively in contemporaneous debates about rival scientific theories. Here Hegel publicly supports some forms of contemporaneous natural science against others, and provides them a speculative justification and foundation. This shows how central natural science and our understanding of it are to Hegel’s PhG and to his critique of Kant. Hegel’s further criticism of scientific explanations of human beings as human bodies shows by reductio ad absurdum that understanding human beings requires examining individual human agency and behaviour – his topic in the remainder of ‘Reason’.

The middle sub-section of ‘Reason’ examines the self-actualization of self-conscious rational individualists. It is a study in the moral failings of asocial individuals (see Shklar, 1976, pp. 96–141). Hegel’s discussion has an important rationale (see Pinkard, 1994, 2009). First, Hegel contends that all individualist accounts of authority founder on partial failures which require increasingly social accounts of authority. Second, this sub-section sets the stage for Hegel’s thesis that we best understand the failure of individualist accounts only if we understand the role of reason in history: once we understand ourselves to be self-interpreting animals, we can understand that the key issue in history is the very nature of normative authority itself. Third, Hegel contends that over historical time we have learned better how to identify what counts as normative authority; understanding what this requires of us is tantamount to spirit’s achieving its full self-consciousness, which Hegel characterizes as an ‘absolute’ point of view. Accordingly, Hegel examines what norms are and how we comply with them. To this end, he analyses how established, accepted, ‘positive’ norms lose their grip on us. This is why Hegel examines phenomenologically actual norms at work, as they are wirklich in various practices. By examining normative governance
in this way, Hegel argues that reason itself is social, and that (inter alia) we hold ourselves responsible to the world through holding ourselves in certain very determinate ways responsible to each other. The most obvious way to do this is to use Kant’s tests of the Categorical Imperative, which Hegel considers in the final sub-section of ‘Reason’.

The two concluding sub-sub-sections of ‘Reason’, ‘Reason as Lawgiver’ and ‘Reason as Testing Laws’, concern reason’s becoming aware of itself as spirit (the title of the next major section of PhG). In these sub-sections, reason is still regarded as essentially individual reason, though individual reason projects itself as universal. Reason is the ‘I’ that thinks everyone else should know what it knows and agree with it. In contrast, Hegel contends, ‘spirit’ is the ‘we’ that makes individual forms of reason possible. Spirit provides the cultural and historical context which enables one to be who one is. These two concluding sub-sub-sections examine how individual reason becomes moral. Morality implies recognizing that one’s own maxims for actions are valid also for everyone else. Most famously, this is represented by Kant’s theory of practical reason. Hegel provides significant counterexamples to argue that Kant’s procedure for testing whether our maxims can hold consistently as moral rules is empty. Hegel does not simply shift his narrative from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’. Instead, he argues that there is no ‘I’ without a ‘we’, thus providing an interpretive explanation of the transition from (individual) reason to (collective) spirit (see D. C. Hoy, 2009).

A central task of Hegel’s main section on ‘Spirit’ is to examine and develop much more thoroughly the relations between individuals and their communities, and the considerable contributions of Mediterranean and Occidental cultural history to rationally autonomous individuals and communities. The first of the three main sub-sections of ‘Spirit’ concerns the ‘immediate’ communal spirit of ancient Greece, primarily as crystallized in Sophocles’ Antigone. Hegel argues that ‘human’ and ‘divine’ law – that is, positive and natural law – inevitably conflict within the ‘immediate’ spirit of Ancient Greek society because they are held to be distinct, though in fact they are mutually integrated forms of authority. Ancient Greek society counts as ‘immediate’ because it lacks the rational resources to resolve this conflict by integrating positive and traditional sources and bases of communal norms and laws (see Ferrini, 2002; Westphal, 2003a, pp. 7–91).

Hegel’s discussion of the Antigone has drawn considerable attention and often criticism from feminist philosophers. J. Hoy (2009) argues that questions about sexist biases, literary figures and historical examples are not philosophically tangential or irrelevant, and that examining recent feminist critiques of this section gets to the heart of Hegel’s phenomenological project, and helps support a broader interpretation of PhG potentially fruitful both for feminism and social theory and for contemporary philosophy.

In the closing sub-sub-section of ‘Spirit’, ‘The Juridical Condition’, Hegel describes the epochal development through which the conflict between divine and human law was resolved by fiat, by jettisoning divine or natural law and focussing exclusively on positive, human law. This is the imperial fiat of the Roman Empire. Hegel contends that it formed a prelude to the rational individualist, though self-alienated (because individualistic) spirit of modernity, which is examined in the second sub-section of ‘Spirit’, titled ‘Self-alienated Spirit. Culture’. (The German term Bildung is broad, covering the entire range of what in English may be called culture,
enculturation and education, whether formal or informal.) Hegel’s analysis of self-alienated spirit contains his most explicit assessment of enlightenment thought, which culminates in the sub-sub-section, ‘The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition’. Hegel develops his critique of the Enlightenment within the context of his theory of spirit (see Stolzenberg, 2009). Hegel’s provocative thesis is that the Enlightenment’s critique of superstition is an unwitting self-critique. Hegel defines ‘spirit’ as the unity of its self-relation with its relation to whatever is other than itself. This unitary relation can be taken – or mistaken – to mean that the relevant ‘other’ to which spirit relates is only the objectification of spirit itself. Much depends upon who or what this ‘other’ is, and what is spirit’s purported self-objectification. Here Hegel shifts attention from ‘forms of consciousness’ to ‘forms of a world’. Hegel explicates the concept of spirit in several stages. The first stage consists in the simple intentional relation to an object, with no awareness that this object is spirit’s self-objectification. This stage corresponds to the relation between enlightened reason and faith in PhG. Hence, Hegel contends, enlightenment thought has no awareness that its relation to faith is in truth only its relation to itself, so that its struggle with faith is an unwitting struggle with itself. Enlightenment thought focuses on its relation to spatio-temporal objects, though its individualism obscures how its relations to objects are a function of its collective, cultural self-understanding. Faith focuses on its relation to God within a religious community, while neglecting that these relations are functions of how it relates to spatio-temporal objects. Echoing the struggle between lord and bondsman, neither faith nor enlightenment correctly or fully understands the self-relations involved in relating to objects, nor the relations to objects involved in relating to oneself. Hence neither side can properly account for itself nor justify its claims and actions. In history, these failings appear dramatically in the moral and political counterpart to Enlightenment deism, the French reign of terror.

This cultural disaster requires re-examining the basis and competence of moral theory and practice, which is Hegel’s topic for the third sub-section of ‘Spirit’: ‘Self-Certain Spirit. Morality’. Hegel thus treats morality as a distinctive stage in the development of spirit, of the ‘I that is We, and We that is I’ (see Beiser, 2009). The world of morality is one of persons who, as individuals, express the universal will. This is a significant advance beyond forms of agency considered previously in PhG, although it represents spirit in its extreme of particularity and subjectivity. Hegel aims to show that this extreme must be integrated properly with the real universality and substantiality – that is, within the communality – of spirit. Here Hegel examines Kant’s and Fichte’s moral world view, individual conscience-based morality and the notion of the ‘beautiful soul’; these present three increasingly extreme versions of moral individualism. Central to the moral world view is morality’s radical distinction from and superiority over nature. Morality is thus independent of nature, and at the same time it also depends upon nature as a source of obligations (Kant and Fichte both belong to the natural law tradition) and as the context of moral action. However, human agents are not independent of nature because they cannot renounce their (natural) claim to happiness, and their happiness requires the cooperation of nature. This tension between dependence upon and independence from nature generates a series of contradictions within Kant’s account.
of moral agency, which in turn generates a series of forms of dissemblance, none of which can resolve or occlude the original contradiction. Alternately, conscience-based morality claims that individual conscience is the sole and sufficient basis for determining right action. It purports to avoid the problems of the moral world view by revising its universality requirement, thus integrating pure duty with moral action. However, claiming to identify what is universally right to do in any situation on the basis of individual conviction is impossible, because particular circumstances defy the simplicity of conscience and because different agents have different convictions about what is right to do on that occasion. A final attempt to advocate moral individualism despite these difficulties is made by the moral genius of the beautiful soul, as depicted by Goethe and Rousseau, which places itself above specific moral laws. This presumed moral superiority requires withdrawing from the world of moral action in order to live by its demands for honesty, openness and authenticity. Yet even if the beautiful soul withdraws into a tiny community of carefully selected companions, living with other people drives it to hypocrisy, thus thwarting its own principles. The shortcomings of moral individualism thus justified reintegrating moral agents into their community, and justify Hegel’s turn to spirit in the conclusion of this chapter and in the remainder of \textit{PhG}.

Although Hegel treats religion only in the penultimate main section of \textit{PhG}, the phenomenon of religion is everywhere present in his analysis of forms of consciousness and forms of a world (see di Giovanni, 2009). Religion is so fundamental to, and so pervasive in, human existence that we (Hegel’s readers) are able to reflect upon it only at the end, after we have understood Hegel’s case, presented in ‘Reason’ and in ‘Spirit’, that the critical, justificatory resources of reason can only function properly when we each recognize that we are members of the human community who require one another’s critical assessment in order to assess and to justify our own claims to knowledge, both theoretical and practical. Religion concerns the experience of an individual as ‘individual’ and as ‘individual in society’, an experience worked out at the interface between nature and spirit. This interface generates the two aspects of ‘cult’ and ‘belief’, each of which provides the emotional and representational means for transforming an otherwise purely natural world into a human home. Hegel re-develops the key issues of ‘faith’ and ‘knowledge’ by examining their transformations from the warrior community at the outset of ‘Self-Consciousness’ to the community of gratitude achieved at the end of ‘Spirit’, more specifically, by tracing their developments from an early culture where social identity is established through warfare under the aegis of the gods to a society of individuals who recognize the inevitability of violence but also their power to contain and redeem it, under the aegis of spirit, in confession and forgiveness. So understood, the ‘manifest’ religion Hegel characterizes and advocates provides the social and historical context for the mutual recognition among rational judges reached at the end of ‘Morality’, in ‘Evil and Forgiveness’, and for reconciling the conflicting claims of reason and faith which plague the Enlightenment. In ‘Religion’, Hegel traces the communal and historical character of religion from Zoroastrianism to Luther and just beyond to ‘manifest’ religion. In ‘Absolute Knowing’, Hegel re-examines the problem of phenomenal knowledge ‘losing its truth’
on the path to conceptual comprehension (see de Laurentiis, 2009; cf. Fulda, 2007). Twice Hegel critically recapitulates consciousness’ many relations to its object, relations he now presents as preparatory to the speculative or ‘absolute relation’ of thought and object required for genuine – manifest, and no longer merely apparent – knowledge (and for the purposes of WL). For logical reasons Hegel maintains that this speculative feature is present, if implicitly, in all apparent modes of knowing. He reassesses Aristotle’s metaphysical basis for this claim, the necessary logical sameness (*Gleichheit*) of thought and its content. Transcending Aristotle, Hegel explains the ‘absolute relation’ as the fundamental logical structure of spirit in the form of self (*selbstische Form*). He contends that this is the ‘absolute ground’ of phenomenal consciousness, which undergirds spirit’s development towards selfhood. This spiritual dynamic is simultaneously an expansion through space and an inwardization in time. This process is possible due to inferential, primarily syllogistic structures of judgement which enable us to know particular objects (of whatever scale or kind) by grasping the interrelations among their specific characteristics and by grasping interrelations among objects. Understanding these logical relations and understanding how we are able to make such cognitive judgements is central to understanding our knowledge of the natural, social and historical aspects of our world, a knowledge which in turn is central to our self-knowledge. It is likewise central to the self-knowledge of spirit as the world-system, which it achieves through us. The famous metaphors which conclude *PhG* – spirit’s ‘slothful movement’ through and ‘digestion’ of its own forms – anticipate the kind of knowing Hegel makes explicit in his philosophical system, starting in WL.

In *PhG* Hegel emphasizes both the broad scale of collective and historical phenomena and the specific dimension of the individuals who participate in those phenomena and through whom alone broad-scale collective and historical phenomena occur (see Bykova, 2009). In this work we observe a double movement: the embodiment and realization of ‘cosmic’ spirit in individuals and the development of individuals raising themselves to ‘cosmic’ spirit. Both converse movements coincide historically and practically; only taken together can they reconstruct the real process of the historical development of human spirit examined in Hegel’s book. This movement must be read in both directions at once. The individual self becomes who he or she is by absorbing spirit – in all the variety of its forms and appearances (*Gestalten*) in the world – into his or her own specific structures; conversely, spirit reaches its self-realization in and through its embodiment in individuals who interact with each other and the world, both natural and social. This complex process of mediation between collective spirit and individual spirits constitutes human history, Hegel contends: only taken as a mutual process of individual and communal development we can understand universality within human history and preserve the autonomy of its social agents. To recapitulate, phenomena at the level of individual human beings, both cognitive and practical, require for their possibility their correlative phenomena at the level of our collective, social and historical life; conversely, these latter require for their possibility their correlates at the level of individual human beings. This general point holds for the more obviously epistemological phenomena treated at the outset of *PhG* and for the more obviously social and historical phenomena examined in its later sections.
NOTES

1 His very first, unjustly neglected book, the *Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum*, was published in 1801. On its significance, see Ferrini (1995, 1996); cf. also Ziche (1997). In general, scholarly neglect of Hegel’s great interest and competence in the sciences and maths (see Moretto, 1984, 1986, 2004; Wolff, 1986) has seriously distorted the understanding and reception of his views.


3 Here Hegel uses the term ‘deduction’ in the legal sense brought into philosophy by Kant: the justification of an entitlement (see WL GW 11:20–1, 33–4, 54–5). The systematic role and function of Hegel’s 1807 work within his philosophical system was established by Fulda (1975) and is further supported by Collins 2012.


5 WL GW 21:54–6; *Enc* §78R; *Enc* 1817 §36R.

6 The abbreviation *PhG* refers here exclusively to the 1807 work. This must be distinguished from the later part of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit which bears the title ‘Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Das Bewusstsein’ (Enc §§413–39), though it has a very different context, scope and aim (see *Enc* §§25R, 387A; WL GW 12:198).


8 This remains a major divide between Hegel and much of contemporary analytic philosophy; see Westphal (2011c).

9 Verification empiricism is either of two theses: (i) For any (non-logical) proposition that is known to be true, there is a sensory experience that confirms the proposition. (ii) For any (non-logical) proposition that can be known to be true, there is some possible sensory experience that would confirm the proposition.

According to concept empiricism, every term in a language is either a logical term, a term defined by ostending a sensory object or can be exhaustively defined by combining these two kinds of terms.

10 This statement may suggest the common notion that Hegel ‘purified’ or ‘radicalized’ Kant’s transcendental idealism. This view cannot be substantiated in Hegel’s texts; see Westphal (1989), Wartenberg (1993) and Stern (2009).

11 For a contrasting account of Hegel’s epistemology, see Horstmann (2006, 2008). How Hegel can demonstrate positive conclusions through phenomenological examination and internal critique is complex; it is the central topic of Westphal (1989).

12 Hegel’s analysis refutes (inter alia) both Hume’s account of abstract ideas (see Westphal, 2005a) and Russell’s ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ (see Westphal, 2010c).

13 Newton’s Rule 4 of (experimental) philosophy states: ‘In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions’ (Newton, 1999, p. 796).

14 The systematic character of Hegel’s examination of human knowing is at odds with the piece-meal approach to dissolving or resolving problems still predominant among analytic epistemologists and contemporary continental philosophers. Piece-meal philosophizing was undermined by Carnap (1950a); see Wick (1951), Westphal (1989, chapter 4) and Westphal (2010–11).

15 Hegel’s semantics of cognitive reference is a main premise for his account of thought in the second part of ‘Self-Consciousness’; see Westphal (2011b).

16 On each and every section of *PhG* it is important to consult Harris (1997).
PART II:
THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY
THE INTRODUCTIONS
TO THE SYSTEM

Ardis B. Collins

The word ‘introduction’ takes on different meanings when applied to the works in which Hegel introduces the philosophical system as a whole. ‘Introduction’ refers to the essays that precede the opening moves of the philosophical project in the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) and the Science of Logic (WL). Hegel repeatedly cautions against allowing introductions to function as a substitute for what must be demonstrated in the main text. Since, however, these essays show how Hegel himself interprets the developments of his philosophical system, they provide an important resource for the interpretation of Hegel’s thought (Enc §§19R, 79R; WL GW 21:27).

In the process of explaining what kind of project philosophical science is, the introductory essays of Enc and WL call attention to the unique challenge involved in justifying its starting point. This discussion brings up the question, what kind of pre-philosophical project justifies the concept with which philosophical science begins, and what kind of justification is it. Here ‘introduction’ refers to the way a thinker is initiated into the philosophical standpoint.

A significant debate has developed over the years about the status of this pre-philosophical initiation. H.-F. Fulda (1965) addresses the question by distinguishing between a propaedeutic and a systematic introduction. A propaedeutic functions as an educational project that teaches a subject how to enter the domain of philosophical discourse and think the truth as philosophy thinks it. It does not, however, address questions that challenge the truth claims of philosophy. According to Fulda, the introduction provided in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) is not just a propaedeutic. It demonstrates the necessary truth of philosophical thinking to a consciousness whose knowing does not attest to this truth. Moreover, this same demonstration is a necessity of philosophical science itself, because it transforms the non-philosophical consciousness into an other in which philosophical thought knows itself (see Fulda, 1965, pp. 79–84).

Other interpreters, however, claim that PhG proves only the negative. According to W. Maker and R. Winfield, it discredits all forms of knowing that depend on a foundation in some presupposed object. This result clears the way for philosophy to make a completely new, presuppositionless beginning in...
pure thought (see Winfield, 1989, pp. 16–32, 101–5; Maker, 1994, pp. 30–7, 67–97, 100–6, 128–34; also Dove, 1982, pp. 28–9, 31–2). Houlgate (2006) represents Pbg as a propaedeutic needed only by a consciousness incapable of surrendering all its presuppositions. All that is really necessary to begin philosophy is the resolve to consider thought as such with no presuppositions. Pbg demonstrates to those incapable of this resolve that surrendering their presuppositions is a necessity implicit in their own ways of knowing (Houlgate, 2006, pp. 144–50, 157–62).

This essay on Hegel's introductions organizes its discussion around the questions raised by this debate. The discussion limits its consideration of other philosophical positions to the way Hegel himself interprets them. The section 'Philosophy and experience' focuses on the definition of philosophy and its relation to experience, which is the central theme of the Introduction to Enc. The section 'Philosophical initiation' examines the way Enc introduces the philosophical standpoint by examining three positions on objectivity. The section 'Scientific procedure' uses texts from both the Enc and WL to analyse Hegel's philosophical and phenomenological proof procedure. The section 'Logic and phenomenology' examines the relation between Pbg and WL as Hegel explains it in the Introduction to WL and in the essay ‘With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?’ The final section concludes with a summary of what the study of Hegel's introductions reveals about the questions raised in the debate.

PHILOSOPHY AND EXPERIENCE

According to Hegel, philosophy and experience have the same content; they differ only in form, that is, in the way they are conscious of this content. Content is the particulars, the determinate characteristics (die Bestimmtheiten) of our feelings, images, representations, aims, duties, thoughts, concepts (Enc §3). Experience knows its content by having it present (dabei sein) in one's sense of oneself (in der Gewißheit seiner selbst), for example, by feeling our ears filled with sound, our thought thinking a concept, our conscience convinced of its rightness. We experience something as found (Gefundenes), given (Gegebenes), immediately at hand (unmittelbar Vorhandenes), as what happens to arise in consciousness and hence as 'altogether contingent' (Enc §§7, 7R, 8, 12, 12R). Philosophy shares its objects with the content of religious experience. Both religion and philosophy seek truth in the highest sense, in the sense that ‘God and God alone is the truth’. Both seek the truth of the finite, of nature and the human spirit, in the infinite, absolute reality of God. Hence, we come to philosophy with its objects already familiar to us from religious experience (Enc §1).

Hegel distinguishes thought from experience by referring to an old belief, the belief that in order to know the true constitution of an object we must think it over (darüber nachdenken). We think over or reflect on what appears immediately to consciousness in order to expose what is essential, important, the truth of the matter. Even experience, however, discriminates between what is really important and what just happens to exist, between the actual and what might just as well not be. Thinking over (Nachdenken) does this differently. It looks for what is universal and necessary. It needs to know why the given patterns of experience must be what they are (Enc §§5, 7).

Hegel describes two forms of reflection. The form characteristic of empirical science
identifies general classifications and laws operating with the force of necessity in the flow of events. Empirical explanations, however, do not explain why the particulars in which a universal law operates must be these particulars, or why these particulars must belong to each other. Empirical science simply rethinks the given patterns of experience as law governed necessities. This critique of empirical science suggests that thought cannot be satisfied unless it also knows a universal that determines its own differences and by doing so determines their necessary relation to each other. Only in this way can thought free itself from the contingency of the given (Enc §§7R, 9, 12R).

Because thought does not find in the empirical the kind of necessity it needs, thought turns away from what is simply there, a fact given in experience, and ‘finds its first satisfaction in itself’ (Enc §12). By rejecting empirical knowledge as unsatisfactory, thought becomes free and detached from experience and preoccupied only with itself (Enc §11). Hegel calls this form of thought philosophical science, which is the second form of reflection. Logic, the first part of philosophical science, articulates the laws proper to thought thinking itself (Enc §§12, 19).

If, however, philosophical thought thinks without depending on experience, and focuses on itself, a subject-matter that is independent of experience, how can philosophy and experience have the same content? In order to answer this question, Hegel distinguishes his own definition of philosophy from other ways of identifying what philosophy is. According to one point of view, philosophy is about ideas and ideals; and these are nothing but phantoms or fantasies. According to another point of view, ideas and ideals identify an excellence, an ought, that either exceeds what reality can be or lacks what it takes to become actual in the real world. When Hegel defines philosophy as the self-development of pure thought, he is not talking about thought developing ideas that are nothing but thoughts. He is talking about articulating the determinations of a rationality that defines not only the true essence of thinking but also the true essence of the real world. The rational is actual, and the actual is rational (Enc §6, 6R).

The aim of philosophical science is ‘to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself with the reason that is, or actuality, through the cognition of this accord’ (Enc §6). Philosophy plays the role of ‘reason conscious of itself’ and experience plays the role of ‘reason that is, or actuality’. Hegel even says that the agreement between philosophical thought and experience serves as at least an external test of philosophical truth (Enc §6). He makes the same point again when he refers to the experience principle. According to this principle, every knower has the right to accept as true only what is given in the knower’s immediate sense of self. Truth requires not only the necessity of pure thought but also the actuality of what is immediately experienced, whether by the external senses or by the immediate intuitions of one’s inner spirit (Enc §7R). It is important to notice here that Hegel’s way of defining the reality issue differs from the way it is usually defined in epistemology. When Hegel talks about thought knowing the true essence of what is, the reality he asks about is not just a world existing outside the knower. It is the whole domain of experience, which includes not only the reality of an external world but also the reality of the subject engaged in an experience of that world.

There can be no philosophy without experience, Hegel says, just as there can be
no eating without food. But philosophical thought, like eating, does not acknowledge, respect or preserve the givenness of what it has received. It absorbs its food into the dynamics of its own system. It rethinks the contents of experience as realities rooted in and derived from the requirements of pure thought. Philosophy, therefore, knows the rational by knowing the accord between independent, self-determined thinking and the universal, necessary determinations of the empirical world. By knowing this accord, philosophy distinguishes the rational essence of empirical reality from the contingent, transitory determinations in which it appears. Unlike empirical science, however, philosophy cannot accept as evidence the givenness of universal classifications and necessary laws. Philosophy must demonstrate that these givens belong to the universality and necessity of the rational, and it does this by deriving them from thought thinking only what answers to its own requirements (Enc §12, 12R).

Philosophy cannot, however, completely transform the contingencies of empirical reality into the form of pure thought. Other forms of knowing, such as empirical science, jurisprudence, history, politics, ‘have to bring the universal down to empirical singularity and actuality’: details of law left undetermined by the concept of the rational, natural phenomena determined by chance or the play of circumstances, historical developments determined by contingent events and the arbitrariness of free choice (Enc §16R).

This account of the relation between philosophy and experience suggests several questions that Hegel needs to address. If thought separates itself from experience because of a need for necessity that thought itself brings to experience, what justifies the assumption that thought’s need identifies what empirical reality essentially is? Hegel himself raises questions about the presupposition with which philosophy begins. Every science presupposes an object for thought to think about and a preliminary concept that focuses the subject’s thinking on the specific subject matter selected for investigation. Since, however, the object of philosophy is thought itself, thought establishes the philosophical standpoint by simply asserting itself in a free act of thinking. Thought gives itself its object by positing itself thinking (Enc §17). This way of beginning, however, focuses on thinking as such. It focuses on thinking as the true essence of real experience only if we accept the hypothesis that the necessities of pure thought are also the necessities of real experience.

Hegel’s critique of Reinhold, however, shows that Hegel cannot accept this hypothetical strategy. According to Hegel, Reinhold begins philosophy with a hypothetical philosophical thesis and continues with this thesis until the procedure somehow reaches the origin or source of truth (das Urwahr). Hegel points out that this procedure is no different from the usual way of developing an investigation. Something is proposed as a beginning definition of the subject matter, and the investigation uses this definition to justify its claims. Reinhold’s approach shows that such justifications are nothing but hypotheticals, that is, they prove only what must be true if the original provisional definition is true. This insight, however, only serves to expose the inadequacy of the usual approach (Enc §10R). Hegel can begin philosophy with a free act of thinking if all he needs for the object of philosophy is thought as such. If, however, the object of philosophy is thought as a rationality whose necessities reveal the true essence of the actual, then he must either posit thought so defined as a hypothetical

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philosophical thesis, a strategy Hegel rejects in his critique of Reinhold, or he must find a way to prove the thesis.

Hegel raises another justification question. Philosophy has as its object the same infinite, absolute reality that religion knows as God; and like religion, it knows this infinite reality as the true essence of nature and the human spirit. But how do we know that human thought, which is finite, is capable of knowing an infinite and absolute truth? The Introduction to Enc states that philosophy itself must justify its claim to know with necessity an infinite, absolute truth. Any other kind of proof would be ‘an unphilosophical one, and it could not be more than a tissue of presuppositions, assurances, and argumentations (Räsonnements), i.e., of contingent assertions, against which the opposite assurances could be made with the same right’ (Enc §10). Philosophy, however, proceeds by developing the necessities of pure thought. If a philosophy does not assume that the necessities of thought are also the necessities of reality, then it produces the idea of the infinite only as a condition of thinking, not as absolute truth.

PHILOSOPHICAL INITIATION

In the chapter of Enc titled ‘Preliminary Conception’, Hegel states that PhG deals with this problem.

In my Phenomenology of Spirit, which was for this reason described, when it was published, as the first part of the system of science, the procedure adopted was to begin from the first and simplest appearance of the spirit, from immediate consciousness, and to develop its dialectic right up to the standpoint of philosophical science, the necessity of which is shown by the progression. (Enc §2.5R)

In the Introduction, Hegel calls experience ‘immediate consciousness’ (Enc §12). By saying that the PhG begins with immediate consciousness, therefore, the text just quoted says that the PhG begins with experience. It begins with experience appearing in its simplest form, and develops the dialectic of this immediate consciousness until it reaches the standpoint of philosophy. In this way, experience itself demonstrates the necessity of the philosophical standpoint.

In the same chapter, however, Hegel initiates the reader into the standpoint of philosophy in a different way, namely by examining three positions on objectivity: naïve metaphysics; empiricism and critical philosophy; and immediate knowing. Hegel acknowledges that this way is more ‘troublesome’ than the approach taken in PhG, because the examination of the three positions is ‘historical’ and ‘argumentative’ (räsonierend). In other places, where Hegel warns against letting introductions substitute for the work of the main text, the term ‘historical’ refers to the author’s position as one who has already worked through the text that demonstrates and justifies claims that are simply asserted in the introductions. In the Introduction to Enc and again in the Introduction to WL, Hegel explains Räsonieren as a form of argument in which a claim is supported by the arbitrary decision to accept one part of the evidence and to dismiss the evidence on the other side of the question (Enc §§10, 19R; WL GW 21:27, 32–3). This interpretation of these terms fits what Hegel actually does in his examination of the three positions on objectivity. He uses his own not yet proved position to interpret the strengths and
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weaknesses of each position he examines. This approach has certain advantages for our purposes, because it shows us how Hegel interprets his own position in relation to and differentiated from other philosophical positions that influenced him. Our study of this examination focuses on texts relevant to the question, how does philosophy begin and what kind of justification does it require.

The first position, naïve metaphysics, accepts without question that we know what things truly are by reproducing the content of sensations and intuitions in the form of thought. In virtue of this presupposition, Hegel says, this position achieves a higher level of philosophical thinking than critical philosophy (Enc §28). Naïve metaphysics, however, does not recognize the oppositions that characterize thought and divide it against itself. As a result, this metaphysics conceives the truth only according to the principle of identity: of two opposed determinations, one must be true and the other false (Enc §§26–8, 32, 36R). The concept of the infinite, therefore, becomes determinate; the infinite is identified as something set off from all the contents that distinguish finite realities. As a result, God is conceived only as an abstract generality, being in general.

Moreover, finite cognition proves something by relating it to something other than itself that explains and accounts for it. Hence, when this cognition tries to ground its knowledge of God, the proof begins with the finite, and derives its knowledge of the infinite from its relation to the finite. If, however, according to the principle of identity the infinite is infinite and not finite, and our knowledge of the infinite is mediated by and dependent on our knowledge of the finite, then the concept of the infinite cannot be true to what the infinite is. The concept derived from its relation to the finite either (i) reduces the infinite to the finite determinations of the world, as the unifying substance to which they belong (as in pantheism), or (ii) conceives God as completely other than the finite and thus conceives the infinite as limited by its not being the finite (as in dualism), or (iii) derives the attributes of God, who is supposed to be infinite, from the limiting content of what is finite. If metaphysics tries to solve these problems by thinking finite determinations enhanced to infinity by some kind of quantitative exaggeration, then it thinks them without limit (e.g. unlimited wisdom or justice) and thereby negates the limited content that gives these determinations a definite character (Enc §36, 36R, 36A).

The second position on objectivity includes two forms: empiricism and Kant's critical philosophy. Empiricism responds to the need for content by seeking truth not in thought but in experience. As a result, empiricism reduces the laws that govern the dynamics of sense experience to patterns that appear with significant regularity. Necessity comes to mean the thinking subject's tendency to anticipate associations that have become customary in the subject's experiences (Enc §§37, 38, 39, 39R).

Critical philosophy restores universality and necessity to the knowledge of empirical content by demonstrating that sense experience cannot be objective unless it is organized according to the categories of pure thought. This objectivity, however, belongs to the subjectivity of the thinker, not to what the object is in itself, independent of its relation to a knower. Critical philosophy absorbs both the subjectivity and objectivity of knowledge into the subjectivity of the knower (Enc §§40–1, 43). This is why Hegel considers naïve metaphysics a higher form of philosophical thinking (Enc §28).

Hegel acknowledges two Kantian insights that are relevant for appreciating how Hegel
himself defines the subject matter of philosophical science. First, Kant shows how reason falls into antinomies when it thinks the idea of world as the unconditioned condition to which all objects belong. Reason thinks with equal necessity opposed propositions about the same object. Hegel dismisses the way Kant resolves this problem because Kant attributes the contradiction only to the way reason applies the categories. The contradiction, Hegel insists, emerges from the content of the categories themselves, not just from the way reason applies them. Indeed contradiction belongs to all objects, representations and ideas. Contradiction is the dialectical element in logical thought, and as such is essential to the way philosophy knows truth (Enc §48, 48R, 48A; also WL GW 21:30–1). This is the opposition proper to the forms of thought that naïve metaphysics does not recognize.

Hegel also acknowledges as authentic speculative thinking the way Kant’s Critique of Judgement (KU) develops the idea of an intellectual intuition giving itself a purpose. Hegel sees in this idea a way of integrating the universality of pure reason with the diversity and contingency of empirical reality. This idea preserves the contingency of empirical particulars. It does not conceive them as necessarily implied in and hence deducible from the abstract self-sameness of the universal. Rather, it conceives them as being determined by the universal as a purpose it gives to itself (Enc §55, 55R).

Hegel rejects, however, the way Kant reduces the idea of intuitive purposiveness to ‘a principle of judging that belongs only to our understanding’ (Enc §58), and the way the unity conceived in it is taken up only as it happens to appear in experience. Hegel objects because Kant does not see that the unity of the universal and the particular conceived in this idea is ‘truth itself’ (Enc §56). Truth itself is the universal intuitive understanding that derives from itself the particulars of empirical reality by producing them as its purpose. According to Hegel, even Kant’s concept of the good, the final purpose of the world, belongs to ‘our practical reason’; in this concept, the unity of thought and being means only ‘the correspondence of the state of the world, and of what happens in it, with our morality’ (Enc §60). But if we conceive this unity without restriction, Hegel says, then

... the idea would be that the universality that is determined by reason—the absolute final purpose, the good – is made actual in the world, and this through a third, through the might that itself posits this final purpose and realises it – i.e., it is made actual by God, in whom, since he is the absolute truth, those antitheses of universality and singularity, of subjectivity and objectivity, are resolved and declared to be not self-standing and untrue. (Enc §59)

Thus, Hegel not only rejects the way Kant reduces the objectivity of empirical objects to a form that does not reach the independent otherness of being; Hegel also rejects the way Critical philosophy restricts our notions of absolute being and the highest good, so that thought thinks only what is appropriate to our thinking and morality. Whatever Hegel means by God, it cannot be confined within the rationality of our thinking and action. The term ‘God’ refers to a truth that overcomes the divisions typical of our rationality and that posits a purpose appropriate to this overcoming.

The third position on objectivity is represented by Jacobi’s immediate knowing position. Jacobi accepts Kant’s critical analysis of
thinking and as a result claims that thinking cannot think the infinite. For Jacobi, thinking explains something by relating it to something else on which it depends, and this other is explained by something else on which it depends, etc. Hegel calls this kind of explaining a progression through ‘conditioned conditions’, which shows that everything in the sequence is ‘mediated’ by an other. A condition is one state of affairs that necessitates another state of affairs, for example, metal expands if heated. A conditioned condition necessitates something only because it is itself necessitated by a prior condition, for example, if fire is applied to metal it becomes hot, and if metal becomes hot it expands. A sequence of conditioned conditions explains everything by way of, that is, mediated by, its relation to something other than itself, which means that everything in the sequence is finite, limited by its not being the whole truth. If, therefore, all explanations are an unending sequence of conditioned conditions, then they cannot produce knowledge of the infinite. Immediate knowing asserts, however, that truth is ‘for’ the human spirit, ‘so much so that it is through reason alone that man subsists’, and reason is knowing God (Enc §63). Since thinking thinks only what is mediated by its relation to something other than itself, the unlimited truth that God is cannot be thought. The human spirit knows the infinite, therefore, only in a non-mediated intuition (Enc §§ 62R, 63).

Immediate knowing insists that the true is not a mere subjective thought. Nor is it pure being for self, which is being that is not the idea, not united with thought. Being in this form is only the ‘sensible, finite being of the world’. Immediate knowing instead grasps the infinite as idea, that is, as thought identified with being and being identified with thought (Enc §70). Immediate knowing claims that this idea of the infinite is present in consciousness inseparably joined to the experienced ‘certainty of its being’ (Enc §64). Hegel calls this ‘the transition . . . from the subjective idea to being’ (Enc §69; also WL GW 21:64–5).

Hegel acknowledges that philosophy has no quarrel with the truth claims of immediate knowing. Philosophy sets out to prove ‘that the nature of thought or of subjectivity implies that they are inseparable from being or from objectivity’. Immediate knowing provides the intuition in which truth defined as the identity of thought and being takes the form of an experienced truth, thereby showing that the propositions of philosophy ‘are in agreement with experience’ (Enc §64R; also §7R). Hegel finds fault with immediate knowing, however, because it takes as its truth criterion the manner in which a singular self experiences the content of his or her consciousness: ‘What I find to be present in my consciousness is thereby promoted into something present in the consciousness of everyone, and given out as the nature of consciousness itself’ (Enc §71). Moreover, if the self’s personal conviction is all that is needed to establish the truth of an experience, then any desire, interest or purpose that a subject believes in takes on the authority of truth. There is no way of distinguishing between a personal conviction that is immoral or evil and one that is right and good (Enc §72).

Hegel considers two ways in which a truth claim based on ‘my’ experience might acquire the universality that truth requires. One is the universal agreement (consensus gentium) approach. ‘My’ experience is true because everyone agrees with it. This approach, however, does not satisfy thought’s need for necessity. Even if we could show that everyone’s consciousness shares the same conviction, the same experiential content with the
same certainty, this would not prove that experience is true. It would prove only that universal agreement on the matter happens to be the case. Thus, Hegel distinguishes between a universality without necessity and a universality based on necessity. General agreement does not prove that what everyone thinks, believes or experiences must be true. Only what is universal because it is necessary provides the necessity demanded by thought (Enc §71R). 3

Hegel suggests a second way in which personal experience might establish the truth of its content, namely by showing that the intuition of the infinite belongs to the very nature of consciousness and hence is necessarily true for any and every consciousness (Enc §71, 71R). Hegel says explicitly that his PhG demonstrates the necessity of the philosophical standpoint by beginning ‘from immediate consciousness’ (Enc §25R). It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a proof examining the nature of consciousness as such refers to the proof developed in PhG. It is important to notice that a proof of this kind would not only prove the legitimacy of defining truth as thought identified with being; it would also prove that individual consciousness has access to this truth. Moreover, this strategy avoids the problems involved if the move from experience to pure thought is determined by thought’s own need for necessity. If the move is determined by the nature of consciousness as such, then experience itself proves the necessity of the shift from the phenomenological to the philosophical standpoint. In order to justify this approach, however, Hegel must devise a proof procedure that avoids the problems involved in deriving knowledge of the infinite from knowledge of the finite.

Hegel addresses this issue by distinguishing rational proof procedure from the proof procedure of the understanding. Both forms of proof begin with the finite as something immediate, something with a being of its own. In the proof procedure of the understanding, the finite remains fixed as what it positively is, while the proof moves on to the infinite as something entirely other. Hegel agrees with Jacobi that this kind of procedure cannot produce knowledge of the infinite, because its way of knowing the infinite depends on the way the infinite is related to and identified in terms of the finite, whose being is other than the infinite. Rational proof differs from understanding’s proof procedure because it demonstrates that the finite is not something isolated in a being of its own. It proves that the being of finite, empirical realities has its ground in a being that is not finite, the being of God; and it recognizes that this reduces the empirical world to what has no independent being, something whose being is only the being of the ground appearing in it. Thus, the procedure that derives knowledge of the infinite from knowledge of the finite sublates the mediation by reversing priorities. In the process of coming to know the truth, knowledge of the finite functions as the ground, and knowledge of the infinite is derived from it. The process demonstrates, however, that the finite is a derivative reality whose being depends on the infinite as its ground. This transforms the finite into a mediated reality and the infinite into the immediacy of an independent originating principle. Rational proof, therefore, demonstrates the necessity of rethinking the infinite in its immediacy as the independent originating ground, and of thinking the finite as realities derived from and determined by the infinite (Enc §§36, 36R, 36A, 50R).

If, therefore, PhG uses a rational proof procedure, then it proceeds by exposing a negative mediation that transforms the
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domain of experience into a reality medi-
ated by its dependence on a ground, which
redefines experience as the appearance of
the ground; and it proves that the ground is
thought identified with being, which defines
the standpoint of philosophy. At this point,
it will have justified the shift into the inde-
pendence and immediacy of the ground. We
turn, therefore, to Hegel’s analysis of sci-
cific proof procedure as Hegel interprets it in
the 1830 Enc and the WL. According to WL,
both the philosophical science and PhG fol-
low this procedure.

SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE

According to Enc, every logical reality has
three aspects: the abstract or understandable,
the dialectical or negatively rational and the
speculative or positively rational (Enc §79).
Understanding holds to fixed determina-
tions that stand firm in their difference from
others. It takes each determination by itself,
identifies this determination in terms of itself
alone and keeps it separated from what is not
proper to it. Thus, understanding thinks with
precision, carefully and relentlessly focusing
on what identifies the object itself, and allow-
ing no mingling with anything else. Thus,
understanding thinks the finite. It thinks a
determination by setting up a restriction,
another truth that the determination does
not hold within itself (Enc §80).

Dialectical thinking shows how the fixed
determinations of understanding pass over
into their opposites. Precisely because every
concept is fixed and isolated in itself, that is,
because its determination determines it as only
itself, the determination goes over to what
opposes it. Hegel’s hidden agenda here is the
dynamic of exclusiveness. The determination
that isolates the finite and identifies it only
with itself maintains its isolation by exclud-
ing what it is not. This exclusiveness is not a
comparison or relation added to the deter-
mination. By being what it is, the deter-
mination excludes what it is not. By being
alive, an organism sets itself off from the
inanimate. By being self-determined, persons
stand apart from what is other-determined.
By being coloured, a thing is not colourless.
What the concept positively is, what identi-
fies it in itself, determines it as an excluding
relation to its opposite. This alone, Hegel
says, gives ‘immanent coherence and neces-
sity’ to scientific procedure (Enc §81, 81R;

Hegel analyses this coherence and neces-
sity in terms of two principles: determinate
negation and positive rationality. A determi-
nate negation does not deny or cancel out
what it negates. On the contrary, it holds on
to the positive determination, and defines
itself specifically as the negation of this deter-
mination. For example, concepts like colour-
less, inanimate and unfree preserve definite
positive contents joined to their negations.
To think such concepts, we must think their
positive contents as well as their negations.
In the dialectical moment of philosophical
procedure, the negativity of a concept, its not
being the original concept, emerges precisely
as a result of what the original concept is.
Thought follows the meaning of the concept
into the exclusiveness that connects it to
what it is not. The transition to an opposite,
therefore, produces a determinate negation. It
preserves the positive content of the original
concept and connects it to a negation whose
whole meaning is derived from and given
specific content by this connection. Hence,
the move neither denies the original concept
nor cancels it out. On the contrary, it asserts
the concept’s fuller meaning. It expands what
thought thinks in the concept by including the exclusivity that connects it to its opposite (Enc §82R). Determinate negation justifies the speculative or positively rational move in philosophical procedure: ‘The speculative or positively rational apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition’ (Enc §82). Speculative thought affirms something positive. It affirms that the original concept and its negation are one truth. It conceives this truth as a unity ‘contained in’ the dissolution and transition of the opposites, a unity of the determinations ‘in their opposition’. The original concept’s rigid, isolated self-definition is dissolved. Its determination, by excluding its opposite, carries the concept into a play of opposition with what it excludes. The opposite, as the determinate negation of the original concept, also dissolves its separation from what it negates. It maintains its separateness by negating the original concept and hence by being involved in a play of opposition with it. Thus, the non-identity of the two determinations depends on their participation in the same dynamic of mutual opposition. This dynamic unifies opposites ‘in their opposition’; in the process, each becomes determined as not being the other. Thus, speculative thought does not get rid of the opposition or neutralize it. Speculative thought asserts the unifying principle that governs the dynamic between the opposites and thus identifies them as mutually exclusive members of the same truth.

The Introduction to WL confirms this analysis of determinate negation. According to this version, a subject matter ‘dissolves itself in being realized’ and thus results in its own negation (WL GW 21:37–8). The phrase ‘in being realized’ is important. Hegel is saying that the subject matter, precisely by being what it is, brings about its own negation. The negation, however, is determinate. It belongs to the specific content that it negates. Thus, Hegel says:

... in the result there is therefore contained in essence that from which the result derives – a tautology indeed, since the result would otherwise be something immediate and not a result ... It is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding – richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. (WL GW 21:38)

Hegel insists that determinate negations introduce ‘nothing extraneous’ (WL GW 21:38). The new concept asserts nothing more than the original concept together with the development of the opposite as its result. It inserts no hidden premise that either dismisses the unity of opposites as untrue, or assumes that the opposition must be neutralized. A determinate negation proves that the original concept implies a necessary connection to its opposite. Since ‘it admits of nothing extraneous’, the new concept simply endorses this connection. Hence, it preserves not only both opposites within a unity, but also their mutual opposition.

The essay ‘With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?’ (which immediately follows the Introduction to WL) explains why Hegel calls this result ‘the self-contradictory’. This essay describes scientific procedure as a retreat into a ground. The procedure begins with the concept of the subject matter. It continues by developing correct inferences (richtige Folgerungen) from this concept. Thus, all developments are necessary implications of the original concept and return to it as that
which persists and becomes fully articulated in these developments. This necessary line of development proves that the same principle drives the connections between all the forms of the concept. This principle grounds the whole dynamic in which the concept becomes fully articulated; hence, all the forms of the concept belong to this one principle determining its own development. If, therefore, the procedure shows that the concept involves a necessary connection to its opposite, then both the concept and its opposite belong to the same ground. One and the same concept determines itself as divided against itself in these opposites (WL GW 21:57–8).

We have encountered the retreat into a ground theme before, in Hegel’s critique of Jacobi (Enc §36A). The procedure begins with the beginning concept taken by itself, unmediated by any relations. It draws out the necessary implications of this concept, and thereby proves its dependence on the ground. In the order of demonstrating what the subject-matter truly is, the beginning concept, which provides the preliminary definition of the subject-matter, comes first; and the ground depends on this beginning for the demonstration of its truth. In the order of what the truth itself is shown to be, however, the ground has priority, and the beginning concept is a derivative truth dependent on the ground.

According to WL, however, the retreat into a ground returns to the concept with which the procedure begins and thus demonstrates that all the determinations exposed in the demonstration are the same concept fully developed. According to Enc, retreat into a ground elevates thought from the finite to the infinite, which suggests that the retreat into a ground shifts into a domain different from the one with which it began. WL addresses this issue when it analyses the relation between the PhG and WL.

LOGIC AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The Introduction to WL identifies the subject matter of logic by distinguishing the logic of philosophical science from the logic of ‘ordinary phenomenal consciousness’. Ordinary phenomenal consciousness assumes that the materials of knowing exist on their own in a world apart from thought. The object of thought by itself is complete; it can be itself with or without its relation to thought. Thought by itself, however, is an empty form, the indeterminateness of thinking without the definiteness of what it thinks. Thought cannot be fully itself unless filled with a content provided by what is other than thought. Hegel attributes these presuppositions to formal logic, natural thinking, ordinary common sense, naïve realism and Kantian idealism (WL GW 21:13–15, 27–9).

Philosophical science stands opposed to the presuppositions of ordinary phenomenal consciousness. Like ancient metaphysics, it accepts the determinations of pure thought as the essential content of what truly is. The logic that belongs to philosophical science and serves as its first part begins with the concept of independent pure thought identified with independent being. This identity defines the subject matter of philosophical science (WL GW 21:30, 33). Since, however, ordinary phenomenal consciousness challenges this way of thinking, philosophy cannot begin without setting aside the presuppositions of phenomenal consciousness (WL GW 21:28–9; also 63). The introductory essays of WL state explicitly and repeatedly that this ‘setting aside’ must be justified, and that PhG provides this justification (WL GW 21:32–3, 44–5, 54–6).

The justification project, however, involves a fundamental ambiguity. It cannot use the principles of logic to make the case since (1)
logic itself must determine what these principles are and (2) the justification project must prove the legitimacy of assuming that logical forms govern what actually exists. Hegel addresses this problem by situating the justification project within the fundamental presuppositions of phenomenal consciousness itself. The phenomenology of consciousness begins with ‘the first immediate opposition of itself and its subject matter’, which is ‘empirical sensuous consciousness’ (WL GW 21:32, 55). In other words, the ‘science of consciousness’ begins with the minimal conditions required for cognition as a form of consciousness. It begins with the opposition that separates consciousness from its object.

Hegel says explicitly that within the science of consciousness, the beginning form of consciousness is a presupposition (WL GW 21:55). But he distinguishes this presupposition status from that of pure thought or intellectual intuition. The ‘I’ of pure thought, with which philosophical science begins, and the ‘I’ of intellectual intuition are not the ‘I’ that everyone recognizes in themselves. Both presuppose a detachment that separates the ‘I’ from its engagement in the manifold content of experience, thus elevating it to the standpoint of philosophy (WL GW 21:62–3).

But as thus immediately demanded, this elevation is a subjective postulate; before it proves itself as a valid demand, the progression of the concrete ‘I’ from immediate consciousness to pure knowledge must be demonstratively exhibited within the ‘I’ itself, through its own necessity. (WL GW 21:63)

The ‘I’ that is immediately accessible to everyone is consciousness of oneself as a world full of content, that is, the ‘I’ of ‘empirical self-consciousness’, of ‘ordinary consciousness’ (WL GW 21:63–4).

Of course, the science of consciousness cannot begin with all the concreteness of this ‘I’, all its complex relations and linguistic representations. But to focus on its minimal conditions, we do not have to detach ourselves from consciousness engaged in being conscious of some object. We simply focus on the form of consciousness that reduces this engagement to its minimal conditions. The immediate presence of a sense datum to consciousness provides this minimal form of consciousness. From this starting point, the analysis moves through all the ways in which the otherness between consciousness and its object emerges in consciousness. The result is the concept that defines the subject matter of philosophical science. Hegel insists that the concept of philosophical science cannot be justified in any other way (WL GW 21:32–3).

Hegel explicitly analyses this process as a retreat into a ground that turns into a circle. From its beginning in the immediate being given in sense consciousness, the science of consciousness retreats into the ‘origin and truth’ on which this being depends. This brings the science back to the immediacy and externality of sense objects now known as a derivative truth defined by its dependent relation to the ground. This return to the beginning is absolute spirit ‘letting itself go into the shape of an immediate being – resolving itself into the creation of the world which contains all that fell within the development preceding that result’ (WL GW 21:57; also 34). By collapsing the diversity characteristic of phenomenal consciousness, this result necessitates a shift to a different area of discourse.

But in that result the idea has the determination of a certainty that has become
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truth; it is a certainty which, on the one hand, no longer stands over and against a subject matter confronting it externally but has interiorized it, is knowingly aware that the subject matter is itself; and on the other hand, has relinquished any knowledge of itself that would oppose it to objectivity and would reduce the latter to a nothing; it has externalized this subjectivity and is at one with this externalization . . . Pure knowledge, thus withdrawn into this unity, has sublated every reference to an other and to mediation. . . . (WL GW 21:55)

The science of consciousness demonstrates the necessity of conceiving absolute truth as the undifferentiated self-sameness of subjectivity and objectivity, of thought and being, of ‘pure thought’ and ‘what exists in and for itself’ (WL GW 21:33; also 45).

Sine this demonstration develops as a retreat into a ground, it proves that knowledge must reverse its direction; it must derive its knowledge of what is determined by the ground from its knowledge of the ground. In order to begin this process, knowledge must assert the ground as immediate, that is, as not derived from or dependent on its relation to anything else, because this is what the retreat into a ground proves it to be. Thus, philosophical science begins with a free act of thinking, the arbitrary resolve to consider thought as such; and it asserts this beginning without presupposing any determinations that identify what thinking as such is. Philosophical science begins with thought simply being (WL GW 21:56).6

Hegel develops a threefold way of conceiving the beginning of logic. (i) The beginning concept of logic, that is, thought as such or pure knowing, presupposes its emergence in consciousness. This is the beginning as mediated, conceived as the truth of consciousness. (ii) This mediation sublates itself. The emergence of pure knowing as a result of finite knowing or consciousness proves that consciousness has its truth not in consciousness itself but in a knowing that negates the fundamental distinction between thought and being characteristic of consciousness as such. This is the beginning as a negative mediation; its emergence in consciousness identifies it as not a consciousness kind of knowing. (iii) Logic begins with the resolve to consider thought as such, to begin with thought simply being. This is the beginning cut off from all mediation, even the mediation involved in negating the opposition in consciousness. This is the truth of consciousness asserted as an independent originating ground.
CONCLUSION

Hegel’s critique of Jacobi and Reinhold shows why philosophy cannot be presuppositionless in the ordinary sense. Philosophy begins by conceiving the object to be investigated as thought identified with being. It takes for granted that truth belongs to an area of discourse, an element, defined and governed by this concept. It does not begin with a developed definition or set of predicates that identify what thought identified with being is. But it does begin by presupposing that thought identified with being is the domain where truth is to be found. This, of course, must be proved. If it is not, then the beginning concept is either a provisional hypothesis, like Reinhold’s, or it becomes an intuition like Jacobi’s that cannot justify the expectation implicit in every truth claim, namely that it must be accepted as true by every consciousness. Nor is it enough to disprove the claims of ordinary phenomenal consciousness (as maintained by Maker, 1994, and Winfield, 1989), or to show a subject engaged in this form of knowing how to let go of its presuppositions (the interpretation of Houlgate, 2006). The entry into philosophical science involves accepting an alternative presupposition with positive claims of its own; and this requires proof not only that the presuppositions of consciousness are not true, but also that the positive claims presupposed by philosophical science are true.

Hegel’s analysis of a retreat into a ground addresses this issue by showing how dialectical negations produce a positive outcome. This procedure transforms the forms of ordinary phenomenal consciousness into a reality that belongs to the truth of philosophy itself, as a derivative truth dependent on the ground that defines the object of philosophical science. Thus, Hegel’s introductions to his system support Fulda’s interpretation of the role that PhG plays in the project of philosophical science. The PhG is not just a pro-paedeutic for educating a knowing subject in the ways of philosophical thinking. It is a demonstration of truth required not only by non-philosophical consciousness but also by philosophical science itself, so that the reality of non-philosophical consciousness can belong to the necessities of philosophical science.

NOTES

1 This essay is a condensed and selective version of four chapters included in my forthcoming book, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Dialectical Justification of Philosophy’s First Principles, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2012). Reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

2 See Fulda (1965, pp. 88–115) for a discussion of Hegel’s decision to change the role of PhG from the first part of science to a pre-philosophical introduction.

3 Hegel’s argument against the consensus gentium theory of truth applies with equal force to the way Forster (1989) interprets Hegel’s theory of truth: ‘According to this theory, it is a necessary and sufficient condition of a claim’s truth that it be agreed upon by an enduring continual consensus’ (p. 69). Hegel denies that consensus per se is a sufficient condition. It is rather a contingent state of affairs. Truth requires a consensus established by knowing that the content of the truth claim must be true.

4 Hegel distinguishes the dialectical moment in philosophical procedure from manipulative dialectics and from scepticism (Enc §81, 81R). Dialectical philosophical procedure derives the transition into an opposite from the objective meaning of understanding’s finite determinations, not from the way a thinker gets trapped by the manoeuvres of a dialectician (Enc §81A1). Philosophical dialectical procedure, like high ancient scepticism, exposes the self-negation implicit in everything finite.
But philosophical dialectical procedure differs from scepticism because scepticism sticks to the negation as negation, as the untruth of all finite claims, whereas philosophy knows that the negation is also positive (*Enc* §81A2).

According to Wandschneider (1985/6, pp. 331–6), the truth of Hegelian logic cannot depend on the demonstration developed in *PhG* because *PhG* uses the principles of logic to discredit the forms of consciousness it examines. According to Hegel, however, the negations exposed in *PhG* are determined by necessities implicit in the fundamental structure of consciousness, not by presupposed logical principles.

See Chiereghin (2003) for an excellent analysis of the problems involved in beginning philosophy with a thought that collapses all distinctions.
The complete transformation undergone by the way of philosophical thinking among us in the past twenty-five years, the higher standpoint in self-consciousness that mind has attained in this period of time, has so far had little influence on the shape of logic. (WL GW 11:5)

So reads the first sentence in the Preface to the first edition of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (WL), published in 1812. It alludes to what Kant, in the Preface to the second (1787) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (KrV), called a ‘revolution in the way of thinking’ (Bxi–xii).

Hegel is convinced that the way of thinking introduced by Kant established a philosophical standpoint that surpasses all previous standpoints with respect to their insights into the essence of mind and thinking. At the same time, Hegel regrets that Kant’s new way of thinking has had no major impact within one of the main areas of philosophy, namely, logic: ‘the new spirit that has dawned in science no less than in reality has left no marks on logic so far’ (WL GW 11:6; 21:6).

This description of contemporaneous philosophy and its situation indicates that it is above all in view of Kant’s revolutionary aims that Hegel has developed his ambitious programme of reshaping logic as a philosophical science. He wants to bring these aims to bear, with as much consistency as possible, even upon this most basic philosophical discipline. He apparently considers neither the logic textbooks of his Kantian and Kantianizing contemporaries nor (as will become apparent below) Kant’s own contributions to logic to be sufficiently rigorous, systematic and coherent.

‘SCIENCE OF LOGIC’: A KANTIAN PROGRAMME

The fact that Hegel’s logic is conceived entirely in the spirit of Kant’s philosophy and is to a considerable extent motivated directly by Kant’s contributions to logic is given succinct expression in a remarkable footnote that Hegel, right at the beginning of his main work on logic, inserts into the section titled ‘General Division of Logic’. Here, Hegel explains his constant reference to Kant’s philosophy by stating that it ‘constitutes the foundation and the starting point of recent philosophy’ and that, in contrast to other recent ‘expositions of philosophy’, it ‘delves deeply into important, more specific aspects of the subject matter of logic’ (WL GW 11:31; 21:46). The very title of Hegel’s work – *Science of Logic* – announces a Kantian project. Hegel uses this title for his
main work on logic (the three parts of which were first published sequentially in 1812, 1813 and 1816) as well as for his shorter exposition of logic as the first of three parts of philosophy treated in all three (1817, 1827 and 1830) editions of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc). The title in effect announces that logic is to be treated in connection with the programme of logic outlined in Kant’s KrV. Indeed, ‘science of logic’ is nothing but a quotation of the collective term that Kant used to designate and group together certain logical disciplines, only one of which had traditionally been called ‘formal logic’. According to Kant’s description and division of the ‘science of . . . logic’ (KrV A52/B76) these disciplines are concerned in part with ‘general’ and in part with ‘particular rules of thought’. There are exactly two logical disciplines that treat the rules of what Kant called ‘pure thinking’. According to Kant’s terminology, one of these disciplines – ‘general pure logic’ – is concerned with universal rules of all thinking (including pure thinking). It therefore abstracts from differences among the objects to which (pure or non-pure) thinking refers. The second kind of pure logic is ‘transcendental logic’. Transcendental logic deals only with particular rules that pertain solely to the ‘pure thinking of an object’ (KrV A55/B80). Kant uses the traditional label ‘formal logic’ to designate general pure logic because this kind of logic, in contrast to transcendental logic, abstracts from every relation to objects, and thus ‘from all content of cognition’ (KrV A131/B170).

The project Hegel sets out to realize with his own science of logic can only be fully understood by recognizing that it incorporates, at least in essential respects, Kant’s conception and division of logical science. However, one also has to recognize that Hegel thinks it equally necessary to modify the Kantian conception for the sake of providing a more rigorous, systematic and coherent elaboration of logic.

This modification takes place in two respects. First, Hegel restricts the scope of the science of logic to that of the only two disciplines concerned with pure thinking. Second, he no longer distinguishes these two disciplines as formal and transcendental logic. Both changes are designed to avoid specific inconsistencies in Kant’s treatment of logic. This can be explained as follows.

THE RESTRICTION OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC TO PURE LOGIC

Kant assumed in KrV that the science of logic includes, in addition to formal and transcendental logic, various disciplines that neither (like formal logic) abstract ‘from all empirical conditions’ of our thinking (KrV A53/B77) nor (like transcendental logic) deal with objects of pure thinking alone (KrV A52/B76). Kant had in mind here disciplines like cognitive psychology as well as the proof theories that apply to particular sciences (e.g. the theories involved in mathematical, juridical and medical logic). He did not further discuss the scientific status of these special disciplines, but he suggested that only pure (i.e. only formal and transcendental) logic can claim to be science in a strict and genuine sense on account of its exclusive concern with strictly a priori principles and pure cognition (KrV A54/B78, A57/B81–2). Kant’s Preface to his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) of 1785 already displays a conception of logic not entirely consistent with that at issue in KrV. We encounter in this preface the view that philosophy as a
whole, in keeping with its ancient model, can be divided into three domains: logic, physics and ethics. In this scheme, logic cannot have an empirical part (see GMS AA 4:387). Instead, it deals exclusively with 'the form of the understanding and of reason itself' and with 'the universal rules of thinking in general without distinction of objects' (ibid.). On this view, logic as a whole coincides with 'pure philosophy' in so far as it 'sets forth its teachings simply from a priori principles' and 'is merely formal' (ibid.). Moreover, because pure philosophy (as ‘cognition of reason’) is 'either formal . . . or material', and because ‘formal philosophy is called logic’, transcendental logic has come to be regarded as a part of ‘formal’ philosophy (GMS AA 4:388). This is in certain respects consistent with what we already find in KrV, where transcendental logic, in treating pure concepts of objects, is always exclusively concerned with the ‘mere form of thinking’ (i.e. of understanding and reason) despite its being ‘restricted to a determinate content, namely, that of pure a priori cognitions’ (KrV A131/B170). Accordingly, Kant’s conception of logic in GMS amounts to a restriction of the scope of the science of logic to that of pure logic. This science is limited to what in KrV is called a ‘pure doctrine of reason’ (A53/B78) and a ‘science of the pure cognition of the understanding and of reason’ (A57/B 81). In other words, it is a science that contains only formal and transcendental logic.

With this restricted and more coherent conception of logical science, Kant anticipated Hegel’s view of logic’s scope. It is Hegel’s view as well that logical science coincides with ‘pure logic’ (WL GW 12:19). In his words, it is the ‘science of pure thinking’ (WL GW 11:30; 21:45) or simply ‘pure science’ (Enc 1817 §57; WL GW 11:33; 12:198). Its sphere coincides with the spheres of formal and transcendental logic in Kant.\(^8\)

### THE DESIGNATIONS OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Kant himself already suggested a modification of the division of pure logic into a formal and a transcendental part. As I said above, his Preface to the 1785 GMS characterizes logic as a whole as ‘formal philosophy’ since it is concerned with the ‘form of the understanding and of reason’ (AA 4:387). This characterization, however, seems incompatible with Kant’s use of ‘formal logic’ in KrV, where the term is used to demarcate but one part of logic.\(^9\) Precisely because transcendental logic, according to KrV, establishes an intrinsic connection between these forms and the categories as forms ‘of thinking of an object in general’ (A51/B75) (by means of the ‘original synthetic unity of apperception as the form of the understanding’ [B169]), it seems natural to regard pure logic in both of its parts as a formal science. This is precisely the perspective Hegel appropriates for his own science of logic: he consistently avoids the traditional talk of formal logic, and instead describes his logical enterprise in its entirety as ‘formal science’ (WL GW 12:25).\(^10\)

Hegel also avoids speaking of general logic, and he does not adopt Kant’s KrV division of the science of logic into a general and a transcendental part. Hegel does divide this science into two parts, the first called Objective Logic (or ‘logic of being’) and the second Subjective Logic (or ‘logic of thinking’ and ‘logic of the concept’) (WL GW 11:30–2).\(^11\) Yet these differ not just in name from Kant’s general logic and transcendental logic.
Kant held that general logic is ‘constructed on a ground plan’ that coincides ‘precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition’ into understanding, judgement and reason (KrV A130/B169). Accordingly, general logic contains a ‘doctrine’ whose analytic part dissolves ‘the entire formal business of the understanding and reason into its elements’ (KrV A60/B84). This ‘analytic’ deals with ‘concepts, judgements, and inferences’ directly in accordance with the functions and order of the understanding and reason (KrV A130/B169). This description matches the structure and content of traditional logic textbooks, which (along the lines of Aristotle’s *Organon*) treated inferences as composed of judgements and judgements as composed of concepts. Hegel’s subjective logic is concerned with this matter as well. He points out, however, that ‘ordinary logic’ contains only ‘the matters’ constituting ‘one part’ of his subjective logic (Enc §162R; cf. Enc 1817 §110). By this he means its first section, titled ‘The Subjective Concept’ (WL GW 20:179; Enc 1817 §111) (or ‘Subjectivity’: WL GW 12:31), which is concerned with concept, judgement and inference. In the remaining two sections, ‘The Object’ (or ‘Objectivity’) and ‘The Idea’, Hegel’s subjective logic discusses topics that by and large do not belong to general logic, whether in its traditional or its Kantian significations. This is apparent even if one takes into consideration Immanuel Kant’s Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen (Immanuel Kant’s Logic: A Handbook for Lectures), a compendium on general logic published in 1800 under the authorship of one of Kant’s pupils, G. B. Jäsche. This manual, with which Hegel was probably acquainted, is a compilation of notes taken from Kant’s lectures on logic. Like G. F. Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason), which was used by Kant for his lecture courses, the Jäsche compilation treats topics such as the so-called laws of thinking (including the laws of identity, contradiction and tertium non datur) and ‘the logical perfection of cognition’. All of these are topics found in Hegel’s logic as well. Yet his subjective logic deals with them only in one part of its third (and last) section under the heading of ‘Cognition’ (or ‘The Idea of the True’) (Enc §§226–32; also WL GW 12:199–230 and Enc 1817 §§170–82), where he takes up ‘some topics regarding cognition’ (Enc §162A) discussed in the textbooks just mentioned: analytic versus synthetic method, definition, division, theorem and demonstrative proof (in other words, the elements of the so-called synthetic method). In doing this, however, Hegel expressly leaves out the ‘psychological, metaphysical, and otherwise empirical material’ that logic textbooks usually ‘connect’ (ibid.) with those topics. Hegel addresses the so-called laws of thought only in the Remarks inserted into the main texts of his objective logic. He discusses them there in connection with the ‘determinations of reflection’, namely, identity, difference, contradiction and so on that correspond (at least in certain respects) to the ‘concepts of reflection’ that Kant analogously treated in his transcendental logic (Enc §§115R; Enc 1817 §§65, 70; WL GW 11:258, 262, 285; KrV A260–8/B316–24).

Likewise, the thematic area of transcendental logic cannot simply be correlated with either one of the two parts of Hegel’s science of logic. It is not coextensive with that of Hegel’s objective logic, and Hegel explicitly states that the two overlap only ‘in part’ (WL GW 21:47). Referring to the outline of the ‘Idea of a Transcendental Logic’ given in the introduction to Kant’s Transcendental Logic (KrV A50/B74 and A55–7/B80–1), Hegel...
points out that Kant distinguishes ‘transcendental’ from ‘general’ logic in such a way that it

\(\alpha\) examines concepts that refer \textit{a priori} to objects, and hence does not abstract from all the content of objective cognition, or contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object; and \(\beta\) at the same time goes to the origin of our cognition in so far as this cognition cannot be attributed to the objects. – It is to this second aspect that Kant’s philosophical interest is exclusively directed. His principal idea is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness, understood as the subjective ‘I’. (WL GW 21:47; cf. 11:31)

Kant’s transcendental logic corresponds to what Hegel calls ‘objective logic’ precisely to the extent that its task is to analyze in detail, according to \(\alpha\), concepts that refer \textit{a priori} to objects, particularly Kant’s categories. In contrast to Kant, however, Hegel is primarily interested in a detailed analysis of the content of \textit{all} such concepts, whereas Kant deferred this task to a future ‘system of pure reason’ (KrV A11/B24, A83/B109, A204/B249). In KrV Kant restricted the task of transcendental logic to ‘determining the origin, extent and objective validity of our cognition’ (KrV A57/B81) in so far as it rests on the use of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding. Thus, as Hegel indicates in \(\beta\), it was sufficient for Kant to provide a ‘complete enumeration of all ancestral concepts’ of pure understanding \textit{without} a ‘detailed analysis of these concepts’ and \textit{without} the ‘deduction’ and ‘scrutiny’ of the ‘concepts derived’ from them (cf. KrV B27–8). This means that point \(\alpha\) could be neglected by Kant, at least for the time being, in view of transcendental logic’s restricted task. Hegel’s objective logic, by contrast, is dedicated exclusively to point \(\alpha\) and is not involved with Kant’s principal concern to prove ‘the so-called \textit{transcendental} nature of the determinations of thinking’ (WL GW 21:48; also VGPh TWA 20:338), that is, to reveal the origin of these determinations in our subjective thinking and consciousness.\(^{13}\)

Despite his divergence from the programme of Kant’s transcendental logic, however, Hegel does not judge this to be entirely misguided and unrelated to his own logic:

However, if there was to be real progress in philosophy, it was necessary that the interest of thought should be drawn to the consideration of the formal side, of the ‘I’, of consciousness as such, that is, of the abstract reference of a subjective knowing to an object, and that the cognition of the \textit{infinite form}, that is, of the concept, should be initiated in this way. Yet, in order to achieve this cognition, the finite determinateness in which that form is as ‘I’, [i.e.,] as consciousness, must be shed. The form, thus thought through in its purity, will then have within itself the capacity to \textit{determine} itself, that is, to give itself content, and to give this content its necessity – as system of the determinations of thinking. (WL GW 21:48 – di Giovanni translation adapted)

Here Hegel assesses the programme of Kant’s transcendental logic and relates it to his own logic. As in the section ‘Of the Concept in General’, which introduces the second volume of WL (1816), he is here pointing out that Kant’s project focused on what Kant called the ‘original synthetic unity of apperception’ and on what Hegel calls the ‘form . . . of the concept’ and the ‘formal side’ of consciousness. In Hegel’s view, ‘form of the concept’ signifies a \textit{logical} issue Kant considered only in its psychological disguise. Hegel’s subjective logic is meant to strip away the disguise
and purify logic of every psychological accessory.¹⁴ In other words, while Kant locates the origin and ground of a priori concepts of objects in our consciousness (KrV B192; cf. Enc §42, Enc 1817 §28), Hegel wants to identify this ground with the concept of concept, that is, with what he calls ‘the concept as such’, or ‘the concept’ for short. He thereby wants to link the subject matters of transcendental and general logic, using ‘concept’ to designate the categories of his objective logic and using ‘concept of concept’ as the basic notion of his subjective logic. While Kant’s transcendental logic aimed to trace objectivity in general back to the ‘objective unity of apperception’ of concepts contained in judgements, and thus to the ‘logical form of all judgements’ (KrV B140), Hegel’s subjective logic seeks to explain objectivity on the basis of a new analysis of the concept of concept and a new treatment of the ‘matters’ of ‘ordinary logic’, that is, the forms of concept, judgement and inference connected with the concept of concept. This is accomplished at the end of the section titled ‘The Subjective Concept’ (Enc §§163–93; Enc 1817 §§111–240) (or ‘Subjectivity’: WL GW 12:31–126), which, as the first part of Hegel’s subjective logic, covers topics of general logic and precedes the section titled ‘The Object’ (Enc §§194–212; Enc 1817 §§141–61) (or ‘Objectivity’: WL GW 12:127–72). Subjective logic is designed, finally, to prove in its third and last section (titled ‘The Idea’: Enc §§213–44; Enc 1817 §§162–92; WL GW 12:173–253) that this explanation of objectivity, in contrast to Kant’s transcendental explanation, does not imply a subjectivizing account of all objective cognition, much less of all rational cognition.

Thus, as the foregoing description of logic’s three parts shows (see also below, ‘Formal science and absolute form’, ‘Immediacy as the result of the sublation of mediation’, ‘The concept of concept as a basic concept of logic’ and ‘The concept of “speculative” or “absolute” idea’, Hegel’s subjective logic – the logic of the concept – stays within the limits of Kant’s general and transcendental logic even when it replaces Kant’s transcendental programme with a new one. If we take Hegel’s objective and subjective logics together as a single system of thought-determinations, we see that they are meant to make up, mutatis mutandis, the ‘system of pure reason’ (to use Hegel’s own words in WL GW 21:34 and 11:17) that Kant identified with ‘the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic interconnection’ (KrV A841/B869).

As for the characterization of the two main parts of this system as ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ logic: it follows from the content description given above that an explanation of the proper sense of this characterization can first be found in subjective logic. Hegel expressly calls attention to this point:

Since subjective brings with it the misunderstanding of ‘contingent’ and ‘arbitrary’ as well as, in general, of determinations that belong to the form of consciousness, no particular weight is to be given here [i.e., with the announcement of the division of the science of logic into its subjective and objective parts] to the distinction between what is subjective and what is objective. This is a distinction which will be more precisely developed later within the logic itself [i.e., in its second, ‘subjective’ part]. (WL GW 21:49; cf. 11:32)

Hegel indirectly indicates here that the name ‘subjective logic’ does not have psychological connotations. The remark gives expression to his endeavour to treat logic in all its
parts consistently as pure logic, that is, as a science unmixed with psychological or other elements alien to logic. The same endeavour underlies both his interest in greater ‘purity’ (WL GW 21:48) in relation to Kant’s transcendental logic and his criticism of the mingling of ‘matters’ of general logic with ‘psychological, metaphysical, and otherwise empirical material’ owing to which ‘ordinary logic . . . has lost its firm orientation’ (Enc §162R).  

THE SYSTEMATIC COHERENCE OF THE TWO PARTS OF LOGICAL SCIENCE

Hegel’s pursuit of consistency and coherence in this novel treatment of a (pure) science of logic can be shown in other respects as well. Let us first remember that Kant did not elaborate anything like a ‘general logic’. His contribution to logic remained fragmentary for this reason. While Jäsche, in the preface to his compendium on Kant’s logic (AA 9:4), refers to a ‘proper treatise on logic’ involving ‘a theory of the three main functions of thinking’ (namely, concepts, judgements and inferences), this is something that Kant himself never wrote. To be sure, this circumstance contrasts with the fact that, in an early (1762) essay on syllogistic forms, Kant had already outlined a novel theory of ‘pure ratiocination’ that includes a novel classification of pure inferences of reason (ratiocinia pura). Moreover, in §19 of KrV (which cites the 1762 essay) he sketched out a novel theory of ‘the logical form of all judgements’ according to which this form consists in the ‘objective unity of apperception’ of the concepts contained in a judgement (KrV B140–2). Yet Kant never developed these approaches to a new foundation and systematization of general logic. Still less did he develop a coherent systematic account of general and transcendental logic. Instead, he limited his explanation of their intrinsic connection to suggesting ‘parallels’ between tabular arrangements of logical forms of judgement and the categories as pure concepts of the understanding (KrV A70/B95, A79–80/B105–6; Prol AA 4:302–3). To this end, it sufficed for him to adhere to already existing logic textbooks. Thus, for the heuristic aim of discovering, classifying and enumerating all ‘ancestral concepts’ among categories, KrV borrows from such books lists of names for forms of judgement and then assigns to these names cognate terms that stand for ‘ontological predicates’ (i.e. stand for categories) which in turn are culled from traditional works on metaphysics. Hegel comments on this procedure as follows:

Kant’s philosophy incurs a further inconsequence by borrowing the categories for transcendental logic, as so-called ancestral concepts, from subjective logic where they were assumed empirically. Since Kant’s philosophy admits the latter fact, it is hard to see why transcendental logic resorts to borrowing from such a science rather than directly helping itself from experience. (WL GW 12:44; cf. Enc §42R; Enc 1817 §32R)  

In Hegel’s view, it was an unnecessary detour for Kant to call upon general logic in order to achieve his heuristic aim. Instead, Kant should have applied his principles of classification directly to the material available in books on metaphysics. Hegel of course considers it ‘one of Kant’s great achievements’ to have ‘asserted the claim’ that ‘the various kinds of judgement are to be understood not just as an empirical manifold, but
as a totality determined by thinking’. Yet he also thinks that ‘Kant’s classification of judgements according to the schema of his table of categories into judgements of quality, quantity, relation, and modality cannot be regarded as adequate, partly because of the merely formal application of the schema, and partly on account of their content’ (Enc §171 – italics mine [M. W.]). Hegel calls this application ‘formal’ because the terms ‘quality’, ‘quantity’ and so on, used to classify forms of judgements and categories, are themselves categories. Moreover, he considers the classification inadequate ‘on account of their content’ because it refers only to forms of judgement without critical scrutiny of the differences among these forms in view of their content.

Just as Kant’s philosophy did not consider the categories in and for themselves, but declared them to be finite determinations unfit to hold what is true, only on the inappropriate ground that they are subjective forms of self-consciousness, still less did it subject to criticism the forms of the concept that make up the content of ordinary logic; rather, it gathered a portion of them, namely the functions of judgements, for the determination of the category and simply accepted them as valid presuppositions. Even if one saw nothing more in the forms of logic than formal functions of thinking, for that reason alone they would already be worthwhile investigating to see how far, by themselves, they correspond to the truth. A logic that does not perform this task can at most claim the value of being a natural-historical description (naturhistorische Beschreibung) of the phenomena of thought as they are found. (WL GW 12:28)

Hegel requires Kant’s tabulated functions of judgements and categories to be subjected to critical examination that leaves neither their content ‘in and for itself’ nor their validity (Gültigkeit) unexamined. This suits his view that Kant’s procedure of correlating elements of the table of categories directly with elements of the table of judgements is insufficient to determine their relation in a comprehensible way. Exactly this sort of determination, for Hegel, must be understood as a proper task of logic: ‘The relationship of forms such as concept, judgement and inference to others like causality, etc., can only emerge within logic itself’ (Enc §24R).

According to this task, the subject matter of general logic must be treated within subjective logic in such a way that its necessary connection with the subject matter of transcendental logic (which includes all ontological predicates along with the category of causality) can be demonstrated within a system that unifies objective and subjective logic.

LOGIC AS SELF-CRITICISM OF PURE REASON

There is another respect in which one can show Hegel’s pursuit of consistency and coherence within his treatment of a science of logic.

Hegel plans this science as a comprehensive ‘system of pure reason’, although it dispenses with the antecedent critique of pure reason that Kant required lest the system degenerate into ‘dogmatism’ (KrV Bxxxv; cf. KrV A841/B869). This has earned Hegel the undeserved reputation of pursuing his project in a ‘pre-critical’ manner. In reality, his science of logic undertakes to practice the critique of reason in a more consistent and profound way than even Kant had done.
In Hegel’s view, however, this critique must not apply to pure reason as a capacity or ‘organ’ of cognition (KrV Bxxvi); nor may it precede the cognition of such an organ (Enc 1817 §36 R). For no matter how ‘plausible’ it may seem to be, a critique of the faculty of cognition as a prelude to cognition is characterized by ‘confusion’ (Enc §10R):

But if we are not going to deceive ourselves with words, then it is obvious that other instruments [i.e., instruments other than the ‘organ’ of cognition] can, of course, be investigated and judged in other ways than by the undertaking of the peculiar task for which they are meant to be used. But the investigation of cognition cannot take place in any other way than by cognition; in the case of this so-called tool the investigation of it means nothing but the cognition of it. But to want to have cognition before we have any is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim. (Enc §10 R - Geraets et al. translation adapted; cf. §41A1 and Enc 1817 §36R)\(^\text{19}\)

In Hegel’s view, then, the critique of pure reason has to go deeper and be more radical than Kant conceived it: it has to bear on pure thinking and reasoning itself. Kant’s critique seems to him inadequate in so far as it concerns not the forms of thought themselves but only the application of these forms to objects. For Kant, the assumption that a pure category is always ‘only of empirical but never of transcendental use’ was a consequence of his critique. Furthermore, since a category is ‘merely the pure form of the use of the understanding in regard to objects in general and to thinking’ (KrV A247/B304), Kant assumed that ‘through a pure category . . . no object is determined, rather only the thought of an object in general is expressed’ (KrV A248/B305). Accordingly, pure categories (as ‘forms of thinking’) ‘determine’ only ‘the concept of something in general’ (KrV A251, A239/B298, A253–4/B309); and if one says that pure understanding represents with its categories objects ‘as they are’, this is ‘to be taken not in a transcendental but in a merely empirical sense’ (KrV A258/B213).

Hegel comments on these assumptions by noting that Kant’s ‘critique of the forms of the understanding’ has the result that such forms do not apply to things in themselves. – This can only mean that they are in themselves something untrue. However, since they have been allowed to remain valid for subjective reason and for experience, the critique has not altered them but rather has let them be for the subject in the same shape as they formerly applied to the object. But if they are inadequate for the thing in itself, still less must the understanding to which they supposedly belong have to put up and rest content with them. If they cannot be determinations of the thing in itself, still less can they be determinations of the understanding . . . . (WL GW 21:30–1)

In Hegel’s view, then, logic has to subject to criticism each of the categories (as pure ontological predicates) as well as each of the corresponding forms of general logic by examining the different semantic contents that they have as expressions of ‘thought’ or as ‘determinations’ of ‘the concept of something in general’. Not just traditional logic and metaphysics but also Kant’s critique of reason fails to provide this kind of criticism. If this is to be provided, then the analytic consideration of the content of pure determinations of thinking (or thought-determinations) that Hegel requires for objective logic and his ‘system of pure reason’ (see above,
The designations of the two parts of the science of logic (α) must be supplemented by a critical examination of these determinations ‘in and for themselves, according to their proper content’ (WL GW 21:31). Such an examination may not presuppose the unrestricted objective validity of these determinations. Nor may it presuppose, according to some presumed ‘need to reflect critically on the instrument of cognition before getting to the subject matter of cognition itself’ (WL GW 12:251; cf. Enc 1817 §36), that they are expressions of merely subjective thinking. Instead, the critique must refer to them as determinations of ‘the concept of something in general’. Thus, the thoughts to which this critique applies can be called objective thoughts, among which have to be counted too the forms that are considered first and foremost in ordinary logic and are usually taken to be only forms of conscious thinking. Thus logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things. (Enc §24)

More precisely, what Hegel means here by a ‘logic’ that in certain respects ‘coincides with metaphysics’ or ‘the science of things grasped in thoughts’ is objective logic:

Objective logic thus takes the place ... of the former metaphysics which was supposed to be the scientific edifice concerning the world to be erected through thoughts alone. – If we look at the final shape in the elaboration of this science, then it is ontology which objective logic most directly replaces in the first instance, that is, that part of metaphysics intended to investigate the nature of ens in general (and ens comprises within itself both being and essence, a distinction for which the German language has fortunately preserved different expressions.) – But objective logic comprises in itself also the remaining parts of metaphysics in so far as these sought to comprehend, with the pure forms of thought, particular substrata (originally drawn from objects of representation) such as soul, world and God, and in so far as the thought-determinations constituted the essential content of this approach. Logic, however, considers these forms free of those substrata, which are the subjects of representation [i.e., not of thinking], and considers their nature and value in and for themselves. That metaphysics neglected to do this, and it therefore incurred the just reproach that it used the pure forms of thought uncritically, without prior investigation of whether and how they could be determinations of the thing in itself, to use Kant’s expression, – or more precisely, of what is rational. – Objective logic is therefore the true critique of such determinations – a critique that considers them, not according to the abstract form of apriority as contrasted with the a posteriori, but in themselves according to their particular content. (WL GW 21:48 – di Giovanni translation adapted)

One must note here that objective logic is to replace not only ontology, that is, the general part of the ‘former’ (i.e. Wolffian) metaphysics (metaphysica generalis), but also its particular part (metaphysica specialis) containing the three disciplines of (rational) psychology, cosmology and natural theology. Yet it must replace these disciplines only to the extent that it takes up and subjects to criticism the pure thought-determinations that occur in them. Objective logic can and must abstract from applying these determinations as valid predicates to presumed and merely represented objects (namely to soul, world and
God). Objective logic can do this because its critique of thought-determinations (‘according to their proper content and value’ [Enc §28]) must implicitly contain a critique of their employment as absolutely valid predicates. And objective logic must abstract from that application because representations that are not determinations of pure thinking do not belong to the province of pure logic.

In one respect Hegel does acknowledge the claim of traditional metaphysics to be a ‘science of the first principles in human knowledge’. For metaphysics, by considering pure thought-determinations as ‘fundamental determinations of things’, has indeed presupposed ‘that what is, in virtue of its being thought, is known in itself’ (Enc §28; cf. WL GW 21:29). By virtue of this presupposition (which in any event is legitimate in certain respects) metaphysics stood ‘higher’ than ‘critical philosophizing’, which treated these determinations merely as forms that are empty in themselves and that acquire meaning only by receiving a sensible content (Enc §28).

Now while the interest of Kant’s philosophy was directed to the so-called transcendental nature of the thought-determinations, their treatment came up empty; what they are in themselves apart from their abstract relation to the ‘I’, a relation which is the same for all, how they are determined and related to each other, this was not made a subject of consideration, and therefore the cognition of their nature was not in the least advanced by this philosophy. What alone is of interest in this connection is to be found only in Kant’s critique of ideas. (WL GW 21:48)

By ‘critique of ideas’ Hegel has in mind the second part of Kant’s Transcendental Logic, treated in KrV under the heading of Transcendental Dialectic. He considers it one of Kant’s most important contributions to a critical examination of the categories that actually overcomes the metaphysical standpoint. This is the starting point for Hegel’s own critical and, as he calls it, dialectical examination of pure thought-determinations. I will return to this point below (see ‘Pure being and the three "moments" in the critique of pure thought-determinations’).

OBJECTIVE THOUGHTS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF LOGIC

The thought-determinations which in Hegel’s view make up the subject matter of logic are called ‘objective thoughts’ since ‘what is’ is a subject matter of cognition ‘in virtue of its being thought’ (see Enc §28 and my foregoing section ‘Logic as self-criticism of pure reason’). They are therefore not representations that we merely have. Truth can only be thought in objective thoughts since what is can only be known by being thought. Accordingly, ‘the truth which ought to be the absolute subject matter of philosophy and not just its goal’ is ‘signified by the expression of objective thoughts’ (Enc §25). The question of whether and in what sense truth may be cognized through objective thoughts, however, is the problem around which revolves ‘the philosophical interest at the present time’ (ibid.). Even Kant assumed that sensible experience and objective cognition are possible only through categories, and thus only as something thought. At the same time, however, he considered categories (in so far as they belong to our – human – thinking) to be something merely subjective when he assumed that through them things
as they are in themselves cannot be cognized. Although the concept of thing can already be considered as a thought-determination (WL GW 21:47), by ‘thing in itself’ Kant intended to refer to something that completely eludes determination by thinking; and since one can identify what things are in themselves with what they are in truth, Kant gave a negative answer to the question of whether (absolute) truth – ‘truth which is absolutely in and for itself’ (Enc §25) – is cognizable. He assumed that pure thought-determinations by themselves are nothing objective – that they are mere forms of subjective thinking which make cognition of objects possible only by being filled with sensible material. Hegel compares this assumption to a view held by F. H. Jacobi, who likewise denied that absolute truth can be known through pure thought-determinations. For Jacobi, however, this impossibility was due not to their being subjective but to their being ‘finite’, that is, to their having a content that restricted them to being mere determinations of what is ‘conditioned’, ‘dependent’ and ‘mediated’ (Enc §62; cf. Enc §25) The ‘true’, ‘infinite’ and ‘unconditioned’, then, cannot be grasped through finite determinations because of their ‘restricted content’ (Enc §§25, 62).

On Jacobi’s account, cognition is always only a ‘cognizing of the finite’ while what is infinite and true can only be an object of belief, whereby belief is identified with ‘immediate knowing’ (Enc §§61–4). Although Hegel rejects Jacobi’s fideism (seeing in it the expression of a spirited ‘polemic’ – a ‘struggle against cognition’ (Enc §62R) – instead of the result of thorough scrutiny), he does adopt Jacobi’s Spinoza-inspired distinction between finite and infinite thinking (cf. Spinoza, Ethica I, Prop. 21 Dem.). Hegel prefers to hold that thought-determinations are ‘untrue’ (i.e. not unconditionally valid) because they are finite rather than because they are subjective. This is a consequence of his plan to subject pure thought-determinations to systematic criticism by examining them in accordance with their particular content and their objective validity. In carrying out this critical programme, Hegel can draw on Jacobi to the following extent:

while Kant’s philosophy posited the finitude of the categories most notably in the formal determination of their subjectivity alone, in this [i.e., Jacobi’s] polemic the categories are dealt with in their determinacy, and the category as such is recognized as being finite. (Enc §62R)

What Hegel considers ‘objective thoughts’ are not only the determinations treated in his objective logic, but are also the ‘forms which are considered first and foremost in ordinary logic and which are usually taken to be only forms of conscious thinking’ (namely ‘concept, judgement and inference’). These forms as well ‘have to be counted among objective thoughts’ (Enc §24, 24R) even if they are treated in subjective logic. This circumstance is due to Hegel’s new understanding of the relationship of objectivity and subjectivity, first examined in his subjective logic. While Kant explicitly regarded ‘consciousness’ as ‘the mere subjective form of all concepts’ (KrV A361), and in one instance even used the word ‘concept’ as (nearly) synonymous with ‘consciousness’ (KrV A103), Hegel’s logic treats neither concepts nor judgements and inferences as contents of consciousness or as occurrences in it. They are not representations that we have; nor are they mental operations or the products thereof. Much less are they to be treated as linguistic entities (which, for Hegel, are at best appropriate for rendering through words and sentences what is meant by ‘concept’, ‘judgement’ and
‘inference’). By comprehending these forms as objective thoughts, Hegel does not assign them, as psychological occurrences, to a world of representations any more than he assigns them to an external world as spatio-temporal structures. I will return to Hegel’s concepts of concept, judgement and inference below (see ‘The concept of concept as a basic concept of logic’).

FORMAL SCIENCE AND ABSOLUTE FORM

Both the critique of objective thoughts (as developed in his objective and subjective logic) and the cognition contained in this critique is what Hegel calls ‘objective thinking’. This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from being formal, far from lacking the matter required for an actual and true cognition, it is its content which alone is what is absolutely true, or, if one still wanted to use the word ‘matter’, which alone is the veritable matter – a matter, however, for which the form is nothing external, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. (WL GW 21:34; 11:21; cf. 12:25–6)

What Hegel means by ‘absolute’ or ‘infinite form’ is what we may refer to as conceptuality (bearing in mind, however, that he does not employ this word). All thought-determinations treated in his objective logic are conceptual determinations. In this objective part of his logic, however, they are not yet treated as conceptual, that is, as determinate concepts. Rather, they occur in it as determinations with a certain content. Only in his subjective logic are they treated as conceptual determinations since this is the part of logic that inquires into the nature of conceptuality. Hegel calls the absolute form ‘absolute’ because it is not just the form of these determinations, but is also the form of what he calls ‘the concept as such’ (or, for the sake of brevity, simply ‘the concept’). Now even the concept as such is a determinate concept that differs from other concepts according to its content. It is the subject matter of subjective logic (WL GW 12:25–6), which considers it as such in the following respects: first, in its abstract form of being the universal (as distinct from other determinate [universal] concepts); and second, as the concrete unity of the universal and the singular, that is, the unity upon which rests the ‘objectivity’ of ‘thought’ (WL GW 12:18, 23–4). Finally, subjective logic treats the concept as what is ‘absolutely true’ – as the ‘absolute unity of concept and objectivity’ that consists in the cognition of the finitude of all finite thought-determinations. In this respect, the concept is what Hegel calls ‘the idea’.

Due to the role played by the concept of concept, Hegel characterizes his science of logic as ‘science of the absolute form’ (WL GW 12:25, 27). This form, he says, has ‘in itself its content and reality’; it is ‘the content posited by the absolute form itself and therefore adequate to it’ (WL GW 12:25). While Hegel concedes that logic must be considered a ‘formal science’, he also points out that it would be wrong to say that logic treats only ‘the mere form of cognition’ (ibid.). This applies in particular to subjective logic as the part of logic that includes the treatment of the objects of general logic. Kant maintained that general logic has to divide analytically ‘the mere form of cognition into concepts, judgements, and inferences’ and that it abstracts ‘from all content of cognition’ (KrV
A132–3/B171–2). For Hegel, however, this position is insupportable. It is awkward to say that logic abstracts from all content, that it only teaches the rules of thinking without being able to engage in what is being thought or to take its nature into consideration. For, since thinking and the rules of thinking are supposed to be its subject matter, logic has in these immediately its peculiar content; in them, logic has that second constituent of knowledge, namely a matter whose nature is its concern. (WL GW 21:28; cf. Enc 1817 §17R)

Another reason why subjective logic should not be considered a merely formal science is that the absolute form that is its subject matter is of ‘a wholly other nature than logical form is usually taken to be’ (WL GW 12:25). Hegel does not wish to say that it would be either nonsensical or wrong to consider logical forms as they have customarily been considered in the formal logic of the syllogistic tradition. Instead, he wishes to keep the syllogistic tradition’s usual way of treating logical forms separate from their treatment in his subjective logic. He writes that ‘the emptiness of the logical forms’ lies ‘solely in the manner’ in which they are ‘considered and dealt with’. To the extent that they are ‘held apart’ as ‘fixed determinations’ (e.g. as forms of the categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive judgement), these forms appear as ‘indifferent containers of representations and thoughts’ for which a content is customarily ‘sought externally’ (WL GW 21:32; Enc §162R),24 namely, in terms that since Aristotle have been denoted by syllogistic variables. In this case, there is no investigation of the extent to which these forms ‘correspond to the truth’; nor is the question of ‘their necessary connection’ investigated (WL GW 12:28; Enc §162). In particular, ordinary formal logic does not consider the question of how these forms relate to the absolute form that Hegel calls their ‘concrete unity’ and ‘firm foundation’ (WL GW 12:32).25 I will come back to this point below (see ‘The concept of concept as a basic concept of logic’).

HOW LOGIC IS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY: THE ‘ABSTRACT ELEMENT OF THINKING’

Since Hegel does not view logic as a merely formal science, he cannot distinguish it from other parts of philosophy through its formal character, which is what Kant did in the Preface to GMS. Hegel does follow Kant in adopting the (originally Stoic) threefold division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics.26 Yet he rejects the principle by which Kant wanted to justify this trichotomy. According to this principle, philosophy is either ‘material’ or ‘formal’ rational cognition; and while ‘formal philosophy’ is called logic, philosophy is material if it has to do with ‘determinate objects and the laws to which these are subject’ insofar as they are subject to the ‘laws of nature’ and the ‘laws of freedom’ (GMS AA 4:387).

For reasons explained above (see ‘The designations of the two parts of the science of logic’), Hegel can appropriate neither this division nor the definition of logic that it contains. In Enc he defines logic instead as ‘the science of the pure idea’ (Enc §19; Enc 1817 §12) or as ‘the science of the idea in and for itself’ (Enc §18; Enc 1817 §11). In explaining what he means by ‘pure idea’ and ‘idea in and for itself’, he equates the idea that is the subject matter of the science of logic with ‘the idea in the abstract element
of thinking’ (Enc §19; Enc 1817 §12). Consequently, in keeping with the definition in question, logic must be distinguished from the other two parts of philosophy not by its subject matter but by its different relation to this matter or its different ways of treating it. For according to Hegel’s division, the ‘philosophy of nature’ (the second part) is ‘the science of the idea in its otherness’; and the ‘philosophy of mind’ (the third part) is the science of ‘the idea that returns to itself out of its otherness’ (Enc §18; Enc 1817 §11). Since (in Hegel’s terminology) ‘idea’ signifies the absolutely true, it follows that all philosophical sciences deal with absolute truth. The distinguishing feature of logic lies merely in the fact that it considers this subject matter ‘in the abstract element of thinking’. This means that logic treats the absolutely true as something thought, and thus does not presuppose for its realization any activity or means other than thinking itself. According to this explanation, logic is by no means a science without presuppositions, and a science working with different presuppositions could well yield different results. Although there can be no science without thinking, there can perfectly well be sciences that presuppose something other than mere thinking. It is therefore conceivable that, if there are sciences other than logic which can make the absolutely true their subject matter, they will not treat this matter merely as something thought.

Hegel’s systematic division of philosophy and the particular position of logic within it become intelligible against the background just discussed. He envisages his natural philosophy as a science that sets out from the presupposition that the absolutely true must be conceived in the form of something that is not something thought. Given this presupposition, the philosophy of nature treats the subject matter of logic – the idea – as something caught up in an element alien to thinking, but also as a matter of thinking: ‘the idea in its otherness’ (Enc §18; Enc 1817 §11). The task of this science is to demonstrate that the absolutely true, as conceived in this form, can only be thought in a contradictory way and in the end as something merely subjective. Hegel envisages his philosophy of mind as a science linked to the presupposition of the philosophy of nature in the sense that it grasps the thinking which seeks the true in a separate, alien and opposing element as an activity which has made itself into the finite (passive) thinking of a merely subjective (human) mind. The task of this science is to show that thinking, qua finite, must give itself up on account of its internal contradictions and must ultimately proceed to comprehend the true only as the subject matter of thinking. Thus, thinking, having followed its path through all three philosophical sciences, in the end returns to its beginning. Taken by itself, then, the subject matter of Hegel’s philosophy of mind is ‘the idea that returns to itself from its otherness’ (Enc §18; Enc 1817 §11).

Hegel’s conception of a tripartite encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences assigns to its first part – logic – the task of providing direct proof for what the following two parts, taken together, must prove indirectly (namely, by ‘corroboration’ [Bewährung]) (Enc §574; Enc 1817 §474). This is the sense in which Hegel deems the method of proof in his logic to be part of a circular procedure (Enc §15; Enc 1817 §6R). One of the main tasks of this circular procedure is to justify the presupposition that lies at the basis of logic, which is the assumption that the ‘abstract element’ (i.e. the purity) of thinking is sufficient for the scientific cognition of the absolutely true.
THE DILEMMA OF THE LOGICAL BEGINNING AND ITS SOLUTION

Hegel thinks, however, that the division of philosophy into its various disciplines should not be made to rest (like in the Preface to Kant's GMS) on a predetermined principle of division. Such a principle must be justified philosophically; and the justification can only be provided within each discipline, not ahead of it. As far as introductions and prefaces are concerned, divisions can only be 'something anticipated' (Enc §118).

The same holds true of logic and its parts. For the very question of what constitutes a scientific division (and hence which requirements such a division has to fulfil) is a theme that belongs to the science of logic itself. Hegel deals with this question only towards the end of the subjective logic (WL GW 12:215–20; Enc §§228–31; Enc 1817 §§175–8). As he explicitly states, the General Division of Logic, in so far as it precedes the Doctrine of Being, can ‘be given only in so far as the author already knows the science’ (WL GW 21:44).

Upon this rests the problem posed at the start of the Doctrine of Being: ‘With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?’ For prior to knowing what parts are contained in the science of logic, one cannot know which part it is with which logic must begin. To assume that logic contains an objective part concerned with being as such and that the beginning of logic must be made with a doctrine of being is to make assumptions that require justification just as much as the division of logic itself.

The logical problem of the beginning of logic is rendered even more acute by the fact that it is accompanied by a (negative) dilemma to which Hegel draws our attention (WL GW 21:53; Enc §1; Enc 1817 §3). Hegel does not deem it necessary to provide anything more than a mere sketch of this dilemma, but its sense can be brought out as follows:

(a) If there is a beginning of the science of logic, then it is either mediated (i.e. is the result of something that precedes it) or not.
(b) A logical beginning (qua beginning) cannot be mediated.
(c) Nor can a logical beginning be immediate. (Otherwise, it would be something presupposed without necessity and would not be the beginning of a logical science.)
(d) Therefore (by modus tollendo tollens), there is no logical beginning.

Hegel’s solution for this dilemma does not lack ingenuity. He transforms it into a constructive dilemma. To do this, he begins by attacking premise (a). Pure science, he notes, may not employ presuppositions ‘that belong to thinking which is caught up in what is given’, but instead may presuppose nothing but the fact ‘that it wants to be pure thinking’ (Enc 1817 §36). Premise (a) implicitly assumes, however, that nothing given can be both mediated and immediate – an assumption that is rightly open to objections (WL GW 21:54). This premise must therefore be replaced by an assumption that leaves it open whether the logical beginning is something mediated or immediate. It is on this assumption that Hegel argues that the logical beginning must be made by starting with the thought of ‘pure being’, that is, by introducing being as the first determination of thinking. The argument, which has the form of a constructive dilemma, runs as follows:

(a*) The beginning of pure science is a mediated or an immediate one.
(b*) If it is mediated, it consists in apprehending the thought of pure being.

(c*) If it is immediate, it equally consists in apprehending the thought of pure being.

(d*) Therefore (by modus ponendo ponens), the beginning of pure science consists in apprehending the thought of pure being. 31

The truth of the conclusion (d*) depends upon the truth of the premises (b*) and (c*). Hegel defends these as follows.

With regard to (b*), he thinks that the beginning in question can only be mediated by the circumstance that there already is a ‘concept’ of pure science in play – a concept which contains at least the demand that pure science must ‘be pure thinking’ (Enc 1817 §36, 36R), that is, that it must take place ‘in the element of thinking that exists freely for itself [im Element des frey für sich seyenden Denkens]’ (WL GW 21:54). Hegel does not simply presuppose this concept as a given. He points out that the ‘production’ of this concept is instead the result of ‘another philosophical science’, namely, the ‘phenomenology of mind’ as it was presented in his Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) of 1807 (Enc 1817 §36; cf. Enc §25R and WL GW 21:54). Hegel here equates the role attributed to this book with the role that, according to his encyclopaedic conception of a ‘circle of philosophy’ (Enc 1817 §36R), must be attributed to the philosophy of mind in toto – namely, the role of developing the concept of a science of pure thinking as a concept that must be grasped by human consciousness. 32

As for (c*): Hegel thinks that the logical beginning can be immediate only if there is already at work ‘the resolve – which can also be viewed as arbitrary – to want to consider thinking as such’ (GW 21:56; cf. Enc 1817 §36R). The thinking upon which one is resolved is the same, Hegel claims, as the thinking that remains when one tries to doubt everything, thus taking to heart the ‘requirement of a fully accomplished scepticism’ (Enc §78R; Enc 1817 §36R). Hegel adopts here a fundamental tenet of Cartesian metaphysics: the thought that doubting is only a kind of thinking. 33

Hegel thus arrives at premises (b*) and (c*) by thinking this fundamental Cartesian thought through to its proper end even while he abstracts from the first person reference that makes its appearance in Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum. This (for Descartes) ‘absolutely first and most certain of all cognitions’ implies that thinking and pure being are ‘simply inseparable’ (Enc §76; cf. §64R). Since Hegel adopts this as an analytically true proposition (Enc §193R, §238R; Enc 1817 §186R), he can use (b*) and (c*) as premises for his conclusion (d*). Consequently, his solution to the logical problem of the beginning amounts to establishing that the science of logic must treat pure being as the first determination of pure thinking and must subject it to critical investigation.

PURE BEING AND THE THREE ‘MOMENTS’ IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE THOUGHT-DETERMINATIONS

I wish to illuminate the method of Hegel’s critical analysis of the determinations of pure thinking by considering the example of pure being, which is the first in the series of ontological predicates investigated. According to Hegel’s method, one abstracts from what such a predicate is used of in metaphysics since its semantic content is the only thing to be considered when treating a determination of pure thinking. The task is to examine whether it is, taken by itself, capable of containing an objective determination of
objects. The fact that, in Cartesian metaphysics, thinking and being are predicates of a thinking ego (and of thinking beings in general) is irrelevant to this examination. Hegel does say that ‘being’, along with ‘logical determinations in general’, may be looked upon as ‘definitions of the absolute’ and ‘metaphysical definitions of God’ (Enc §85). But this means merely that the critical analysis of these determinations aims at testing the legitimacy of the unrestricted use of ontological predicates as determinations of an (in Jacobi’s sense) infinite thinking. Thus Hegel’s critical analysis of pure being as a component of the metaphysical definition of God is also directed against ‘what Jacobi says of Spinoza’s God, [namely,] that God is the principium of being in all determinate being [Daseyn]’ (Enc §86R; Enc 1817 §38R; cf. Jacobi, Über die Lehre des Spinoza, GA 1/1:39, 247).

Hegel’s criticism of this definition and of the unrestricted use of ‘being’ in the objective determination of objects is quite succinct. He proceeds as follows. First, he pursues a thought the account of which is already given in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione with these words: ‘not even “to be or not to be” [τὸ έιναι ή τὸ μὴ έιναι] is a sign of the thing [at issue] [τοῦ πράγματος] (nor if you say simply “that which is” [τὸ ἣν]); for by itself it is nothing [ουδέν]’ (16b22–25). Nominalizations of verbs (and auxiliaries) by means of a definite article may be used in Greek and German in two ways: first, for the word employed as a verb; second, for that which the word signifies. The sense of Aristotle’s sentence, then, is this: (a) είναι (seyn) by itself is not a meaningful word; and (b) what είναι by itself signifies is (consequently) ‘nothing’. Thus, the first statement Hegel makes about being sounds like a quotation from Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. It states, in accordance with (b), that ‘being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing’ (WL GW 21:69; Enc §87; cf. Enc 1817 §39); and it indicates, in accordance with (a), that ‘being’ by itself means nothing. There is no secret lurking behind Hegel’s assertion that ‘pure being’ is ‘nothing’. It simply means that what ‘being’ (taken by itself) refers to is the same as what ‘nothing’ (taken by itself) refers to, namely, according to (a): nothing. However, Hegel’s critical analysis of the ontological interpretation of ‘being’ as an independent and objectively valid determination reaches further than the mere insight that pure being, like nothing, is a determination without content. He also takes into consideration (WL GW 21:69; Enc §88R; Enc 1817 §40R) that pure being and nothing (i.e. what ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ mean) are not at all the same but different. Indeed, although ‘nothing’ signifies nothing other than nothing, it is by no means a meaningless word. The same consideration applies also to ‘being’. If this were not so, then ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ would be synonymous, that is, words that could be used in the same way. This is where a contradiction emerges since pure being and nothing seem to be at once both different and the same. This contradiction, however, results when pure being and nothing are understood as independent ontological determinations. In Hegel’s view, this contradiction can be resolved by keeping to the logical task of finding a pure thought-determination that is objectively valid. Such a resolution can be achieved by finding an ontological determination for which two conditions obtain. First, it must combine both the shared meaning of ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ and their distinct meanings. Second, it may not contain any other meaning beyond this combination. Hegel finds the required determination in the concept of becoming. Contrary to what critics of Hegel
have assumed, ‘becoming’ does not refer here to a temporal process. Instead, Hegel adopts the concept of becoming (fieri) established by Newton as a basic concept of his differential calculus (i.e. of his ‘method of fluxions’). Arguing against this notion, D’Alembert had raised the objection that it amounts to the concept of a ‘middle state (état moyen) between being and nothing’ – an impossible concept. Hegel rejects d’Alembert’s objection and his talk of a ‘state’ in this context as an ‘improper, barbaric expression’ (WL GW 21:92; 11:56). He defends Newton by interpreting the concept of becoming as a ‘pure concept’ of the ‘unity’ of being and nothing in which these are neither just different nor just the same, but are instead ‘vanishing moments’ of that unity (ibid). In making use of ‘to vanish’ (evanescere) and ‘moment’ (momentum), Hegel again draws upon terminology introduced by Newton for his differential calculus.

Far from reaching its conclusion in the pure concept of becoming, of course, the logical investigation of pure determinations of thinking has only just begun. This circumstance is due to the difficulty of comprehending the ‘unity’ in which being and nothing are ‘vanishing’ and ‘sublated’ moments (WL GW 21:92; 11:56). For at least as moments they seem to enjoy a kind of existence – Daseyn – and can be distinguished as ‘something’ and ‘other’. Thus emerges the next task, which is to investigate the sense and the extent to which ‘Daseyn’, ‘something’ and ‘other’ may be regarded as objectively valid determinations. In the first part of Hegel’s objective logic, this investigation will be followed by a critical analysis of the categories that Kant called ‘mathematical’. And this in turn will be joined by a comprehensive critical examination of basic concepts of mathematical analysis (to which are appended, in the 1812 and 1832 versions of WL, extended considerations on the philosophy of mathematics). All of this, however, will still not conclude the logical inquiry into pure determinations of thinking.

Roughly speaking, Hegel’s treatment of the determinations of being, nothing and becoming provides a formal pattern for the entire inquiry to follow: (α) He begins with a semantic analysis that attempts to ‘stop short’ at the ‘fixed determinacy’ of a determining expression’s meaning and ‘the distinctness of this meaning with respect to other meanings’. This analysis, however, is still carried out under the assumption that the analyseandum is a determination ‘that subsists and is for itself’ (Enc §80; Enc 1817 §14). (β) If the first result of the analysis is that the fixedness and distinctness of the analysed meaning cannot be upheld because it passes over into its opposite, then it has been shown that the determination in question ‘sublates itself’; and the assumption that it ‘subsists and is for itself’ must be then given up (Enc §81; Enc 1817 §15). (γ) Although the determination in question is a ‘finite’ one, that is, is a ‘moment’ in a ‘unity’ with other moments, it may well continue to obtain. But it may do so only if a concept can be found that contains exactly this unity in itself. According to this pattern of inquiry:

The logical has three sides with regard to its form: (α) the side of abstraction or of the understanding, (β) the dialectical or negative-rational side, (γ) the speculative or positive-rational side. (Enc §79; Enc 1817 §13)

α) Thinking as understanding stops short at the fixed determinacy and its distinctness vis-à-vis other determinacies; such a restricted abstract subject matter counts for the understanding as one that subsists and is for itself. (Enc §80; Enc 1817 §14)
β) The *dialectical* moment is the self-sublation of these finite determinations on their own and their passing into their opposites. (*Enc* §81; *Enc 1817* §15)

γ) The *speculative* or *positive-rational* apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the *affirmative* that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition. (*Enc* §82; *Enc 1817* §16)

As Hegel points out, these three sides are not ‘three parts of logic’ but are instead ‘moments . . . of everything true in general’ (*Enc* §79R; *Enc 1817* §13R). This marks a difference from Kant’s division of the ‘science of logic’, which divides both general logic and transcendental logic into two parts the first of which is called ‘analytics’ while the second is called ‘dialectics’ (*KrV* A57–64/B82–8). Yet there is also a positive link to Kant since the sides mentioned in (α) and (β) can be correlated with Kant’s analytics and dialectics. To the extent that these sides are present in Hegel’s logic, their tasks are indeed comparable to those of the analytical and dialectical parts of general and transcendental logic. However, (α) and (β) dispatch these tasks differently in as much as they show, for every single thought-determination, the connectedness of the side of abstract understanding and the dialectical side of thinking. In Hegel’s view, the dialectical side of the procedure of the science of logic differs from Kantian transcendental dialectics mainly in so far as the former is no longer concerned with the analysis of thought-determinations in their metaphysical application to objects of representation (soul, world and God). In Hegel’s view, it is sufficient to examine thought-determinations in terms of their content (‘in and for themselves’) in order to show the dialectic inherent in them as well as their finitude.

In traditional logic, there is no name for the side mentioned in (γ). It is in view of this side that Hegel calls his logic ‘speculative logic’ and ‘speculative science’ (*Enc* §9A, §92A; *Enc 1817* §16). Traditionally, the adjective ‘speculative’ has been used mostly as the synonym for ‘theoretical’ and as the antonym of ‘practical’. Hegel, however, uses it to designate the particular form of pure logical cognition. Only the end of his science of logic gives us sufficient clues for understanding the exact import of this designation. I will consider this point in the last section (see ‘The concept of "speculative" or "absolute" idea’).

**IMMEDIACY AS THE RESULT OF THE SUBLATION OF MEDIATION**

On the basis of what Hegel says about the three ‘sides’ of his logical procedure, one might expect his logic to consist in an endless chain of speculative concepts formed by unifying finite thought determinations that have been reduced to moments. This is not the case. The first part of the Objective Logic – the Doctrine of Being – actually reaches its conclusion only by showing (with the concept of ‘indifference’) the necessity of a concept of pure being. This conceptual determination of pure being is distinguished from the pure being investigated at the outset of logical science only through the fact that its complete emptiness, that is, its lack of content and determinacy, belongs to it not immediately but medially – namely, as the result of the complete sublation of the determinations of being (by way of the categories of quality, quantity and measure) in the concept of indifference.

This conclusion furnishes the starting point for the second part of the Objective Logic. This part becomes a Doctrine of Essence for the following reason. The insight that every determinacy of being is sublated...
in pure being amounts to the insight that this determinacy is a merely deceptive appearance (Schein) and therefore lacks objective validity. Likewise, the insight into the mediated character of the indeterminacy of immediate pure being is the beginning of the insight into the essence (Wesen) concealed behind the immediate appearance. Hence it is characteristic of the Doctrine of Essence that it deals only with correlative determinations that, like appearance and essence, occur in pairs and relate to one another in what Hegel calls a relation of ‘reflection’. Like its first part, the second part of the Objective Logic forms a ‘circle’: Pure being, which at the beginning of the Doctrine of Being is ‘at first only what is immediate’, proves at the end of this doctrine to be mediated (in its indeterminacy). Similarly, essence, which (as the opposite of appearance) is ‘at first only what is mediated’, proves to be something immediate at the end of the Doctrine of Essence (Enc §83A). For this doctrine concludes by showing the necessity of a concept, that is, the concept of substance as both cause and effect of itself (causa sui). According to this concept, essence is no longer only mediated even if it must always be grasped as mediated. In so far as it is now, at the end of the Doctrine of Essence, something mediated only through itself, it is also something immediate since mediation through another is sublated in self-mediation (‘it is, because it is’) (WL GW 11:391, 394; Enc §149). Thus, the Objective Logic ultimately comes to regard essence as something that has returned to being as simple immediacy’ (Enc §159R; Enc 1817 §107R).

The circular structure of the argument in both parts of Hegel’s objective logic fulfils two requirements. It shows first, in Hegel’s view, the correctness of not making the beginning of the science of logic dependent on the assumption (see above, ‘The dilemma of the logical beginning and its solution’, premise [a]) that immediacy and mediation exclude one another (Enc §65R). Second, the circular structure of the Objective Logic makes it possible to introduce the (‘speculative’) concept of concept as the topic and point of departure of the Subjective Logic. Indeed the conclusion of the logic of essence can be understood as showing that immediate being and self-mediated essence are moments of a unity that can be apprehended by the concept of concept (Enc §159R; cf. Enc 1817 §107R). This can be explained as follows.

What distinguishes the concept of concept from other concepts is this: it is the concept of itself as well as the concept of all other concepts. It is common to all concepts that they are universal and that they differ from one another through a particular content. As concept of itself, however, the concept of concept is distinguished from all other concepts by the fact that it particularity consists in its universality. Just as the concept of horse abstracts from all differences among horses, so too the concept of concept has its particular content in virtue of its abstraction from all differences among concepts. Its only content, therefore, is what universally belongs to concepts, namely, their property of being universal. The concept of concept has not just any determinate universal for its content. It has the universal as its sole content, and the particular that distinguishes this content from all remaining particulars lies precisely in its being the universal that is common to all concepts. As Hegel puts it, the universal that has the concept (of the concept) for its content ‘overlaps its other’, that is, it overlaps (übergreift) the particular (WL GW 12:35).

This does not exhaust what can be said about the (particular) universality of the concept. The fact that the universal as such is
the particular content of the concept means that the latter is the concept under which it is itself (together with all other concepts) to be subsumed. And like every individual that is subsumable under a concept, this concept is therefore something singular. The peculiar character of its 'singularity', however, lies in this: the concept of concept falls under a concept only because the latter is the concept of itself. In this sense, the singularity of the concept coincides with its ‘overarching [übergreifend]’ universality.

Hegel calls this overarching universality (which coincides with particularity) and singularity ‘the moments’ that ‘the concept as such contains’ (Enc §163; Enc 1817 §111). What does this mean, though? Immediate pure being and self-mediated essence have indeed turned out to be intelligible only as moments of the concept. Yet in so far as they are grasped in this way, they are no longer contained in the concept ‘as being and essence’; for ‘they have this determination only in so far as they have not yet returned into this unity’ (i.e. the unity at issue in the concept of concept) (WL GW 12:11).

Rather, as moments of this unity they are the same as the overarching universality and the singularity of the concept. On the one hand, the overarching universality that determines itself as its own concept is, like essence (and the substantial causa sui of Spinoza which Hegel identifies with essence) (WL GW 12:14–16), both mediated through itself and free from all finite determinacy. On the other hand, the singularity of the concept (namely, its immediate subsumption under itself as concept) is immediate, undetermined being that now, however, must also be thought of as mediated and determined through itself, because singularity and overarching universality coincide in the concept of concept.

THE CONCEPT OF CONCEPT AS A BASIC CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Hegel’s science of logic does not end with the exposition of the concept of concept and the description of the moments that it contains. This concept becomes the topic of a third part of the science of logic only by being grasped as ‘subject’. The Subjective Logic owes its name to this conception. The concept of concept is not yet grasped as subject just by showing that it contains self-determination. In Hegel’s view, not even Spinoza, who had equated substance with causa sui, comprehended substance as subject when he thought of it as something ‘free’ that is determined only by itself. Instead, Hegel calls the concept of concept ‘subject’ on account of the logical structure that underlies its self-determination. This structure derives from the fact that the concept, as self-determining, is ‘at first only its own concept’ (WL GW 12:29). Understood in this way, ‘the concept [of concept]’, that is, the concept as such, is ‘the simply concrete’ and ‘singular’ (Enc §164; Enc 1817 §112). It is the singular whose singularity and particularity consists in (overarching) universality. Comprehended as this concrete singular, the concept is ‘the subject as such’ (Enc §164R; also §162R and Enc 1817 §§110R, 112R).

One should not understand ‘subjective’ logic as a project of mixing a bit of psychology with logic. Hegel’s intention goes in exactly the opposite direction. His logical concept of the subject, which is meant to grasp the ‘essence of the concept’, is supposed to replace the concept of the original synthetic unity of apperception that Kant introduced into logic. Due to its reference to human consciousness, this Kantian notion of the unity of self-consciousness links psychology to transcendental logic. Kant traced
the ‘logical form of all judgements’ back to this unity, which he saw to be expressed by means of the copula ‘is’. He characterized such unity as ‘objective’ because a ‘judgement’, as is indicated by its copula, is an ‘objectively’ valid relation – a relation distinguished from all relations of representations that are merely ‘subjectively valid’ (KrV B140–2). For Kant, the objective character of the ‘validity’ (Gültigkeit) of judgements rests on the ‘necessary unity’ of the issue of ‘original apperception’; and the necessity of this unity, in turn, rests on its originally synthetic character (ibid; cf. KrV A121–7).

Following Kant, Hegel wants to trace objectivity back to necessity; and he wants to trace necessity back to belongingness in an original synthetic unity. Unlike Kant, however, he identifies this unity with the ‘simply concrete’ unity of the concept at issue in subjective logic. Hegel discerns the necessity of this unity in the immediate coincidence of the different moments of this concept.

Hegel also shares Kant’s view that objectivity is concerned with logical form. Thus, an expression like ‘the rose is red’, which is an ‘objective expression’ of a judgement, must on account of the copula be distinguished from an expression like ‘I attach to the rose the predicate red’ (Enc §167R). Differing from the understanding of judgement in ‘ordinary logic’, Hegel does not have in mind a form of ‘conscious thinking’ when he speaks of ‘judgement’ (or of ‘concept’ and ‘inference’). Instead, he has in mind an ‘objective thought’ (Enc §§24, 24R, 167, 167R), that is, the thought of a state of affairs (existing or non-existing) – for example, the circumstance that this rose is red. Contrary to Kant, however, Hegel misses in the unity of judgement, as it is expressed by means of the copula, the necessity upon which all objectivity is supposed to rest. For Hegel, the moments (singularity, particularity, universality) that coincide in the concrete unity of subjective logic’s subject – that is, come together in the concrete unity of the concept – appear in judgement as separate from one another and as merely externally related.

Of course, the concrete unity of the concept, as it appears at the beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept, still lacks the necessity that constitutes the objectivity of a unity. Since this unity initially appears only as immediate unity, it appears in such a way that the understanding keeps its moments separated ‘in the form of immediate, fixed determinations’ that let the concept appear as a ‘determinate concept’ alongside other determinate concepts (WL GW 12:30; Enc §80). In this form, the concept appears as ‘subjective thinking’, that is, as a ‘reflection external to the subject matter’ (WL GW 12:30). But ‘the identity of the concept’ – its being indistinguishable from its own moments – ‘sets them’ (i.e. the determinations of the universal, particular and singular) ‘in dialectical movement, through which their isolation is sublated and with it also the separation of the concept from the subject matter’ (ibid.). The sublation of this separation is that by which the concept, and hence the unity that is thought in it, attains objectivity (ibid.).

Hegel’s presentation of the dialectical process of this sublation in the first of three parts of the Doctrine of the Concept contains a critical analysis of the conceptual material of ‘general’ (syllogistic) logic. It also contains what could be called Hegel’s ‘deduction’ of the logical forms (or types) of judgement and inference from the concrete unity of the concept. This analysis is comparable to Kant’s division of the logical forms of judgement and inference (except for the fact that Hegel’s deduction does not, like Kant’s, proceed from a presupposed principle of division).
Hegel’s systematic account of four by three judgement types (Arten) corresponds to Kant’s account of four by three judgement forms. On Hegel’s account, however, forms of judgement must be clearly distinguished from judgement types since, as Kant already saw, forms can occur in types as ‘moments’ of the latter. In his analysis, Hegel treats the twelve types of judgement in a sequence determined, first, by their increasing complexity with regard to the moments contained in them; and second, by their correlation with categories already treated in objective logic. Hegel proceeds similarly in his analysis of types of inference, which he divides into three groups of three. The result of his analysis agrees with Kant’s view that the class of the basic types of deductive inference that Hegel calls ‘syllogism of necessity [Schluß der Notwendigkeit]’ consists in categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

At the same time, Hegel’s investigation of the types of judgement and inference contains, on account of its dialectical side, a critical assessment of these same types. This assessment aims to determine the ‘value’ of the types at issue, namely, the finite cognitive value that differentially accrues to them in virtue of their increasing or decreasing lack of objective unity (Enc §187R; Enc 1817 §134R; see also Enc §§171A, 177A). Only in the syllogism of necessity – through its sublation of the separation occurring in judgement, and through its sublation of the difference between mediated and mediating moments – do the moments of the concept come together in a relation that approximates their original configuration, that is, the relation in which they figure as moments of the concept that furnishes the subject of Hegel’s Begriffslogik.

The unity that is thought in this syllogism is not yet an objective conceptual unity. Still, it is already the unity of an object. By ‘object’ Hegel means a ‘concrete, independent something that is complete in itself [ein concretes in sich vollständiges Selbständiges]’ – something whose ‘completeness is the totality of the concept’ (i.e. the totality of the different moments of the concept) (Enc §193R). At this juncture, as Hegel explicitly points out, ‘object’ (Objekt) does not yet mean ‘object of’ (Gegenstand), for example, an object of thinking or an object of cognition. In particular, it does not refer to something ‘external’ to us or to other beings (Enc §193). The fact that an object is also an object in this sense becomes a topic for treatment only in the middle and final parts of the Subjective Logic, where the relation between concept and object comes to be thematized.

THE CONCEPT OF ‘SPECULATIVE’ OR ‘ABSOLUTE’ IDEA

In the present essay, I can go only into the most important features of the highly complex argumentation that is characteristic of Hegel’s science of logic. Therefore, in this last section I will briefly highlight the end result of his science.

Objective logic, as we have seen, ends with Spinoza. Subjective logic does so as well. As is the case in the transition between objective and subjective logic, the ‘idea’ thematized in the final chapter of Hegel’s great work on logic is identified with Spinoza’s causa sui. But now, in order to explain what the idea is, Hegel brings in Spinoza’s definition of causa sui (Ethica I Def. 1) in its verbatim translation: the idea is ‘that, whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing’ (Enc §214; Enc 1817 §163). The definition put forward at the beginning of Spinoza’s Ethica stands
at the end in Hegel’s logic. It thus stands as something proved instead of as something simply asserted. The first part of this proof is what Hegel calls ‘the genetic exposition’ of the concept of concept; and he characterizes the Objective Logic in its entirety as such an exposition (WL GW 12:11). It consists in the sublation of all the categories of objective logic in the category of substance and in the sublation of this category in the concept of concept. The second part of the proof is the declared task of subjective logic, which is to prove that this concept has objective reality. Subjective logic must therefore explain how ‘the concept forms within and from itself the reality that has vanished in it’ (just as the determinations of the finite intellect vanish in Spinoza’s substance) (WL GW 11:377). This amounts to explaining how the concept ‘gives itself’ this reality ‘as its own reality generated out of itself’ (WL GW 12:24). In other words, subjective logic must show that the concept, that is, ‘the nature’ (or essence) of the idea, can only be thought of as having an existing object corresponding; and it must show that the concept itself is precisely this object.

This proof, of course, is not accomplished just by introducing the concept of idea, that is, by the idea’s mere definition. The proof itself takes place in connection with this definition by way of a critical investigation of the concept of cognition. As we have seen (in the section ‘Logic as self-criticism of pure reason’), Hegel rejects the notion that there must be a critique of cognition that precedes logical cognition. Hegel considers the entirety of cognition that Kant called theoretical – that is, all cognition that is receptive and relates to a given subject matter in order to search into a world of given objects – to be ‘finite’ cognition (WL GW 12:199; Enc §§226–7; Enc 1817 §§170–3). Such cognition is finite in the sense that it can never attain ‘the true’ (das Wahre) because it has to do solely with ‘appearances’. On this point, Hegel’s agreement with Kant is unrestricted. It results from the fact that the aim of objective logic – the goal of its endeavour to prove the finitude of all pure thought-determinations – corresponds to Kant’s epistemological aim in KrV, which was to prove the ‘merely subjective’ validity of the categories in their theoretical employment (A287/B343).

Kant however made this result into a ‘principle’ that ‘completely governs and determines’ his idealism, namely, the proposition that ‘[a]ll cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but simple illusion, and there is truth only in experience’ (Prol AA 4:374). This proposition entails an inconsistent claim to absoluteness that Hegel cannot accept for the following reasons. First, if the result of Kant’s critique of cognition is to be valid, then it must contain truth and knowledge on its own part despite its being the result of ‘pure thinking’ (i.e. of transcendental logic) (Enc §60R; cf. WL GW 12:201). Second, apart from ‘theoretical cognition’ there is also ‘practical cognition’; and on Kant’s account, the latter is the kind of pure rational cognition that surpasses all experience in its claim to truth. For practical rational cognition does not deal merely with appearances. It also has to do with practical laws that are independent of all experience and that have absolute
validity as determining grounds of the will for all rational beings (see KrV Bx; Critique of Practical Reason [KpV] AA 5:20, 31).

According to Kant, cognition of the validity of the ‘fundamental law of pure practical reason’ provides absolute knowledge of the idea of the good (the content of which, according to Hegel, is presented in this law) as well as the sole ground of proof (ratio cognoscendi) for freedom of the will (KpV AA 5:4, n.). And this ‘practical idea’, Kant says, is not just ‘the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason’. For it is in and through this idea that ‘pure reason even has the causality actually to bring forth what its concept [i.e., the concept of this idea] contains’ (KrV A328/B385).

This idea is the paradigm for what Hegel calls ‘the speculative or absolute idea’ (Enc §235; Enc 1817 §183; WL GW 12:235–6). Its paradigmatic standing becomes evident in its identification with Spinoza’s causa sui. To say that the idea of the good, apprehended in its ‘truth’ (Enc §235; Enc 1817 §183), is the speculative idea means that it must be determined as simultaneously practical and theoretical. That is, it must be determined not only as the idea of the good but also as the idea of the (absolutely) true. Taken in their unity, the true and the good are not just ‘goals’ of ‘finite cognition’ or ‘finite willing’ attainable only by approximation (WL GW 12:178). Beyond this, they are the content of ‘established’ cognition as well as the ‘absolute end’ whose realization consists in sublating the opposition between, on the one hand, the one-sided subjectivity of finite cognition and willing and, on the other hand, the one-sided objectivity of a merely encountered or pre-given reality (WL GW 12:235; Enc §234). This sublation is already implicitly thought in the concept of concept, but it is first explicitly grasped in the speculative idea.

Hegel’s peculiar use of the adjective ‘speculative’ becomes intelligible only now, at the end of the science of logic. Throughout the course of the philosophical tradition before him this word was used as a synonym for ‘theoretical’ and as a designation for the ‘non-practical’. Hegel, however, uses it to name a third kind of cognition in which both the theoretical and the practical are contained as moments.

Hegel’s characterization of his logic as ‘speculative science’ (Enc §9R; WL GW 21:7, WL GW 11:7) is due to the circumstance that, in his view, what is absolutely true is not accessible through cognition that is merely theoretical or merely practical. At the same time, Hegel also uses this characterization to highlight the relevance of this science for both theoretical and practical cognition.

The speculative idea has no other content than that of being the unity of the ideas of the true and the good. As the end result of ‘true cognition’, which is identical to ‘thinking that conceptually comprehends [begreifendes Denken]’ (WL GW 12:239) or ‘thinking cognizing [denkendes Erkennen]’ (Enc §1; WL GW 21:20), the speculative idea belongs to the science of logic. The content of this science is ‘the system of the logical’ (Enc §237), that is, the system of the self-sublating stages of the speculative idea. Its form is the ‘speculative method’ itself. This is a method that is not only realized in the outward structure and the arrangement of that system’s parts. It is also the method that coincides with its content in so far as its parts are, without exception, only moments of a unity. In fact, it is only as moments of a unity that these parts can form a complete system (Enc §243). Given that this unity coincides with the ‘one’ speculative idea, and given that logical science knows its own parts precisely

**SCIENCE OF LOGIC**

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as moments of such unity, this science ‘con-cludes’ by ‘apprehending the concept of itself as [the concept of] the pure idea for which the idea is’ (ibid.).

NOTES

1 This was reprinted in the second edition, post-humously published in 1832.

2 Here, as elsewhere in this chapter, the first citation pertains to the words quoted or the passage directly referred to. The remaining supporting citations may deviate somewhat from these.

3 The second and third editions of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia have the same numbering sequence for their respective sections of the science of logic. I therefore use the abbreviation ‘Enc’ without specifying the years of publication when referring to both of these editions.

4 In its first edition (1817), the Encyclopaedia Science of Logic spans §§12–192. In the second and third editions (1827 and 1830), Hegel’s logical science includes §§19–244. The latter two editions differ only sporadically. In the following, I do not address differences of content that apply to the 1817 edition, especially those pertaining to the Doctrine of Essence. Nor do I deal with the differences between the versions of the Encyclopaedia science of logic and the two editions of WL. The developmental history of Hegel’s logic, which dates back at least to the year 1801, is an extremely complex field of research which I do not treat here. The best reference work on the current state of research is provided by Jaeschke (2003) (especially pp. 97–100, 164–9, 201–2, 204–7, 221–54, 259–72, 327–31).

5 The designation ‘formal logic’ does not originate with Kant, as is sometimes supposed by historians of logic. In fact, Kant’s use is simply a translation of the common Latin expression logica formalis that was traditionally used as extensionally equivalent to logica genera-lis, that is, syllogistic logic (see, for instance, Jungius).

6 See Wolff (1995, pp. 204–21). According to Kant’s classification, the contributions to logic represented by, for example, Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora or Frege’s Begriffsschrift would belong to the non-pure part of the ‘science of logic’. See Wolff (2009, pp. 151–63).

7 See, for example, KrV A51/B75: ‘pure concept [contains] only the form of thinking of an object in general’. Cf. KrV A568/B595 and AA 20:27 (where Kant states that categories are ‘only forms of thinking . . . for the concept of an object of intuition in general’).

8 See in this regard Hegel’s report to Niethammer, ‘Über den Vortrag der Philosophie auf Gymnasien’ (1812): ‘Thus in a Kantian sense logic can be understood in such a way that, beside the usual content of so-called general logic, the logic he calls transcendental may be associated with and premised to it; . . .’ (Briefe GW 10:825).

9 In another respect, Kant’s use of ‘formal logic’ is quite adequate since in the context of KrV it refers to ‘pure general’ (i.e. syllogistic) logic, which is concerned with the logical forms of judgements. See note 5 above.

10 Hegel uses the expression ‘formal logic’ on only one occasion in WL GW 12:204. He mentions it in a context in which he is merely interested in describing how KrV refers to what it calls ‘formal logic’.

11 The titles of the 1812/13 and 1816 volumes of WL and of the first part of the 1832 edition contain corresponding designations. Hegel omits the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ logic in all three editions of Enc. But this does not warrant the inference that he renounced this distinction after 1816. He must have considered it fitting until the end since he uses it in the second (1832) edition of the Doctrine of Being, both in the text (WL GW 21:46–9) and on the title pages (WL GW 21:2, 3). It is another matter entirely.
that Hegel thought the distinction to be open to misunderstandings, against which he cautions at the beginning of both editions (WL GW 11:32; 21:49). More on this below, at the end of this section.

Hegel's acquaintance with Jäsche's compendium is not proved. Yet the description of 'ordinary logic' found in the Addition to Enc §192 may be related to this as much as to other logic textbooks inspired by Kant. For a Kant-influenced textbook on logic that Hegel certainly consulted, see G. E. Maass, Grundriß der Logik (Outline of Logic, 1793). Hegel already refers to this work (which discusses the 'Laws of Thought') in his introduction to the 1812 WL: see GW 11:25; 21:39.

Since his objective logic is dedicated exclusively to point α, Hegel does not say that it corresponds to what Kant calls transcendental logic, but only that it 'would correspond' to this in part (WL GW 21:47). Hegel means to say that objective logic would correspond in part to Kant's transcendental logic if Kant had completed his project of transcendental logic also with respect to point α. For different interpretations of Hegel's intent regarding this point, see Fulda's and Horstmann's joint contribution to the discussion presented in Fulda (1980. p. 37), and Pippin (1989, pp. 170, 294 n. 1).

This purification should not be understood as the mere destruction of the psychological considerations that slip into Kant's transcendental logic. Hegel actually adopts a number of these fundamental ideas of Kant in his Psychology. For example, Hegel engages the theory of the syntheses of the power of imagination, which is the core of the 'subjective deduction of the categories' developed mainly in the first edition of KrV. See Enc §431, §§454–67.

Regarding general logic, a similar criticism is already found already in Kant's KrV (Bvii–ix).

See Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren (The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures) (AA 2:45–61).

Hegel's critique of Kant's procedure is here, however, not entirely justified. He does not take into account that Kant's fourfold division of the 'logical functions', which underlies the corresponding fourfold division of the categories according to 'quantity', 'quality', 'relation' and 'modality', does not rely on available logic texts. Instead, it is based on Kant's equating the understanding (or intellect) with the capacity to judge and on his use of this equivalence as a principle of division (ratio divisionis). For discussion, see Wolff (1995, pp. 175–95).

Hegel's view differs in this regard from Salomon Maimon's conception of a new logic. In a letter of 2 December 1793 Maimon had written to Kant: 'Since you convinced me . . . that all our cognitive claims must be preceded by a critique of the faculty of cognition, I could not help but be vexed by the following observation: since the appearance of this critique and of several attempts to bring particular disciplines into accord with its requirements, no one has attempted to reconstruct a logic according to this critique. I am convinced that even logic, as a science, may not be exempted from critique. General logic must of course be distinguished from transcendental logic, but the former must be revised in light of the latter' (AA 11:470–1. [Arnulf Zweig's 1999 translation adapted]). Hegel would, however, share Maimon's view that 'general logic' (as part of logical science) may 'not be exempted from critique' (see below, 'Formal science and absolute form', and WL GW 12:28).

The 'wise resolution of Scholastics' is quoted from a collection of jokes from Roman imperial times: Philegälos. See §2 in the German translation by Thierfelder (1968) and in the English translation by Baldwin (1983).

Hegel's characterization of metaphysics as the 'science' of the 'fundamental determinations of things' (Enc §28) grasped in 'thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentials of things' (Enc §24) gives the gist of Baumgarten's conception of metaphysics. See Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §§1, 4, 36, 39 (reprinted in Kant, AA 17:23–4, 34–6).

On Hegel's concept of 'cognition as a result of thinking' (i.e. of what he calls 'denkendes Erkennen') see below, 'The concept of "speculative" or "absolute" idea'. Cf. Enc §1; WL GW 21:20.

Hegel's reference is to a supplement added by Jacobi to the second (1789) edition of his Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (On Spinoza's Doctrine in Letters to Mr Moses Mendelssohn). This
supplement (VII) is reprinted in Jacobi, GA 1/1: 247–65 (see especially pp. 260–4).

23 In this regard, Frege’s view concerning the objectivity of thought is comparable to that of Hegel, and it is possible that Frege was indirectly influenced by Hegel through his teacher Kuno Fischer. For Frege, however, thoughts as such are something objective. In his view, representations, not thoughts, must be classified as subjective or objective; and thoughts are objective representations: ‘A representation in the subjective sense is what the psychological laws of association refer to . . . A representation in the objective sense belongs to logic and is essentially non-sensible . . . A subjective representation is often demonstrably different in different persons, and an objective representation is the same for everyone. One can divide objective representations into objects and concepts’ (Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, pp. 41–2). ‘Thus, by objectivity I mean independence from our sensibility, intuition, and representation . . . not, however, independence from reason’ (ibid., p. 41).

24 Hegel’s criticism is here directed against the view, popularized in the tradition and put forward by authors like Cicero, Ramus and Descartes, that syllogistic ‘forms’ are irrelevant to the cognition of truth and that one could not construct a syllogism that even ‘reveals something true’ as long as its ‘matter’ is not already ‘proved’ (Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, AT X, p. 406).

25 Hegel’s project is to trace all forms of objective logic back to the absolute form that is to be ascribed to the concept as ‘concrete unity’, and he wants to derive from this unity all of the forms of subjective logic. This indicates that Hegel intends to use a Kantian claim as the basis for a complete logical theory. The claim in question is that the synthetic unity of apperception is ‘the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of the logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy’ (KrV B134).

26 Like Kant (see GMS AA 4:387), Hegel defends the view that the ‘three parts’ which, according to the Stoic division, make up the whole of philosophy, ‘will generally always be: 1. Logic, 2. Physics or philosophy of nature, and 3. Ethics or philosophy of mind especially in its practical dimension’ (VGPh TWA 19:262).

27 Throughout this chapter, I render Hegel’s Geist as ‘mind’ rather than as ‘spirit’. This is, of course, contrary to current standard practice. But the reasons for my insistence on ‘mind’ will be apparent from the sources cited in note 29 below. (In addition to these sources, see Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes V.38–9 and Hegel’s renderings of Descartes’s and Spinoza’s mens as Geist in VGPh TWA 20:134, 160, 183.) The point is that Hegel’s use of Geist is historically and semantically linked to mens (i.e. mind), which is distinct in meaning from spiritus.

28 Enc §17 contains a sketch of this procedure and points out the task of the science of logic, which is to develop what is merely the ‘first’ concept of philosophical science’s circular procedure. (This concept furnishes the main theme of the final section of WL: ‘The Absolute Idea’. See WL GW 12:252). The second concept of this science is what Hegel calls the ‘concept of its concept’ (Enc §17), and its achievement is the ‘single end, doing, and goal’ of philosophical science. The goal is reached at the end of the science of mind with the sublation of the presupposition that apparently lies at the basis of philosophical science, that is, the supposition that thinking is merely the ‘subject matter for an (as it were external) philosophizing subject’ and not the object of what Hegel calls (in view of Spinoza’s cognitio infinita s. absoluta) ‘infinite’ and ‘absolute’ thinking and (in view of Aristotle’s νόησις νόησεως) the ‘thinking of thinking’ (Enc §19; Enc 1817 §12R).

29 Cicero (Tusculanae disputationes L.66) characterizes the quinta essentia as mens soluta et libera. This is the circularly moving element to which Aristotle ascribes the thinking of the passage from his Metaphysics (1072b18–30) that Hegel quotes at the conclusion of the 1817 and 1830 editions of Enc. We can thus understand both Hegel’s metaphorical use of the word ‘element’ and his talk of ‘free’ and ‘absolute mind’. Logical science has to do with the thinking of thinking that ultimately takes place in this mind, and not merely in the head of a subject who happens to be philosophizing.
SCIENCE OF LOGIC

30 This is the title of the initial section of the Doctrine of Being (WL GW 21:53; 11:33).

31 Hegel does not make explicit, in this order, the premises and conclusions of the negative and positive dilemmas just treated. This makes it difficult to discern the structure of the argument in the section at issue ("With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?" – WL GW 21:53).

32 Hegel characterizes his 1807 PhG as the ‘production’ [Erzeugung] of the ‘concept’ of pure science. This concept corresponds precisely to what he understands, in Enc §17, as the ‘concept of the concept of science’ (i.e. as the second concept of pure science); cf. note 28 above.

33 See Descartes, AT VIII, pp. 6–7 (Principia philosophiae I §7).

34 Ibid.

35 See Newton, Principia mathematica I.1 Lemma 1 and Schol.; II.2 Bk II.2 Lemma 2.

36 See D'Alembert, Éléments de philosophie, pp. 344–5.

37 See Newton, Principia mathematica I.2, Lemma 2. For discussion, see Wolff (1986, pp. 197–263) (especially 249 ff.).

38 The model for Hegel's classifications of the 'sides of the logical' is the account of the trichotomous structure of divisions in pure philosophy that Kant gives in KU. See KU AA 5:197 (note).

39 Whenever Hegel speaks of 'the concept', he also means 'the concept of concept' (WL GW 12:29). For the concept as such encompasses all determinate concepts, including the concept of concepts.

40 The account of concepts here at issue does not agree with Gottlob Frege's still highly influential account. Frege was concerned with linguistic – that is, with not purely logical – criteria for distinguishing between expressions for concepts and for objects. In keeping with such criteria, he held that expressions with definite articles are not expressions of concepts. Downplaying the significance of this point as 'unavoidable linguistic toughness', he disregarded its contradictory implication – namely, that 'the concept F' (e.g. the concept of horse) is not a concept. See Frege, 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand', in Kleine Schriften, p. 170.

41 For an exceptionally illuminating discussion of the concept of overarching universal- ity in Leibniz and Hegel, see König (1978, pp. 27–61).

42 According to Spinoza (Ethica I Prop. 14 and Prop. 17 Cor. 2), substance is what a 'free thing' (res libera) is, namely, something that 'is determined to action by itself alone' (a se sola ad agendum determinatur) (Ethica I Def. 7). Borrowing from this determination of substance, Hegel begins the second part of his Encyclopaedia account of the Doctrine of the Concept with these words: 'The concept is what is free as the substantial might which is for itself' (Enc §160; cf. Enc 1817 §108).

43 In so far as it is at first only its own concept, Hegel calls the concept of concept the 'pure' or 'formal' concept (WL GW 12:31–2).

44 See WL GW 12:17–18. Hegel uses the adjective 'concrete' to replace the paradoxical expression 'original synthetic'. His account of the systematic relation between subjective logic and psychology is not found in his science of logic. He treats this relation in the context of his theory of subjective mind (see Enc §387; Enc 1817 §307).

45 For discussion of the relevant passages in Kant's KrV, see Wolff (1995, pp. 135–9, 182–9).

46 Negation, for instance, is the logical form of the negative judgement (which is a subspecies of the judgement type that Hegel calls 'qualitative judgement' [Enc §172]). But negation can also be a moment of judgements of another type (i.e. of judgements of 'reflection', of 'necessity' or of 'concept' [Enc §§ 174–9]). For example, it can be a moment of the hypothetical judgement (which is a subspecies of the 'judgement of necessity') since the latter can contain a negation in its antecedent or in its consequent.

47 The concept of object is inspired by Kant, who defined 'object' as 'that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united' (KrV B137). Hegel discusses this definition in considerable detail (WL GW 12:17–25). This discussion differs from Kant's in so far as Hegel lays aside the manifold of intuition and concentrates on what it is 'in the concept' that makes up the unity of the object.

48 This sublation also features the replacement of all so-called metaphysical definitions of the absolute, as these are discussed in the Objective
Logic, with the exposition of the concept of concept. To understand Hegel’s proximity to Kant in this regard, see KrV A730/B758.


See, for example, Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, §§216–18; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §669.

Hegel points out that his conception of the speculative idea makes Kant’s moral theology superfluous. According to Hegel, the latter results from the absolutization of finite cognition and from a correspondingly inconsequential subjectivizing of the idea of the good in the concept of the highest good. On this see WL GW 12:235 and Enc §234 in connection with WL GW 12:25 and Enc §§59–60.

Cf. Enc §213A. ‘The concern of philosophy has always been with nothing but the thinking cognition of the idea. . . . ’

translated by A. de Laurentiis and J. Edwards
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE*

Dieter Wandschneider

It is one of the oddities of intellectual history that our present age – an epoch determined by natural science and technology – has developed an elaborate philosophy of science but no full-fledged philosophy of nature. Popular accounts of the results of scientific research, which have appeared in great numbers for decades now, have made important contributions to the promotion of science. But they cannot replace the philosophical penetration of natural scientific knowledge. Consider, for example, the problem of what constitutes a law of nature. This problem is central to our understanding of nature. Yet philosophy of science has not provided a definitive response to it up to now. Nor can we expect to have such an answer from that quarter in future. Since its interest lies above all in the question of whether and how assertions concerning universal laws of nature are empirically justified, contemporary philosophy of science loses sight of the ontological issue at stake, namely, the question of an intrinsically lawful nature. What is needed in this regard would be a philosophical ontology of nature that takes account of the modern development of science. Of course, the articulation of such an ontology would have to integrate and render useful the immense theoretical labour already purveyed by the philosophical tradition. And this would undoubtedly mean thinking primarily of Hegel. But why Hegel?

The orientation of Descartes’s thought is epistemological and methodological rather than ontological. While Spinoza and Leibniz have their general ontologies, neither of them developed a special ontology of nature. Moreover, the empiricism of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume is again primarily of epistemological orientation. Finally, while Kant’s transcendental turn in the theory of knowledge has direct implications for the problem of natural law,¹ from a justificational point of view it sticks to a construction that leaves open the essential ontological questions. According to Kant’s own testimony, the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (MAN) of 1786 does not satisfy the philosophical need for a fully realized metaphysics of nature. That this need ultimately remains unsatisfied is evidenced by the repeated attempts at clarification that we find in Kant’s *Opus postumum* (Mathieu, 1989; Edwards, 2000, pp. 132–92). The account of organisms’ ‘inner’ purposiveness that Kant gives in the 1790 *Critique of Judgement* (KU) also lacks a foundation in natural ontology (Dahlstrom, 1998). Kant was well aware of this latter deficiency, and he responded to it by means of his hypothesis of a ‘supersensible’, that is, rational, ‘substrate’ of nature.
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But in immediately revoking this hypothesis by interpreting it as a merely subjective reflection on nature, he ontologically devalued his response (see KU AA 5:414; cf. KU AA 5:176, 196, 381, 388–9, 409–15, 422). At the same time, though, an entirely new perspective becomes evident through KU’s conception of nature’s supersensible substrate. This substrate, which Kant thinks of as a rational ground of being, is in a fundamental sense already the idea of an absolute logos that encompasses subject and object in equal measure. In Kant’s formulation, it is the idea of a ‘supersensible real ground for nature . . . to which we ourselves also belong’ (KU AA 5:409) – a genuinely ontological conception that was of central significance to the emergence of German Idealism. Indeed, one can understand the developmental history of German Idealism from Fichte through Schelling and towards Hegel as precisely the emergence and further shaping of that Kantian conception.

Of fundamental importance to German Idealism, then, is the concept of an absolute that lies at the basis of reality. This is a concept interpreted differently by Fichte, by Schelling and by Hegel. For Fichte, the ‘I’ has absolute standing while the world, including nature, is first and foremost determined as non-‘I’. This devaluation of nature, which goes hand in hand with Fichte’s subjective idealism, was remedied by Schelling. Thus, Schelling’s historical merit should be seen not least of all in the fact that he made clear the relevance of the concept of nature for the project of a viable idealistic system. Nevertheless, Schelling’s brilliant philosophical conjectures did not coalesce into a complete and convincing picture. A basic difficulty in this regard lies especially in the unclarified relation of the absolute – Schelling spoke of ‘absolute identity’ or ‘absolute indifference’ – to natural reality and the reality of spirit. Just what is it that necessitates the realization of the absolute in the forms of nature and finite spirit? This is a question that Schelling ultimately left open and that Hegel is the first to have made progress in answering. From a systematic point of view, Hegel’s philosophical interpretation of nature is until now perhaps the most well thought out account of a philosophical concept of nature.

AN INTERPRETATIVE PREJUDICE

Opposed to this evaluation is a prejudice of long standing, namely, the view that Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not only the weak spot in his system, but is also downright absurd on account of its purely speculative character and its lack of any real relation to empirical data and the positive sciences. As an example of the devastating judgements passed on Hegel’s philosophy of nature, consider what Henrich Scholz had to say during the period of Hegel’s rediscovery in the last century:

Hegel’s philosophy of nature is an experiment that, instead of promoting natural philosophy, throws it back several centuries to about the level of Paracelsus . . . Hegel’s natural philosophy is a play with concepts – a game that will never again be taken seriously and that can serve merely to prove that a great thinker, when he goes astray, does not stop at minor aberrations. (Scholz, 1921, p. 38)

Given this sort of assessment, Michael Petry states that ‘until 1970 there was hardly anyone among the Hegelians – let alone any philosopher of science – who was prepared to
recognize Hegel’s philosophy of nature as a serious area of research’ (Petry, 1981, p. 618).

Undoubtedly, the interpretative attitude just characterized will not appear to be entirely groundless in view of some of the outdated, historically conditioned points in Hegel’s work on natural philosophy. This can be seen especially in the second part of Hegel’s mature system of the philosophy of nature, that is, in the part titled ‘Physics’. (We bear in mind here, however, that Hegel’s explanations regarding light and chemical processes are undoubtedly of fundamental interest. More on this below.) It is certainly true that Hegel did not always resist the temptation of co-opting insufficiently researched empirical materials and then rashly declaring them to be derivable from ‘the concept’. But the pioneering works of Petry (1970) and D. von Engelhardt (1972), which have given rise to many further investigations, have effectively shown Hegel’s purported disdain for empirical data to be an interpretational prejudice that can no longer be supported (Neuser, 1987a; Petry, 1988). The scientific and mathematical works used by Hegel and available in his library bear testimony to his intensive preoccupation with the empirical sciences of nature of his time as well as with mathematics (Neuser, 1987b; 2000b, pp. 199–205; Bronger, 1993; Mense, 1993; Petry, 1993a).

In any case, the long neglect of Hegel’s natural philosophy must appear as absurd when regarded from the general perspective of the interpretation of his thought. Hegel consistently emphasized the character of philosophy as system, and for a thinker of Hegel’s stature it is extremely improbable that parts of his total system can simply be eradicated without losing something essential for understanding the remaining parts. This is already reason enough not to disregard the role of natural philosophy in Hegel’s overall philosophical project. To mention just one example: the very concept of spirit, according to Hegel, simply cannot be determined independently of the concept of nature.

The following considerations are based on the final version of Hegel’s comprehensive account of his system that is found in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc), which is divided into the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit.

THE LOGICAL BASIS

According to Hegel, only logic comes into question as the foundation for every philosophical undertaking. Every philosophy that lays claim to rational demonstrability must be in a position to ground its own point of departure. While this demand appears to be taken for granted, it has hardly ever been satisfied in more than two millennia of rational Western philosophy. Even the great systems – Kant’s or Schopenhauer’s, for example, which rest on the merely assumed basis of ‘transcendental subjectivity’ or, respectively, ‘primitive will’ – come up short in this respect. They are significant because they are astutely and elaborately worked out. Yet they lack any rationally demonstrable justificational basis. Hegel avoids precisely this deficiency by setting out from logic.

Hegel’s procedure in this regard is based on the insight that fundamentally everything can be called into question except for logic. For logic always furnishes the presupposition of every line of questioning – of every possible epistemic challenge to any given claim. According to Hegel, only a fundamental logic can furnish the basis of philosophy. It is clear,
then, that this logic cannot be one of the many ‘logics’ that, as formal systems, rest on axioms, and thus on arbitrary assumptions that could have been selected differently and that therefore cannot be taken as genuinely fundamental.

But how are we to understand fundamental logic in Hegel’s sense? Consider, for example, the principle of contradiction – hence the principle that contradiction is to be avoided. This principle is held to be unconditionally valid since any arbitrarily given proposition would be formally derivable if contradiction were permissible. If the principle of contradiction did not obtain, then all argumentation would be an idle and pointless exercise. Furthermore, there could not even be meaningful concepts: If ‘A’ and ‘non-A’ did not differ, there could be no negation; but without negation (as the contrary of affirmation) there is no demarcation, and thus no possibility of conceptual determination (Begriffsbestimmung). That is to say, by reverse inference, that whenever meaningful concepts are applied, the principle of contradiction does hold true. This principle is thus indispensable for meaningful argument and is, in this sense, fundamental.

Analogously, the entire system of fundamental logic – which in the following I will abbreviate as ‘logic’ – must be understood as the un-annulable basis of meaningful argumentation. To use a key term from contemporary philosophic discussion, logic is ultimately groundable. Of course, if logic itself is to be grounded, then it is already presupposed (since grounding is itself a logical operation). In other words, fundamental logic can be grounded, or proved, only in the form of its self-grounding. This should not, however, be taken literally as a grounding of logic upon itself – which would be absurd – but rather as logic’s own logical exposition and clarification. In short, it must be understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means (for details, see Wandschneider, 2005b).

This self-referential and cyclical structure of fundamental logic (Rockmore, 1993) involves the idea that the system of logic ‘coils in a circle’ (Science of Logic [WL] GW 12:251). As Hegel had already expressed this idea during his Jena period, logic presents a self-grounded totality (Begründungstotalität) to the extent that it is ‘a whole that is internally supported and completed, that has no ground apart from itself but is instead grounded by itself in its beginning, its middle, and its end’ (The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy [Differenzschrift] GW 4:30–1). Taken in this sense, logic is a self-supporting, internally autonomous and un-conditioned (un-bedingt) holistic structure. As such, it is absolute.  

HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF NATURE

The absoluteness of fundamental logic as a whole, which Hegel characterizes as absolute idea, is also what furnishes the basis for the existence of nature (Wandschneider, 1985) – which is tantamount to saying that that logic also has ontological relevance. That is because what simply cannot be gainsaid cannot not be. Rather, it must be; and this applies in particular to the being of nature.

Hegel’s own considerations on the relation between logic and nature, which are exceedingly terse, have been the subject matter of numerous and controversial investigations (see, e.g. Volkmann-Schluck, 1964; Burbidge, 1973; Brinkmann, 1976; Wandschneider, 1985; Falkenburg, 1987, ch. 1.2; Drees, 1993). This is not the place...
to go into this discussion, and it will have to suffice for me to provide a plausibility argument. The notion that fundamental logic – Hegel’s absolute idea – is absolute or un-conditioned (un-bedingt) signifies that it cannot be grounded ‘from the outside’, that is, from a non-logical standpoint; for the activity of grounding is itself already a logical operation. What is logically ideal points beyond itself precisely because it is determined as un-conditioned; and it does this precisely as that which is not conditioned by the non-ideal, whatever that might be. Thus, the non-ideal is always co-implied by the logically ideal – a point which, incidentally, expresses the essentially dialectical character of fundamental logic. From the standpoint of dialectical logic, the absolute idea and the non-ideal belong together inseparably (Wandschneider, 1995).

But what is the non-ideal? If the ideal is characterized by logical and conceptual connectedness, the non-ideal is characterized by separateness, that is, by ‘externality [Außereinander]’ or simply ‘juxtaposition [Auseinanderseyn]’ (Enc §253) as this is encountered in the spatio-temporal being of nature (Halper, 1998). Nature, then, is understood as the complement of the absolute idea. From the viewpoint of dialectical logic, nature belongs to the absolute idea as the positive belongs to the negative. According to Hegel, nature is also ‘the idea’, but it is the idea in the negative form of ‘otherness [Andersseyn]’. It is, as it were, the eternal accompanying phenomenon of the ideal that determines itself as absolute. Together with the logically ideal (the existence of which cannot meaningfully be denied on account of the very character of its absoluteness), there must also always be nature.

But is the character of absoluteness likewise to be ascribed to nature? Not at all, for nature is what is conditioned. It is what is conditioned by the logically ideal as that which is un-conditioned. The logically ideal, in Hegel’s sense, is the underlying principle of nature, and nature is that which is principiated. Given this relation, a remarkable ambivalence accures to the concept of nature: as the other of the idea – as the non-ideal – nature is characterized by separateness even though the ideal is what furnishes its underlying principle. Put differently: natural being appears as something separate, but its underlying essence is of an ideal nature (Wahsner, 1996, ch. 1.1). Although this may sound mysterious, it is in fact something quite familiar. For natural reality is not absorbed into its spatio-temporal separateness, but is rather determined by natural laws, that is, by a logic that lies at the very basis of nature. A law of nature, of course, is not a natural object. The law of falling, for example, is not itself something that can fall; and the laws of electricity are not themselves electrical. The laws of nature, then, constitute the logic of nature, in the sense that they are the ideal entities that lie at the basis of nature as its underlying ideal essence.

THE OBJECTIVE-IDEALISTIC PERSPECTIVE

The sort of philosophy which takes logic as its basis, even in its account of nature, is designated as objective idealism (cf. Hösl, 1987c). It must not be confused with the subjective idealism of Descartes or Fichte, which seeks to ground everything by starting from the ‘I’. Much less may it be confused with Berkeley’s psychologistic version of idealism (cf. Solomon, 1974; Maker, 1998). Hegel’s idealism is called ‘objective’ because
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Hegel sets out from the objectively binding character of logic. As was explained above, logic can be called into question only at the cost of self-contradiction, and it is for this reason that logic alone comes into question as a firm rational foundation. The being of nature – which is necessarily entailed by dialectical logic – thereby qualifies as something that in its essence is ideal. This means that it must be grasped as something determined by an underlying logic, and hence by laws of nature. This relation between the logically ideal and natural reality grounds a unique characteristic (Alleinstellungsmerkmal) of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, namely, the fact that reasons are given for both the existence of nature and nature’s lawfulness.

When understood from the standpoint of objective idealism, ‘all reality is in itself lawful’ (Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG] GW 9:92) in the sense that it is determined by an underlying logic that for its part is accessible to thinking. This logic, however, must not be understood as a merely subjective faculty, but rather as ‘the reason of that which is’ or as a universal logos that inhabits all being (WL GW 21:17). At issue here is Hegel’s conception of the ‘idea’ which underlies both thought and reality in equal measure: ‘Everything actual is the idea inasmuch as it is something true and has its truth only through the idea and in virtue of it’ (Enc §213R; cf. Berliner Antrittsrede 1818, GW 18:19–20). This ideal ground of nature explains why nature is cognizable – why determinations of thought can grasp and penetrate reality.

That the natural sciences actually presuppose the objective-idealistic conception of nature – while not explicitly reflecting this on their part, of course – is something that can be seen in their attitude towards scientific research (Borzeszkowski and Wahnser, 2004; for criticism, see Wetzel, 2004, p. 18). Hegel speaks of the theoretical approach in this regard.

To take up things directly, to deal with them and apply them is what he calls the practical approach – which is what occurs when even an animal simply tucks into things and devours them. Opposed to this, then, is the theoretical approach, that is, the purely cognitive attitude that does not involve changing or destroying things, but rather ‘leaving them as they are, and adjusting to them’ (Enc §246A). Following Hegel, however, we must take into consideration the fact that in cognition we also ‘transform [things] into something universal’ (ibid.). Thus, the theoretical approach seems to be ‘inwardly contradictory since it appears to bring about the precise opposite of what it intends’ (ibid.). For theory is what makes things into something ideal: ‘We make them into something subjective, produced by us . . . for the things of nature do not think, and are neither representations nor thought’ (ibid.). Consequently, the question arises: ‘How are we as subjects to get over into the object?’ (ibid.).

An answer to this question is possible only in the framework of an objectively idealistic conception of nature: The universality that belongs to the conceptual determinations of theory ‘is not something subjective and belonging to us; it is rather . . . the truth, objectivity, and actual being of the things themselves. It resembles the platonic ideas, which do not have their being somewhere in the beyond, but which exist in individual things’ (Enc §246A). Being the ‘true nature’ of factual reality, the universality of conceptual theoretical determinations belongs as well to laws to which ‘is ascribed objective reality’ (ibid.). Cognition, then, ought to leave things as they are. Yet it must apprehend not their sensible surface but rather their essence. That
is to say, it must grasp the immanent lawfulness that completely determines all things. Scientific research is directed to this alone; and to that extent it presupposes the objectively idealistic conception of nature even if it does not know that it does so.

‘COMPREHENDING’ COGNITION

It is only on the basis of logic that nature is cognizable at all. Otherwise, it would be as inaccessible to thinking as Kant’s thing in itself is supposed to be. If nature is cognizable, however, then it must be more completely open to conceptual comprehension than it is to merely empirical acquaintance. According to Hegel, ‘comprehending consideration [begreifende Betrachtung]’ is the special goal of natural philosophy the task of which is to make evident the conceptual infrastructure concealed in nature’s basic features (Enc §246). This is what distinguishes philosophy of nature from empirical natural science. The latter erects complex theories, but it does this in the form of abstract and hypothetical positions that lose sight of any holistically integrated perspective. Hegel refers to this as a ‘deficiency in physics’ (ibid.), but it is a deficiency that is representative of the natural sciences in general. To be sure, physics already demonstrates the tendency to fathom conceptual connections and base them on principles – which is, as it were, an intrinsically philosophical tendency at work within the science. One thinks here of natural scientists like Einstein or Heisenberg as well as the contemporary project of a Grand Unified Theory (in which the role played by a priori arguments has become increasingly pronounced) (Posch, 2009).

Is it conceivable that natural science, by ultimately substituting pure a priori cognition for what is empirically yielded by observation and experimentation, could in the end be absorbed into a comprehensive philosophy of nature (Webb, 1980; Hösle, 1987b, ch. 3.2.2)? Such a ‘philosophical’ tendency is indeed grounded in the desire to understand nature, and it is comprehensible insofar as it is so grounded. In what follows, we will repeatedly encounter examples of this tendency while concretely expounding on Hegel’s philosophical arguments. Nevertheless, philosophy of nature is not pure logic, and it always remains reliant upon nature. As Hegel himself emphasizes, beyond conceptual argumentation the point holds that ‘the empirical appearance . . . also has to be specified, and it has to be shown that the appearance does in fact correspond to its conceptual determination’ (Enc §246). With respect to the ‘necessity of the content’ (ibid.), then, this is not an ‘appeal to experience’ (ibid.). Yet as Hösle rightly remarks: ‘in designating what corresponds to reality in this [conceptual] structure, philosophy . . . inevitably surrenders itself to experience – which always means: to the contemporaneous state of empirical knowledge’ (Hösle, 1987b, p. 82). If, for example, philosophical arguments for the three-dimensional character of physical space are put forward, there is always the question whether space’s tri-dimensionality, which seems empirically obvious, will not at some point be shown to be outdated (as will in fact happen should contemporary ‘super string theory’ be confirmed along with its supposition that there are at least seven additional spatial dimensions).

One essential thing to bear in mind in this connection is the fact that Hegel determines real nature (as distinguished from natural law) as the non-ideal, that is, as something that is in principle non-conceptual. As a matter of principle, then, this determination sets
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cardinal limits upon our conceptual grasp of nature. There is in this sense a moment of contingency contained in Hegel’s conception of nature (see Henrich, 1967, pp. 157–86; Hösle, 1987b, pp. 88 ff.). Hegel speaks of the ‘impotence of nature’ in this regard, and he holds that it is the height of pointlessness ‘to demand of the concept that it should comprehend such contingencies of nature’ (Enc §250R). To a certain Mr. Krug’s naïvely polemical demand that natural philosophy ought to prove itself capable of ‘deducing only his pen’, Hegel replies that this task can wait until ‘there is nothing more important to comprehend’ (Enc §250R note). 3

THE IDEALIZING TENDENCY IN NATURE

Hegel’s position is that the conceptual-ideal (das Begrifflich-Idelle) is only the inner ground of nature while the real being of nature appears above all as non-ideal separateness. This supports the further claim that there is in nature an effective ‘drive’ which can be characterized as a tendency towards idealization. According to its original and most general description, nature is first of all nothing more than the non-ideal. Taken simply as such, nature is incomprehensible; and it must therefore be grasped as pure separateness. Yet the very point of Hegel’s philosophy of nature lies in the insight that the comprehending account of nature cannot remain caught at the level of this abstract extrinsicality. Instead, such an account places upon itself the demand to advance towards ever more concrete specifications of nature’s real being. It must advance to the structures of space and time, to the structures of the material world and of living nature and finally to the structures of spirit. As ‘determinations’, these specifications are essentially conceptual, and therefore ideal. Thus, Hegel’s philosophy of nature, which takes the non-ideal as its starting point, progresses to determinations that make evident nature’s increasingly ideal structures.

For this purpose, Hegel brings to bear the discrepancy that is characteristic of natural being, namely, the discrepancy between nature’s real forms of appearance and its underlying ideal essence. This fundamental discrepancy between nature’s appearance and essence means that ‘the idea as this shape of externality is inadequate to itself’, which is to say that ‘as it is, its being does not correspond to its concept, but is rather the unresolved contradiction’ (Enc §248R). This contradiction sets in motion a dialectic that induces a stepwise development, a ‘development of the concept’ underlying nature with the ‘goal’ of manifesting ‘what it is in itself’, namely, ‘something ideal [ein Ideelles]’ (Enc §251A). The concept aims, as it were, to ‘break the rind of externality and become for itself’ (ibid.; cf. §381A). In other words, it wants to validate the ideal form that is the only form adequate to it.

It may seem that the motor of nature’s real evolution can be discerned in the tendency towards idealization just described. On Hegel’s understanding of nature, however, that would be a misinterpretation. Nature’s idealizing tendency does not cause the development of real natural forms. Instead, it involves the development of the conceptual determinations of such forms in the framework of natural philosophy. Thus, nature is indeed ‘to be regarded as a system of stages, the one proceeding of necessity out of the other, being the proximate truth of that from which it results’ (Enc §249). But this should not be thought of in such a way that ‘the one [stage] naturally generated out of the other’
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(ibid.) since to ‘imagine genera as gradually evolving themselves out of one another in time is to represent them in a completely empty manner’ (Enc §249A). The thinking consideration of nature as a system of stages ‘must therefore relinquish such nebulous and basically sensuous concepts as for example the so-called emergence [Hervorgehen] of plants and animals out of water, and of the more highly developed animal organizations out of the lower, etc.’ (Enc §249R).

Some 30 years before the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, then, Hegel rejects the idea of natural evolution. He justifies this verdict by taking the position that development belongs to the concept alone (Enc §249). ‘Development’, in Hegel’s sense, signifies the conceptual explication of what is already implicit in a determination (Enc §161A). Taken in this sense, it is not something encountered in real being. Hegel does, of course, provide formulations that appear to endorse a conception of real natural evolution. He holds that philosophy has ‘in a certain way only to look on at how nature itself overcomes its externality . . . at how it liberates the concept concealed in nature from the cover of externality’, and he maintains that nature is in this way ‘driven onwards beyond itself to spirit as such’ (Enc §381A, cf. §389A). According to these formulations, it is nature itself that carries out the process of idealization as natural evolution. Yet Hegel immediately goes on to deny this as well (Enc §381A).⁵

Hegel’s philosophy of nature has three main parts: ‘Mechanics’, ‘Physics’ and ‘Organic Physics’. His Mechanics treats space, time and motion. It also treats matter as something without specific properties, that is, as mass. What Hegel calls ‘Physics’ encompasses the domain of qualitatively different forms of matter such as light, the classical ‘elements’ (air, fire, water, earth) as well as phenomena like cohesion. In addition, Physics treats acoustic, thermal, optical, electrical, magnetic and chemical properties of matter. Clearly, the Hegelian conception of physics is not fully congruent with our contemporary conception. Nor is the idea of an ‘organic physics’ employed today, and the subject matter of Hegel’s Organic Physics pertains above all to the specific phenotypes of plant life and animal organisms. The highest form of organic life is reached in the occurrence of the psychical. Only the human being is able to go beyond this highest stage of nature’s development towards the forms of mental life that in turn lead into the sphere of spirit.

In what follows I will present and interpret the three parts of the Philosophy of Nature in connection with Hegel’s text, but I will not give a point by point treatment of the work. Instead, I will give preference to certain features of Hegel’s text in view of their possible contemporary relevance.⁶ There can be no doubt that Hegel’s intention was not to present antiquated and nowadays outdated scientific views, but rather to engage in the philosophical penetration of natural being. On the other hand, we can hardly overlook the fact that the Philosophy of Nature contains a good deal of dated material – especially if we consider the second part of this work with its treatments of heat, electricity and magnetism. In view of these factors, and given the allotted space for discussion, it is advisable to proceed selectively by discussing insights that are of interest to debates in contemporary natural philosophy. I will therefore concentrate on Hegel’s views concerning space, time and matter in the first section of his Philosophy of Nature; concerning light and chemical processes in the second section; and concerning the interpretation of organic and psychical phenomena in the third section.
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MECHANICS

Space and Time

In keeping with Hegel’s conception of nature as the ‘otherness [Andersseyn]’ of the idea, the Philosophy of Nature begins with pure separateness, that is, with what is completely unstructured and ‘contains no determinate difference’ (Enc §254). Nevertheless, something results from this separateness despite its lack of structural differentiation. I will summarize here Hegel’s argument concerning this result.

Just because it lacks all differences, pure separateness is actually no separateness since things must be distinct if they are separate from one another. In a dialectical sense, the concept of pure separateness collapses into that of non-separateness, that is, the concept of a point. Both belong together and they exclude one another. This dialectically contradictory state of affairs, then, requires a new structure in which both separateness and punctuality are compatible. This becomes possible in the form of a line. Considered lengthwise (or longitudinally), a line is extension characterized by separateness. Considered crosswise (or transversely), however, it is non-extension characterized by non-separateness, in which case its ‘transverse direction’ at the same time brings into play a new spatial dimension. Hegel’s procedure of conceptual development thus leads to an explanation of the three-dimensional character of intuitional space.

The concept of pure separateness has thus been shown to contain an internal dialectic the explication of which gives rise to new categorical structures – at this initial juncture, the concepts of point, line and further spatial determinations.

‘Limit [Grenze]’ is in this way shown to be essential to spatial structures. A limit is what separates parts of space, though it belongs to none of them. Thus, a limit is itself non-spatial inasmuch as it is, as it were, thin as a point. But if this is so, what exactly is it? As a limit, it is essentially a negating – the excluding or, respectively, the leaving of a part of space. In the concept of space, then, negation (in the sense of change) and hence the concept of time are always implied. For the non-spatial character of the limiting function rests on its point-related character: ‘The negativity which relates itself to space as a point . . . and is thus posited for itself . . . is time’ (Enc §257, cf. 257A). Contrary to spatial being, which as such just is what it is, time is ‘the being which, in that it is, is not, and in that it is not, is’ (Enc §258; see Richli, 2002).

Hegel continues by determining time as ‘intuited becoming’ (Enc §258). He does this because ‘becoming’ signifies the now occurring transition from a past to a future that is about to be realized. Hegel calls past, present and future ‘the dimensions of time’ (Enc §259) which, on account of their differing ontological modalities, are nowadays designated as the modes of time. The ‘triadic’ overarching structure of time, however, can become tangible only by representing the modes of time in the form of simultaneous juxtaposition. But this is to represent time in a spatial form since ‘[t]he past . . . and the future of time, in so far as they have being in nature, is space’ (Enc §259R; cf. §260A). A temporal structure is therefore one that is only spatially – that is, intuitively – representable. Moreover, only spatial representation allows for time to be ‘fixed’, which is a basic requirement of scientific method. Consider, for example, what occurs in the determination of time by means of a clock. Earlier temporal states have in a sense left their traces behind in space. It is only in this way that they can be confronted with the later temporal states by which they
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are determined as earlier. While Hegel does not develop this point in detail, it is by building on his analysis that time’s property of irreversibility becomes intelligible. Time must appear as anisotropic and unidirectional since what is later is ascertainable only by recourse to what is earlier. A new occurrence appears in view of an earlier one, and the progression of time is thereby univocally defined by additive augmentation. But a well-defined direction of temporal progression can only be drawn in a uni-dimensional manifold (Lucas, 1973, pp. 178–9), which is what likely provides the simplest argument for the one-dimensional character of time (Hösle, 1987b, p. 307).

MOTION AND MATTER

The spatialization of time has widely been regarded as a falsification of the concept of time. Opposing this view, however, is the consideration that Hegel’s explication of spatial limit, and thus his explication of the negativity latent in space, makes evident the intrinsic connectedness of space and time (see Enc §257A; cf. Inwood, 1987, p. 59). The truth of both is thus a synthetic determination: spatial limit – or more accurately, the spatial point – is now also expressly determined as a temporal point. This sort of point, which intrinsically connects space and time, is what Hegel calls (in a linguistically unusual manner) place (Enc §260). Whoever schedules a meeting, for example, at a certain place must provide a temporal specification in addition to a spatial identification.

A place is a ‘spatial now’ (Enc §261). As such, however, a place is also essentially determined by change on account of its intrinsic temporality. As one place in space and time, it continually becomes another place. In other words, ‘place’ in Hegel’s sense is in principle ‘motion’ (ibid.). Since even a spatially fixed place changes temporally, it is fundamentally a movement – in this case, a motion with zero velocity.

Now motion takes place not only in time but also in space. A place changes its spatial and temporal position while remaining a moving place. As such, it maintains itself in motion and thus has a sort of a substantial character. It is a something that moves – a something that Hegel identifies as ‘matter’ (Enc §261). Hegel grants that this ‘transition . . . to the reality that appears as matter’ is ‘incomprehensible for the understanding’ (Enc §261R). But this is only because the understanding regards matter as something ‘indifferent towards space and time’ (i.e. as something completely different from space and time) and at the same time regards material things as ‘essentially spatial and temporal’ (ibid.). This internally contradictory conception of matter has to be overcome. It has to be recognized that the logic of the concept of motion contains the determination of something moved – that is, the determination of something that in its motion preserves its identity as ‘a singularity that is for itself’ and that therefore possesses substantial character. According to Hegel, this something is matter. At this juncture, of course, it is matter without any properties apart from those required by its determination purely as mass (Enc §261, 261A). As Hegel puts this point: ‘Where there is motion there is something that moves; and this durable something is matter . . . Just as there is no motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion’ (Enc §261A).

Now, by enduring – that is, by preserving itself in its motion as something identical – matter is something that

occupies one place, and then changes its place, passing thereby into another place, but both before and after this, it does
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not leave, but occupies, its place. Zeno expresses this dialectic by demonstrating immobility; [by showing that] to move would be to change place, but the arrow never leaves its place. (Enc §261A)

Thus, what is moved so to speak defines its own place. This is a place that does not change for what is moved, which means that something moved is there at rest. The determination of rest, then, is always contained in the concept of motion. That, however, is precisely the core of Zeno’s paradox of the arrow, that is, the paradox according to which a flying arrow remains at rest.

Motion is determined only in relation to something that – in its motion – rests. This means that motion is determined only in relation to a place that is likewise a material place, that is, a mass. Thus, if both of these instances of place are masses, then the relation of motion is symmetrical in the sense that each mass is at rest in relation to itself while it is moved in relation to the other. This is the principle of the relativity of motion, which can be abbreviated as follows: the motion of a mass is equivalent to a relative motion. As we will see below with regard to the motion of light, an ‘Einsteinian’ perspective is already in evidence with this principle.

GRAVITY

The concept of matter or mass has been determined first of all as ‘singularity that is for itself’ (Enc §261R). According to this concept, masses are basically many singular entities that in an ‘abstract’ sense are characterized by repulsion. Since all of them are in equal measure separate and isolated, however, they are all alike; and insofar as they are alike, they show themselves to be (in the same abstract sense) attraction (Enc §262). Repulsion and attraction are here not to be understood as natural forces, but rather as conceptual determinations of ‘singularity’. In keeping with this understanding, Hegel seeks to establish argumentatively the ‘construction of the concept of matter’ in terms of opposing forces of repulsion and attraction, which Kant undertook in MAN (see AA 4:498, 505, 518, 534; for discussion, see Edwards, 2000, pp. 132–44). Hegel’s decisive point in this regard is that singularization is the ground of both the difference and the sameness of singularities. These exist so to speak in the stress field of a contradiction that drives towards its sublation. At issue, fundamentally, is the concept of field that is indispensable for the modern understanding of nature.

In this context, Hegel discerns the origin of gravity (Enc §262) as something that is, as it were, ‘an ought, a yearning, the most unhappy striving to which matter is eternally damned; for its unity does not come into its own – it does not fulfill itself’ precisely because singularization (as repulsion) ‘is just as much an essential moment of matter as attraction’ (Enc §262A).11 Such is Hegel’s visionary intuition of physical ‘singularity’.

Hegel treats the property of gravity, which is constitutive for mass, in three steps that concern corporeal inertia, the impact of bodies, and falling motion.

The single body is ‘indifferent’ towards motion. Motion ‘is external to the body in the same way as its negation of motion, or rest – the body is in fact inert’ (Enc §264). Given its indifference to motion and rest, the single mass is something that ‘in itself neither rests nor moves, but merely passes from one state to the other through external impulse, i.e., rest and motion are posited within it by means of another’ (ibid.). A motion makes its appearance in the single, isolated mass – but not yet explicitly as the proper essence of the latter (Enc §264R).

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According to Hegel, the ‘indifference’ of inert matter is negated in impact. In the interaction of any two bodies that are party to impact, motion is ‘one movement of both bodies though they also resist one another insomuch as each of them is likewise presupposed as an immediate unity’ (Enc §265). This inertial effect occurring in the impact of bodies is what Hegel calls their ‘relative gravity’ (ibid.).

The isolation of inert masses is in principle overcome in falling motion, that is, in bodies’ free striving towards one another. The movement of these bodies has thus become their ‘essential’ motion; it is no longer only the ‘accidental’ motion of impacted inertial masses (Enc §266). The essential gravity by which falling masses are ‘inseparably combined’ is the striving by which bodies seek to ‘posit and have their centre outside themselves’ (ibid.). This is a figurative formulation for the idea that each mass tends of itself to move towards other masses that, taken together, virtually constitute a common centre:

It is . . . not the centre, but the tendency towards the centre, which is immanent in matter. Gravity is so to speak matter’s acknowledgment of the nullity of the self-externality of matter in its being-for-itself—of its lack of independence, of its contraction. (Enc §262R)

Such is matter’s tendency to sublate its externality. But as long as matter is taken as a singular body, this tendency is only an inner disposition. As such, it does not manifest itself in an external form. Matter is ‘still indeterminate, undeveloped, occludent’ since its ‘form [itself] is not yet material’ (Enc §262R). It is only at the highest stage of mechanics that form becomes material. At this stage, which Hegel titles ‘Absolute Mechanics’ (Enc §§269–71), matter’s form becomes material in the totality of the solar system.

Hegel characterizes the solar system as ‘absolute’, and consequently as un-conditioned (un-bedingt), because as a whole it appears as something self-contained. It requires no external impulse, but is rather supported and preserved by itself. In the solar system as a whole, then, ‘the externality of matter is no longer external to itself’ (Enc §271). With this ‘system of many bodies’ Hegel has in mind a system of masses that maintains itself through ‘gravitation’ (Enc §269; for detailed discussion, see Ihmig, 1989, ch. 3) and that is completely determined internally by Kepler’s laws. According to Hegel, it is in this Keplerian system that everything implicitly contained in the concept of matter is explicitly developed: thus ‘developed into the totality of form’, the ‘merely sought centre’ (Enc §271) that is virtually posited by singular masses is now realized in the shape of the ‘central body’ (Enc §269A), namely, the sun.

Hegel is fascinated by Kepler’s laws. They embody for him ‘a discovery of immortal fame’ (Enc §270R) – of fame wrongly conferred upon Newton and his law of gravity. According to Hegel, what ‘Kepler expressed in a simple and sublime manner in the form of laws of celestial motion’ is changed by Newton ‘into the reflectional form of the force of gravity’ (ibid.). The concepts of ‘independent forces’ such as those of ‘centripetal and centrifugal force, etc.’, are likewise but ‘empty reflectional determinations’ in the sense of being ‘fictions of the understanding’ (ibid.; see also Neuser’s introduction to Hegel’s dissertation [Hegel, 1986b], as well as Ihmig, 1989, ch. 2).

Hegel has in mind here the ideal of a ‘rational proof’ (Vernunftbeweis) of Kepler’s laws (Enc §270R) as the foundation of
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absolute mechanics. In his extensive considerations on this topic Hegel demonstrates his competency in contemporaneous physics (even if he does hold that the force effective in capillary action is a form of gravitation \((Enc\ §269)\)). His invective against Newton, though, shows him to be something of a Don Quixote as far as this aspect of his natural philosophy is concerned.

TRANSITION TO QUALIFIED MATTER

The determinateness of form of matter as such, and hence that of unqualified mass, is completed and finalized in the solar system. Matter has therefore been ‘disclosed to form \([\text{zur Form entschlossen}]\)’ \((Enc\ §271)\). In other words, the concept of matter has been developed to the stage at which it is prepared to feature forms of matter that are of greater specificity. At issue, then, is ‘qualified matter’ \((ibid.)\), and thus the thematic content of what Hegel calls physics.

With regard to the argumentative structure of Hegel’s natural philosophy, it is not readily apparent why the treatment of matter’s qualified determinations should occur at this point. It will therefore be helpful to have recourse to Hegel’s science of logic since this is what is supposed to furnish the structural basis of the Philosophy of Nature. The Logic of Being is the part of logical science to which Hegel’s Mechanics corresponds; and the transition to Physics, which is here the point in question, corresponds to the transition in logic from the sphere of being to that of essence. The logical transition between these spheres is mediated by the category of ‘measure \([\text{Maß}]\)’. For the sake of illustrative brevity, let us consider how this category relates to the phase change between water and steam. Regarding this physical phase, the quantitative increase in temperature makes evident intrinsic relations of measure by which continual change in quantity – as governed by these relations – is transformed into qualitative change in the sense that there is the emergence of new qualitative determinations. Ice, water and steam figure here as forms of appearance of an underlying substrate (designated by the chemical formula \(\text{H}_2\text{O}\)) that represents the essence of what appears.

The relation of planets in the solar system is also defined by fixed relations of measure (Ferrini, 1998), which is what Hegel finds so highly fascinating in Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. It is in view of that relation that Hegel seeks to get closer to the essence of matter:

\[
\ldots \text{that which the solar system is as a whole, matter should be in particular} \ldots \text{the complete form of the solar system is the concept of matter in general} \ldots \text{the determinations of form} \text{ which constitute the solar system are the determinations of matter itself, and these determinations constitute the being of matter.} \quad (Enc\ §271A)\]

In a certain sense, this sounds quite modern since Bohr’s pictorial model of the atom is also orientated towards that of the solar system. Hegel is so to speak intuitively correct (even if the example of the solar system is misleading when taken literally). As we hold today, the intrinsic ‘structure of measure’ of a material’s electronic configuration is indeed the actual basis for the emergence of qualitative determinations of matter. And matter is thereby no longer mere mass. It has become something that ‘is determined in itself’ – something that ‘determines by the immanent form’ which constitutes its inner essence and that enters into appearance as qualitatively determinate ‘individuality’ \((Enc\ §272)\).
The transition to the sphere of essence, as it is understood in the context of Hegel’s science of logic, is hereby completed. It is characteristic of this sphere that determinations are ‘only relational’ (Enc §112), that is, are essentially referred to one another, as is the case with essence and appearance, identity and difference, content and form, etc.

PHYSICS

The subject matter of ‘physics’ (again, bearing in mind that Hegel’s use of this term is not entirely congruent with its contemporary usage) consists in the specific qualities of the various forms of matter – for example, light, the traditional four elements (air, fire, water, earth), solid-state properties, acoustic and thermal phenomena, electricity and magnetism, as well as chemical processes. This list lends itself to the supposition that the part of Hegel’s natural philosophy now under consideration is one that, given the empirical research landscape of his time, contains views that are quite outmoded. But this is not the place to go into detail concerning this supposition. Instead, I will concentrate on two particular topics in Hegel’s physics that I hold to be worthy of special attention, namely, Hegel’s account of light and his treatment of the chemical process.

LIGHT

As we have seen, physics corresponds to the logical sphere of essence, which in Hegel’s logic begins with the following ‘determinations of reflection’ (Reflexionsbestimmungen): ‘identity’, ‘difference’ and ‘ground’. Accordingly, ‘matter as it is first qualified’ is characterized by its ‘pure identity with itself’ (Enc §275). In keeping with what was shown above, the self-contained totality of the solar system as a whole, which maintains its own identity in nearly complete independence from external influences, should be the actual essence of matter. In a preliminary and abstract sense, then, the determination of ‘pure identity’ is what constitutes the ‘existent universal self’ – the abstract essence – of matter (ibid.). As natural determinateness, this universal ‘self’ must also have a self-subsistent existence, which Hegel identifies as light (ibid.). This determination of light is unquestionably indebted to Schelling’s early natural philosophy, where light is opposed to gravitational force and – in the particular framework of Schelling’s ‘philosophy of identity’ – is grasped as the real raising of ‘absolute identity itself’ (see Schelling, SsW IV:163, also 162 ff. and 174; SsW VII:358). Hegel holds light, as identity, to be free of all difference and material singularization. Contrary to the reality of heavy matter, light is thus ‘material ideality’ (Enc §276).

Correlative to light’s determination as pure identity is the demand ‘to discard all determinations relating to composition’ (Enc §276A). In its quality as ‘incorporeal and in fact immaterial matter’ (ibid.), light ‘can no more be packed into bundles than it can be separated into rays’ (Enc §276R). Rays, bundles (or packets), particles and even waves as well as vibrations are inappropriate categories for the account of light because of their relatedness to bodies. Hegel is thus decidedly opposed to Newton’s particle theory as well as to the wave theory of light to the extent that these theories are in effect borrowed from the domain of material corporeality. Contradicting the dominant theories of his time, Hegel radically insists on the opposition between light and corporeal matter. He thereby rightly seizes upon something
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quite fundamental to physical reality. (His
dogged but misdirected appeal to Goethe’s
to Newton’s experiments and theories – see, e.g.
VNat:55–62) – is, however, quite another
matter.)

Hegel goes on to treat questions of visibil-
ity as well as optical reflection and the polar-
ization of light before turning to a closer
consideration of ‘darkness’ – of its ‘rigidity’
and ‘neutrality’ in the appearance of lunar
and cometary bodies – and then to further
forms of qualified matter leading beyond the
‘abstract identity’ of light.

Hegel’s conception of light has crucial
implications that point towards key insights
of contemporary physics. Corresponding to
the determination of light as ‘incorporeal and
in fact immaterial matter’ (Enc §276A) is the
assertion that light must also be ‘absolute
levity’ (Enc §276). In other words, to use a
more modern formulation, light is something
that possesses no rest mass. For the motion
of light, however, this means that light is
not subject to the principle of relativity as
it results from the ‘logic’ of the concept of
motion. If corporeal motion is equivalent to
relative motion (see above, ‘Mechanics’), then
non-corporeal motion must be a non-relative
motion.  

Let us consider what this means in con-
tinue terms (for detailed discussion, see
Wandschneider, 2008, ch. 4.9). Since it is
something that is not body, light cannot be at
rest. Light itself can only be moving even if
the reference instance for the determination
of light’s motion has to be a body. But this
implies as well that the velocity of light must
be independent of the state of motion of a
given body of reference. Otherwise, a body
that furnishes the relevant reference instance
could be moving in such a way that light has
zero velocity relative to it, which would be
inconsistent with the aforementioned cir-
cumstance that light, as non-corporeal, can
only be something moving. Should the veloci-
ty of light be independent of the body of
reference, however, then that velocity must
remain the same in relation to every body.
The character of light’s velocity is therefore
absolute; it is no longer relative. This means,
further, that the velocity of light must be the
greatest possible velocity. For if a body could
have the same velocity as that of light, then
light – with reference to such a body – would
be determined precisely as something at rest.
The velocity of light, then, is the physically
limiting velocity that cannot be exceeded.17

Furthermore, if light can only be some-
thing in motion, then it must also be true that
every body, taken in its kinematic relation to
light, is determined as resting. Consequently,
what each body is (as something that is first
of all for itself to the exclusion of other bod-
ies) is now also manifested, in connection
with the motion of light, as a property that
is common to all bodies. The real singularity
and diversity of bodies becomes irrelevant in
relation to light. Light proves to be the com-
mon denominator, as it were, in everything
diverse. It is by light that the ideal identity
of bodily things becomes manifest beyond all
corporeal singularity and difference. Thus,
according to Hegel’s characterization, light
qualifies as something like the ideal substrate
of matter: the underlying ideal ‘self of matter’
(Enc §275) that provides for the ideal iden-
tity of all things corporeal.

The insights just developed from Hegel’s
criteria of motion and light are in line with
basic features of Einstein’s (special) theory
of relativity. John N. Findlay has thus cor-
rectly claimed that there is ‘a flavor of rel-
vity-physics in some of the things Hegel
says about light’ (Findlay, 1964, p. 279). Yet
it would also be perverse to maintain that
Hegel anticipated twentieth-century relativity theory. Einstein’s great accomplishment in fact lies in his conception of a theory that provides a framework in which the relative motion of bodies and the non-relative motion of light are mathematically compatible despite their apparent incompatibility as physical contraries (which, however, truly belong together). By contrast, Hegel’s considerations pertain to a more basic theoretical level. They reveal to the (special) theory of relativity a philosophical perspective that remains concealed within the theory itself.  

THE CHEMICAL PROCESS

Also of fundamental interest – though, again, along with much that is outdated – is Hegel’s interpretation of chemical processes. In keeping with his conception of physics, this interpretation is found in the concluding chapter of the second main part of the Philosophy of Nature. It is in this chapter on the Chemical Process that the structural determination of physics by the logic of essence is perhaps most clearly evident, as can be seen in the essential reciprocal relatedness of the chemical determinations in question (Burbidge, 1993, pp. 609–17). Acids and bases, for example, are understood as opposites that are per se not neutrally related to one another, but must instead react upon one another and change accordingly on account of their opposing natures. Only the product of a chemical reaction (e.g. NaOH + HCl → NaCl + H₂O) has a neutral character (in this case, salt and water). The opposition of elements is thus sublated, and the chemical process comes to a rest.

Hegel treats the nature of the chemical process in his science of logic (for extended discussion, see Burbidge, 1996). It is distinctive of a chemical object that ‘the reference to other, and the mode and manner of this reference, belongs to its nature’ (WL GW 12:148). Thus, ‘in this there is immediately posited the striving to sublate the one-sidedness of the other and, through this reciprocal balancing and combination, to posit a reality conformable to the concept that contains both moments’ (WL GW 12:149). Each chemical object has ‘within it the necessity and the drive to sublate its opposed, one-sided subsistence, and to make itself . . . into the real whole’ (WL GW 12:148). It thus strives to bring out its underlying ‘universal determinateness, not only the determinateness of the one [italics mine, D.W.] singular object, but also of the other’ (ibid.).

Once this is accomplished, the chemical process is extinguished. It therefore ‘does not spontaneously restart itself, for it had the difference only as its presupposition – it did not itself posit it’ (WL GW 12:150). To this extent, then, the chemical process is ‘still finite in comparison with the organic process’ (Enc §329A). Hegel holds that biological life is indeed ‘implicit within the chemical process’ and that life is itself ‘a perenniating chemical process’ (Enc §335A). Yet he also maintains that the products of the chemical process would be living only if they ‘spontaneously renewed their activity’ (ibid.). It is striking that Hegel already has a biochemical perspective in sight when he thinks of the organic from the standpoint of the chemical process.

ORGANIC PHYSICS

The transition from inanimate to animate nature is, in Hegel’s view, so to speak the transition ‘from the prose of nature to its
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poetry’ (Enc §336A). It must be understood as the emergence of determinations of form in the organic (Neuser, 2002a). In a chemical reaction an object changes, but ‘the totality of shape does not endure’ in this process (Enc §336A). An organism, however, is essentially characterized by its self-preservation as its own end (VNat., 140). It is thus distinguished by its ability to preserve its own form, including its specific functions in the life process (Breidbach, 2004). Similar to the way in which the general form of a poem is preserved through change of that poem’s lines, the ‘flyishness’ of a particular fly – its genus-universality – is always preserved throughout the life process of such an organism. As an individual, an organism is at the same time something universal; and insofar as it is universal, it obtains what is in effect a conceptual character (Spahn, 2007): ‘Nature has here reached the determinate being of the concept’ (Enc §336A). An organism is in effect a concept become active. It is a subject (though not yet one in the human sense, of course). It is in view of the organism’s capacity for self-preservation qua preservation of genus universality – hence its ability to preserve its specific essence together with its self-identity, for example, the ‘flyishness’ of a fly – that Hegel describes organisms as having a ‘self-centred’ character, that is, as having the ‘subjectivity’ that is characteristic of a self (Enc §§337, 350).

In the following I will concentrate above all on the distinction between plant and animal that is essential to organic nature’s forms of appearance. This will allow us to focus on Hegel’s insights concerning the emergence of the psychical, that is, the occurrence of organisms with sensory capacity. The conclusion to this section treats the transition from nature to spirit, which is both the completion and the surmounting of nature itself.

Given the concept of self mentioned-above, Hegel provides the following typology for the forms of life: (1) ‘geological organism’: self-preservation without a self (Enc §§338–42); (2) ‘vegetable organism’: self-preservation with a non-reflexive self (Enc. §§343–9); (3) ‘animal organism’: self-preservation with a reflexive self (i.e. the self that is for itself) (Enc §§350–76). Let us consider this systematic classification of life forms, paying particular attention to the characterizations of ‘self’ that it involves.

GEOLOGICAL ORGANISM, PLANT, AND ANIMAL

Since what Hegel calls geologischer Organismus is without a self, it is not an organism in the proper sense. Hegel speaks of the terrestrial body (Erdkörper), for example, as having the capacity for self-preservation, but not as having the subjectivity and genus-universality that are otherwise essential features of organic life forms (Enc §338A). A familiar contemporary example – namely, our notion of an ecological system – may here be useful for clarifying what Hegel means by ‘geological organism’.19 Like Hegel’s geological organism, an ecological system is characterized in terms of self-preservation – in this case, in terms of its maintaining a dynamical equilibrium that may also be overturned under changing conditions and transformed into a different balance. An ecological system is not yet a subject. What it lacks is in fact permanent control over its own form (qua form of a specific genus-universal) by a self that is something like a subjective valuation system. It thus lacks a subject-like system that, as a matter of self-preservation, existentially assesses and regulates everything that internally and externally concerns an organism in its proper sense. (If a fly is threatened with respect to its existence as a fly, then it flies away.)
In contrast to the geological organism, a plant is a genuine organism. As such, it is determined by a self that aims to preserve the organism under changing external conditions. According to Hegel’s concept of organism, a plant possesses the kind of subjectivity by which it teleologically strives to preserve its genus-universality, also in view of obstacles. None of this, of course, can be experienced by the organism here at issue. The plant does not possess ‘sentience [Selbstgefühl]’ (Enc §344A). It is ‘not yet subjectivity that is for itself’ (Enc §344). While the plant’s vegetable self is indeed related to the organism as a whole, it is not yet related to itself as well. The vegetable self, then, is without reflexivity. It corresponds morphologically to a rather loose form of organic unity according to which ‘the process of articulation and self-preservation of the vegetable subject is one in which it comes forth from itself, and falls apart into several individuals’ (Enc §343) – as happens, for instance, when a part of a plant – a ‘scion’ – can again become the whole plant.

What a plant still lacks is realized in an animal’s structure of subjectivity. A plant is a subject, but an animal also exists as a subject (Enc §350). The subjectivity of an animal is thus present to the animal itself. Essential to this self-presence of animal subjectivity is the emergence of ‘the self that is for the self’ (Enc §350A), that is, the self that so to speak encounters itself. Hegel sees the distinctive ‘self-for-self’ structure here at issue (Enc §351A) as something first realized in animal subjectivity. In this regard, one has to consider that an animal, in contrast to a plant, must move and find its orientation within its environment. Hegel has basically this in view when he refers to animal ‘self-mobility’ and ‘interrupted intussusception’ (Enc §351) as well as to the animal’s nervous system (Enc §344).

Hegel does not go into detail concerning the import of the considerations just mentioned for the structure of the animal self. But to bring out this import, we can pursue the following line of argument in connection with some early considerations on ‘cybernetics’ put forward by W. Ross Ashby (1966). An organism must regulate its biochemical functions, whether its regulative function requires a central organ or is distributed over its entire biochemical system. For the sake of brevity I will refer to this instance of regulative function as an organism’s function-self. Since a plant has to regulate only its internal biochemical functions, its form of self-regulation is limited to that of the function-self. An animal, however, must also be in control of its actions within its external environment. Thus, in addition to the function-self, the animal organism requires an arrangement of nerves and sensory organs corresponding to a form of self-regulative activity that oversees and controls an animal’s actions in view of its self-preservation. This is what I will call an action-self (Wandschneider, 1987).

The crucial thing to notice here is that the action-self of the animal organism remains reflexively bound to the function-self because an animal’s actions must be existentially purposive in the sense that they have to be in keeping with the organism’s needs. Consequently, all such actions are subject to existential evaluations on the part of the function-self. But what does this mean in concrete terms? (For extended discussion, see Wandschneider, 2008, ch. 7.3.) To take an instructive example, consider what happens when a hot stove burner is touched. The externally perceived tactile impression is first presented to the function-self and is thereby subjected to existential assessment. This is given back to the
action-self and blended into its outer perception. As the sensation of pain, it is thus ‘the immediate unity of being and of that belonging to it [die unmittelbare Einheit des Seyns und des Seynen]’ (Enc §358A). While this characterization is, of course, Hegel’s play on words, his meaning is that perception in this form is no longer concerned only with the animal organism’s external situation (das Seyn). It also makes the organism’s own internal evaluative condition (das Seyne) something that can be experienced – which is something fundamentally new. Perception, which first of all is directed externally, has hereby achieved an internal dimension. Thus, Hegel’s characterization of sensation as a ‘finding of oneself within oneself [Sich-selbst-in-sich-Finden]’ (Enc §337A) designates inner sensation’s appearance on the perceptual stage, which is made possible by the structure of the double self that is distinctive of the animal subject. Given this structure, it also becomes possible for the existential assessments performed by the function-self to be subject to perceptual experience. Qualities such as ‘hot’, ‘sweet’ or ‘disgusting’ are in fact significant factors in organismic self-preservation. Indeed, the animal soul and self-preservation go essentially hand in hand. It is in the co-operation of function-self and action-self that an inner dimension is spanned:

. . . the self forms both sides of this relationship, which is therefore an internal circuit of the soul, keeping itself aloof from organic nature. As the plant has not yet attained to this selfhood, however, it lacks inwardness. (Enc §344A)

We can see what is specific to behaviour regulated by sensation by comparing programmed robotic actions with the bare reflex actions of an animal organism. A robot, lacking a self, is deprived of the existential dimension of self-preservation. It simply does what it has been programmed to do as the result of its programmer’s intentions; and on account of its lack of that existential dimension, it does not worry about its own being since ‘[o]nly a living existence senses deficiency’ (Enc §359R). In contrast to this, an organism’s reflex action – an action defending the organism against danger, for example – is existentially determined through and through, and it should therefore not be confused with any robotic action. Still, an organism’s reflex action does exhibit something robot-like to the extent that it lacks sensation. In this case the existential assessment of perception is not fed back into perception as something to be integrated into it (in which case it would be sensation), but instead goes directly into triggering a motoric action.

With this Hegel-inspired interpretation of sensation we come upon an important pathway for approaching the so-called mind-body problem (Wandschneider, 2008, ch. 7). But if sensation is not properly understood as the most elementary form of the psychical, it seems that there is little hope of illuminating the far more complex connections involved in our higher mental processes.21

**Generic Process, Death and Transition to Spirit**

Having the capacity for self-preservation is a constitutive property for being an organism. As was explained above, an organism is self-identically preserved through all internal and external changes to which it is subject. As an individual, then, an organism is at the same time a universal, an instance of a species. The inner tension between singularity and universality finds its basic expression in the sexual nature of the process.
differentiation to which higher forms of the organic are subject. The singular individual cannot, qua singular, be the truth of species-universality. But insofar as it is nonetheless related to its species as a whole, it has (in the most elementary form) the instinct (Trieb) driving it towards unification with another instance of its species. The natural basis for this instinctual drive is the differentiation of individuals into the male and female principle, which in each individual gives rise to a feeling of ‘deficiency’ (Mangel). The singular individual is thus subject to

the drive to attain its sentence [Selbstgefühl] in the other of its genus, to integrate itself through union with this other and by means of this mediation, to bring the genus into existence by linking itself into it – sexual copulation [Begattung]. (Enc §369)

This realization of the species in the unification of male and female individuals, which in higher animals gives rise to ‘a feeling of universality’ (Enc §369), is on Hegel’s view ‘the supreme moment of an animal’s capabilities’ (Enc §368). It is in effect a genetically anchored and most primitive form of intersubjectivity by which individual separation is overcome and species-universality is realized.

Since the natural result of sexual generation is always yet another individual, this ‘process of propagation issues forth into a spuriously infinite progression’ (Enc §370). At the same time, though, the individuals involved have fulfilled ‘their determination in the process of generation’ and ‘must pass on to death in so far as they have no higher determination’ (ibid.). Their very ‘inadequateness to universality’, then, is their ‘original disease and inborn germ of death’ (Enc §375).

Nevertheless, Hegel continues, ‘superseding this death of nature, proceeding from this dead husk, there rises the finer nature of spirit’ (Enc §376A). Inasmuch as spirit is ‘the universal which exhibits itself as universal’ (Enc §375A), nature’s immanent tendency towards idealization here reaches its conclusion. The universal that is realized through spirit no longer has the organism’s spatio-temporal and material mode of being. As logical and ideal, spirit is something non-spatial, super-temporal and immaterial. It is, then, immortal – ‘the divine, the eternal’ (Enc §376A). Spirit – the apprehension of the universal as universal, and hence the possibility of objective cognition – rests upon the capacity for thinking (see de Laurentiis, 2002) as distinguished from the subjectively tinted cognitive forms of perception and animal sensation. In its cognition of the laws that determine nature as nature’s underlying ideal essence, spirit accomplishes something that nature itself is not in a position to achieve. For the essence of nature – nature’s immanent logic of natural laws – is not itself a natural entity. It is rather of an entirely different order of being – a transnatural mode of being, as it were. Nature merely is, and it knows nothing thereof. Only spirit is capable of accomplishing that which nature is incapable of doing, namely, achieving knowledge of nature (Wandschneider, 2005a, pp. 206–12).

In natural science spirit grasps the ideal that underlies nature in the form of natural laws. A natural philosophy in Hegel’s vein comprehends spirit itself as the highest manifestation of this ideal.

Nature’s development towards spirit as the realization of its underlying ideal essence can be summarized as follows. The basis of nature’s development lies in fundamental logic. In its completion as the absolute idea, the logical is determined as un-conditioned, that is,
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as absolutely independent of the non-ideal. Precisely in virtue of logic’s absolute independence and unconditioned character, however, the non-ideal is co-posted as the other of the idea – namely, as nature. And in so far as nature is as this other of the idea, it remains related to and determined by the latter. The expression of this relatedness and determination is the lawfulness of nature understood as the ground of nature’s immanently self-realizing tendency towards idealization – a tendency that culminates in spirit, and thus in the reflective self-comprehension of the logical idea (Drees, 1992; Burbidge, 1996, ch. 32).

This means, however, that nature, as the necessary accompanying phenomenon of the idea, is unavoidably determined to develop towards the emergence of spirit. Put differently, the laws of nature must be such that the existence of spirit is both possible and actually achieved in nature. Now this is exactly what is asserted by the so-called anthropic principle, which has been discussed mainly by physicists for the past three decades (Barrow and Tipler, 1986; Carr, 2006). Scientific discussion of the anthropic principle has arguably yielded no solid results to date. On its objective-idealistic interpretation, however, nature is comprehensible as the development towards spirit, and thus as the full-circle return to the idea. From the encompassing metaphysical perspective of objective idealism, the question of whether nature – physis – could fail to achieve such a goal is not posed since the idea must find its way back to itself by way of the stages of nature and spirit.

But why this detour from the logical idea through nature to spirit and back again to the idea? Following Hegel, it is because the idea, as we have seen, cannot simply remain ‘by itself [bei sich]’ since nature is dialectically co-posted with it. The detour through nature is thereby unavoidable. But if there is nature, then nature must be given as the idealizing tendency that is directed towards the anthropic goal called spirit. This is the end in which nature finds both its completion and its self-transcendence in the human being, that is, in the type of being that is able to survey and comprehend nature’s systematic connectedness in its totality.

When seen from a fundamental viewpoint, Hegel’s philosophy provides the most well-considered concept of nature in the entire tradition of natural philosophy. Given its foundation in the system of objective idealism, Hegel’s philosophy of nature has a theoretical grounding that is superior to other approaches to natural philosophy – to the Leibnizian, the Kantian or the Schellingian metaphysical systems of nature, for example. By setting out from the objectively binding character of logic – which, as we have seen, can only be called into question at the cost of self-contradiction – Hegel’s philosophy of nature obtains a rationally supportable foundation. And proceeding from this foundation, it frames a fascinating overall picture of nature (Schmied-Kowarzik, 1998; Fulda, 2006). In doing this, it makes possible a holistic view of reality in which nature and spirit essentially belong together precisely in and through their opposition. Moreover, Hegel’s philosophy of nature opens up new perspectives – new options for the philosophical interpretation of relativity theory, for example, or for the explanation of the emergence of the psychical in nature. More generally, it leads to the further advancement of Hegel’s project of providing comprehending knowledge of nature in the form of an elaborated dialectic of nature.
NOTES

1. I would like to express my cordial thanks to Jeffrey Edwards (Stony Brook) for a sensible and thorough translation of my German text.

2. ‘The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from nature, but rather prescribes them to nature’ (Prol AA 4:320).

3. In a similar vein, Hegel writes in his Berlin Inaugural Address of 1818: ‘In its grounding, . . . , philosophy, like the universe, is round within itself. Nothing is first and nothing last. Instead, everything is supported and maintained – mutually and in oneness’ (Antrittsrede 1818 GW 18:18–19).

4. This reply, of course, does not do full justice to the basic problem contained in Krug’s challenge (on this, see Klein, 2002).


6. I have elsewhere argued in detail that, despite this denial, Hegel’s philosophy of nature does offer a persuasive ontological framework for the explanation of the stage-like developmental process of nature that we today call evolution (Wandschneider, 2001; cf. Findlay, 1964, p. 272; Harris, 1998, p. 206; Hösle, 2005; Spahn, 2007, ch. 3.3.3).

7. For criticism of this interpretative approach, see Rinaldi (2002).

8. For further elaboration, see Halper (1998).

9. As far as I can see, this is something unique in philosophy. Even for Kant, spatial tri-dimensionality is not proved, but is instead declared to be a fact of our a priori intuition of space. For detailed treatment of Hegel’s interpretation of space’s tri-dimensionality, see Wandschneider (1982, ch. 2).


11. A passage from Hegel’s Jena period puts the point similarly: ‘Just as there is no motion without matter, there is no matter without motion. Motion is process, the transition from space to time and the reverse; matter, however, is the relation of space and time as resting identity’. Friedrich Engels later adapted the relation in question to his view of materialism. See Engels, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) XX:55.

12. Repulsion is as essential as attraction since matter ‘would fuse together in a single point’ if it ‘reached what it aspires to in gravity’ (Enc §262A).

13. The circular nature of the planetary orbits characterizes the solar system. If, according to Hegel, the essence of matter is manifested in the solar system, then circular motion (as the simplest example of planetary motion) must be essential to the understanding of matter. On Hegel’s approach to the interpretation of mass from the symmetrical structure of circular motion, see Wandschneider (1993).


15. We may disregard here whatever astro-physical scruples we might have concerning this claim.

16. This implication, which at first glance may seem bizarre, was already formulated by Hegel in 1805–6 (though without explicit reference to the kinematic principle of relativity) when he attributed ‘absolute velocity’ to the ‘being’ of light (Jena Systementwürfe [JS] III GW 8:35; see also Enc §275A).

17. Hegel’s position on the physical reality of light’s absolute velocity thus holds against whatever Gerald Feinberg may have demonstrated concerning the theoretical possibility of ‘tachyons’, that is, imaginary masses with velocities exceeding the speed of light (see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tachyon).

18. See for instance the specifically physical orientation of the investigations on the special theory of relativity by Hans Reichenbach (1928) and Ernst Cassirer (1972). On the options for interpreting the general theory of relativity in the framework of Hegel’s natural philosophy, see Wandschneider (2008, ch. 4.10).


20. As Hegel expressed this thought during his Jena period, the animal organism is ‘as the unity of two selves – first, a whole as individual, as self-sensing in desire; then, a whole that
excludes from itself this abstract I, a whole for which another exists’ (*JS III GW 8:166*). I find this characterization noteworthy because Hegel distinguishes between two selves that he otherwise speaks of in an undifferentiated manner. We have here the unity of the function-self (as the self that evaluates and senses the internal state of want) and the action-self (which perceives an external object).

21 For the place of the mental in the systematic framework of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, see Wolff (1992).

translated by J. Edwards
Hegel characterizes philosophical knowing as a process of comprehending (begreifen) which is neither an evolution nor an emanation but a ‘development’. For Hegel to say that the concept (der Begriff) ‘develops’ means that the universalizing activity of thought aims at self-actualization (or at the complete manifestation of what it is in itself) as a system of determinations of forms (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [Enc] §§249A, 251A). This conception of rational or speculative comprehending, centred on the self-determined character of subjectivity, is at once logical and real (Enc §79R). It mirrors the way in which philosophy ‘truly’ regards its external objects. Philosophy cannot deduce singular and contingent objects, such as Herr Krug’s pen. Neither does philosophy confine its comprehending activity to abstracting from and generalizing finite features of empirical objects. Rather, as philosophy of nature it accounts for the inward necessity of those objects of experience (such as roses or dogs), that are truly comprehensible only through their substantial form or inward principle of unity. Other objects (such as the moon within the solar system: GW 4:178–9) can only be comprehended from the totality that frames them, that is, from a self-organized whole consisting of a network of relations between a centre of unity and its peripheral parts.

This conceptualization of subjectivity as the internal principle of any object that is not a transitory form and is thus worthy of philosophical consideration (i.e. as principle of the Sache: see Inwood, 1992, pp. 289–90; di Giovanni, 2010, pp. lxxi–lxxii) is made apparent also in Hegel’s systematic outline of the three constitutive elements of the philosophical idea, that is, of the form of all thought forms together with their real manifestations: first, the ideal sphere of objective and subjective logic consisting of the pure categories and subjective concepts can only be simple, undifferentiated universals – mere ‘possibilities’ of the real determinations of forms; second, the real objective–subjective sphere of nature; and third, the real subjective–objective sphere of spirit. Both nature and spirit are forms that the logical idea attains in actualizing what it is in itself or potentially, namely a self-differentiating and self-identical universal (or a universal that is the unity of itself and its determinate opposite). This ‘concrete universality’ results from the syllogistic movement of rational thought within its three spheres, a movement characterized by immanent differentiation and reintegration into a unity. In its totality, the philosophical idea ‘equally appears’ in each one of the three elements.
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Furthermore, ‘every single circle also breaks through the restriction of its element as well, precisely because it is in itself [the] totality, and it grounds a further sphere’ (Enc §15). Accordingly, what is being known in the element of nature is not something ‘other than the idea’, for it is the idea in the form of externalization (Entäußerung). The reciprocal relation between the two real spheres of nature and spirit is reflected by the reciprocal relation between the science of the idea’s objective existence (of the idea in its being-other), and the science of the idea’s subjective existence (of the idea returning to itself from its being-other) (Enc §18R).

LOGIC, NATURE AND SPIRIT: THEIR SYSTEMATIC RELATIONS

Readers have been puzzled by the apparent contrast between two claims: on the one hand, Hegel claims that philosophy comprehends nature as externalization of thought – in the sense that nature is the representation of all that is independent of and external to mind in contrast to what is inward. On the other hand, in the first division of the Philosophy of Spirit Hegel presents subjective mind as still immersed in natural corporeity. Although the further development of spirit consists of its cultural self-formation (Bildung) in the freedom it gains by sublating its otherness, for us this development presupposes nature (Enc §381). From the first perspective, nature can only be the negative of spirit – what is self-external against the fundamental unity of the self of spirit. From the second perspective, spirit becomes what it is ‘through’ and ‘in relation to’ its pre-history and embodiment, that is, nature (see Winfield, 2011). Hegel warns, however, not to take nature as the original prins, making spirit into something derived from nature. Rather, ‘spirit is in truth its own result’ for it produces itself from the presuppositions that it itself makes, that is, from the logical idea and from nature. Spirit is as much the truth of the one as it is of the other. Its true shape (wahre Gestalt) originally integrates spirit that is only in itself (as in logic) together with spirit that is only external to itself (as in nature) (Enc §381A; also §376A).

Hegel also clarifies our relation to nature by examining the ‘separation’ between universality and singularities in pre-philosophical forms of thinking (see Marmasse, 2005, pp. 74–7; 2011, pp. 22–35). We ordinarily distinguish between an abstract form of universality as generalization from or shared features of individual beings, and the sensibly given (Vorlesungen über die Naturphilosophie 1821/2 [VNat]:5–6; Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur 1825/6 [VNat]:19–20). Whereas thinking is taken to contain what is universal and stable, the immediately sensible is taken as being singular and variable. This is why we regard nature empirically as an enigma in need of solution (TWA 9:12). As the infinite manifold of sensible beings, nature appears not merely external but positively extrinsic to us, that is, foreign to thought. We distinguish our spirit both from the ‘Proteus’ that is phenomenal nature (Enc §376A), that is, from an outwardness in which we do not find ourselves, and from nature’s inwardness or being-in-itself (VNat:9). We assume that we confront a natural, and as such impenetrable, being that can be understood only by ‘forcing’ upon it an abstract cognitive scheme with no objective referent – for example, by considering the truth of a particular animal to be its genus (see Marmasse, 2006, pp. 34–7). We also assume that, conversely, spirit needs to comprehend nature by finding its objective truth, that is, the nous that nature by itself
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does not bring to consciousness (Enc §§24A1, 381A), in what remains (timelessly) stable within natural being’s transience. This nous is the concept that syllogistically ‘determines at the same time the particular’ (see Ferrini, 2004, pp. 73–7); by contrast, the formal universal activity of the understanding withdraws from natural things by means of abstraction. For Hegel, the only form of universality found in nature by rational, self-determining spirit, namely the immanent subjectivity of objectivity as ‘that which is self-determining within itself’ (VNat,1:10) is precisely the outcome of the Science of Logic (WL).

Indeed, insofar as it thinks itself, pure thinking activity comes to know itself truly as ‘the absolute idea’, namely as the infinite form that, by examining its objective and subjective logical determinations, attains the condition of being for itself. Thus thinking knows itself as ‘the determining of form’ within its own immediacy and universality. At the end of WL, mind’s drive to overcome the contradiction between the simple oneness of the universal and the multiplicity of singulars results in thinking’s ‘freedom’ to overcome the one-sidedness and deficiency of logical universals in their undeveloped potentiality. By stating that the absolute idea knows itself Hegel means that we become aware that our thinking ‘posits’ and intuits itself in what exists (Daseyn). This is possible because our thinking actually presents its own determinations of the form of the sensible as mind-independent reality, making the latter into logic’s own otherness. Hegel describes the transition from the idea of logic to the idea as nature in terms of a freie Entlassung, often rendered in English with ‘release’ or ‘discharge’. But freie Entlassung should be interpreted rather as the idea’s self-emancipation from any essential dependence upon the sensible and the understanding as sources of truth (see Marquard, 1968, p. 175). At the conclusion of WL we realize that there is no finite, empirical, mind-independent existent left that thinking cannot truly know as a posited, mediated, conceptually transparent, inner determination of form. In Hegel’s words: ‘Since the inwardness of nature is nothing but the universal, then, if we have thoughts, we are by ourselves in this inwardness’ (Enc §246A).

THE TRUTH OF NATURE’S EXTERNALITY IN THE 1807 PHENOMENOLOGY

This result of WL presupposes the justification of absolute knowing offered in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG). The philosophical system (of which PhG was originally intended as the first part) is meant to deduce a priori, or according to syllogistic necessity (see Ferrini, 2004, pp. 80–3), what experiencing consciousness has shown to occur in its study of nature’s laws, forces and genera – a study undertaken in order to cognize any object’s being-in-itself as being essentially other than the cognitive subject. In ‘Observing Reason’ – that is, from the standpoint of the unification of our theoretical procedures with the practical knowing of the self previously developed in ‘Self-consciousness’ – Hegel has exhibited the self-sublation of a shape of consciousness trapped in a finite subject–object relation, namely, subject’s mere observation of the object. In this relation, universal natural laws are believed to derive empirically from nature and to be unaffected by the self. In ‘Observing Reason’, Hegel argues that natural scientists’ descriptive classifications of nature’s profuse particularizations actually show that approaches based merely on the abstract and finite mental framework of the understanding
are wholly inadequate to account for nature’s inherent contradiction between simple universality and sensuous manifold. By contrast, Hegel highlights how systematic classifications based on internal purposiveness and the structural relations among members of an organic whole (as the classifications provided by Cuvier) can discern the essential way in which natural beings differentiate themselves. In this second approach, Hegel remarks, the concept rises ‘above the dispersion of the sensuous’ (*PhG GW* 9:140). Even scientific experiments themselves show the inversion of that ‘stand-point of consciousness’ for which the truth of nature’s laws lies in experience: the first falsification of this standpoint occurs in the attempt to generalize a law to cover all cases that fall under it. Consciousness discovers then that the truth of nature’s laws lies in the concept (ibid.) because modern scientific research frees universal laws from all empirical character (*PhG GW* 9:143; see Ferrini, 2007).

Accordingly, Hegel writes about the transition from logic to nature that ‘in this freedom . . . there is no transition that takes place; the simple being to which the idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it’ (*WL GW* 12:253). This apparent paradox of a ‘transition without transition’ makes sense in light of the idea’s own emancipation from all empirical character (*PhG GW* 9:143; see Ferrini, 2007).

NATURE’S LIBERATION FROM EXTERNALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Each part of philosophy is a philosophical whole. Accordingly, the object of the philosophy of nature ‘is in its own self this process of becoming spirit, of sublating its own otherness’ (*Enc §247A* [emphasis added]). The contradiction between the objective, outward reality of nature and the subjective, inward ideality of spirit is overcome along the ‘path of return’ (ibid.) of the philosophy of nature. The universal idea takes the particularity that to thought, as it were (*VNat* ;5). Rather, while it determines the forms of contingent and multifarious phenomena, the idea for Hegel remains by itself. It recognizes itself in the phenomena’s concealed centre, in their point of unity, or their truth. At the same time, the self-relation of the idea paves the way for the self-constitution of finite or subjective spirit. Hegel’s statement that ‘nature has in itself the nullification to pass over into truth, at first into finite spirit’ (*Vorlesungen über die Logik* [VLog]:226) means that nature by itself negates the externality ‘which constitutes the determination in which nature is as nature’ (*Enc §247*). Thinking of nature, in other words, means negating the truth of the multiplicity of singular bodies that appear reciprocally indifferent and external to one another. Since, for example, the planets of our solar system are necessarily related because they ‘have to patrol a single [gravitational] field’ (*Enc §248A*), here truth has the objective sense of the object’s (Sache) agreement with itself, or of the adequacy of its reality and its concept (*Enc §246A*; see Ferrini, 2004, pp. 76–7).
is external to it back again into itself. In so doing, the idea returns to itself as finite individuality and eventually as subjectivity and fully developed spirit. The transition to spirit, therefore, is not conceived as a sudden or a natural occurrence between the end of the Philosophy of Nature and the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit, but rather as a timeless kind of transition that is ‘mapped’ onto nature as what is given’ (di Giovanni, 2010, p. xxvi). This transition is already present in the conception of the mechanism of nature as a whole of composite material bodies conceived as mere quantities of matter consisting of discrete parts, all of which tend towards a centre. This ‘legitimation’ of the mechanical conception of matter (see Renault, 2001, p. 60) extends to the physical, individual and qualitative inner form of matter. In the chemical process, we come to grasp the chemical substance as a point of unity and its properties as momentary appearances that become reintegrated into the essential unity of a permanent co-ordination of the parts (the bond of affinity). This movement ends with the living individual as an immediate unitary existence, whose internal necessity is purposive and self-determining. The organism is a subject with a self-developing form because its material ‘parts’ exist only as members of a whole that negates their independence and subjects them to a centre of unification. We comprehend the organic body as being essentially self-determining and no longer dependent upon an other (see Ferrini, 2009d, pp. 48–54; 2011, pp. 207–16). The singular living organism acquires, preserves and transmits by reproduction an individually differentiated ‘self-form’ (VNat:168). In Hegel’s words: ‘nature itself . . . is its own sublation into spirit’ (VLog:226). This sublation begins as nature’s emancipation from self-externality in the ‘free’ heavenly bodies and continues through the inwardness of physical qualities and properties and through the dynamic unity of chemical substances. It ultimately results in the subjective unity of living beings, where each organ generates the other as cause and effect, means and end. The animal organism shows that self-externality is completely devoid of truth (Enc §§376A, 381A). However, only spirit in its freedom develops its own centre as clear consciousness and thought of what is universal as something universal, for only ‘I am what is entirely universal, and my object is also I’ (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes [VGeist]:24; also Enc §381A).

This marks the difference between ‘mere’ nature and nature as externalization of spirit.

WHY NATURE IS NOT YET SPIRIT

Animals, whose relation to externality is mainly one of control and assimilation, are unable to grasp unity within multiplicity and thus to cognize the ‘form’ or ‘universal’ that underlies experience. According to Hegel, on the one hand, the animal experiences a thorough sense of unity in all its members; on the other hand, it achieves only a feeling of itself as ‘singularity’ through its instinctual behaviour towards external objects, a behaviour characterized by internal excitement and satisfaction. Thus, the animal has not yet free will, that is, the capacity for autonomous self-determination independent of excitement, sensation or singular circumstances: in the animal, the universal is ‘not yet’ for the universal (Enc §381A). Hegel nevertheless argues that, in the (alleged) independence and firmness of external objects, animals actually ‘sense’ or ‘intuit’ our ‘concept of things’. The animal ‘idealistically’ trusts
that the material externality of nature has ‘no truth’: the animal consumes things, that is, it negates their substantial being so that its own substantial subjectivity is maintained and developed (VGeist:25).

In the protean realm of nature, only the living being can represent the ‘concept’, that is, a unity of itself and its determinate opposite (Enc §359). In the phenomenological analysis of natural life, ‘animal obtuseness’ driven by appetite (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte [VGesch]:35) is said to treat any encountered object as a means to re-integrate the unity of its own sensible self. The same applies to human life driven by instinct alone: when immersed in a preconscious, unthinking, merely natural condition, the human being is external to itself or to its humanity (VGesch:27). Though they reach the outer limits of the idea in its externality, still animals remain fully within nature. From the cycle of consuming and self-preservation to sexual reproduction, the contradictions of animals’ subjectivity with otherness are always resolved within their natural state (Enc §381A). They are therefore exempted from the ‘tremendous contradiction’ arising within human beings, whose germinating self-consciousness is immediately ‘entangled with appetite’ (Enc §430A). Thus, neither is there an ‘immediate transition’ from nature to spirit consisting of a simple process of becoming (see Ferrini, 1999, pp. 68–75; also Marmasse, 2002, pp. 145–7); nor is the transition carried out naturaliter (Marmasse, 2008, pp. 373–9); nor does spirit emerge directly from animal instinct. Hegel even states that ‘human animality’, far from being implicit in that of animals, is rather completely distinct from it. He stresses the discontinuity (signalled, e.g. by a human newborn’s cry) between animal nature and the spiritual disposition of human nature (VGesch:35; VGeist:12). The death of the immediate living being is the proof of the gap between the singularity of the animal, whose determinate being simply passes away, and the abstract persistence of its ideality (Enc §§222, 375A), the latter being the indifferent universality of the genus present in the concept of the singular. In nature, both individual and genus remain confined and closed, each in its own finitude and one-sidedness. There can be no syllogistic mediation between these two extremes. In spirit, by contrast, our thought is the universal that is for itself and ‘immortal’. The death of the animal form of life demonstrates the ultimate inadequacy of the merely outward existence of the higher organic expression of nature vis-à-vis its inwardness or essence, which does not pass into existence. In Hegel’s philosophy, nature’s goal is to attain a higher form of existence by consuming its own immediacy and sensuous being. Nature’s inner purposiveness reveals that spirit is, conceptually, prior to nature. Spirit, which in its path of return to itself has implicitly organized the integration of the self-external parts of nature into higher centres of unity, thus showing how it has progressively produced itself, guides the final transition from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit. This is why, philosophically, the transition from the natural to the spiritual domain has no empirical foundation: its source of truth is the concept intrinsic to nature that ‘develops’ in order to overcome the ultimate natural gap, driven by its inner necessity to be by itself and to make reality correspond to itself. The result is consciousness, a unity that is in itself and for itself both singular and universal, or ‘singularity that is in itself and for itself the universal’ (Enc §381A).

For consciousness, that is, for the individuality of the self, universality is no longer a finite and one-sided ideality. Rather, consciousness possesses the conceptual element of its own existence: this is, what spirit is (Enc §376). This is why Hegel states: ‘The result of the philosophy of nature is that when one knows the nature of nature, this is the conciliation of spirit with nature’ (VNat:189).
8

SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT:
SOUL, CONSCIOUSNESS,
INTELLIGENCE AND WILL
Willem deVries

THE TEXTS

Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS) occupies an important place in his system. The system has three major parts: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The Philosophy of Spirit itself has three parts: the PSS, the Philosophy of Objective Spirit and the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. The PSS, then, stands at the transition from nature to spirit and thus contains important material concerning the relation of nature and spirit. Furthermore, objective spirit concerns the various forms of relation among agents within a rational society; subjective spirit analyses the elements necessary for or presupposed by such relations, namely, the structures characteristic of and necessary to the individual rational agent. The PSS analyses the fundamental nature of the biological/ spiritual human individual along with the cognitive and the practical prerequisites of human social interaction.

Given the importance of Hegel’s PSS, the level of scholarly attention it has received is disappointing. Only his philosophy of nature currently receives less attention from Hegel scholars. To some degree, this situation derives from the fact that one part of the PSS, the Phenomenology of Spirit – the middle third that sits between the Anthropology and the Psychology – corresponds to the first five chapters of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) with the same title. The literature on PhG is massive, and the Phenomenology of the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) gets lost in its shadow.

Effectively, many Hegel scholars substitute the 1807 volume for the PSS when thinking about Hegel’s system. PhG is far more detailed than the Phenomenology in Enc (though Hegel clearly changed his mind on some issues after writing the former), and is a text of sweeping vision. The historical as well as systematic contexts of PhG and Enc differ. It is a major interpretative challenge in Hegel scholarship to understand the relation between the large, complex, and sometimes ungainly PhG, which was billed as an introduction to Hegel’s systematic philosophy, and the compressed, telegraphic Phenomenology of Spirit that occupies a place within the encyclopaedic system. The focus here is solely on the latter.
THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL: SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The concern to understand the nature of the human individual that dominated early modern philosophy from Descartes and Spinoza through Locke, Hume and Kant is also the central concern in Hegel’s PSS. But Hegel approaches the issue in a radically different way from his pre-Kantian predecessors. I will start by summarizing the common assumptions shared among Kant’s predecessors.

Pre-Kantian thinking about the individual’s relation to the material natural world, the internal resources native to humans and the basic prerequisites of human relationships adopted a common generic theoretical framework that we can call (following Locke) ‘the new way of ideas’. This framework assumes a deep ontological distinction between extended material objects (bodies) and immaterial, thinking or experiencing objects (minds). Bodies are thought to interact according to rigorously mathematizable and exceptionless laws of nature of the kind being discovered by the then emerging new sciences of astronomy, mechanics and optics. Causation is generally conceived of along mechanistic lines, and teleological causation and explanation are also generally rejected. Minds, in contrast, contain (consist of?) ideas, usually characterized in terms of their representational content, that interact according to normative rules of reason. Ideas are taken to have a fundamentally compositional structure: there is a supply of simple ideas that can be compounded into complex ideas – though the forms of composition recognized in this framework were quite limited. It is also a standard pre-Kantian assumption that minds have some form of immediate and transparent access to the ideas they contain.

(Descartes, for instance, defends such a claim at the end of the Second Meditation: see Descartes Oeuvres [AT] VII:33.) Thought is identified with the processes of composition and analysis operating on ideas. Our knowledge of the existence and characteristics of material bodies is taken to be mediated by knowledge of our own mental states, thus remaining always more problematic than self-knowledge.

These assumptions were shared broadly among Kant’s predecessors, but there were numerous specific differences. The rationalists believed that the simple ideas are highly abstract and innate in the very structure of the mind, and that a great deal of knowledge about the fundamental structure of the world is encoded in them, affording insight into necessary truths concerning the supersensible realm and our spiritual nature. The empiricists, in contrast, thought that the simple ideas are particular sensory images, from which all our other ideas are derived or compounded by de facto faculties (such as innate abilities to compare or to abstract ideas) in accordance with certain laws of association. The dialectic of empiricist thought led empiricism to a rather unhappy scepticism according to which conclusions that reach even a little beyond the senses cannot be justified, and the only necessities we can cognize are trivial.

Kant began to revolutionize this framework. He enriched the framework of ‘ideas’, distinguishing in a meaningful way between sensory and conceptual representations, and employing the logical forms of judgement to provide a more sophisticated notion of the relationships among representations. He recognized that representations in a judgement are combined with a modal force that signals that the combination is not merely subjective association. Kant argued that the innate architecture of the mind determines certain
complex representations to be necessarily true. Yet he also argued that these judgements can hold true only of the phenomenal world revealed by sensory experience. The supersensible realm remains beyond our ken. Kant thus tried to validate more knowledge than the empiricists thought to be obtainable (namely, knowledge of the necessary structure of the phenomenal realm), without acceding to rationalist metaphysical pretensions concerning the supersensible realm. But Kant remains mired in a highly dualistic framework: the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal cannot be overcome, so that human beings can neither know the nature of reality as it is in itself, nor can they know themselves as free, rational, moral agents. In the end, Kant denies knowledge to make room for faith.

SHIFTING THE PARADIGM:
HEGELIAN REVISIONS

Hegel is deeply dissatisfied with both the metaphysics and the methodologies employed by his predecessors, so dissatisfied that he proclaims that ‘Aristotle’s books on the soul, as well as his dissertations on its special aspects and conditions, are still by far the best or even the sole work of speculative interest on this general topic’ (Enc §378). Understanding why Hegel is so dissatisfied with his predecessors’ paradigm is important to grasping his approach.

Let us start with Hegel’s complaints about methodologies commonly used in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of spirit aims at cognition of spirit itself; it is the execution of the ‘absolute command, Know thyself’. Is this an injunction to know oneself in a narrow sense: What are my particular characteristics, abilities, etc.? Hegel rejects this reading: the philosophy of subjective spirit ‘is concerned with cognition of human truth, with that which is true in and for itself, – with essence itself as spirit’ (Enc §377). Merely including knowledge of the characteristics and foibles of those around us is also ruled out by this test. The philosophy of mind looks for the truly universal across all humans. Hegel then identifies two ways this universal project has been approached recently: first, so-called rational psychology; second, empirical psychology (Enc §§377–8). Both these approaches are faulty, however, because mired in the ‘categories of the understanding’. This means that certain aspects of the phenomenon under consideration are regarded as ‘separate and fixed’ (Enc §378A) and form an independent basis from which all other aspects are to be derived.

Empirical psychology reaches towards the universal by generalizing from empirical observation of particular spiritual faculties:

In empirical psychology, it is the particularizations into which spirit is divided which are regarded as being rigid in their limitation, so that spirit is treated as a mere aggregate of independent forces, each of which stands only in reciprocal and therefore external relation to the other. (Enc §378A; Petry translation adapted)

Empirical psychology however cannot demonstrate the ‘harmonious integration’ of the powers or faculties it discovers, that is, the necessary unity they must exhibit in order to exist as powers of a unified spirit. Rational psychology or pneumatology concerns itself, not with empirical research and data, but ‘with abstract and general determinations, with the supposedly unmanifest essence, the in itself of spirit’ (ibid.; Petry
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translation adapted). The problem is that rational psychology assumes that its job is to demonstrate the simplicity, immateriality and immortality of the soul.

These questions, true to the general character of the understanding, in that they took spirit to be a thing, assumed these categories to be static and fixed. As such the categories are incapable of expressing the nature of spirit however, for far from being anything static, spirit is absolute unrest, pure activity, the negating or ideality of all the fixed determinations of the understanding. (Enc §378A)

I especially want to emphasize here Hegel’s criticism of rational psychology for treating spirit as a thing. Of course, the pneumatologists did not think that spirits are physical things, but they did think of spirit as a determinate thing entirely separable from one’s body. In Hegel’s view, this dualism makes unintelligible the relation between the natural, physical side of humans and their spiritual aspect. For spirit

is not abstractly simple, for it differentiates itself from itself in its simplicity, nor is it already complete prior to its being manifest, an essence maintaining itself behind the range of its manifestations, for it is only truly actual through the determinate forms of its necessary self-revelation. This [rationalist] psychology imagined it to be a thing, a soul standing in a merely external relation to the body, but [in truth] it is inwardly connected with the body through the unity of the concept. (Enc §378A; Petry translation adapted)

As long as we are tied to the separate and fixed categories of the understanding, an appreciation of spirit’s true nature is beyond reach.

We see here as well that method and metaphysics cannot be kept entirely separate. The attitude of understanding is both a method – atomistic analysis and reconstructive composition – and a metaphysics – the assumption that the world is fundamentally a composite of determinate atoms with fixed properties combinable in fixed and determinate ways. It takes reason, which is more than mere understanding, to appreciate the creative negativity operative in the world.

Hegel cites the recent discovery of ‘animal magnetism’ – what we now call hypnotism – as an empirical confirmation of the inadequacy of the attitude of understanding.3 ‘This has discredited all the rigid distinctions drawn by the understanding, and it has become immediately obvious that if contradictions are to be resolved, a speculative consideration is a necessity’ (Enc §379). It is worth looking at what Hegel took hypnotic phenomena to show. He devotes to them in §406, as Petry notes in the Introduction to his translation of PSS (vol. I, p. lviii), ‘the most extensive and detailed exposition of any one topic in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and one of the most extensive expositions of the whole Encyclopedia’. Hegel took hypnotism seriously, despite its having an air of charlatantry about it already in the early nineteenth century.

The understanding is at least capable of apprehending, in an external manner, the other conditions and natural determinations, as well as the conscious activities of spirit. It can also grasp what is called the natural course of things, the external connection of cause and effect, by which, like finite things, it is itself dominated. It is however evidently incapable of ascribing even credibility to the phenomena of animal magnetism, for in this instance it is no longer possible for it to regard
spirit as being completely fixed and bounded in place and time as well as by the postulated connection of cause and effect. It is therefore faced with what it cannot regard as anything but an incredible miracle, the appearance within sensuous existence of spirit’s having raised itself above extrinsicality and its external connections. (Enc §379A; Petry translation adapted; cf. GW 25/1:161)

The idea seems to be roughly this: the understanding treats things as compositions of externally related objects, bound together by spatio-temporal and causal relations. To an extent, the activities of spirit can be so understood, but this misses their essence. This is evident when it comes to hypnotism. Hypnotic phenomena in which, for example, one person tastes what another eats or acts in immediate accord with another’s will, cannot be accommodated within the paradigm of the understanding. Hegel thinks that the holism of the spiritual and the rational, in distinction from the atomism of the understanding, comes to the fore in such phenomena.

Interestingly, the phenomena of hypnotism are still not well understood, though hypnotism is a very real and interesting condition. Few today would boldly assert that it will remain forever impenetrable to scientific investigation, but one point made by Hegel remains viable even today. This is precisely the anti-atomist claim that spiritual (or, as we now call them, ‘mental’) phenomena will not be made intelligible using bottom-up, atomistic methods alone. Even starting with mental atoms, such as pre-Kantian ideas, will not enable an atomistic explanation of spiritual phenomena, because the realm of the spiritual or mental is essentially holistic in structure. Hegel believes that the notion of the spiritual is so tied to a systematic and teleological view of the world that apparently distinct spiritual items like different sensations, feelings, thoughts and actions can be what they are only in virtue of their role in the self-realization of the absolute; this point of view entails seeing the world-whole as a spiritual phenomenon. This is not to say that in the explanation of each individual thought or action reference must be made to its contribution to the self-realization of the absolute. But regarding an organism as a person, or regarding a particular behaviour as the expression of a thought or as the execution of an action, presupposes that these phenomena fit into a highly differentiated and teleologically organized world-order. A related though less radical view can be seen in the rise of externalism in contemporary philosophy of mind. ‘Content externalism’ as defended by Burge (1979) and ‘active externalism’ as defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998) both reject the possibility of identifying mental states atomistically, based solely on what is ‘in the head’, whether that is construed physically as what is within the boundary of a person’s skin or skull, or mentally in terms of what is ‘present to consciousness’ at a moment. The very architecture of mentalistic language involves essential reference to the environment and social context, so minds and their states cannot be treated as atomistically isolated ‘things’ separable from and independent of their environment. The boundary between the mental and the social begins to evaporate, as it does in Hegel’s concept of spirit. We no longer think of hypnotism as an example of the mind’s extension beyond the boundaries of the skull, but the larger point Hegel draws retains its interest in contemporary philosophy of mind.

With this in view, one can make sense of Hegel’s claims that spirit is the ‘truth of nature’ (Enc §381), that its essence is
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freedom (§382) and that its determinateness is manifestation (§383). Let us take these in reverse order.

Manifestation amounts to self-revelation, but the real point for Hegel is that there is ultimately no distinction between the form and the content of the manifestation. Spirit is, indeed, manifest in things unable to recognize their own spirituality, things which are therefore at best partial or imperfect manifestations of spirit, such as nature. Yet spirit itself manifests itself to itself and thereby knows itself. It does this by finding itself in an ostensible other.

For spirit, rather than losing itself in this other, maintains and actualizes itself there, shaping its internality by turning the other into a determinate being commensurate with it, and by thus sublating the other, the determinate and actual difference, reaching concrete being-for-self, determinate self-revelation to itself. This revelation is therefore itself the content of spirit, and not some form merely added from without to the content of spirit. (Enc §383A; Petry translation adapted)

Effectively, we come to know ourselves as spirit, and thus we actualize spirit, in shaping the world into a site appropriate for and responsive to our free, rational activity. Spirit realizes itself (in both senses of actualizing itself and knowing itself) ever better by tuning the world to its purposes. The freedom that is the essence of spirit is not a matter of being cut off from and independent of nature, but of being at home in the world because spirit has transformed the world's material reality into an expression of itself and is able therein to sustain and support the rational activity that it is. Such freedom is fully actualizable only in a well-structured, cultured society that recognizes both the individuality and the communality of rational agents. This characterization, of course, goes beyond the boundaries of subjective spirit into the realms of objective and absolute spirit. Yet it is a clear corollary to Hegel’s position that subjective spirit could not exist as something ‘really distinct’ (in Cartesian terms) from the kind of body humans possess or from the kinds of social structures peculiar to humans.

The PSS is divided into three major parts: Anthropology, Phenomenology of Spirit and Psychology. Each of these is itself divided into a further triad with at least one more subordinate level of triads below that. The text of Enc is notoriously abstract and telegraphic; even supplemented by the material from Hegel’s lectures, it is challenging to trace a coherent web of claims and justifications in this text. In the following I sketch a systematic overview of the problems Hegel was responding to and of the positions he developed. It is worth pointing out, in light of the fascination exerted by the 1807 PhG, that when the volume was written, Hegel had not yet developed the conceptions of anthropology and psychology that came to frame the phenomenology in the mature system. His conception of these disciplines was initially developed during his time in Nuremberg (1808–16). Thus, the systematic context of the phenomenology changes significantly between the early tome and the mature system.

1. THE ANTHROPOLOGY

The Anthropology, the first major division of the PSS, encompasses 24 paragraphs (§§388–412) in both the second and third editions of Enc. It concerns spirit in its
immediate unity with nature and the natural organism. This form of spirit Hegel calls ‘soul’. Both the unity of and any distinction between nature and spirit or organism and spirit at this level is not for spirit. Spirit is here still not conscious of itself under any description. ‘Anthropology’ seems, then, a strange title for this segment of PSS, for we tend to think that the distinctive trait of humans is their self-consciousness, their awareness of themselves as conscious and spirited creatures. This is exactly what is not considered in Hegel’s Anthropology. Rather, the focus here is on embodiment, on the way in which qualities and characteristics of humans that appear, at first blush, to be simply natural have spiritual significance and express the spiritual. These qualities must ultimately be understood as having their true identity, not in the self-externality of causal processes among distinct spatio-temporal objects and states, but in their participation in the processes of self-realization in which spirit expresses and fulfils itself. Racial differences, differences in temperament and character, the ‘natural’ processes of growth and development, sexuality and wakefulness are all discussed at the beginning of the Anthropology as phenomena that are, of course, natural, but equally spiritual, that is, to be understood in terms of a larger whole.

The greatest amount of space in the Anthropology is devoted to discussing sensation and feeling. Understanding the nature of the sensory is a challenge to any philosophy, and Hegel’s attempt is complex and sometimes obscure. We need to be clear at the outset that Hegel does not take sensation and feeling to be uniquely human; animals also have sensation and feeling. As we will see, Hegel even identifies what makes something sentient. He also distinguishes between mere sensation and feeling, which is a slightly higher-level phenomenon. But the importance of sensation cannot be sold short:

Everything is in sensation; one might also say that it is in sensation that everything emerging into spiritual consciousness and reason has its source and origin, for the source and origin of something is nothing other than the primary and most immediate manner in which it appears. Principles, religion etc. must be in the heart, they must be sensed, it is not enough that they should be only in the head. (Enc §400R)

This passage is both a bow to what is true in empiricism and an acknowledgement that one cannot stop with empiricism’s immediacies.

One of the faults Hegel regularly finds with empiricism is its general atomism, and this echoes throughout the Anthropology. Hegel thinks of living organisms as complex beings that are significantly more unified than other physical objects.

In the plant there is already a display of a centre diffused into the periphery, a concentration of differences, a self-development outwards from within, a unity which differentiates itself and brings itself forth out of its differences into the bud, and consequently into something to which we ascribe a drive... In the animal organism externality is more completely overcome, for each organ engenders the other, being its cause and effect, means and end. Each member is therefore simultaneously its own other. What is more, the whole of the animal organism is so pervaded by its unity, that nothing within it appears as independent. Since each determinacy is at the same time of an ideal nature, the animal remaining the same single universal within each
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determinacy, it is in the animal body that extrinsicality shows the full extent of its lack of truth. (Enc §381A)

There are strong reverberations here of Kant’s characterization of teleology as something we must attribute to organisms. Hegel thinks that the greater unity of the animal accounts for its being sentient. ‘Sensation is precisely this ubiquity of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate each impression to the single whole’ (ibid.). Hegel’s most complete attempt to explain the nature of sensation appears in the unfinished manuscript of a projected book-length treatment of subjective spirit:

If neutral water is coloured, for example, and is in this quality or condition, then it would be sentient if it differed from this its condition not only for us or, what amounts to the same thing, merely according to possibility, but rather if, at the same time, it differed from itself as so determined. Differently expressed: the genus colour only exists as blue, or as a certain specific colour; in that it is blue, it remains the genus colour. But if the colour as colour, i.e., not as blueness but at the same time as colour persisting in opposition to itself as blue colour—if the difference between its universality and its particularity were not simply for us but existed within itself, then blue colour would be a sensation of blue. (GW15:234; Petry translation revised)

The idea seems to be that sensations are peculiar because, although they are in one sense simply properties of sensory organs, what they are as sensations depends crucially on their occurrence in the context of a complex organic whole, namely as particular properties of sense organs that provide a way for the whole organism to tune its condition to a specific aspect of the world. Thus, sensations are not objects of awareness, but components or aspects of acts of awareness. Further, these states occur because they occupy a particular point in a sensory range that is significant for the whole organism. This is consistent with Hegel’s general strategy of arguing that something first seen atomistically from the bottom–up, reveals a very different identity when seen in a holist (and teleological) context from the top–down, and that it is the top–down identity that is, in the long run, the more important. This also helps explain what Hegel means when he insists that ‘everything is in sensation’: to the extent that we have truly appropriated an idea, no matter how abstract, it will make a difference in our immediate sensory encounters with the world. Someone who cannot feel moral indignation or does not feel a gut-wrenching sensation when betrayed may be able to think about morality, but is not a moral person, not someone whose very being is informed by morality. ‘In general, sentience is the individual spirit living in healthy partnership with its corporeity’ (Enc §401R).

I have gotten ahead of the game here by introducing already the notion of feeling. Hegel distinguishes relatively clearly between sensation and feeling only in the third edition of Enc:

Linguistic practice happens to provide us with no thoroughgoing distinction between sensation and feeling. Nevertheless, we do tend to speak not of a sensation of right, self and suchlike, but of a feeling for what is right, of self-awareness . . . [W]hile sensation puts more emphasis upon the passive aspect of feeling . . ., i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling’s determinacy, feeling refers more to the selfhood involved here. (Enc §402R)
What we call the feeling soul . . . is neither confined to the immediate sensuousness of sensation, [e.g., to a proper or common sensible] and dependent upon immediate sensuous presence nor does it relate itself to what is wholly universal, which can be grasped only through the mediation of pure thought. (Enc §402A; Petry translation adapted)

The notion of feeling allows Hegel to ascribe a kind of content to a mental state that is neither the determinate singularity of a proper or common sensible nor the objectifying universality of concept. A feeling of moral indignation is not yet a concept of moral indignation, but it is more than a particular proprioceptive sensible. There will be some proprioceptive sensible involved in the feeling, but what it truly is can be understood only in terms of a larger context. That feeling is an immediate, embodied response to a situation that conflicts with morality by someone in whom a moral upbringing has inculcated both moral habits and some conception of morality. Purely sensory comparisons and discriminations, such as those we make when discriminating colours or analysing flavour notes in a fine wine, are tied to the structure of our sensory organs. Feeling, by contrast, has a much broader range. Craftsmen acquire a feel for their materials, politicians a feel for the mood of the public. Whereas in the purely sensory cases we are passive, accepting the deliverances of sense (or learning to ‘read’ such deliverances), in feeling often a great deal of experience, training or knowledge is unconsciously active.

This permits Hegel to discuss the importance of preconscious comparisons and discriminations in our cognitive and conative architecture. Preconscious abilities to compare and distinguish, however, are not open to direct introspection. Hegel discusses a number of pathological phenomena in this section of the Anthropology. When things are going well for us, when we correctly perceive or anticipate the world around us and respond to it appropriately, everything seems simple, and the complexity of our connection to the world fades from sight. It is when our normal, relatively happy intercourse with the world, ourselves and others breaks down that the complex architecture of the preconscious mind becomes visible. There are extensive discussions of dreaming, of ‘magnetic somnambulism’, and of mental derangements of various kinds in these sections of the Anthropology, for in all of these, Hegel thinks, there is a breakdown in the ‘healthy partnership’ between an individual spirit and its corporeity.

There is no room here for a detailed review of Hegel’s discussions of the pathologies of mind, but he was clearly concerned with and aware of the cutting-edge empirical and clinical work of the time.

At the end of the Anthropology, Hegel provides a lengthy and significant discussion of habit. Prior to this, he treated the unity of the bodily and the spiritual in terms of individual phenomena, sensations and feelings that, though bodily, have to be seen as an expression or manifestation of something larger and higher, a spiritual reality. Habit provides a form in which the organism can gain some freedom from the sensuous particularities of sense and feeling while becoming a still better expression of spirit. Habit is, indeed, a mere form itself; any kind of content, good or ill, progressive or regressive, effective or ineffective can be embodied in a habit.

The essential determination of habit is that it is by means of it that man is liberated from the sensations by which he is
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affected . . . [H]abit is what is most essential to the existence of all spirituality within the individual subject. It enables the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an ideality of soul, so that the religious or moral etc. content belongs to him as this self, this soul, and is in him neither merely . . . a transient sensation or presentation, nor as an abstract inwardsness cut off from action and actuality, but as part of his being. (Enc §410R; Petry translation adapted)

Through the development of habits, we are less in the thrall of particular feelings: we can become inured to pain; we can postpone pleasure. A self that is no longer a merely immediate responsiveness to the world can begin to emerge. We can think of the progress through the Anthropology along the following lines. The significance of individual states of the organism for the organism itself can only be seen by taking a systematic look at their place in the overall fit of the organism into its environment. Some states are general, such as those that track time (like biological clocks), but some express particularities of the organism. For instance, animal organisms all have a sense of self, of their boundaries, of where they are in relation to their environment (e.g. as prey and predator) or a sense of who they mate with. Such ‘self-feeling’ is unconscious and highly particularized to the moment. In acquiring habits, the organism can begin to abstract from this direct immersion in nature and build for itself a ‘second nature’. Without it, a distinctively human nature would not be possible.

The Anthropology culminates in what Hegel calls ‘the actual soul’. It is at this stage, I believe (though Hegel does not explicitly say so), that humanity goes beyond anything available to animals, which are never fully actual souls.

Since the soul, within its thoroughly formed and appropriated corporeity, is as the being-for-self of a single subject, this corporeity is externality as a predicate in which the subject relates only to itself. This externality exhibits not itself, but the soul of which it is the sign. (Enc §411; Petry translation adapted)

In the human species, the natural organism has become both sign and expression of something that is, like all signifeds, distinguishable from it. Indeed, the organism is not even a terribly good expression of spirit:

[B]ecause this [human] shape is something immediate and natural in its externality, [it] can therefore only signify spirit in an indefinite and wholly imperfect manner, being incapable of presenting it as the universal it is for itself. For the animal, the human shape is the highest appearance of spirit. For spirit however, it is only the first appearance of itself, and language simultaneously its more perfect expression. (Enc §411R; Petry translation adapted)

Language, however, does not receive explicit consideration until later in the Psychology. Still, there is an abstract unity, the centre of gravity around which the otherwise disparate bodily, sensory and habitual characteristics of the organism are organized. This unity differs from these disparate characteristics, which it excludes from itself. Yet by being their unity or universal, it is incapable of existing apart from them:

In so far as the soul has being for abstract universality, this being-for-self of free universality is its higher awakening as ‘I’ or abstract universality. For itself, the soul is therefore thought and subject, and is indeed specifically the subject of
its judgement. In this judgement the ‘I’ excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object or world external to it, and so relates itself to this totality that it is immediately reflected into itself within it. This is consciousness. (Enc §412; Petry translation adapted)\(^6\)

Hegel here identifies consciousness with an abstract point of unity that stands over against a de facto disparate manifold in sense and feeling. This echoes Kant’s conception of consciousness as a unity of manifold representations and prepares the move to the next part of the PSS, the Phenomenology of Spirit, which considers the appropriate forms for the normative or de jure unification of the determinations found within spirit.

### 2. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

#### A. THE IDEA OF A PHENOMENOLOGY

The Phenomenology of the PSS occupies 26 paragraphs (Enc §§413–39). This is two more than the Anthropology, but there is considerably less supplementary material in the Additions. The lecture notes show that Hegel kept increasing the amount of lecture time spent on the Anthropology at the expense of the other parts of subjective spirit.

The Phenomenology is narrowly focused on examining subjective spirit’s relation to appearances. Since subjective spirit is something that both appears and is appeared to, this imposes structural requirements on it that are examined dialectically in this segment of the PSS. Hegel’s absolute idealism is in many ways deeply realistic in its metaphysics and has little in common with the epistemologically motivated idealism found, for instance, in Bishop Berkeley or in the phenomenalism of Mill. In the framework of the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology, however, the objects of consciousness are indeed treated as internal constructs of spirit. The determinations of soul – the sensations and feelings discussed in the Anthropology – are, in and for themselves, without objective reference for soul. The feeling that embodies one’s indignation at a social slight, for instance, is not for the soul itself a recognition of or response to a social slight – that aspect of this determination of soul is for us, for some external or reflective viewer cognizant of its larger, objective context. The body considered in the Anthropology may express spirit, but at the level of soul spirit cannot yet interpret itself or its state.

The Phenomenology investigates a new and more complex way in which a human relates to itself. The high level of structure and integration present in what Hegel calls ‘the actual soul’ effectively enables a new kind of reflexive relation to itself. We have to take seriously the remark quoted above that ‘the “I” excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object or world external to it, and so relates itself to this totality that it is immediately reflected into itself within it’ (Enc §412). The abstract unity of the organism – which we now call the ‘I’ – stands over against the soul’s particular determinations (specifically the sensations and feelings) which, from the point of view of the ‘I’, are now regarded as independent, natural objects that are not the ‘I’’s own determinations but external to it. Spirit must now consciously return to itself by coming to see itself in those apparently external objects. It thereby returns as well to the larger world when it sees these determinations of...
SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

itself as nonetheless also expressions of the truth of the world.

Clearly, the *Encyclopaedia Phenomenology* echoes Kant’s critical philosophy. The phenomenological point of view shares with critical philosophy the notion that the world we sense and experience is a reconstruction from (or is it a construal of?) our sensory and feeling states. Thus, Hegel asserts: ‘The Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed in that it is considered as having grasped spirit as consciousness, and as containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but merely determinations of its phenomenology’ (*Enc* §415R). The difference between the two, however, is that Kant thought that his approach entailed that our knowledge is confined to the merely phenomenal: things as they are in themselves remain forever beyond our ken. Hegel instead locates the constructive activities examined in the phenomenology within a broadly monistic world. That objects necessarily appear to us under certain constraints, Hegel thinks, does not entail that we have access to merely phenomenal objects. Rather, to the extent that the constraints under which objects appear to us appropriately capture constraints on the objects themselves, to that same extent we can know the truth of those objects. The very same organizing structures and principles that are active in the rational mind are also active and determinative in the world itself. The rational mind has access to the truth, not merely to the appearance of truth. The world is in itself what it appears to be to the fully developed rational mind.

B. CONSCIOUSNESS AS SUCH

(i) Sensuous consciousness

The organism has achieved the brute ability to represent itself (the ‘I’) as something distinct from and independent of the material determinacies of feeling, which it represents in turn as objects distinct from and independent of itself. These objects appear to it as immediate, simple others. ‘Of the object therefore, sensuous consciousness knows only that it is a being, something, an existing thing, a singular etc. Although this consciousness appears as the richest in content, it is the poorest in thought’ (*Enc* §418R). Consciousness cannot long stay in this framework:

From this standpoint I become aware of this unit [a conglomeration of sensations and feelings] in an immediate and singularized manner. It enters my consciousness at random, and disappears out of it again. To me it is therefore something which, with regard to both its existence and its constitution, is simply given, so that I know nothing of whence it comes, the derivation of its specific nature, or of its claim to truth. (*Enc* §418A)

Sensuous consciousness, as such, is utterly unfocused, a mere assurance of being but unable to put its finger on anything. Perception is a higher and more adequate form in which consciousness escapes this scattered, unfocusable form.

One specific difference between the treatment of sensuous consciousness in the *Encyclopaedia Phenomenology* and its treatment in *PhG* needs mention. In *Enc*, Hegel no longer thinks that sensuous consciousness is concerned with spatio-temporality, the here and the now, which plays a significant role in the arguments of the Sense Certainty chapter in *PhG*. These arguments expose the ultimately conceptual structure of indexical reference; in *Enc*, however, the application of spatio-temporal representations to sensory experience is proclaimed to be the province of intuition, which is treated later in the Psychology.
(ii) Perception
The drive hidden within the phenomenological spirit is, of course, the drive to know itself, which underlies the dialectic of all of subjective spirit. Spirit certainly cannot find itself or its equivalent in the scattered manifold of singularities that dominates sensuous consciousness. In spirit’s experience, the mere ‘somethings’ of sensuous consciousness become things it perceives, that is, loci of many distinct properties related to a common focus. The sensuous determinations spirit finds given to it are now organized for it in accordance with certain categories that classify and relate them together into structured objects and events.

[Perception] starts with the sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised into truth by being considered in their connection, reflected upon, and at the same time, turned by means of certain categories into something necessary and universal, i.e., experiences. (Enc §420R)

Hegel says that this is the standpoint of ordinary consciousness and of most of the sciences, and that it marks the boundaries of Kantian philosophy. This last seems a bit contentious: many interpreters think Kant’s philosophy achieves at least the level of the understanding, to which we now turn.

(iii) Understanding
Consciousness becomes aware in perception that the objects it encounters are appearances, so it begins to focus on the internality underlying and uniting the manifold appearances: ‘This simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearance, their quiescent and universal likeness’ (Enc §422).

The truly internal has however to be defined as concrete, as internally differentiated. Grasped as such it constitutes what we call law, for the essence of law, whether referred to external nature or to the ethical world, consists of an indivisible unity, a necessary internal connection of different determinations . . . Laws are the determinations of the understanding dwelling within the world itself. It is within laws therefore that the understanding consciousness rediscovers its own nature and so becomes its own opposing object. (Enc §422A; Petry translation adapted)

The understanding takes the truth to consist in the (invisible) laws that knit together the various objects, properties and relations that appear to consciousness. But the understanding does not yet see that the organizing principles it now identifies as the truth are, in fact, its very own. Thus, a new kind of object is now appropriate, an object that is itself a consciousness.

It is worth pausing a moment here to make it clear that from within the Phenomenology, the ‘stages’ of spirit being traversed do not simply replace each other seriatim. Someone who perceives structured objects with variegated properties does not cease to have sensuous presentations; someone who experiences the world as a particular instantiation of universal laws does not cease to see propertied things; and someone who becomes conscious of other consciousnesses in the world around her does not cease to experience a world of external, propertied things governed by laws. In each case, the world is enriched with new, more complex kinds of objects, and consciousness’ relation to its objects is equally enriched with new, more complex forms. Progress in these realms is cumulative, and consciousness is driven to ever more complex forms of thought to make sense of the complex world it encounters.
C. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Having just pointed out the cumulative nature of the progress in the Phenomenology, I now have to qualify those claims. Spirit itself, in the broad sense that includes nature and history, is the truth of things. Ultimately, nothing is external to spirit. Thus, in Hegel’s view, all knowledge is ultimately spirit’s self-knowledge. That spirit is complete within itself and need (and can) relate itself to nothing other than itself, however, is not yet a fact for the phenomenological consciousness or self-consciousness. As consciousness, spirit cannot see itself as a complete totality and remains burdened by an apparent other. The phenomenological self still sees itself as set over against an other, and even when this other is its equal, their deeper unity is not yet apparent. The dialectic of self-consciousness is the overcoming of the apparent particularities that divide self-consciousness.

(i) Desire

The self-conscious self finds itself confronted with an external object that it takes to be, in fact, a nullity; self-consciousness is driven to make this object its own. ‘Here . . . desire still has no further determination than that of a drive, in so far as this drive, without being determined by a thought, is directed to an external object in which it seeks satisfaction’ (Enc §426A). Hegel portrays this as arising from the fact that self-consciousness is still also consciousness. That is, spirit at this point contains the ‘contradiction’ of having an independent object external to it (the structure of consciousness) while also being certain that it is itself the truth and related only to itself (the structure of self-consciousness). Its initial attempt to overcome this contradiction is to try to simply overcome the external object and make it its own: this is desire.

Notice that these independent objects are objects of the kind appropriate to consciousness, things in the material world that submit to the activity of spirit. The paradigm case of overcoming such objects is consuming them. ‘Desire is therefore generally destructive in its satisfaction, just as it is generally self-seeking in respect of its content, and since the satisfaction has only been achieved in singleness, which is transient, it gives rise to further desires’ (Enc §428). The satisfaction of consumption is ever only temporary, constantly renewing the drive for more. To escape this endless progression of desire and satisfaction, a different object and a different relation to it must be found by self-consciousness: another self-consciousness, self or ‘I’.

(ii) Recognitive self-consciousness

Self-consciousness (still not yet made fully explicit) is prepared to encounter another self-consciousness: ‘Within the other as “I”, I have not only an immediate intuition of myself, but also of the immediacy of a determinate being which as “I” is for me an absolutely opposed and independently distinct object’ (Enc §430; Petry translation adapted). I intuit myself in the other insofar as I recognize that the other is the same as ‘I’, a self-consciousness. We are, Hegel says, ‘a single light’. Nevertheless, he claims that this view contradicts the equally apparent fact that this other is opposed to and independent of me. ‘Through this contradiction, self-consciousness acquires the drive to display itself as a free self, and to be there as such for the other. This is the process of recognition’ (ibid.).

But the process of recognition is, Hegel tells us, a struggle. These two self-consciousnesses are, in their immediacy, distinct from and impenetrable to each other. This immediacy is represented principally in the fact that they
are spatio-temporally distinct living bodies beset with contingencies: different talents, dispositions, and abilities, different appetites or desires, etc. These consciousnesses initially relate to each other via their distinct bodies but possess a drive to find the sameness, the common identity they implicitly recognize. In order to do this, they need to overcome their immediate differences and negate their natural, organic existence. They need to show each other that they are free beings, not merely the pawns of their natural existences (nor are they ready to be the pawn of the other consciousness). This dialectic takes the form of a struggle between these two consciousnesses: ‘Each self-consciousness imperils not only the life of the other but also itself. It merely imperils itself however, for each is equally committed to the preservation of its life, in that this constitutes the existence of its freedom’ (Enc §432). The death of one of the antagonists in a struggle for recognition yields no progress, no movement towards a more satisfactory resolution of the ‘contradiction’ driving these interactions. If one of the antagonists yields in the struggle, however, a new dynamic is set up: the relationship of mastery and servitude. The forces at work here – the struggle for recognition and the eventual dominance of one party over another – Hegel tells us, account for the beginning of states and governments. But the idea that states began among humans in a violent struggle for recognition does not mean that states are legitimated by this violence. The legitimation of the state, as Hegel shows in Objective Spirit, lies elsewhere. Even so, Hegel insists that the struggle for recognition can occur only in a state of nature, where there is no government. For, in his view, the institution of the state – even a faulty, tyrannical state – already embodies the recognition of the citizens. The existence of a state preempts any crude form of the struggle for recognition.

In a famous turn-about, it is the servant who provides the key to further progress towards the fulfilment of self-consciousness. The master ‘is involved in his self-seeking, sees in the servant only his own immediate will, and is only recognized in a formal manner by a consciousness lacking in freedom’ (Enc §435A). The master has not truly met his equal in the servant; he has not found himself in his other. But the servant cannot be self-centred, ‘his desire acquires the breadth of not being confined to himself, but of also including that of another. It is thus that he raises himself above the selfish singularity of his natural will’ (ibid.).

This subduing of the servant’s self-seeking constitutes the beginning of the true freedom of man. The quaking of the singularity of the will, the feeling of the nullity of self-seeking, the habit of obedience, – this constitutes a necessary moment in the education of everyone. (Enc §435A)

The master remains in thrall to his own natural impulses; the servant learns to control his. This is the beginning of human freedom. The servant controls his natural impulses, at this point, only for the sake of the single, contingent will of the master, not yet for the sake of a truly universal rational will; but the ability to subordinate oneself to another will is an essential part of full recognition. This is a lesson the master must also somehow learn. This lesson, once learned, makes possible the transition to universal self-consciousness.

(iii) Universal self-consciousness
In universal self-consciousness, the contingent peculiarities of distinct individuals are not lost altogether, but they are subordinated to
the mutual recognition of the individuals. In this form of self-consciousness, the freedom and fundamental equality of all humans has become explicit. ‘This form of consciousness constitutes not only the substance of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the state, but also of all virtues – of love, friendship, valour, honour, fame’ (Enc §436R). Our social lives in general rest on universal self-consciousness; mutual recognition of a shared and common nature provides the ground for the co-operation and co-ordination without which humans could not long live. It is, unfortunately, only imperfectly realized in far too many societies; bigotry and other forms of the denial of the universality of freedom and equality among persons remain a persistent and recalcitrant fact of human life.

Self-consciousness has found itself in its other. It has come to see that the fundamental structures of the objects it has found outside it are, in fact, the same as its own fundamental structures. Hegel means this literally: the forms of organization that subjective spirit, in its drive to make sense of itself, has imposed upon the sensory material with which the Phenomenology originally began have been the same forms of organization that are present everywhere in nature and in consciousness itself. Thus the subjective and particular has been unified with the objective and universal. This unity Hegel calls reason.

D. REASON

Hegel’s treatment of reason in the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology is a mere two paragraphs. He re-emphasizes the identity of the subjective and the objective.

As the certainty that its determinations are not only its own thoughts, but to the same extent generally objective, determinations of the essence of things, self-consciousness constitutes reason, which as this identity, is not only the absolute substance, but truth as knowledge. (Enc §439)

While Kant insisted that the categories do not (and could not) apply to things as they are in themselves, Hegel proposes a more powerful interpretation of reason. In his view, the fundamental nature of the world is determined by the fact that it is the self-actualization of spirit. The structural principles that we use to organize the phenomenal world of our sensory experience, and which constitute ourselves as finite, subjective spirits, are ultimately identical with the structural principles that are embodied in the natural and the intersubjectively social worlds, the principles by which infinite spirit actualizes itself. Our finitude, the fact that we are each a subjective spirit, does not cut us off from the world; it means only that we are imperfect and incomplete actualizations of spirit.

This view enables us to see ourselves once again as embodied in and continuous with the natural world; it enables us to investigate our own activities and powers: this is carried out in the Psychology.

3. THE PSYCHOLOGY

The Psychology occupies 41 paragraphs (Enc §§440–81), significantly more than either the Anthropology or the Phenomenology of Spirit. The opening paragraphs (§§440–4) discuss the general nature of the (finite) spirit reached at this stage and the specific concerns of psychology as a discipline. They also draw the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit.
Spirit here is still subjective in the sense that it is particularized into distinct individuals who possess the simple and immediate unity of organism and spirit that is the soul. At the same time, they also possess the complex but abstract organization of internal states that makes itself congruent with the structure of external realities, that is, they possess (self)-consciousness. Psychology aims at a non-abstract self-knowledge, knowledge of the specific modes of activity by which subjective spirit can grasp its concrete reality and realize concrete freedom therein.

Psychology is therefore concerned with the faculties or general modes of the activity of spirit as such,— intuiting, representing, recollecting etc., desires etc. . . . The content, which is raised into intuitions, consists of its sensations, just as its intuitions are changed into representations, and representations immediately into thoughts etc. (Enc §440R; Petry translation adapted)

Hegel rejects the notion that the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit can be understood in terms of passivity and activity. Spirit is always active. Theoretical spirit can appear passive, because it takes up what is present or existent, while practical spirit has to produce something that is not already existent. But, Hegel points out, there is a tremendous amount of activity involved in rationally understanding something, and conversely always something passive involved in the constitution of our desires and drives. Perhaps we are, then, better off distinguishing theoretical from practical spirit, not by level of activity but in terms of whether the object is supposed to determine the subjective state or the subjective state is supposed to determine (or create) the object.

A. THEORETICAL SPIRIT

We cannot separate theoretical and practical spirit absolutely; they are necessarily related. Neither of them is ‘a fixed existence, separate from the other, as if volition could be devoid of intelligence or the activity of intelligence could be devoid of will’ (Enc §445R). Neither should we take the various ‘faculties’ or ‘powers’ (we could as well speak of ‘capacities’) that analysis attributes to theoretical spirit to be discrete existences, nor should we take theoretical spirit to be a mechanical aggregation of independent parts. These faculties — intuition, recollection, imagination, etc. — are moments in theoretical spirit, ‘the activities having no other immanent significance; their only purpose being the concept of cognition’ (ibid.).

To an extent, the dialectic of theoretical spirit replicates the dialectic we witnessed in the phenomenology, beginning from the sensory and rising once again to reason. But in the phenomenology, the development occurs via changes in the apparent object of consciousness. In theoretical spirit, it is spirit itself that develops. It understands ever better its own nature, a fact that enables it to have an increasingly rational grasp of the world around it. Hegel distinguishes between knowledge (Wissen) and cognition (Erkenntnis):

Cognition must certainly be distinguished from mere knowledge, for even consciousness is already knowledge. Free spirit is not content with simple knowledge however, for it wants to cognize, that is to say to know not merely that an object is and what it is in general as well as in respect of its contingent and external determinations, but to know what it is that constitutes the determinate substantiality of the nature of this general object. (Enc §445A; Petry translation adapted)
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The phenomenological spirit, for all it knows, just happens to have the right ways to engage the objects it encounters. Theoretical spirit develops the ability to aim at and to cultivate -- on purpose! -- a thoroughly rationalized, self-reflective conceptual or theoretical framework for dealing with the world. Theoretical spirit aims to comprehend the world, no intellectual holds barred.

(i) Intuition

We begin at a familiar place, though in a new key. Theoretical spirit begins with immediacy: sensation and feeling. 'Now, in the third and final instance, feeling has the significance of being the initial form assumed by spirit as such, which constitutes the unity and truth of the soul and of consciousness' (Enc §446A). As Hegel insisted in our previous encounters with the sensory, everything is present in sensation and feeling.

Cultivated, true sensation is the sensation of a cultured spirit which has acquired consciousness of specific differences, essential relationships, true determinations etc., and it is into the feeling of such a spirit that this adjusted material enters, i.e., acquires this form. Feeling is the immediate, also the readiest form, in which the subject relates itself to a given content. (Enc §447R; Petry translation adapted)

Cultivated feelings are crucial to the good human life, but the form of feeling, mired in immediacy and open as it is to good content and bad, does not live up to the thoroughly rational ideal of theoretical spirit. Further development is called for.

The simple immediacy of intuition is broken in the next stage. On the one hand, attentive spirit now takes responsibility for distinguishing its object from everything else; on the other hand, spirit, in grasping its object not only as external but as self-external, projects it into the forms of space and time. I mentioned earlier that Hegel changed his mind between 1807 and the period of the encyclopaedic system about just when spatiotemporality appears in spirit's objects -- and in 1817 this even happens one stage later, in 'Representation' (Enc 1817 §373). My guess is that space and time show up only here because Hegel thinks of them as precise and quantifiable, even metrical. Spatiotemporal determinations can be elaborated in endlessly precise ways and related to each other with mathematical precision. They are the rational elaboration of self-externality, so they make their appearance within subjective spirit only in its final, rational stage, even if they appear as immediate determinacies. These moments are brought back together in intuition proper:

Intuition . . . is a consciousness which is filled with the certainty of reason, its general object having the determination of being a rationality [ein Vernünftiges], and so of constituting not a single being torn apart into various aspects, but a totality, a connected profusion of determinations. (Enc §449A)

Intuition promises insight into the substance and unity of things, their rational connectedness. Even so, the form of intuition must be superseded if spirit is to achieve a fully explicit comprehension of things.

In intuition, spirit is still very much focused on the object it grasps, but a simple turn of attention introduces a new dialectic.

Spirit . . . posits intuition as its own, pervades it, makes something inward of it, recollects [erinnert] itself within it, becomes present to itself within it, and
so becomes free. By thus passing into itself, intelligence raises itself to the stage of representation. (Enc §450A; Petry translation adapted)

(ii) Representation
Hegel develops the dialectic of representation more thoroughly than any of the other concepts in the PSS. Whereas most other parts of the text go three layers deep (e.g. I. Anthropology / A. The Natural Soul / 1. Natural Qualities), and the other parts of theoretical spirit go four layers deep (e.g. I. Psychology / A. Theoretical Spirit / 2. Representation / a. Recollection / i. The Image). This shows the importance Hegel placed on these concepts and the care with which he thought about the issues. The following overview account cannot follow the dialectic in all its detail.

In representation there is still always some sensory aspect, though its significance diminishes in the course of representation's development. Intuitions, considered not as transparent revelations of the world, but rather as subjective states whose semantic relation to the world is open to question, are also representations. Representations are mental states that do not purport to be transparent revelations of the immediately present. The three stages of representation are (a) recollection (Erinnerung), (b) imagination (Einbildungskraft) and (c) memory (Gedächtniß).

(a) Recollection. In intuition, the sensory presentation is taken as transparent revelation of the disposition of things here and now – arguably, indeed, as identical to that disposition. In recollection, the sensory presentation is isolated, abstracted from that context and freely available to spirit – Hegel calls this an image (Bild). ‘This image no longer has the complete determinacy of intuition, and is arbitrary or contingent, being generally isolated from the external place, time and immediate context in which intuition was involved’ (Enc §452). Images are somehow stored in spirit, unconscious in some ‘night-like abyss’ but available for recall on the right cue (and not necessarily available for conscious recall). Hegel denies that ‘particular representations are preserved in particular fibres and localities’ (Enc §453R; Petry translation adapted). (One thinks of modern claims that brains use non-local, distributed representations.)

Such abstract images acquire a fully determinate being, however, only when they are brought into relation to an intuition, which puts them then in indirect relation to the world itself. Such images are, like Hume’s ideas, a constant flow within us, enriching our current experience with echoes of the past. ‘The more cultured the person the less he lives in immediate intuition, in that in all his intuitions he lives at the same time in recollections’ (Enc §454A).

(b) Imagination. In imagination, spirit gains increasing power over its representations. The representations present to spirit are no longer simply evoked by external circumstances, but begin to express spirit’s own content. Furthermore, spirit is able increasingly to analyse and synthesize these representations, to pull them apart and put them together in new ways.

Hegel’s descriptions of the imaginative power of spirit are reminiscent of those of Hume and Hartley, but he criticizes thinkers who rely on the notion of the association of ideas to explain the shape of our mental lives. The supposed laws of association are no laws at all and do not, in fact, determine any particular course of mental events.

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Representations, as Hegel conceives them, already have the form of universality about them. They are abstract, without fixed relation to individuals in space and time. They are not atomistically determinate beings in their own rights, but draw their significance from their role within spirit’s individuality. So Hegel does not think that it is a problem that particular representations can have general significance, something that bothered the British empiricists.

Intelligence is increasingly able to express itself ever better in its representations, first via symbolic representations and then in signs. Hegel calls this capacity ‘phantasy’. Symbols share some characteristic of the thing symbolized, as when the eagle symbolizes courage; but signs are arbitrary. In these developments spirit comes to be able to give itself a determinate and concrete expression and therefore existence. This ability to give its own content – itself – determinate expression free from ties to the immediate environment is for spirit an important step towards absolute freedom. The most important product of sign-making imagination is clearly language, about which Hegel has a great deal to say. Language is a multi-layer affair, in Hegel’s view:

If language had to be handled in a concrete manner, the anthropological or rather the psycho-physiological (§401) standpoint would have to be referred back to for its lexical material, while the standpoint of the understanding would have to anticipated for its form or grammar. (Enc §459R)

Effectively, then, Hegel thinks that while the materials and the formal framework for language are provided by earlier stages of subjective spirit, it is only in the productive imagination that spirit has sufficiently loosened the hold of immediacy on itself to be able to use linguistic signs in a creative and self-expressive fashion.

(c) Memory. Recollection and imagination are a process of gaining greater control over the intuitive material, of subordinating what is present in intuition to spirit’s own purposes. This process is repeated again at a higher level in memory, where it is performed on those intuitions that are signs, particularly linguistic signs. Given our ordinary uses of the terms, ‘memory’ does not seem much different from ‘recollection’, but Hegel is playing here on the fact that the German word for memory, ‘Gedächtniß’, shares the same root as the word for ‘think’ (Enc §464R). Language is the form most suited to the expression of thought, so memory is primarily concerned with language.

The name lion enables us to dispense with both the intuition of such an animal and even with the image of it, for in that we understand it, the name is the imageless and simple representation. We think in names... Memory is however no longer concerned with the image, drawn as this is from intuition, from the immediate unspiritual determinedness of intelligence, but with a determinate being which is the product of intelligence itself... (Enc §462R; Petry translation adapted)

Memory therefore represents another important step in spirit’s climb out of its immersion in the sensory towards its freedom, in its ability to determine and express its own content. In language, thought acquires a determinate and objective being – which is essential to its reality. Hegel is also dismissive of the notions that being tied to language is a defect of thought and that truth is somehow ineffable.
But memory is also puzzling. Its final stage is what Hegel calls ‘mechanical memory’, in which all that is present to spirit is a series of meaningless words. Spirit here ‘posits itself as being, the universal space of names as such, i.e., as senseless words’ (Enc §463). Hegel thinks that it is significant that we can learn things by rote, but it is difficult for us to see just what this significance is. A parallel with an earlier stage of spirit offers itself. At the end of the Anthropology the abstract ‘I’, empty of all particular content, was opposed to the sensory material encapsulated in the soul but now ejected from and opposed to the ‘I’. This provided the point of transition to the Phenomenology, during the course of which the ‘I’ recovers its content by discovering itself in the world. I suggest that the mechanical memory marks a similar point in spirit’s progress. The material content available here, language, is in principle distinguishable from thought itself. Thought does not occur in any particular language, but is rather expressed in language. The possibility of rote learning emphasizes the distinction between the pure internality of thought and the externalized internality that is language.

Intelligence purifies itself of the limitedness within it; with the meaning, the signs and the sequences also become a matter of indifference, . . . This constitutes the transition to thought, the being of this purity of intelligence, which has divested itself of images, of determinate presentations, and at the same time posited pure indeterminate self-identity as being. (Enc §464A)

(iii) Thought. After all this preparation, spirit is finally ready to think in the full-fledged sense of the term: ‘We are always thinkers, but we only fully know ourselves as such when we have raised ourselves to pure thought. Pure thought recognizes that it alone, and neither sensation nor representation, is able to grasp the truth of things’ (Enc §465A; Petry translation adapted).

Pure thought is not incompatible with, but rather builds upon representation, intuition and soul. There are three stages of thought: understanding, judgement and comprehending or syllogizing reason. Understanding (note that this term is also used to name a stage in the Phenomenology) is essentially classificatory, subsuming the singular under categories. Judgement is always thought of by Hegel as involving essential relations – both connections and differences count – among categories. In the final stage of comprehending, the necessary ties between the singular, the particular and the true universal come into focus. Comprehending reason grasps not only the full structure of the universal, but also why it particularizes itself the way it does. In pure thought, thought is its own object; it is both form and content. Spirit is ready, at this point, to think out the science of logic where, in fact, these matters are spelled out in much greater detail.

B. Practical Spirit

The practical spirit under discussion in these paragraphs is subjective, still concerned with the internality of the individual. Nonetheless, it can be made sense of only in the light of the objective reality of spirit, which is a life of freedom in a rational society. Furthermore, although this section on practical spirit follows the section on theoretical spirit, we have to think the developments of theoretical and practical spirit as coordinated and simultaneous. In coming to see how well it has come to fit the world, theoretical spirit in turn discovers how well the world has come to fit it. In its general shape, practical spirit
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recaptulates themes we have encountered previously, moving from something apparently immediately given in spirit, through the diremption of that immediacy into a manifold, and finally finding a higher unity. The level of Practical Spirit, however, is higher because it is informed with thought.

(i) Practical feeling. Practical feeling is similar to feeling as we have encountered it before: it presents itself as immediately singular with a ‘natural, contingent and subjective content’ (Enc §471). Practical feeling includes moral emotions, inclinations such as benevolence, and, as we have seen with earlier levels of feeling, is crucial to living an engaged existence in which one’s rationality pervades one’s whole being. But the form of practical feeling, immediacy, does not force a rational content upon practical feeling. So practical feeling ‘can also be onesided, inessential, bad’ (Enc §471R). Bad practical feelings often get the most attention, because the good ones have a content that more properly ‘does not constitute feelings, but rights and duties, the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity’ (ibid.).

Most important here is that in practical feeling there are two moments: the immediate determinacy of feeling, which seems to come from without, and the determinacy that is posited by spirit as that which ought to be. Agreement between these two moments is pleasant; disagreement unpleasant. Indeed, there are different kinds of pleasure and displeasure (e.g. joy, contentment, remorse), depending on just how the given condition agrees or disagrees with the ought posited by spirit.

(ii) Drives and wilfulness. We have, of course, many drives and inclinations, and it would be impossible to satisfy them all. Which of our drives and inclinations, then, do we pursue? Sometimes, in some people, a particular drive comes to dominate all the others: this is a passion. There may be many different subjective and contingent ways to resolve the conflicts among our drives and inclinations, each of which demands our attention and response, but not all of which can be fulfilled. ‘The immanent reflection of spirit itself is however to overcome their particularity as well as their natural immediacy, and to endow their content with rationality and objectivity, within which they have being as necessary relationships, rights and duties’ (Enc §474R). This ‘reflection’ of spirit begins here in subjective practical spirit as the will distinguishing ‘itself from the particularity of the drives, and plac[ing] itself above their multiple content as the simple subjectivity of thought’ (Enc §476; Petry translation adapted). This process culminates, however, in objective spirit. In this abstraction from the immediacy of its drives, subjective spirit begins to gain the ability to choose among its drives and inclinations, to exercise a reflective judgement over its activities. This Hegel calls ‘willfulness’ (Willkür). At this level subjective spirit is still a welter of disparate drives and inclinations, over which it tries to exert some control and into which it attempts to introduce some overall coherence. Achieving such coherence is happiness.

(iii) Happiness. Happiness is an ideal in which a coherent balance among one’s drives has been achieved, sacrificing some wholly or in part for the sake of others. But happiness is not a form of objective unity in practical spirit: ‘since happiness has affirmative content only in drives, it is they that arbitrate, and subjective feeling and whim which have to decide where happiness is to be posited’ (Enc §479). Though happiness is an ideal, an ought-to-be, it can still take on subjective and contingent shapes, depending on one’s given nature. But both the particularity
of our drives and the abstract singularity of willfulness ‘have their truth in the universal determinacy of the will in itself, i.e., in its very self-determining, in freedom’ (Enc §480; Petry translation adapted).

C. Free Spirit

Free spirit is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit: spirit that knows itself as free, as at home in the world. It recognizes its immediate and particular determinations but subordinates them to its own universal essence, thus pursuing its essential purpose, the full actualization of freedom itself. Thus, spirit now moves on to Objective Spirit, which imprints its rational essence on the world around it. The full idea of freedom is, Hegel thinks, a relatively late human acquisition. The ancient world and the orient never grasped this idea, but Christianity introduced it and it comes to fruition in modern society.

[The] relationships [of family, civil society, and state] are formed by means of [the divine] spirit and constituted in accordance with it. Through that existence the character of ethical life infuses the individual, who then, in this sphere of particular existence, of present sensations and volitions, becomes actually free. (Enc §482; my translation)

4. CONCLUSION

In the PSS, phenomena concerning individual human organisms that appear originally natural but become increasingly complex and distant from animal immediacy are interpreted in terms of their contribution to the development of individuals capable of participating in and contributing to a culturally rich, historically developed, ethically structured, free society. How the interactions of these developed individuals play out in the intersubjective arena of the social world is examined in the Philosophy of Objective Spirit.

NOTES

1 How deep the ontological divide goes was open to debate: Descartes thought the distinction was between two fundamentally different kinds of substances, Spinoza located it at the level of the basic attributes of the one substance he recognized. The empiricists, who had trouble with the notion of substance generally, still treated the mind/body distinction as exhaustive and of the greatest significance, even when one of the two was treated as ultimately illusory.

2 Hume’s attempt to replace the normative rules of reason with natural laws of association leads him into a sceptical cul-de-sac.

3 ‘Animal magnetism’ was brought to popular attention in the late eighteenth century by the Austrian physician Franz Anton Mesmer. The hypnotic state was originally thought to be related to sleep and was thus also called ‘somnambulism’ (a mistake also responsible for the word ‘hypnotism’).

4 The loci classici of both versions of externalism are, respectively, Burge (1979, pp. 73–121) and Clark and Chalmers (1998).

5 This unfinished manuscript is translated in Petry (1978, vol. 1). The passage quoted is on page 123.

6 The word translated as ‘ego’ by most English translators, one should remember, is simply the first person singular pronoun ich.

7 The stages of Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness, which appear in PhG, are not mentioned in Enc.

8 The notion of ‘moment’ here is derived from physics, in which motion is treated as a vector quantity analysable into distinct ‘moments’, each parallel to one of the spatial axes, even though there is no ‘causal reality’ to the vectors associated with the different moments of force.
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9 Petry translates *Vorstellung* as ‘presentation’. However, following most translators of Hegel and Kant, I use ‘representation’.

10 Both Petry and Wallace/Miller translate *Triebe* as ‘impulses’. But we tend to think of impulses as temporally unique events, while Hegel clearly thinks of *Triebe* as informing a whole series of acts: ‘*Trieb* . . . is a form of volitional intelligence [and] goes forth from the sublated opposition of what is subjective and what is objective, and as it embraces a series of satisfactions, is something of a whole, a universal’ (Enc §473A). This is why I prefer ‘drive’.
Hegel’s theory of ‘objective spirit’ is his social philosophy, his philosophy of how the human spirit objectifies itself in its social and historical activities and productions. It is a normative theory, deeply rooted in political economy and in political, social and intellectual history. Hegel’s main work in social philosophy, Elements of the Philosophy of Right or Natural Law and Science of the State in Outline (RPh) appeared in Berlin at Autumn 1820, though dated 1821. Recht is the German counterpart to the Latin ius, that is, justice in its broadest and most fundamental normative sense. Hegel’s RPh is a philosophy of law or theory of justice. It is a treatise in moral philosophy, in the traditional genus of practical philosophy, still common in Europe, which has two proper, coordinate species: justice and ethics. I render Recht by ‘law’, as encompassing moral law, and indicate contrasts among ethical principles, principles of justice and positive or statute law as required. Justice and ethics are closely linked: one of our foremost ethical duties, as guides to individual action, is to abide by the dictates of justice!

Though expressly a lecture compendium, it is splendidly organized and tightly argued, though often misunderstood by mistaken attempts to assimilate it to familiar positions, occasioned in part by Hegel’s presupposing his philosophical method from the Science of Logic (WL) (see RPh, Preface and §31) and his justification of the concept of law within the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) (see RPh §2, also §48; Enc §§481–6). Hegel’s claim that ‘the rational is actual, and the actual is rational’ (RPh, Preface) is normative, because something is ‘actual’ only if it adequately corresponds to its rational concept, which alone justifies it (WL GW 11:380–1; 12:233–5; Enc §§6R, 142); Hegel distinguishes between the actual and whatever merely exists, including extant states (for discussion, see Hardimon, 1994, pp. 42–83).

Hegel’s subtitle indicates his allegiance to the natural law tradition. His method for identifying and justifying the most basic moral principles belongs to a neglected though important branch of natural law theory, one inaugurated by Hume (Westphal, 2005b, 2010a), expanded by Rousseau (Westphal, 2013a), systematized by Kant (Gregor, 1993, 1995) and augmented by Hegel. This branch of natural law theory is a distinctive kind of moral constructivism which is independent
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of moral realism and its alternatives, and yet identifies and justifies strictly objective basic moral principles. Cognitivism about basic moral principles is provided by its account of justification, rather than by appeal to moral truth or truth-makers. I call this approach ‘Natural Law Constructivism’.

PART I: NATURAL LAW CONSTRUCTIVISM

To understand Natural Law Constructivism, consider first a basic contrast in moral theory posed by Socrates’ question to Euthyphro (see below, ‘The Euthyphro question and moral objectivity’) which raises an issue about the relation between artifice and arbitrariness (see below, ‘Artifice and arbitrariness’). This issue about arbitrariness highlights the significance of Hume’s founding insight into the prospect of Natural Law Constructivism (see below, ‘Hume’s key insight’), and how this type of theory addresses Hobbes’ insight that our most fundamental moral problems are problems of social coordination (see below, ‘Hobbes’s two key problems’). Rousseau’s contention that, to be legitimate, social institutions, including legislation, must preserve each citizen’s moral freedom is justified by Kant’s analysis of respect for persons as free autonomous agents (see below, ‘Freedom as autonomy and respect for persons’). Seeing how this is so shows how Hegel augmented Kant’s account by anchoring respect for persons in mutual recognition and its fundamental role in rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains (see below, ‘Respect for persons and mutual recognition’), including the social and political institutions Hegel outlines in his RPh (see below, ‘The collective assessment of moral principles and practices’).

THE EUTHYPHRO QUESTION AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY

Questions about the objectivity of moral principles often focus on issues about moral realism, the idea that there are objective, mind-independent moral facts or standards woven into the fabric of the universe, as it were, which serve as criteria of moral right and wrong, and as criteria of correct or adequate moral thinking. One central contrast between realism and non-realism in matter moral is evident in Socrates’ question to Euthyphro: ‘Is the pious (τὸ ὁσίον) being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?’ (Euthyphro, 10a). The first option represents moral realism about the pious: the pious is what it is, and the gods recognize it for what it is and love it accordingly. The second represents moral non-realism, for on this option, the gods make the pious by loving it (doubtless, in a certain way). This question is easily permuted to ask the same kind of question about the right, the virtuous, the just or the moral good. The Euthyphro question thus highlights this fundamental dichotomy in moral philosophy:

Either moral realism (in some version) is true, in which case there are objective moral standards, or moral non- or anti-realism (in some version) is true, in which case moral standards are artificial.

This dichotomy is a dilemma if it follows from moral standards being artificial, that they are also relative, conventional or arbitrary, and so are not objective. This dilemma is pervasive in moral philosophy. This threat of relativism, conventionalism, arbitrariness or (in sum) lack of objectivity has made moral realism appear mandatory to many. However, justifying a tenable form of moral realism has defied repeated efforts, for reasons
epitomised by the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion. (Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 2.4.20; cf. 1.14.116–17)\(^1\)

Very briefly, the key problem is that, as a group, moral realists disagree fundamentally about what are, so to speak, ‘the real moral facts’, and no one has developed an adequate account of moral knowledge or of moral justification to distinguish between true or false, nor between better or worse justified, claims about alleged ‘real moral facts’. Moral realism too easily succumbs to moral dogmatism, relativism and ultimately scepticism, as anticipated by the Dilemma of the Criterion.

Taken together, these considerations have strongly suggested that basic moral principles must be artificial. This option is explored by contemporary forms of moral constructivism, inaugurated in contemporary political philosophy by John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* (1971), though many constructivist ethical theories take inspiration from Hume’s sentiment-based ethical theory. Constructivism as an explicit philosophical method was first developed by Carnap in *The Logical Structure of the World* (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*) (1928). His method is followed, unacknowledged, by all contemporary forms of moral constructivism. The constructivist strategy comprises four steps: Within some specified domain of interest, (1) identify a preferred domain of basic elements; (2) identify and sort relevant, prevalent elements within this domain; (3) use the most salient and prevalent such elements to construct satisfactory principles or accounts of the initial domain by using (4) preferred principles of construction. This states the constructivist procedure generally, so that it may be used in epistemology, philosophy of science or semantics (as Carnap did), or instead in moral philosophy. According to constructivist moral theories, basic moral principles are artificial because they are identified and justified by constructing them, in whatever way a specific constructivist moral theory proposes. According to constructivist moral theories, the right or the just is whatever is identified and justified as right or as just by a specific constructivist moral theory.

**Artifice and Arbitrariness**

According to constructivist moral theories, to what extent are basic moral principles, because they are artificial, also relative, conventional or arbitrary? Although contemporary constructivist moral theories seek to avoid such results, in principle their methods are inadequate to this task. Contemporary constructivist moral theories appeal to basic elements (steps 1, 2) which are subjective in the sense of something of which individual people are aware, and these states of awareness are taken as theoretically fundamental. Examples of such basic elements include, for example, sentiments, passions, affective responses, particular moral intuitions, manifest preferences, individual interests, contractual considerations or validity claims (*Geltungsansprüche*). This directly raises a key justificatory problem, one also central to contractarian strategies. Contemporary constructivist moral theories can identify and justify moral principles only in consideration of whatever group happens to share sufficiently in whatever subjective ‘basic elements’ (step 2) are used by any specific constructivist theory. Yet both historically and regionally (geographically) such subjective elements (of whatever preferred kind) vary significantly. How or to what extent can such theories address individuals who either lack or who disavow allegedly relevant, putatively basic states of awareness? Ultimately, they cannot.\(^2\)
Constructivist theories built upon subjective bases (in the sense specified) are committed to an internalist model of justification, according to which to justify any claim or principle is to justify it to some particular person(s) by appeal only to what that person acknowledges (or those persons acknowledge) as relevant considerations – though one may hope that cogent discussion can lead someone to expand her or his scope of acknowledged premises or principles (cf. Griffin, 1996). Because they appeal to subjective basic elements, contemporary constructivist moral theories face serious difficulties in avoiding moral relativism. This is a severe limit on moral theory, which must solve certain basic kinds of social coordination problems (see below, ‘Hobbes’s two key problems’), including those which arise among groups with, for example, different interests, cultural outlooks, moral views or morally salient responses. Contemporary moral constructivism is ill-suited to addressing the Dilemma of the Criterion (see Westphal, 2003a, §28).

Justificatory internalism, however, is not the only option in matters moral. Most epistemologists rescinded justificatory internalism in response to Gettier (1963), whose infamous counter-examples support the thesis that the justificatory status of a person’s beliefs or claims may depend in part upon factors of which he or she is unaware; this is justificatory externalism. Natural Law Constructivism provides an important element of justificatory externalism by appeal to objective basic elements.

Hume’s key insight is that the arbitrariness of basic moral principles does not follow from their being artificial: ‘Though the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature . . .’ (Treatise 3.2.1.19). Hume’s key insight is fundamental to his theory of justice, which inaugurates the distinctive approach to natural law theory (see Haakonssen, 1981, 1993, 1996, chapter 3; Buckle, 1991), called here Natural Law Constructivism. To provide objectivity within a constructivist moral theory requires eschewing subjective states of the kinds mentioned above (see ‘Artifice and arbitrariness’), and instead appealing to basic, objective facts about our form of finite rational agency and circumstances of action. Hume’s theory of justice focusses on physiological and geographical facts about the vital needs of human beings, our limited capacities for acting, the relative scarcity of material goods and our ineluctable mutual interdependence. The principles Hume constructs on their basis merit the designation ‘laws of nature’ because they are utterly indispensable and so are non-optional for us: ‘. . . if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species’ (Treatise 3.2.1.19). Hume’s Natural Law Constructivism breaks the deadlock in moral theory between moral realists and their detractors, by showing that their debate is irrelevant to identifying and to justifying basic, objective moral principles. This is a major breakthrough: the protracted debate about moral realism need not be settled in order to identify or to justify basic objective moral principles. Showing that the relevant facts are endemic to the human condition requires recognizing, as Hume did, Hobbes’s insight that the most fundamental moral issues are social coordination problems.

Hobbes’s two key problems

Anglophone discussion has seized upon Hobbes’s apparently pessimistic, egoistic psychology and
its implications for any non-governmental ‘state of nature’ being a ‘war of all on all’. However, Hobbes’s analysis of the state of nature makes two much more important points (see especially Ludwig, 1998). First, unlimited individual freedom of action is impossible due to consequent total mutual interference. Hence the fundamental moral question is not, Whether individual freedom of action may or must be limited, but rather: What are the proper, justifiable scope and limits of individual freedom of action? Second, complete though innocent, non-malicious ignorance of what belongs to whom suffices to generate the total mutual interference characterized in the non-governmental state of nature as the war of all on all. Consequently, justice must fundamentally be public justice, to remedy such ignorance and thus to substitute social coordination for chronic mutual interference. This ‘innocent’ problem of mutual interference entails that no account of (putative) rightful relations between any one individual and any one physical object – nor any account of (putative) rightful relations between any one individual, any one physical object and the divinity – suffices in principle to identify or to justify basic principles of justice. Thus does Hobbes refute prior natural law theories of property, and also Locke’s.6 Hobbes’s two key points show that the most basic moral problems are fundamental problems of social coordination.

Hume’s most basic social coordination problem stems directly from Hobbes: Under conditions of relative scarcity of external goods, the easy transfer of goods from one person to another, the limited benevolence typical of human nature, our natural ignorance of who rightly possesses what, and our mutual interdependence due to human frailties, we require a system of property in order to stabilize the distribution of goods (and thereby avoid chronic mutual interference).4 The minimum effective and feasible solution to this social coordination problem is to establish, in principle and in practice, this convention: Respect rights to possessions! Hume’s three principles of justice are ‘that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises’ (Treatise 3.2.6.1; cf. 3.2.11.2). Hume’s construction of these three basic rules of justice shows that these three principles count for us as ‘laws of nature’ because without them human social life, and hence all of human life, is impossible.

However, Hume’s theory of justice omits personal safety and security, and says nothing about collectively permissible distributions of wealth. Hume’s three rules of justice allow much arbitrariness about further principles and practices. Both issues were directly raised by Rousseau, whose sine qua non for just collective distributions of wealth is that no one is to have any kind or extent of wealth or power which enables him or her to command the actions of anyone else. Any such dependence upon the personal will of others Rousseau prohibits as an unjust infringement of anyone’s and everyone’s ‘original’ right to be free to act solely upon his or her own will (Du Contrat Social 1.6.1, 1.8.2).7

Natural Law Constructivism challenges the social contract strategy by highlighting this question: To what extent is a (or the) social contract merely an expository device, or to what extent is a (or the) social contract a specific, substantive method for identifying or justifying basic moral principles? Many secondary principles are proper matters for public deliberation, legislation or custom. For such principles, express agreement based on considered reasons contributes both to identifying and to justifying such elective statutes, policies or practices. Natural
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Law Constructivism, however, purports to identify and to justify the most basic moral principles without constitutive appeal to contractual agreement. The key issue permutes the Euthyphro question once again: Are basic moral principles justified because people agree to them, or do (or ought) people agree to them because they are justified (on other, agreement-independent grounds)?

FREEDOM AS AUTONOMY AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS

More clearly than Hume, Rousseau emphasized that principles of justice and the institutions and practices they inform are mandatory for us in conditions of population density which generate mutual interference. Rousseau’s insistence that social institutions be such that no one can command the will of another is required for moral freedom, which requires obeying only self-legislated laws. Rousseau’s proclamation of and plea for moral autonomy is compelling, but is it justified? Analysing and justifying moral autonomy as the correct account of human freedom is one of Kant’s central contributions to moral philosophy (see Westphal, 2011a), which Hegel accordingly extols (RPh §135R, cf. §57R). Hegel agrees with Kant that duties ought to be done because they are duties (§133), but disagrees with Kant’s official view that duties ought to be done solely because they are duties, agreeing instead with Kant’s occasional concession that we can only act on mixed motives, and that in performing duties, the motive of respect for moral law shall predominate (KpV AA 5:155–6). Hegel holds that motives cannot be sharply distinguished from the ends of action; humans act on the basis of the ends they seek to achieve, and there are various ends sought in any action, including the general of enjoying one’s capacities and abilities (RPh §135R). This is reflected in successfully executing one’s intended action, which results in ‘self-satisfaction’ (§124, 124R). These disagreements with Kant’s transcendental idealist account of action, however, are consistent with Hegel’s agreement with Kant’s key principle of right action, and its associated universalization tests (see Westphal, 1991, 1995, 2005b).

Kant’s universalization tests determine whether performing a proposed act would treat any other person only as a means, and not at the same time also as a free rational agent. The key point of Kant’s method for identifying and justifying moral duties and permissions is to show that sufficient justifying grounds for a proscribed act cannot be provided to all affected parties. Conversely, sufficient justifying grounds for omitting positive moral obligations cannot be provided to all affected parties. By contrast, morally legitimate kinds of action are ones for which sufficient justifying reasons can be given to all affected parties, also on the occasion of one’s own act. Onora O’Neill notes that Kant’s criterion of right action is modal: ‘When we think that others cannot adopt, a fortiori cannot consent to, some principle we cannot offer them reasons for doing so’ (O’Neill, 2000, p. 200; cf. Westphal, 1997, §§4, 5). ‘Adopt’ means, to be able to follow consistently the very same principle in thought or action on the same occasion as one proposes to act on that maxim. This is an issue of capacity and ability, not a psychological claim about what someone can or cannot bring himself or herself to believe or to do. The possibility of adopting a principle, in this sense, is thus distinct from ‘accepting’ one, in the senses of ‘believe’, ‘endorse’ or ‘agree to’. Kant’s tests rule out any maxim which cannot possibly be adopted by others on the
same occasion on which one proposes to act on that maxim. The universality involved in Kant’s tests includes the agent’s own action, and extends (counterfactually) to all agents acting the same way at that time and over time. What we can or cannot adopt as a maxim is determined by the form of behaviour or its guiding principle (maxim), by basic facts about our finite form of rational agency, by basic features of our worldly context of action and most centrally by whether that action (or its maxim) neglects or circumvents others’ rational agency.

Kant’s contradiction-in-conception test rules out maxims and acts of coercion, deception, fraud and exploitation. In principle, such maxims preclude offering to relevant others – most obviously to victims – reasons sufficient to justify their following those maxims (or the courses of action they guide) in thought or action, especially as the agent acts on his or her maxim. This is signalled by the lack of the very possibility of consent, which serves as a criterion of illegitimacy. Obviating the very possibility of consent on anyone’s part obviates the very possibility of offering sufficient justifying reasons for one’s action to all affected parties. Any act which obviates others’ possibility of acting upon sufficient justifying reasons cannot itself be justified (see below, ‘Respect for persons and mutual recognition’), and so is morally proscribed.

Because any maxim’s (or any course of action’s) passing his universalization tests requires that sufficient justifying reasons for that maxim or action can be given to all affected parties for acting on that maxim on that very occasion, Kant’s universalization tests embody at their core equal respect for all persons as free rational agents who can determine what to think or to do by rationally assessing the reasons which justify that act (as obligatory, permissible or prohibited). Ruling out maxims which fail to pass this universalization test establishes the minimum necessary conditions for resolving the fundamental problems of conflict and social coordination which generated the central concern of modern natural law theories with establishing normative standards to govern public life, despite deep disagreements among various groups about the character of a good or pious life. These principles hold both domestically and internationally; they also concern ethnic and other inter-group relations. These principles are neutral regarding theology and secularism; they establish minimum sufficient conditions for just and peaceful relations among groups or peoples who disagree about such often contentious issues (see further O’Neill, 2000, 2003, 2004b).

RESPECT FOR PERSONS AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION

Kant’s justificatory strategy is constructivist because it makes no appeal to any antecedent source or kind of normative authority. Kant’s constructivism is entirely neutral about moral realism. Kant’s justificatory strategy appeals to a fundamental principle of rational justification as such, that justifying a principle, policy, belief, institution or action requires that its proponent can provide sufficient justifying reasons to all other affected parties, such that they can consistently adopt or follow the very same proposal in thought or action. Kant’s constructivist justification of practical principles is fundamentally social, intersubjective, because it addresses all affected parties. Our behaviour, both verbal and physical, is not coordinated naturally. Nor is it coordinated transcendentally or transcendentally. Hence any stable social practices or constructions, whether
Communicative, intellectual, political or physical, must be based on principles which all parties can consistently follow in thought and in action. To identify and to justify such principles requires, Kant contends, that we follow the maxims always to think actively, to think consistently, to think (so far as possible) without prejudice and ‘to think from the standpoint of everyone else’ (KU AA 5:294). These maxims are neither algorithms nor methods, but they are *sine qua non* for rationally cogent and justifiable thought, judgement and action. O’Neill (1989) notes that these are also maxims of communication, required so that we can communicate with everyone, not just with our fellow partisans (ibid., pp. 24–7, 42–8). Hence Kant’s justificatory strategy is fundamentally social. The nerve of Kant’s constructivist strategy is to show that the modal requirement to provide justifying reasons to all affected parties is very stringent. Kant’s minimalist strategy of justification is that it avoids familiar problems regarding agreement or acceptance, whether implicit, explicit or hypothetical. ¹⁰

Kant’s constructivist principle addresses neither a particular society with its norms (communitarianism), nor an ‘overlapping consensus’ of a pluralistic society (Rawls), nor the multitude of voices aspiring to communicate in accord with the requirements of an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas), nor a plurality of potential contractors (e.g. Gauthier or Scanlon). These latter considerations are important, but are secondary to the basic moral principles identified and justified by Kant’s constructivism, which articulates the most basic rational principles of human thought and action as such. The principles required for legitimate contract cannot themselves be established by contract, because (as Hume recognized) any contract presupposes rather than defines those principles (*Treatise* 3.2.2.10, 3.2.5.1–4). Conversely, requiring consent to establish basic norms too easily allows for negligence, hypocrisy or exploitation through refusal to consent, including refusal to acknowledge relevant, other-regarding considerations and obligations (on some key shortcomings in consent theories, see O’Neill, 2000, pp. 185–91; Westphal, 2013b).

Kant’s constructivism identifies and justifies key norms to which we are committed, whether we recognize it or not, by our rational requirements to act in justified ways, and by the limits of our very finite form of human agency and our worldly context of action. According to Kant, there is no public use of reason without this constructivist principle, which uniquely avoids presupposing any particular authority, whether ideological, religious, socio-historical or personal.

Because constructivist rational justification is fallibilist, it underscores that to judge rationally is to judge matters thus: ‘To the best of my present abilities, understanding and information, this conclusion is justified for the following reasons and in the following regards – what do you think?’ Because rational judgement is fallible, and because it involves one’s own, as it were, ‘perspectival’ assessment of the relevant evidence, principles and links between them, rational judgement (in the non-formal domain of morals) is also fundamentally social. The judgements each of us make and the principles we use to make them have implications beyond one’s present situation and purview. Among these are implications for domains, issues and specific cases one might never attend to, or ever be able to attend to. Hence we each require the critical assessment of others engaged in other activities and concerns, both directly and indirectly related to our own, because they can identify implications of
our judgements and their justifying grounds which we cannot. None of us can sufficiently simulate for ourselves the confrontation of our judgements with the loyal opposition by also playing for oneself the role of the loyal opponent. While important, being one’s own devil’s advocate is inherently limited and fallible. Each of us can do our best to try to determine what those who disagree with us may say about our own judgements, and we may do rather well at this, though only if we are sufficiently broad-minded and well-informed to be intimately familiar with opposing analyses of and positions on the matter at hand. However, even this cannot substitute for the actual critical assessment of one’s judgements by knowledgeable, skilled interlocutors who actually hold differing or opposed views. Inevitably we have our own reasons for selectively gaining expertise in some domains rather than others, for focusing on some issues rather than others and for favouring some kinds of methods, accounts or styles rather than others. However extensive our knowledge and assessment may be, we cannot, so to speak, see around our own corners. Our own fallibility, limited knowledge and finite skills and abilities, together with the complexities inherent in forming judgements about moral matters, require us to seek out and take seriously the critical assessment of any and all competent others. Failing to do so renders our judgements less than maximally informed, less than maximally reliable and so less than fully rationally justified.

All of these considerations and measures are required, and understanding of all them is required, in order rationally to judge that ‘I judge’, and not merely to utter the words ‘I judge’, thereby merely feigning rationality. Hence for any human being genuinely to judge rationally that she or he rationally judges, requires judging that others are likewise rational judges, and that we are equally capable of and responsible for assessing rationally our own and each other’s justificatory judgements. This rich and philosophically crucial form of rational self-consciousness requires the analogous consciousness of others that we are all mutually interdependent for our capacity of rational judgement, our abilities to judge rationally and our exercise of rational judgement. This requirement is transcendental, for unless we recognize our critical interdependence as fallible rational judges, we cannot judge fully rationally, because unless we acknowledge and affirm our judgemental interdependence, we will seriously misunderstand, misuse and over-estimate our own individual rational, though fallible and limited powers of judgement. Thus recognizing our own fallibility and our mutual interdependence as rational judges is a key constitutive factor in our being fully rational, autonomous judges. Only by recognizing our judgemental interdependence can we each link our human fallibility and limited knowledge constructively with our equally human corrigibility, with our ability to learn – especially from constructive criticism. This form of mutual recognition involves mutually achieved recognition of our shared, fallible and fortunately also corrigible rational competence. This involves recognizing the crucial roles of charity, tolerance, patience and literal forgiveness in our mutual assessment of our rational judgements and those of others, to acknowledge that oversights, whether our own or others’, are endemic to the human condition, and not as such grounds for blame or condemnation of anyone’s errors. Therefore, fully rational justification requires us to seek out and actively engage with the critical assessments of others. This is precisely the conclusion
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reached by the two, initially staunchly individualist moral judges Hegel analyses in ‘Evil and Forgiveness’ (Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG], chapter VI), which is expressly the first instance of genuine mutual recognition in PhG (GW 9:359–62) and constitutes the advent of ‘absolute spirit’ (PhG GW 9:361; see Westphal, 2009c, 2011b).

Furthermore, the justification of any substantive view in a non-formal domain requires thorough, constructive internal critique of all relevant opposed views so far as we can determine them, whether historical, contemporary or possible. This is built into Hegel’s method of ‘determinate negation’ (PhG GW 9:57; see Westphal, 1989, pp. 125–6, 135–6, 163). Because the list of relevant alternative views can always be extended, in part by devising new variants on previous accounts, and in part when confronting new kinds of circumstances, rational justification is fallible and inherently provisional. Consequently, rational justification is fundamentally historical, because it is based on the current state of knowledge, because it is fallible and thus provisional and because the list of relevant alternatives and information expands historically.

THE COLLECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

The social dimensions of rational justification (see above, ‘Respect for persons and mutual recognition’), together with the basic points of Natural Law Constructivism (summarized above), have important implications for the collective assessment of moral principles, practices and institutions. As noted, Kant’s universalization tests rule out maxims and acts of coercion, deception, fraud and exploitation. These are important implications of Kant’s criteria of right action, yet not sufficient: though many forms of such actions may be obvious, and hence obviously wrong, some forms may be more subtle, and not so easily detected. As O’Neill emphasizes, assessing maxims or forms of action by Kant’s universalization tests requires information about the ‘normal, predictable results of the success’ of that action (O’Neill, 1975, pp. 70–1). In many cases – her example is bank robbing – these results are obvious. In other, more complex cases in which the sociological law of unintended consequences holds, the ultimate results of the behaviours of a group of people may be far from obvious or predictable as, for example, subtle forms of ethnic, racial, gender or economic discrimination. (Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is an example of the law of unintended consequences, to which Hegel appeals in RPh §189, 189R.)

The social dimensions of rational justification in matters moral entail that we must seek to understand the implications of our behaviour towards any and all others, no matter who ‘we’ are. This is required to establish, to assess and to promote or to improve the principles and practices of justice within any community, in part by identifying and rectifying illicit benefits which accrue selectively to some persons or groups due to differential treatment of others.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND COMMUNITY COMMITMENT

Principles of justice exist or hold only insofar as people abide by, uphold and honour them in deed as well as in thought. This holds, too, of the core principles of justice identified and justified by Natural Law Constructivism. Because Natural Law Constructivism requires respecting all persons as rational agents, it requires a republican constitution, and a system of education which enables
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children to mature into responsible holders of the office of citizen.

A political constitution is a set of fundamental institutions and laws, insofar as they are institutionalized within a society which lives and conducts its affairs on their basis. The principles of justice formulated in a political constitution structure the legal and political life of a nation. Most fundamentally, law is a set of enabling conditions, which make possible the various forms of action they institute. As a nation changes through history, the implications of constitutional law for newly developed social conditions must be worked out through legal and political processes. Constitutional law is a set of determinable provisions. Like empirical concepts, they have an ‘open texture’, acquiring new determinacy in new contexts of use. Like all norms, they have latent aspects, which become manifest as new developments and disagreements arise (see Will, 1988, 1997). Consequently, there can be no ‘social contract’ in the sense of an explicit and complete set of specific legal stipulations to which one could agree in advance. Republican citizenship involves commitment to one’s constitution, which is fundamentally a commitment to one’s national community, including the commitment to on-going assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the legal system, the nation’s system of justice, to amend or augment it when and as necessary to preserve or improve its compliance with the principles of justice expressed in the constitution, and with the core principles of justice identified by Natural Law Constructivism. This is why Montesquieu (1748) stressed the spirit of the laws. Hegel extols Montesquieu for providing the truly historical view, the genuine philosophical standpoint,

[that] legislation as such and its particular determinations [are] not to be regarded in isolation and abstractly, but rather as a dependent aspect of one totality, in connection with all the other determinations which constitute the character of a nation and an age; in this connection they obtain their true significance and hence also their justification. (RPh §3R; my translation – KRW)

To this view Hegel directly contrasts the historical school of jurisprudence, which sought to justify Prussian law by tracing its origins back to Roman law. This strategy, Hegel notes, commits the genetic fallacy and delegitimizes law because the historical conditions which spawned Roman law are long past (RPh §3R). This is the key fallacy of the historical school of jurisprudence, founded by Gustav Hugo (see Hugo, 1799, 1818) and favoured by the reigning Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Hegel expressly criticizes Hugo’s work in this connection (for the context of Hegel’s RPh, see D’Hondt, 1988; Westphal, 1993, §II; Siep, 1997b).

PART II: HEGEL’S SOCIAL ANALYSIS

OUTLINE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

The structure of Hegel’s RPh shows that political autonomy is fundamental to his analysis of the state and of government. Hegel’s Introduction (RPh §§1–33) adumbrates basic considerations about will, freedom and law. Part I, ‘Abstract Right’ (§§34–104) examines basic principles governing property, its transfer and wrongs against property. Part II, ‘Morality’ (§§105–41) examines the rights of moral subjects, responsibility for
one’s actions and *a priori* criteria of right action. Part III, ‘Ethical Life [*Die Sittlichkeit*]’ (§§142–360) analyses the principles and institutions governing central aspects of rational social life, including the family, civil society, government and the state as a whole. Unlike his critics, Hegel distinguishes – terminologically and analytically – three senses of the ‘state’: civil society is the ‘state external’ (§183), government is the ‘strictly political state’ (§§273, 276), as integrated within a nation they all form the ‘state proper’ (§§257–71).

Hegel analyses the concept of the will (*RPh* §§4–7, 279R) and what it requires for freedom. Achieving freedom requires both achieving one’s ends and engaging in actions voluntarily. Voluntary action requires (*per* Aristotle) not regretting one’s act post facto in view of one’s actual consequences (§7, 7R), and (*per* Rousseau and Kant) obeying only laws one legislates for oneself. Free action involves both achieving one’s ends and matching one’s intentions with one’s consequences (cf. §§10, 10R, 22–3, 28, 39). Unintended consequences may ground post facto regret, or a sense of encumbrance by unforeseen and undesirable circumstances. Hegel’s analysis examines what sort of action, in what sort of context, constitutes free action so conceived. Hegel uses indirect proof, critically analysing purported answers to this question. He contends that the conditions for successful free action ultimately include membership in a rationally well-ordered republic. Hegel’s analysis turns on an unspoken principle much like Kant’s principle of hypothetical imperatives (*GMS AA* 4:412): Whoever rationally wills an end is rationally committed to willing the requisite means or conditions for achieving that end. The most basic end of the human will is to act freely (*RPh* §27). Obligations are identified and justified by commitment to the basic end of willing to be free, and by the consequent commitment to the necessary legitimate conditions and means for achieving freedom (cf. §261R). Correlatively, rights are identified and justified by showing that they secure some necessary legitimate means or condition for achieving freedom (§§4, 29–30, 261R). Principles, practices and institutions are identified and justified by showing how they play necessary, irreplaceable roles in achieving freedom (cf. *Enc* §502R). Accordingly, slavery is absolutely unjust (*RPh* §57R), for the right to freedom of will is inalienable (§66).

‘Abstract Right’ addresses basic principles of property, beginning with the paradigmatic liberal individualist candidate for the most basic free act, acquiring a possession (see Ritter, 1997). Abstract Right considers actions and principles in abstraction from interpersonal relations, from moral reflection and from legal and political institutions. These abstractions are sequentially shed as Hegel develops his analysis; ultimately he argues that the presuppositions and inadequacies of simple acquisition justify membership in a specific kind of modern republic.

Like Hobbes, Hume and Rousseau, Hegel argues that rights to possession are founded on conventions; like Kant, he argues that the relevant conventions only exist on the basis of mutually recognizing the principles, practices and specific titles which constitute rightful possession (*RPh* §§13R, 21R, 211R; cf. Kant, *MS AA* 6:245–62; see Westphal, 1997, 2002a). Like Hume, Rousseau and Kant, Hegel argues that property is necessary for finite beings like us to be free; Hegel argues that this justifies a right to some property (§§41–6, 49). Hegel highlights the necessary role of mutual agreement to principles in any system of property rights and
the intellectual achievement such agreement reflects. This agreement involves an ‘object’ common among individual wills, a set of principles and their maintenance, since these are constitutive of any rightful act of acquisition and possession (§71). Seizing and holding an object is an inadequate expression of freedom because it does not achieve its aim, which includes stability of holding (§45) for use (§§53, 59–64); mere seizure prohibits no one from making off with one's holding. Possession is distinguished from mere holding by others’ recognition that one possesses something (§51). Such mutual recognition of principles, rights and duties is explicit in contract, which involves agreeing to the principles of contractual exchange, along with the particulars exchanged by any specific contract (§§72–4).

These elementary property rights are necessary for human freedom, because we are neither rational nor free agents except through our embodiment. Our human form of finite, embodied rational agency cannot create ex nihilo, and can only achieve ends by acting in, on and through our material surroundings. Hegel’s RPh assumes this premise as previously demonstrated (RPh §§47R, 48R; cf. Enc §§213, 216, 336ff., 376, 388; see Nuzzo, 2001).¹²

Necessary as some property is to free, rational action, these elementary property rights do not constitute a self-sufficient system of principles and actions, because they generate key problems which this abstract system of rights cannot resolve. These come under the heading of ‘wrong’ (Unrecht). This abstract system of property rights enables agents to commit wrong acts: theft, fraud or extortion. Within this elementary system of rights, the agreement between contracting parties is merely contingent (§81); express contractual agreement may be fraudulent, an exchange may be coerced or a possession may be stolen. Wrongs against property are defined as acts which violate specific rightful acts of others (§92, cf. §126). Wrongdoers purport to own something which rightfully belongs to another. Hence, theft both presupposes a system of principles of ownership and also violates those principles. Theft is therefore an incoherent exercise of freedom (§92). This abstract system of property rights makes no provision to train agents habitually and intentionally to uphold rather than to violate this system of rights. Resolving this problem requires a system of education; any effective and stable system of property rights requires a social ethos as a condition of its effectiveness.

The abstract system of property rights also cannot distinguish punishment from revenge. Revenge can be defined within the abstract system of property rights as the informal exchange of bads for (alleged) bads, instead of goods for goods. In addition to principles which define violations, punishment requires impartial assessment and use of those principles and multilateral recognition of the impartiality of judgement. Multilateral recognition of impartial judges directly anticipates the social institution of courts. However, courts lacking impartial judges are illegitimate. Impartial judgement requires individuals to ignore their individual circumstances and to judge according to universally valid and accepted norms (RPh §103). Within the abstract system of property rights, agents only commit themselves to and act in accord with the system of property rights insofar as so doing enables them to achieve their private wants and desires. This is an insufficient basis for impartiality because impartiality requires disregarding one’s personal interests, and may require judging to their disadvantage. The concept of a particular agent who
judges impartially thus transcends the realm of abstract property rights. Such an agent is fundamentally a moral agent (§104). This is the key to justifying ‘Morality’ as the proper successor to ‘Abstract Right’. The abstract system of property rights is not self-sufficient because its maintenance and stability requires impartial judges, but the capacity of impartial judgement cannot be defined or developed within the abstract system of property rights. For this reason, and to form the ethos proper to maintaining property, Abstract Right must be augmented by moral agency and reflection (on Hegel’s account of wrong and punishment, see Mohr, 1997).

‘Morality’ has two central aims: first, to enumerate a set of rights which are fundamental to moral agency; second, to argue that moral principles cannot be generated or justified a priori. Hegel distinguishes terminologically between mere proprietors and moral agents, referring to abstract proprietors as ‘persons’ and moral agents as ‘subjects’. Hegel argues for several ‘rights of the subjective will’, which are due moral subjects. They include the rights only to recognize something (e.g. a principle) insofar as one adopts it as one’s own (RPh §107), only to recognize as valid what one understands to be good (§132), only to be responsible for one’s actions insofar as one anticipates their results (§117) and to find satisfaction through one’s acts (§121). These rights are due moral subjects because they are necessary to preserve and promote the autonomy of thought and freedom of action which are required to assess alternative courses of action, to justify and to accept responsibility for one’s acts and their consequences, to evaluate behaviour and to form impartial, well-reasoned judgements. Although the rights of subjectivity are abstract – they are too general to determine any specific injunctions or directives – they are crucial to Hegel’s enterprise and to humanity: The recognition of these rights marks the divide between antiquity and modernity (§124R); freedom is only actual, and only exists, in and through the free voluntary action of moral subjects (§106).

One responsibility involved in moral reflection is to reflect adequately on the principles, circumstances and consequences of action. Hegel recognizes that the rights of moral subjects just enumerated may allow for subjectivism or negligence due to ignorance or irresponsibility (RPh §132R). Moral reflection must be based on correct principles (cf. §140R). Under the ‘right of objectivity’ Hegel upholds a doctrine of strict liability, that agents are responsible for the actual consequences of their acts, even if unintended (§§118, 118R, 120, 132R). Hegel further argues that, crucial as the rights and capacities of moral subjectivity are, a priori moral reflection cannot identify or justify substantive moral principles (§258R). In ‘Morality’ Hegel argues for this claim in two representative ways: first, by distinguishing two views of conscience, only one of which claims normative self-sufficiency; second, by highlighting an important feature of the structure of Kant’s moral philosophy.

On one view, conscience is an important aspect of moral reflection rooted in the ethos of a rational system of social practices. This type Hegel calls ‘true conscience’ and expressly exempts it from criticism (RPh §137, 137R). The view Hegel criticizes holds that conscience, unto itself, suffices to identify and to justify correct and sufficient moral norms. Hegel’s basic objection to this view is that conscience, so conceived, cannot reliably and adequately distinguish between mere subjective certainty, being convinced of some claim and only thus concluding that it is
correct and justified, and objective certainty, where the correctness of a principle is the basis upon which one is convinced it is correct and justified (ibid.). This is the fault typical of most claims to self-evidence, though reasoning with correct and justified moral principles is crucial and cannot be gainsaid merely by claiming to abide by one’s conscience (§140R). Hegel refers (in §135R) to PhG (chapter VI C) for detailed criticism of a priori theories of conscience (see Westphal, 1991; Beiser, 2009). Hence conscience is an aspect, not the (self-sufficient) apex, of moral reflection.

Hegel highlights an important feature of the structure of Kant's moral philosophy: his ‘metaphysical principles’ of right action require, for their application to human action and to determine our obligations and permissions, appeal to ‘practical anthropology’ (GMS AA 4:388, 412; MS AA 6:216–17), which catalogues basic human capacities and incapacities, and pervasive facts about our worldly context of action. Though his examples suggest much relevant information, Kant relegated ‘practical anthropology’ to an unwritten appendix to his moral system (MS AA 6:469). In rejoinder, Hegel notes that, on Kant's own analysis, without this practical anthropology, his moral principles can only be empty formulae. Hegel expressly develops his account of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) to remedy this circumstance, so that Kant's principles not be condemned to empty formalism (RPh §135, 135R; cf. Siep, 1992, pp. 182–94; Westphal, 2005b). By integrating Kant's moral principles within a systematic social theory – per Montesquieu's and Scott's political economy (RPh §189R; see Chamley, 1963, 1982; Waszek, 1988) – Hegel propounds an immanent doctrine of duties (RPh §148R), one which shows how duties and rights follow from, are justified by and are non-optional because they are required for free rational action within a modern commercial society (§299R; see Peperzak, 1997).

One central aim of Hegel's analysis of ‘Morality’ is to show that moral reflection is essential to the individual integrity required for impartial judgement and for the stability of the system of property conventions, and yet that moral reflection alone cannot establish any principles of right. This contributes to his justifying an important pair of biconditionals: first, principles of right can exist if and only if there is personal integrity and moral reflection; second, there are moral principles on which to reflect if and only if there are social practices. Social practices were presented abstractly in ‘Abstract Right’ as mutually recognized principles governing property. Such a system of integrated principles, practices and morally reflective agents Hegel calls Sittlichkeit. Hegel's argument for introducing Sittlichkeit is expressly regressive: the communal phenomena analysed in Sittlichkeit provide the ground for the possibility of the phenomena analysed in ‘Abstract Right’ and ‘Morality’ (RPh §141R). ‘Ethical Life’ analyses a wide range of social practices which form the basis of legitimate normative principles. Social practices, however, cannot occur without social practitioners, agents who behave in accordance with social practices and who understand themselves and others as engaging in those practices. Thus these practices also include subjective awareness on the part of agents of their own actions and the actions of others.

Hegel focusses on rational social life to understand the possibility, the principles and the motivation of moral action. Because rational social life can only exist if it is practiced and supported by individuals, action in accord with its norms is possible (RPh §151).
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Because rational social life consists in recognizable norms which guide the actions of particular individuals, it has specific content (§150R). Because individuals develop their aims, desires, skills and knowledge by maturing within their particular society, they tend to develop characters and a self-understanding which value what their rational social life provides. Hence by doing what their rational social life requires, they fulfil aims essential to their own characters and their motivation for behaving morally is unproblematic (§§152–5).

Hegel’s analysis of Sittlichkeit addresses six central questions: (1) How does rationally ordered social life enable agents to achieve their aims successfully? (2) How can the principle that one is responsible only for intended consequences be reconciled with responsibility for one’s actual consequences? By regularizing and making known the social context of individual action, so that individuals can act knowingly and reliably succeed; hence: (3) How can the social context of action be regularized and made known? (4) How are natural needs and desires customized to make them rationally self-given ends? (5) How can moral autonomy, the right to obey only those laws and principles which one legislates for oneself, be preserved within a social context? (6) How do social institutions perform the functions required by these desiderata? In sum, one central aim of Hegel’s social philosophy is to show that, and how, our natural drives become systematically ordered as determinations (or specifications, Bestimmungen) of an agent’s free rational willing (RPh §19).

Hegel’s normative theory involves both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ conditions. Objectively, an adequate social structure consists in institutions which make specific, necessary and jointly sufficient contributions to achieving individual freedom. Subjectively, an adequately rational society makes known to its members the civil, legal and political structure of the community, along with how individuals’ activities contribute to and benefit from this structure. Both sets of conditions are crucial to preserving moral autonomy within a social context (on the objective and subjective aspects of Hegel’s account, see Neuhouser, 2000; Westphal, 2002b). Ultimately, Hegel requires that a society be sufficiently effective at providing this knowledge and at satisfying individual needs for objects, relations, culture and for belonging, so that individuals who understand these features of their community and their roles within it, can affirm their community as fulfilling their aims, requirements and needs (see Hardimon, 1994). Only in this way can individuals freely engage in actions within their society. This requirement stems directly from Hegel’s initial analysis of freedom (RPh §§5–7).

Because humans act collectively to promote their freedom, the primary question of modern political philosophy, on Hegel’s view, is not, what institutions would fulfil these functions?, but rather, how and to what extent do extant institutions fulfil these functions? This, too, marks Hegel’s allegiance to the natural law tradition, which tended to place greater store in the rationality of human behaviour than in the a priori ratiocinations of political philosophers. Though some of the institutions Hegel describes are unfamiliar, there is much to learn from the functions he assigned to various institutions and of how and why they are to fulfil them. 15

THE INSTITUTIONS OF A WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

Among much else, the family provides an institutional context for customizing and
rationalizing sexual desire and provides for the duty to raise the next generation. This involves more than simply reproducing human organisms, by raising human beings by introducing the child to the ways and means made available within one’s society for meeting basic needs and by educating children in the principles and practices established in one’s society for achieving various purposes, upholding rights and fulfilling obligations, whether legal, moral or elective. Customizing whatever needs are due to our biological and psychological nature occurs here, through upbringing and socialization (RPh §§174–5). Because in modern economies few families produce for their own subsistence, the family must have dealings with the economic and civil life of society.

Civil society comprises the institutions and practices of producing, distributing and consuming goods which meet various individual needs and wants. Hegel called this the ‘system of needs’ (RPh §188). The system of needs transforms natural impulses, needs and wants by providing socially specific goods which modify, multiply and fulfil them (§§185, 187R, 193–4, 194R) and by inculcating the social practices through which individuals can achieve their ends (§§182–3, 187). Hegel stresses that the division of labour requires specialization, which requires coordination, which in turn requires conformity to ‘the universal’, that is, to common practices (§§182, 198–9). (The relevant ‘universal’ just is those practices, since they are the relations among the individuals in question; see §182.) The collective development of social practices, based on the joint pursuit of individual aims, contributes directly to the collective development of implicit principles of justice (§187R; cf. §§260, 270). Hegel stresses the fact that these ‘universal’ principles derive their content from the ends and activities of particular agents who determine for themselves what to do (§187R). This is the most fundamental role for individuals in developing the content of principles of justice, in Hegel’s view. Legitimate statute codifies those practices which require legal protection to remain effective (§§209–12). In this connection Hegel refers to his opening endorsement of Montesquieu’s view that laws are justified by their systematic interconnection within present social circumstances (§212 and §3R quoted above in the section ‘Constitutional law and community commitment’).

Civil society and the economy must support the basic freedom of choosing one’s vocation (RPh §§206–7). Everyone enjoys equal civil (and later, political) rights because there is no legitimate reason to distinguish among persons to the disadvantage of some and the advantage of others (§§36, 38, 209R, 270, note 3). (Hegel explicitly repudiates the anti-semitism of his conservative and liberal contemporaries: §209R and cf. §270, note 3.)

Civil society contains three distinct kinds of institution: the Administration of Justice, the Public Authority and Corporations. The Administration of Justice (Rechtspflege) codifies, promulgates and administers statute law. Codification makes explicit the normative principles implicit in social practices (RPh §§209–12; cf. §§187R, 249). Promulgating codified law contributes to informing people about the structure of their social context of action (§§132R, 209, 211R, 215; cf. 228R). Hence the legal code must use the national language (§216) and judicial proceedings must be public (§§224, 228R). The enforcement of law regularizes the context of individual action and protects and preserves the social practices people have developed to exercise their freedom and achieve their individual aims (§§208, 210, 218, 219). Establishing recognized courts replaces revenge with punishment (§220).
The Public Authority is responsible for removing or remedying ‘accidental hindrances’ to achieving individual ends; it minimizes and ministers to the natural and social accidents which impair or disrupt successful free individual action (RPh §§230–3, 235). It is responsible for crime prevention and penal justice (§233), price controls on basic commodities (§236), civil engineering, utilities and public health (§236R), public education (§239), moderation of economic fluctuations, including unemployment (§236), the eradication of the causes of poverty and poverty relief (§§240–42, 244) and the authorization and regulation of corporations (§252). If these factors are not regulated, individuals cannot plan or conduct their affairs reliably, thus compromising their freedom. Although the Public Authority is to address accidental events, among them poverty relief, Hegel did not regard poverty as accidental: it results from the workings of civil society (§245). In his 1822–3 lectures on the philosophy of right (VRPh 4:609), Hegel states what the text of RPh clearly implies, namely that poverty is a wrong done by one class to another (RPh §244A). Hegel regards poverty as an evil because it produces wretched living conditions and because it systematically excludes the poor from participation in society (§244). He is deeply concerned with it, and dissatisfied with any solution he proposes.16

The coordination among different economic agents, whether persons or businesses, entails that the economy consists of sectors or branches of industry or commerce (RPh §§201, 251). This results from the division of labour and the distribution of specialized manufacture across various geographical regions. In modern specialized production, individual jobs and businesses depend upon complex, far-flung economic factors (§183; cf. §§182, 187, 289R, 332). Hegel seeks to insure that such factors will not hold sway over people’s affairs, which would compromise their freedom and autonomy. Hegel addresses this need by advocating a certain kind of professional and commercial corporation (Heiman, 1971). These corporations are a kind of trade association, one for each significant branch of the economy, to which all people working in that sector belong, including both (regular) labour and management. Corporate membership explicitly integrates one’s gainful employment into a sector of the economy and provides information about how one’s economic sector fits with and depends upon others. Corporations moderate the impact of business fluctuations on their members (§§252, 252R, 253, 253R) and counteract the divisive tendencies of individual self-seeking in commerce by explicitly recognizing individual contributions to the corporate and social good and by bringing together people who would otherwise form two antagonistic groups, one an underclass of rabble, the other a class of elite captains of industry wielding inordinate influence through their disproportionate wealth (§§244, 253R).

The final institution in Hegel’s state is a central government. He calls government the ‘strictly political state’ (RPh §§273, 276) and reserves the term ‘state’ for the whole of a civilly and politically well-organized society (§§257–71). He calls civil society – ‘sans representative government’ – ‘the state external’ (§183); it is an ‘external’ state because it does not fulfil the requirements of political autonomy and because the Administration of Justice and the Public Authority are (in this context) regarded merely as instruments for achieving personal aims. The members of civil society are bourgeois, but not citizens, since they must obey statute law without recognizing, and without having public and
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official recognition of, their role in constituting legitimate law. The Public Authority and the Administration of Justice act on their behalf, but not under their purview. Thus, the political aspect of autonomy is not achieved within civil society (cf. §266). Achieving political autonomy, and hence citizenship, is the primary function of Hegel’s central government, which addresses national concerns. (Regional and municipal concerns are addressed by regional or municipal government: §§288, 290.)

Hegel ascribes sovereignty to the state as a whole, not to the monarch, nor even to ‘the princely power’ – die fürstliche Gewalt or ‘Crown’ (RPh §278). No element of the state holds sovereignty; each has an institutionally defined role in sovereignty, and no office is a private, individual possession (§§277, 278R). Hegel analyses government under the heading of the constitution. Although the constitution should be regarded as eternal (§273R), Hegel recognizes that the constitution is subject to change (§§273R, 298). What he said of law in general holds also of constitutional law, that to be executed, law must be determinate. By being specific enough to be enacted, a law requires an ‘empirical side’, which is subject to change in implementing the law (§299R). This may seem to contravene the nature of law, but does not, because, per Montesquieu (§3R), a law is justified by the function it presently performs within an integrated society. As conditions change, so must laws change in order to remain legitimate and effective (§298; cf. GW 15:30–125; see Jammé, 1986). In this way, Hegel notes in his lectures, a country can gradually bring its constitution to a very different condition from where it began (RPh §298A; cf. VRPh 3:788–90; 4:698). Hegel regards this, not as an inevitable concession to historical contingency, but as a rational process of gradual collective revision of the legal conditions required to achieve and preserve freedom. He holds that the constitution ought to be regarded as eternal to insure that change results gradually from detailed knowledge of genuine need, rather than from insufficiently informed ratiocination. He equally holds that reform must be deliberate and continual, so that it neither requires nor prompts revolt.

Hegel’s government comprises the ‘princely power’ or Crown, the Executive and the Legislature (RPh §273). The Crown consists of a hereditary monarch and chief ministers of state (§275). Ministers formulate laws which articulate and protect the basic social practices necessary for individual free action (§283). Cabinet ministers must meet objective qualifications (§§291–2) and are strictly accountable for their actions (§284) and for the content of law (§§283–4); at their recommendation laws are enacted by the monarch (§§275, 283–4). The Crown protects the interests of one’s nation, and one’s interests in the nation, through foreign policy, by diplomacy or war (§329). The Executive administers the laws necessary for knowledgeable individual free action (§287). The Legislature consists of an advisory body, drawn from high-level civil servants with direct ties to the Crown and the Executive (§300), and the bicameral Estates Assembly.

Hegel assigns a restricted but crucial role to the Estates Assembly. This provides popular insight into national political affairs (RPh §§287, 301). The Assembly provides popular insight into how laws enacted by the Crown and administered by the Executive codify and protect the social practices in which one participates and through which one achieves one’s ends (cf. §§314–15). The Estates Assembly puts government under popular purview (§302). Corporate representatives
OBJECTIVE SPIRIT

to the lower house of the Estates Assembly are elected by their respective memberships (§§288, 311). Representatives from the agricultural sector, landed aristocrats (§306), inherit their right to enter the upper house (§307). Hegel bases his system of representation on the Corporations and other branches of civil society because doing otherwise divides political from civil life, leaving political life ‘hanging in the air’ (§303R). The main function of the Estates Assembly is educative, to inform people systematically and thoroughly about the activities of their government and the principles, procedures and resources for acting within their society, so that individuals can resolve to act in an informed and responsible manner, unencumbered so far as possible by unexpected consequences. This education and information enables individuals to act voluntarily and autonomously within their society (§301, 301R). Hegel expects that when people will understand how their society meets their needs and facilitates their ends they will affirm their membership in society and act in it willingly. The fact that the institutions of government, especially the legislative assembly, are necessary for free, autonomous action is their primary political justification (see Siep, 1992, pp. 270–84).

Hegel opposes open democratic election because democracy rests too much on political sentiment (RPh §173R), open elections encourage people to vote on the basis of their apparent particular interests at the expense of their interests in the community as a whole (§§281R, 301R), the tiny role each elector has in large general elections results in electoral indifference (§311R), and because open elections do not insure that each important economic and civil branch of society is represented (§§303R, 308R, 311R). Consequently, open elections threaten to allow what Hegel’s corporate representative system is designed to avoid: the overbearing influence of factions, especially of moneyed interests, on the political process (§§253R, 303R; see Plant, 1980, 1984; Walton, 1984). Hegel recognizes that legislation requires expert knowledge; he expects public opinion to provide general ideas and feedback about problems or details (§301R).

Hegel was also aware of the political inexperience of his Prussian contemporaries. His civil and political institutions were designed to provide regular, publicly acknowledged, institutionalized channels for political education so that people would not act in political ignorance. Hegel may have opposed democratic plebiscite, but he was a staunch republican who took the vital issue of an informed body politic and universal participation in political life much more seriously, at a much deeper institutional level, than most modern democracies (cf. Drydyk, 1986).

Hegel upheld equal and fundamental civil rights and freedoms of person, belief, property, profession and trade (§§35–6, 38, 41–9, 57, 62R, 66, 206–7, 209R, 252, 270R; see Lübbe-Wolff, 1986). Institutional guarantees are built into Hegel’s governmental structure through a division of mutually interdependent powers (§§272R, 286, 286R, 301R, 308, 310, 310R). Hegel emphasizes the co-ordination and co-operative aspects of civil and political institutions (see, e.g. §§272, 303, 303R), though he insists that cabinet ministers are strictly responsible and accountable for their actions (§284) and for the content of the law (§§283–4). Ministers are scrutinized by both the monarch and the Estates Assembly (§295). How such scrutiny is to be effective Hegel does not say (in print), nor is it reassuring that the monarchy can be inherited (§§280, 281R, 286) in part because no talent is needed merely to sign legislation (§§279A, 280A; on
Hegel’s division of governmental powers, see Siep, 1992, pp. 240–69). Nevertheless it is clear that the developmental telos of Hegel’s nation-state is a well-informed, active republican citizenry. Once that is achieved, Hegel’s representational institutions can easily become democratic.

**THE RATIONALLY ORDERED NATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Hegel’s theory of historical change, cast in terms of the world-spirit actualizing itself by achieving deeper self-understanding (RPh §§342–3, 345–6), may perhaps gloss the results or significance of some historical developments, though not the causes or process of historical change. Hegel’s lectures on world history are of limited help in this regard. Harris argues in detail that Hegel’s genuine philosophy of history is contained in PhG, and that it is far more historically complete and accurate than has been recognized (Harris, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 142 [note 59], 721, 723–4, 747). Here a brief word must suffice. In Sophocles’ Antigone, against all custom and precedent, Creon prohibits the burial of Antigone’s traitorous brother. She condemns Creon’s prohibition as neither law nor justice by appeal to unwritten, eternal divine law (verses 450–60). This is one of the earliest extant statements of the natural law view that there are normative standards of justice which transcend human edict, statute or convention (Ostwald, 1973; Valditara, 2002, §B and note 43). The idea of natural law is essentially critical, for it concerns criteria by which to assess the legitimacy of human artifice (Neumann, 1957, pp. 69–95). Creon’s rule by edict exhibits the key defect Hegel repeatedly points out in intuitionism, conventionalism, self-evidence or pure ‘positivity’, the notion that any mere assertion can be taken for granted without further justification: such views cannot distinguish, nor can they provide any method or criterion for distinguishing, between being justified and merely, mistakenly believing that one is justified. Consequently, such views cannot distinguish truth from falsehood, nor justified from unjustified claims. Hegel finds this same fault in declarations of natural law, whether by Antigone, Locke or the US Declaration of Independence. The inadequacy of unreflective appeal to custom or to edict is the crux highlighted in Antigone and re-analysed by Hegel in PhG in order to highlight the key defect of ‘immediate spirit’: Creon’s and Antigone’s equal incapacity to rationally justify their principles or claims. The conflict between them was resolved historically by the ascendancy of imperial edict, which issued in a series of forms of individualist self-assertion reaching into modern times (see Shklar, 1976, ch. 3; Ferrini, 2009b). Hegel’s philosophy of history highlights the achievement, initiated by the Stoics and crowned by Justinian (RPh §215R; cf. TWA 12:408) of re-founding and developing natural law theory within one of the greatest systems of pure positive law in history, the Roman Empire.

In PhG Hegel critically assesses a finely differentiated series of individualist views to show (inter alia) that rational justification in non-formal domains is a social and historical phenomenon, which is consistent with and ultimately justifies realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about basic moral principles – per Natural Law Constructivism, although he had not yet developed this view. The still common presumptions that individuals are fundamentally mutually independent, or that they are ‘prior to’ or ‘more basic than’ their societies, and that rational justification in non-formal domains must be ahistorical and non-social, Hegel criticized as unjustified presumptions,
Indeed as Enlightenment superstitions. Hegel's own philosophy occupies a central position in the historical and social development of reason, because he first understood how to integrate Kant's and Montesquieu's insights within a comprehensive account of rational justification of objective principles and claims in non-formal domains.

NOTES

1 Sextus' *Outlines* are cited here by book, chapter and paragraph numbers. For further discussion, see the entry 'Proof, Justification, Refutation'.

2 This point is central to Kant's rejection of moral empiricism (cf. GMS AA 4:444, *KpV* AA 5:158); see Westphal (2011a, §2). I defend this general claim via two paradigm examples, Hume's ethical theory (Westphal, 2010a) and Gauthier's contractarianism (Westphal, 2013b). The problems confronting Hume's ethical theory extend *mutatis mutandis* to contemporary neo-Humean ethical theories.

3 Carnap's early theory of truth (ca. 1930) involved a form of relativism, because it made truth dependent upon the protocol sentences uttered by scientists of 'our' scientifically minded cultural circle (Westphal, 1989, pp. 56–7).

4 Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* is cited here by book, part, section and paragraph numbers.

5 Very briefly, Locke's claim that in the state of nature we have a right to punish violations of the law of nature is confused within the terms of his own analysis, sufficiently so to discredit his claims to know any of his alleged laws of nature.

6 On the relative scarcity of goods: *Treatise* 3.2.2.7, 16 and 18; on their easy transfer: 3.2.2.7 and 16; on our limited generosity: 3.2.2.16; 3.2.5.8; 3.3.3.24; on the natural ignorance of possession: 3.2.2.11; 3.4.2.2; 3.2.6.3–4; on our limited powers and consequent mutual interdependence: 3.2.2.2–3.

7 Rousseau's *Social Contract* is cited by book, chapter and paragraph numbers.

8 O'Neill (1989, pp. 81–125). A maxim such as one by which you and I agree now that 'I shall exploit you at one time and you me at another' may satisfy minimal requirements on the generality of reasons for action (namely, that a reason for one agent can also be a reason for others), but such examples only underscore that such generality does not suffice for Kant's specific universality requirement, which expressly rules out making an exception for oneself from an otherwise universal rule (*GMS* AA 4:424, 440 note; *MS* AA 6:321).

9 Those who think moral justification can dispense with this condition ought carefully to rethink the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion (see entry 'Proof, Justification, Refutation', §2).

10 This paragraph summarizes some thoughts from O'Neill (2000); cf. O'Neill (1996, 2003, 2004a,b) and Westphal (2013b). The embeddedness of equal respect for all persons as free rational agents within Kant's universalization tests shows that the incommensurable worth or dignity of free rational agency (*GMS* AA 4:434–5) is not required as an independent premise in Kant's analysis, nor specifically as a premise regarding value.

11 ‘Possible’ alternatives must be cogent: In non-formal domains, mere logical possibilities have neither cognitive nor (hence) justificatory status; this they only gain through relevant evidence (Westphal, 2010–11).

12 Hegel first proves this thesis in ‘Lord and Bondsman’ (*PhG*, chapter IV A); see Westphal (2011b, §4).

13 Cf. entry ‘Proof, Justification, Refutation’, §3.


15 Brevity requires omitting how Hegel uses his logical analyses in *RPb*; see Brooks (2007) and especially Vieweg (2012), who (inter alia) explicates in detail how Hegel's institutional arrangements form sets of interlocking syllogisms.

16 Hegel did not recognize the Keynesian policy of expanding public expenditures in times of economic recession, though it is well-suited to his account of government. See Waszek (1984).

17 For an organizational diagram of Hegel's nation-state, see Westphal (1993, p. 269).

18 Hegel's advocacy of constitutional monarchy was politically progressive; see Lübbe-Wolff (1981).

19 Hegel contends that individuals and their societies are mutually interdependent for their existence and their characteristics; neither is ‘prior to’ nor ‘more basic’ than the other; see Westphal (1994; 2003a, §§32–7).
The objectifications of spirit are not yet exhausted by the shapes of objective spirit. Juxtaposed to or set above these configurations are art, religion and philosophy (or ‘science’ in the emphatic sense). Hegel treats this sphere of spiritual life under the title ‘Absolute Spirit’. The special characteristic of this sphere is that spirit is here not related as something merely subjective – as consciousness or will, for instance – to some external, non-spiritual object. It is not even objectified only in the institutions of social life. While spirit unquestionably knows itself in these institutions, their primary significance lies in the regulation of human life, not in spirit’s self-knowing. That is why Hegel calls ‘absolute’ the sphere in which spirit frees itself from the external reality of the institutions of ethical life and makes itself into its object. It is only in this sphere that spirit brings forth a shape – an image of itself, as it were – and relates itself to this shape in the forms of intuition, representation and comprehending thinking. It is here that spirit relates itself to itself and is absolute precisely in its self-relation. It cognizes itself as what it is and it is with itself (bei sich) and free in this cognition. Only with this cognition is the concept of spirit – as the concept of a thinking relation to self – complete.

**ART**

As is the case with history, art has come to be a new subject matter of philosophy around the year 1800. For art, too, the presupposition of this development is a shift in meaning. Art becomes a thematic object of philosophy only when it is understood (as it had been since the middle of the eighteenth century) as ‘fine art’, and is thus no longer taken in the traditional sense of *ars* or *tέχνη*. But this non-traditional understanding of art does not provide a sufficient basis for a philosophy of art as such. For art becomes the object of a *philosophy of art* only when its content is understood as accessible to reason instead of to sensation or sense alone (as is in fact implied in the etymological formation of the word ‘aesthetics’). For Hegel – similarly to Schelling, especially in his *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* – art is ‘one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit’ (*TWA* 13:21). It is thus a form of spirit’s self-intuition. That is why there is art wherever spiritual life develops, no matter how rudimentary it may be. And, although Hegel works out and presents a proper philosophy...
of art only from his Heidelberg period onwards, even his earliest system sketches give a pre- eminent place to the philosophy of art. Together with the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of art is assigned to the highest position in the ‘system’ and has the task of concluding it (GW 5:262–4; 4:75–6).

With this placement of art in the ‘system of science’ Hegel joins his contemporaries, especially Schelling, in the high regard paid to its subject matter. Hegel at first follows Schelling even in the architecture of his lectures. Dividing these into their ‘general’ and ‘particular’ parts, he includes in the general part two quite divergent themes: ‘the beautiful in general’ and ‘the universal forms of art’ (i.e. art’s symbolic, classical and romantic forms). It is only in his final course of lectures (1828/9) that Hegel treats these themes in two separate parts and assigns the originally second theme to a third part (architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry). Yet apart from his borrowing from the structure of Schelling’s aesthetics (with which Hegel would have been familiar from his years together with Schelling in Jena), Hegel takes a different path as far as content is concerned.

Hegel grasps art in the context of his concept of spirit. Art is the first of the shapes of ‘absolute spirit’, that is, of spirit that relates itself to itself, that knows itself as it is in itself and in this knowledge is for itself and thus free. From both systematic and historical-developmental points of view, this grounding of art within the framework of the philosophy of spirit is decisive for Hegel’s aesthetic theory. Whatever else art may be – a means for the beautification and enjoyment of life, or even a mere pastime – it remains primarily a form of spirit’s self-knowledge and thus a return to itself, a cognitive self-relation. As something born of an artist’s mind, every work of art is an objectification of spirit. Its primary meaning always lies in its being a realization of spirit’s self-intuition. This is as much true of an Egyptian sculpture from the Old Kingdom as it is of a modern novel. Hegel’s conception of the unity of ‘absolute spirit’ in its three forms is also made possible by this interpretation of art in the light of his comprehensive philosophy of spirit.

The concept of spirit, however, does not seem to occupy the highest position in Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art. The first and foundational part of these lectures is devoted to the ‘idea of beauty’, and both of the key concepts there at issue – ‘beauty’ and the ‘self-knowing of spirit’ – seem to be juxtaposed to one another without mediation. But this is only apparently the case since Hegel thinks of ‘beauty’ from the standpoint of the concept of spirit. He refers in the lectures to considerations on the concept of beauty and art according to which we find ‘something twofold [ein Gedoppeltes], namely,

first, a content, a purpose, a meaning; and secondly the expression, appearance, and reality of this content. But, thirdly, these aspects are so permeated by one another that the external, the particular, appears exclusively as the presentation of the inner, and nothing else is present except what has an essential relation to the content and is an expression of it. (TWA 13:132).

Strictly speaking, Hegel’s reference concerns not merely something twofold in a work of art, but rather the exposition of two sides and their penetration. The mutual penetration of these sides is so intimate that they coalesce into unity, and apart from this unity there is nothing else at hand. This turn of phrase – ‘nothing else’ – has its analogue in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc), where Hegel speaks of the concrete
intuition and representation of implicitly [an sich] absolute spirit as the ideal – of the concrete shape born of subjective spirit, a shape in which natural immediacy is only a sign of the idea whose expression is so transfigured by in-formative [einbildend] spirit that the shape shows nothing else: the shape of beauty. (Enc §556)

The beauty here in question is not an internal quality of a work of art. Beauty does not lie in a harmonious ordering of shapes. Nor does it consist in a particular arrangement of colours or sequence of tones – or whatever else one might imagine. Instead, beauty lies solely in the perfected penetration of ‘a content, a purpose, a meaning’, on the one hand, and the ‘expression . . . appearance and reality of this content’, on the other. This is what decides whether or not a work is to be grasped as a work of art, that is, as a ‘sign of the idea’. Whether such penetration is successful, and whether there really is ‘nothing else’ present apart from this mutual penetration (as Hegel demands in both his lectures and Enc), is something that can actually be determined only by someone familiar with the work’s content, purpose and meaning. This point holds even if the work of art to be determined is not ‘known in advance’, that is, not approached it with prior knowledge. Knowledge concerning the achievement of artistic penetration can also be imparted by the art work itself, that is by the self-knowing of spirit that the work makes possible. And if one uses the word ‘beauty’ to characterize this penetration, then the following point must be granted: even if it lies in the object intuited, such beauty is revealed not through any ‘intuition’ but solely by spirit’s self-knowing activity or by intellectual comprehension. This circumstance is what explains the well-known fact that the beauty of a work of art is cognized by the mind, not by the eyes and ears. (This is not to say, of course, that beauty could be cognized without the eyes and ears as long as it concerns the visual and plastic arts as well as music.)

This concept of the beautiful thus does not have its place at the level upon which it could be opposed to the sublime, the ugly or the comical. That is why Hegel’s understanding of art is not exposed to the objection that it remains bound to the classical ideal of beauty. Since that understanding pertains purely to his conception of the philosophy of spirit, what is ‘beautiful’ in Hegel’s sense is the shape that spirit brings forth – a shape through which it knows itself; and only this shape is beautiful. Art, now taken in the sense of ‘fine art’, is per se beautiful in so far as it is art; and even the ‘ugly’ is, for Hegel, a moment of fine art. Precisely because his account of art is grounded exclusively in his philosophy of spirit, it becomes plausible why, contrary to Kant, Hegel only treats natural beauty in order to provide reasons to exclude it from aesthetics. This exclusion of natural beauty may well seem implausible if one holds that the beautiful is found only in a certain quality of a work of art – in the harmonious proportions of what is portrayed, for example – or if one understands the beautiful as something that elicits certain sensations in human beings. But if one discerns the very character of art to lie in the mutual penetration of ‘in-formative spirit [einbildender Geist]’ and ‘natural immediacy [natürliche Unmittelbarkeit]’ (Enc §556), and if one makes beauty the constitutive feature of art as art, then no natural beauty can remain alongside artistic beauty. To use an expression from Hegel’s Jena philosophy of spirit, the beauty brought forth by art can be characterized as a ‘pure intellectual beauty’ (GW 8:279). For it lies solely in the mediation of the aforementioned ‘something twofold’ that is always given with the artistic character of a work of art, and is indeed what constitutes that very character. This does not mean, however, that all art is bound to a
set of canonic rules that guarantee beauty. To the contrary: the concept of beauty that pertains to the philosophy of spirit limits neither the ‘content, purpose, meaning’ of a work of art nor the ‘expression . . . appearance, and reality’ of such content. It requires solely the interpenetration of the sides in question. And it is also plausible, as well as something to be welcomed, that Hegel does not attempt to develop and prescribe criteria for this penetrative work. This is accomplished through the labour of the artist, and the standard of assessment lies in what the artist accomplishes.

Hegel’s grounding considerations on the philosophy of art are followed by a treatment of the ‘forms of art’ that in fact amounts to a history of artistic epochs. Hegel presumably takes the notion of ‘art forms’ from Schelling, who discusses such forms in the general part of his own lectures on aesthetics (SW 5:132 ff., 458 ff.). But Hegel interprets this notion historically. According to Hegel, the inclusion of the history of art in aesthetics does not occur at the discretion of the aesthetician. For art is itself a configuration of spirit, and its reality must therefore take the form of historical development. A comprehensive philosophy of art must understand art as a historical phenomenon since otherwise it would unavoidably diminish its thematic object.

Hegel divides the history of art according to the criterion of the concept by which the beautiful is thought of as the unity of nature and spirit. In accordance with this concept of the beautiful, the history of art is divided into ‘symbolic’, ‘classical and ‘romantic’ art – that is, into art that is not yet beautiful, into art that is beautiful and into art that is no longer beautiful in the narrower sense. While one might make light of this tripartite classification as the expression of a rather irritating interpretive schematism, one does well to bear in mind that Hegel’s way of dividing the history of art originates in his repudiation of another classificatory scheme. It is by means of his scheme that Hegel evades the twofold division of ancient and modern art that had come to be accepted almost as a dogma in the wake of the quérèle des Anciens et des Modernes and that, indeed, was still affirmed by Schelling (SW 5:372). The concept of symbolic art enables Hegel to reach back beyond ancient Greek art in order to make the art of the Orient an integral component of a comprehensive history of art. This is a significant achievement even if today it is no longer in doubt that Hegel’s initial approach in this regard is far too sweeping to account for the highly differentiated character of the artistic directions falling under the heading of symbolic art.

‘Classical art’ furnishes the centrepiece of Hegel’s history of art forms. Classical art is the form in which the ‘beautiful world’ of the ancient Greek epoch finds its adequate expression and shines its light into our present age. It is not merely one – the middle – epoch among three. Rather, it is the epoch that furnishes the absolute measure of art. It is in its classical form that art is consummated, according to its highest possibility, as beautiful art: ‘Nothing more beautiful can either be or come to be’ (TWA 14:128). While in the preceding form of symbolic art ‘the shaping adequate to the idea was not yet found’ (Enc §561), in classical art nature and spirit grow together to form an inseparable unity. Accordingly, no matter how brief it was, this epoch attains a pivotal position in the history of consciousness. It qualifies as the organizing centre which divides the history of art into its ascending and descending phases with respect to its perfected shape, and which consequently degrades all earlier art into something ‘pre-’ and all later art into something ‘post-’.
Looking backwards, Hegel formally determines the 'classical' character of ancient Greek art as the 'absolute unification' (V 2:154) of what is separated in symbolic art – namely, form and content; concept and reality; that which is portrayed and the meaning of its portrayal. This assertion seems difficult to verify, but it follows from premises intrinsic to Hegel's philosophy of spirit. Since art is the self-consciousness of spirit in the form of intuition, it must find its true shape where its object – the spiritual – is intuited according to its truth. But the spiritual can only be adequately revealed and intuited in the human form. Thus, what is human constitutes the 'focal point and content of true beauty and art' (TWA 14:19). It is only in the human form, purified of all the defects of the finite, that spirit obtains the 'existence proper to it in what is sensible and natural' (TWA 14:22).

For 'the sensible shape of the human being is that alone in which spirit is able to appear'. It is a shape that is 'significant in itself', and 'what it signifies is the spirit that comes out in it' (V 2:157). The human form, then, is not the symbol of spirit. It does not signify something other than what it is, and it refers to spirit not only as a sign. Rather, spirit is real in the shape of the human being.

This sensible shape of the human being, however, can only hold as the highest expression of the spiritual if it is also the shape of a god – if the divine does not deny its spirituality. The anthropomorphism of the Greek gods becomes in this way a constitutive moment of classical art's consummation. Taking the human figure as the adequate manifestation of spirit goes hand in hand with the debasement of the animal, of the merely natural and even of the power of nature. It thus goes together with the debasement of the symbolic. Still, while sculpture exhibits the human figure, and may even exhibit God in the human shape, it is nonetheless something created by the artist from existing material through the expenditure of labour. As such, it is also something destructible. While spirit knows itself in the sculpted human figure, it knows as well that this is something other than itself. Spirit is not really present to itself in the image of the gods: 'While you may be as enthusiastic as you like about [Greek] beauty and art, this enthusiasm is and remains something subjective, something not found in the object of its intuition, i.e., in the gods' (TWA 14:110).

Accordingly, within Greek art itself a conflict breaks out between what spirit is in itself – spiritual being in itself – and a form of beauty that is necessarily bound up with externality and embodiment (TWA 14:82-4). Classical art can indeed show the human figure and characteristics, but not the character of free spirit – not the inwardness that knows itself as infinite.

This line of argument does not, of course, belong to the Greek world. Rather, it pertains to the retrospective view of this world taken from a later standpoint in the history of consciousness. For spirit itself is nothing beautiful, and the attempt to portray it as beautiful pertains to a stage of historical development at which spirit still knows itself in its unity with nature and has not yet achieved clarity about itself. From here there proceeds the 'quiet cortège' that mourns the transitoriness and perishability of the beautiful (TWA 14:108), but this goes together with knowledge of the necessity of beauty's passing away. Both of these aspects are characteristic features of Hegel's interpretation of classical art, and he sees them as already expressed in classical sculpture itself. This is what saves him from the sort of classicism that seeks the salvation of art in the ancient conception of mimesis (TWA 14:109 ff.):

The realm of the beautiful itself is still imperfect for itself, because the free concept [is] only sensuously present within
it and has no spiritual reality in itself. ... Spirit must have itself as the basis of its existence; it must create for itself an intellectual world. Inwardness in itself is here consummated. (V 2:179)

The consummation of inwardness here at issue is the romantic form of art.

By ‘romantic art’ we should not understand the art of the modern romantic period. The latter involves a use of the word ‘romantic’ that first gains currency in Hegel’s time as the notional counterpart of Weimar ‘classical’ art. Such usage comes to be prevalent only after Hegel’s death, especially in the wake of Heinrich Heine’s *Die romantische Schule* (Windfuhr, 1979, pp. 121–49) as well as Theodor Echtermeyer’s and Arnold Ruge’s manifesto *Der Protestantismus und die Romantik* (Jaeschke, 1995, pp. 192–325). What Hegel designates as ‘romantic’ – without justifying his usage – is the art of the Christian world. It is characteristic of this form of art (though to a lesser degree than is the case for symbolic art) that its unity is negatively defined. Just as symbolic art is what comes before ancient classical art, romantic art is what comes after the classical period. The unity of romantic art does, of course, appear to be substantive in the sense that it is buttressed by this art form’s relation to the Christian religion. Indeed, on account of romantic art’s dogmatic fixation on the Christian religion’s representational world, its unity is given in even stricter measure than the unity deriving from classical art’s relation to Greek popular religion or from symbolic art’s relation to the highly varied religions of the Orient. The religious anchoring of romantic art is reflected in its restriction to explicitly religious motifs such as the ‘redemptive history of Christ’, ‘religious love’ – especially love of the Virgin Mary – and the ‘spirit of community’ (TWA 14:147). In other words, that anchoring is expressed through romantic art’s portrayals of martyrs, legends of the saints and reports of miracles. What is decisive, however, is the inner content that romantic art takes from these motifs: the elevation of spirit above nature.

The difference between romantic and classical art can hardly be more strikingly illustrated than by the notion that the Christian God cannot be portrayed by sculpture. This notion stems not merely from early Christianity’s (plausible) demand to be disassociated from statues of the ‘heathen gods’. In keeping with the Old Testament tradition of iconic prohibition, it also originates in the tenet that the ‘nature’ of God is to have no nature except to be Lord over nature. Even the (comparatively few) portrayals of God in painting, with their oscillation between painfulness and triviality, are evidence more for the non-portrayability of God than for the successful achievement of such portrayals. The specific object of God’s portrayal in romantic art is not God as such. Instead, it is the God who has become human: the ‘real subject’, the real human being in whom – unlike in any statue of religious cult – the ‘light of the eye’ is no longer missing (TWA 14:131–2). With this, beauty comes to occupy a different place. It is no longer concerned with the external, but is rather indifference to the configuration of the immediate world. It is the ‘intimacy of the soul with itself’ (TWA 14:128–9).

This difference between intimacy and reality can subsequently turn into a blunt opposition between the two. It can become spirit’s breaking free from the finite – the triumph of the spiritual over the world as it is encountered in romantic art’s portrayals of martyrdom and, indeed, in its reveling in cruelty (TWA 14:161–3). An art that portrays all this must not merely despise ‘ideal beauty’. It must also be one that necessarily becomes ‘unlovely’ (unschön) (TWA 14:153). Moreover, although
romantic art’s blunt opposition between beauty and cruelty belongs to the ‘absolute history of divine appearance’ (TWA 14:147), and therefore furnishes the signal feature of this art form, Hegel still sees himself compelled to take his distance from artistic portrayals in which he sees sick fantasy at work alongside the necessity of the concept – especially when such fantasy has no practical efficacy:

The sufferings are cruelties undergone by others, and the mind does not accomplish within itself the breaking of the natural will. One sees here executioners, tortures of every kind, and bodily convulsions. Thus, with respect to the portrayal, the distance from beauty is too great for such objects to be able to be chosen by healthy art. (V2:188).

Nevertheless, in romantic art we come upon a highly significant development regarding the relation between art and religion. Spirit’s romantic and Christian retreat into itself – its freeing of itself to itself – has implications not only for the artistic portrayal of the human being but for non-human nature as well. To be sure, the religious domain repudiates the formation of any independent sphere of the mundane: ‘In their abstract attitude, the virtues of Christian piety kill the mundane and make the subject free only if he denies himself in his humanity’ (TWA 14:174). But it is already during the mediaeval period – roughly at the time in which the Christian religion, in conjunction with the ‘iconic controversy’ of the eighth and ninth centuries, establishes its relation to the plastic and visual arts – that a new thematic domain of poetry breaks the fetters of explicitly religious motifs. Hegel pays little attention, however, to this ‘sphere of chivalry’, which during his time was described as romantic. In fact, he does not speak of an ‘art form’ in this regard, but rather describes (under the headings of ‘honour’, ‘love’ and ‘loyalty’) merely a form of consciousness; and he does this looking back to antiquity. Since the Renaissance, however, the emancipation of art from its attachment to a predetermined religious content accelerates and increasingly takes hold of the other arts as well:

. . . when the Kingdom of God has won a place in the world and is active in penetrating worldly ends and interests, and is thereby active in transfiguring these; . . . then the worldly realm begins from its side to claim and assert its right to validity . . . We may indicate this transition by saying that subjective individuality [Einzelnheit] now becomes free for itself as individuality, independently of mediation with God. (TWA 14:170–1).

Hegel places greater emphasis on this third domain of romantic art. It provides the final stage of a development that begins with the religious domain and that, in virtue of its internal dynamics, ends by detaching itself from the latter. The ‘world’, no longer retroactively bound to the ‘unity of the absolute’, comes to be placed ‘on its own two feet’ (TWA 14:194), and this circumstance has significant consequences for art:

Matter and subjectivity are separated; and their further development is their mutual in-formation [Einbildung] until they again fall apart. Their absolute unity does not come about in art. Inwardness raises itself to pure thinking, which is where true unity first occurs. (V 2:196)

Hegel regards the art of his own time as the terminal point of this development. Its peculiar characteristic lies in the fact that

the subjectivity of the artist stands above its materials and its production because this subjectivity is no longer dominated by the given conditions of a domain of content and form already determined in
itself, but retains within its own power and choice both the content and the way of shaping it. (TWA 14:231 – Knox translation adapted).

Hegel evidently has in mind here the adoption of oriental thematic materials in Goethe's West-östlicher Divan (1819), in the poems of Rückert (1821) and in the adaptations of Hafis's lyric poetry (1812). But what he says applies just as much – and perhaps more so – to what follows the ‘Goethean period of art’ and Hegel’s own lifetime (see Windfuhr, 1979, p. 125). Since the objects of art are no longer integrated into a substantial spiritual unity, it ultimately makes no difference how they are portrayed – whether in a realistic, an idealistic or an abstract manner. For it is no longer the object that is of interest, but rather the manner of its treatment, that is, the technique of painting or narration and, more generally, the 'subjective interpretation and execution of the work of art' (TWA 14:223).

Hegel’s historical account should already provide an adequate guide to the treatment of art in its full spectrum. But in the final phase of his lecture courses, Hegel delineates a ‘system’ of the arts that so to speak runs diagonally across the historical sequence of art forms. It is above all this final part of each lecture series that shows Hegel’s impressive familiarity with particular works of art as well as his profound understanding of art as such. It is unlikely that there will ever be another philosophy of art of equal range and depth even if other approaches can no doubt provide better knowledge of various themes of restricted scope. Hegel’s claim that he knows ‘pretty much everything’ and that ‘one can and should know it’ (TWA 15:550) may seem like a provocation. Yet it is by no means a claim made without justification.

According to Hegel’s systematic conception, five arts are distinguished according to the standard furnished by the refinement of sensibility, that is, by the degree of their liberation from crude sensuous material. These are the arts corresponding to the two theoretical senses (namely, sight and hearing): architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and – ultimately – poetry.1 Hegel also seems to have grounded this fivefold division of the arts in a more basic threefold division, that is, the classificatory trinity consisting in the plastic, musical and oratory arts (see Hotho’s marginal comments in V 2, 205 f., 270). Moreover, holding that there is a special affinity between art forms and types of art, he interweaves his system of the arts with the history of art forms. He thus assigns architecture to symbolic art, sculpture to classical art and painting as well as music to romantic art. Poetry, which is indifferent to time, is placed above the historically grouped art forms. Hegel can appeal in part to empirical evidence in order to lend support to this ordering scheme for the arts. He thus emphasizes the privileged position of sculpture in the classical world – a position that could be neither anticipated from the perspective of symbolic art nor attained again in romantic art. He also treats the higher development of painting in modernity, which one can quite rightly trace to the intensification of subjectivity.

In addition to this overarching historical movement, in which the content of art as such unfolds in the sequence of prevailing art forms and the types of art especially linked to them, Hegel also attributes an internal history to the individual arts as shapes of spirit. Oddly, though, he does not describe these in keeping with the form of development that is specific to the course of spirit’s history. Instead, he describes the development of those shapes as a process of nature – namely, as ‘a beginning, a process, a perfecting and ending, a growth, blossoming, and deterioration’ (TWA 14:246).
Hegel links a highly provocative claim to his interpretation of art on the basis of his philosophy of history: the (far too) much debated thesis of the ‘end of art’. This thesis, of course, has its place in a broad theoretical context that includes the consideration of a structural peculiarity of art, namely, its ‘resolution [Zerfallen]’ into a work of art and into productive and appropriative spirit (Enc §556). But in essence, Hegel’s thesis of the end of art boils down to an insight that can hardly be denied. The insight is that fine art irrevocably forfeits its pre-eminent position if the divine is no longer revered in the human form of a statue which lacks what is properly human, that is, self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is what cannot be produced by art, which is why art can no longer satisfy the highest interest of the human being in the event that a higher self-consciousness of spirit has emerged. As is already the case in the biblical religions, the ‘absolute content’ that is known as truth no longer allows the highest human satisfaction to be achieved through art. Even in the biblical religions, spirit’s self-knowledge can no longer be harmoniously combined with what is natural. External shape (Gestalt) can no longer be intuited as divine if what is human – self-consciousness – is cognized as divine. Spirit can then no longer consummate its knowledge of self in its ancient unity with nature, and hence no longer in art, in so far as art always remains bound to what is natural.

The thesis of the ‘end of art’ does not, of course, insinuate that there will be no more art (which is indeed what a standard English rendering, ‘death of art’, misleadingly suggests). Instead, the thesis implies that art in the modern world can no longer satisfy the highest need of spirit – its knowledge of self – in the highest way possible.

It is historically indisputable that religion actually ascribes a secondary role to art. The distinctive feature of Hegel’s position lies in the fact that he grounds his thesis concerning the end of art exclusively in his philosophy of history. That is why this thesis must be discussed in the context of art’s relation to religion. For it is not a thesis that pertains to the philosophy of art as such, but rather to the philosophy of history as it applies to the development of religion in relation to art. Consequently, it is not self-contradictory for Hegel to grant that ‘one may well hope that art will always rise higher and achieve perfection’ when the decisive passage immediately follows:

... but the form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of spirit. No matter how excellent we find the Greek likenesses of the gods [Götterbilder], no matter how we see God the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably perfectly portrayed: it is no help; we no longer bow before them. (TWA 13:142 – Knox translation adapted).

For Hegel, all other justifications of the thesis in question – especially those currently fashionable in contemporary thought – would be in part misguided and in part secondary. The partial character of art in the modern world’s culture of reflection, and even the political and economic relations that force art into the niches and free spaces of the capitalist system, do not qualify as grounds for explaining the end of art. For, in the course of spirit’s development, it was already two millennia ago that art ceded the position from which it expressed the highest interest of spirit. Compared to this, all updated arguments for the end of art in the modern world amount to the thematization of trace phenomena when viewed from Hegel’s perspective. At the same time, Hegel’s position provides no justification for any hope that the end of art...
might be retroactively annulled by means of a change in political and social relations or by way of art's self-reflection. To bring this about, one would have to be able to reverse the history of consciousness, which would be tantamount to nothing more than a relapse even if it could be managed. Of course, the succinctness of Hegel’s argument for the end of art binds it to his philosophical position on the content identity of art and religion. Whoever does not share this position, which is anchored in the philosophy of spirit, can unquestionably take other views of the place of art in modernity. But these views will no longer be Hegel’s, and they require support independent of that afforded by his philosophy.

RELIGION

While the philosophies of history and art represent new disciplinary branches of philosophy during Hegel’s time, it may seem that Hegel steers his way along already familiar pathways in his philosophy of religion. This is not the case, however, since the philosophy of religion was also a new discipline at that time. It owes its emergence to the end of natural religion and to the demise of theologia naturalis as the highest ranking discipline in the Schulmetaphysik of the eighteenth century. Kant sought to fill the place vacated by these traditional disciplines by means of an ethico-theology, that is, by means of a new justification of the idea of God based on ethics instead of on nature. This ethico-theology, which to begin with was (not quite correctly) designated as ‘philosophy of religion’, was expanded into a ‘philosophy of moral religion’ during the 1790s (see Jaeschke, 2012, pp. 7–92). In this way, philosophy of religion was established as belonging to the domain of philosophical knowledge. And soon after the collapse of religion’s purely moral interpretation during the atheism controversy (Atheismusstreit) of 1798–9, Hegel would go on to develop an interpretation of religion purely within the systematic context of his philosophy of spirit.

The few (though important) remarks on religion found in Hegel’s earlier system sketches (GW 5:263 f.) are given concrete treatment in his Jena philosophy of spirit of 1805/6 (JS III GW 8:280–6) and in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) (GW 9:363–421). Thereafter, he selectively returns to the theme of religion in the 1817 edition of the Encyclopedia (Enc 1817 §§465–71) as well as in the later editions of this work (see Jaeschke, 2000, pp. 375–466). Finally, he treats the same theme in full depth in four lecture courses on philosophy of religion given in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831 (VRel vols 3–5). Throughout the development of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, religion is understood as ‘absolute spirit’, the self-consciousness of spirit itself.

Hegel’s thesis that art, religion and philosophy are different forms of the same content has repeatedly been the cause of considerable bewilderment. Either it has seemed implausible to maintain that the same content could take on such different forms, or such a thesis of content identity has been held to degrade religion. But Hegel’s thesis is not at all mysterious even if it does contain something that is perhaps provocative. It says nothing more than the following. The content of art, religion and philosophy is self-comprehending spirit; and spirit in its immediate form is nothing other than spirit that is actual in the human being. Art, religion and philosophy, then, are the ways in which spirit objectifies
and cognizes itself, which is why Hegel calls them the three forms of absolute spirit.

‘Absolute spirit’ is an expression that nowadays is often misunderstood by both Hegel’s apologists and his critics. Yet there is no mystification involved in its use since the expression simply designates a shape or form in which spirit, directing itself to itself, seeks to know itself. In art, this self-knowing takes the form of the production and intuitive self-apprehension of spirit in a work of art. In religion, it has the form of the representation of spirit as a divine entity that stands over and against the spirit that is actual in the human being. But spirit also fails to achieve its self-knowledge in religion because the representing subject, not comprehending the identity of itself and its object, understands itself as consciousness of an external object. Inasmuch as spirit relates itself to itself, religion is a form of its self-consciousness. Yet it is self-consciousness that does not know its object – God – to be the ‘spirit of its spirit’.

The compartmentalizing separation of God from the human being as two kinds of self-standing subjects is commonly held to be the essential feature of religion. For Hegel, though, this compartmentalizing view involves a fundamental self-misunderstanding. Religion is not the relation of spirit to a divine entity that exists for itself and that can be encountered only by spirit’s stepping beyond itself. Instead, religion is a self-relation of spirit. It is ‘spirit conscious of its essence, conscious of itself. Spirit is conscious, and that of which it is conscious is the true, essential spirit. This is its essence, not the essence of another’ (V 3:86). If philosophy not only calls God ‘spirit’ but also intends to think of God as spirit, then it must think of God as spirit that knows itself in religion. And the philosophy of religion comes to be philosophical theology in so far as the content that is known in religion is the divine that is not divorced from human spirit. As one of the three forms of spirit’s self-knowing, religion is not a knowing of self on the part of a singular spiritual entity. It is not the autistic self-relation of such a being, but rather a knowing of what it is to be a spiritual being as such. That is why this self-consciousness of spirit is not something isolated. The forms of spiritual life are always intersubjective.

The philosophy of religion has to develop this conception of self-knowing in relation to the intersubjective forms of spiritual life. Its task is not to promote piety or to traffic in apologetics (even though it draws piety-endangering as well as apologetic consequences in its wake). Nor is its task to bring about the critical destruction of religion. Instead, its role with respect to religion is analogous to philosophy’s role in relation to art and to philosophy itself. Philosophy must comprehend religion as a form in which spirit turns back upon itself, achieves consciousness of itself, and is thereby ‘absolute spirit’, that is, the ‘self-consciousness of absolute spirit’ (V 3:221, 227), although it remains a self-consciousness that falls short of its mark on account of its entrapment in representational form. This characteristic of religion – its being the ‘self-consciousness of spirit in the form of representation’ (V3:235) – both permits and requires an ambivalent accentuation. To use the language of religious representation itself, what befalls us as positive revelation is the product of spirit and is intrinsically rational in virtue of being such a product. It is not something merely accidental, let alone the instrument of priestly cunning. We thus encounter here an apologetic effect of Hegel’s philosophy of religion. Yet it is equally true that what at first appears as merely positive and alien to reason is cognized as something that is
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(at least in substance) rational, that is, as something that can be reconstructed in the form of reason. In this way, then, we are confronted with the critical thrust of that theoretical enterprise. The hermeneutic task of the philosophy of religion is to develop both ways of viewing religion. We are to comprehend as rational what we first encounter as ‘positive’ even if we encounter it as something contrary to or beyond the scope of reason. So the task is to comprehend the positive as a shape of spirit’s self-consciousness (even if not an adequate one), and then to think this self-consciousness in its conceptually adequate form. This comprehending thinking has two requisite moments: the material of religion and the form of the philosophical ‘concept’. While religious representation is the object of this concept as well as its historical presupposition, that form of representation is not the philosophical concept’s justificatory basis. Instead, this concept is both the basis for knowing the truth of religious representation and the gauge of its truth. To decipher the hieroglyphs of reason in religious representation – including its Christian variant – one must already be in possession of the concept.

Hegel develops the ‘concept of religion’ in the first part of his lectures. Although he only gradually succeeds in working out its proper presentational form, the manuscript for his first lecture already mentions (in analogy with the concept of spirit: see Enc §§553 ff.) the following moments of the concept of religion: first, ‘the determination of absolute unity’, that is, the determination of absolute, substantial content or the determination of spirit; second, ‘the moment of separation’, or the moment of otherness; and third, the ‘subjective moment’ by which ‘the self-consciousness of the spiritual is itself the eternal, absolute moment’ (V 3:103–6). It is only in the third lecture course, however, that Hegel comes to realize what the one systematically relevant task of the first part of the philosophy of religion is, namely, to specify the concept of religion into these three moments because they articulate the internal structure of religion as a shape of spirit. Thus, Part A (‘The Concept of God’) explicates the first moment – absolute unity – as so to speak the concept of God *qua* substance. Part B (‘The Knowledge of God’) thematizes the forms of the religious relation, that is, the forms of the individual mind’s relation to spirit as its ‘essence’: faith, feeling, representation and thinking. Part C (‘The Cultus’) develops the third moment of religion: the self-consciousness of spirit that overcomes the separateness which cannot be sublated in representation. This self-consciousness of spirit leads to spirit’s self-knowing – the self-consciousness of absolute spirit to the extent that this can be achieved at the level of religion.

The three moments just delineated structure religion as such as well as all given religions. It is a distinctive feature of Hegel’s philosophy of religion that it does not take into account the Christian religion alone. In reaching to include religion in its entirety – as can be seen in the second and most extensive part of the lectures, namely, the part on ‘determinate religion’ – Hegel breaks with both of the traditional and familiar interpretative structures stemming from Christian apologetics: ancient religion-Judaism-Christianity and Judaism-Christianity-Islam. Hegel is not concerned with this or that dogmatic truth but with the conceptual cognition of the historical shapes of spirit’s self-knowing. In keeping with this concern, Hegel draws upon all religions in order to know them as historically varying forms of spirit’s self-consciousness, thereby comprehending self-knowing spirit.
in its historical movement. What is surprising is not what is still lacking in or distorted by Hegel’s account, but rather how much he draws into it and how well he thinks it through. And this is all the more surprising if we consider the fact that Hegel did all this during the brief period of a summer semester and long before the history of religion was established as a proper field of academic research.

In each of the lecture courses in question, Hegel begins his treatment of determinate religion with nature religion (Naturreligion). This is the early form of religion in which the differentiation between the natural and the spiritual has not yet developed into the form familiar to us. In his second lecture course, Hegel understands nature religion to include not only the ‘religion of magic’ (attributed to the Eskimos and Africans) but also the religions of China, India, Persia and Egypt followed by the religions of Israel, Greece and Rome. He proceeds similarly in the third course, although he modifies the sequence of religions on account of the headway that he makes in his knowledge of the historical source materials and in their conceptual penetration. In the final course, he again overturns his gradually established sequential order. He comes to have a quite narrow understanding of the concept of nature religion, and he sets against it the religions of China, etc., as forms of the bifurcation of spirit and nature.

Hegel’s methodology is more stable than his historical ordering. For each of the religions considered, he always treats first its ‘abstract concept’, that is, its conceptual basis, which he initially correlates with one of the traditional proofs of God’s existence (cf. V 4:38, 100; 5:7). He then discusses the ‘concrete representation’, thus addressing the theoretical side of religious knowledge; and he concludes by considering the given religion’s practical side – the ‘cultus’ – in which human beings secure their unity with the divine ‘Being’ represented.

The decisive issue here is not the often posed question whether Hegel drew upon the complete range of sources available during his lifetime and grasped what is most distinctive in each of the religions that he treated. Nor is it the question whether he presented religions in their correct historical or hierarchically ordered sequence. Rather, what is decisive is Hegel’s thoroughly non-dogmatic approach. His survey of the ‘ethnic religions’ (as he, like Goethe [1821, p. 173], calls them) no longer serves the purpose of disparaging their content as mere superstition, as something unworthy of human beings or as the cunning of priestly deception. This sort of interpretative approach – which, incidentally, has its roots in Christian apologetics – aims to defame the ‘heathen’ religions by exposing their ungodly origins and their lack of truth. Hegel’s interest in the knowledge of religions in their historical diversity, however, is intended neither to undermine nor to provide an apologetic affirmation of Christianity. His interest applies instead to the historical confirmation of the fundamental assumption of his philosophy of religion – an assumption that should be regarded more as the setting of a hermeneutic task than as the taking of a dogmatic position. The task is to demonstrate that there is reason in religion. For a philosophy of religion is possible only if this demonstration can be achieved; and reason that is historically actualized in religion must reveal itself to reason as it is actual in philosophical knowledge. Hegel proclaims this ‘pre-judgement [Vorurteil]’ in one of the programmatic passages of his manuscript:

The history of religions is connected with the precise forms [Gestalten] of the
representations of God. No matter how much this history is compiled and elaborated, it mainly lets only the external, the apparent side be seen. The higher need is to cognize its meaning, its positive and true [significance] and its connection with what is true – in short, its rationality. It is human beings who have lighted upon such religions, so there must be reason in them – in everything contingent there must be a higher necessity. The history of religion [is] to be studied in this sense. It is not a question here of justifying it, of finding it correct and true in all of its configurations (including human sacrifice or the sacrifice of children). But at least to recognize its origin, its well-spring, as something human – this [is] the higher reconciliation. (V 3:107–8 – translation by Brown, Hodgson et al., adapted)

Thus, no matter how much the religions may have missed and distorted the ‘self-consciousness of spirit’, they are all shapes of the spiritual unity that they represent, in their different ways, as the divine spirit’s relation to what is human – that is, as the relation between universal and singular spirit. Even an object of religious veneration that at first appears as something purely natural proves on closer examination to be something spiritual. It does so even if, at the early stages of religion, the categorial difference between the natural and the spiritual is not yet worked out with the poignancy that is familiar to us today. The object of religion – ‘the Being’ (das Wesen), as Hegel sometimes briefly characterizes it – can be experienced as something more natural or as something more spiritual, as something terrifying or as something well-disposed towards human beings. Its image can be stamped more by the moral or more by the beautiful. It can stand against humanity in the form of harsh otherworldliness, or it can appear in human shape. But it is always the faithful expression of what the human spirit represents to itself as what is true. Every religion is such a relation of spirit to spirit even if it is an imperfect relation in which spirit does not yet adequately grasp itself. That is why every religion is a shape of absolute spirit, and not only religion’s final form, that is, the form in which religion is raised beyond history because it includes within itself the entire history of religion.

In a third part of his lectures, Hegel separates the Christian religion, which he designates as ‘consummate’ or (occasionally) as ‘absolute’ religion, from ‘determinate religions’ and sets it against the latter, while his way of treating both types of religion does not differ. This has often been criticized as an unjustified break with his own methodology. For Hegel, the Christian religion, like any other religion, is an object that has to be comprehended. It is not to be regarded as the foundation of philosophy, as was in fact a demand made by Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling in roughly the same period. 4 Hegel singles out Christianity as the ‘consummate’ religion not merely because it accords with the concept of religion. (All religions do this; otherwise they would not be religions.) Christianity is consummate, that is, perfected, because in it the concept of religion has come to be its own object.

This last formulation must be taken quite literally. For the concept of religion, according to Hegel’s understanding, is no ‘abstract concept’; nor does it represent the sum of the singular characteristic features of religion. Instead, that concept is nothing less than religion’s rational structure – its internal logos, as it were, which is nothing other than spirit itself as comprehended according to the three constitutive moments of spirit’s self-knowing relation: the moment of substantial unity; the
moment of original differentiation (Urteil) into spirit and object; and the moment of spirit’s mediated identity. Hegel therefore marks very precisely the difference between ‘determinate’ and ‘consummate’ religion:

But it was noted earlier, both with regard to the method of science and with regard to the progressive determination of the concept, that the consummation of religion itself brings forth its concept and makes this objective to itself. Once it has been thus objectified, the concept [of religion] is developed, and the determinations of its totality posited in it . . . It should be noted that these determinations emerge in this revealed religion as essential moments of content, together with the consciousness of content and with the determination of being truth – i.e., [they] appear as objective and in the system of the objective object . . . These determinations also appear in the determinate religions, however, sprouting up fortuitously, like flowers and natural formations, as foreshadowings, images, representations, without knowing where they come from or where they are going. (V 3:106 – translation by Brown, Hodgson et al., adapted)

Thus, while all religion is structured by the three moments of spirit’s self-relation, it is in the Christian religion that these moments also furnish the content of representation. This occurs in the trinitarian conception of God. Contrary to contemporaneous (Protestant) theology, Hegel insists on upholding the fundamental importance of the doctrine of the trinity because he finds the meaning of this doctrine in the concept of spirit. Moreover, he does not consider it objectionable that the conceptual determinations which he mentions by no means seamlessly agree with that Trinitarian conception. This lack of agreement is already indicated by the incongruity between his development of the concept of revealed religion in the three versions of the Encyclopaedia (Enc 1817 §§467–70; Enc §§567–70) and the variegated structure of his account of consummate religion in the lectures. Such discrepancies are held to be unavoidable consequences of the difference between (religious) representation and (philosophical) concept. Even if representation makes the concept into its subject matter, it can still only represent the latter. That is, representation apprehends the concept in images and orders it according to a spatio-temporal coordinate system. It seeks to place the truth of spirit on a (supposedly) historical basis, thereby inescapably shifting its focus away from the concept of spirit. In religious creed, representation draws the conceptual moment of universality down into the sphere of ‘creation’ since it otherwise knows nothing to say about the Father. And to the moment of particularity, which should be represented as the creation of nature and finite spirit, it gives no proper systematic place. Moreover, the central moment of mediation between God and humanity – God’s becoming human – is something that religious representation not only assigns to the second article of faith. It also misunderstands this profound conception in an almost naturalistic manner by regarding that mediation as a unique historical event. Finally, instead of enjoying in religious ritual the fulfilled presence of and reconciliation with God, representation splits this into a time that once was and a time that has yet to be. Still, despite all of these deficiencies, Hegel here regards the agreement between the concept of spirit and religious representation as something that is in principle given. Since religious representation, qua representation, unavoidably falls short of the concept, the real knowledge of spirit
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is reserved for the comprehending cognition that is unique to philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY

Hegel treats philosophy as the final shape of absolute spirit in *Enc.* In analogy with the philosophies of art and religion, then, we can expect him to outline here the main features of a ‘philosophy of philosophy’. While there are hints of such a project in Hegel’s early lecture, and while the issue is already in evidence in the concluding sections of *PhG* and the *Science of Logic* (WL), it is at the end of the encyclopaedic system itself that Hegel actually delves into the matter. He introduces philosophy as the ‘unity of art and religion’ because it unifies their ‘modes of intuition’ into ‘the simple spiritual intuition’ and then raises them in this to ‘self-conscious thinking’ (*Enc* §572). Philosophy is thus the ‘liberation’ from the one-sidedness of the forms and their elevation into the absolute form that determines itself to content and remains identical with it’ (*Enc* §573). But he then states: ‘This movement, which philosophy is, is found to be already accomplished when at its conclusion it grasps its own concept, i.e., only looks back upon its knowledge’ (ibid.). And after a lengthy remark on the relation between religion and philosophy, Hegel concludes the outline of his system with the ‘doctrine of the three syllogisms’ in which he indicates the alternative structures of mediation for his portrayal of philosophy (*Enc* §§574–7).

Hegel’s account of the three syllogisms is difficult as well as controversial. The relevant handwritten notes found in Hegel’s own copy of *Enc* (see GW 13:528–43) do not elaborate on the basic considerations presented in the printed text. Like these notes, the lectures that Hegel gives on this part of his system (GW vols TWA vols 18–20), thematize ‘merely’ the history of philosophy. But it is with these lectures that he sets foot upon what is in many respects *terra nova*. They link the comprehensive interpretation of philosophy’s history – its interpretation as the history of free, self-objectivating thinking that knows itself and abides by itself in its objectifications – to a historically detailed account of single philosophical projects and to the exposition of the meaning of specific propositions and principles. They thus link the comprehensive interpretation of the history of philosophy to the wealth of historiographic details pertaining to particular philosophical approaches; to the interconnections between these approaches; to the establishment of philosophic schools and the disputes arising between them; and to the history of interpretation concerning these factors. Above all, those considerations link the history of philosophy to the history of art and religion as well as to the history of states. This is not an external connection established post facto since each of these histories is a merely partial history belonging to the *one* history of spirit whose principle encompasses all partial histories. The history of philosophy, however, is the one in which spirit conceives itself in its own shape. While it does not express spirit in its totality, it does express spirit in its pure form.

Hegel’s thematization of the history of philosophy in its narrower sense is also something novel. There were, of course, ‘histories of philosophy’ prior to Hegel. But they were of a different character than that of Hegel, and philosophy’s history does not belong to the traditional canon of the philosophical sciences. Kant and Fichte did not cultivate the field of study, and Schelling did so only after Hegel. Two developments of
epochal significance furnish the presuppositions of Hegel’s *Philosophiegeschichte*. The first presupposition lies in the aforementioned shift in the meaning of ‘history’ that occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century. For example, the influential history of philosophy by Jakob Brucker (often cited by Hegel) is titled *Historia critica philosophiae*. The adjective ‘critical’ already indicates that ‘history’ is to be understood as a report, and thus in its traditional subjective sense. It is the presentation of philosophy’s history that is critical, not the history presented. Brucker was still far removed from the understanding of history as a coherent context of development through time, which is why a strictly chronological arrangement of materials is not at all mandatory for his *historia*. But in Tennemann’s and Buhle’s works on the history of philosophy, which originate around 1800, the shift in the meaning of ‘history’ has already taken place. These works do not provide a merely narrative report on various philosophies. Instead, they thematize a quasi-objective framework of interconnections. We encounter the same approach in Hegel, whose introductory fragment of 1820 begins by announcing that his ‘lectures have the history of philosophy as their subject matter’ (*V* 6:5). These lectures are no history. Rather, history is itself their thematic object.

The second presupposition of Hegel’s history of philosophy lies in contemporaneous concern with the ‘horrendously wide trenches’ (Lessing, ‘Beweis des Geistes’, p. 7) that rationalism had dug between the necessity of truths of reason and the contingency of historical truths – that is, with the attempt to bridge over these trenches at least here and there, if not to fill them in. In the years following 1800, the philosophical dignity of the historiography of philosophy comes to depend on whether it can succeed in reconstructing philosophy’s rational content instead of being restricted to providing merely an informative account of what is essentially an accidental emergence and waning of individual edifices of thought. Accordingly, the signature characteristic of philosophy’s historiography is found in a combination of rational (a priori) and historical (a posteriori) moments. Since this characteristic can be more easily found and realized in the historiography of philosophy than in general historiography, the history of philosophy comes to have an important methodological significance. As a historical discipline, it cannot become fully detached from general historiography. Yet its special theme gives it a privileged position over other historical disciplines. For one must expect that the development of this thematic object – namely, the development of reason – participates in the constitution of the object itself and is not subject to mere contingency.

Hegel expresses this expectation in nearly an axiomatic manner: ‘Philosophy is rational cognition; the history of its development must itself be something rational; the history of philosophy must itself be philosophical’ (*V* 6:14). But like world history and the other partial histories of absolute spirit, the reason intrinsic to the history of philosophy is something that is revealed only to those who regard it as rational. To anyone who is unacquainted with reason and who thus does not dare to interpret philosophy’s history as the history of reason, the reason intrinsic to such history will not become manifest. Just as one must bring the concept of right to bear in the assessment of our actions, one must also bring along the idea of reason if one is to know the history of philosophy (*V* 6:28). This is a hermeneutically legitimate condition of the apprehension of

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reason in the history of philosophy – it is not some sort of petitio principii. The requirement to bring along the ‘idea’, however, does not hold at the expense of a second requirement that concerns the treatment of earlier philosophy. According to this second requirement, one must ‘adhere with strict precision, with historical exactitude, [to] the actually authentic [eigensten] words’ (V 6:44). Only both requirements taken together describe the task of the historian of philosophy.

Hegel, indeed, takes the task just mentioned even a step further when he explains that ‘only a history of philosophy comprehended as a system of the idea’s development merits the name of science’ (V 6:28–9). Otherwise, as mere historical narrative (bloße Historie), it is not science in the Hegelian sense. The rational content of philosophy’s history and historical narrative guided by the idea jointly furnish the presupposition of their integration with the system of philosophical sciences. And, as Hegel says, ‘only for this reason do I concern myself with it [i.e., the history of philosophy] or lecture on it’ (V 6:28). This close connection between historical development and rational content, which Hegel probably forged during the first lecture on history of philosophy that he gave in Jena (1805/6), is one that he never revokes. Rather, he goes on to affirm that ‘the succession of divergent systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical derivation of the idea’s conceptual determinations’ (V 6:27).

This is a bold claim that resonates, of course, with one of Spinoza’s key propositions: ‘ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum’ (Ethica II Prop. 7). But Hegel does not sustain it, as is already evident if we consider its systematic implication – namely, that the history of philosophy would have to begin with the Eleatics in order to correspond to the beginning of Hegel’s science of logic. Maintaining that there is this correspondence would require a significant loss of both historical precision and logical rigour; and Hegel himself does not begin his history of philosophy with the Eleatics even if ascribes to them a higher dignity than he does to their predecessors, the Ionian philosophers of nature and the Pythagoreans. Moreover, according to Hegel’s bold claim, logical science’s ordering of the thought-determination ‘becoming’ would require – implausibly – the chronological placement of Heraclitus after the Eleatics. And in any event, there simply is no historical counterpart to logic’s second thought-determination, that is, ‘nothing’. In view of the undeniable differences between the development of thought-determinations in logic and the historical development of philosophy, then, the postulated harmony between logic and history cannot be maintained.

Yet even without the kind of universal logic that seamlessly covers the order of categorial as well as historical developments, the history of philosophy is by no means divested of all reason. For all of the determinations of thinking developed in the history of philosophy necessarily occur in logic as well, since otherwise logic would not be the complete cognition of those determinations. Conversely, it is as necessary as it is trivial that all determinations of thinking, which in logic are explicated in their systematic sequence, must have been thought in the history of philosophy. If this were not so, then they would not be known at all; and they consequently would not be a possible theme for logic. The decoupling of the historical ordo from that of logic tacitly transforms the principle of the identity of both orders into the more modest principle of co-extensionality in content. Moreover, in his lectures on the history of
philosophy as well as in those on the philosophy of right (GW 26/2; V 6:27), Hegel himself explicitly grants the difference between temporal and conceptual sequentiality (even if he does not establish why and to what extent this difference obtains). Here, too, it is evident that the rational and scientific character of the history of philosophy cannot be secured by any principle as simple as that of logico-historical parallelism. As the science of the intrinsic connectedness of the pure determinations of thinking, logic is not also the science of their ordered occurrence in history. The latter requires a far more complex logic – a logic of the history of philosophy.

Such a logic concerns the partial discipline of a ‘philosophy of philosophy’ whose systematic location is marked by the sections dedicated to philosophy at the end of Enc. And it is by no means true that the unavoidable alternative to logical and historical identity lies in the fundamental misunderstanding of philosophy’s history as a ‘disordered heap’, that is, a ‘series of mere options, errors, and games played with ideas [Gedankenspielen]’ (V 6:28). Instead, the necessity exhibited by the irreversible historical sequence in the occurrence of thought-determinations results from a multiplicity of world-historical, religious, social and philosophical contexts, each of which obeys its own logic.

Like the histories of art and religion, the history of philosophy is the history of spirit’s self-cognition. It also explicitly targets the development of comprehending thinking (begreifendes Denken). The history of philosophy, then, is the history of reason as ‘history of self-consciousness’. But such history is no longer a transcendental-philosophic reconstruction of the faculties of cognition. Instead, it is the actual history of reason as the kind of thinking that thinks itself in and through its relation to reality. In Hegel’s words, this history of philosophy does not present us with the ‘genesis [das Werden] of alien things’ (V 6:9). Rather, by portraying ‘the genesis of our science’ (ibid.), it presents us with our own process of becoming. It is the identity of ourselves with our history – that is, our ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) and the identity of our science’s genesis with our own becoming. This process is not something external that lies ‘beyond our reality’, nor is it ‘a matter of the past’; for ‘what we are, we are at the same time historically’ (ibid.).

Historicity is not limited by the brief span of an individual life, but rather by the measure of our participation in the spiritual as such. For in that which we are, ‘the commonly shared past that does not perish [das gemeinschaftliche Unvergängliche] is inseparably coupled with that which we are historically’ (V 6:6). Since this is our spiritual substance, as it were, the ‘we’ here at issue is not an aggregative collection of individual selves. Rather, the unperishing and commonly shared past is a presupposition of the very constitution of any individual ‘I’. Nor does this past become what is commonly shared simply in virtue of a relation common to many, but through the conditions by which it is constituted as something communal. Philosophy, after all, is the ‘objective science of truth’, not the ‘spewing out of opinions’ (V 6:18). That is why the commonly shared past is ‘all the more excellent’ the less it is stamped by the particularity of the subject that produces it and belongs instead ‘to the universal character of the human being qua human’ (V 6:6). Indeed, that past is all the more splendid the more ‘this thought without peculiarity is itself the productive subject’ (ibid.). Since ‘universal spirit does not stand still’ (V 6:6–7), however, the unperishing past is not something immobile even if it is not stamped by subjective peculiarity. Even its being is its
deed, and its deed is its self-knowing. And the genuine location of spirit’s self-knowing is the history of philosophy.

It is not surprising that the comprehending thinking of philosophy, as absolute spirit’s third shape, is regionally limited. Nor is it surprising that it should make its appearance significantly later than art and religion, which are based on ‘intuition’ and ‘representation’. Appealing to Aristotle (cf. *Metaphysics* 981b), Hegel mentions two social and historical presuppositions for philosophy’s late emergence. First, liberation from the cares of everyday life frees the human being for the pursuit of sciences that pertain neither to necessary ends nor to the comforts of life. This liberation thus frees the human knower for the pursuit of philosophy, which presupposes that he must come to have the need for the already satisfied need, that is, the need for needlessness [das Bedürfniß des schon befriedigten Bedürfnisses, der Bedürfnislosigkeit] (WL GW 21:12). Such is the necessary condition for the emergence of philosophy, but it is not a sufficient one. The developmental stage of societies with divisions of labour comes about in many places; and Aristotle himself cites the leisure enjoyed by the Egyptian priests as a reason for the development of mathematics – but not for the emergence of philosophy. The second part of Hegel’s explanation of the emergence of philosophy thus brings in political freedom as a presupposition for the freedom of thought that philosophy is: ‘Only where civil freedom blossomed could philosophy make its appearance. Civil freedom rests upon the infinitude of the will as something to be absolutely respected’ (V 6:93–4). Hegel repeatedly underscores this presupposition for the emergence – in the Greek polis – of the free thinking that characterizes philosophy: ‘Since this is the principle of political freedom – that the subject counts as a subject for itself in its own right [daß das Subjekt für sich gilt] – the free thought of the object is also contained within it’ (V 6:265).

Hegel never repudiates this highly affirmative view of the connection between the achievement of political freedom and the formative development of free thought. Yet he does supplement it in an essential respect by means of a general insight into the history of consciousness. The insight is that thinking spirit transcends its natural, substantial shape, that is, it goes beyond immediate ethical life:

[Spirit] brings forth in this way an ideal world in opposition to that real world and flees into its world of the ideal. Thus, if a philosophy is to make its appearance, then a breach must already have opened up in the real world. Philosophy is then the conciliation [die Versöhnung] of the decay that thinking began. This conciliation occurs in an ideal world into which thinking flees when the mundane world no longer satisfies it. (V 6, 239–40)

When philosophy paints its ‘grey on grey’, then ‘the freshness of youth and liveliness is already over and gone’, and the conciliation that philosophy affords takes place ‘not in reality as such but only in the world of ideas’ (ibid.)

This argument at first appears to concern the third phase of Greek philosophy, that is, its development in the Roman world where ‘[t]he principle of the interiority of consciousness for itself is the cause of . . . philosophers’ withdrawal from the affairs of state and of their limiting themselves to the formation of an ideal world’ (V 7:163). The rupture that this principle represents in the history of consciousness is thus assigned to the time after Socrates. Nonetheless, the self-withdrawal of
philosophers from political affairs is already apparent in Ionia and Magna Graecia. It is already there that alienation from the political world begins, together with the unfolding of philosophy’s ideal world. And even in advance of the Roman world, this break in the history of consciousness is reinforced by a world-historical upheaval. It is not with the achievement of political freedom in the polis, but rather with its endangerment and destruction – with the ‘downfall of Ionian life in Asia Minor’ and the ‘corruption of the Athenian people’ – that ‘the time comes about in which philosophy conciliatorily comes forth’ (V 6:240).

The arguments just presented unquestionably specify important historical conditions for the emergence of philosophy in Greece. But they are hardly sufficient for comprehending the complexity of this process. Further aspects, such as the specific form and development of Greek popular religion and art, would have to be taken into account as well. Nonetheless, those arguments clearly document Hegel’s intensive concern with the question of why philosophy first appears in Greece instead of in other regions of the world.

Today, the ‘Eurocentrism objection’ is often raised against this restriction to the Greek tradition. Such an objection may appear all the more justified if considered against the background that such a methodological restriction was by no means traditional, but was instead quite explicitly introduced during Hegel’s time (by Tennemann and Tiedeman as well as by Hegel). ‘Ethnographic’ history of philosophy was characteristic of the eighteenth century; and this sort of history presented, along with the Greek tradition, the ‘philosophy’ of nearly all peoples of the ancient world and of the Orient – not merely the philosophy of the Persians and Indians, but also the philosophy of the Egyptians and Chaldeans as well as of the Scythians and Mongols; the ‘Chaldean-Persian realism’ that came to be ‘materialism’ among the Egyptians; and ‘Tibetan idealism’ (V 7:172–3). Hegel has only sarcastic disdain for this type of history of philosophy, and this for three reasons. First, it involves a completely unreflected concept of philosophy. Second it is supported by equally inadequate sources (e.g. the ancient reports that attribute four books on nature to Zoroaster). Third, it compensates for the lack of source materials by the ostentatious display of erudition. In opposition to this sort of conceptually deficient and empirically unsupportable historiographic procedure, the crafting of a history of philosophy limited to the occidental tradition but based on reliable sources is a project that has considerable merit.

Moreover, Hegel is quite prepared to revise his view about philosophy’s restriction to ‘the West’ to the extent that his sources provide the occasion for doing so, as is evident from the delighted exclamation that he makes upon reading Henry Thomas Colebrook’s article, ‘On the Philosophy of the Hindus’. This is, Hegel says, ‘actually the first thing that we have on Indian philosophy’ (V 6:376). Nonetheless, while Hegel makes full use of this article, its weight is not sufficient to lead him to revise his conception of philosophy’s history. It remains Hegel’s view that the ‘philosophy of the Orient’ has its place in philosophy’s pre-history.

In point of fact, the history of philosophy, for Hegel, encompasses only two epochs: ancient and modern. While he places mediæval philosophy between these epochs as a historical stage specifically linked to the Christian religion, he hesitates to give it the same status as ancient and modern philosophy. It represents ‘an intermediate period, a
period of fermentation’ (V 6:5), but it does
not ultimately constitute an epoch as such
despite its connection with Christianity.
Indeed, the ‘principle of the Christian reli-
gion’ first receives its adequate expression in
modern philosophy, not in the philosophy of
the Middle Ages.

Hegel distinguishes between the two ‘gen-
uine epochs’ of philosophy by employing the
concepts of idea and spirit (or ‘self-knowing
idea’); and he explains that his somewhat
schematic procedure of differentiation is
appropriate for structuring the history of phi-
losophy conceived as the history of subjectiv-
ity: ‘The idea – the eternal thing [Sache]
that is in and for itself – is the principle of the Greek
world; this eternal thing is realized through
thought, and is brought to consciousness’ (V
7:4). In Greek philosophy, then, thinking pro-
duces an ‘intellectual world’, a ‘world of truth’
that is thought of as something objective.
But it does not yet reflect upon the thought
that this world is something produced by the
thinking subject. In Greek philosophy, ‘sub-
jectivity still appears accidentally’ (ibid.). It
is only in philosophy’s second epoch that the
world which is produced by the subject as
an objectively appearing world is one that
is cognized as such and taken back into the
subject: ‘The “I” is cognized in the idea itself,
the idea is grasped as the infinite form, . . .
and this must be cognized as “I” – i.e., as the
knowing principle’ (ibid.). It is only through
this way of knowing that subjectivity obtains
its ‘infinite worth’. In so far as what is subjec-
tive is known as the productive principle in
the objectivity that it produces, and thinking
is known as being and being as thinking, ‘the
subjective side is made wholly identical with
the thing [Sache], i.e., with the objective side’
(V 7:5).

It would be a mistake to understand this
way of ordering the history of philosophy as
suggesting that the two epochs in question
are radically separated by a dividing line,
and that the emergent self-consciousness of
subjectivity so to speak drops from heaven
(in the form of the Christian religion, for
example). Historical developments include
continuities as well as breaks, and even the
‘principle of subjectivity’ owes its validity
not merely to discontinuity. It is already at
work in the Greek world as the ‘Socratic
principle’ by which ‘what is true is mediated
by thought’ (V 7:128). But it appears in this
historical context as a principle directed neg-
atively against the Greek world – as the inter-
nal corruption of this world and, indeed, as
the ‘tragedy of Greece’ (ibid.). Moreover, the
(at first abstract) ‘return of consciousness to
itself’ (V 8:159) bears the signature of ‘phi-
losophy in the Roman world’ following upon
Plato and Aristotle; and Hegel interprets the
period of Alexandrian philosophy as one in
which spirit ‘again goes out of its subjectiv-
ty towards objectivity, but at the same time
wards toward an intellectual objectivity’ (V
8:161).

In this period,

the infinitude of thinking that grasped
itself only subjectively now makes itself
objective . . . [F]rom the loss of
the world there is generated a new world
which, in its externality, also remains
an inner world, and consequently a world
reconciled; and this world is thus the
world of spirituality, which here begins.
(V 8:164)

But the principle of subjectivity becomes
predominant only in the second epoch of
philosophy. And even then, from Descartes
onwards, it comes to prevail only gradually in
the course of an exceedingly conflict-ridden
process. Hegel assigns pre-Kantian meta-
physics to the ‘first position of thought with
respect to objectivity’ (Enc §§26–36), that is,
to the artless and forthright thinking that still takes its object to be something straightforwardly objective and takes what is subjective to be something accidental or merely contingent. Thus, the bifurcation of the history of philosophy does not contrast two internally homogeneous epochs. Rather, it marks a decisive break in a history that is both convoluted and charged with tension. Hegel discerns the true dissolution and conciliation of the opposition between the subjective and the objective in the insight that ‘this opposition, carried to its absolute extreme, dissolves itself’ since ‘eternal life is this: eternally to produce . . . oppositions and to posit them eternally in their identity’ (V 9:188). This process of conciliation, of course, does not take place as an unending game. It occurs through a series of spiritual formations that necessarily emerge from one another and that by no means continue ever onwards into empty infinity.

It would be grotesque to contend that Hegel understood the ‘end of the history of philosophy’ as implying that there would be no philosophy after him and that the series of spirit’s formations would cease with him. One of his students (von Griesheim) reports that the final passage in Hegel’s lectures on philosophy’s history even includes the statement that ‘the series of spiritual formations is thus concluded for now’ (V 9:188). In the event that this report is accurate, however, the ‘for now’ in question does not pertain to just any arbitrarily determined present. For Hegel, it is unquestionably the case that the time at issue is a pre-eminently distinguished ‘now’, namely, the point in time at which the internal structure and movement of the entire history of philosophy is known for the first time – and known not by way of some overhasty anticipation of a supposedly future final state, but rather through the retrospective view of that history’s course from its beginnings to Hegel’s own time.

It is through this retrospective view that the history of philosophy is revealed as the labour of spirit. At the same time, this history is revealed as the innermost core of world history which, qua history, must always have the self-referential structure of cognition. This is why Hegel, at the conclusion of his history of philosophy, transforms Vergil’s verse pertaining to the founding of Rome and its empire into the following: ‘Tantae molis erat se ipsam cognoscere mentem [How difficult an endeavour it was for the mind to know itself]’ (W 15:685; cf. Aeneid I.33). In the same context, Hegel characterizes this exceedingly hard labour of spirit as ‘the life of spirit itself’ (V 9:188). But this is life understood not merely as laborious development. It is also life comprehended as ‘the struggle of finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness that appears to the former as something apart from itself’ (W 15:689). World history and the history of philosophy as its innermost core portray this struggle. Were the struggle to end, world history and the history of philosophy would reach their destination.

NOTES


1 Because of its attachment to representation (Vorstellung), poetry is always bound to sensibility even though it is not directly assigned to the latter.

2 J. G. Fichte initiated the atheism controversy with his 1798 essay ‘Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung’ (‘On the Basis of Our Belief in Divine World Governance’) (FGA I/3:347–57), in which he
disputes God’s personality and equates God with the ‘moral world order’.

3 With this conception of religion, however, the divine is not a mere projection of the human being – as it in fact is for Hegel’s follower, Ludwig Feuerbach, in Das Wesen des Christentums (1841). According to Hegel, the divine is instead the self-representation of the one spirit that cannot be divided at all into ‘human’ and ‘divine’ spirit. For spirit is what is divine in the human being.


6 One of the remarks that Hegel makes about Ionian philosophy would have its place here as well: ‘one can be learned most of all about that of which one knows the least’ (V 7, 22).

translated by J. Edwards
PART III:
SUBSTANTIVE AND INTERPRETATIVE QUESTIONS
‘Philosophy, they [the Stoics] say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul’ (Diogenes Laertius, VII.40). Like the Stoics, in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) Hegel divided philosophy into three parts: Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit, which study respectively the ‘logical idea’ (Enc §187A) or ‘the logical’ (Enc §§574–7), nature, and spirit or mind. The Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) was originally intended to serve as an introduction to his system, but this plan was later abandoned, because PhG inevitably anticipated too much of the material belonging to the philosophies of nature and spirit intended to follow it (Enc §25). In the Encyclopaedia, the fullest exposition of the complete system, he supplies a new, briefer introduction and incorporates a truncated version of PhG into the Philosophy of Spirit (Mind) (Enc §§413–39). Ideally, however, the system should need no introduction, since philosophy forms a ‘circle’ (Enc §§15, 17), so that the final part, on spirit, serves as an introduction to the first, logic. That is, the final stage of spirit is philosophy itself and this begins (insofar as it ‘begins’ at all) with logic. Hegel’s inspiration for this arrangement comes from neo-Platonism, especially Proclus’s triad of ‘remaining-procession-return’, and from the Christian Trinity, rather than from Stoicism. But like the Stoics, he also used a variety of biological analogies to explain the structure of his system. Hegel admired Kant’s teleological account of an organism as a system in which each organ is both an end and a means in relation to other organs, and which can only be understood from a concept of it as a whole, not in terms of its parts (Enc §57; Kant, KU AA 5:357–436). Hegel’s system is a whole or ‘totality’ governed by its ‘concept’, the logical idea.

Another of Hegel’s favourite analogies is the growth of a plant from a seed (e.g. Enc §379A). The seed embodies a plan or ‘concept’, which governs the stages of the growth of the plant and its final structure. This plan corresponds to the logical idea, which similarly governs the stages in the development of nature and spirit. The logical idea is not itself a temporal process any more than the plan in the seed is, nor is it discarded in the emergence of nature and spirit; it is embodied in every stage of their growth. Eventually, the plan in the seed is completely realized in the full-grown plant, thus closing the circle, and returning us to the beginning with the new seeds produced by the plant. This analogy illustrates some features of Hegel’s system, but it falls short in several respects. It suggests that the
logical idea precedes nature in time and that nature develops by temporally distinct stages. But nature does not, in Hegel’s view, develop over time. Different levels of nature embody different stages of the logical idea: space, for example, embodies pure quantity (Enc §254), while organic nature embodies the idea in the form of life (Enc §§216ff., 337). Nature thus follows a certain logical order, more or less the order prescribed by the logical idea. But space does not precede organic life in time, nor does, say, plant life precede animal life in time. Spirit, by contrast, develops over time. For example, the Greek city-state is a significantly different stage of spirit from the modern state and it preceded it in time, just as Greek religion preceded Christianity. But not all stages of spirit form a temporal sequence. For example, humans did not have intuition (Enc §446) before they acquired memory (Enc §461); these stages of spirit are contemporaneous. The climax of spirit, philosophy, in which the logical idea, nature and spirit itself are explicitly examined, is temporal in several respects. It emerged relatively late in the development of humanity. It develops over the course of its history. And it forms a temporal sequence in the spirit of the philosopher, who thinks about pure being, say, before he thinks about causality or space. But within Hegel’s system it is the same philosophy that returns to the beginning, not numerically distinct philosophies like the seeds of a plant.

Hegel believes that the logical idea, nature and spirit are interconnected by ‘syllogisms’. Hegelian syllogisms are inspired by Aristotle’s syllogisms, but introduce significant changes. Hegel’s syllogism consists not of three propositions, but of three terms, which are respectively ‘universal’, ‘particular’ and ‘individual.’ A ‘concept’ has been divided into these terms by a ‘judgement’ (Urteil, which Hegel interprets as an ‘original [ur-] division [teil]’), and a ‘syllogism’ (Schluss, also ‘closure, conclusion, inference’) restores unity by means of a middle term, which may be universal, particular or individual, while the two extremes are the terms to be united. The terms may be concrete entities. For example, the state involves individual people (I), their needs (P) and a government (U); each of these terms unites the remaining two in a system of three syllogisms. Such a syllogism is exemplified by yet another feature of the living organism which Hegel derived from Albrecht von Haller: ‘Animal life’ (Enc §§216–22) involves three functions: ‘sensibility’, the animal’s capacity to sense or feel its whole body; ‘irritability’, its responsiveness to stimuli; and ‘reproduction’, its self-maintenance by the regeneration of its organs. These functions are related in a ‘syllogism’: sensibility, the ‘concept’ of the animal, at one with itself, is disrupted or ‘dirempted’ by the ‘judgement’, but its unity is restored by the ‘closure’ of reproduction.

This is analogous to the relation of the three parts of Hegel’s overall system. The logical idea, which he often regards as a single all-embracing concept, is dirempted into an initially alien nature, but unity is restored by the emergence of spirit or the human mind, since this reclaims nature as its own both by its cognitive and by its practical activities. But the three realms studied by philosophy, ‘the logical (idea)’ (universal), nature (particular) and spirit (individual) are related by three syllogisms, not only one. In the first, the logical ‘becomes’ nature and nature ‘becomes’ spirit; the logical begins the process and is united to spirit by nature as a middle term (Enc §575). This syllogism presents the objective order in which the three ‘moments’ occur, the order followed in the Encyclopaedia. But it does not explain how we know that the three moments occur in this order. It neglects the subjective aspect, since spirit does not play an...
active role, but simply emerges from nature. The second syllogism remedies this defect by giving spirit an active role. Spirit is now the middle term between nature and the logical idea (Enc §576). It discerns the logical idea implicit in nature and thus unites them by explaining the relationship between them. (In principle, the stages of nature are structured in accordance with the logical idea, though in practice Hegel sometimes deviates from this plan.) This process has no counterpart in the first syllogism. Spirit transgresses the objective order recorded there by conceptualizing the nature that gives rise to spirit. The second syllogism therefore remains out of step with the objective order and is thereby subjective. The third syllogism comes in two versions. The simpler version is that 'the logical idea itself is the middle; it is the absolute substance of spirit and of nature, that which is universal and all-pervading' (Enc §187A). In the more complex version, the third syllogism is the idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle, a middle that divides into spirit and nature, making spirit the presupposition, as the process of the idea’s subjective activity, and nature the universal extreme, as the process of the idea that is in itself, objective. The self-judging of the idea into the two appearances (§§575, 576) determines them as its (self-knowing reason’s) manifestations, and in it a unification takes place: it is the concept, the nature of the subject-matter, that moves onwards and develops, and this movement is equally the activity of cognition. The eternal idea, the idea that is in and for itself, eternally remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute spirit. (Enc §577)

This syllogism combines the objective process of the first syllogism with the subjective process of the second. It does this by presenting two processes. First, the logical idea divides into nature and spirit. Here it follows a similar course to that of the first syllogism and the simpler version of the third in Enc §187, except that in §577 the logical idea acquires an explicitly active role: it does not simply form the ‘absolute substance’ of spirit and nature, but it generates the very distinction between spirit and nature. But the logical idea can do this only because it has emerged explicitly in the highest phase of spirit, the spirit that the logical idea has itself produced; the logical idea divides into spirit and nature, but it can do this only because it itself emerges within spirit. Hence this syllogism contains something like the second, subjective, syllogism. That is, the culmination of spirit is philosophy itself (Enc §§572–7), and philosophy begins with the logical idea; it then proceeds to nature and it discerns the logical idea in nature. Spirit in the form of philosophy does what it was presented as doing in the second syllogism, but it no longer deviates from the objective order. It does not start with nature and then unites it to the logical idea. It starts with the logical idea and discerns it in nature. It then proceeds from nature to spirit, and eventually concludes with philosophy itself. Hence in the third syllogism the sequence Logic–Nature–Spirit is repeated. Its first occurrence presents the objective order (the ‘subject-matter’), while its second occurrence presents the subjective order. But there is no reason why the sequence should occur only twice. It can occur indefinitely many times. This is why Hegel says: ‘The eternal idea . . . eternally remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute spirit’ (Enc §577).

One might take Hegel to be endorsing a heady idealism, according to which the logical idea, nature and the lower phases of spirit are
created not only by spirit, but by philosophy itself. But this would be a mistake. Philosophy too has presuppositions. It presupposes and emerges from lower phases of spirit, from nature and from the logical idea. Some of the oddity of this circle is removed if we cease to think of it as a temporal process, in which at one time there is the logical idea as yet undivided into nature and spirit, then at a later time the idea divides into nature and spirit, but can only do this, indeed can only exist at all, because at some time before that the logical idea has been produced by philosophy. The logical idea is non-temporal and therefore does not exist at any time apart from its manifestations. It is the deep logical structure of nature, spirit and their interrelationship. It is not, therefore, like a seed that grows on the tree that grew from that selfsame seed, or an egg laid by the chicken that emerged from that selfsame egg. The claim that the logical idea divides into nature and spirit is comparable to the claim that 12 ‘divides into’ 5 and 7, where the question ‘When does it divide?’ is inappropriate. Moreover, even the realm of spirit is not regarded by Hegel as a temporal successor to nature, or to the early stages of nature: this is excluded by his denial that nature develops over time, as well as by his rejection of any significant history of humanity’s development before the emergence of organized states.

The bifurcation of the logical idea into nature and spirit is prefigured within the logical idea itself. This coheres with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which Hegel regards as a pictorial presentation of the truth that philosophy later presents in a conceptual form. According to this doctrine, implicit in St John’s Gospel and developed explicitly by later theologians, God is an eternal Trinity of Father, Son (or Word or logos) and Holy Spirit, and this prefigures and explains the temporal process of the incarnation and descent of the spirit. Hence, two Trinities – an eternal Trinity and a temporal Trinity – appear in Hegel’s exposition of the doctrine (Enc §§566–71). The temporal Trinity, the incarnation of the Word and the descent of the Holy Spirit into the Christian community, is prefigured in the eternal Trinity, in a manner roughly analogous to the actualization of a script in a theatrical performance or a film. In Hegel’s philosophical version of the doctrine, the logical idea represents God the Father, nature represents the Son, and spirit, the Holy Spirit. Hegel links the incarnation with the creation and thus sees Christ as symbolizing not only the human condition, but nature itself (Enc §§381A, 566, 569), which must then be reclaimed by spirit. God is not complete and self-contained, but a logical structure that needs to actualize itself in nature and humanity.
Starting at least from the year 1800 Hegel frames his philosophical project in terms of the ‘system’ of philosophy. With the idea of system he takes up a crucial suggestion of Kant’s work (i.e., the architectonic of a system of reason) – a suggestion that shapes the general course of post-Kantian philosophy. At the same time, given his early political and historical interests, Hegel faces the problem of the systematic position of history within the whole of philosophy. The issue remains crucial in his mature thought and is compounded by the dual meaning of the concept of history. As Hegel maintains in his lectures on the philosophy of history (VGesch):

history combines in our language the objective and the subjective side. It means both res gestae (the things that happened) and historia rerum gestarum (the narration of the things that happened). (Hegel, 1955, p. 5; also VGesch:3)

Or, in another formulation, ‘the proper, objective history of a people (Geschichte) starts only at the point in which it also has a Historie’ (Hegel, 1955, p. 15; on Historie vs. Geschichte, see de Laurentiis, 2010).

From the outset, the idea of history and its development are closely connected for Hegel to the concept of spirit (Geist) and its dialectical development. In the Jena years (1801–7) the issue assumes a twofold form. On the one hand, in the period 1803–6, Hegel uses the concept of spirit to designate the collective unity of a people (ein Volk) and its role as agent of history (this is the case even when, in this period, he speaks of ‘absolute spirit’). Spirit is seen at work as ‘alienated’ in the objective realm of the state and its institutions, from which it progressively rises in the attempt to unify the external and the internal world. The ‘spirit of the world’ (Weltgeist) is the agent of ‘universal history’ (Weltgeschichte), which, in turn, develops within the sphere of Sittlichkeit. History is the dimension in which the singularity of a people, mediated by its ethical action, eventually attains universal significance on the world scene. On the other hand, since history expresses for Hegel the peculiar life of spirit, and spirit is fundamentally consciousness, history receives in consciousness its proper foundation. In this perspective, history is properly a ‘history of consciousness’ (Geschichte des Bewußtseins). Moreover, since philosophy is spirit’s highest form of activity, namely self-reflection and self-cognition, history as ‘history of consciousness’ ultimately develops into the ‘history of philosophy’. During his 1805/6 semester in Jena, Hegel lectures for the very first time on the history of philosophy. From now on throughout his
academic career, he will regularly offer this course as an essential introduction to speculative philosophy.

Both lines of thought – the one that sees history as belonging to the ethical development of spirit and hence to its practical, objective dimension, having the Volk as its agent, and the one that stresses instead the theoretical import of spirit’s activity (subjective as well as absolute) and connects it to the development of philosophy itself, having consciousness as its subject – are closely linked, in the years 1805–7, to the project culminating in 1807 in the *Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG)*. In this period, the logic that governs the internal articulation of history is a phenomenological logic guided by the process of consciousness’s self-cognition and coming-to-itself through alienation in its otherness. From the outset, Hegel views this process as the liberation of consciousness, as the realization of freedom and as the foundation of speculative science.

While in the first five chapters of *PhG* history is an implicit presence in the development of consciousness to self-consciousness and reason – a phenomenological ‘cycle’ that has, for the most part, an epistemological significance – with the appearance of spirit history comes thematically to the forefront. As this happens, however, Hegel is forced to re-think the entire organization of the work (see Forster, 1998). Unlike the development followed so far, the figures of spirit are no longer just ‘figures of consciousness’ (*Gestalten des Bewußtseins*); they are, more properly, ‘figures of a world’ (*Gestalten einer Welt*) (*PhG GW* 9:238). Consciousness must now be seen as necessarily rooted in the social and political context of the historical world. The psychological and phenomenological self is meaningful only within a social context that is fundamentally historical. At the end of *PhG*, the history of spirit, developed throughout the complete collection of figures of its ethical, political and religious life, is taken up in the conclusive moment of ‘absolute knowing’ in which the form of philosophical cognition in its purely logical dimension is first disclosed. This is the dimension of ‘the concept’. Yet the final identification of spirit’s history with the ‘recollection’ (*Erinnerung*) of philosophical thought (*PhG GW* 9:434) immediately encounters a problem. The tension between the temporality of history and the alleged eternity of philosophical thinking (or of the concept) leads Hegel to reflect on the relation between history and temporality (on this see Nuzzo, 2012). The cryptic conclusion of *PhG* testifies to the unresolved tension between Hegel’s two different systematic views of history at this time: is history the topic of a philosophy of history or of a history of philosophy?

Hegel’s chief concern in *PhG* is to show what the only possible form of philosophical knowledge can be, given that philosophy ought to be developed in systematic form (*PhG GW* 9:21) – or given that ‘the truth is the whole’ (*PhG GW* 9:19). Philosophy is discursive knowledge par excellence. Accordingly, it is in the dimension of reason that philosophical science must prove both the power of its actuality and the concrete meaning of its mediations. It is not enough for Hegel to show how science is possible; it is also necessary to develop science in its full actuality. This is the task of the philosophical *system*. This issue is addressed at the very end of *PhG* by showing the necessary relation between the concept (of science) on the one hand, and time and history on the other. Science and its absolute modality of knowing are intrinsically and necessarily historical, for history is the actuality...
(and actualization) of reason – or, in another famous formulation, the becoming subject of substance as spirit (PhG GW 9:18, 22). Here we find the specifically phenomenological component of Hegel’s systematic project in 1807. Reason is not the re-naming of an esoteric absolute but the standpoint of ‘absolute knowing’ reached by finite consciousness at the conclusion of its process of experience. Not only does absolute knowing belong to experience; it also constitutes the condition of its truth. The dialectical paradox is that truth can be said to be eternal precisely because it has proved itself to be intrinsically historical. Thus, the two views of history, the philosophy of history and conceptual history (PhG GW 9:434), are established as mutually compatible within the system.

This argument is taken up and fully developed in Hegel’s later encyclopaedic system. The result of PhG is to gain the dimension of ‘objective thinking’, that is, the form of thinking in which all possible opposition of consciousness has finally been overcome. As Hegel argues at the beginning of the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc), the meaning of ‘objective thinking’ is identical with the thesis that ‘reason is in the world’ (Enc §§24R, 25). At the level of the last moment of objective spirit, Hegel reformulates this thesis by saying that ‘reason is in history’ as its immanent moving force (Enc §549R). This is the central claim of his later philosophy of history.

PhG sets out to think the two dimensions of history (its ‘practical’ and its ‘theoretical’ dimensions) in their unity. A key move that guides Hegel in this endeavour is the final shift from the phenomenological development of spirit to the logical dimension of the concept. The paradox of PhG consists in the fact that consciousness, in the conclusion of its experience, opens up to two seemingly incompatible dimensions: time (or history) and the concept (or logic). At this juncture, the notion of ‘conceptual history’ (begriffene Geschichte) expresses Hegel’s attempt to think the dialectical unity of time and logic, alienation and freedom, nature and spirit. This unity is the achieved standpoint of science or of the system – absolute knowing as historical knowing. The issue disclosed by absolute knowing, that is, by the systematic standpoint, regards the conciliation between the historical succession of the figures of spirit and the timeless succession of the logical forms of the concept. The systematic problem of history is therefore clearly stated at the end of Hegel’s 1807 work. Its solution, however, is yet to come.

The uncertainty regarding the place of history within the system of philosophy occupies Hegel again in his Nürnberg lectures (1808–16), published posthumously as Philosophische Propädeutik (GW 10/2). Now he renders the ‘conceptual history’ from the end of PhG alternatively as ‘philosophical history’ (philosophische Geschichte) (TWA 4:64) and as ‘philosophical view of history’ (philosophische Ansicht der Geschichte) (GW 10/2:828). The former emerges at the conclusion of Hegel’s treatment of the state and is opposed to merely ‘historical history’ (historische Geschichte) (TWA 4:64); the latter is tentatively placed within the ‘science of religion’ (GW 10/2:828). This disposition anticipates the later reflection on history found at the intersection between objective and absolute spirit. In either case, that is, with regards to ‘philosophical history’ or to the ‘philosophical view of history’, Hegel does not merely emphasize how the topic of history must be taken up in the system, namely, conceptually rather than historically.
and empirically. The difference between the two perspectives lies not only in the form but in the very content of what is meant by Geschichte. ‘Historical history’ goes only as far as detecting the contingent development of a people in its individuality; ‘philosophical history’ recognizes the ‘universal spirit of the world’ (allgemeiner Weltgeist) as the true agent of historical events. Accordingly, only this kind of history can properly be called ‘world history’ (Weltgeschichte). For, it is only in this case that history expands in space in order to cover a universal context and extends in time in order to embrace a discrete process that evolves through different ‘stages’ or epochs (TWA 4:64). The latter perspective alone allows the philosopher to detect the dynamic structures of history and to articulate their intrinsic logic. In this connection, Hegel mentions two characteristics of world history. He contends, first, that not all peoples with a ‘historical history’ belong to world history; and he claims, second, that unlike the contingency of the succession of events in time, the succession of peoples in world history is strictly necessary (TWA 4:65).

In this period, Hegel still hesitates in locating the philosophical-conceptual history either at the end of ‘practical spirit’ (later, ‘objective spirit’) or within the doctrine of religion in the discussion of a providential order where history is considered a moment of ‘pure spirit’ (later, ‘absolute spirit’). It is only in the 1817 Encyclopaedia that he clearly follows the first alternative: Weltgeschichte is recognized as the last moment of objective spirit (and is placed at the end of the 1821 Philosophy of Right (RPh)) building the transition to absolute spirit. As the state, itself the culmination of the sphere of ethical life, expands (or alienates itself) on the international scene in the confrontation of many states, Hegel discloses the horizon of world history and its periodization (RPh §§341–60). Taking up a line from Schiller’s poem ‘Resignation’ (1786), Hegel utters the famous claim that ‘world history is the tribunal of the world’ (RPh §348; see Nuzzo, 2010a). In this systematic position, however, history is properly – and problematically – a moment of tense transition rather than the reconciled (and conciliatory) culmination of the movement of objective spirit. The field of world history seems to represent an abrupt interruption – even a reversal – in the ascending structure of the progress of freedom from the level of ‘abstract right’ through ‘morality’ up to the different moments of ‘ethical life’. Already in the confrontational relations between autonomous states (Völkerrecht) right loses its power of actuality, sinks back to the level of an ineffectual ‘ought’ (RPh §§330, 333), and is constantly undermined by contingency (RPh §§334R, 335), while the anarchy of a renewed state of nature seems to propose, yet again, the resurgent condition of abstract right. Although world history does not bring this open-ended process to a close, its advance is nonetheless justified with the force of a final, historical judgement: Weltgeschichte is Weltgericht. Herein lies one of the distinctive traits of Hegel’s idea of history. History does not require a metaphysical basis for its foundation, no longer searches for mythological origins or an absolute first (as for Schelling) and no longer claims a moral justification (as for Kant or Fichte). History is the intra-worldly activity and objective reality of spirit, for its subject and agent is the political state – not the absolute, the individual or the Volk. History is the history of political states.
And yet, as world history becomes the last moment of objective spirit, Hegel’s early idea of developing a ‘philosophical history’ at the level of absolute spirit is not entirely abandoned. Philosophical history gives rise, for Hegel, to both a philosophy of history and a history of the absolute forms of spirit (art, religion, philosophy). In Enc Hegel brings the perspective of conceptual or philosophical history so close to the activity of objective spirit as to define spirit itself as the ‘thinking spirit of world history’. World history is the ‘action’ of objective spirit. In this activity, however, the ‘thinking spirit of world history’ reaches its metamorphosis and becomes ‘knowledge of absolute spirit’ (Enc §552; see MacDonald, 2006). It is in history and through the activity of history that objective spirit gains knowledge of itself as absolute spirit.

In VGesch, greatly developing and expanding on empirical details, Hegel presents his philosophy of history without the systematic framework of the system, implicitly superimposing this framework on an immense historical material.

1. See Hegel’s letter to Schelling from the end of 1800: ‘in my scientific education, which started with the lower human needs, I had to move on to science, and the ideal of youth had to gain reflective form and be transformed into a system’ (Hegel: The Letters [Briefe 1:59).

2. Fichte had already alluded to his own Wissenschaftslehre as to a ‘pragmatic history of human spirit’ (see Breazeale, 2001).

3. The development of spirit introduces what De Negri (1943) has called the ‘historiographical cycle’ of the book. As this interpreter provocatively puts it, in the chapter on Geist ‘we no longer have a phenomenology and not even a philosophy of spirit but a true philosophy of history in which events primarily of social and political nature are translated into concepts’ (ibid., p. 386). This topic is extensively developed in Nuzzo (2008 and 2012).

4. In VGesch, ‘philosophical’ history is, along with ‘original’ and ‘reflected’ history, one type of historiography (Hegel, 1955, pp. 4–5). On Hegel’s classification of historiographies and the relation of historiography to res gestae, see de Laurentiis (2010).

5. See, for example, Weil (1950), claiming that in the outline of a philosophy of history placed at the end of RPh there is nothing of interest ‘sauf le fait que cet exposé se trouve à cette place’ (ibid., p. 74). See also Cesa (2008, p. 37).
In all three editions of the *Encyclopaedia logic*, the Doctrine of the Concept begins with the categorical if cryptic statement: ‘The concept is what is free [Der Begriff ist das Freye].’ The concept is further characterized in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, as ‘what is in and for itself determined’ and as ‘pure negativity of reflection . . . or the power of substance’ (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences of 1817* [Enc 1817] §108). In the *Science of Logic* (WL), the connotation of freedom implicit in the category of the concept is derived from the latter by the ‘immanent deduction’ (WL GW 12:16) provided in the transition from ‘actuality’ to ‘the concept’. Hegel therefore does more than ‘associate’ freedom with the concept (see Inwood, 1992, p. 60). He considers the former to be implied by the latter. In WL the categories preceding the category of the concept are merely concepts ‘in themselves’ or ‘for us’. The concept differs from them in that it denotes a self-relating concept (a concept for itself) that is even connected (somewhat surprisingly in this context) with the notion of ‘individual personality’ (WL GW 12:17; also 12:236). This characterization is due to the fact that the logical structure of freedom coincides with that of individual personhood. ‘Freedom’ connotes a type of universal that also relates negatively to itself and is thus a universal singularity – precisely the logical structure of personhood. Accordingly, the concept and the ‘I’ share the same logical determinations. Yet the concept of the ‘I’ coincides with the concept of the concept only insofar as the latter can be thought as embodied in a particular existent. The ‘I’ differs from the concept, then, as appearance differs from essence (WL GW 12:17).

Hegel characterizes this unusual concept of the concept variously as ‘universal absolute activity’ or ‘soul and substance’ of everything (WL GW 12:238); self-movement; self-determination; ‘absolute unity of being and reflection’ (WL GW 12:12); and ‘absolute idea’. In a first approximation, the meaning of the concept may be given as self-thinking thought or pure thinking. The following is aimed at elucidating the connections among all these characterizations.

Hegel's concept of pure thinking is close to Kant’s ‘transcendental apperception’ in that both intend a pure, self-relating unity. Kant, however, never explicates transcendental apperception in these terms. On the one hand, his transcendental logic is, just as Hegel’s logic, not merely formal (*KrV B79–88*), but a ‘logic of truth’ (*KrV B87*). On the other, Kant’s transcendental logic lacks any counterpart to Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept (see Inwood, 1992, p. 58). In mainstream textbooks of
Aristotelian logic of the eighteenth century, the doctrines of concept, judgement and syllogism constituted the whole of logic. Hegel's Doctrine of the Concept retains but also radically transforms all three. Far from constituting logic's main body, they form a sub-section of it. It does not follow, however, that concept, judgement and syllogism are for Hegel of minor importance. Rather, he transforms them into Platonic-Aristotelian forms, that is, into items that are not only mental representations but forms of things. (Plato's and Aristotle's distinct doctrines of the  ἐίδη are here considered together insofar as Hegel 'sublates' both in his doctrine.) Appropriating Aristotle's concept of the ἐνέργεĩν of νοũς (see Metaphysics 1072b18–30, with which Hegel chooses to close the encyclopaedic system), Hegel understands concept, judgement and syllogism as moments of a single 'form-activity [Formtätigkeit]' (Enc §150) that actualizes the 'substantial identity' of all there is. This is the activity of pure thought or the concept tout-court.

On the one hand, Hegel's logic treats concept, judgement and syllogism as thought forms in the ordinary sense, namely as speech acts or linguistic expressions of mental items that require logical (not psychological) analysis. Yet Hegel also refers to them as 'objective thoughts'. This characterization of fundamental thought forms is what principally distinguishes Hegel's logic from traditional logic:

In accordance with these determinations, thoughts can be called objective thoughts; and among them the forms which . . . are usually taken to be only forms of conscious thinking have to be counted too. Thus logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things. (Enc §24)
moments in the third that unites them helps explain Hegel’s otherwise perplexing characterization of the concept as a ‘totality of this negativity [of substance], wherein each of the moments is also the whole which the concept itself is’ (Enc 1827 §160).

Despite his emphasis on the self-determination of the concept, Hegel – unlike Leibniz and Kant – does not speak of the ‘spontaneity’ of thinking. He prefers to use (though sparingly) the notion of thought’s self-movement, as when he characterizes the logic itself as the ‘self-movement of the absolute idea . . . the original word’ (WL GW 12:237, alluding to John 1:1). In general, Hegel’s conception of determination is that of an ontologically and cognitively primary activity. Determination is, first, negation (following Spinoza: omnis determinatio est negatio); second, it is universal (following Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and Kant: omni-moda determinatio). Hegel’s original contribution consists in integrating both meanings into one: to determine is both a negative and a universal activity. In the reflective mode, self-determination amounts to positing oneself ‘as the negative of oneself’ (Enc §238) and to universalizing oneself. Ultimately, it amounts to self-actualization.

The ‘freedom’ of the concept discussed in the beginning refers therefore to mind’s independent activity of unifying differences by relating them to itself. This activity contains of course also a moment of negativity because self-relation requires a unity to be dirempted into two (a dynamic that, as already mentioned, also characterizes the logical structure of individual personhood). ‘Subjectivity’ denotes precisely this activity: ‘on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity which is truth’ (WL GW 12:246). But how and in what sense does subjectivity unify the opposite poles of thinking and reality? To approach this question, the following section sketches the concept’s movement through the logic and the Realphilosophie.

THE MOVEMENT OF THE CONCEPT THROUGH LOGIC, NATURE AND SPIRIT: AN OVERVIEW

The dialectic of being, nothing and becoming that opens the Doctrine of Being is the first, purely logical instance of the movement arising from the self-referential negativity of the concept. Thinking ‘being’, Hegel says, is nothing but thinking ‘the concept in itself only’. Taken as such, ‘being’ means ‘pure thought as well as the undetermined, simple immediate’ (Enc §86), or also ‘nothing – something that cannot be said’ (Enc §87R). In this abstraction, therefore, being and nothing are the same: their opposition ‘is null and void’ and their ‘distinction . . . something merely meant’ (Enc §87R2). Yet being and nothing are also not the same, for, considered together, they are ‘the antithesis in all its immediacy’ (Enc §88R1). It is therefore both the case (a) that being and nothing are identical, insofar as they are empty abstractions (i.e. equivalent expressions of the concept in itself), and (b) that they are non-identical, insofar as they are opposite contents of thinking.

The general method of the logical science results from Hegel’s appropriation of and solution to a pivotal question of Plato’s Parmenides, namely, whether the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ are each similar or dissimilar, equal or unequal, to the other and to itself (see especially Parmenides 127e1–136b1–7; 139e7–140d8; 147c1–151e2). Like Plato, Hegel derives from the indeterminateness of fundamental
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concepts (Grundbegriffe) that they are both the same and not the same as themselves and their opposites. Going beyond Plato, however, Hegel also affirms that the meaning or truth of categories like ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ is found in a third of which they are said to be ‘mutually vanishing’ moments (Enc §§88–9). Here, the categories become mere moments of ‘becoming’. Yet this is only a first truth of the concept in its development towards the idea.

[B]ecoming . . . is not just the unity of being and nothing, but it is restlessness itself—the unity which in its self-relation is not simply motionless, but which, in virtue of the diversity of being and nothing which it contains, is in itself [turned] against itself. (Enc §88R4; Geraets et al., translation adapted)

On account of its immanent contradictions, the concept changes or becomes an other. This other of the concept is determinate being (Daseyn). Yet the movement continues: being determinate means being determined qualitatively, and determinate being in general, ‘reflected into itself in this its determinacy . . . [becomes] a determinate thing, something [Daseyendes, Etwas]’ (Enc §90; Geraets et al., translation adapted). Once again, this transition from the concept of determinate being in general to that of the something results from the negativity of thought. And again, within the concept of the something, its being-in-itself is opposed to its being-other. By being the opposite of its being-other, the something turns into an other itself; and its other, being its opposite, turns into the other of its other, ‘and so on ad infinitum’ (Enc §93). This is the movement that leads the concept of the something to that of ‘spurious or negative infinity’—an understanding of the infinite as incessant reproduction of the finite rather than as finitude’s sublation (Enc §94).

In sum: according to Hegel, the internal opposition revealed by the analysis of each category, and the consequent transitioning of each from the preceding and into the next, are expressions of the self-referential negativity of thinking—expressions, that is, of the movement of the concept. This negativity is implicit in the initial categories of being and nothing; it becomes explicit for the first time in the category of becoming; it functions as principium individuationis in the transition from Daseyn to Etwas to Fürsichseyn; and so forth. These first stages of the Doctrine of Being rehearse the historical-philosophical transition from Plato’s concept of the ἐπίδημος of determinate being in general, to Aristotle’s concept of the λόγος of universal singularity (i.e. the concept of τόδε τι). Hegel phrases this transition as ‘production’ of individuality by an original continuous formative principle he calls the concept. For Hegel, then, the concept, being at once universal, particular and singular activity (Enc §163), is not just a theoretical notion but indeed the constitutive principle of actual individuality.

The movement of the concept determines the entire philosophical science, not only its logical part. The strictly logical movement ends in the concept of the absolute idea. Yet even this result becomes sublated, for although the idea is said to entail ‘the true in and for itself, the absolute unity of concept and objectivity’ (Enc §213), it still is only the concept of the idea, whose referent still awaits proof of existence. Thinking, therefore, goes on to conceive the idea as actualizing itself in what is other than mere conceptuality. The self-actualizing idea—the concept of the idea externalizing itself—is initially nature (Enc §244, 244A).

The natural manifestations of the idea (physical bodies, systems and forces) relate relate to one another as logical forms do: by sublation of oppositions and contradictions,
natural forms rise to ever new levels of unity and universality. Even this natural series finds a temporary conclusion in what Hegel calls ‘the last externality of nature’, that is, the living organism. But thinking presses on. The organism can only be truly grasped as a form transitioning into an other as its truth. Natural objectivity sublates itself into natural subjectivity; the immediate singularity of sentient bodies sublates itself into the concrete universality of conscious ones; as a whole, nature, having become ‘the concept which has . . . the concept [itself] as its determinate being’ (Enc §376), sublates itself into spirit.

The concept as spirit undergoes new and complex developments that Hegel analyses, as is well known, in terms of subjective, objective and absolute configurations. All spirit’s forms share a common trait: they are (internal and external) activities of mind returning out of nature to itself.

THE CONCEPT AS OBJECT AND AS IDEA

In part two of WL, under the heading ‘On the Concept in General’, Hegel writes:

the concept has substance for its immediate presupposition; substance is implicitly what the concept is explicitly. The dialectical movement of substance through causality and reciprocity is thus the immediate genesis of the concept by virtue of which its becoming is exposed. (WL GW 12:11; di Giovanni translation adapted)

The reason for the ‘genesis’ of concept from substance is the following.

The concept of substance is the concept of a whole of causal and reciprocal relations. As all these are internal to substance, the latter can be said to self-relate – thus anticipating the subjectivity of the concept. Once again, it is intrinsic negativity that makes the concept (here as substance) go beyond itself, sublate its immediacy and realize its inherent opposite. This is why Hegel also calls substance the ‘absolute relationship’ and a ‘process . . . in which relationship sublates itself . . . into absolute identity’ (Enc §150).

Hegel’s treatment of the logical relations among substance, causality and reciprocity follows but also modifies their treatment in Kant’s Analogies of Experience. Hegel preserves Kant’s conception of substance as appearance that is a whole of relations (KrV B321), as well as his conception of a world of appearances constituted by a multiplicity of interacting substances. Yet Hegel denies that this world of appearances is all we can experience, cognize and act upon. Cognition of appearances, Hegel thinks, is insufficient to account for actuality. What shines through the reality (Realität) of appearances is actuality (Wirklichkeit). Phenomena are moments of actuality and enable our access to it.

Hegel’s concept of substance is, of course, also indebted to Spinoza’s causa sui: the unity that is actuality vis-à-vis its appearances is both cause and effect of itself (Enc §153R). For Hegel, this is the case objectively, that is, not only for us but for actuality itself. The proof is provided in the analysis of reciprocal action as a sublation of cause–effects relations (Enc §156). The internal relationality of substance, this ‘infinite negative relation to self’ (Enc §157), makes explicit what the Doctrine of the Concept has implied all along, namely, that the ‘completion [Vollendung] of substance’ is none other than the self-relating concept.

This ‘hardest’ (Enc §159R) of all transitions also shows that, by necessity, the potential subjectivity of substance actualizes itself as real (individual) subjectivity. The logical analysis of this transition clarifies now the
beginning statements of the Doctrine of the Concept, namely, that the concept is free, negative and determined in and for itself.

Hegel does not derive the self-relational capacity of individual substances from their reciprocal relations. Conversely, he grounds the reciprocity among individuals in substance’s self-differentiating, self-negating and self-sublating character. Yet Hegel’s independent finite individuals are not, as Spinoza’s, mere modifications of substance. For Hegel, their independence is necessarily real even though conditioned and limited in time. Individuals are self-referential substances for as long as they exist. Their identity is not natural but spiritual identity forged in relations of reciprocity. These relations are not triggered externally: their ground is ‘the concept, the subject’ (WL GW 12:14). Understood as subjectivity tout court, the concept’s reflexivity denotes the ‘self’, a singular reality in which every real determination is suspended or sublated.

As shown above in rough outline, pure thinking develops its content dialectically from categories of being (denoting the concept in itself) through categories of essence (the concept for itself) to concepts of the concept (the concept in and for itself). To the extent that this movement is a purely logical one, Hegel says, the deductions involved are ‘entirely analytic’: they are a ‘mere positing of what is already contained in a concept’ (Enc §88R1).

Conceived at its stage as absolute idea, the concept is at once itself and its own object or content. It is now thought that thinks itself. Its content, Hegel explains, is nothing less but also nothing more than ‘the system of the logical’ (Enc §237; also Enc 1817 §185).

Hegel’s concept does not (transcendentally) determine a manifold, except in the sense that it determines objectivity by deriving it from itself as its actualization. This is why the second division of the Doctrine of the Concept bears the title ‘Objectivity’ (in WL) or simply ‘The Object’ (in Enc). The analysis developed in this part shows that the concept can only be conceived as complete if it is also grasped as ‘objectively true’ (WL GW 12:173). In this completion, the concept is ‘the idea’ (Enc §§212–15; WL GW 12:172–8).

The concept considered as idea signifies an existent that is both subject and object (Enc §213–14). This is not to be understood as a propositional conjunction of two elements but as a rational identity of the kind expressed in the copula of judgements: ‘the particular is the universal’, or: ‘the subject is the object’. This same identity pertains to every existent as unity of its ideality and reality, of its infinity and finitude, or, in living organisms, as real unity of soul and body.

Because it entails an identity of opposites, the concept of the idea is a concept of reason, not of the understanding:

the idea itself . . . is the dialectic which eternally divides and distinguishes what is self-identical from what is differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul from the body . . . [At the same time,] it is the dialectic that makes this product of the understanding, this diversity . . . see that the independence of its productions is a false semblance, and leads it all back to unity. (Enc §214R)

The rational identity epitomized by the idea is the identity of the concept and its self-actualizations, that is, the natural phenomenon of life, the epistemic process of cognition and the free activity of the will.
The verb *bestimmen* originally meant ‘to establish by the voice (*Stimme*), name, designate’, and later acquired the more general meaning of ‘to fix, arrange, determine’. It has a variety of non-philosophical uses, but in eighteenth-century logic it came to mean ‘to determine’ in the sense of delimiting, demarcating or defining a concept by giving it features that differentiate it from other concepts. In his *Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*) of 1794 Fichte used it to claim that the ‘I’ or ego ‘posits’ itself as ‘determined’ or affected (*bestimmt*) by the non-‘I’, and the non-‘I’ as determined by the ‘I’. The first of these positions underlies the theoretical *Wissenschaftslehre*, the second the practical *Wissenschaftslehre*.

The past participle, *bestimmt*, has a range of adjectival and adverbial uses corresponding to those of the verb. But it also gives rise to the abstract noun *Bestimmtheit*, ‘determinacy, determinedness, determinateness’. This refers ambiguously to the fact that something is determinate, for example, that the concept of a horse is relatively determinate in comparison to the concept of an animal, and to the specific features or *differentiae* in virtue of which it is determinate, such as having a backbone and eating grass.

The seventeenth-century *Bestimmung* is more active and verbal than *Bestimmtheit* and denotes both the process of determining something and the result of the process. In the latter sense *Bestimmung* is hard to distinguish from *Bestimmtheit*. *Bestimmtheit* has two broad senses. First, it is ‘determination’ in such senses as ‘delimitation, definition’; adding features to a thing or a concept; the features so added; finding out the position of something; and establishing legal provisions. (*Bestimmung*, like other derivatives of *bestimmen*, never means ‘determination’ in the sense of ‘resoluteness’ or ‘fixity of purpose’.) Second, it refers not to the present condition of something, but to its ‘destination, destiny, vocation, calling’. Thus someone might be ‘destined’ (*bestimmt*), or have a *Bestimmung*, for high office, that is, on their way to high office, but also designed for it, so that the attainment of high office will fulfil their true nature. And when Fichte entitled one of his books *The Vocation of Man* (*Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, 1800), he was referring not to the present condition of humanity, but to our final purpose or destiny, which confers meaning on our existence.

Hegel uses *bestimmen*-words in a variety of non-philosophical senses. For example, he uses ‘rechtliche Bestimmungen’ in the normal sense of ‘legal provisions’ (e.g. *Enc §522*). But his most explicit account of his own technical use of the words occurs in the first section...
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of the first part of the Science of Logic (WL), The Doctrine of Being. The section is entitled Bestimmtheit (Qualität), where Bestimmtheit is a general term for qualitative determinacy, in contrast to Quantity and Measure, the titles of the second and third sections. Hegel endorses Spinoza’s dictum ‘determination is negation’ (Spinoza’s Letter to Jarig Jellis, 1674), that is, a thing or concept is determined only in virtue of its contrast with other things or concepts, which are determined in a way that it is not. Apparently taking this to mean that negation is a sufficient condition of determinacy, not only a necessary condition, Hegel argues that the indeterminacy (Unbestimmtheit) of being, with which the section begins, is itself a sort of determinacy, since being’s indeterminacy contrasts with, and distinguishes it from, the determinacy of quality. In this section he attempts to distinguish the terms Bestimmtheit, Bestimmung and Beschaffenheit (‘condition’, ‘constitution’ and ‘the way a thing is created or made’). The discussion is complicated, not least by Hegel’s attempting to combine the two main senses of Bestimmung (‘determination’ and ‘destiny’) in a single concept. A human being, for example, has three main types of feature. First, a human being, even a human infant, has an inner nature or potentiality, the capacity, say, for rational thought and activity, an inner nature that differentiates it from other types of entity. That is, a human being is rational ‘in itself’ (an sich), and insofar as this inner nature is what distinguishes a human being from other creatures, it is our Bestimmtheit. But this inner nature may not be realized in our outer qualities, and insofar as it is something that should be fulfilled and expressed in our outer qualities and conduct it is also our Bestimmung. Secondly, there are the explicit outer qualities and relationships of a human being, insofar as these depend on, though they may not adequately express, its inner nature, and enable it to interact with other types of entities and reveal its inner nature to them. These are said to be ‘in it’ (an ihm). If our Bestimmung is fulfilled in our outer conduct, then it is also our Bestimmtheit, but it is so not because of its connexion with our inner nature, but only because it is a quality that we happen to have. Finally, human beings have many features which do not depend on their inner nature, but only on their natural and sensory aspects and on their contingent encounters with other things. Such features are our Beschaffenheit, our superficial and variable characteristics in contrast to our inner nature. In a general sense they are also one’s Bestimmtheit. However, they are not one’s Bestimmung, except to the extent that the fulfilment of one’s Bestimmung requires the incorporation of one’s Beschaffenheit into it. Emotions, feelings and desires that do not stem from our rational essence can nevertheless be imbued with thought, and our contingent encounters with other things or people can be controlled or made use of for our rational purposes.

Hegel also connects the distinction between Bestimmtheit and Bestimmung with two different uses of reell, ‘real’. It is used in a classificatory sense to say, for example, that someone is a real human being, in contrast to a statue or waxwork, having, that is, the Bestimmtheit of a human being. It is also used in an evaluative sense to say that someone is a real human being in fulfilling the Bestimmung of a human being, namely thinking and acting rationally, in contrast to those human beings who do not. (English translations often use ‘determinate being’ as a rendering of Hegel’s ‘Daseyn’, in part because Hegel himself says ‘Daseyn ist bestimmtes Seyn’ [WL GW 21:96]).
Apart from human beings, straightforwardly finite entities have a *Bestimmung*, as well as a *Bestimmtheit*, but their *Bestimmung* is their end. For example, the *Bestimmung* of an acid, in contrast to its current *Bestimmtheit*, is to be neutralized by a base. However, Hegel’s most important use of the word is for the categories presented in his Logic, which he often calls *Bestimmungen* or *Denkbestimmungen* or *Gedankenbestimmungen* (‘thought-determinations’). The primary significance of such designations is that these are ways in which the thought of pure being, which is, as it were, the blank indeterminate space of thought, determines itself into definite categories. But it also suggests that such a thought determination is *destined* to pass over into another thought determination and ultimately into the ‘absolute idea’, the whole articulated system of thought to which it belongs.

*Bestimmung* in the sense of ‘destiny, etc.’ is often close to Hegel’s use of *Begriff* (concept): if something (including a thought determination) fulfils its *Bestimmung*, it also fulfils its concept; it becomes what it is supposed to be. Hegel often uses the analogy of a plant: its concept is implicit in the seed and determines the growth of the plant until eventually the concept is realized in the fully grown plant. *Bestimmtheit*, by contrast, is usually contrasted with *Begriff*: it represents a phase intermediate between the pure unfulfilled concept and the fulfilment of the concept by its return into itself. For example, in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel divides his account into three parts. The first, the ‘Concept of Religion’, deals with features common to all religions, for example with cult conceived as a unification of the rift between god(s) and human beings. The second part, ‘Determinate Religion’, deals with primitive and oriental ‘nature religion’, Judaism and Greek and Roman religions. They are conceived as the ‘development of the concept’. The final part deals with Christianity, which is variously described as ‘absolute religion’, ‘consummate’ (*vollendet*) religion and as ‘revelatory’ or ‘manifest’ (*offenbare*) religion. Christianity is conceived not as merely one determinate religion among others, but as the ‘return of the concept to itself’ out of the development involved in determinate religion and as fulfilling the concept of religion in a way that other religions do not. Christianity is the complete or ‘consummate’ religion in that it embraces the determinate principles of all its predecessors, while at the same time it sheds determinacy altogether by liberating religion from the sensory and natural devices that they employ.

This triadic pattern of a relatively indeterminate concept, which then determines itself, but finally overcomes one-sided determinacies in order to fulfil the concept on a higher level, pervades Hegel’s thought. It structures Hegel’s account of the mind or spirit in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhG*) and in the 1830 *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (*Enc*). As the mind develops it acquires more and more ‘determinacies’, such as ‘sense-certainty’ in *PhG* or ‘sensation’ in *Enc* §399. Each such determinacy is a step towards the mind’s long-term goal of becoming for itself what it is in itself, that is, to gain complete self-knowledge. Moreover, each stage within this long-term process, such as the stage of ‘will’ in the *Philosophy of Right* (*RPh* §§4–28; cf. cf. *Enc* §§469ff.) is itself a process of the same type. The will, for example, begins as an indeterminate ‘reflection of the “I” into itself’, a withdrawal from any and every determinate content (*RPh* §5). At the next stage the will adopts some particular determinate project (*RPh* §6). Finally, it combines the first two stages by willing
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itself or freedom as such, that is, by submit-
ting to the rational structure of ethical life,
wherein its raw urges are refined into rights
and duties (RPh §7). At the beginning of the
process the mind has a certain character ‘in
itself’ or implicitly. We (i.e. we philosophers)
see that the mind has this character, but
the mind itself cannot. But by the end of that
process the mind itself, in the form that it has
at that stage, sees what it is and what it has
implicitly been all along. This self-knowledge
is limited, however, and does not constitute
the final goal of the mind. It drives the mind
on to the next stage of its development. The
mind does not have a determinacy in the way
that straightforwardly finite entities do. Its
Bestimmung, and in a way its Bestimmtheit,
is simply to manifest or reveal itself, and it
does this by ‘positing’ or acquiring various
subsidiary determinacies:

the determinacy of mind is manifestation. The mind is not some one deter-
minacy or content whose expression or
externality is only a form distinct from
the mind itself. Hence it does not reveal
something; its determinacy and content
is this very revelation. Its possibility is
therefore immediately infinite, absolute
actuality. (Enc §383)

It is because in Christianity, unlike other reli-
gions, God reveals himself, wholly and non-
sensorily, as spirit, that Christianity forms
the penultimate stage of the self-revelation
of Geist. The final stage, however, is reserved
for philosophy, wherein mind attains its final
goal and is entirely revealed to itself concept-
ually and with no pictorial intermediaries.
Mind is then able to survey the whole course
of its own development. Hegel sometimes
suggests that philosophy is divided into dis-
tinct philosophies, each with its own deter-
minacy like varieties of fruit (Enc §13). This
is a decent ad hominem response to the scept-
ic who abstains from philosophy because of
the difficulty of deciding which philosophy
to adopt; it is, says Hegel, like refusing to eat
apples, cherries, etc. because none of them
is fruit as such. However, Hegel does not in
fact regard different philosophies as co-ordi-
nate determinate species of a genus. Rather,
apparently discrete philosophies complement
each other and display internal incoherencies
that can only be resolved by a transition to
another stage of philosophy. Higher stages of
philosophy, which resolve the incoherencies
and reflect on lower philosophies in a way in
which the latter cannot reflect on the former,
‘sublate’ lower ones and incorporate the
determinate principles that they advanced
one-sidedly. At the stage of philosophy of
which Hegel is the spokesman the mind has,
in his view, attained its ultimate Bestimmung,
reflectively immersed in the Bestimmtheiten
of all previous philosophy, but dominated by
none of them.
Traditionally, rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza had associated ‘pure thinking’ with a conceptual understanding of how the world actually is. Challenging this approach, Kant limited the application of concepts (and categories) to only the realm of our experience. Thus, he declared the world as it is in itself to be beyond the reach of human thinking and knowing. This, in turn, put some serious constraints upon the modern concept of thinking, restricting its scope, capabilities and autonomy. Thinking had to rely upon a particular faculty – the understanding – for providing the integrating unity of cognitive activity. Moreover, the very possibility of thought was grounded in something other than the thought principle itself: the transcendental unity of apperception. This served as the underlying, formal condition of synthesizing a manifold of intuition into the cognition of an object.

Unsatisfied with the results of Kant’s probing into the ground of rational thinking, as well as with the purely subjectivist modifications of Kant’s principle of apperception undertaken by Fichte, Hegel explores the fundamental concepts that govern our thinking in order to justify the claim that thinking grasps reality. This was the claim that modern rationalists had enthusiastically defended but failed to prove. To substantiate his argument Hegel needs to determine a new concept of thinking which can explain the possibility of cognition, grasp its own processes and capture the metaphysical principles that underlie and govern all reality. This becomes the project of his Science of Logic (WL), whose subject matter is ‘thinking or more specifically conceptual thinking’ (WL GW 21:27), that is, not thinking that is rooted in a stream of consciousness and is thus arbitrary and limited, but the careful thinking that ‘conceives concepts’. Hegel’s initial approach is somewhat akin to empirical science. He starts with something assumed to be self-evident and then, through analysis and critique of our implicit presuppositions, develops a positive theory of thinking that can venture beyond our experience and produce concepts that capture the nature of reality itself.

Hegel uses ‘thinking’ (Denken) to designate the activity of thought, distinguishing it from ‘thought’ (Gedanke) as the product or content of thinking. Since thinking is an activity, it is in constant flux: thoughts lead to others which, in turn, produce new ones that grasp and describe reality with more precision and adequacy. Thoughts, concepts and their interrelations are all in flux. At no point in time does thinking pause; similarly, no concept can stop evolving or merging into another. Thus thinking, caught in a
restless dialectical process, leads every concept to move beyond any fixed determination and precisely defined term into the next one. Hegel emphasizes the ongoing change, active growth and progression of thinking as development. It would be incorrect, however, to understand thinking simply as a linear sequence of thoughts. Instead, it is a self-contained dynamic (dialectic) that, while constantly increasing in complexity, sustains and preserves its comprehensive unity.

Talking about thinking as an activity usually involves discussing and exploring the capabilities and functions of the human intellect. In the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc), Hegel rejects the traditional understanding of thinking as primarily referred to a narrowly construed human cognitive faculty alongside perception, intuition or representation. Instead, he conceives thinking in a rather inclusive sense: ‘everything human is human . . . only as a result of thinking’, and thinking is ‘responsible for the humanity of all that is human’ (Enc §2). As activity of universalization (see below), thinking is unlimited, infinite and as much objective as it is subjective.

Hegel begins his investigation into thinking by comparing it, first, with other human faculties and psychic activities such as perceiving, intuiting, representing, imagining, etc.; second, with the thinking subject or the ‘I’ who thinks; and third, with the content of thought. He rejects the identification of thinking with each of these as erroneous and partial (Enc §§20–5) and argues for their dialectical sublation into a new concept of thinking.

First, Hegel embraces Aristotle’s doctrine that what distinguishes man from other living creatures is the ability to think. He takes this further by stressing that thinking permeates (durchdringt) all other proper human activities and that, as a self-sustaining and unlimited dynamic, thinking overreaches (übergreifen) what is other than itself. This claim includes two important ideas.

(i) Every human activity necessarily involves thought: ‘thinking [is] at work in everything human’ (Enc §2). Humans alone have religion, right and morality due to the fact that, although in these spheres we rely on feeling, belief or representation, the ‘activity [of thinking] and its products are present and contained therein’ (Enc §2R). By ‘contained’ Hegel means not just that human perception, intuition, willing, etc., are infused with thinking, but that they are ‘merely further specifications of thinking’ itself (Enc §24A1) – as whatever humans do is determined (bestimmt) by thinking.

(ii) Thinking serves as the ground of all other activities. Yet it does not itself require an underpinning. While all other psychical activities can be objects of thought, thought itself is not an object for them. Hegel argues that the unification function of conceptual activity is derived from the universality inherent to thinking and cannot – contrary to Kant’s assessment (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] A76–80/B102–5 and A95–110) – be furnished by any other faculty of mind whose objects are singularities. As universalizing activity par excellence, thinking generates syntheses (WL GW 21:84–6). Pure thought, always implicit in intuition, representation, perception, etc., develops the scope, relations and internal structures that make cognition possible.

Second, while Hegel is largely sympathetic to traditional philosophical views that associate the ‘I’ and its identity with thinking rather than with other psychical activities (Enc §24A1), he rejects an instrumentalist approach to thinking. For Hegel, the ‘I’ is not ‘in possession’ of thought; it does not
‘have’ thought, at least not in the same way as it can ‘have’ sensations, desires, intuitions, emotions or feelings. Thinking is not a tool that the ‘I’ can use or discard. It is the very essence of the ‘I’. Try as I may, I cannot distance myself from my own thinking without losing myself altogether. The ‘I’ is thought thinking itself (Enc §20). This is why Hegel claims that there cannot be a proper subject of thought other than thought itself; thinking, in other words, must be its own substratum. Hence, Hegel rejects traditional substantialist conceptions which either merge thinking with one of its appearances, namely representation (thus making thinking into a sort of permanent idea of the mind) or else equate ‘thinking’ with the ‘thinker’ (Enc §20R).

Although thinking reveals to us all things, including ourselves, as universal activity it cannot be a singular substance.

Third, building upon an established view that thinking always tends towards, intends or is ‘about’ something, Hegel formulates two important principles concerning the structure of thought and its relation to the object:

(i) Since thinking is an activity, and activity involves interaction, the structure of thinking can be described as a system of relations, the most basic of which is a relation to objects. Thus the fundamental insight about thinking is that it can also be directed towards something other than itself: thinking is able to ‘overreach’ beyond itself.

When the object of thinking is thinking itself, Hegel speaks of a strictly logical activity. This is ‘pure’ thinking in a self-relating mode, that is, it is a thought form (Denkform) that enables attainment of ‘the cognition of the infinite form, that is, of the concept’ (WL GW 21:48) and is thus able to ‘reconstitute’ (i.e. grasp conceptually) the identity of thought and object. Although the pure concept of the structural identity of thought and object becomes intelligible only in the science of logic, all experience is a result of the over-reaching activity of thought that goes beyond itself in a quest to know and grasp (internalize) its object. Everything that may at first be viewed as alien to thought can ultimately be grasped only through thinking, because the objective independence of things is itself a product of thought – not of sensation, perception or understanding alone. Thinking provides a synthesis of multiple qualities and patterns by tracing their objective connections and holding them together in the concept of the oneness of the object.

(ii) Since all thinking is thinking about something, an object or content is essential to thought itself. This structural identity between thought and object provides a foundation for knowing the world as it is and not merely as we experience it. Thinking does not just make strong cognitive claims; it actually provides cognitive means unavailable to perception, intuition or even the understanding. Conceptual comprehension (Begreifen) provides concepts that capture the nature of reality; as such, comprehension is the process of knowing proper. Stressing the cognitive role of conceptuality, Hegel points out that just as the essence of things can be traced back to thoughts (and not to any perceptible features available to our senses), the most important structures and patterns of reality are discerned by conceptual thinking.

Hegel rejects Kant’s view that in the process of cognition thoughts are imposed upon reality. He insists instead that thoughts (ideal-like structures) are embedded in things independently of our thinking. Things are self-determined unities, and not united solely by the activity that thinks them. This claim has two implications: first, it implies that thoughts are as much objective as they are subjective – affirming the identity of thought and being
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that is central to Hegel’s philosophy; second, the claim also supports Hegel’s epistemological realism by implying that the world is genuinely independent of our thinking and contains objective structures that can be discovered. Thus to know is not to figure out preordained thoughts; it is to disclose the intelligible structure of the world, those law-like regularities that can be systematized and shown to be conceptual or rational in form. In the attempt to gain knowledge, we seek to grasp reality as it actually is – not as it is experienced by us.

But how do we come to know reality? This question is central to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG), whose project Hegel describes as ‘the exposition of phenomenal knowledge’ (PhG GW 9:55). Here he develops a sophisticated account of epistemology, defending it against a wide range of sceptical, subjectivist and relativist views, and criticizing these internally on the basis of their own principles and definitions. Hegel begins his 1807 inquiry by rejecting a traditional view – common to empiricists but also shared by Kant – according to which knowledge is a kind of instrument or medium by which we grasp reality. He argues that this view separates knowledge from reality, thus challenging our ability to truly know anything that actually is. We must therefore abandon these ‘useless ideas and expressions’ about knowledge as an instrument or medium and embrace a completely new approach. ‘The examination of knowing cannot take place other than by way of knowing. With this so-called instrument, examining it means nothing other than acquiring knowledge of it’ (Enc §10R). Thus, obtaining true knowledge presupposes being engaged in a process, just as learning to swim presupposes that we first ‘venture into the water’. In order to have ‘actual cognition of what there is in truth’ (PhG GW 9:53) we must plunge into the stream of consciousness and examine it as it appears to itself. Hence, the PhG traces the progression of consciousness in its restless search for true knowledge. Hegel takes us along the itinerary of a consciousness that, appearing on the scene in a simple form, makes strong claims to genuine knowledge only to find relative and partial cognitions. Thus one shape of consciousness must develop into an other which in turn, proving inadequate, evolves into a third and so on, until consciousness reaches knowledge without any residue of partiality. As such, thinking is able to grasp reality as it truly is, that is, to grasp it absolutely.

Hegel uses the term ‘knowing’ (Wissen) to emphasize the in-process, dynamic character of cognition. Like thinking, knowing is neither immediate nor does it remain fixed and unchanged. Knowing develops over time; it grows into what it becomes. It can be described as coming to know, a cumulative process that involves a full development and display of the concepts that express our cognitions. Knowing progresses and modifies itself as it explores and stirs deeper into its object. In the search for more adequate concepts, knowing constantly revises itself; it opposes its own previous formulations and overcomes them in more advanced concepts, thus revealing its dialectical nature.

Hegel’s PhG shows that the concepts we presuppose are not just subjective features of thinking. They are rather products of our human historical experience. By closing this work with Absolute Knowing, Hegel shows that we may have genuine knowledge of the world, a knowledge resulting from a long process of intensive ‘training and educating’ our thinking through our interactions with and within the world. Thinking comes to incorporate individual and collective experience – including specific outcomes of
practical applications of ideas and thoughts. Hence, our concepts reflect the world as it actually is by capturing not only the logical principles of thought but also the metaphysical principles of reality.

With this move Hegel goes beyond Kant, who argued that we can think but not know things-in-themselves, since they supply no intuitions for our concepts. Kant held that to cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility ... But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought. (KrV Bxxvi)

For Kant, then, not everything that I can think is a possible object of experience and thus a possible object of knowledge. And although all that I know has actual existence (concepts of the understanding have objective validity), not everything that exists or has real possibility can be known. Rejecting this view, Hegel maintains that the following are both true: (i) all objects of our knowledge actually exist – the thesis strongly defended by Kant (Critique of Judgement [KU] AA 5:401–4); and (ii) all existing objects can be known, the claim that Kant refuses to accept. Furthermore, Hegel holds that the sphere of (possible) knowing coincides with the sphere of thinking, that is, all we can think about can be known. And since there is no limit to the activity of thought, not only is thinking capable of exploring reality in its totality, but the flow of thought (driven by its inner dialectical momentum) leads us to true cognition of what is actual.

Hegel is not saying that we can always know the truth of everything we encounter in our thinking. Neither does he predict the course experience will actually take. Thought’s path is neither linear nor predetermined, but a dialectical progression; we discover it as we go along, learning from our failures. What counts as known or as knowable is revealed as thought examines itself in action, scrutinizing and correcting what it takes to be genuinely true at each stage of its development. One of the most valuable lessons of this process is that every concept that allegedly captures the truth of a particular separate experience is limited, partial and abstract. Yet to truly know is to grasp reality in its totality, namely as a rational whole of interrelated moments. Thus individual concepts must become increasingly encompassing in order to ‘match’ the true structure of reality and thus generate a true grasp of the world. Accordingly, even though the quest for ‘absolute knowing’ is the basic theme of PhG, it eventually becomes the focus of Hegel’s entire system. This is not just because such a ‘system of philosophical sciences’ treats a wide range of substantive epistemological issues. Hegel argues that the most adequate, complete account of absolute knowing is only attainable in form of an organized totality of cognitions constituting itself as system (die Wissenschaft). This system of knowledge develops from a kind of thinking that generates its categories internally and that – through self-criticism – overcomes its own limitations at each stage.

Reality, then, can be adequately and fully rendered in concepts. Such knowledge is the result of the whole process of philosophizing, which resembles a circle that presupposes its end (or its goal) but is actual only when completed (PhG GW 9:18). The important feature of knowledge that this circularity points to is that the very process (coming-to-be) of cognition is an integral part of the result reached. Thus comprehensive knowing involves not only the exploration (carried out in PhG) of the possibility of absolute knowing, but the actual grasp of this possibility as provided by the account of thought in and
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for itself. This investigation into the ‘pure’ structure of thinking is undertaken in WL. Yet knowledge results from internalization of the materials of our historical experience. Hence, the philosophical account of knowing must be validated in terms of thought’s manifold relations to natural and social givens. This is masterfully portrayed in the Encyclopaedia’s Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit.

The philosophical system hence represents the unfolding of a cognitive process that leads to a comprehensive and complete form of knowledge. At whatever stage philosophical inquiry may find itself, it is always a quest for absolute knowing. Consequently, concepts and ideas resulting from rational inquiry, however partial and inadequate at any given point in time, are only different ways of rendering reality intelligible through the medium of thought. The fact that concepts can capture the structures of nature and society (or that thinking can grasp the essence of reality) affirms the validity of the claim to absolute knowing, and also shows that the patterns of thought are patterns of reality as a whole. What thoughts and concepts reveal is the inherent rationality of the real, which is a distilled result of human social and historical experience. Thus Hegel’s epistemological realism is not just consistent with a social and historical account of human knowledge but is based on his ‘social ontology’ (a point stressed in Westphal, 2006a). The question of the possibility of absolute knowledge can be adequately discussed and answered only within the context of human development, namely in terms of an analysis of our experiences of the world through history. Grasping these experiences conceptually is how our thinking comes to match the world we are capable of knowing.

NOTE

1 This insistence on an equally dynamic nature of both thoughts and thinking takes Hegel beyond Frege, who distinguishes sharply between pure concepts and the contingencies of the mind that thinks them. Isolated from any contamination by the latter, Frege assumes thoughts and concepts to be unchanging and static.
The relation between mediation and immediacy is one of the keys to understanding Hegel's philosophical system. Hegel himself points to the second part of his *Science of Logic* (WL), that is, to the Doctrine of Essence, as to the place where this relation is developed in detail (WL GW 11:241–3; also 12:236–50). He also addresses this issue, from a variety of perspectives and for different theoretical purposes, in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Enc) §§20–4, 65–6; in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (PhG) GW 9:18–29, 64–73; in the 1825/6 Lectures on the History of Philosophy (VGPh₁); and in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1824 and 1827 (VRel₁₂₃). All of these treatments are applications of the relation between mediation and immediacy which Hegel conceives as universal categories.

Yet, in Hegel's systematic this distinction is not absolute; on the contrary, immediacy and mediation are the two moments of one and the same dialectical process. And 'although both moments appear to be distinct, neither of them may be absent and they form an inseparable combination' (Enc §12R). In this sense, nothing is purely immediate or purely mediated. Everything is at once both immediate and mediated.

This fundamental unity with its opposite is the essential characteristic of the notion of mediation, which Hegel develops in response to the doctrine of immediate certainty formulated by F. H. Jacobi. While Jacobi admits that reality is ultimately knowable, he denies, like Kant, that reality is rationally accessible. For Jacobi, the only medium through which reality can be known lies beyond reason: it is an intuition, which he interprets as a form of knowledge that does not require any mediation. Thus, knowledge of the ultimate reality involves a certainty that 'not only requires no proof, but downright excludes all proof' (*On the Doctrine of Spinoza* [Über die Lehre des Spinoza]), F. H. Jacobi Werke IV/1, p. 210). Furthermore, Jacobi conceives the mediation of thought as merely 'a serial progression . . . through conditioned conditions, where ‘something is mediated by an other’ (Enc §62R). From Hegel's point of view, this Jacobian position not only reduces
knowledge claims to absolute relativism, but also undermines the very idea of philosophy as search for truth. Hegel argues that Jacobi’s doctrine is based upon a misunderstanding of the mediating activity of thinking. Thought’s mediation is not external mediation. Instead of leading ‘from something conditioned to something else conditioned’ (ibid.) in an infinite regress, thinking transforms the conditioned into the self-conditioning and so discloses the infinite and unconditioned within the finite and conditioned. Likewise, true immediacy does not result from transcending mediation; it has its beginning in the subsumption or sublation of the mediation into a higher synthesis of mediations. True immediacy is thus nothing but perfected mediation (Enc §50R); what is immediate is a fully self-mediated content (Enc §74).

Hegel argues that the degree of truth and concreteness of various stages of immediacy depends upon the level of comprehensiveness of the mediations involved in grasping that immediacy. Imperfect or abstract mediation results in an immediacy which is only partially true; immediacy becomes entirely true only when fully mediated. In the Logic, for example, ‘being’ is comprehended in its truth only in the concreteness of the absolute idea; likewise, all other forms of immediacy achieve their true realization only as results of the entire process of development of the idea, that is, as fully mediated. Hence, Hegel argues that any starting point will be immediate if it is indeed posited by itself and not through something else. At the same time, any immediacy can be shown to be the result of mediation and thus to have developed through its relation to an other than itself. This clarifies two meanings of Hegel’s use of ‘immediacy’: first, ‘simple immediacy’ refers to utter lack of mediation, or to the merely implicit character of an as yet unrecognized mediation; second, ‘mediated immediacy’ refers to immediacy into which mediation has been sublated. For example, the category of pure being or being in general is immediate in the first way, while being that is elevated onto the stage of the absolute idea is immediate in the second way. The former signifies an undetermined, original and simple beginning proper (WL GW 12:252); the latter is being that has ‘turned back into itself’ (WL GW 11:251), a process that restores it not in its original immediacy but in an immediacy that has been determined through this process. Hegel warns that, however much we may think of immediacy in its purity, unmediated immediacy is impossible. Similarly, it is meaningless to think of mediation without immediacy as its moment. Not only does everything in the world contain ‘just as much immediacy as mediation’, but the two determinations cannot be separated because ‘the opposition between them [is] nothing real’ (WL GW 21:54). The contrast between mediation and immediacy is itself an opposition that requires mediation, a relation which Hegel understands as ‘self-moving self-identity’ or ‘simple becoming’ (PhG GW 9:19).

Hegel uses ‘mediation’ to refer to both a process and its result. Process and result are not only connected but actually inseparable: in Hegel’s system, every result necessarily includes the process leading up to it. From the perspective of simpler stages of immediacy, mediation appears as an external relation among otherwise independent phenomena. In reality, however, mediation expresses the crucial interconnection of phenomena which themselves have significance only as parts of a comprehensive whole. Thus thought’s mediating process is a progression towards ever greater determinateness and concreteness; it is the development of an integrated unity of opposites which exists for itself.
Considered in this context, immediacy and mediation are the two aspects of the same dialectical process of transition from what is simply immediate (abstract) to what is mediated (concrete) and eventually to the unity of both. This is the dialectical movement of overreaching (übergreifen) and sublating (aufheben) the opposition of mediation and immediacy, and their joining together (zusammenmenschliessen) into a whole. In the Logic, Hegel describes this movement in terms of cognitive activity. It is a complex movement of thinking that proceeds through two complementary phases: (i) from the abstract positing of the object to grasping it as a concrete totality; and (ii) from the concept of the latter as a unity to that of its inner differentiation, and back again to the concept of its unity.

Thinking begins with abstract concepts that appear, as Hegel puts it, in their ‘immediate universality’ (WL GW 12:239). Yet thought always refers to an other, something it posits as mediated. Once thinking becomes aware of the mediated nature of being, it renounces all pretensions of immediacy and universality and searches for ‘the determinate content’ (WL GW 12:240) it lacked in the beginning. This is the meaning of the dialectic from abstract to concrete that inheres in the activity of thinking. Hegel points out that ‘the immediate character of the beginning must be a lack inherent in the beginning itself, which must be endowed with the impulse to carry itself further’ (ibid.). This, however, should not be interpreted as saying that concreteness and determination are wholly present in what is immediate. Concepts that are concrete totalities emerge for Hegel only at the end of a cognitive process that renders the immediate concrete by apprehending its mediations. This is why a concrete concept must be understood as result of the process leading up to it. This process presents the first phase of the dialectic of immediacy and mediation, which for Hegel essentially coincides with the dialectical progression of cognition itself.

Hegel’s discussion of the second phase of the dialectical process emphasizes the significance and power of negativity in thinking. He shows that thinking is not exclusively an affirmative activity. It is negative as well. Its negative function is to transform, that is, to conceptually comprehend, the immediately given. As such, thinking synthesizes in its negation (Cunningham, 2001, pp. 35–7). Its main task is to affirm the complex interrelatedness of phenomena and to grasp their identity in difference. This twofold ‘mission’ of thought is accomplished through the double function of negation. It first denies the abstract and affirms the concrete. As (first) negation, thought leads us from the apparent immediacy of a concrete totality, through its relation to (or mediation by) an other, to the essential differentiation among its elements. Considered ‘from this negative side’, Hegel explains, ‘the immediate has perished in the other’; yet the ‘negative of the immediate’, which is ‘determined as the mediated – contains as such the determination of the first in it’ (WL GW 12:244–5). As a result, difference – absent in the first immediacy but implicitly contained in the (mediated) second immediacy – is introduced. Yet this difference is a relation that presupposes a unity and can be comprehended only through the further, second negation that pertains to the moment of sublation. The latter is the process by which mediation is overcome and immediacy restored – not any longer as abstract and undetermined but now as a determinate, concrete or mediated immediacy, which ‘has rejoined itself’ through the encounter with and the sublation of difference (WL GW 12:248). This, for Hegel, is
the positive ‘turning point’ of thinking that ‘returns at the same time back into itself’ (WL GW 12:247).

Thus, the relation of immediacy and mediation is not a dyadic opposition, but a triad: initial or simple immediacy, mediation and mediated immediacy. This pattern repeats itself, so that the mediated immediacy that synthesizes one triad becomes the initial immediacy of the next (see Inwood, 1992, p. 184). Immediacy and mediation are therefore mutually complementary ways of comprehending objective reality. Everything simply immediate is indefinite and partial; making it definite and complete necessitates its subjection to a process of mediation. In this sense, mediation is the process by which objectivity comes to be what it is.
The theme of truth in Hegel is normally developed in terms of a contrast, which should not be immediately construed as an opposition, between truth as ‘coherence’ and as ‘conformity’. This is a fair way of doing it – provided, however, that ‘coherence’ and ‘conformity’ are given due historical weight, and for this, one must turn to the tradition.

When Kant famously declared that in pursuit of truth one should not ask whether our subjective representations of objects conform to these objects, but whether, on the contrary, the objects conform to the representations; or again, when he said that in the objects one should look for what we have put into them in the first place (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] Bxiii–xiv), he was indeed, on the face of it, turning long-held assumptions about the nature of truth upside down. But there was a deeper sense in which he was reasserting against the empiricism of the contemporary popular philosophy an even longer standing and certainly more authoritative element of the tradition. This was the element expressed by the well-known scholastic sentence that truth is said in two ways – one according to the conformity of the (human) mind to things, and a second according to the conformity of the latter to God’s concept of them (Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae Art. 1).

The point being made was that, in questions of truth, the ‘conformity’ at issue was more than just a psychological adequation of the mind to things but rather the mind’s recognition in the things of what made them what they were, namely God’s creative concept of them. It was this concept that provided the norm of their being, and the recognition of this norm in them was what made any discourse about them internally intelligible and, therefore, recognizably conform to the things. Truth is normative: this is the insight that Kant was retrieving from the tradition in opposition to any facile form of empiricism. Of course, since Kant now denied the possibility of seeing things from God’s point of view – from ‘inside–out’, so to speak – but restricted human cognition to the external observation of objects as given in experience, the required norm had to be of a different kind. At issue now was what counted as a recognizably given object of experience. In effect, Kant had replaced the traditional metaphysics of being, which he now dubbed ‘dogmatic’, with a logic of empirical discovery. There was nothing necessarily incompatible between the two, except for one extra move that Kant had made. This was his critical move. In denying, as he did, that we do not know things as they are ‘in themselves’ – that is, as God or anyone equipped with
intellectual intuition would hypothetically see them – he was thereby retaining this God’s view of them, albeit impossible to us, as the ultimate norm of truth, and, by contrast, also downgrading the value of whatever truth can be obtained through experience alone. This made his logic ‘transcendental’ in the sense that, while establishing a priori norms of truth, it restricted the latter ex hypothesi to the merely phenomenal. Now Hegel rejected Kant’s unknown ‘thing in itself’ as mere fiction. But by thereby reclaiming for experience the possibility of unqualified truth, he was also marking the return from ‘transcendental logic’ to ‘logic of being’. The question is how he could make this return without at the same time reverting to dogmatic metaphysics or – it amounts to the same thing – without laying claim to intellectual intuition. One thing is certain. If Hegel’s use of ‘coherence’ is understood materially, as it was by McTaggart (1910, pp. 209, 232) – if, according to Hegel, it should be in principle possible to arrive at a representation of reality in which everything (Krug’s famous writing pen included) would cohere with everything else, Hegel would be marking indeed a singularly naïve return to pre-Kantian dogmatism.

(B) Hegel’s return to a logic of being was historically complicated in the making; conceptually, however, very simple. Kant had assigned to human reason the reflective function of generating ideal constructs that would bring to completion the unity and totality of experience which, though intended in the representation of objects at the immediate level of experience, could not ex hypothesi be realized there. This reflective function of reason generated, and also satisfied, the norms of meaning that God’s concepts supplied in dogmatic metaphysics; in Kant’s new critical context, however, both the norms and their satisfaction had to remain subjective. Hegel’s move was simply a matter of redefining the scope of this unity and totality. If it was the case, as Kant had claimed, that in experience the subject must recognize in an object what it has put into it in the first place, then the only reliable guarantee that, in determining the object, the subject does more than just impose upon it arbitrary norms of being recognizably given – or again, that the required recognition is more than just a self-mirroring – is that the object itself actively confirms the truth of what the subject has put into it. In other words, the object must be itself a subject – the two, subject and object, interlocutors in a discourse on what ought to count as truly real (Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG] GW 9:134).

It followed that the unity and totality sought in experience was not to be modelled after the cosmogonic image of a God establishing laws for a physical universe, but after the image of a linguistic community establishing the possibility of both raising and answering questions about truth in the medium of precisely its language – a language for which what counts most, according to its underlying motivation, is its coherence as language. In the imagery of the tradition, which Hegel was in fact demythologizing, God is to be thought, not as a transcendent physical cause of the cosmos, but first and foremost as Spirit (PhG GW 9:351–2). His creative act was essentially a matter of entering into discourse with the human being.

Hegel’s move consisted in replacing Kant’s ‘thing in itself’, the intuition of which would have satisfied in Kant’s system the interests of both practical and theoretical reason, with the works of Spirit. That is, he replaced it with products such as those of art, religion and philosophy, all of them social in nature and, though themselves, no less than Kant’s noumena, ‘beings of reason’, all none the less
amenable, unlike Kant’s, to both historical observation and historical testing. The search for unity and totality that motivates all experience was now interpreted by Hegel as an at least implicit attempt on the part of the experiencing subject at transforming what would otherwise be a merely given nature into a human universe of meaning within which the subject would feel at home. This was no arbitrary move by Hegel but the logical extension of the insight that had been behind Kant’s critical turn, namely that knowledge is essentially a matter of satisfying conditions of self-recognition. Equally so, Hegel’s denial of intellectual intuition was not simply a matter of admitting that such an intuition is for us impossible, but of excluding it, even as hypothesis, as relevant to experience (PhG GW 9:12,14). For if available, it would remove from the latter precisely the distance between subject and object that opens up the possibility of the one recognizing itself in the other. It would mark, not the achievement of experience, but its relapse, into unconscious nature.

Accordingly, the Phenomenology, in which Hegel develops his model of experience, is structured in the shape of a discourse whose two principal interlocutors are, on the one side, historical consciousness, and, on the other, a reflective subject (the philosophical ‘we’ of the Introduction) who, motivated by the belief that science is possible, performs with respect to the other a twofold task (PhG GW 9:12). It questions the various norms of truth that historical consciousness has assumed in the course of time, and it also takes stock of the changes undergone by these norms as historical consciousness, in order to avoid the contradictions that it found itself incurring on any given assumption, instinctively shifted to another. Historical consciousness does this shifting more or less deliberately but always forgetting that the adopted new norms are not immediately given but the result rather of a previous experience. The task of the philosophical ‘we’ is to bring this fact back to memory: recognition in experience is a process of remembrance. At the conclusion of the Phenomenology, where religion, art and the concept itself (the subject matter of philosophy) come under reflective scrutiny, what is remembered is that this concept’s reflective structure originally gave rise to the search for self-identity which the religious community seeks to satisfy in concreto but philosophy alone, in the medium of the concept abstracted by itself, is capable of comprehending.

(C) Hegel’s reform of Kant thus consisted in adding to the latter’s transcendental subject of experience a socio-historical dimension. The question is whether, while thus avoiding Kant’s formalism – historically, the source of renewed scepticism – Hegel had opened up the way for a historicism which, on issues of truth, would necessarily result in cultural relativism. Two constraints were there to prevent this slide. The first was logical. Hegel’s objection to Kant’s categories was not that they were, as Kant himself had said, a priori determinations of the concept of an object in general, but that, as such, they were neither methodically derived nor complete. Therefore, they could give the impression that they were merely subjective and in need of an external material to which they had to be applied. Rather, just the like the syntax of a language which specifies the limits of what the latter can say without itself saying anything directly – its only object (its content) being the language itself – so Hegel’s logic is thought reflectively determining the limits of a universe of meaning (PhG GW 9:40–2). It is not itself a particular science of being but the measure rather of the kind of truth
that can be attained in any such science: it is the concept of the concept of being. It is therefore in principle possible for Hegel to pass judgement on the extent to which any community, in its language about itself and its world, has abided by this measure. The *Phenomenology* is a parade of precisely such judgements.

The second constraint comes from nature. It is indeed the case that for Hegel nature becomes humanly significant only to the extent that it is implicated in the activities of an experiencing subject. In this sense, reason has ultimate power over nature – in the sense, that is, that the face that nature acquires for the subject depends on the judgement that the latter passes about its own identity. But, while there is latitude of choice in this judgement, there is none for the natural consequences that follow from the behaviour conditioned by it, and these might well involve issues of life and death (*PhG GW* 9:111–12). These consequences are historically ascertainable and, as a matter of fact, have also been the catalyst in history for new *prises de conscience* on the part of the historical subject. The *Phenomenology* is a record of such changes.
Spirit is *Geist*, but *Geist* is often more appropriately translated as ‘mind’. *Geist* originally meant ‘emotion, excitement’ but later accumulated a wide range of meanings, partly under the influence of similar foreign words, such as the Latin *spiritus*, the Greek *pneuma* and *nous* and the French *esprit*. Among its current meanings are: ‘mind, intellect’; our spiritual aspect, in contrast to the flesh or body; the holy spirit; a spirit, demon or ‘ghost’ (an etymological relative); vivacity, (high) spirits; the mentality, spirit, genius, temper of an age, a people, Christianity, etc.; the inner meaning or spirit of, for example, a law, in contrast to its letter. Kant used the word sparingly and primarily in the sense of ‘vivacity’. It is what enlivens the mind. It animates a conversation or a work of art and enables the artist to present ‘aesthetic ideas’ (Critique of Judgement [KU] AA 5:314), to capture the ‘quickly passing play of the imagination’ and pass it on to others (KU AA 5:317; Anth AA 7:224–5). But *Geist* is Hegel’s most general word for ‘mind’, replacing Kant’s favoured word, *Gemüth*, which Hegel uses for the emotional aspect of the mind. In Hegel *Geist* takes various forms. It is:

(i) Humanity and its products, in contrast to logical forms and nature. Thus, part three of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Enc) contains the philosophy of *Geist*.

(ii) ‘Subjective spirit’, including all individual psychological life, ranging from ‘natural soul’ to thinking and will (Enc §§387–482).

(iii) Intellectual aspects of the mind, ranging from intuition to thinking and the will, and including the ‘phenomenology of spirit’ (Enc §§413–39), which considers consciousness of objects, but excluding the ‘soul’, which is aware of its own sensations but not of external objects (Enc §§440–82). (The 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* [PhG] covers much of the same ground, but tends to reserve *Geist* for the collective rather than the individual mind, that is, for ‘this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: I that is We and We that is I’ [PhG GW 9:108].)

(iv) ‘Objective spirit’: the shared spirit of a social group embodied in its customs, laws and institutions, and pervading the character and consciousness of the members of the group. It is the objectification of subjective *Geist* (Enc §§483–552).

(v) ‘Absolute spirit’, embodied in art, religion and philosophy (Enc §§553–77). It is
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‘infinite’, both because spirit is now ‘for’ itself, its own object, and because it reflects upon what is other than, and thus limits or restricts, spirit (Enc §§386, 386A, 563–4). (ii), (iv) and (v) are respectively the concept of spirit, its reality and the unity of concept and reality (Enc §385). Absolute spirit has a theological dimension: spirit that is for spirit is God, and so absolute spirit is the self-consciousness of God. It is ‘absolute’ also in the sense that it is relatively detached from the social life of any particular community.

(vi) ‘World-spirit’ (Weltgeist). In the seventeenth century this was the ‘worldly’ spirit, in contrast to the divine spirit. Then it became (e.g. in Thomasius) a cosmic spirit or world-soul pervading the whole of nature. Finally, in Herder and Hegel, it becomes spirit governing the rational, coherent unfolding of history, determining the rise and fall of nations. It usually falls under the heading of ‘right’ or ‘objective spirit’ (Philosophy of Right [RPh] §§341–60; Enc §549), but it also governs the development of art, religion and philosophy, and thus of absolute spirit.

(vii) The ‘spirit of a/the people’ (Volksgeist). This is similar to (iv), but it also includes a people’s contribution to (v). Unlike (iv), it also occurs in the plural and so is more readily seen as relative and transitory: the world-spirit actualizes itself in a people (e.g. the Greeks), develops its spirit fully and then withdraws from it and passes on to another people (e.g. the Romans). A Volksgeist outlasts its retreat from the centre of the world-stage, but it remains fairly static and makes no further decisive contribution to world-history.

(viii) The ‘spirit of the age’ (Geist der Zeit): the shared mentality, social life and cultural products of the times, especially within a single people. Individuals are imbued with this spirit and cannot ‘leap beyond’ their time.

(ix) In general, God is spirit. But the ‘holy spirit’ that pours forth from God and inspires humanity is the third person of the Trinity. For Hegel, spirit is immanent in the Christian community and is God’s self-consciousness, the religious analogue of Geist as a whole, in contrast to logic and nature.

Hegel views these as systematically related phases of a single, developing Geist, not as different senses of the word Geist. Geist develops because it is pure activity, not a static ‘thing’; it takes over, both cognitively and practically, what is other than itself, nature as well as lower levels of Geist, and realizes itself in them; it advances to a higher stage primarily by reflecting on its current stage. Since it is activity and, as truly infinite, embraces the finite, it does not transcend worldly phenomena and is hard to distinguish from their logical structure. Hegel’s claim that Geist is ‘the absolute’ does not mean that everything is mental or the product of our own minds. It means that the unified system of thoughts that form the core of the (subjective) mind are also immanent in nature and in the development of Geist itself, and also that spirit ‘overreaches’ and ‘idealizes’ what is other than spirit, making it its own by its cognitive and practical endeavours.

Bewusst, ‘conscious’, was a technical term in psychology and philosophy from the eighteenth century on. Bewusstsein, ‘consciousness’, was coined by Wolff from bewusst and tended to replace Leibniz’s Apperzeption, though this still occurs in Kant alongside Bewusstsein. In Hegel it also denotes the conscious subject. It is used not to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness, but to indicate intentional consciousness, consciousness of objects conceived as distinct from the subject. Hence it is not applied to the thinking of logicians, since the thoughts they study are not conceived as distinct from...
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the thinking subject. (Nor is it applied to animals, which are assumed to lack proper consciousness of objects.) It is thus narrower than Geist and, unlike Geist, applies primarily to an individual subject. Bewusst is cognate with wissen (‘to know’) and Wissen (‘knowledge’) and so Hegel often uses Wissen more or less interchangeably with Bewusstsein. (It also explains his disconcerting tendency, in RPh, to imply that knowledge may be false.) It is also cognate with gewiss, ‘certain’ and so Gewissheit (‘certainty’) is closely associated with bewusst and Bewusstsein.

In eighteenth-century psychology and philosophy Selbstbewusstsein was usually knowledge of one’s own changing conscious states and of processes occurring in oneself. It included awareness of one’s own ‘I’ or self as the unitary bearer of states and processes, despite the succession of its varying experiences and objects, from which the ‘I’ distinguishes itself as a subject persisting identically throughout the changes in its objects. However, Kant argued that Selbstbewusstsein, ‘self-consciousness’, is not independent of the character of my experience. My intuitions must, if they are to be my experiences and of objects distinct from myself, be ‘synthesized’ in accordance with such categories as causality (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] A107/B144), a synthesis conducted by the ‘I’ itself. This, and the Neoplatonists’ and Böhme’s doctrine that the self and world are reciprocally related and knowledge of the one affords knowledge of the other, led Hegel to conceive the self as pervading and embracing its objects, not as sharply distinct from them. But his use of selbstbewusst and Selbstbewusstsein is also influenced by their colloquial sense, ‘self-assured, -confident’, etc. Bewusstsein itself is self-conscious in that it ‘is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth’ (PhG GW 9:59). But it conceives its object as distinct from the self, and treats the self as co-ordinate with the object, conceptualized in the same or correlative terms. Selbstbewusstsein is sometimes associated with Selbstgewissheit, ‘self-certainty’ (e.g. PhG GW 9:103), a primitive version of self-consciousness, somewhat akin to self-centredness.

In PhG and in the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology consciousness is ‘appearing’ (erscheinend), that is, not illusory, but displaying and depending on an object distinct from itself, in contrast to the ‘soul’ (in Enc, but not PhG), which has no distinct object, and to reason and spirit, which overcome the object’s otherness. Consciousness successively assumes three forms or ‘shapes’ (Gestalten): sensory certainty (immediate knowledge of sensory individuals which it refers or points to); perception (mediated knowledge of perceptible things with properties); and understanding (knowledge of things as expressions of force and as appearance governed by laws). Consciousness’s awareness of a discrepancy between itself and its object promotes it to a new form, whose object is the previous form of consciousness. For example, sensory certainty denotes its putatively individual objects in universal terms such as ‘this’, ‘here’ and ‘now’; universals become the explicitly universal properties of a thing, the object of the next form. But no form of consciousness knows that it arises in this way. Only ‘we’ philosophers know that.

The advance to self-consciousness occurs when consciousness as understanding deploys conceptions involving a ‘distinction which is no distinction’ (such as negative and positive electricity and magnetic poles): it sees that the inner essence of things, conceptualized in terms of a vanishing distinction,
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is its own product, and that the concept of such a distinction applies to its own relation to its object. This gives the simplest form of self-consciousness: the ‘I’ is conscious of the ‘I’ itself. (Hegel mentions ‘the motionless tautology of: I am I’ \(PhG\ GW 9:104\) a formula especially associated with Fichte and expressing one’s withdrawal from all one’s characteristics and objects apart from one’s bare self.) But this self-conscious ‘I’ is vanishingly thin and overwhelmed by the external world, the objects of consciousness. It therefore adopts a sequence of manoeuvres both to remove the alien otherness of external objects and to acquire content for itself. These manoeuvres are more practical than cognitive and none of them is successful: desire (an endless process of consuming sensory objects); a combat for recognition from another self-consciousness, culminating in the enslavement of the vanquished by the victor; in the combat the victor displays and confirms his self-consciousness, his bare self-awareness in contrast to the contingencies of life, by risking death, and subsequently the defeated slave derives a similar advantage from fear of death at the hands of his master. In the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology this episode is followed by a direct advance to universal self-consciousness, the mutual recognition of self-conscious individuals co-existing in an ethical community, but in \(PhG\) the quest for full self-consciousness leads to further unsuccessful attempts to attain it: disregarding external objects (Stoicism), denying their existence (scepticism) and projecting the essential features of oneself and the world into a transcendent world (unhappy consciousness). The advance of self-consciousness does not stop there. Hegel proceeds to reason, the unification of consciousness (knowledge of objects seen as other than myself) and self-consciousness (knowledge of myself seen as other than the objects): reason regards the determinations of the self as also inhering in the object. In fact self-consciousness advances both throughout history and throughout Hegel’s own system, which is, in his view, the culmination of human self-consciousness.

Hegel’s account of self-consciousness is, among other things, an attempt to explain humanity’s emergence from the state of nature, which Hegel, like Hobbes, regarded as unsocial and barbaric. But it is also an attempt to repair a deficiency in Kant’s \(KrV\): his neglect of the relationship between myself and others. Other people are needed for at least two reasons. First, other people impose moral constraints on me and thereby ensure that I cannot and should not simply fulfil my own desires; I am thereby liberated from my desires and achieve a peculiarly human freedom. Secondly, other people ensure that the world I inhabit is not simply my world, conforming exactly to my view of it and to my desires and emotions, but an objective world about which I may be in part ignorant or mistaken, a world that is susceptible to the different views and responses of different people. Others correct my tendency to regard the world as my world by informing me of aspects of it of which I would otherwise be unaware and by expressing attitudes towards it that conflict with my own. Hence recognition (Anerkennung) involves not only recognizing others as people, but also acknowledging and respecting them. Like his contemporaries, Hegel is more inclined to bring other people into explicit consideration in dealing with ethical matters than theoretical or cognitive matters, but the importance of other people for drawing a distinction between myself and the world around me, and thus becoming a properly self-conscious rather than a merely self-centred human being, pervades his writings.
In his early theological writings, Hegel downgrades reason, understanding and concepts in favour of concrete phenomena, such as life and love, which he supposed to be resistant to conceptual investigation. Later, however, he does not reject the abstract for immersion in the concrete, but works his way from the abstract to the concrete. Central to this enterprise are Vernunft ‘(the faculty of) reason’, and Verstand, ‘(the faculty of) understanding, intellect’. The distinction between two intellectual faculties goes back at least to Plato’s contrast between dianoia (‘discursive reason’) and nous (‘mind, intellect’) or noesis (‘thinking, the activity of nous’); dianoia lies between sense-perception and nous, and it deals with mathematics, while the more intuitive nous brings us into contact with the intelligible realm of ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’. In Plato’s successors nous continued to be regarded as the higher faculty and is often attributed to God or the gods, while the lower, ratiocinative faculty is peculiar to humans, though sometimes ascribed to other animals. The distinction entered mediaeval thought by way of Boethius and others, with the more intuitive intellectus or intelligentia as the higher faculty and the more discursive ratio or ratiocinatio as the lower. They retained the same relative positions when Eckhart and other mystics translated intellectus as Verstand and ratio as Vernunft. Vernunft conceptualizes now sensory material, while Verstand gains intuitive knowledge of God. But Enlightenment thinkers, such as Christian Wolff, began to reverse their positions. For them, Verstand is still more intuitive than Vernunft, but it no longer provides supersensory knowledge; it is the ‘faculty of distinctly representing the possible’ (Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott §277) which deals with concepts and their application to sensory material. Vernunft remains associated with inference as the ‘faculty of seeing into the connexion of truths’ (ibid., §368). For Kant, Verstand is still the faculty of concepts and judgements, while Vernunft deals with inferences. But Vernunft also transcends experience to generate ‘ideas’ and metaphysical concepts; it reflects on the knowledge acquired by Verstand and tries to make it a self-enclosed whole, thereby transgressing the limits that reason itself sets for the understanding.

Hegel’s (and Schelling’s) conception of the distinction was most directly influenced by Kant. But other thinkers helped to shape the concepts. According to Goethe, Verstand solves specific, small-scale problems, while Vernunft surveys and reconciles opposites; Verstand is concerned with being and with keeping things as they are for practical purposes, while Vernunft is concerned

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with becoming and development. Hegel and Schelling are also close to Schiller, when he writes that ‘nature (sense) unites everywhere, the understanding separates everywhere, but reason unites again’ (On the Aesthetic Education of Man [Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen], Letter XIX). The essence of Verstand is clarity without depth. It defines and fixes contrasting pairs of concepts such as finitude and infinity, thereby isolating them from each other. In the hands of Wolff and Kant, the ideal of the understanding is to assign to every word a clear and stable meaning, sharply demarcated from the meaning of every other word. The understanding aims (as Fichte said) at a ‘fixed terminology – the easiest way for literalists to rob a system of its spirit and transform it into a dry skeleton’ (Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre]); it is oblivious to the permutations that words undergo both historically and in the course of an argument, as well as to the intrusion of colloquial uses of terms into their philosophical uses. It produces clear analyses and deductive arguments. It is thus linked with concepts in the traditional sense, not with the Hegelian concept which flows over into other concepts and generates its own instantiations. Its products are abstractions in the sense that they are abstracted, or isolated, from other concepts. Nevertheless, the work of the understanding is an essential first stage in logic and in philosophy in general. We cannot, as F. H. Jacobi (who regarded Vernunft as a ‘sense for the supersensory’) and occasionally Schelling supposed, advance directly to the truths of reason without a preliminary understanding of the subject matter (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [Enc] §80).

The second stage is that of negative reason or dialectic. This exposes the contradictions implicit in the abstractions of the understanding and also the tendency of opposites to veer into each other when they reach their extreme points (Enc §81). The concepts of finitude and infinity exemplify this. If God is regarded as infinite and quite distinct from the finite world, then God becomes finite, since he is bounded by the finite world. Hegel is equally discontented with the other conception of infinity, that of an infinite series that will never come to an end: in proceeding through the series, we will only ever have traversed a finite segment of it, never infinity itself, and so this type of infinity turns out to be finite as well (Enc §§94–5).

The third final stage is speculative or positive reason. This derives a positive result from the collapse of understanding’s abstractions (Enc §82). The ‘bad’ infinity of the understanding, for example, is supplanted by the ‘true’ infinity of reason, an infinity that includes the finite rather than excluding it, an infinity that comes round in a circle rather than proceeding in a straight line. Such a resolution is conceived as the ‘negation of the negation’, the restoration of the initial affirmation on a higher level. The new affirmation in turn reveals contradictions and thus forms the starting point for a repeated application of the same pattern.

Hegel’s thought invariably proceeds in this way. He does not, however, regard understanding and reason simply as ways in which we think about concepts and things. They are, rather, intrinsic to the concepts and things themselves. The philosopher simply watches as they reveal their contradictions and reach a suitable resolution. At the beginning of the Logic, for example, pure being is said to become nothing, and nothing to become being, an oscillation that is resolved by subsiding into the stability of determinate being or ‘being-there’ (Daseyn) (Enc §§86–9). The repetition of this three-step process eventually
leads to the ‘absolute idea’ (Enc §§236–44),
the climax of the Logic. This is followed by
a different (and problematic) type of transition
to the simplest phase of nature, namely
space and then time (Enc §§254–61), whose
initial independence of each other is resolved
by the introduction of bodies in motion. The
progression of the Philosophy of Nature,
like that of the Logic, does not represent a
historical development, since nature has no
history, but is repetitive and cyclical. Space,
time and motion, for example, do not follow
each other in time; their relations are logical
rather than temporal.

However, in the realm of mind or spirit logi-
cal relations sometimes, though not invari-
ably, coincide with temporal relations, both in
the life of an individual and over the course
of history. In particular, Hegel’s lectures on
world history, on religion and on the history
of philosophy survey a historical as well as a
logical progression. The Roman Empire, for
example, was a product of the understand-
ing, characterized by a sharp separation from
each other of citizens and institutions, which
eventually led to its downfall (negative rea-
son), while speculative reason reared a new
order, mediaeval Europe, on the ruins of the
old order. This new order later matures into
a stage of understanding and thus forms the
starting point of a further process of dialecti-
cal dissolution and speculative restoration.

Hegel’s belief that reason and understand-
ing are not simply features of our thought
about things, but are also embedded in
things and events themselves, is part of his
systematic extension of concepts tradition-
ally applied to our thought and discourse
(such as truth, judgement, inference, con-
cept and contradiction) to the objective
realm as well: things, as well as thoughts,
may be inferential, true, etc. This is an essen-
tial aspect of his idealism, of his attempt to
overcome the dichotomy (itself a product of
the understanding) between subjectivity and
objectivity. Thus he regards the processes and
hierarchies of nature and spirit as governed
by an immanent understanding and reason
that is analogous to the understanding and
reason of the human mind.

Hegel sometimes speaks of ‘reason’ with-
out any immediate contrast to ‘understand-
ing’, especially in his account of history. ‘If
you look at history rationally,’ he said, ‘it
will look rationally back at you’ (Berliner
Antrittsrede 1818, GW 18:20). In itself this
could mean that history will appear rational,
if we look at it in an appropriately rational
way, even if it is not intrinsically rational. But
Hegel is more likely to mean that the philo-
sophical historian’s rational gaze discerns
the intrinsic rationality of history, and does
not simply impose rationality upon it. He
speaks of the ‘cunning of reason’, whereby
the ‘world-spirit’ utilizes the passions of
individuals, especially of ‘world-historical
individuals’ (such as Alexander the Great,
Julius Caesar and Napoleon), who are only
dimly aware of their historic purpose, in
order to bring about a new epoch, embody-
ing a new and higher stage of spirit, of free-
dom and self-consciousness. In the Preface to
the Philosophy of Right (RPh) Hegel wrote
in a similar vein: ‘What is rational is actual
and what actual is rational’. In Enc §6 he
explains that he does not mean that every-
thing is rational. For not everything is actual.
Contingent entities, such as brain-waves,
error, evil and anything that is ‘wilted and
transient’, do not count as ‘actual’ but rather
as ‘appearance’; in fact only God is ‘genuinely
actual’. ‘Rationality’ here combines a variety
of senses. It has a theological sense: God or
the world-spirit utilizes unplanned contin-
gencies in order to fulfil its overall purpose,
in something like the way that a human agent
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does. But ‘rationality’ also has an ontological sense, namely that things are structured in accordance with the concepts of logic; an epistemological sense, that things and events are intelligible; and an evaluative sense, that things are reasonable and conform to rational standards. The doctrine implies that we should not criticize present or past actuality or recommend changes in it, but attempt to discern its intelligibility, necessity and justification. Our ideas and proposals are inevitably superficial in comparison to the deep rationality embedded in the nature of things. Hegel does not, however, provide any clear criterion for distinguishing the actual from the merely apparent.

Verstand and Vernunft also occur, without any immediate reference to each other, in PhG. In chapter three (Force and Understanding, Appearance and Supersensory World), understanding contrasts not so much with reason as with sensory certainty and perception, the themes of chapters one and two respectively. While sensory certainty simply picks out items in its environment, and perception encounters unitary ‘things’ with a diversity of ‘properties’, understanding attempts to explain the diversity of perceptible ‘appearance’ by the law-governed interplay of forces underlying it. In chapters one and two, the self or ‘subject’ plays a prominent part in the dialectic, but in chapter three the understanding itself does not intrude into the play of forces and the laws governing them, until eventually it realizes that the ‘inner’ that it postulates behind appearance is simply the reflection of itself. This discovery supplies a precarious transition to the theme of chapter four, Self Consciousness, and this is followed by chapter five, on Reason. There are at least two reasons why understanding and reason are assigned their respective positions. First, chapter three deals with the physical science of Hegel’s time, which he assumed to be largely the work of the understanding, whereas chapter five deals with phenomena such as life, psychology and morality, which tend to resist the finite categories of the understanding, but not those of reason. Secondly, whereas understanding attempts to keep itself at a distance from the laws and forces that it postulates, reason explicitly aims to assimilate reality to itself by imposing its thoughts on it. Here too understanding tends to separate, while reason brings subject and object together: ‘Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality’ (PhG GW 9:133).

The contrast between reason and understanding shapes Hegel’s overall approach to philosophy. A question raised by his contemporary, G. E. Schulze, was: Given that there are so many competing, but seemingly internally coherent philosophies, how can one decide which to adopt? Schulze’s answer, like that of the ancient sceptics he so admired, was that one should suspend judgement. As mentioned in Chapter 14, Hegel compares to refusing to eat particular fruits because none of them is fruit as such (Enc §13). Hegel’s considered answer, however, is that to adopt one philosophy (such as idealism) in preference to its competitors (such as realism) is to succumb to the one-sided ‘dogmatism’ of the understanding. Mutually contradictory philosophies display, to negative reason, internal incoherencies that can only be resolved by positive reason, that is, by ‘sublating’ both philosophies into a higher combination of the two. There is, therefore, ‘only one philosophy at diverse stages of its formation, and . . . the particular principles on which each system is grounded one by one are only branches of one and the same whole’ (Enc §13).
In the *Encyclopaedia* Science of Logic, Hegel claims that the concept of the ‘true’ infinite (*wahre Unendlichkeit*) is the ‘fundamental concept of philosophy’, and that the notion of the ‘ideality of the finite’ is ‘a fundamental proposition’ of all true philosophy (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* [Enc] §95R, my emphasis). These qualifications of the infinite as ‘true’ and of the finite as ‘ideal’ arise from Hegel’s dialectical-speculative re-thinking of the problem of the relation between the finite and the infinite – a problem that had extensively occupied traditional logic and metaphysics. From early on, Hegel draws the reflection on this relation to the centre of his philosophical project. His dialectic finds here its birthplace. At stake is the possibility of thinking the finite and the infinite not as original, irreconcilable terms dualistically opposed to each other but as terms that are themselves made possible by the dynamic relation of unity that encompasses both. For, it is this unity that guides and determines the development of their interaction, namely, on the one hand, the movement of self-transcendence and self-overcoming whereby the finite becomes ideal, and on the other, the realization process in which the infinite becomes actual and attains truth.

The problem of thinking the finite and the infinite in a non-dualistic relation is pervasive in Hegel’s philosophy and orients his confrontation with the historical tradition (Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza’s reflection on the infinite, Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy and the contemporary post-Kantian debate). This problem constitutes the specificity of Hegel’s dialectical-speculative logic against the shortcomings of the ‘logic of the understanding’ (*Verstandeslogik*); it orients his criticism of Kant’s merely antinomic dialectic of the finitude/infinity of the world in space and time; it leads Hegel to a new approach to metaphysics (ontology and theology) and to contemporary philosophies of the absolute; and informs his view of the structures of self-consciousness and subjectivity (individual and social) as well as his conception of freedom and ethical life.

In *Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy* (1801) (Differenzschrift), taking a stand on the contemporary debate in Kant’s aftermath, Hegel reacts both to the views that separate ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’, pitching one against the other in the attempt to grasp the (seemingly infinite but truly indeterminate) absolute, and to the views that condemn philosophy to the ‘standpoint of the division’ (*Entzweiung*), whereby ‘being and non-being, concept and being, finite and infinite’ are split and irreconcilable. Against the...
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alleged inevitability of such divisions, Hegel announces that the ‘task of philosophy consists in rejecting these presuppositions, and in positing being in non-being as becoming, in positing the split at the heart of the absolute as its manifestation, in positing the finite in the infinite as life’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:16). Rejecting the understanding’s consideration of the opposition of the finite and the infinite as fixed, Hegel advances the idea of a form of knowledge as ‘conscious identity of the finite and the infinite, as unification (Vereinigung) in consciousness of the two worlds – the sensible and the intellectual, the necessary and the free’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:18). Here we find an early formulation of Hegel’s dialectical programme. The task of philosophy is to think and to exhibit the living, dynamic interaction of the finite and the infinite, which, at this stage, Hegel conceives as ‘life’ or as ‘unification in consciousness’ of the dualisms of Kant’s philosophy.

The problem of articulating the immanent connection between the finite and the infinite is for Hegel first and foremost a logical problem. And this in two senses: first, logic alone provides the adequate conception of a unity of the finite and the infinite in its pure form; second, the true infinite and the ideal finite display a ‘logic’ of their own. More generally, on Hegel’s account, the task of conceiving the finite as ideal and the infinite as true can be fulfilled only by a logic that is dialectical and speculative, that is, a logic that overcomes the limitations of traditional formal logic and of Kant’s transcendental logic. The latter belong to the ‘logic of the understanding’ (or, in an earlier designation, to the ‘philosophy of reflection’) whose fundamental shortcoming is the incapacity to think the dynamic relation between the finite and the infinite. As the logic of the understanding fixates and isolates the two terms in their abstract opposition, it renders the finite absolute and the infinite finite (the ‘bad infinite’ of the infinite regress and the open-ended, inconclusive ‘ought’) thereby making their true comprehension in principle impossible. By contrast, only a logic for which understanding and reason are no longer two separate functions of abstract thinking but immanent ‘moments’ of the dialectical-speculative determination of pure, ‘objective thinking’ (Enc §§79–82; see Nuzzo, 2010b) – only such a logic can grasp the finite in its movement of self-transcendence and Aufhebung, hence in its relation to (or identity with) the infinite conceived in its truth.

In Hegel’s mature system the issue is addressed thematically within the Doctrine of Being, the first division of the Science of Logic (WL). We have here the first and most extensive presentation of how the logic of the true infinite develops from the logic of the finite. In the articulation of the determinations of ‘quality’, the dialectic of ‘finitude’ and ‘infinitude’ (Endlichkeit and Unendlichkeit) leads ‘Daseyn’ to ‘being-for-itself’ in which first emerge the logical structures of subjectivity. The infinite then reappears in the discussion of the mathematical infinite within ‘quantity’ (see Moretto, 1984). In its most general definition, the finite or finitude is that which is in itself contradictory, being determined by an immanent limit that necessarily pushes the finite beyond itself. This necessary going-beyond-itself of the finite discloses the dimension of the infinite. The logic’s task is to think through this determination of the finite by following the process of its self-overcoming in the transition to the infinite. The concept of the finite develops through three moments: (i) the dialectic of ‘something’ and ‘other’; (ii) the inner movement of the ‘limit’ (Grenze); (iii) the constitution of the finite in the ‘limitation’ (Schranke).
and its inherent open-ended progress – the Sollem or ‘bad infinite’.

(i) The determination of the finite lies in the distinction between ‘something’ and ‘other’ (WL GW 21:105). As something receives its identity only in relation to the other, it is truly ‘being-for-other’ (WL GW 21:106). But if being is what it is only insofar as it differs from the other, it is to the other that it owes this difference. The determination meant to distinguish something from the other comes not from something but from the other. Ultimately the something, being what it is only in relation to the other, is identical with the other. On this basis, Hegel claims that the other is the ‘other of itself’ (see Henrich, 1982). This figure expresses Hegel’s seminal critique of the traditional separation of the finite and the infinite. He underscores that the crucial moment of ‘being-for-other’, the real turning point of the relation between something and other, is a discovery of the dialectic of speculative logic, a dimension entirely lacking in traditional logic and metaphysics (WL GW 21:110). This logical determination remains the basis for the successive presentation of the structures of the finitude and infinity of spirit and self-consciousness.

(ii) The distinction between something and other appears as distinction between an internal and an external dimension of self-identity. Hegel designates this moment as ‘determination, constitution’ (Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit), and its culmination as ‘limit’ (Grenze) (WL GW 21:110). ‘Determination’ is the ‘affirmative determinateness’ that constitutes being. It appears as the being-in-itself to which finite being ‘remains faithful’ in an existence unavoidably entangled with the other. Although the other is still always determining (and indeed changing) what being is, for the finite its determination is fixed as that in which it ‘preserves’ its inner integrity. In its allegedly fixed determination the finite stakes its being in relation to the other (ibid.). While Fichte’s ‘determination of man’ advanced a lofty ideal of moral ‘vocation’, Hegel’s dialectic makes clear that this position only expresses the limited stance of the finite. With the idea of determination Fichte wanted to lend concrete and individual content to the formality of Kant’s moral imperative by tying the notion of freedom’s realization to the movement of a progressive extension of individuality and its limits.3 Hegel argues instead that determination or vocation is still far from actual freedom – it still belongs to the realm of the finite. The gap between the ‘bad infinity’ of the moral ‘ought’ and the reality of freedom (or its true infinity) is not closed by the arbitrary vocation Fichte claims for each individual. Moreover, Hegel shows how the very notion of vocation or determination is not sufficient to define what being is. The determination of being is opposed by its ‘constitution’ – the external side in which identity is compromised with difference, the self with the other, the ideal with the real.

Accordingly, as the separation of inner vocation and external constitution vanishes a different strategy is needed for defining the distinction between ‘something’ and ‘other’. The next stage of this process is the ‘limit’, whereby the open relation of the something to the other is repealed and their separation is made ‘real’. According to the logic of the finite, identity must acquire clear-cut limits in order to be real. Limits make the separation real by setting something against the other and defining the logical place from which the other is excluded (WL GW 21:113–14). In the limit, the presence of the other is at once sanctioned and erased. The existence of the finite is always qualified as existence ‘within’
or ‘without’ the limit (WL GW 21:114). The limit institutes the ‘contradiction’ whereby ‘something and other both are and are not’ (ibid.). Thus, the limit dissolves the independent, separate existence of the something and the other and marks the beginning of the finite’s self-transcendence – its becoming ‘ideal’.

(iii) As the dialectic of the limit renders it ‘immanent’ to the finite (WL GW 21:115, 118), it defines its mode of existence. The finite’s identity is provided by what it is not, what lies beyond or is negated by its limit. As immanent, the limit becomes essential to the subsistence of the something. Hence, Grenze becomes Schranke (ibid.). This is the terminus ad quem of the finite’s existence (WL GW 21:116). Limitation defines the nature of the finite.

Hegel’s dialectic articulation of the existence (Daseyn) of the finite through the structures of determination, constitution, limit and limitation shows the inevitable collapse of merely qualitative determinations of the finite in the relation to the other. The limit’s determination of the finite implies a movement beyond the limit to radically negate that determination. However, the ‘liberation’ from the limit that results from the logic of Grenze-Schranke is still only a formal, negative liberation. The structure of Sollen, the ‘ought to’ that leads individuality to an endless reproduction of the limit cannot guarantee its achievement of a real identity. Sollen is yet another form of finitude, namely, the bad infinite. At this juncture, Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s moral imperative reduces the empowering formula: ‘you can because you ought to’ to an expression of powerlessness: ‘you cannot precisely because you ought to’ (WL GW 21:121). As the ought is unable to realize moral freedom, Hegel views it as weak justification of a task left unaccomplished.

And yet, the movement of self-transcendence inherent in the unity of the limitation and the ought achieves the transition to the infinite.

On Hegel’s account, the crucial point regarding the infinite is to distinguish ‘the true concept of the infinite from the bad infinite, the infinite of reason from the infinite of the understanding’ (WL GW 21:124). The concept of the infinite develops in three stages: (i) in its first determination, the infinite is ‘the affirmative, as the negation of the finite’; this reveals it as being (ii) in ‘alternating determination’ with the finite, thus as a merely ‘abstract, one-sided infinite’; (iii) in the movement of self-overcoming, the infinite becomes the ‘true infinite’ (ibid.). The crucial point is that the infinite as such is not a separate determination from the finite – something laying ‘above’ or beyond the finite. It is the ‘very nature of the finite . . . to become infinite’ (WL GW 21:125). This central idea, which has far-reaching consequences for Hegel’s account of subjectivity and spirit, expresses the affirmative character of the infinite and leads to the alternating determination of the finite and the infinite, in which the latter is the ‘bad infinite’ or the ‘contradiction’ of the ‘finite infinite’ (WL GW 21:127) – ultimately a repetition of the logic of the finite. The reciprocal transition of the finite into the infinite and of the infinite back into the finite is the ‘progress in infinity’ (WL GW 21:128) that replicates the inconclusive linearity of the ‘ought’. And yet, this alternating transition is itself the ‘realization’ of the concept of infinity into true infinity. The true infinite is the unity or totality of the finite and the infinite (WL GW 21:132). It is precisely the speculative character of this ‘double unity’ that un-dialectic understanding cannot grasp (WL GW 21:132–3). In contrast to the linear progression of the bad infinite, the speculative unity of the true infinite displays
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the circular, complete structure of a return-to-self which, for Hegel, characterizes true freedom and self-conscious subjectivity. The true infinite is the complete movement that in its conclusion connects back to itself (WL GW 21:134–6). Now an immanent moment of the true infinite, the finite has become ‘ideal’: ‘The ideal is the finite insofar as it is in the true infinite’ (WL GW 21:137).

The logical development of the finite and its idealization in the true infinite already point to the second thematic area for which their relation is central, namely subjectivity, that is, spirit at all levels of development – subjective, objective and absolute (see Jaeschke, 2001). Self-consciousness is the closest ‘example of the presence of infinity’ (WL GW 21:145). It is the infinite circle of self-mediation and self-transcendence, the movement of return-to-self that is freedom. Indeed, Hegel conceives freedom as a process of realization structurally antithetic to Kant’s and Fichte’s ineffectual (merely finite) ‘ought’. The Science of Logic offers the justification for this position. Moreover, at the level of objective spirit freedom instantiates something like a ‘social’ infinite (see Wallace, 2005, p. 292), while at the level of absolute spirit, the concepts of true infinity and of the ideality of the finite express both the relation between man and god (in art and religion), and the absolute power of conceptual thinking: philosophy.

NOTES

1 All translations are by the author.
2 On the range of topics that fall within the issue of the finite/infinite relation, see especially Menegoni and Illetterati (2001); also Wallace (2005), whose focus is however Hegel’s theological thought.
3 In his Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man) of 1794, Fichte aims at overcoming both the formality of Kant’s moral law and the separation of nature and freedom within the human being.
Few terms occur as often in the Science of Logic and in as many different contexts, as ‘moment’. The problem is to identify the conceptual norm that governs Hegel’s use of this term. One strategy is to define its meaning with reference to certain other terms that occur in the logic as widely, and in the same contexts as ‘moment’. These comprise two terms, ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung) and ‘idealization’ (das Ideelle), and a set of related expressions, made up of pronoun-expressions, all designating in one way or another an object’s identity. These terms and expressions all relate to an object’s determination as object. In this context, ‘moment’ is of course used metaphorically, in abstraction from its primary chronological sense. As we shall see, however, the latter meaning is important for placing Hegel in his historical context.

The pronoun-expressions at issue all designate the sense in which an object is what it is said to be, or the sense in which a determination attributed to an object inheres in that object – whether ‘in itself’ (an sich), ‘in it’ (an ihm/ihr), ‘for itself’ (für sich), ‘in and for itself’ (an und für sich), ‘for another’, ‘in it and for another’. Together these expressions convey the complex structure of an object’s conceptual determination. In a phenomenological context, they could be said to define the ‘aspects’ of an object. Significantly, however, Hegel refrains in the logic from using this term in connection with these expressions. And one can understand why. The expressions define the ‘moments’ of an object as object, whereas ‘aspect’ implies instead a standpoint from which an observer gains a special view of the object and defines it accordingly. ‘Aspect’ thus presupposes the distinction between subject and object, and invites the possibility that the object’s perceived complexity is subjective. In the logic, however, Hegel wants to establish the conceptual norms that an object must satisfy in order to be intelligently recognized for what it is, or, in other words, in order to count as a valid object (Science of Logic [WL] GW 21:45). The above expressions define, as broadly as possible, the moments of this objective determination: they mark stages in its achievement, as the object is conceptually present first in mere adumbration, then according to circumstances both internal and external to it, and finally as standing complete on its own.

We say that a determination inheres in an object an sich inasmuch as it defines the object’s identity and thus essentially enters into its definition. Such a determination defines the object’s ‘in-itselfness’. However, it does not follow that this essential connection is clear from the beginning of the defining
of an object. The *an sich* inherence can also mean that, granted what one has already said about an object, one is de facto already committed to attributing a given determination to it, even though all the required conditions for the attribution are yet to be realized, and the determination, therefore, cannot yet formally enter into the object’s definition. The determination is present only *implicitly* or *an sich*. (For one passage in which the ‘in-itselfness’ is discussed in connection with ‘something’ and is also contrasted with the ‘for itself’, and where the role of ‘negativity’ in all these determinations is mentioned, see WL GW 21:103.) According to Hegel, moreover, one cannot determine an object per se without thereby also positing it within a context that transcends it. This is not a merely subjective requirement but one established by an object’s very presence. Without the object generating an otherness, that is, without its ‘being-in-itself’ establishing the possibility of a transcendent ‘other’ against which it can be contrasted, the object’s own ‘in-itselfness’ would not be intelligently apprehensible (WL GW 21:107). Accordingly, a determination can also accrue to an object *an ihm/ihr*, that is, not reflectively but inasmuch as the object enters into relation with an ‘other’ (WL GW 21:108). The determination, therefore, is only ‘within it’ (as one can also translate the German *an ihm/ihr*): it is there with respect to an other, or ‘for an other’. Finally, when an object is so defined that all the determinations hitherto attributed to it – whether with respect to the object ‘in itself’, ‘within or in it’, ‘for an other’ or all these together – enter into the definition formally, that is, when the definition reflectively controls both the internal and external economy of the object’s determination, then the object is said to be what it is ‘for itself’, or ‘in itself and for itself’: its identity as object is complete (WL GW 12:17).

Although these expressions are quite general in meaning, they are not vague, for they define specifically, not what objects in general are (then they would be vague indeed), but the steps in a continuing narrative that determines what counts as an object. They define the moments in this narrative which, at different stages of the narrative, are implicated in ever more complex objective structures. It is characteristic of Hegel’s logic that the determination of an object necessarily carries a history with it (WL GW 21:86). The memory of prior determinations is always ingrained in the language about an object.

Phenomenologically, this means that at the level of ordinary language, even when one uses terms which are prima facie as simple as could be (as when one refers to a thing as a ‘this’ or ‘that’: *Phenomenology of Spirit* [PhG] GW 9:70), such terms are in fact the result of a prior attempt at determination that foundered because of lack of sufficient specification. The terms have a conceptual history, and one that can be reflectively retrieved because the terms, despite their prima facie immediacy, are in fact the product of reflection. In the course of actual discourse, as these terms are also shown to fail in the originally intended determination, another set of terms is introduced to make up for the failure. A new reflective level of language is thereby generated, by virtue of which whatever determination has so far accrued to an object ‘within it’ or ‘for an other’ is made to re-enter into it explicitly, *für sich*. This is a new conceptual achievement in the determination of the object and, therefore, also a progression in the more general determination of what counts as objectivity in general. But the same movement can also be taken as the retrieval of a past – as a regression, in other words – in the sense that the achieved new determination must
also be recognized as having been present in the object from the beginning, albeit only in intention or *an sich*, and even as supporting the whole subsequent process of determination by providing its yet unexpressed norm of development. The achievement, in other words, must be in the mode of a remembering: the fully developed object is ‘for itself’ what it would otherwise be, and has in fact been, only ‘in itself’. The implication is that no experience is possible unless reason is at work within it supporting it from the beginning. Reason’s interest in constituting intelligibility is the factor motivating and directing experience even in its apparently most immediate forms. As for the Science of Logic, the implication, which is stated at the end of the text, is that the theme implicitly governing it from the beginning is the determination of the ‘idea’, or the thought which, in thinking itself, thereby constitutes the ‘logicality’ (*das Logische*), or the intelligible space that makes the determinations of objects, whether theoretical or practical, possible in the first place (*WL GW* 12:236–7).

The terms, *Aufhebung* and *das Ideelle*, become relevant at this point. *Aufhebung* is Hegel’s term for the process by which determinations, which otherwise accrue in an object de facto (whether from within or from without), and without any yet explicitly defined connection with the object itself, are taken up into a more reflective level of determination (but also removed from their hitherto dispersed position in the object) (*WL GW* 21:94–5). They are thereby manifested as what in truth they are: moments of a more reflectively comprehensive objective unity, one which so far was only adumbrated but is now made explicit in this process of *Aufhebung*. As transformed into moments, the original determinations that were merely assumed in the object and gave the appearance (*Schein*) of being entities on their own, are equally shown to be *idealizations* (*das Ideelle*): conceptual products that have no meaning independently but only as referring to each other and, together, providing the structure for coherent, objective discourse.

In the 1807 *PhG* Hegel gives a historical rendition of this narrative of *Aufhebung*, indicating how different communities, on the basis of an originating (albeit preconscious) judgement about what counts as truly real, have enchanted nature and at the same time constituted an ideal world of typically human values and social structures. Hegel’s repeated argument is that, to the extent that this preconscious judgement fails to generate adequate reflective awareness of what one seeks in seeking truth, it destines those under its sway to social and personal conflicts. The judgement remains implicit in their consciousness of themselves and their assumed social and natural world, hiding the fact that it lies at the origin of the theoretical and practical attitudes that typify that consciousness, and obscuring the logic that led to their assumption and that, once assumed, controlled the move from one attitude to the other. The conflicts are the result of taking these attitudes as explanatory, whereas they are derivative; hence, of seeking the satisfaction of the aspirations that motivate them elsewhere than where it can actually be found.

It is because of these conflicts that a more critical attitude sets in into a given cultural world and the judgement underlying its many conceptual structures becomes both modified and more explicit. The cases of classical scepticism and of the late Enlightenment language of wit, which Hegel considers at opposite ends of chapter six, are especially instructive (*PhG GW* 9:119–20; 283, 285–6). In both cases, we have a language that transforms conceptual determinations, otherwise
presumed stable, into fleeting moments in a discourse in which everything that is said turns out to amount to the same as its opposite. A situation of perfect conceptual fluidity is thereby created, the required ground for a new prise de conscience and the corresponding more reflective determination of rationality. The upshot, according to Hegel, is a community in which it is finally clear, at least to a segment of its members, that it is reason which transforms an otherwise merely given nature according to its reflective interests: which turns this nature into an object of science and action, and, to this extent, is the sole source of meaning (PhG GW 9:427–8; contrast this with 9:420–1). The time is ripe for Hegel’s science of logic.

In all this, ‘moment’ is used metaphorically, as the component of a conceptual structure rather than in its original chronological sense. Yet the latter sense is never far away, for in every case the achievement of a particular determination is at issue, and ‘achievement’ carries in train the image of progress with its attendant temporal connotations. One defining feature of both Hegel’s phenomenology and logic is that, although in both ‘moment’ is obviously given a systematic meaning, the transition from this meaning to real time comes quite naturally. At the conclusion of PhG, one can say that the purpose (Endzweck) of history has been attained in the sense that in a community in which reason is reflectively aware of its creative function, reason’s immanent teleological structure has finally been realized. This is something that happens in time, where this process of realization assumes different shapes in different communities at different moments and at different places. These are shapes which can be ‘all the more barbarous and harsher, the deeper is a [community’s] Spirit’ (PhG GW 9:430): they are all equally subjected to history’s judgement, of which the norm (das Gericht) is none other than reason (PhG GW 9:430–1; cf. Enc §548). But the realization of history’s purpose does not mean that history has come to an end. On the contrary, it can with greater justice be said that it truly begins, for only at that point do the full creative possibilities of Spirit become explicit and a future truly opens up for it. In the same vein, the attainment at the conclusion of the Science of Logic of a fully determined concept does not mean that discourse has thereby come to an end but, on the contrary, that fully self-critical discourse can finally begin. To interpret Hegel otherwise, to take him as translating logical into historical and physical necessity tout court, whereas he is intent on maintaining the distinction between the two, is to encumber him with the kind of late Enlightenment historiography which he, in fact, is just as intent on dismantling.
(A) Hegel’s concept of negativity has historical precedents, the most distant of which, historically as well as conceptually, is Parmenides’ ‘not’ in his claim, ‘For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are’ (DK Fragment B7.1). The closest to Hegel is Fichte’s attempt at a thought that has no object except itself – a thought, in other words, that has no positive content, but suspends ‘being’ altogether (FGA I/4:224–5). Parmenides mentioned his ‘not’ only to deny that it had meaning. The purpose of Fichte’s abstraction, by contrast, was to introduce an extra reflective space in experience by virtue of which one could distance oneself from experience and thus explain it as if from outside it. It was a way of transcending experience while remaining within its limits, thus avoiding the dogmatic move outside it that Kant had interdicted. Fichte’s negativity was intended to make meaning possible.

Like Fichte, Hegel also relied on negativity to make room for discursive meaning. Unlike Fichte, however, Hegel conceived his ‘not’ as affecting ‘being’ internally – in effect, prioritizing ‘becoming’ over ‘being’. For this, we must turn to his treatment of ‘reflection’, a category in which ‘negativity’ becomes explicitly at issue. The category comes at the beginning of book two of the Science of Logic (WL GW 11:245–50), as the upshot of the preceding ‘being/nothing’ dialectic and the start of a new series of reflections which eventually lead to the logic of the concept in book three.

(B) We determine an object and thereby justify its validity as object by saying what it is. For this reason ‘becoming’ has traditionally been a source of difficulty for metaphysics, for it seems that a thing escapes determination to the extent that it is in becoming. One cannot say of a thing what it is without the thing already being something ‘other than’ the what with which it was originally designated. As an intended object, the thing alters in being determined. There is no fixed determination on which to pin the claim that, in picking it out, one has attained anything real. Determination must remain abstract, only a subjectively intended determination. It is this circumstance which, according to Hegel, is the source of scepticism and the subjective idealism of Kant or Fichte.

Hegel’s category of ‘reflection’ is significant because it is an attempt at defining how an object is to be determined precisely as in becoming. Hegel says, ‘Reflection [is] the movement of becoming and transition that remains within itself, wherein that which is distinguished is determined simply and solely as the negative of itself’ (WL GW 11:249). Or, reflection ‘is the movement from
nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself. Transition or becoming sublates itself in its transition’ (WL GW 11:250). And again, reflection is ‘a negation which has being only as self-referring. Or, since the self-referring is precisely the negating of negation, what we have is negation as negation, negation that has its being in its being-negated’ (WL GW 11:249).

To determine an object in becoming, in other words, one must begin by taking back whatever one might say of it prima facie as a would-be fixed determination of it; in this sense, therefore, one begins with a ‘not’, or from ‘nothing’. But this negation is not to be taken as a simple abstraction from any positive determination. Rather, it makes room for referring any original, provisionally assumed determination to an ‘other’ than it, that is, to some other such determination by virtue of which alone, by being distinguished from it, the original determination could be even meaningfully mentioned in the first place. But lest this ‘other’ be itself taken as a would-be fixed determination of the object (whereupon it would cease to be the significant ‘other’ of the originally assumed determination), it must itself be negated and referred back to the original determination. Its only determination is to be the original determination’s ‘other’: its vocation (to play on Bestimmung, which can mean both ‘determination’ and ‘vocation’) is to constitute that determination as in turn its ‘other’.

I have begun with a presumed ‘would-be fixed’ determination of the intended object. The stress must not be on the ‘fixed’ aspect of this determination, which is necessarily subjective and arbitrary, but on its ‘would-be’ – on the fact that, as ‘fixed’, it can be just as well posited as negated. It is this circumstance that forces the movement of outward and backward reference which, according to Hegel, characterizes ‘reflection’ and defines the constitution of the object at the present stage of the Logic’s development. In the cited texts, Hegel defines this ‘would-be’ as the ‘negation of a negation’ or as ‘the movement from nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself’. The result of the movement is not a simple ‘nothing’ but an area of positivity which, though not itself the warrant for any determination in particular, indeed, while preempting the possibility of any such determination as fixed, establishes nonetheless the limits of the intended object’s determinacy in general (Bestimmtheit as contrasted with Bestimmung). Hegel’s generic term for this positivity is ‘immediacy’. In the course of the Logic, it assumes a variety of forms. In the context now under consideration, the form is that of Schein (WL GW 11:246–9) – ‘shine’ or ‘apparent being’.

The singular determination of an object was at issue in book one. As treated there, this kind of determination gave rise to the transition from one determination to an other, and from this to yet an other, and so on ad infinitum. A turning point was achieved when this infinite progression, though not stayed, was nonetheless contained by being defined in toto in terms of the constant difference separating one determination from the other, or, more precisely, in terms of the determinable ‘otherness’ marking the transition from the one to the other (WL GW 21:236). (In this context, Hegel offers interesting reflections on the nature of ‘quantum’ and the conceptual art of ‘calculus’ associated with it.) But at the beginning of book two, this distinction between an object’s possibly infinite determinations and the rule governing the attribution of such determinations – the rule that prevents the process of determining the object from deteriorating into random determination, with the consequent dissipation of
The intended object – is reflectively canonized in the new distinction between what is essential to the object and what is unessential to it, between its essence and its immediate manifestation. One comprehends an object essentially by taking it as standing on its own, not indeed as a would-be simple point of reference (it would then escape discursive determination and cease to be a significant object), but by being itself reflectively in the way just described: as opening up within itself, and at the same time containing, an area of positive otherness by virtue of which one can say, and also deny, many things about it, always maintaining, however, what is essential to it (its reflective self-identity) as the norm of this saying and denying. The object thus becomes the subject-matter of a discursive, hence meaningful, determination.

The object’s reflectivity makes for both, its transcendence (negativity) with respect to its positive determinacy and this determinacy itself. It is normal, as one considers this reflectivity externally, to attribute to each of these, reflection and immediacy, an immediate content and to treat each as if it were an independent particular determination of the object. But the truth is that reflection and immediacy are each the ‘other’s other’: each is to be conceived within the other, so that – together – they define a self-contained process of becoming. This shine [the immediacy] is not something external, something other than essence, but essence’s own shining. This shining of essence within it is reflection’ (WL GW 11:245–6).

In the rest of book two Hegel argues the same point regarding the pairs of categories (such as ‘substance/accident’) into which this original ‘reflection/immediacy’ distinction develops. At issue are the paradoxes to which classical metaphysics was vulnerable because it took these pairs as independent quantities. But it is only in book three, where the process of objective determination at work in books one and two itself comes under reflection and the ‘concept’ itself is the object of this reflection, that we finally have a becoming which is perfectly fluid (WL GW 12:15–16). This is discourse, in which, upon saying anything, this saying already implicates an other saying, the significance of the first consisting precisely in its leading to the other – the two sayings, and any that follow, immediately flowing unopposed each into the other, together manifesting a common theme that holds them together and actually impels the self-referring movement of meaning from one to the other. One can state this theme by itself, in which case it becomes a particular saying taking its place next to the others. As theme, however, its realization is the unfolding of discourse itself.

Book three of the Logic examines the categories that govern the logic of discourse as discourse. It was this logic, and in fact the discourse determined by it, that implicitly supported and made possible the discourse about ‘being’ and ‘essence’ in the first two books.

(C) Hegel is saying that truth is to be found in the path which Parmenides thought to be that of mere opinion, for it is only by virtue of the ‘not’ breaking up the solidity of ‘being’ that the latter can be the object of meaningful discourse and, therefore, intelligible. The ὄπωζ  στίν of Parmenides’ supposed path of truth, that of the simple ‘that is’, escapes articulation – hence meaning; hence even the possibility of truth. To Fichte, who had recognized the need for negativity, Hegel is saying that the extra conceptual space that his abstractive ‘not’ generates still lies as if outside ‘being’ – in effect still amounts to the dogmatic assumption of a transcendent point of reference (pure freedom, in the case
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of Fichte) which itself remains inexpressible and, therefore, escapes truth. Fichte’s Science is constructive in nature, in the sense that its determination of ‘being’ only responds to the a priori requirements of an ineffable subjectivity, and as such is a reflective artefact that stands at a distance from its intended ‘being’, separated from it by a gap that resists conceptualization and can only be surmounted by subjective diktat (Rosenkranz, 1843, p. 42, writes: ‘For Fichte, it is as if nature had been shrouded by a veil’). For Hegel, on the contrary, the ‘not’ is coincidental with the ‘is’: ‘negativity’ and ‘positivity’ are internal to one another and each must therefore be said in as many ways as the other.

This makes a difference to Hegelian phenomenology. Like Fichte, Hegel associates subjectivity with negativity (Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG] GW 9:19). But the ‘not’ of this subjectivity originates in nature, when representation is implicated in such natural events as ‘desire’ and turns into the reflective representation of a representation, thus making this representing itself the issue of its relation to nature (PhG GW 9:107). The human organism – now ‘subject’ – distances itself from nature. Nature becomes problematic for the subject – its being there (Daseyn) is in need of justification – and the task is set of reassembling it, now that its mere naturalness has been dissipated, into a nature for the subject, a universe shot through by typically human values. This is a task which is repeatedly posed as, once a new human nature has been established, a new prise de conscience on the part of the subject dissipates it again and its parts, now the remnants of an earlier lived world, must be reassembled (PhG GW 9:14–16). The judgement that had previously made them parts of a universe of meaning must be recollected: a new judgement passed on that judgement. What is important is that in all cases the subject seeks itself in objectified nature (PhG GW 9:22), as if written large upon it, not in any supposed pre- or post-nature event which, if achieved, would put an end to nature altogether. Unlike Fichte’s subject which does not belong to the world but only stands at its limit, Hegel’s belongs to it: it is the world’s internal limit. Accordingly, Hegel’s account of this process of recollection in the 1807 PhG, though fictional on the whole, must nonetheless make a historical point. This is a history which, unlike the history as conceived by the Enlightenment and by Kant, is not ruled by a principle external to it, but by the ‘not’ in which typically human existence originates. It is a structural principle governing history from within. As of 1807, Hegel thought that the conditions were ripe for recollecting the logic of this governance.
IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION

George di Giovanni

(A) Hegel’s principle that ‘all things are in themselves contradictory’ (*Science of Logic* [WL] GW 11:286), and his further claim that ‘contradiction’ expresses the truth of ‘identity’ (ibid.), have drawn much criticism, and it cannot be denied that they have been the source of mystification. The cause of both the mystification and the criticism is the lack of attention that has been paid to the logical context in which the claims are made. Hegel is saying that contradiction expresses the ‘truth of things’ (ibid.). According to Hegel, however, it is only in the transparent medium of the concept that a thing’s measure as a possible object of knowledge is made manifest. Although, as we shall see, the claims have metaphysical implications, they are first and foremost logical; they concern the language of things, and this is indeed the area in which identity and contradiction have traditionally been at issue. Unique to Hegel is that, contrary to this tradition, contradiction is for him the prerequisite of identity. Contradiction does not simply occur by accident in the language of things, but is necessary to it and must even be generated by it if it is not there, in order for the language to have meaning. At issue, therefore, is why for Hegel contradiction is logically necessary. To understand this necessity is also to understand why for Hegel contradiction must be resolved as much as it must arise.

(B) Hegel makes three moves in the *Science of Logic* that set his treatment of contradiction apart from anything preceding it. The first is directed at the tradition of the logicians in general. Hegel does not raise the issue of contradiction in purely formalistic terms but, like Kant, as part of the more fundamental issue of conceptual object-determination (cf. WL GW 21:129). Kant’s problem of the synthetic a priori still lurks behind Hegel’s treatment. One cannot attribute a determination to an object, already identified by some other determination, without justifying the attribution. However, either to say one thing of the object (the first determination) is in fact the same, though not verbally, as saying the other (the new determination), or the two determinations are totally disparate in meaning, so that to say one thing of the object (the first determination) is in fact the same, though not verbally, as saying the other (the new determination), or the two determinations are totally disparate in meaning, so that to say one thing of the object (the first determination) is in fact the same, though not verbally, as saying the other (the new determination), or the two determinations are totally disparate in meaning, so that to say the one has nothing to do with saying the other. In both cases, justification fails – in the first because, since a formal identity of determination is declared, the very issue of justification becomes moot; in the second because, since each determination is originally taken as standing on its own, any connection between the two as posited within the object remains external: the justification, therefore, is arbitrary.

This is a troublesome dilemma. It leads to the conclusion that, in order to say something new about an object, yet do it with
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necessity, the two determinations must at once be significantly different yet competing for the same space of signification in the object. In other words, the two must be mutually exclusive, or in opposition, for only thus is their connection non-arbitrary (for to mention the one is necessarily to bring the other into play as well, albeit negatively), and only as posited in the one object does their difference become significant, indeed, is their exclusivity first generated. The conclusion is that significant determination – as contrasted with the mere stringing together in an object of determinations that remain external both to each other and to the object itself – requires that one say, in one and the same respect, opposing things of the one object (WL GW 21:30). This, however, is to court contradiction. Contrary to the tradition, contradiction becomes for Hegel an integral moment in the determination of an object. I say ‘court contradiction’ with intent, as will become clear. Contradiction is not the last word on the issue of determination. Kant resisted the possibility of contradiction by counting on a tertium quid for connecting the intended object and the conceptual determinations. The object was assumed (as indeed it is by common sense) as coming equipped with a content of its own, be this sensuous or imaginary, which provided the possibility of distributing over the object conceptual determinations (such as ‘identity’ and ‘difference’, ‘substance’ and ‘accidents’, ‘ground’ and ‘grounded’), the meanings of which would otherwise interfere with each other. We need not dwell on Kant’s solution. The relevant point is that this solution depended on an extra-logical factor (the assumed content) which stood in the way of a full conceptualization of the intended object. Since the basis for any necessary synthesis of determinations could not therefore be located in the intended object itself, it had to fall on the subjective side of the determination process – specifically, on Kant’s presumed a priori sense-intuition or on de facto conditions of actual experience. In other words, Kant’s transcendental logic had to depend for its validity as logic on psychological considerations.

Hegel’s second move was directed precisely at this aspect of Kant’s critical work. Hegel was committed to relativizing Kant’s distinction between reflective or conceptual form and extra-logical or intuitive content by demonstrating that the distinction, far from being a mere fact of experience only psychologically ascertainable, is, on the contrary, essential for the determination of an object as object. The distinction must emerge from within the attempt at determining what we mean by on object, precisely in order to control reflectively any discourse about objects in general (WL GW 11:331–2, Remark). This is also what Kant wanted to do with his list of categories (which Hegel found unsystematic and truncated). Hegel’s point is that these categories do not need to be applied to a content external to them in order to be valid as determinations of an object, but, rather, it is only by virtue of a full conceptual determination of what counts as objective, such as the logic is supposed to provide, that the intelligible space is made available within which the presence of things can be recognized for exactly what they happen to be.

A full account of how Hegel performs this task of reflective determination requires one to keep in mind the claim that underlies the whole logic, namely that an object is what it is only by becoming it, and only as such – that is, as in becoming – can it be the subject of discursive comprehension (WL GW 21:91). Indeed, the first contradiction that one incurs in thinking about an object in becoming is
that one must say of it at the same time both that it ‘is’ and ‘is not’. We have just seen how such an incurring of contradiction makes for the significant determination of an object. But this is only one side of the story. The fact is that although this incurring of contradiction is for Hegel a necessary condition of discourse about an object, the positing at once of two contradictory determinations cannot be maintained. Contradictory discourse is fated to founder – *zu Grunde gehen* (WL GW 11:281). And the very fact that in contradiction mutually exclusive determinations compete for the same space of signification in an object warrants the possibility of taking each of these determinations in abstraction from the other – negating, in other words, the reference to the other, and thus differently applying them both to the object. Or, when the object is taken as a ‘thing’, the one thing can be taken (and in this too there is contradiction) as both an exclusive (negative) or inclusive (positive) subject of determination (WL GW 11:333–4). It is in the positive determination that the stringing together of external determinations in an object to which we referred above comes into play. This kind of indifferent determination is also required for objective determination: it is part of Hegel’s full story. However, if in contradiction discourse runs the risk of coming to a halt completely, in this indifferent determination it runs the opposite risk of losing unity of signification – of dissipating its subject matter. For this reason, new determinations must be brought into play that reflectively re-establish the otherwise dissipated unity of discourse, but also, by that very fact, also reinstate the possibility of contradiction. Hegel’s Logic neither sanctions nor condones contradiction. Its only claim is that the possibility of contradiction must be maintained in any discursive determination of an object, and even actively generated, if such determination is to be significant (WL GW 11:288). Meaningful discourse, as we have said, necessarily courts contradiction.

It is in this way, as exclusive determination yields to indifferent determination, and the latter calls for the reflective reintroduction of exclusivity and possible contradiction, that, according to Hegel, the distinction between form and content in an object both arises and is relativized. The distinction is generated in the attempt to determine the concept of an object in general – as a moment in the development of a system of categories, and not, as in Kant, by appealing to extra-logical, psychological factors. The most interesting aspect of Hegel’s theory of the concept is that Hegel takes the categories of the logic, which are also the categories that govern our discourse about things in general, as each carrying within it a conceptual history – as each being, more or less explicitly, the result of a judgement regarding what counts as objective that has been occasioned by a prior perceived failure in making this determination of objectivity (WL GW 21:86). The science of logic is the systematic account of this history, its three parts each characterized by the way in which contradiction is more or less explicitly generated, and equally contained, in the course of the categories specific to that part.

(C) There is more than the science of logic to Hegel’s system. There are also the philosophical sciences of spirit and the philosophy of nature, and in all these contradiction figures prominently. Two considerations are relevant here. The first is that, so far as the science of spirit, including the phenomenology of spirit, is concerned, since the works of the spirit are realized in the medium of language, itself the first of spirit’s products, it makes perfect sense to say that in the relations that humankind establishes with respect to nature...
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or within its own kind the incurring of contradiction is a constant possibility. But the interest of Hegel's analysis of such relations is that any mention of contradiction working its power within them is immediately translated (especially in the Phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [Enc] §§413–39) into an account of historical human situations and the real problems to which these succumb as a result of the originally faulty social decisions on which they are based. This is the same as speaking of the identity of an individual, borrowing the category of ‘identity’ from logic, but giving it historical meaning by treating it in socio-psychological terms. Mystification arises when one takes contradiction as a principle of historical explanation – as if it were a force driving history – and not just a first descriptive account of historical situations, its only explanatory value the fact that it alludes to reason, the presence of which in human decisions is, after all, the source of both human situations and their typically human problems.

The second consideration regards the philosophy of nature. It is indeed both fair and helpful to think of reason as a form of life, and rationality itself, in some way or other, as originally a product of nature. But it is a mistake to believe that we understand the workings of reason, and the possibility of contradiction that these necessarily bring in train, because we first understand nature and its organic structures, as if contradiction already lurked in the latter materially. For Hegel the opposite is true. We can speak of reason and its workings after the image of nature because the latter has in the first place been construed after the image of reason, of which we are originally aware. Nature lacks the internal principle that would allow it more than abstract, that is, external determination (Enc §250), the kind that courts contradiction. It requires the support of language making up for its indeterminacy in order to be brought to intelligible comprehension. Here again there is continuity between Kant and Hegel. The difference is that whereas for Kant the idea of nature – because it was the product of reflection – had to be merely subjective, for Hegel – for the same reason – the idea is on the contrary the intelligible medium in which alone nature as it is in itself becomes present to us in the first place.
Concepts of human will and freedom lay at the heart of Hegel's philosophy. The will is the core of the individual's existence, and freedom of the will develops together with individuals’ self-realization through active involvement within their community and the larger social and political context.

In the 1821 *Philosophy of Right* (*RPh*) Hegel holds that freedom is the ‘worthiest and most sacred possession of man’ (*RPh* §215A). He argues that the entire normative sphere or ‘system of right’ can be viewed as ‘the realm of actualized freedom’ (*RPh* §§4, 29). Freedom is the prominent organizing concept of Hegel’s social philosophy. It is only intelligible in the context of a social medium of human interactions. And while Hegel discusses freedom in a variety of works, the theory of freedom in its entirety is developed in *RPh*. Here he considers the concept of freedom as evolving dialectically on account of inherent contradictions, and as unfolding new features at different stages until it finds completion in the structure of the modern state. This is a progression from an abstract freedom, linked to a single individual will, to a concrete freedom actualized in a political community as a (rational) system of wills.

Hegel rejects common sense conceptions of freedom as ‘being able to do as one wants’ (*RPh* §15R). Instead, he follows Kant in equating true freedom with rational self-determination. On this view, freedom is inconsistent with acting on anything merely ‘given’ (including one’s own particularity). It is realized only when the individual acts on reasons that are truly his own – or in complete self-determination.

Hegel’s theory of freedom rests, then, on his concept of the will. In the Western philosophical tradition, ‘will’ (Lat. *voluntas*) usually refers to the capacity to act purposively. Actions performed according to one’s will are intentional and based on choice; they are called ‘voluntary’ and are conceived as essentially free. In German, *Wille* is etymologically associated with two verbs: *wollen* (to wish, to want) and *wählen* (to choose) (see Inwood, 1992, p. 311). Before Hegel, these different connotations gave rise to two closely related terms: *Wille* and *Willkür*. The first referred to the general capacity of having *desiderata* and of acting upon them; the second referred to the ability to choose. Only later did *Willkür* develop a derogatory sense of ‘caprice’ or ‘arbitrariness.’ Still, *Wille* and *Willkür* were often used interchangeably. Kant was perhaps the first to clearly distinguish between the two. Attributing *Willkür* to animals, he described it as sensory, ‘pathologically affected’ (in some cases, necessitated)
by impulses and desires (KrV A534/B562). In contrast, *Wille* is non-sensuous, that is, either wholly unaffected by sensory impulses (the ‘holy’ will) or indifferent to these and capable of motivating action on rational principles. For Kant, only the will which is subject to rational laws that are independent of one’s desires is pure or absolutely free. The will that acts on rational principles based on one’s sensory nature (the ‘empirical’ will) depends on the ‘given’ contents of desire.

Hegel’s own account of *Wille* and *Willkür*, introduced in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (*Enc*) §§473–82, and systematically developed in *RPh* §§4–28, differs from Kant’s in that Hegel rejects as unjustifiable the sharp contraposition between the two. He makes two important clarifications. First, being concerned by the sharp Kantian rift between reason and desire, Hegel aims at developing a concept of freedom as harmonious co-operation of our rational and sensuous natures. Second, viewing the will as essentially free, he distinguishes different stages or types of freedom through which it unfolds historically. At some of these stages, the will still depends on something given to it, and is thus not entirely free. Hegel aims at eliminating the element of ‘givenness’ or ‘positivity’ and at promoting and protecting the content of the will that inheres in genuinely autonomous activity, that is, in freedom. Thus, one of Hegel’s goals is to develop a concept of freedom closely connected to the structure of the will. For Hegel, the secret to rational self-determination lies within the will itself.

The will is not a faculty separate from reason. It is a mode of reason: ‘the will is . . . a special way of thinking, thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the urge to give itself existence’ (*RPh* §4A). In choosing, deciding and acting a person expresses her rationality. She reflects upon her experience and develops a concept of herself that determines the typology of her will and how she actualizes herself as a human being. Thus, the will is inseparably connected with self-consciousness, and free will presupposes true self-consciousness: ‘it is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free’ (*RPh* §21R).

In every act of willing, one can discern three ‘moments’ of the development of the will and freedom: the (abstract) universal, the particular and the singular. The first moment, the *universal* will, denotes one’s capacity to abstract from desires and impulses and refrain from their satisfaction. This is ‘the element of pure indeterminacy’ of the self, and it involves ‘the dissipation of restriction and every content’ (*RPh* §5). This type of free will is wholly negative; it rejects all external determinants and claims complete independence from externality. In its pure form such a will manifests itself in the human capacity for suicide, in mysticism and in revolutionary fanaticism.

The second moment, the *particular* will, differentiates between desires and impulses and determines itself to a particular course of action. The ability to select something definite or particular – the capacity for choice – constitutes the ‘positive’ element of the will. Although essential, the particular will is still incomplete for two reasons. First, while the will is free to choose among desires, the range of options is simply a given. Thus the determinacy of the content does not eliminate the element of givenness. Second, there is a conflict between the universality of the will and the particularity of its objects: no particular object can match the universality of the will, and the will in turn depends on its content on the givenness of particular objects.

The third moment, the *individual* will, overcomes these problems by becoming its
own object – a free will, willing freedom as such. This will embodies the unity of the universal and particular moments, a kind of ‘restoration’ of universality out of particularity. This is the self-contained free will of an agent capable of rejecting all motives for action except those that are truly the agent’s own.

Hegel, however, emphasizes that truly free will must act according to its rational nature – not on impulse. When the single source of one’s determinations are impulses and desires, the will is ‘immediate or natural’ (RPh §11). Although capable of utilitarian rationality grounded in feelings of satisfaction and happiness, this natural will is not governed by principles of reason. Its indeterminacy, in the absence of a truly rational criterion of choice, constitutes arbitrariness (Willkür). Against conceptions of the arbitrary will as instantiating free will, Hegel notices that ‘arbitrariness implies that the content is made mine not by the nature of my will but by chance’ (RPh §15A). This kind of will is determined by (external or internal) contingencies. The content willed by the free will consists neither in any particular course of action nor in specific choices. Free will’s fundamental end is the preservation and exercise of its freedom to choose. Contrary to the ‘abstract or negative freedom’ of the natural will, true freedom is found in complete self-determination. ‘The definition of the concept of the will... is in general the free will that wills the free will’ (RPh §27; cf. §10).

Hegel explicates the freedom of the will in terms of the concept of the will’s rational nature or, more precisely, in terms of the conception of rational agency masterfully mapped in his moral philosophy. What Hegel means by ‘will that wills itself’ is neither a will that ‘generates rules for its conduct’ (Kant), nor one that is ‘appetitive’ and ‘goal-oriented’ (Royce), but a will whose criteria of choice flow from its rational nature. Thus, the will’s end of developing, expressing and maintaining its freedom coincides with the promotion and actualization of rational agency. This can only be achieved in modern ethical life (Sittlichkeit), specifically, in a community that incorporates the rational core of free willing individuality. The institutions embodying the social and moral relations central to Sittlichkeit; family, civil society and the state, are expressions of the free will. Although social practices are said to flow from human freedom, Hegel does not deduce these practices from a single principle. Rather, he develops an account of our social world that integrates our relations and practices into one common life. Contrary to the Kantian view that transcendental freedom allows each person to rise above all contingencies to achieve the good will, for Hegel human freedom is possible only within a social framework. In this sense, the attainment of free will is a collective enterprise. The aim of Sittlichkeit is ‘to reconcile us to our real social world’ (Rawls, 2000, p. 344). We must come to understand collectively that the social framework enables, rather than hinders, freedom and strengthens our ability to exercise rational agency. Our participation in actual social structures is, then, the necessary condition for freedom. Hegel emphasizes the role of social institutions in determining individual duties. In Sittlichkeit, moral obligations flow from the already existing communal life: one’s obligations arise in interaction with others, and the fulfilment of those obligations in turn sustains the communal life itself. Impulses and urges are transformed into rights and duties associated with the individuals’ roles in the community. Hence, in ethical life agents go beyond the immature
stage of abstract freedom. Their freedom consists of living and acting in accordance with the rational principles and laws that restrict their wants.

In tracing freedom’s development in ethical life, Hegel identifies three forms of individual freedom which – for the sake of classification – may be called ‘personal,’ ‘moral’ and ‘social’ freedom (see Neuhouser, 2000). Each is a specific form of the rational self-determination of individual conduct.

Personal freedom is the freedom to choose and pursue one’s elective ends. Modern versions of this form of freedom, on Hegel’s view, include one’s professional choice as well as one’s ability to adjust to, modify and create social roles. This requires avoiding ‘unjust interferences’ (Westphal, 2010b, p. 172) with the interests of others, which in turn necessitates one’s moral reflection on norms and principles of action. Hence, personal freedom must be supplemented by moral freedom.

The aim of rational moral agency is neither the recognition of norms’ validity nor the determination of norms’ content, but the empowerment of individuals to live by moral principles and to apply them to specific situations. Thus, moral freedom involves evaluating and affirming the principles that guide one’s conduct and are consistent with respect for other moral agents. As noted, for Hegel the moral agent acting on the scene of social reality is not an atomic individual, but rather a member of the human community. Both the production and the application of principles of the good and the right that guide individual action is a collective undertaking that entails the exercise of social freedom.

Social freedom emerges and develops through the conscious interactions of individuals. These include voluntary participation in institutions that protect and promote freedom. Individuals are not just posited in social reality; they freely choose to take part in it. With their participation in communal practices, individuals reproduce social reality by rationally affirming principles, aims and procedures that they find functional. They endorse institutions that are the theatre of their actions because this is the sphere where they can exercise free agency. At the same time, practices and institutions that structure human interaction serve as foundation of, and give objective form to, human freedom. By promoting the reciprocal recognition of agents contributing to the community, those institutions afford individuals the protection required for the universal realization of freedom (Enc §544).2

This is why Hegel argues that it is in the modern state that human freedom reaches its fullest development. He explains this by distinguishing between objective and subjective aspects of social freedom. The totality of existing rational laws, social practices and political institutions constitutes the objective aspect. But this objectivity must manifest itself in the actual thinking and willing of the citizens who should be able to identify their subjective ends within the ends of the institutions. Only then can they regard the principles governing the institutions as proceeding from their subjective free will. The state is the appropriate medium for human will’s self-determination because it enables the reconciliation of the subjective and objective aspects of freedom. By consciously participating in public affairs and thus contributing to the development of the community, the individual enhances his self-determination. This unity of the subjective and objective dimensions of the political life constitutes ‘concrete freedom’, the highest level of rational self-determination for Hegel.
Thus freedom for Hegel is not a momentary act; it is a long and complex practical achievement, taking shape in and through human activity over historical time. Freedom is a concrete universal process through which individuals become aware and achieve control of themselves and their natural and social environment.

NOTES

1 With one exception, all quotes from RPh are from T. M. Knox’s translation (1952).

2 For a nuanced account of Hegel’s emphasis on the importance of social institutions in developing individual freedom, see Westphal (2010b, pp. 168–80).
PART IV:
HEGEL’S FORMS OF ARGUMENT
SCEPSIS AND SCEPTICISM
Italo Testa

Hegel’s philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds and of one’s own mind. A key-role in Hegel’s argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel’s theory of recognition. According to Hegel, the capacity of self-reference is not an originary, spontaneous property of the subject; instead, to be able to make reference to myself, to be able to recognize myself, I have to be able to recognize myself in the other and to be recognized by the other; that is, I have to learn, in a mutual process, to mirror myself in the other with whom I interact – to know myself and intuit myself in him. As such, recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world: in fact, according to the argumentation we find in the first three sections of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG), I can refer myself to the objects I interact with – be conscious of them – only insofar as I am capable of self-reference – only as a self-conscious subject; but I can be self-conscious only through the cognitive mediation of other self-consciousnesses.

In this way, Hegel’s theory of recognition furnishes a unitary response to the threefold sceptical issue of the accessibility of the external world, of other minds and of one’s own mind: the evolution of the capacity of recognition institutes unitarily the possibility of self-reference, reference to others and objective reference. The reference to a common world of public objects is thus possible only thanks to the mediation of cognitive capacities that are naturally possessed and socially articulated, which make possible the triangulation between self, world and others. This insight becomes possible insofar as the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. From this point, knowledge does not proceed from the subjective to the objective, as in the Cartesian formulation that gave rise to modern scepticism: knowledge of self, of other minds and of the external world are holistically connected and intersubjectively structured by means of the cognitive capacities of recognition.

On the one hand, Hegel’s strategy against modern scepticism consists, with respect to the Cartesian tradition, in a sort of Aristotelian naturalization of the questions of epistemology and philosophy of mind: the question of subjectivity and the problem of
the external world are posed – with a recovery of Aristotle’s position in the Physics – on the basis of an evolutionary-natural perspective of life and of the primary relations that first come about in an affective-corporeal dimension and then develop as second nature through the historical institutions of Bildung. On the other hand, this pragmatic-vitalistic approach is characterized in a strictly relational-interactional sense: the world of objects and of other subjects denotes primarily an interaction or mediation, rather than an immediate ‘given’ of consciousness. Self-consciousness, as is already clear in the 1797 fragment Die Liebe (On Love) (Nohl, pp. 378–82), is not an originary structure but is grounded in life – as is also the case in PhG, where self-consciousness is nothing other than life become conscious of itself. The first object of self-consciousness is life itself, whose initial level of self-relation is corporeal and becomes established through the affective interaction proper to primary relations of care.

To that effect, it is in the just mentioned fragment on love that the sceptical questions regarding the external world and other minds appear for the first time in Hegel’s work. Against the backdrop of a confrontation with Jacobi Hegel attacks the absolutization of that subjectivity which, in modernity, was formulated theoretically by Descartes: such subjectivity withdraws from the ensemble of life-relations (absolutizes an opposite) and constitutes itself as a totality with respect to which all otherness belongs to an external world [Außemwelt], a res extensa devoid of life, whose existence for the subject can be guaranteed only by the intervention of God. Thus Hegel sketches a genealogy of the question of modern scepticism, which he imputes to a specific epistemological approach. But his response to the sceptics’ puzzle does not follow the Jacobian road of a recourse to the intuitive immediacy of the world and other subjects; rather, it takes the form of an intersubjective theory of the constitution of self-consciousness. In this we find the first nucleus of Hegel’s theory of recognition, one not yet contained within the Fichtian notion of Anerkennung. Hegel shows that, in the cycle of development of life [das Leben], self-consciousness – which comes to light in the affective experiences of care that have sustained the development of human identity since infancy – becomes such only as life’s ‘duplication of itself’ [Verdoppelung seiner selbst]. The self-reference of self-consciousness is not the originary viewpoint from which the world and the subjects that inhabit it must be recovered as external beings: if that were so, the world and the subjects that inhabit it would never be accessible. On the contrary, self-consciousness begins to refer to itself and to the world only through the interaction, taking place at the stage of life, with another self-consciousness that specularly performs the same movement (this is the theory of the recognition of opposites). In the other as its opposite, individual self-consciousness, which as such is nothing other than life that refers to itself, sees its own image as reflected in a mirror, and it is precisely by recovering this image of itself found in the other that individual self-consciousness can take itself for an object.

The change of paradigm announced in the Frankfurt writings is justified in the first Jena writings (1801–2) through an immanent critique of the epistemology of Cartesian origin that gave rise to modern epistemological scepticism. As emerges from his attack on Reinhold in Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (Differenzschrift) of 1801, Hegel takes a stand against the ‘foundationalist’ approach
that claims to base all empirical knowledge in an ultimate self-justifying foundation (Grund). In his The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy of 1802 (Scepticismus GW 4) Hegel identifies the qualifying traits of this approach – traits that are ultimately also found in modern scepticism, and whose ultimate and exhausted form is represented by the Aenesidemus (1792) of Gottlob Ernst Schulze. In Scepticismus – and subsequently in the ‘Sense-Certainty’ chapter of PhG – Hegel sees this foundationalist approach as resulting from a ‘subjective dogmatism of the facts of consciousness’: ‘This scepticism . . . is directed against the common sense and common consciousness that hold fast the given, the finite (whether this finite be called phenomenon or concept)’ (Scepticismus GW 4:215, my translation). In other words, Hegel criticizes both the assumption of an absolute dualism between subject and object and the concomitant myth of a form of immediate, unquestionable givenness that allegedly concerns private states of the subject – so-called facts of consciousness. (With this, Hegel is anticipating the ‘Myth of the Given’ of Sellars, 1997.)

The claim that empirical cognition can be grounded in a mythicized givenness to which the subject would have privileged access provokes the backlash of modern scepticism since, under this assumption, access to the external object that gives rise to the subject’s internal givens – be they the world or other subjects – can be gained only directly and hypothetically.

The attack on foundationalism (understood as presupposition of the rise of modern scepticism) is also directed against its conception of epistemic justification. Foundationalism is bound up with a linear model of justification which holds that empirical cognition has the structure of a pyramid where the justification is linearly and unidirectionally transmitted, starting from a first self-justifying principle in need of no further justification and therefore functioning as foundation of all knowledge – that which the Differenzschrift calls ‘foundational demonstrative procedure’ [Forderung eines Grundes] (GW 4: 65). According to Hegel, then, the ‘foundational demonstrative procedure’ is the argumentative form presupposed by modern scepticism.

To combat any attempt at grounding based on a principle, Hegel makes explicit use of the second series of tropes of ancient scepticism, the so-called Aggripan tropes, which claim to show that no foundational attempt can escape the inevitable trilemma of (i) an infinite regress in its justification, or (ii) the arbitrary assumption of a first principle capable of arresting that regress, or (iii) argumentative circularity. In this way, Hegel dissolves the assumptions of the argumentative form of modern scepticism through recourse to the argumentative forms (tropes) of ancient scepticism: modern scepticism is in reality a form of foundationalist dogmatism. The real sceptical question that philosophy must deal with is rather the one posed by the tropes of Agrippa, namely the problem of epistemic justification (for an interpretation of German Idealism as attempt to answer Agrippa’s trilemma through monistic holism, see Franks, 2005). In this context Hegel gives a positive sense – first in Differenzschrift and later in PhG – to the trope of the circle (on circularity in Hegel’s epistemology; see Rockmore, 1986), and proposes a holistic solution to the problem of justification: ‘As objective totality knowing is grounded all the more, the more that it is more formed, and its parts are only grounded simultaneously with this whole of cognitions’ (Differenzschrift GW 4:82, my translation). In philosophy, it is not the beginning that transmits justification...
SCEPSIS AND SCEPTICISM

to what follows. Rather, there can be justification only within the totality of a system of propositions that mutually sustain one another dialectically antinomically, triggering a circularity in which the result is what justifies the beginning.

Hegel understands this solution, that is, the positive exploitation of the sceptical trope of the circle, as a fully legitimate, rational integration of the argumentative forms of true (i.e. ancient) scepticism in the argumentative form of philosophy. Holism confutes modern but not ancient scepticism, insofar as the process of development of the holistic system is nothing other than ‘scepticism that comes to maturation’, according to the formula employed in *PhG*. This is a metaepistemological scepticism that proves that every epistemic justification is fallible and destined to dissolve. Ancient scepticism, whose principle of equipollence-antinomy (every proposition has an equipollent one that opposes it) had already been taken up by Hegel in his Frankfurt period as the principle of philosophy, is now declared to be united with true philosophy – namely as its negative moment. For Hegel, the antinomy consists essentially in the recognition of the relatedness of opposites (*Differenzschrift GW 4:51*) (on the epistemological relevance of Hegel's philosophy and its relation to scepticism, see Fulda, 1965; Forster, 1989; Westphal, 1989; Varnier, 1990; Fulda and Horstmann, 1996; Heidemann, 2007; on scepticism in the young Hegel, see Westphal 1998; Vieweg, 1999; Testa, 2002, 2010). Thus in philosophy as reason’s self-knowledge, reason knows itself as having an essentially recognitive structure. At this stage, ancient scepticism plays a constructive role in the development of Hegel’s theory of rationality: he develops systematically his youthful intuition (going back to the Tübingen years) that reason, like love, essentially consists in recognizing oneself in every rational being (*Studien 1792/3–1794, GW 1:101*).

The critique of foundationalism is also linked to a critique of its corresponding representational theory of perception, with respect to which Hegel delineates an alternative model. The attack against the dogmatism of ‘facts of consciousness’ already brought into focus in *Scepticismus* is aimed in the Jena System Sketches of 1803/4 and 1805/6 (*JS I GW 6 and JS III GW 8*) at the specular theories of epistemological idealism and empiricism. Hegel develops here an alternative to that representational model of perception proper to modern foundationalism. This theory views perception as merely passive reception of inner perceptive facts that present themselves as immediate and unquestionable, while the veridicality of their objective reference can only be established indirectly – which in turn accounts for the scepticism of the external world and of other minds. Hegel, on the contrary, formulates a pragmatic and interactional theory of perception – eventually developed further in the ‘Perception’ and ‘Understanding’ chapters of *PhG* – that shows, for example in relation to seeing, that perception is always linked to action and motor activity. Perception’s character, in other words, implies active discriminating, distinguishing and recognizing (see also the ‘Intelligence’ chapter of the 1805–6 Jena ‘Realphilosophie’: *JS III GW 8:185–201*). In this way, the infallibility of immediate facts of consciousness is lost but the relation to the world is assured, because the distinction between direct access to internal facts and indirect access to the external world, which caused the sceptics’ problem, is dissolved.

The next argumentative step in the attack upon modern scepticism goes beyond the
critique of the immediatistic theory of perception and knowledge, and calls into question as well the theory of subjectivity linked to it. It is here that we find Hegel's original treatment of the theoretical connection between the question of scepticism on the one hand, and that of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, on the other. The Jena Realphilosophie, in fact, contains – starting with Fragment 18 of 1803–4 (JS I GW 6:273–9) – a radical critique of the self-reflective conception of the identity of self-consciousness, understood as a result of the objectivizing self-reference of an isolated ‘I’. This critique is at once directed at Kant’s ‘apperception’ in the element that links it to the Cartesian cogito, and it addresses the Fichtean problem of a non-circular explanation of self-consciousness. A few years later, moreover, the refutation of foundationalism and of the passivistic theory of perception in the ‘Consciousness’ section of PhG will be followed by a critique of self-centric theories of self-consciousness.

The immediatistic theory of perception is linked in modernity to a proprioceptive conception of the subject as having an epistemologically privileged relation with its own inner contents. This approach persists even when, most notably in post-Kantian philosophy, the notion of subject is de-substantialized and reconceived in terms of ‘self-consciousness’ (Selbstbewußtsein), that is, in terms of a subject that is such not insofar as it is a type of substance, but rather insofar as it refers to itself by self-reflection. Even post-Kantian theories of reflective self-consciousness assume a form of privileged access of the subject to an immediate content of its internal perception, where this cognitive content is the subject itself qua immediate object of its own knowledge. This relation to self as object is supposed to be private and originary with respect to any type of relation to other objects (external world, other self-consciousnesses). Hence, the Fichtean puzzle of circularity to which Dieter Henrich has paid special attention (Henrich, 1967, 1970): if self-consciousness consists of the act of turning back onto itself as to the object of cognition, how can such self-consciousness recognize itself in this object without presupposing a knowledge of itself?

Hegel’s critique of the modern epistemology of the subject had thus to be extended – due to an intimate argumentative connection – also to this self-centric and ultimately solipsistic conception of self-consciousness. The critique of the immediatistic theory of perception had to find its necessary complement in a critique of the modern theory of the subject and of monological self-consciousness, a critique which shows how even the reflective self-relation of the conscious subject is no immediacy but rather something mediated. The theory of intersubjective recognition between self-consciousnesses will become the instrument through which Hegel intends to critique and overcome such conceptions. For Hegel, in fact, epistemic self-consciousness can neither presuppose itself without falling into a vicious circle (Fichte’s solution, i.e. self-position), nor can it pre-exist its relation with other self-consciousnesses. While an isolated self-consciousness has no criterion by which to identify with itself as with the object facing it, a relational self-consciousness constitutes itself precisely through the mediation of a public criterion that makes its self-identification, hence self-knowledge, possible. This Hegelian solution of the paradox is based on the same logic later found in Wittgenstein’s arguments on private language (Wittgenstein, 1953, §§ 188, 213, 239, 258, 265, 289; for a Wittgensteinian interpretation of ‘Self-Consciousness’ in PhG see Pinkard, 1994, pp. 53–62). For Hegel, self-consciousness has a criterion of self-recognition only if
it is relational, that is, self-constitutes through the mediation of a public criterion. Thus the epistemic accessibility of other minds is not derived with respect to the accessibility of the first person, as presupposed by the formulation of the sceptics’ problem. The theory of recognition agrees therefore with the critique of foundationalism in so far as it criticizes the claim that subjectivity (in its various forms as cogito, as Kantian apperception, as Reinholdian consciousness or as Fichtean self-positing ‘I’) is the ultimate ground of knowing – a claim that is at the origin of the peculiar form of scepticism implied by epistemological idealism and modern solipsism. Thus it was the confrontation with scepticism that drove Hegel to reconstruct reason at all levels, that is, in its logical, epistemological and practico-moral structures, in terms of pragmatic relatedness grounded in recognition.
In his mature system of philosophy, Hegel’s concepts of ‘dialectic’, ‘dialectical’ and ‘the dialectical’ signify the scientific or absolute method. This method, based on the nature of the concept, has the concept as its object. It is thus a method that is not indifferent to its subject matter, but instead results from the comprehension of this matter as the subject itself (die Sache selbst). In the Science of Logic (WL), Hegel expresses the key implication of this thought as the following principle: ‘All things are themselves contradictory, in the sense, moreover, that this proposition . . . expresses the truth and essence of things’ (WL GW 11:286). The proposition here in question corresponds to the first of the paradoxical theses in Hegel’s Habilitationschrift, the Philosophical Dissertation on Planetary Orbits (Dissertatio): ‘Contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio est regula falsi [Contradiction is the rule of what is true; non-contradiction, the rule of what is false]’ (GW 5:227). Hegel’s philosophical method of dialectic is thus the method of presentation for that which determines both the concept and its subject matter, namely, contradiction comprehended in its generation and sublation through subjective as well as objective thinking.

Hegel’s logical conception of dialectic is closely linked to Kant’s. According to Kant, dialectic results from the fact that ‘general logic . . . has been used as if it were an organon for the actual production of at least a semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact has thereby been misused’ (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] A61/B85). On Kant’s view, then, ‘general logic, as a putative organon, is called dialectic’ (ibid.). While Hegel draws on this Kantian definition of dialectic, however, he turns it into its opposite: ‘It must be regarded as an infinitely important step that dialectic is once more being recognized as necessary to reason, although the result that must be drawn from it is the opposite that Kant drew’ (WL GW 12:242). For Hegel, dialectic is not reducible to a logic of semblance or illusion (Schein). It is the only possible method of achieving the cognition of truth.

DIALECTIC IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

According to Hegel, the origin of dialectic is found in Eleatic thought. Its first completion is achieved in Plato’s Parmenides, the second part of which in effect brings the method of Zeno to its perfected application and furnishes the point of departure for Hegel’s own conception of dialectic.
Considering the ‘Eleatic School’ of philosophy in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (VGPh), Hegel states that the Eleatic thinkers grasped the dialectic intrinsic to conceptual thinking as well as the contradiction that adheres to the subject matter or object of thinking: ‘We find here the beginning of dialectic, i.e., simply the pure movement of thinking in concepts; hence [we find] in the objective being [an dem gegenständigen Wesen] the contradiction that it has in itself (dialectic proper)’ (VGPh TWA 18:275). Hegel sees the culmination of Eleatic dialectics in Zeno of Elea, the ‘author of dialectic’ (VGPh TWA 18:301). It is in Zeno that philosophy achieves ‘a pure expression’ (VGPh TWA 18:276), and it is with Zeno that Eleatic thought comes to be ‘the movement of the concept in itself, the pure soul of science’ (VGPh TWA 18:295). In Zeno, we see ‘reason make the beginning – calmly demonstrating its nullification [Vernichtung] in that which is posited as existing’ (ibid.). For Hegel, it is in this essential feature of Eleatic metaphysics that we encounter not only the dialectic of thinking but also ‘the truly objective dialectic’ (VGPh TWA 18:301). The method of Eleatic thought consists in considering the subject matter or object of thinking as that which is immanent to thinking itself. In this way the object becomes

for itself without presupposition . . . One puts oneself entirely in the thing [Sache], considers the object in itself, and takes it according to the determinations that it has. In this consideration, it shows itself as containing opposed determinations, and thus sublates itself. (VGPh TWA 18:303)

The most important example of this objective dialectic is the Zenonian account of motion. The reason why dialectic was first discovered in spatio-temporal (i.e. local) motion is that ‘motion is itself the dialectic of everything that is [die Dialektik alles Seienden]’ (VGPh TWA 18:305). Taking the position that motion is essentially a ‘becoming other than itself, self-sublation’ (ibid.), Hegel can interpret Zeno as holding that everything that moves has dialectic within itself. Thus, setting himself against customary interpretations of Zeno, Hegel maintains that Zeno’s propositions regarding motion should not be understood as mounting an objection to the notion that there is motion in the world. To the contrary, they express the necessary character of motion as such since they meant to show that ‘motion is the infinite as the unity of the opposing determinations of time and of space [der Entgegengesetzten der Zeit und des Raums]’ (VGPh TWA 18:310). By comprehending the determinations of space and time contained in motion as well as its internal contradiction, Zeno thus accomplished something that Kant would later undertake to do. For ‘Kant’s antinomies do no more than Zeno did here’ (VGPh TWA 18:317). And Zeno’s dialectic, unlike Kant’s, is also objective dialectic.

Dialectic acquires even greater objectivity with Heraclitus, who comprehended ‘the absolute itself as this process, as dialectic itself’ (VGPh TWA 18:319). In Heraclitus, dialectic becomes the principle of all reality – universal becoming itself: ‘This is the first concrete, the absolute as the unity of opposites in it [das Absolute als in ihm die Einheit Entgegengesetzter]’ (ibid.). The philosophical idea was thereby grasped for the first time by Heraclitus. As Hegel puts it: ‘Here we see land; there is no sentence of Heraclitus that I have not taken up into my logic’ (ibid.). Heraclitus’ philosophy is thus fully current in the sense that its principle is found at the beginning of Hegel’s logic, immediately after
the account of being and nothing, where the task of thinking is to determine the absolute as becoming – that is, as ‘the unity of opposites, of the pure opposition of being and nothing’ (VGPh TWA 18:325).

On Hegel’s interpretation, Heraclitus took the notion of pure being as the simple thought in which everything determinate is negated. Heraclitus thus already thought of pure being as ‘the absolutely negative’, that is, as nothing. Going beyond Zeno, he also grasped being and nothing as the ‘self-same [Sichselbstgleiche]’, thereby establishing a second beginning of philosophy that Hegel calls the ‘beginning of the existence of philosophy’ (VGPh TWA 18:336). For Heraclitus’ (‘absolute’) transition from being to nothing shows an insight that is proper to philosophy as such, namely, the fundamental insight that negativity is an immanent moment of both thinking and reality.

Hegel repeatedly refers to Sophistic thought in his presentation of Eleatic and Heraclitean dialectics. He points out that the Eleatic School would later come to be counted as belonging to the Sophistic movement; and he adds in this connection that Heraclitus’ conception of the ‘nullity of being’ (VGPh TWA 18:301) (i.e. the notion that being is nothing determinate with respect to nothing) is the same as that found in Gorgias’ dialectical treatment of the universal and pure categories of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’.1 In Hegel’s view, Gorgias’ dialectic is distinguished from other forms of Sophistic argumentation by its non-subjective import. Hegel writes that contrary to common belief Gorgias was engaged in something of far greater significance than merely rhetorical ‘twaddle [Geschwätz]’, and that ‘his dialectic is objective’ (VGPh TWA 18:435–6).

We now turn to Plato, who (according to Diogenes Laertius) added dialectic as the third part of philosophy to the natural philosophy of the Ionian thinkers and the moral philosophy of Socrates. As distinguished from the non-objective forms of Sophistic dialectical thought, Plato’s dialectic is one that ‘moves in pure concepts – the pure movement of the logical’ (VGPh TWA 19:61). By portraying the necessary movement of pure concepts in their opposition to one another, it shows that these very concepts are movement itself and that ‘the universal is the unity of such opposed concepts’ (VGPh TWA 19:62). More precisely, the Platonic dialectic’s interest is to show the finitude of the particular, that is, the negation at hand in any given particular – in other words, to show that the particular is not simply what it is but is also transformed into its contrary. Its limit is a ‘negation that is essential to it’, and, once this limit is shown, the particular ‘passes away’ into ‘something other than that which it is taken to be’ (VGPh TWA 19:644).

This negative dialectic, which consists in ‘the dissolution of the particular, and consequently in the production of the universal’, is not yet true dialectic since it is ‘a dialectic that Plato shares with the Sophists’ (VGPh TWA 19:65). But a contrasting form of dialectic also evident in Plato’s work, namely, a speculative dialectic the role of which is to determine the purely negative universal that emerges from the dissolution of the particular – that is, to determine ‘the universal that issues from the confusion of the particular’ (ibid.). Through this dialectic, the contradictory features of the universal are resolved in such a way that ‘this resolution of the contradiction is the affirmative’ (ibid.). The universal obtained through this work of resolution is what Hegel calls ‘the intrinsically concrete [das an sich Konkrete]’ (ibid.). So determined, the notion of the intrinsically concrete represents a fundamental concept of Hegel’s own dialectic.
Because the intrinsically concrete must be grasped as the unification of self-nullifying opposites, ‘what is difficult for the understanding begins here’ (VGPh TWA 19:65). According to traditional logical rules of the understanding, the universal is the genus that includes the contradictorily opposed species that supply its content. At the same time, though, that genus cannot be richer in determinations than the opposing species that it contains. Indeed, because it must be poorer in content than the latter, it ultimately cannot self-consistently be thought of as containing those determinations at all. Hegel is thus well aware of the contradiction for the understanding that lies in the concept of the concrete universal. And he holds that not even Plato was able to comprehend the significance of this concept, which is essential to genuinely speculative dialectic. Still, although Plato’s dialectic ultimately remains merely ratiocinative (räsonierend) – as his ‘form of method is not yet developed purely for itself’ (VGPh TWA 19:65) – authentically speculative dialectic is nonetheless implicit in it (VGPh TWA 19:68). That is because Plato’s ‘idea’ (or ‘form’) is nothing other than the Hegelian universal, that is, the Hegelian idea. This idea, Hegel maintains, is the universal, but as that which, as self-determining, is concrete in itself. This comes only through the movement in thoughts containing opposition within themselves, difference in itself. The idea, then, is the unity of these differences; it is thus the determinate idea, which is the main side of cognition. (VGPh TWA 19:68)

Hegel thinks that Plato did not go far enough on the path leading to properly speculative dialectic since the latter kept separate the movement through thoughts and the result of this same movement (i.e. the idea). Still, he holds that the path that Plato took was clearly the right one.² He regards Plato as his predecessor because Plato’s dialectic determined ‘the universal in and for itself’ (VGPh TWA 19:74). There are in Plato various ways or forms of the universal even if they are ‘still very general and abstract’ (ibid.). Moreover, the ‘highest’ of these forms, for Plato, is ‘the identity of being and non-being’, namely, that which truly is but is ‘not without negation’ (ibid.). In Hegel’s view, then, Plato showed that ‘non-being is’, that what is simple partakes of otherness, and that ‘unity partakes of multiplicity’ (ibid.)

Above all, Hegel appeals to the Parmenides – the ‘most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic’ (VGPh TWA 19:79) – as the dialogue containing Plato’s most fully developed dialectic. This work ‘is actually Plato’s pure doctrine of ideas’, and the dialectical consideration that it presents is one whose content is comprised by ‘pure thoughts’ (VGPh TWA 19:81). It pertains to the movement of pure thoughts that ‘they make themselves the other of themselves’ (ibid.), thereby expressing that what is true (das Wahrhafte) lies only in their unity. Thus, the pure determinations of ‘one’ and ‘many’ are shown to be dialectical since it is their essence – hence their truth – to be identical ‘with their other’ (ibid.). Hegel refers to becoming as an example in which there is both being and non-being, so that what is true in both lies in ‘the unity of both as inseparable yet also as distinct; for being is not becoming nor also non-being [denn Seyn ist nicht Werden und Nichtseyn auch nicht]’ (ibid.). Here again, however, we encounter the incomplete character of Plato’s dialectic since the result obtained is merely negatively conceived and is not thought of affirmatively. This result, in other words, is ‘not expressed . . . as negation of the negation’ (ibid.). According to Hegel, it was the
Neoplatonists – especially Proclus – who brought Plato’s dialectic to its completion when they came to regard the Parmenides as ‘the true [wahrhafte] theology’ (ibid.):

Insofar as the idea is the absolute thinking being thinking itself [das absolute Sich-selbst-Denken], it is the activity of thinking in itself; and dialectic is likewise nothing other than the activity of self-thinking [die Tätigkeit des Sich-selbst-Denkens]. The Neoplatonists regarded this connection only as metaphysical and took from this the theology that cognized the development of the secrets of the divine Being. (VGPh TWA 19:82–3)

DIALECTIC IN THE ABSOLUTE IDEA

The absolute idea, treated in the concluding chapter of Hegel’s Subjective Logic (or Logic of the Concept), is ‘the sole subject matter and content of philosophy’ (WL GW 12:236). In the science of logic, comprehended as a science of the form of thinking and being, the content of the idea is considered only in so far as it is consummated totality of the ‘form determination’ that is also the ‘pure concept’ (WL GW 12:237). The determinateness of the absolute idea therefore does not have the shape of any particular content. It is not the form of a given content since it is simply as form. It is the ‘infinite form’ that generates its content from itself and thus ‘has itself . . . for its content’ (ibid.). What has to be considered at the conclusion of Hegel’s logic, then, is ‘not a content as such, but the universal character of its form – that is, method’ (WL GW 12:237).

What is true for Hegel’s concept of logic applies to his concept of method as well. The basis of method is not a subject matter that is ‘given to the method and of a nature of its own’ (WL GW 12:237). For the method in question is by no means ‘a merely external form’ (ibid.). Rather, it is ‘the absolute form’ that furnishes the ‘absolute foundation and the ultimate truth’ of science as such:

the method has resulted as the absolutely self-knowing concept, as the concept that has the absolute, both as subjective and objective, as its subject matter, and consequently as the pure correspondence of the concept and its reality, a concrete existence that is the concept itself. (WL GW 12:237–8)

Such is the conception of method that underlies Hegel’s account of ‘absolute cognition’ (WL GW 12:242). Hegel’s account of the essential features of absolute cognition’s method is combined with a reminder of the role played by dialectic in the philosophies of Plato and Kant. The reminder in both cases is directed against the ‘fundamental prejudice . . . that dialectic has only a negative result’ (WL GW 12:243) – that either the subject matter of cognition or cognition itself is ‘declared null and void’ (ibid.). Hegel comments in this connection that ‘the infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy’ (ibid.) is to have called attention to this prejudice. It was Kant who provided ‘the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic understood as the examinations of thought determinations in and for themselves’ (WL GW 12:244).

Hegel gives an abstract sketch of the development of such thought determinations immediately after his indication of Kant’s significance for the restoration of logic and dialectic to their proper standing. The beginning is the initial standpoint from which a universal prius, considered in and for itself, proves to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be
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taken to mean that what is at first immediate is therewith posited as mediated, as referred to an other, or that the universal is posited as a particular. The second universal that has thereby arisen is thus the negative of the first and, in view of subsequent developments, the first negative. From this negative side, the immediate has perished in the other; but the other is essentially not an empty negative, the nothing which is normally taken to be the result of dialectic, but is rather the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated – contains as such the determination of the first in it. The first is thus essentially preserved and contained in the other. (WL GW 12:244–5 – di Giovanni translation adapted)

Obviously avoiding here the term ‘sublation [Aufhebung]’, Hegel clarifies the second step in dialectical development, which leads to the negative of the immediate, by saying that it is ‘the most important factor in rational cognition’ to hold fast to ‘the positive in its negative, to the content of the presupposition in the result’ (WL GW 12:245). He then adds that the second determination (i.e. the negative, mediated determination) that is achieved in this way is also ‘the one that mediates’ (ibid.) since, although it at first appears as simple, it is in truth a ‘reference or relation’ (ibid.). Specifically, it is a relation that is

the negative, but the negative of the positive, and it includes the negative in itself. It is therefore the other and, moreover, the other of an other; hence it includes its own other within itself and is consequently the contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. (WL GW 12:244–5)

More precisely, two dialectical features are combined in the second determination. Because the first immediate is ‘the concept in itself’, it is also (‘only’) ‘the negative in itself’ (WL GW 12:245). The moment of immediacy thus consists in this: ‘the difference implicitly contained in it is posited in it’ (ibid.). This occurs through the circumstance that the first moment is thought as the negative of the second, and is consequently thought of as that which mediates. In Hegel’s words, ‘the second is itself the determinate, the difference or relation; hence the dialectical moment consists in its case in the positing of the unity contained within it’ (WL GW 12:246). The ‘dialectical moment’ in question, then, lies in the contradiction that constitutes the relation between the two moments involved.

Discernible at this juncture is an implicit allusion to Kant’s account of the antinomies that are characteristic of formal thinking and are opposed to Hegel’s own way of thinking: ‘The firm principle that formal thinking lays down for itself here is that contradiction cannot be thought. But in fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept’ (WL GW 12:246 – di Giovanni translation adapted). This consideration in WL is further elucidated by a passage from VGPh in which Hegel treats Kant’s doctrine of the antinomies of pure reason:

Kant sets out four contradictions. These are few, and antinomies are everywhere. It is easy to set out the contradiction in every concept; for the concept is concrete, and thus not a simple determination. It therefore contains various determinations, and these are immediately opposed. Kant called these contradictions antinomies. That is important, though contrary to Kant’s intention. (VGPh TWA 20:356)

Returning to the WL chapter on the absolute idea, we find Hegel making a remark that is
of fundamental significance for his philosophy. When considering the concept’s second determination, that is, the determination leading to the negative of the immediate, he states that this ‘constitutes the turning point of the movement of the concept’ (WL GW 12:246) on account of its being a negative relation of self-reference. Such a relation is

the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement; it is the dialectical soul which everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity which is truth. (WL GW 12:246)

The second determination of the concept thus concerns the self-relation of the negative since this is ‘the relation of the differentiated, as differentiated, to that from which it is differentiated’ (WL GW 12:246). The second determination, as the negative of the first, is also the negative relation to a content within it (ein in ihr Enthaltenes) by which the first determination itself comes to be a negative in relation to that which is immediate. And the fact that this negative relation to self is characterized as subjectivity makes the following implication immediately transparent: the negative relation to self through which the relata prove to be identical and merged into unity is, for Hegel, what constitutes the fundamental structure of the concept. Moreover, subjectivity (thus understood) at the same time serves as the model of truth and as the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality. For if every concept, qua determinate, refers to its negative, then it is also related to its object as the determinate negation that it contains; and it is related to itself just in so far as it is so related. It is in this sense that subjectivity and truth of the concept coincide.

As the second determination of any determinate concept, the negative therefore appears as the mediating factor because both the negative itself and the immediate are contained in it: ‘This negativity is as self-sublating contradiction the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal’ (WL GW 12:247). Relative to the first immediate as well as to that which is mediated, this second immediate is the third determination of the concept. And if one counts the negative twice (i.e. as the formally negative and as self-referential negativity), then the third negative is also to be counted as the concept’s fourth determination. This third, or fourth, determination is thus ‘the unity of the first and second moment, of the immediate and the mediated’ (ibid.). Moreover, given that the third determination is this unity, it contains the dialectical moment of negativity’ (ibid.). For the immediate and the mediated can, on account of their difference, form a unity only in so far as they are sublated.

The third determination in question is thus the immediate through the sublation of mediation. It is the simple only through the sublation of difference, and it is positive only through the sublation of the negative. As Hegel puts it, it is ‘the concept that has realized itself through its otherness, and through the sublating of this reality has rejoined itself and has restored its absolute reality, its simple self-reference’ (WL GW 12:248). This result, however, should not be grasped as a third moment at rest, but rather as ‘the self-mediating movement and activity’ (ibid.). And this is, in turn, a new determinateness that already goes beyond the result achieved. It is ‘itself a new beginning’ in virtue of which ‘cognition rolls onwards from content to content’ (WL GW 12:250).
The forward movement just characterized is a process of content enrichment by which ever more concrete determinateness emerges from what is simple. Each resulting unity contains a new starting point for further enrichment, and the progress of enrichment represents a continual concretization of the determinateness of origin:

In the absolute method, the concept maintains itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularization . . . at each stage of further determination, the universal elevates the whole mass of its preceding content, not only not losing through its dialectical advance, or leaving it behind, but, on the contrary, carrying with itself all that it has gained, inwardly enriched and compressed. (GW WL 12:250)

In this metaphorical description, Hegel solves (in his characteristic way) the aforementioned problem of compatibility regarding the higher universality of a concept and the greater wealth of its determinations, that is, the problem which emerges from the assumption that concepts must be increasingly impoverished in terms of their content in proportion to their increasing extension. In this regard, Hegel holds that the ‘expansion (Erweiterung)’ in question must indeed be regarded as ‘the moment of content’ in which ‘the universal is communicated to the wealth of content, is immediately received in it’ (WL GW 12:251). But because the relation of the universal to its particular content ‘has also a second, negative or dialectical side’ (ibid.), that is, the sublation of the particular through the universal, this communication of the universal ‘proceeds in the necessity of the concept, it is contained by it, and every determination is a reflection into itself’ (ibid.). This means that the expansion of conceptual content also represents a heightening of the subjectivity of the concept that determines itself through its opposing features and their identity: ‘Each new stage of exteriorization, that is, of further determination, is also a withdrawing into itself, and the greater the extension, just as dense is the intensity’ (ibid.).

Hegel here makes metaphorical use of the notions of extensive and intensive magnitude as they are employed in natural philosophy. But even more important than this borrowing reference to natural philosophy is the characterization of the ‘logic of the divine concept’ (WL GW 12:253) that he takes from rational theology. In keeping with this metaphorical reference to the divine, the concept richest in its determinations – the concept that is the ‘most concrete and subjective’, the ‘most deeply self-interiorizing’ – is also the ‘mightiest and most encompassing’ (WL GW 12:251).

At issue here is an abstract, purely logical concept of God the historical antecedent of which is (as was indicated above) discernible in the Neoplatonic theology of Proclus. This concept is now, at the end of Hegel’s logical science, further specified through recourse to the Judeo-Christian theology of creation. Hegel writes:

The highest and most intense point is the pure personality that, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, equally embraces and holds everything within itself, for it makes itself into the supremely free – into the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality. (WL GW 12:251 – di Giovanni translation adapted)

By declaring the ‘absolute dialectic’ to be the nature of the ‘pure personality’, Hegel’s logic of the concept provides a solution to the problem of the concrete universal. For by thinking of what encompasses all things as
pure personality – and thus as self-determining subjectivity – Hegel also thinks of the highest concept as the idea personified in ‘divine cognition’ (WL GW 12:253). This is not only the form of cognition that disposes over the whole of reality as the content of thinking. It is also the cognition that is able to give to the concept the immediacy of being – namely, external existence as nature.

NOTES

1 Hegel’s remarks on Gorgias’ dialectic are keyed to the pseudo-Aristotelian work, De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia (which nowadays is standardly referred to as De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgia) as well as to the relevant discussions in Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus mathematicos VII. See VGPh TWA 18:436–40.

2 For Hegel’s highly positive view of the import of Plato’s dialectic, see especially the comments on what Plato says regarding identity and diversity in his Sophist at 259b–c (VGPh TWA 19:72–3). Plato insists here that what is different (or ‘other’: ἄλλο) is the same (αὐτὸν ὄν) only in a certain respect, and that it is crucial to distinguish the ways in which identity and diversity are attributed to things. It may therefore be worth noting in this connection that Plato actually says the opposite of what Hegel interprets him as saying.

translated by J. Edwards
In both theory and in practice Hegel was subtle and sophisticated about philosophically central issues and methods regarding proof, justification and refutation. His insights into these topics have been obscured by the tendency to assimilate his views to familiar philosophical classifications and strategies. For example, by 1802 Hegel replaced the traditional dichotomies in kind between the a priori and the a posteriori, and between the analytic and the synthetic, with continua — with gradations in degree — between the a priori and the a posteriori, on the one hand, and the analytic and the synthetic on the other (Westphal, 1996). This shift suffices to dispense with the still common presumption that Hegel was a mad rationalist who sought to deduce substantive, comprehensive truths by some esoteric (perverse, bogus) form of entirely a priori logic. Instead, Hegel radicalized Kant’s profound anti-Cartesian philosophical revolt (cf. Westphal, 2007a), in part by rejecting (rather than radicalizing) Kant’s transcendental idealism (Westphal, 2009b). The preoccupation of most of Hegel’s expositors with metaphysics and their consequent neglect of epistemology, philosophy of natural science and issues of justification more generally have obscured Hegel’s views, analyses and achievements.

DE DUCTION, SCIENTIA AND INFALLIBILISM

Hegel adopted from Kant the legal sense of ‘deduction’ as the justification or proof of an entitlement, of a rightful claim (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] B116–21; Science of Logic [WL] GW 11:20–1, 33; 21:32–4, 54–5; cf. Philosophy of Right [RPh] §2, 2R). What form(s) of proof or justification can we attain in philosophy or in other kinds of inquiry? ‘Infallibilism’ is the thesis that justification sufficient for knowledge entails the truth of what is known. The presumption that rational inquiry can achieve infallible knowledge derives from the Attic Greek model of scientia, in which rational first principles suffice for the deduction of more specific corollaries. ¹ How, whether or to what extent this model (or family of models) might be fitted to empirical domains has been a philosophical preoccupation from Aristotle to contemporary efforts (e.g. by logical positivists) to use axiomatic systems within natural sciences, especially physics.

The two most sophisticated and thorough attempts to analyse our knowledge of the world in terms of an infallibilist model of scientia are Descartes’s Meditations and Kant’s transcendental idealism.² Careful analysis
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of their views – based on Hegel’s requirement of strictly internal critique (see below, ‘Phenomenology and the critical assessment of principles’) – reveals insurmountable problems with each. Descartes’s Meditations are vitiated by five distinct vicious circularities (Westphal, 1989, pp. 18–34).\(^3\) Kant’s transcendental idealism ultimately fails to justify our basic causal judgements, and one of Kant’s most basic lines of analysis refutes his own core arguments supporting transcendental idealism. These two failings are significant for Hegel’s methodological (and substantive) views, and merit brief consideration.

Transcendental idealism fails to justify our basic causal judgements because neither alone, nor when supplemented by Kant’s critical metaphysics of nature (see Kant, MAN), can it justify the specific causal principle required for our common-sense and scientific causal judgements, namely that every spatio-temporal, physical event has an external, physical cause. Kant’s analysis of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold (i.e. of the necessary minimum degree of humanly detectable variety and regularity among the contents of sensations or analogously among the spatio-temporal objects and events we sense) ultimately shows that mind-independent, material factors can satisfy Kant’s formalism requirement and can be required on proper transcendental grounds for the possibility of integrated self-conscious human experience, expressed in the apperceptive ‘I think’. In a phrase, the relevant ‘neglected alternative’ to Kant’s main arguments by elimination in favour of transcendental idealism derives directly from Kant’s own Transcendental Analytic (part one of the Transcendental Logic of KrV). More specifically, according to transcendental idealism, the formal transcendental conditions for the possibility of human apperception can only be satisfied by the structure and functioning of the human mind. This hallmark thesis of transcendental idealism is refuted by Kant’s own (sound) analysis of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold. Hegel recognized these defects in Kant’s transcendental idealism by 1802 (Westphal, 1996, 1998c).\(^4\)

Appeals to self-evidence have been popular among foundationalists (both empiricists and rationalists), intuitionists, Lockean natural lawyers and among Hegel’s immediate predecessors, Jacobi and Schelling. Though some substantive claims are infallible (e.g. Descartes infallibly knew he existed each and every time he considered the point), typically such infallibility is achieved by stripping candidate claims of any further implications. Perhaps one cannot at any moment be mistaken about what one seems to experience at that moment. However, such self-evidence is evidence for nothing else. Such claims are justificatorily vacuous; only thus can they be infallible.\(^3\) When more substantive claims are made, however, appeals to self-evidence face a challenge Hegel highlighted, to distinguish effectively in principle and in practice between these two cognitively very different scenarios: (i) grasping a truth, and only on that basis having, and recognizing one has, infallible knowledge of it; (ii) being utterly, even incorrigibly convinced one has grasped a truth, and on that basis alone claiming (mistakenly) to have infallible knowledge of that purported truth. This distinction holds regardless of the truth or falsehood of the claim in question; it is a cognitive distinction marking a crucial justificatory difference. No advocate of self-evidence has devised plausible criteria for distinguishing reliably between them (in connection with claims substantive enough to contribute to justifying further claims).
Infallibilism is ill-suited to substantive domains. The alternative is fallibilism, according to which justification sufficient for knowledge strongly indicates the truth (or the strict objectivity) of what is known, but does not entail it. Infallibilists have condemned fallibilism as a capitulation to scepticism. Clarifying why fallibilism is not a sceptical capitulation requires distinguishing between formal and non-formal domains. Strictly speaking, formal domains are those which involve no existence postulates. Strictly speaking, the one purely formal domain is a careful reconstruction of Aristotle's Square of Opposition (Wolff, 2009). All further logical or mathematical domains involve various sorts of existence postulates. We may define ‘formal domains’ more broadly to include all formally defined logistic systems (Lewis, 1970, p. 10). The relevance of any such logistic system to any non-formal, substantive domain rests, however, not upon formal considerations alone, but also upon substantive considerations of how useful a specific logistic system may be within a non-formal, substantive domain (Lewis, 1929, p. 298; cf. Carnap, 1950a). Within any specified logistic system, deduction suffices for justification only within that system; the use of that system within any non-formal domain to which that system is applied requires further justificatory resources, not limited to formal deduction. This holds too for the use of that system in justifying any particular claims within its domain of application. Within any substantive domain, fallibilism is no sceptical capitulation, not because infallibilist standards of justification are too stringent, but because in principle they are inappropriate to any and all substantive domains. Conversely, within any substantive domain, a merely logical possibility has no cognitive status and so cannot serve to ‘defeat’ or to undermine (refute) an otherwise well-grounded line of justificatory reasoning within that domain (see below, ‘Phenomenology and the critical assessment of principles’).

More thoroughly than any other philosopher, Hegel probed the character, scope and prospects for rational justification in non-formal domains, including both empirical knowledge and moral philosophy (ethics and theory of justice).

THE PYRRHONIAN DILEMMA OF THE CRITERION

Hegel realized that his radical reconsideration of the issues and prospects of philosophical proof, justification and refutation – together with his heterodox substantive views – required addressing the most fundamental challenge to rational justification, especially within philosophy: the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion. This Dilemma poses the problem of justifying criteria of justification or of truth within any disputed domain:

[In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion of truth, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow those who claim to know something] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum.
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And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning. (Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 2.4.20; cf. 1.14.116–17)

Hegel restates this Dilemma in the middle of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhG*) (GW 9:58) and then etches the basic points required for one main aspect of its solution, further aspects of which are developed within *PhG*. Though Pyrrhonian scepticism has pervasively influenced philosophy (see Popkin, 1980, 2003; Popkin and Vanderjagt, 1993), until very recently little attention was devoted to it by analytic epistemologists. Fogelin (1994) is an exception, though he omits the Dilemma of the Criterion. Chisholm (1982, pp. 65–75) substitutes for the Pyrrhonian Dilemma his own ‘Problem’ of the Criterion. Though often mistaken for the original (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, 2004b), Chisholm’s ‘Problem’ oversimplifies the original Dilemma (Westphal 1998b; cf. Cling, 1994).

The Dilemma of the Criterion refutes the two standard accounts of cognitive (‘epistemic’) justification, coherentism and foundationalism. Against coherentism, the Dilemma raises the charge of vicious circularity. Coherence alone cannot distinguish in any principled way between genuine improvement in our knowledge, in contrast to mere change in belief, nor between a true set of beliefs and an elaborately detailed, coherent fiction – which may include (and coherently embed or systematically implicate) the statements, ‘this set of beliefs is true’, or ‘this version of the coherence theory is true’. Coherentism’s most able and ardent contemporary advocate, Laurence BonJour (1997, pp. 14–15), has conceded that coherentism provides no adequate criterion of truth or justification. BonJour’s concession recapitulates the key point made by von Juhos and Ayer against Hempel in the mid-1930s (Westphal, 1989, pp. 56–7).

Foundationalist models of justification typically distinguish between *historia* and *scientia*. Historical knowledge (*historia*) derives from sensory and memorial data; rational knowledge (*scientia*) is deduced from first principles. Common from Aristotle through the modern period, this distinction remains influential today, as is evident in the common analytical distinction between ‘conceptual’ and ‘empirical’ issues. Both models involve justifying conclusions by deriving them unilaterally from basic foundations: justification flows from basic foundations to other, derived claims, not vice versa. This holds whether justificatory relations are strictly deductive or involve other kinds of rules of inference (e.g. induction, abduction) or weaker forms of basing relations.

The Dilemma exposes foundationalist models of justification as dogmatic and question-begging (*petitio principii*) because such models cannot be justified to those who fundamentally dispute either the foundations or the basing relations invoked by any foundationalist theory, or the foundationalist model itself, because this model explicates justification solely in terms of derivation from first premises of whatever kind. In principle, foundationalism preaches to the (nearly) converted, and commits a *petitio principii* against those who dissent; once disputed, foundationalism cannot justify its criteria of truth or of justification.

In these important regards, the Dilemma of the Criterion challenges coherence and foundationalist theories of justification, and not simply the justification of any particular first-order cognitive claim(s). This is an
important regard in which the Dilemma of the Criterion differs from and is more challenging than (what has come to be called) ‘Agrippa’s Trilemma’ (Williams, 1996, pp. 60–8), which challenges first-order cognitive claims by noting that any mere claim is no more (nor less) justified than any other, and that justifying a claim by appeal to another claim threatens to launch an infinite regress, to argue viciously in a circle or to appeal to another mere assertion (or to a falsehood). Additionally, the Dilemma of the Criterion stresses that solving the problem of cognitive justification at the first order must be carefully coordinated with solving the problem of epistemic justification at the second order of theories of justification. Trying to solve either problem before the other threatens to prejudice the issues (cf. Chisholm, 1982, pp. 65–75).

Contemporary epistemologists have taken notice of Agrippa’s Trilemma, but tend to ossify it into a taxonomy of the standard alternatives within theory of justification. Consequently, they overlook the second order, the reflexive and the fully general character of the Dilemma of the Criterion. The Dilemma of the Criterion raises not only the second- or third-person question: How might a philosopher justify his or her second-order analysis of first-order justification, together with his or her original first-order claim, without dogmatism, *petitio principii*, infinite regress or vicious circularity? The Dilemma of the Criterion also raises the reflexive first-person question: How might I, qua philosopher, justify my second-order analysis of first-order justification, together with my original first-order claim, without dogmatism, *petitio principii*, infinite regress or vicious circularity? The Dilemma of the Criterion raises these issues in their fully general form.

**SOLVING THE DILEMMA OF THE CRITERION**

Solving the Dilemma of the Criterion within substantive, non-formal domains requires a philosophical sea-change, only partly inaugurated by Kant’s critical philosophy, and only partly undertaken by post-Gettier analytic epistemologists (e.g. Alston, 2005). Some key features of its solution are these.

(i) Per above, solving the Dilemma of the Criterion requires distinguishing properly between strictly formal and non-formal domains, and rejecting justificatory infallibilism. This requires rejecting the thesis that to know something requires knowing that one know it (the ‘K-K thesis’). (ii) It requires rejecting justificatory internalism, the thesis that the only factors relevant to justification are ones of which someone is aware, or can easily become aware upon simple reflection. Conversely, it requires accepting justificatory externalism, the thesis that some aspects of justification fulfil their justificatory role(s) without the subject being (readily) aware of them. Justificatory externalism involves some form(s) of ‘reliabilism’, the thesis that, to some extent and in some way(s), beliefs or claims may be justified (at least in part) by reliable processes which generate them – most plausibly, simple perceptual beliefs. (iii) It requires accepting a ‘mixed’ theory of justification, one which combines, for example, internalist and externalist elements. (iv) It requires recognizing that not all forms of justificatory circularity are vicious. For example, if many simple perceptual beliefs are typically generated by suitably reliable psycho-physiological processes, these may count as perceptual knowledge. On the basis of such perceptual knowledge, we then may be able to formulate and to justify the cognitive principle that, in favourable circumstances,
many simple perceptual beliefs are typically generated by suitably reliable psychological processes, and so count as perceptual knowledge. Such a procedure involves justificatory circularity, but this circularity is not in principle vicious (Alston, 1986). (v) However, such two-step procedures must be carefully assessed in order to identify genuine cases of non-vicious, positive justification of principles of justification, and to distinguish these from justificatorily vicious cases of pseudo-justification (Alston, 1989b). The relevant kind of assessment requires two linked analyses, one of the possibility of constructive self-criticism, the other of the possibility of constructive mutual assessment. Hegel is the only philosopher to address either point; he provides both analyses in PhG.

Hegel’s account of the possibility of constructive self-criticism is subtle and intricate. Two of its core points are these: First, our experience of the world involves our experience of ourselves in and as we experience the world. Second, our experience is constituted in part by the conceptions we use and by how we use them to grasp objects, and also in part by the objects we thereby grasp. Consequently, we are incapable of a conceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, and yet neither are we trapped within our conceptual schemes’. Instead, sustained use of our conceptions of the world and of ourselves (as cognizant agents) to know the world and to know ourselves can inform us about whether or how we must revise or replace our conceptions (or our use of them) to better comprehend our objects. Because the character and content of our experience depends both upon our conceptions and upon their – that is, upon our – objects, our conceptions of the world and of ourselves can be made adequate to our experience of ourselves and of the world if and only if our conceptions adequately correspond to their – that is, to our – objects: to the world itself and to our actual cognitive capacities and activities. These theses (and some related ones) must be true in order for constructive self-criticism to be possible; they need not, in addition, be known to be true, in order for constructive self-criticism to be possible. From these rudiments Hegel develops a powerful criterion for the truth and the justification of philosophical theories of knowledge and of moral principles which solves the Dilemma of the Criterion (Westphal, 1989, 1998b, 2011b).

Rational justification, both cognitive and moral, Hegel further argues, also requires our mutual critical assessment (Westphal, 2009c, 2010–11, 2011b). Very briefly, this is because each of us is a decidedly finite rational being. We each know only a fragment of information pertaining to any substantive issue of justification. We each have our own strengths, predilections and preferences, and their converse shortcomings in other regards. Above all, we are each fallible. Consequently, even the most scrupulously self-critical among us faces the difficulty in practice, in any case of purporting to justify any significant substantive claim or judgement, to determine whether or the extent to which we ourselves have justified our judgement because we have sufficiently fulfilled all relevant justificatory requirements; or whether instead we merely believe we have fulfilled those requirements and thus merely believe we have justified our conclusion. To make this distinction reliably and effectively requires the constructive critical assessment of others; and likewise in each of their cases too. In non-formal, substantive domains, rational justification is thus fundamentally a social phenomenon. Moreover, in substantive domains both general principles and specific claims are and remain justified to the extent
that they are adequate to their intended domains and are superior to their relevant alternatives, whether historical or contemporary (see below ‘Phenomenology and the critical assessment of principles’), and retain their adequacy over time in new contexts of use. Hence in substantive domains rational justification is fundamentally also an historical phenomenon.

Hegel was the first to understand and to argue that these social and historical aspects of rational justification in substantive domains are consistent with – indeed ultimately they require – realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about basic moral norms. It is still widely supposed that ‘pragmatic realism’ is oxymoronic. This supposition, Hegel rightly argued, rests on a series of false dichotomies (Westphal, 2003a). In non-formal domains cultural and intellectual history – including all forms of empirical inquiry – play central, ineliminable roles within rational justification. Philosophy itself, as a rational examination of substantive issues within substantive domains, is essentially historical and social. Hegel elevated the history of philosophy to a specifically philosophical discipline because he recognized (already in PhG11) that comprehensive, critical, philosophical history of philosophy is essential to rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains of philosophical inquiry.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES

Following Kant (see O’Neill, 1992), Hegel realized that a sound fallibilist account of rational justification requires identifying and assessing our basic cognitive and practical capacities, together with their attendant incapacities. This rational self-assessment is required to assess and to establish sound principles of justification and their appropriate use for and by beings with our form of cognitive and practical agency. To conduct this self-assessment while avoiding petitio principii, PhG examines a wide range of principles of justification, both cognitive and practical, as used by their paradigmatic exponent within their intended domains. Each candidate set of principle, exponent, use and intended domain is presented as a ‘form of consciousness’. Each candidate set is relevant because it plausibly highlights one or another of our putative cognitive or practical capacities or abilities.

Hegel holds that each candidate principle of justification can be assessed strictly internally, because, as Robinson (1977, p. 2) observed, ‘bad theory makes for bad practice, and . . . the bad practice shows up the logical difficulties of the theory’. Hegel holds that cogent refutation must be internal; thorough internal critique enables us to understand both the insights and the oversights of the assessed principle. Deepening our understanding of that principle and its purported domain and use in this way enables us to assess the adequacy and justificatory status of that principle, and in the case of inadequate principles, to identify and to justify the introduction of a superior successor principle, which is then subjected to internal critique. Through this process, we also better learn what are our actual cognitive capacities and incapacities. This is part of what enables us to winnow the insights from inadequate forms of consciousness and to understand the rationale for introducing more adequate successor forms of consciousness.

Hegel’s use of this kind of strictly internal critique reflects his contrast between
‘abstract’ negations of philosophical views, which stop at finding fault (e.g. Popper’s falsificationism), and ‘determinate’ negations, which result from thorough, strictly internal critique (PhG GW 9:57; cf. WL GW 12:14–15). External criticism can be blocked by dogmatic re-assertion of the original view; ‘abstract’ criticism undermines the justification of a view, but provides no constructive steps towards a superior alternative. Determinate negation via thorough internal critique provides both genuine refutation and strong regressive proof. Regressive proofs start from an acknowledged phenomenon (e.g. the claim ‘now is night’), and purport to show that the phenomenon in question could not occur unless certain specific preconditions for it are satisfied. These preconditions are thus necessary grounds for that phenomenon (WL GW 21:57; cf. PhG GW 9:239).

What sort of preconditions these may be, and why (and how) they may be necessary, depend upon the domain and topic at issue. In PhG Hegel argues, for example, against individualist accounts of thought and action that the phenomena of individual thought and action are possible because as individual human agents, we are each fundamentally social practitioners (Hegel’s view, however, is non-reductive; see Westphal, 2003a, pp. 103–15). One reason for this is especially germane here.

The central significance of Hegel’s account of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) for rational justification is this: For anyone accurately and rationally to judge that she or he is a rational judge requires (i) recognizing one’s own rational fallibility, (ii) judging that others are likewise genuine rational judges, (iii) that we are equally capable of and responsible for assessing rationally our own and each other’s judgements and (iv) that we require each other’s assessment of our own judgements in order to scrutinize and thereby maximally to refine and to justify rationally our own judgements. Unless we recognize our critical interdependence as fallible rational judges, we cannot judge fully rationally, because unless we acknowledge and affirm our judgemental interdependence, we will seriously misunderstand, misuse and over-estimate our own individual rational, though fallible and finite, powers of judgement. Hence recognizing our own fallibility and our mutual interdependence as rational judges is a key constitutive factor in our being fully rational, autonomous judges. Only by recognizing our judgemental interdependence can we each link our human fallibility and limited knowledge constructively to our equally human corrigibility, our ability to learn, especially from constructive criticism. Therefore, fully rational justification requires us to seek out and actively engage with the critical assessments of others (Westphal, 2009c, 2010–11, 2011b).12

In PhG Hegel argues for three substantive views which have direct methodological implications for his WL and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc). At the end of ‘Sense Certainty’ (chapter one), Hegel argues that, in principle, however extensive or detailed, specificity of description (or analogously, specificity of conceptual content) is insufficient to secure unique reference: Whether a description is empty, determinate or ambiguous because it describes (and in that way refers to) no, only one or several particular objects or events is determined, not only by that description, but also by what in the world exists. Hence in principle, there can be no empirical knowledge simply by description (Westphal, 2002–3). Within substantive domains, to make a cognitive claim requires not only stating that claim, but locating within space and time at

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least some particular(s) to which one’s claim pertains, either directly or indirectly (as evidence). So doing is required for predication, and predication is required for making a claim to know something, and for assessing both the truth and the justification of one’s claim. This thesis is central to Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference, which Hegel adopted, adapted, defended and augmented. This thesis has the important methodological implication that, in substantive (non-formal) domains, statements of mere logical possibilities have no cognitive status, and so cannot undermine the justification of cognitive claims which are otherwise well supported by relevant evidence.

In ‘Force and Understanding’ (PhG, chapter three), Hegel uses his semantics of singular cognitive reference (inter alia) to rebut empiricist scepticism about causal powers and to defend Newton’s causal realism about gravitational force (Westphal, 2009b, §5). In ‘Self-Consciousness’ (PhG, chapter four), Hegel uses his semantics of singular cognitive reference to argue that global perceptual scepticism (whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or contemporary) is based upon mere logical possibilities, which have no cognitive standing within the non-formal, substantive domain of empirical knowledge because they cannot be referred to any localized particulars. In principle global perceptual ‘sceptical hypotheses’ are cognitively idle transcendent speculations, coupled with self-alienation from one’s own share in human cognition (Westphal, 2011c). The fact that, as a matter of sheer deductive logic, all of our perceptual beliefs could have just the contents they do and yet all be false (e.g. Stroud, 1994, pp. 241–2, 245), is no ground for scepticism. Rather, it is a good reason for distinguishing between strictly formal domains and the substantive domain of empirical knowledge, in which cognitive justification requires more than deductive logic and more than a host of claims merely about ‘appearances’ – if ‘appearances’ are presumed to be distinct from the objects, events and people surrounding us, as global perceptual sceptical hypotheses require.

In ‘Force and Understanding’ Hegel criticizes a representative range of such presumptive global distinctions between mere appearances to us and reality, showing that these distinctions are epistemologists’ own creations, all of which are cognitively vacuous because they violate the requirements of the semantics of singular cognitive reference. Positively, Hegel argues that the philosophical theory of knowledge must take the special sciences into very close consideration (Westphal, 2008a). He argues for this claim in detail in ‘Observing Reason’ (PhG, chapter five, part A), by arguing (inter alia) that the empirical findings of the special sciences are very much intellectual and methodological achievements which belie both empiricism and rationalism – and both historia and scientia – and which exhibit and substantiate human reason’s power to know nature, in part by identifying genuine natural kinds, species and laws of nature (Ferrini, 2007, 2009a). All of these findings are highlighted in PhG’s concluding chapter, ‘Absolute Knowing’ (de Laurentiis, 2009); they are important to both the substance and the method of Hegel’s WL.
withstanding its various other introductions, Hegel stressed that the 1807 \textit{PhG} is the sole ‘deduction’, ‘justification’ and ‘proof’ of the starting point of the science of logic, centrally because it alone justifies our cognitive competence (\textit{WL GW} 11:20–1, 33; 21:32–4, 54–5; see Fulda, 1975; Collins, 2012). In particular, \textit{PhG} alone justifies Hegel’s initial premise that the science of logic can and does examine ‘objective determinations of thought’ (\textit{objektive Denkbestimmungen}), which are fundamental structures of things – their constitutive species, characteristics and differentia – which we comprehend through genuine concepts. Accordingly, the subject matter of the science of logic is not things (\textit{Dinge}) as such, but rather the fundamental concept or the constitutive structure of kinds of things, which Hegel designates as their \textit{Sache} (\textit{WL GW} 21:14–15, 17, 33, 35; 12:20; \textit{Enc} §§19, 24A1, 25, 28).

That we are cognitively competent to comprehend and analyse \textit{Sachen} (in this sense) is the central premise of \textit{WL} which is justified by \textit{PhG}. This premise is justified by \textit{PhG} in large measure by re-analysing the scope and character of knowledge within the special sciences. Hegel’s concern with the scope and character of knowledge within the special sciences is prominent throughout \textit{WL} as well. In particular, central to the revisions of the second edition of the Doctrine of Being are extensive analyses of infinitesimal calculus and of the intricate relations between quantity and quality. These issues are central to the proper use – and to the proper understanding of the proper use – of quantification in the special sciences. Hegel plainly treats them in \textit{WL} in anticipation of the more thorough and concrete re-analysis of their use in the Philosophy of Nature in connection with rational physics, that is, with the conceptual foundations of physical science, for example, the centre of gravity of a system of bodies (‘Absolute Mechanism’, \textit{WL GW} 12:143). Why is this?

Hegel’s science of logic is an exercise in what Kant called ‘transcendental logic’, the study of the legitimate cognitive role(s) and use of our basic conceptual categories. Fundamental to the science of logic is the key principle of Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference, which Hegel restates in these terms: ‘it is an essential proposition of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, that concepts without intuition are empty, and only have validity as connections of the manifold given through intuition’ (\textit{WL GW} 12:19). Indeed, the objective reference of our concepts to objects occurs in and is constituted through the original, a priori synthetic unity of apperception. This cognitive-semantic thesis holds from the micro level of integrating the sensed characteristics of any one perceived item (\textit{KrV} B137, quoted by Hegel in \textit{WL GW} 12:18) to the macro level of integrating the observed positions of astronomical bodies into one comprehensive theory of our solar system, and Hegel would have welcomed the subsequent extension of astronomy via astrophysics into physical cosmology. One aspect of Hegel’s opening analysis in his logic, from ‘being’ up through \textit{Daseyn} (existence or ‘being-there’), is that there is and can be no determinate thought without a determinate object of thought, one sufficiently structured so as to exist, to be somewhere at some time as something determinate and to be identified as such (\textit{da sein zu können}). In this regard, Hegel’s opening analysis in the logic corroborates and reconfirms his semantics of singular cognitive reference.

Central to Hegel’s science of logic is the critical assessment of the content of our basic conceptual categories in order to determine whether, in what regards or to what
extent they can be true (WL GW 12:27–8). Accordingly, Hegel’s science of logic is concerned, not only to articulate, explicate, order, integrate and inter-define traditional metaphysical categories, but also to specify their scope of legitimate cognitive use in specific cognitive claims, even though the science of logic itself prescinds from those specific claims (WL GW 12:20) to focus upon the content of our categories. For example, Hegel contends not only that ‘becoming’ is distinct from and yet integrates ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, he contends that a truthful quantitative infinity (das wahrhafte Unendliche) is found in infinitesimal analysis, in which a constant quantitative relation holds between vanishing quantities which tend towards zero (WL GW 21:254–5). Infinitesimal calculus, too, requires corresponding concrete objects to have real sense (WL GW 21:271, 282, 296, 299, cf. 300). Hegel’s critical assessment of Cauchy’s ‘first reform’ of mathematical analysis (Wolff, 1986) is central, not incidental, to his science of logic, which is the successor to Kant’s ‘Systematic Presentation of all Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding’ (Transcendental Analytic, book two). Briefly, Hegel’s Doctrine of Being is his counterpart to Kant’s ‘mathematical principles’, namely, to Kant’s ‘Axioms of Intuition’ and ‘Anticipations of Perception’; Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence is his counterpart to Kant’s ‘Analogies of Experience’; Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept – together with its preceding two books – is his counterpart to Kant’s ‘Postulates of Empirical Thought as such’.

One of Hegel’s key points, elaborately revised in the second edition of the Doctrine of Being (Ferrini, 1988, 1991–2), is that Kant’s conception of the distinctive character of the categories of modality – namely, that they add nothing to the concept of the (putatively known) object, but express only its relation to our cognitive capacity (KrV B266) – does not hold of the categories ‘possible’, ‘actual’ or ‘necessary’, nor of any of Kant’s categories or principles (cf. WL GW 21:66–7, 84, 323–4). The proper measure (Maß) of something specifies numerically one or more of its qualities, including variable qualities. Only because constitutive qualities of things or events can be measured appropriately rather than arbitrarily – for example, by naturally occurring rates, ratios or periods – is quantified natural science possible. Indeed, natural philosophy becomes quantified exact science as the sciences of measure, which discern appropriate measures of natural events. Such measures intimate conditions under which (or according to which) the variable quantities of any naturally occurring quality occur. In this regard, measure anticipates more robust modal categories by anticipating the identification of conditional necessities, and the constitutive dispositions of entities which manifest such conditional relations. Hegel further argues in the Doctrine of Essence that a complete concept of any kind of thing (Sache) includes its constitutive causal characteristics, whereas a complete concept of any specific thing (Ding) would further include its specific causal history (WL GW 11:344–7). Accordingly, Kant is mistaken to hold that a complete concept of any (spatio-temporal) thing prescinds from the questions whether it is possible, actual or necessary (KrV B266). More generally, only by comprehending the proper concept of anything do we forge any properly cognitive relation between it and our capacity to cognize it. Furthermore, Kant’s four kinds of Principles are insufficiently integrated, and three of these sets (Axioms, Anticipations and Postulates) are too glibly ‘justified’ by Kant’s transcendental idealism and its
consequent constructivism; ‘systematic’
Kant’s presentation is not, nor is it complete,
for developments in the natural sciences dur-
ing Kant’s lifetime – especially in chemistry
and biology – outstripped his focus in KrV
on narrowly mechanical forms of causation
and explanation, a restriction unresolved by
the Critique of Judgement (KU), according
to which biological life cannot be objectively
cognized because in principle mechanical
explanations are insufficient while teleologi-
cal judgements are merely heuristic (KU AA
5, §§64–66).

If transcendental idealism is false, then
Hegel’s successor to Kant’s transcenden-
tal logic, namely Hegel’s science of logic,
must address the question, whether, how
or to what extent can Kant’s Principles be
revamped, augmented and upheld? Hegel’s
answer to this question is not the purely a
priori exercise it has too often been taken
to be. 15 Hegel develops a moderate form of
conceptual holism by articulating the ways
in which and the extent to which the con-
tent of concepts is defined by contrast and
by reciprocal presupposition. Specifying and
assessing such conceptual content is central
to Hegel’s science of logic (WL GW 12:27–
8), which, although it deals with concepts as
forms, accordingly is not a ‘formal logic’ in
any strictly deductive sense.

Central to Hegel’s issues in the science
of logic are two key features of quantita-
tive natural science. First, that quantitative
laws of nature cannot be justified simply by
mathematics – pace Galileo’s kinematics and
Newton’s statics of fluids 16 – and second,
that the natural sciences use concepts and
principles which they do not fully articulate
and assess. Such concepts and principles are
open invitations to a priorist philosophers,
for example, Descartes and Kant, who insist
that physical science requires prior and
independent metaphysical foundations. 17
Hegel seeks to foreclose on such metaphysi-
cal speculations through philosophical anal-
ysis of basic scientific concepts and principles
within an explanatory domain, which shows
how they are closely inter-defined in ways
which anticipate and found, if not provide,
their quantitative as well as their qualitative
relations (WL GW 21:340–1; 11:344–7; cf.
Falkenburg, 1987, pp. 91–241; Moretto,
2004).

A third central aim is to show the ways
in which and the extent to which mechanical
systems can be self-regulating (as mechanical
oscillators) in order to differentiate properly
between mechanical, chemical (Burbidge,
1996), functional or teleological (de Vries,
1991) and organic functions (Ferrini, 2009d,
2011) and in order to outline the basic ways
in which organic life is possible only through
interaction with its organized environment, in
which organisms intervene (Ferrini, 2009d).
Hegel’s analysis of the concept of life is con-
ceptual and explicative, not explanatory. 18
In all of these fundamental regards, Hegel’s
model of philosophical science revamps
Aristotle’s meta ta physica on the basis of
modern natural sciences. In effect, Hegel
agrees with Galileo (Opere, vol. 7, pp. 75–6)
that Aristotle would have revised his first
principles if he had fuller information about
nature.

Hegel’s methods of analysis and proof
involve the analytical pattern of initial
position, differentiation and higher-level
reintegration (Enc §§79–83) and the use of
interlocking triads of syllogisms (Sans, 2004,
2006; Burbidge, 2011). Hegel’s normative jus-
tification of his social theory involves further
considerations of rights as requirements for
actualizing freedom (Westphal, 2010b) and
of the syllogistic integration of social institu-
tions (Vieweg, 2012, chapters 5 and 8).
NOTES

1  Brevity requires some simplification; for discussion, see Sorell et al. (2010).
2  The empiricist aim to replace talk of physical objects with talk of sets of sense data would be a third such attempt, except that the reduction fails for significant technical reasons (Westphal, 1989, pp. 230–2), and so cannot support infallibilism about cognitive justification. Spinoza advocates a robust form of scientia, but neglects basic issues in epistemology.
3  Both the severity and the multitude of the problems crippling Descartes’ analysis have been widely neglected, for example, by Sosa (1997).
4  Though Hegel recognized these points, he did not develop them in detail. I substantiate them in Westphal (2004).
5  This kind of Cartesianism lives on in ‘narrow’ accounts of mental content, according to which the content of someone’s thought, feeling or experience can be specified without any reference to that person’s physical or social context, nor to any facts about him or her of which she or he is unaware (or cannot easily become aware upon reflection).
6  The Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion is also omitted from Bett (2010), Vogt (2011) and Borchert (2006), including Comesaña (2006), though the latter includes the ‘Problem of the Criterion’ from Chisholm (1982), but mentions general problems about criteria of truth only within Indian philosophy (Franco, 2006, pp. 118–20).
7  I speak of ‘cognitive’ justification to emphasize that the relevant issue is the justification involved in knowing various substantive claims or facts, and reserve the phrase ‘epistemic’ justification for issues about the justification of any philosophical theory of cognitive justification. As Alston (1980) emphasizes, it is crucial not to confuse the various levels involved in epistemological issues.
9  Kant’s account of the a priori transcendental conditions for human perceptual knowledge is in part an externalist view; the designation is recent, though this kind of view is not.
10 Hegel’s account thus rejects narrow accounts of mental content, as defined in note 5. In this regard, Hegel concurs with Burge (1979) in highlighting the importance of partial understanding.
11 Harris (1997) argues in detail that Hegel’s history in PbG is far better than has been recognized, and that PbG contains Hegel’s genuine philosophy of history.
12 Conversely, constructive mutual criticism is undermined by piecemeal, unsystematic philosophy, by philosophical factionalism (‘cultural circles’ or ‘philosophical stances’ in van Fraassen’s, 2002, sense), by substituting philosophical lines of policy for philosophical theses (Carnap, 1950a [1956, p. 208]; cf. Wick, 1951), by neglecting Carnap’s (1950b, pp. 1–18) distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication or by neglecting the distinction between formal and non-formal domains; see Westphal (2006b, 2010–11).
13 On some central relations between WL and the Philosophy of Nature, see Westphal (2008b).
14 Here I boldly assert a deeply heterodox interpretative hypothesis to illuminate the character and aims of Hegel’s methods of proof. I am encouraged in this hypothesis by the findings especially of Ferrini (1988, 1991–2, 2002), Moretto (2000, 2002, 2004) and Wolff (1986), though none of them is responsible for my assertions here. Hegel’s counterpart to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is PbG; see Westphal (2009b).
15 Taking Hegel’s science of logic to be purely a priori requires neglecting its relations to PbG and its many links to historically contingent and natural-scientific concepts and issues (cf. Burbidge, 1996, 2007). The notion that Hegel’s science of logic must be purely a priori is itself one of the host of presuppositions we are not to make when reading his book (WL GW 21:27, 56). That notion precludes doing what Hegel insists we must do, which is to come to understand the character, aims, methods and findings of this science as he develops them in the course of his analysis.
16 Galilei, Opere vol. 7, pp. 171–3; letter to Pietro Carcavy, 5 June 1637 (Opere vol. 17,
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17 See Descartes' letter to Mersenne, 29 June 1638, and Kant, MAN. For discussion, see Westphal (2006b, §§1–3).

18 Accordingly, Hegel's view is independent of scientific issues about the truth of natural selection.
PART V:
HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE
It is widely acknowledged that the relation between Hegel and Marx is crucial to the formulation and understanding of Marx’s position. This relation is mediated through the Young Hegelians, a group of left-wing Hegelians active in the German context after Hegel’s death. Although this relationship has been extensively studied, there is no agreement in the literature about the correct analysis. The single most influential analysis of this relationship, due to Engels, was later adopted by generations of Marxists as well as non-Marxists and anti-Marxists. This article will sketch some main aspects of the relationships between Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, Marx and various forms of Marxism, or Marxisms.

When Hegel died in 1831, his followers split into various groups (Fackenheim, 1967). The best known groups are the right-wing, or old Hegelians, and the left-wing, or Young Hegelians. The Right and Left Hegelians differed in a number of ways. The former were situated in the Prussian university system of the time; the latter, except for Eduard Gans, Hegel’s former student who taught in the law faculty, were situated outside the university system. The Right Hegelians, who were politically and religiously conservative, favoured a religious interpretation of Hegel’s position centering on the Christianity they embraced. The Left Hegelians were politically and religiously liberal or even radical. They thought that the Right Hegelians were correct about the interpretation of Hegel’s position, whose religious dimension they strongly rejected.

The Right Hegelians, who included such figures as K. F. Göschl, G. A. Gabler, H. F. W. Hinrichs, K. Daub, H. Leo, L. von Henning and H. G. Hotho, were quickly forgotten. They are today mainly known only to specialists in the thought of this period. The Left Hegelians included some of the most important thinkers of the period. Through their emphasis on practice, some of these thinkers have remained exceedingly influential. They include David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Edgar Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, Johann Caspar Schmidt (pseud. Max Stirner) and Karl Neuwerk, as well as such younger members as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, August von Cieszkowski and Karl Schmidt.

This article will consider the views of four of the most important young Hegelians: Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx and Engels. Each was influential in his own way, and Bauer, Feuerbach and Engels were further influential in paving the way for the
emergence of Marx – arguably Hegel’s most important successor in the context of nineteenth-century German intellectual tradition.

BRUNO BAUER (1809–82)

Bruno Bauer was a German philosopher and theologian, whose political position shifted from the extreme left to the extreme right. Bauer studied theology in Berlin with the Right Hegelian Philipp Marheineke, who aimed to demonstrate the objectivity, reality and absolute validity of Christian truth. Bauer began as a defender of evangelical theology, but later became a stern critic of theology, pointing towards a view of religion in part developed later in Marx’s early writings.

Bauer, who was interested in Hegel’s philosophy of religion, was concerned not only to explain but also to ground religious phenomena. According to Bauer, who discussed the literary origin of the gospels, it cannot be shown that a historical Jesus existed. Bauer taught in Bonn from winter semester 1834–5 until summer semester of 1838. Karl Marx was one of his students. From 1836 to 1838, Bauer edited the Journal of Speculative Theology (Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie) in which he sought to replace the historical-critical method through his own speculative-critical method. One result was to rethink the history of divine consciousness through the finite subject. In his Critique of the Evangelical History of the Synoptic Gospels (Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker) his permission to teach was withdrawn. He returned to the University of Berlin, where he was the central figure of a doctoral organization (the ‘Doctor Club’). During this period he wrote for various publications, including the Rheinische Zeitung then edited by Marx. In his 1843 book The Jewish Question (Die Judenfrage) Bauer developed an anti-Semitic position while arguing against religion of all kinds. Bauer’s anti-Semitic nationalism from an anti-Christian basis is sometimes understood as an immediate predecessor of national socialist ideology. In his own ‘On the Jewish Question (Zur Judenfrage), 1843) Marx criticized Bauer’s view of Judaism. In Das entdeckte Christentum (Christianity Exposed) (1843), seeking to undermine Christian restoration Bauer claimed that religion is only a stage on the way to full self-consciousness.

LUDWIG FEUERBACH (1804–72)

The German materialist philosopher and theologian Ludwig Feuerbach (an uncle of the painter Anselm Feuerbach) was also a member of the Young Hegelians. Though not a systematic thinker, Feuerbach is important as a minor critic of Hegel, as a theologian and for his influence on Marx’s position.

Feuerbach’s work is marked by his turn to philosophical anthropology. Feuerbach studied philosophy first in Darmstadt under Karl
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Daub, a Hegelian, and later in Berlin, where he attended Hegel's courses for two years. Under Hegel's influence, Feuerbach moved to philosophy, receiving his doctoral degree in Erlangen in 1828. He taught in Erlangen during the period 1828–32, when he was dismissed after it became known that he was the author of an anonymous work that described Christianity as an inhumane religion. Feuerbach never taught again. From 1837 to 1843 he collaborated with Ruge on the Halle Annals for Science and Art (Hallische Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Kunst) (Halle Annals for Science and Art). This collaboration ended when Feuerbach was replaced by Marx, who was both influenced by and critical of him.

Feuerbach, who wrote in an aphoristic style and was not a systematic thinker, is a transitional figure. He was important for developing a so-called materialistic alternative to Hegel that was carried further by such other Young Hegelians as Ruge, Engels and, supposedly, Marx. Yet it is debatable whether Feuerbach's effort to counter Hegel's philosophy amounts to anything more than a particularly widespread, tenacious misunderstanding. Feuerbach basically understands and criticizes Hegel as a theological thinker. This image of Hegel is the basis of the right-wing reading of his thought. But at best what Feuerbach opposes is only a mistaken reading of Hegel's thought, while his position is rather continuous with Hegel's. Feuerbach's basic claim, which he varies in many ways, that finite human existence is the truth of the infinite, is central to Hegel's own theory. Nonetheless, The Essence of Christianity (Das Wesen des Christentums, 1841) caused a sensation when it appeared.

Feuerbach, who began as an enthusiastic student of Hegel, eventually broke with his philosophy. In reacting against Hegel, he emphasized human existence, including the need to derive a philosophy of humanity from the philosophy of the absolute. He denied Hegel's assumption that philosophy and religion differ only with respect to form, not content. According to Feuerbach, Hegel's philosophy is a theological idealism that aims to restore Christianity and hence remains theology; there can be no agreement between religion and a philosophy with respect to the results of science. Idealism that remains on the level of thought requires supplementing real objects with sensory perception. The 'new philosophy', which relies on sensation to think the concrete in a concrete manner, is, hence, the truth of Hegel's philosophy and of modern philosophy in general. The new philosophy substitutes the real and whole being of mankind for the absolute and abstract mind, that is, for reason. Since only human beings are rational, humanity is the sole measure of reason. Hegelian theology must be dissolved in anthropology, which, according to Feuerbach, becomes universal science.

Later assessments of Feuerbach's work vary greatly. For many historians of philosophy, he is important for his contribution to the 'destruction' of classical German Idealism. For others, Feuerbach is one of the first to continue Hegel's liquidation of traditional epistemology, albeit on an anti-idealistic basis. His influence, which was immediate, quickly waned as the revolutionary storms of 1848 burst in Europe. Yet his teaching left its mark on a series of enormously influential thinkers such as Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Troeltsch, Scheler, Freud, Berdiaev, Heidegger and Sartre.

KARL MARX (1818–83)

The main figure of the Young Hegelians, Karl Marx, philosopher, political economist
and political revolutionary, is one of Hegel’s most important ‘students’ and one of the most influential thinkers of the nineteenth century. Marx was born in Trier and died in London in voluntary exile. He studied first in Bonn and then in Berlin. In Berlin, he was a member of B. Bauer’s ‘Doctor Club’. Marx, who was trained as an academic philosopher, received a doctorate in philosophy in 1841. His interest in Hegel began during his teenage years. Marx’s dissertation was a thoroughly Hegelian analysis of Democritean and Epicurean philosophy, entitled *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* (*Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie*). Since there were no academic jobs for left-wing students, he quickly turned to journalism, which (other than the charity of his friends) was for a long time his only source of income.

Hegel, like Kant, was a philosophical giant, and died a mere ten years before Marx completed his dissertation. Thus when Marx was a student, and for a time thereafter, Hegel was still the dominant philosophical figure. Marx’s theories have generated an immense literature, beyond the capacity of any single person to master. The jury is still out about the precise nature of Marx’s philosophical position. The safest hermeneutical claim is that it originates in his reaction against Hegel but cannot be understood merely in terms of Hegel’s philosophy. Marx’s complex position includes efforts to interpret, criticize and surpass Hegel from a perspective different from but still strongly dependent on Hegel’s own. This concern with Hegel is a constant theme in Marx’s work: it figures importantly in several of his early writings and remains influential throughout the later ones, including *Capital: Critique of Political Economy* (*Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*) (*Kap*), widely regarded as Marx’s (unfinished) masterpiece.

Marx wrote extensively but was only rarely able to finish texts that met his standards. His corpus includes texts he published during his lifetime and many more he left unpublished in his *Nachlass* and that only appeared later. These include *The German Ideology* (*Die deutsche Ideologie*), the ‘Paris Manuscripts’ and the *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy* (*Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (*Grundrisse*). Both of the latter texts were influential in changing the received Marxist view that early on Marx had turned to political economy, simply leaving philosophy behind. These texts suggest, on the contrary, that Marx’s position develops in continuous fashion without any breaks.

In the early 1840s, Marx wrote a series of texts in which he began to formulate the position that ultimately culminated in *Kap*. Marx’s mature position follows (almost) seamlessly from his early critique of Hegel. In retrospect, we find in the early texts the outline of Marx’s later understanding of Hegelian philosophy, the types of objections he will later raise against orthodox political economy and the contours of his own original position – including what later became his general theory of modern industrial society.

Marx’s explicit analysis of Hegelian ideas and texts is mainly confined to his early writings before and during the period when he was engaged in formulating his own original position. A number of these writings can be read as ongoing effort to come to grips with Hegelian philosophy in order to overcome it. These include three texts from 1843 to 1844, including ‘*Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*’ (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*), ‘*Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s
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Philosophy of Right. Introduction’ (‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtphilosophie. Einleitung’) and the ‘Paris Manuscripts’. The first text, which reads like the work of an advanced graduate student, is a paragraph by paragraph commentary on the theory of the modern state contained in §§261–313 of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (RPh).

Marx consistently criticizes Hegel from an economic perspective, even though at this point of time his own background in economics is still far from solid. In his initial discussion of RPh, the main criticism centres on Hegel’s supposedly insufficient awareness of the role of political economy in modern industrial society. Marx’s objection that Hegel does not accord sufficient weight to economic factors amounts to the claim that anything less than an economy-centred model of modern society fails to comprehend its basic nature.

According to Marx, Hegel’s concern with civil law, as distinguished from the (empirical) collision between competing interests, creates an illusory identity between alienated elements, masking an unresolved antinomy. In Hegel’s supposedly mystical account, the family and civil society emerge from the state, and not conversely, since the idea is turned into the real subject and the real relations of family and civil society are demoted to the status of merely imaginary ideas. In effect, Hegel substitutes a concern with logic for the study of empirical reality in inverting the relation of family and civil society to the state. Examples include a failure to grasp the specificity of empirical occurrences, a turn away from real human subjects, an insensitivity to the difference between individual and state interest and a related failure to comprehend that political representation merely represents private property.

It is not difficult to grasp the main lines of Marx’s future theories in this initial critique of Hegel. Marx’s position arises out of a change of focus already visible in his initial analysis of Hegel’s theory of the modern state. Unlike Hegel, whose logical analysis supposedly overlooks the central point – that is, that the state and everything else are ultimately determined by civil society, whose central force is (private) property – Marx argues that civil society, the realm of property relations, determines the state and not conversely. It follows that a theory that really grasps modern society must be basically an economic theory of the role of (private) property. Despite his grasp of economics, Hegel fails to comprehend its centrality in the modern world – as illustrated by his approach to property.

This basic thesis is transformed in Marx’s future writings into a powerful position, arguably intended to do three things: to criticize Hegel, to criticize the modern economic theory on which Hegel depends and to offer an alternative theory of modern industrial society. It is inaccurate to interpret the Marxian move as a rejection of Hegelian philosophy – or indeed of philosophy tout court – in favour of an economic approach. Marx’s critique of Hegel is Hegelian in that it is intended to refute Hegel’s position while preserving and developing it. One can read this intent in Marx’s famous remark in Kap that Hegelian dialectic, presently ‘standing on its head . . . must be turned right side up again if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell’ (Kap in Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe [MEGA] II/6:709 [Preface 1973]).

Modern economics assumes that capitalism is basically stable and that economic decisions are made by rational individuals. Marx’s critique of modern industrial society assumes that in the long run capitalism is unstable and will eventually fall prey to a so-called universal crisis (ibid.). Marx, who further assumes that human beings are
fundamentally social and hence restricted in their actions by their social surroundings, presupposes a conception of the human subject as agent that he borrows from Fichte but is ultimately Aristotelian. The Marxian theory of the modern industrial state understands capitalism as a system devised to meet basic human reproductive needs (e.g. food, clothing, shelter). Through their work or labour, human beings not only produce products to be sold in the marketplace (commodities), but also their own social relations, their relations to the products, themselves as workers, and finally also the possibility of a transition from capitalism to communism. Marx further thinks that communism (which has often only the name in common with the historical manifestation of communism in the Soviet bloc, China and elsewhere) will feature the absence of private property in the means of production, opening up for the first time the real historical possibility for human beings to overcome their modern economic roles and hence to develop their true individual capacities.

Marx embarked on the formulation of this theory as soon as he began to come to grips with Hegel. The initial version of the mature position is already present in the Paris Manuscripts, which, having been published long after Marx’s death (like the Grundrisse), prompted remarkable changes in the interpretation of Marxism. In these manuscripts Marx begins to develop a categorial framework to grasp political economy based on a schema sketched by Engels. The first manuscript contains a brilliant theory of alienation articulated in four sub-forms. The second manuscript discusses the concept of the subject in terms clearly borrowed from Fichte. In the third and fourth manuscripts, Marx carries forward his critique of Hegel in a complex and fragmentary series of remarks. These remarks are important for evaluating Hegel’s role in Marx’s formulation of his own position.

In later writings, Marx often borrows from Hegel or from his own Hegel-critique in working out his alternative theory of modern capitalism. In the Grundrisse (1857–8), he outlines an enormous project, including six sections, of which the study of ‘capital’ represents no more than a single part. In the 1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie), Marx presents the distinction between society’s ideological superstructure and its economic base. His writings culminate in the first volume of Kap (1867), the only volume he published. In this tome, Marx formulates a complex analysis of modern capitalism based on the distinction between use value and exchange value.

**ENGELS AND MARXISMS**

There is a distinction in kind between Marxian theory and various Marxisms. The latter originate mostly in the work of Friedrich Engels (1820–95). Engels was Marx’s collaborator, close friend, financial supporter and literary executor. In Marxist circles, he is often regarded as a philosopher and Marx as a political economist. Marx and Engels are frequently thought of by Marxists, non-Marxists and anti-Marxists as joint co-inventors of a single common position known as Marxism.

A number of factors seem to support the assumption that Marx and Engels hold identical views. Closely associated over some 40 years, they co-authored a series of works, including The Holy Family (Die heilige Familie), 1845; The German Ideology (...
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(Die deutsche Ideologie), 1846; and the 
The Communist Manifesto (Manifest der 
Kommunistischen Partei), 1848. Engels even 
suggests explicitly that they jointly laid the 
foundations of the theory. Yet Engels’s edit-
ing of Marx’s writings after his friend’s death 
was tendentious in that it incorporated his 
own views. Their writings were published 
(by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in 
a single series of collected works supposedly 
authorised by a (mythical) collective entity: 
Marx-Engels. Furthermore, Engels’s simple 
writing style, more accessible than Marx’s 
complex academic formulations, was often 
more influential. Later Marxists propounded 
a supposed continuity between Marxian the-
ory and Marxism – as illustrated by Lenin’s 
claim that Marxism is the science of Marx’s 
ideas.

While Marx and Engels indeed held iden-
tical political views, their philosophical per-
spectives differ in basic ways. Having been 
trained as a philosopher, Marx is philo-
sophically very sophisticated. He belongs 
to the broadly post-Kantian German ideal-
ist tendency. Engels, who did not complete 
high school and was mainly self-taught in 
philosophy, exhibits neither Marx’s grasp 
of nor talent for philosophical thinking. He 
is often insensitive to philosophical nuance. 
He claims, for example, that Kant’s con-
cept of the ‘thing in itself’ can be refuted by 
experiment and industry. Impressed by the 
rapid development of natural science after 
Hegel, Engels believed that it helped solve 
philosophical problems. Today he would be 
regarded as close to positivism.

Engels’s formulation of Marxism derives 
from varied sources, including Young 
Hegelianism, Fichte, Schelling and his own 
interest in modern science. He shares the 
Young Hegelians’ antipathy to religion, to 
which he accords greater weight than Marx. 
From Fichte he borrows the distinction 
between idealism and materialism as the two 
fundamental philosophical positions. Having 
audited, like Kierkegaard, Schelling’s class in 
Berlin in 1841, Engels derived from Schelling 
the view that Hegel’s idealism and philoso-
phy in general are unable to solve problems 
intrinsic to them, which only materialism can 
solve. In combining these two views, Engels 
argues that Marx’s position is a form of 
materialism beyond philosophy itself – which 
he regards as an essentially idealistic under-
taking. He formulates his views in a number 
of writings. These include the Anti-Dühring, 
a polemical attack on a contemporary phi-
losopher, economist and socialist critic of 
Marxism; and the unfinished ‘Philosophy of 
Nature’, in which he attempts a formulation 
of the laws of dialectic. Engels’s most influen-
tial statement is set out in his infamous bro-
chure, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome 
of Classical German Philosophy (Ludwig 
Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen 
deutschen Philosophie, 1886), published 
several years after Marx’s death. In virtue of 
its simple formulations, this text was widely 
adopted as the canonical statement of what 
came to be called Marxism.

In the Foreword, Engels claims that he 
and Marx worked out a common view 
known as historical materialism, supposedly 
expounded by Marx in the Preface to the 
1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. Engels identifies an alleged water-
shed running through the entire philoso-
phical tradition with regards to the relation 
of thought to social being. Either one begins 
(incorrectly) from principles of thought in 
order to descend to being, or one begins (cor-
correctly) from social being in order to ascend 
to thought. According to Engels, Hegel, an 
otherwise important figure, begins from
thought and presents an illusory analysis of social reality. Feuerbach, on the other hand, does provide a materialist critique of Hegel indicating the way out of idealism towards social reality. Yet Feuerbach’s contemplative position represents an incorrect form of materialism later superseded in Marx’s historical materialism.

Marx’s and Engels’s ceaseless political agitation led to a Marxist political movement featuring different kinds of Marxism. One was the transformation of their political views into a revolutionary political movement that seized power in Russia in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Eventually, this led to a split between Trotsky, who favoured worldwide revolution, and Stalin, who favoured communism in one country. But Marxism also developed in the realms of philosophy and literature. Other Marxists such as Eduard Bernstein favoured peaceful social transformation as the road to democratic socialism (Bernstein, 1961). Various Marxist political leaders began the practice of intervening in philosophical discussions. Thus Stalin, who was not philosophically trained, invented dialectical materialism in deciding the dispute between the ‘mechanists’ and the ‘dialecticians’, led by A. M. Deborin. In literary criticism, Marxism emphasized social factors in evaluating literary works. Some Marxists favoured a kind of crude reductionism identified with Franz Mehring, an early biographer of Marx. G. Lukács and K. Korsch invented Hegelian Marxism independently in the early 1920s (Lukács, 1971; Korsch, 1972). The tardy publication of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts led to an important discussion of what was called Marxist humanism in the mid-twentieth century. This was later countered by Louis Althusser’s theoretical anti-humanism, according to which Marx first developed a humanist philosophy, but later developed a very different, anti-humanist scientific theory. The majority of scholars now reject Althusser’s reading and acknowledge that Marx’s theory develops continuously without major breaks or discontinuities.

The sudden breakup and demise of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, in addition to newly available information about the Stalinist gulag, deflected attention away from Marxism in the West. The appeal of Marxist political parties in Europe, such as the French Communist Party, has weakened considerably. Western scholarly interest in Marx and Marxism has sharply declined despite efforts to call attention to Marx (Rockmore, 2006). At the time of this writing, China is the only major country in the world that is still officially Marxist. Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Marxism has been associated with a turn towards capitalism – precisely that form of social-economic formation that Marx opposed throughout his life.
It is generally thought that analytic philosophy has very little in common with the philosophical approach of Hegel. After all, doesn’t Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ proclaim the universe to be ultimately some kind of mind, and is this not simply a reflection of a premodern religious consciousness rather than an approach in line with a modern, scientific view of the world? From the point of view of many contemporary interpreters of Hegel, such a view may be little more than a caricature, but it is still a widely held one, and can be traced back to the earliest days of analytic philosophy.

Given the general invisibility of Hegel within the analytic tradition for most of its history, it is sobering to be reminded that when Bertrand Russell first went to Cambridge in 1890 he found a philosophical culture dominated by the followers of Kant or Hegel (Russell, 1959b, p. 30). In his earliest philosophical endeavours Russell himself worked within the Hegelian tradition, but after a time came to be convinced that recent developments in logic showed the deep flaws in Hegel’s thought. Besides this, Russell had become influenced by G. E. Moore who had swung from being a follower to an opponent of the idealist F. H. Bradley. In his criticism of ‘idealism’ Moore had seemed to run together elements of Kant’s idealism about ‘form’ with Berkeley’s idealism about ‘matter’, and this confusion between the idealist doctrines of the Germans and the immaterialist doctrines of Berkeley has seemed to persist within the analytic tradition. Ironically, Hegel had been one of the most powerful critics of the ‘way of ideas’ conception of the mind on which Berkeley’s immaterialism was premised. In fact, it was just this anti-subjectivist dimension to Hegel’s philosophy that came to be appreciated by some thinkers within the analytic tradition in the second half of the twentieth century, during a period in which analytic thought moved away from the more empiricist orientations that had characterized its earlier phases.

Thus when Wilfrid Sellars, in his celebrated set of lectures of 1957 (later published under the title of ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’) has an imaginary interlocutor (a ‘logical atomist’) refer to Sellars’s own account as his ‘incipient Meditations Hegelienes’ (sic) (Sellars, 1997, §20), he was not being entirely flippant. In its early years analytic philosophy had gone through a ‘linguistic turn’ in which the capacity for thought had been tightly linked to the capacity for language – a turn similar to that in German intellectual life in Hegel’s time (Lafont, 1999; O’Neill Surber, 2006). From such considerations, by mid-century a number of leading analytic philosophers were coming to advocate a type of conceptual holism opposed to the ‘logical atomism’ with which
Russell had attacked Hegel. Moreover, philosophers like Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin and Sellars were stressing the social and pragmatic dimension of language in ways that again recalled Hegel’s attempts to ground thought in historical patterns of human interaction. It is this ‘Hegelian’ dimensions of the thought of Sellars and Wittgenstein that has been recently taken up in two influential works of analytic philosophy: John McDowell’s *Mind and World* (1994) and Robert Brandom’s *Making it Explicit* (1994).

In light of the framework elaborated by Sellars and his followers, it has become easier to grasp certain parallels between Hegelian and analytic thought. Thus, Willem deVries (a student of Sellars), stressing that the central idea of Hegel’s idealism was that of the ‘autonomy of reason’, has pointed to the vast gulf between Berkeley’s immaterialism and Hegel’s idealism.

What is at the heart of the idea of the autonomy of reason is not reason’s separateness from something (or anything) else, such as material nature, but the self-determination of reason. . . . Hegel does not defend the autonomy of reason by running to a substance dualism but by pointing out that there is a ‘logical space of reasons’ within which all our discourse occurs and which has a structure uniquely and irreducibly its own. In particular, the salient structures in the logical space of reasons are normative structures of justification and enlightenment; they are distinct from the causal structures of the physical and even the historical realm, though such causal structures can (indeed, must) be exploited by and for the justificatory and illuminatory purposes of reason. (DeVries, 2009, pp. 231–2)

The idea of thought inhabiting this ‘logical space of reasons’ in virtue of the social norms governing verbal reactions to a sentence expressing it was central to Sellars’s alternative to the form of empiricism that had flourished in the early decades of analytic philosophy. Opposing the type of empiricist epistemology of the early Russell and others, in which a ‘foundation’ for empirical knowledge was conceived in terms of the mind’s ‘acquaintance’ with ‘givens’ such as Russellian ‘sense-data’, Sellars denounced as ‘mythical’ the idea of a certain and presuppositionless knowledge of something ‘given’ immediately in sensory experience: the ‘Myth of the Given’. As an alternative he proposed a conception of judgements as fallible assertions made in the context of ‘language games’ involving ‘giving and asking for reasons’. Inquiry is a rational enterprise not because truth can be transmitted to beliefs by sound logical inferences from purportedly certain ‘foundational’ beliefs; it is rational because fallible claims can be corrected in the face of criticisms within a linguistic community holding itself to shared rational norms that are themselves open to correction.

The most systematic attempt to develop Sellars’s project in ways that retrieve Hegel’s philosophy is undoubtedly that of Brandom’s ‘inferentialist’ and ‘pragmatist’ approach to semantics (Brandom, 1994, 2002). The retrieval of Hegel within analytic thought in projects like this is in its comparative infancy; they may, however, give cause to reassess the dismissal that Hegel had suffered at the hands of Russell in the early years of the analytic movement.

**RUSSELL, HEGEL AND THE LOGICAL REVOLUTION**

In the context of his early work on the philosophy of Leibniz (Russell, 1900), Russell
had come to the opinion that an inadequate treatment of relations had been crucial not only to the philosophy of Leibniz himself but also to the ‘systems of Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley’ (Russell, 1959b, p. 48). Leibniz, he claimed, had conceived of every relation as ‘grounded in the natures of the related terms’ (ibid., p. 43), and this idea had been a consequence of his adherence to traditional logic in which ‘every proposition attributes a predicate to a subject and ... every fact consists of a substance having a property’ (ibid., p. 48). But this conception of logic had been swept away by the logical revolution of the late nineteenth century initiated by Frege’s Begriffsschrift published in 1879 (Frege, 1967). The new logic permitted multi-placed (‘polyadic’) predicates, and so allowed the representation of relational facts. Relying on the Aristotelian monadic conception of predication and the ontological system of Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley could only conceive of relations as ‘internal’ to some unitary, absolute substance.

Mr. Bradley has worked out a theory according to which, in all judgment, we are ascribing a predicate to Reality as a whole; and this theory is derived from Hegel. Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and from this it easily follows that there can be only one subject, the Absolute ... Thus Hegel's doctrine, that philosophical propositions must be of the form, ‘the Absolute is such-and-such,’ depends upon the traditional belief in the universality of the subject–predicate form. This belief, being traditional, scarcely self-conscious, and not supposed to be important, operates underground, and is assumed in arguments which, like the refutation of relations, appear at first sight such as to establish its truth. (Russell, 1914, p. 48)

The application of the new logical resources became central to the method of ‘analysis’ with which thought could be freed from the dead hand of Aristotelian logic. Analysis is preceded by a type of re-transcription of claims from the ‘subject–predicate’ grammar of everyday language into a more adequate logical form. Here the model was a treatment of universally quantified affirmative judgements allowed by the new logic. From a logical point of view, a judgement such as ‘all Greeks are mortal’ should not be thought of as saying something about a type of collective subject, ‘all Greeks’, on the model of the way ‘Socrates is mortal’ says something about Socrates. Rather, the former should be analysed as a universally quantified conditional. ‘All Greeks are mortal’ tells us that if something is a Greek, then it is mortal, and the same principle can be applied to claims about ‘everything’, undercutting the idea of the type of absolute substance that Russell believed he perceived in Hegel.

Russell’s celebrated version of this style of ‘analysis’ was that found in his ‘theory of descriptions’ contained in the essay of 1905, ‘On Denoting’ (republished in Russell, 1959a). There Russell used this type of re-transcription to bear on sentences that seemed to express a meaningful thought about non-existent objects. Frege had claimed that the ‘thought’ or proposition expressed by a sentence had to be either true or false, but while the sentence ‘The present king of France is bald’ seemed to express a thought, there was at that time no present king of France, the state of whose skull could make that thought true or false. Russell then brought ‘analysis’ to bear on this problem by transcribing the sentence into the new logical syntax so as to eliminate the offending subject definite description in a similar way to that in which he had eliminated collective
terms like ‘all Greeks’ in the sentence ‘all Greeks are mortal’ (ibid., p. 482). That is, ‘a reduction of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur’ (ibid.) eliminated the problem of phrases which only purportedly denoted.

The new logic had provided an exceptionally clear way of showing how logical reflection could aid in the solution of philosophical problems, but Russell exaggerated the revolutionary status of ‘analysis’, was overly optimistic about how the new logic could be reconciled with traditional empiricist assumptions and misinterpreted Hegel as an easy target of the new analytic critique. In retrospect, it is clear that the germs of the new method of analysis, along with the recognition of the problems it posed for empiricism, were already present in the idealist tradition that Russell had condemned in terms of its fatally flawed ‘logic’.

AN IDEALIST ANTICIPATION OF ‘ANALYSIS’ IN PHILOSOPHY

When recounting his early history in 1959, Russell told of first learning of the treatment of universally quantified judgements as conditionals from the Italian logician Giuseppe Peano, although he attributes the insight to Frege (Russell, 1959b, p. 52). But in a footnote to the original ‘On Denoting’ (Russell, 1956, p. 43n), he had attributed the idea to Bradley’s *The Principles of Logic*, which he had read and studied in the 1890s, while Bradley himself linked his account to the Kantian J. F. Herbart’s treatment of categorical judgements as hypotheticals in the early nineteenth century (Bradley, 1883, book 1, ch. 2). Indeed, behind Herbart, the basic idea can be found in Wolff and Leibniz (Kortet al., 2009, pp. 522–6). Moreover, as for the more general strategy of ‘analysis’ modelled on it, while the new logic provided a way of making this type of logical reparsing of judgement forms explicit, the principle behind it was not novel. The idea, I suggest, had been clearly present in Hegel’s conception of ‘reflection’, and earlier in Leibniz’s conception of the making ‘distinct’ of clear but ‘confused’ ideas – a procedure that he termed, ‘definition’ or ‘analysis’. Moreover, the use of such ‘analyses’ in Leibniz and Hegel was bound up with that aspect of their thought that came to be celebrated by Sellars, their critiques of the ‘Myth of the Given’.

Leibniz’s version of the critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ can be found in is his criticism of Locke in the posthumously published *New Essays on Human Understanding (Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain)* of 1765 and in his own ‘logical’ interpretation of Descartes’ theory of ‘clear and distinct ideas’. Speaking of the coldness and hardness felt in a piece of ice, or of the whiteness seen in a lily, Locke declares that ‘there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of these simple ideas’ (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. II, ch. II). But Leibniz insists that a sensory idea thought of as ‘red’, say, would be ‘clear’ but ‘confused’ (*Nouveaux Essais*: 255). To be made distinct it would need to have its ‘inner structure . . . deciphered’ (ibid.). All clear ideas ‘are distinguishing . . . but only those which are distinguished, i.e. which are in themselves distinct and which distinguish in the object the marks which make it known, thus yielding an analysis or definition’ are distinct (*Nouveaux Essais*: 255–6).

For Leibniz, then, one perfects knowledge by progressing from some initially clear yet confused perceptually given representation.
of an object to a clear and more distinct one. Leibniz’s idea of the critique of a foundational role for perceptual givens, as well as a conception of knowledge as progressing via the replacement of immediate and thus confused ideas by mediated and distinct ones, is also found in Hegel’s discussion (cf. the Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827/8 [VGeist]) of the movement from ‘representation [Vorstellung]’ to ‘thought [Denken]’ (Enc §§451–68).

Hegel describes the content of representation as ‘given [gegeben]’ and as ‘something immediately found [unmittelbar Vorgefundenes]’ (VGeist:195). Representation is ‘essentially different from concept [Begriff] and thought [Gedanke]’ and to have a representation ‘means that I do not yet know the object in its determinacy [Bestimmtheit]’ (VGeist:196). While representation involves concepts, here the universal is ‘not yet a genuine universal but in fact itself merely a particular in opposition to other particulars’ (VGeist:224). In Leibnizian terms, what Hegel calls ‘representations’ are clear but confused. Going beyond representation to fully conceptual thought involves ‘definition’ in which ‘I state the species, the universal, and also state the determinacy, the essential determination [die wesentliche Bestimmtheit]’. And ‘in so doing, I have gone beyond the form of representation to the determinations of the concept [zu den Bestimmtheiten des Begriffs]’ (VGeist:196).

In comparison to representation, such contents are, we might say, clear and distinct.

The threefold distinction within forms of theoretical intentionality that Hegel gives in the lectures (intuition, representation, thought) has a parallel with his discussion of the three ‘shapes of consciousness’ twenty years earlier in the opening chapters of his Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG). In chapter one, Hegel criticizes the assumption that knowledge can be constructed on a firm basis of what he calls ‘sense-certainty’ – effectively, a type of phenomenally given content akin to Locke’s notion of a simple idea of a colour (and equivalent to ‘intuition’ in the discussion of theoretical spirit). As has been noted by DeVries (1988b, 2008), Hegel’s treatment of sense-certainty has clear parallels with Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ (Sellars, 1997). In Sellars’s version, the ‘given’ is conceived along the lines of Russellean ‘sense-data’, ‘acquaintance’ with which supposedly grounds all propositionally contentful ‘knowledge by description’ (Russell, 1912). Sellars’s point seems to be that purported knowledge of simple sensory givens like those of colour cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge because they cannot be quarantined from general theoretical beliefs about the world. A viewer’s knowledge that this tie is blue, for example, is contingent upon assumptions about the conditions under which it is viewed: were the lighting conditions abnormal, one might ‘mistake’ a blue tie for a green one. Furthermore, as McDowell (1994) has stressed, that experience can play a justificatory role in judgement suggests that it must have an internal articulation such as a propositional content, that is, the content of experience must be more akin to the content in ‘knowledge by descriptions’ than in bare ‘acquaintance’. That any purported atomic knowledge of immediately given perceptual ‘objects’ is ultimately dependent on some more encompassing theoretical knowledge of the world is also a central factor of Hegel’s account of the progression of the shapes of consciousness in the opening chapters of PhG.

Hegel’s critique of the ‘given’ in the PhG goes through three stages. First, he attempts to show that the purported objects of sense-certainty cannot be conceived as free of
contradiction. Importantly, to be free of contradiction is Leibniz’s anti-Lockean criterion for a ‘true’ simple idea (de Pierris, 2002). For Hegel, it would seem that the contradictory nature of simple phenomenal givens is consequent upon the tensed character of the way they are demonstratively picked out as perceptual objects. I am aware of ‘this’ content, present here and now, but with the passage of time it turns into something else, as when the ‘now’ of night turns into day twelve hours later (PhG GW 9:64–5). That is, a sense-datum simply picked out demonstratively could not be the subject of predication for a judgement with a stable truth-value. That the purported objects given in these shapes of consciousness turn out to be self-contradictory requiring their replacement by a different ‘shape’ is the motor driving the transitions between the successive ‘shapes’, and the new ‘given’ that had come to replace that of sense-certainty that Hegel calls ‘perception’ (seemingly more like an Aristotelian substance than a Lockean determinate simple idea) suffers a fate similar to sense-certainty itself. In turn, then, ‘perception’ is replaced by ‘the understanding’, whose ‘givens’ are conceived more as theoretical ‘posits’ like forces than as substances (PhG GW 9:94–5). But, of course, a theoretical posit is not ‘given’ at all. It is posited by a subject as part of an explanation of what it had considered as given. The next transition in chapter four is from ‘consciousness’ to ‘self-consciousness’, in which the subject is aware of its own positing activity.

Sellars’s approach to mental life was to model it on linguistic activity, and with this we can think of the progress through the Hegelian ‘shapes of consciousness’ as a series of reconsiderations of what components of mental content are akin to referring parts of speech. Sense-certainty is modelled on the ‘bare demonstrative’ as that which links talk to the world. ‘Perception’ might be thought as perhaps modelled on an Aristotelian ‘this-such’ (DeVries, 2008), a combination of a demonstrative and a sortal term. The movement from perception to understanding might therefore be thought of as akin to classical Russellian analysis in which a sentence with an only apparently referring term as the subject of predication is replaced with a sentence of different logical structure. Behind Russell’s understanding of analysis was a conception of an ultimate end point in which sense-data were arranged in ways akin to Lockean patterns of determinate simple ideas. But this analysis was premised on the problematic ‘Myth of the Given’, the inadequacy of which had been shown in PhG’s chapter one. In contrast, the Hegelian analysis might be seen as leading in the direction of later, more holistic and pragmatic approaches to language like that of Quine.

In Quinean analysis, proper names came to undergo the fate that definite descriptions had suffered in the hands of Russell. Self-consciously reviving the mediaeval tradition of treating singular terms as ‘universals’ (Quine, 1960, p. 181), Quine was to treat proper names as predicates. All talk of singular reference was, as he put it, ‘only a picturesque way of alluding to the distinctive grammatical roles that singular and general terms play in sentences’ (ibid., p. 96). A singular term ‘need not name to be significant’ (Quine, 1961, p. 9 [emphasis added]). With regards to reference itself, Quine was explicit: for him the parts of natural language closest to referring terms were relative pronouns like ‘that’ or ‘who’, the informal equivalents of the variable. For Quine, everything we talk about should properly be regarded as a ‘posit’, like the imperceptible posits of our most successful scientific explanations. While Russell had reacted to the problems of
the objects of *PhG*’s chapter two by going back to the start of chapter one, Quine seems to have pushed on to the radical conclusion of chapter three. Meanwhile, with Sellars’s contextualization of linguistic forms within pragmatically conceived ‘language games’, we might regard ‘analysis’ as having been taken into the territory explored in Hegel’s intersubjective grounding of consciousness and self-consciousness in *PhG*’s chapter four – an idea central to Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel.

At the start of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy had commenced by radically breaking with an Hegelian-styled philosophy that had thrived during the last decades of the nineteenth. Within just half a century, however, analytic philosophy itself had changed to such a degree that the idea of an irreconcilable opposition between its own approach and that of Hegel was starting to be questioned. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, any significant reconciliation may still have a long way to go, but the chances of this happening seem much stronger than at any time hitherto.

**NOTE**

1 De Pierris (2002) points out that Leibniz had disambiguated Descartes’s approach to clear and distinct ideas in which phenomenological and logical issues had been conflated. Leibniz interpreted the idea of distinctness in an entirely logical way, while empiricists such as Locke had understood it in a phenomenological way.
There is a distinction between ‘French Hegel studies’ and studies of Hegel in France. France has long been a fertile terrain for Hegelian studies. Heinrich Heine, the great Romantic poet and sometime student of Hegel, published *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* (*Zur Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*) in three instalments in a French journal (Heine, 1834). Marx, a friend of Heine, came to grips in some detail with Hegel by writing several texts in Paris, including *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction* (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung)*, and the 1844 ‘Paris Manuscripts’.

The reception of Hegel in France resembles the reception of Hegel in other languages and literatures, but with a difference, namely, an unusually passionate turn towards and then an equally passionate turn away from Hegel, who for a time functioned as a kind of master thinker in the French context. This turn towards and then away from Hegel produced what is in fact an original philosophical view disguised as a close reading of Hegel’s text – a phenomenon arguably unusual outside the French philosophical context.

**VICTOR COUSIN AND THE BEGINNING OF FRENCH HEGEL STUDIES**

French Hegel studies began during Hegel’s own lifetime. One of the earliest French thinkers to become interested in his work was Victor Cousin (1792–1867). Cousin worked primarily in the Scottish realist tradition of Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart. But he also studied German and became interested in Kant, Schelling and Hegel. He met Hegel in Heidelberg in 1817 and 1818, and the two remained in correspondence (on Cousin’s relation with Hegel, see D’Hondt, 1988, pp. 132–61 and *passim*).

Cousin provided an early impulse for the French study of Hegel (for his reading of Hegel without dialectic; see Roudinesco, 1986, pp. 136–7). He taught courses on Hegel at the Collège de France in 1828 (Cousin, 1991) and initiated a series of translations, including the following: an adaptation of Hegel’s Aesthetics by C. M. Bénard, who called it Hegel’s ‘poetics’ (Bénard, 1855); the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* (1859); the Philosophy of Nature (1863, 1864, 1866); and the Philosophy of Spirit (1867, 1870). Cousin later translated...
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the Philosophy of Religion (1876, 1878), and an Italian student of his, A. Véra, published an Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel (Véra, 1855).

Other nineteenth-century French authors, some of them rather obscure, also began to write on Hegel. J. Willm published ‘Essai sur la philosophie hégélienne’ (Willm, 1836). E. Beaussire, who published ‘Le centenaire de Hegel en 1870’ in the Revue des deux mondes (1871), saw Hegel as continuing the views of Dom Deschamps, an eighteenth-century French Benedictine monk. H. Taine, the French critic and historian, favoured a historicist approach to literary criticism (of which he is one of the founders) and helped call attention to Hegelian aesthetics. He sought a rapprochement between Hegel’s ideas and the empiricist views of E. Condillac and J. S. Mill. J. Jaurès, the French socialist leader, saw in Hegel a precursor of socialism. He wrote his Latin dissertation on the Germanic origins of socialism in Luther, Kant, Fichte and Hegel (Jaurès, 1891).

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, L. Herr contributed a short presentation of Hegel’s life and thought (Herr, 1932), which according to R. Queneau was the only decent discussion of Hegel available at the time (Queneau, 1963, p. 694). G. Noël contributed a little work entitled La Logique de Hegel (1967). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Hegel’s thought was discussed by a number of French writers. Such discussions include several chapters in a work by V. Basch on classical German views of political philosophy (Basch, 1904–27), and a monograph by P. Roques (1912). In the Revue de metaphysique et de morale (see especially nos 28 and 32) the Kant scholar V. Delbos mentioned Hegel in the context of a discussion of ‘Kantian factors in German philosophy from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth’ (Delbos, 1919–28). In a comprehensive work on scientific explanation, E. Myerson wrote at length on Hegel’s philosophy of nature (Myerson, 1921; for a summary, see Koyré, 1961, pp. 215–20). The neo-Kantian L. Brunschvicg contributed a virulently critical chapter on Hegel in his account of consciousness in Western philosophy (Brunschvicg, 1927, vol. II, pp. 382–401). Brunschvicg’s influential attack helped establish an unsympathetic climate towards Hegel’s thought. Brunschvicg, like Husserl, regarded Hegel as part of the romantic reaction to Kant. He described Hegel as ‘the master of contemporary scholasticism’ (ibid., p. 397). According to Brunschvicg, Hegel proposed a metaphysics of nature that was an anachronism even prior to its formulation (ibid., p. 398). He further maintained, from a Cartesian perspective, that the absence of an appropriate method in Hegel’s theory ‘renders his philosophy of history as inconsistent and feeble as his philosophy of nature’ (ibid., p. 395).

In the twentieth century, French Hegel studies continued in desultory fashion up to Jean Wahl (1888–1974). Father M. Régnier began to teach Hegel in 1927, when he returned to France from Oxford. C. Andler gave two courses on Hegel at the Collège de France in 1928–9, one concerning Hegel’s philosophy of religion, and the other an analysis of the original German text of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) (see Koyré, 1917, pp. 226–7). A stronger impetus was provided by Wahl, who taught for many years at the Sorbonne and influenced important French figures like Sartre and Levinas. Wahl, who was a non-systematic thinker interested in Bergson, Santayana and especially Kierkegaard, wrote two books which are important in the French context: Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel.
(1929) and Études kierkegaardgiennes (1938). The first was especially important at a time when few could read the (not yet translated) PhG in the original. It called attention to the relation of Hegel and Kierkegaard through an interpretation of the section on Unhappy Consciousness (on this and the larger context of French Hegelianism, see Baugh, 1993).

ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE AND THE MASTER THINKER PHENOMENON IN FRANCE

By far the strongest influence on French philosophy, including French Hegel studies, was provided by Alexandre Kojève. There have always been master thinkers in the philosophical tradition – those whose thought dominated the later debate. In France, the unquestioned master thinker is Descartes, whose theories continue to be read in widely different ways. Since the beginning of French philosophy in Descartes’s response to Montaigne, the former’s influence has run throughout the warp and woof of French thought. As Descartes’s influence has waxed and waned over the centuries, other French master thinkers have emerged from time to time. Since the 1930s, Hegel, Kojève, Sartre, Lacan, Marx and Heidegger have all at least briefly enjoyed the special status of a master thinker. Merleau-Ponty, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault and Derrida are French writers with important international reputations who never gained that kind of ascendancy in French philosophical discussion. In France, Marx’s theory is a special case. For many years his influence was sustained through two different sources: philosophically through the left-wing Hegelianism of Kojève and then Sartre; politically through the French Communist Party.


Just after the war, Kojève melodramatically claimed that the interpretation of Hegel may provide the key to understanding world history. ‘Perhaps at present the future of the world and hence the meaning of the present and the significance of the past finally depend on the way in which one today interprets Hegel's writings’ (Kojève, 1946, p. 366). Ironically, Kojève’s lectures on Hegel led to a reversal similar to the one brilliantly described in the master-slave section of PhG. Hegel famously contends that the truth of the relationship is that the slave is the master of the master and the master is the slave of the slave. This same dialectical logic seems to be at work in Kojève’s relation to Hegel. For through a strange quirk, Kojève became for a while even more important in French philosophy than the author whose text he construed. Kojève presented himself as a mere reader of the thought of one of the most powerful of philosophical minds, while simultaneously presenting his own views as those of the master. Indeed, he may have been in this period France’s greatest.
master thinker. (When the definitive history of twentieth-century French thought is written, it will not be surprising if the most influential ‘French’ thinker of the period between the two world wars turns out to be Kojève.)

The famous lectures on _PhG_ were published on the basis of notes edited by Queneau under the title _Introduction à la lecture de Hegel_ (Kojève, 1947). Kojève seems to have been a mesmerizing speaker, in part because he spoke fluent German (and hence had access to the original text, not yet available in French), and in part because of his unusual personality. The political scientist Raymond Aron, a man not easily impressed, was nevertheless among those deeply impressed by Kojève. Here is his description of Kojève’s lecturing style:

Kojève translated, to begin with, several lines of the _Phenomenology_, stressing certain words. Then he spoke, without notes, without ever tripping over a word, in impeccable French to which a Slavic accent added an originality and charm. He fascinated an auditorium of super-intellectuals inclined to doubt or to criticize. Why? The talent, the dialectical virtuosity were part of it. I do not know if his oratorical capacity remains intact in the book that depicts the last year of the course; but this capacity that had nothing to do with eloquence, was due to the topic, and to his person. The subject was both universal history and the _Phenomenology_. Through the latter, the former was explained. Everything acquired a meaning. Even those who were skeptical about historical providence, who suspected artifice behind art, did not resist the magician; at the moment, the intelligibility that he accorded to time and to the events functioned itself as proof. (Aron, 1984, p. 94)

Jacques Derrida credited Kojève with playing a decisive role in French philosophy just before and after the Second World War (Derrida, 1993, p. 123). V. Descombes detected in Kojève a pivotal figure in the transition from French neo-Kantianism, centering on Brunschvicg’s rejection of Hegel, through the period of the ‘three Hs’ (Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger), to the student revolution turning decisively against Hegel (Descombes, 1979).

Descombes points out that the neo-Kantian Brunschvicg understood idealism as the reduction of metaphysics to consciousness and as the opposite of realism (Descombes, 1979, p. 32, n. 17). Before Kojève’s intervention in the debate, French intellectuals regarded Hegel – as did Brunschvicg and, later, H.-G. Gadamer – as a romantic refuted by scientific progress (see Gadamer, 1996, p. 25). In a report on French Hegel studies for a Hegel congress in 1930, Koyré had noted that at present there was no Hegel school in France (Koyré, 1961, pp. 205–30). Yet after Kojève the turn towards Hegel became prominent. Hyppolite Taine observed that ‘[f]rom 1780 to 1830, Germany produced all the ideas of our historical period, and, during still half a century, perhaps during a century, our great task will be to rethink them’ (Taine, 1911, p. 243). This observation is echoed in a passage by Merleau-Ponty:

All the great philosophical ideas of the past century – the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche, phenomenology, German existentialism, and psychoanalysis – had their beginnings in Hegel; it was he who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason, which remains the task of our century. He is the inventor of that reason, broader than the understanding, which can respect the variety and singularity of individual consciousnesses, civilizations, ways of thinking, and historical contingency but which nevertheless does not give
up the attempt to master them in order to
guide them to their own truth. But as it
turns out, Hegel’s successors have placed
more emphasis on what they reject of his
heritage than on what they owe to him.
(Merleau-Ponty et al., 1964, p. 63)

Sartre illustrates the strong French turn
towards Hegel. While Sartre did not attend
Kojève’s lectures, Hegel was culturally perva-
sive by 1943 when Sartre composed L’être et
le néant. The book features Hegelian vocabu-
lary and insights, even though Sartre appears
to have never studied Hegel in depth. Sartre’s
later 1960) centres on the analysis of this
Hegelian concept.

The strong anti-Hegelian current arising
around the time of the French student revolu-
tion took several forms. One was a turn away
from Sartre, whose intellectual influence
nearly disappeared at the height of the revolu-
tion. Another was the turn to Heidegger, who
around 1960 effectively replaced Sartre as
the ‘French’ master thinker. Sartre’s existen-
tial humanism, based on a romantic view of
individual’s responsibility for humanity, had
become influential among the first postwar
generation. But Heidegger’s 1948 Letter on
‘Humanism’ (Brief über den ‘Humanismus’) was
now widely understood as having effectu-
ately countered Sartre’s brand of existential-
ism. Though he collaborated with Nazism,
Heidegger paradoxically offered a suppos-
edly deeper humanism of ‘being’.

The turn to Heidegger contributed to a
turn away from Hegel, despite the fact that
the former stressed the importance of dialogu-
ing with Hegel (Heidegger, 1982, p. 178). In
France Heidegger influenced the rise of a series
of intellectual movements characterized by
non-historical or anti-historical approaches –
including structuralism, post-structuralism
and others. Thus under Heidegger’s influence
a number of important French contemporary
thinkers rejected Hegel. G. Deleuze began his
main dissertation Différence et Répétition
1968) in noting Heidegger’s orientation
towards the ontological difference, the new
novel (le nouveau roman) and other factors.
According to Deleuze, ‘All these signs may be
attributed to a generalized anti-Hegelianism:
difference and repetition have taken the place
of the identical and the negative, of identity
and contradiction’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. xix).
Similarly, Foucault noted in his inaugural
talk at the Collège de France that ‘This entire
period, as concerns logic or epistemology, or
again Marx or Nietzsche, is trying to escape
from Hegel’ (Foucault, 1970, p. 74).

Kojève’s Hegel and French
Anti-Hegelianism

Kojève’s Hegel is as idiosyncratic as it has been
influential. As noted above, under the guise
of presenting Hegel’s philosophy he in fact
presents his own views. In a letter, he stresses
his silent revision of essential Hegelian doc-
trines in his reading of PhG (Auffret,
appears familiar with the views of Marx and
Heidegger. The ‘master-slave’ subsection is
presented as central to PhG as well as to the
philosophy of world history.

Kojève’s interpretation is related to
Koyré’s. According to Kojève,

[t]he Phenomenology of Spirit is a
description of human existence. That is,
human existence is described there as it
‘appears’ to someone who lives it. . . .
Hegel describes the self-consciousness
of a man whose existence is dominated
by one of the typical existential attitudes
one always finds everywhere (first part),
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or by the attitude characteristic of a significant historical epoch (second part). (Kojève, 1947, p. 576)

Kojève attributes to Hegel a description of human existence from an anti-religious, atheistic perspective (Kojève, 1947, pp. 75–7, 114, 119, 162, 197, 527), and that includes an extension of the dialectic to nature (ibid., pp. 485, 490) and an anti-dialectical view of method as being essentially the same as Husserl’s (ibid., p. 470). And since the Young Hegelians believed that Hegel had brought philosophy to a high point and to an end, now Kojève, in claiming to derive his position from Hegel’s, proclaims the end of history (on this, see Besnier, 1988, pp. 59–70; cf. Cooper, 1984):

Hegel was able to bring the history of philosophy (and, hence, history in general) to an end and to initiate the era of wisdom (whose light already shines on us, but also burns us, more than it warms us, which sometimes seems to us to be revoltng) in identifying the Concept and Time. (Kojève, 1955, p. 18)

This idea has been widely echoed, for instance in Derrida’s view of ‘absolute knowledge as closure or as the end of history’ (Derrida, 1967, p. 115). Yet Hegel never claims to bring philosophy to an end. In fact, he explicitly disclaims this possibility by insisting that philosophy, which comes after the fact, is condemned to meditate on previous forms of thought. Nowhere in Hegel’s texts is there any evidence for Kojève’s claim that Hegel saw the end of history in the figure of Napoleon at the battle of Jena (see Maurer, 1980, pp. 139–56). In fact, Hegel only writes in a letter to Niethammer of 13 October 1806 that on seeing Napoleon he has seen the world-soul on horseback. And there is absolutely nothing in Hegel to support Kojève’s revision of that claim – an instance of his professed Stalinism that so irritated Aron (1983, p. 96) – to the effect that the end of history arrived not with Napoleon but with Stalin. The closest Hegel ever comes to this sort of assertion is in the comment (from the Preface to PhG) that ‘ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era’. Indeed, he later seems to take back even this claim, as when in the 1821 Philosophy of Right (RPh) he insists that the owl of Minerva, or philosophy, begins its flight only at dusk.

RECENT FRENCH HEGEL SCHOLARSHIP

Opinions are sharply divided about Kojève’s understanding of Hegel. J. Vuillemin, who sees Kojève as an atheistic existentialist, claims one cannot exaggerate the importance of his study, which shows that Marx’s Das Kapital (Kap) is the real commentary to Hegel’s PhG (Vuillemin, 1950, 296–8). According to Bataille, Kojève understood that Hegel had already reached the outer limits of thought, which led Kojève to renounce producing an original theory in favour of an exegesis of Hegel’s (Bataille, 1955, p. 21 note). For J. Lacroix, Kojève was simply the only Hegelian of his time (see Auffret, 2002, p. 9). The phenomenologist M. Henry sees Kojève’s denial that dialectic applies to nature (as also urged by Hyppolite) as incompatible with Hegel’s position (Henry, 1963, p. 871). For E. Roudinesco, the French historian of psychoanalysis, Kojève’s reading of Hegel lies somewhere between history and fiction (Roudinesco, 1986, p. 134). Aron, despite his admiration for various insights in Kojève’s Hegel interpretation, holds the
already mentioned thesis that Kojève presents his own theory under the cover of a reading of Hegel’s (Aron, 1984, p. 94). According to P. Riley, Kojève simply had no intention of presenting an accurate reading of Hegel (Riley, 1985, pp. 5–48). Descombes, who studies Kojève in more detail, simply refuses to address the question of the link between Kojève’s account of PhG and Hegel’s text (Descombes, 1979, p. 41). Other more critical scholars, such as G. Canguilhem, distinguish between Kojève’s commentary on, and his interpretation of, PhG (Canguilhem, 1991, p. 52). For P. Macherey, Kojève was in effect a conceptual terrorist, abusing the right of the commentator in presenting his own theory under the guise of an interpretation of Hegel’s text (Macherey, 1983, p. 90).

In reacting against Hegel, French thinkers are mostly reacting against Kojève’s Hegel, and against the suffocating influence it used to exercise in the hothouse world of French philosophy. Structuralist, post-structuralist, postmodernist and other rejections of monism or universalism; their emphasis on difference; their turn away from history; their rejection of over-arching explanation and their protest against system – all count as facets of the rejection of Hegel as interpreted by Kojève.

Though Kojève was not a scholar in any ordinary sense, French Hegel scholarship has flourished in his wake, and often in the form of more orthodox approaches to Hegel’s texts. In 1939, as France was marching off to war, Kojève brought his famous lectures to an end. In the same year Hyppolite (1907–68) (who famously taught himself German by reading Hegel) published his translation of PhG (the first into French). This translation formed the basis of his important book, Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l’ésprit de Hegel 1946), still one of the most useful French commentaries on PhG.

Hyppolite was succeeded by a number of other French Hegel scholars, perhaps most prominently B. Bourgeois. For Bourgeois, very active both in France and abroad as a Hegel translator and commentator until his recent retirement, Hegel is not simply the prelude to Marxism. Rather, Marxism is but a parenthesis in Hegelianism, understood as the philosophy of freedom.

Since the 1930s, a small but lively tradition of Hegel studies has continued to develop in France. This tradition keeps relating its concerns with rationalism, theology, philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, existentialism and Marxism to Hegel’s PhG, while those concerns simultaneously accord well with the traditional French emphasis on Descartes. The French discussion of Hegel’s thought is now largely rationalist and mainly concerned (in opposition to other recent French philosophy) with the historical character of reason as it unfolds in social, political and cultural contexts. This adds a historical dimension to the otherwise ahistorical, even anti-historical Cartesianism of reason, for which history is only a fabula mundi. Yet the interest in philosophical anthropology is a further development of the conception of subjectivity launched by the Cartesian cogito. There is an implicit critique of theology in the French concern with philosophical anthropology in general, and in the master-slave discussion central to Kojève’s Hegel in particular (see Jarczyk and Labarrière, 1987).

Another strand of French Hegel interpretation is dominated by a religious or right-wing reading that corresponds to the strongly Christian impulse in French philosophy. The Christian inspiration behind Hegel’s thought is unmistakable, and this in part explains the large number – larger perhaps than in other...
national traditions – of Roman Catholic thinkers among French Hegel scholars (see Bruaire, 1964). These interpretations stress the relation of Hegel’s theory to phenomenology and to its stepchild, existentialism. The emphasis on a continuity between the Cartesian impulse and the phenomenological approach to Hegel is supported by two factors. First, there is the obvious continuity between the theories of Descartes and Husserl, manifest in the latter’s effort to depict his own theory as the continuation of the Cartesian position. Second, Hegel too calls attention to the link between his own and Descartes’s position. (For example, he suggests that if Kantian philosophy had been successful, it would have resolved Descartes’ problem; further, by indicating his interest in completing Kant’s philosophical revolution, Hegel implies that his philosophy prolongs Cartesianism).

Until recently, Marxism was a main component of the French Hegel discussion. Advocates included Marxists and non-Marxists alike, ranging from Kojève, who may or may not have had Marxist leanings, to R. Garaudy (1962), a member of the French Communist Party, and J. D’Hondt (1982), an eminent Hegel scholar with similar leanings. Like Hyppolite, these scholars were involved in the (typically French) effort to understand Hegel through Marx and Marx through Hegel. In his important study of the young Hegel, the Hungarian Marxist G. Lukács (1973) interprets Hegel as an Adam Smith reader who anticipates Marx. Though not himself a Marxist, Hyppolite follows Lukács in his discussion of the latter’s reading of Hegel (Hyppolite, 1969).
In his early reflections, inspired by Feuerbach, Marx famously planned to turn Hegel ‘from his head onto his feet’. While this phase is what is commonly retained from Marx’s assessment of his attitude towards Hegel, Marx himself gave a number of indications that his relation to Hegel was far more complex. In 1858, for example, he wrote to Engels concerning his method and its relation to Hegel’s science of logic:

In the method of treatment, it was of the greatest service to me that by mere accident . . . I again leafed through Hegel’s Logic. Should I ever again have time for such labours, I would take great pleasure in making the rational content (das Rationelle) of [Hegel’s] method accessible to common understanding. (Marx-Engels Werke [MEW] 29:260)

The afterword to the second edition of Capital (Kap) (1873) provides a slightly more detailed explanation of Marx’s relation to Hegel’s philosophical method:

My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurg of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the idea’. With me, on the contrary, the ideal [das Ideelle] is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. . . . But just as I was working at the first volume of the ‘Capital’, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre epigoni, who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a ‘dead dog’. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. (MEW 23:27)

Despite the emphasis placed here on his own methodological opposition to Hegel, this public ‘confession’ still amounts to Marx’s claim to be Hegel’s successor on the territory of political economy, while other Hegel disciples like Eduard Gans laboured in the field of law. Political economy, having been abandoned as if it were a res nullius, was now quasi officially occupied by Marx.
Marx’s references to his own method of ‘dealing with the material world’ pertain to a series of notebooks (written in 1857), parts of which would be published in Moscow in 1939/41 as *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy* (*Grundrisse*). The ‘coquetting’ with Hegel’s ‘modes of expression’ in these notebooks, first noted by the editors, would eventually give rise to a small library of commentaries whose common thread was the search for the underlying logic of *Kap*. But these works, dedicated to the question of Marx’s method, left crucial questions unanswered. Most of this secondary literature did not trace Marx’s actual sources, that is, the sources that provide the data on the ‘material world’ that he claimed as the basis for his own method. The many hundreds of primary and secondary sources that Marx drew upon were nearly unknown to his commentators, and their methodological discussions of Marx’s emphasis on ‘dealing with the material world’ were highly problematic for this reason (see Schrader, 1980).

Still, it appears that *Grundrisse* does represent a crucial turning point in Marx’s thought, given its proximity to the ‘mere accident’ of his renewed acquaintance with Hegel’s science of logic (to which Marx refers in the letter quoted above); and many of those who first read the *Grundrisse* notebooks quickly became aware of their watershed significance. The Soviet scholar V. Adoratskij as well as R. Rosdolskij and K. Korsch were struck by Marx’s sudden turn to ‘Hegelianism’. They interpreted this in terms of a formal analogy between the structure of Hegel’s science of logic and the logic of Marx’s *Kap*. Although many scholars have pursued this topic, there have been relatively few attempts to specify the nature of the analogy (see, e.g. Krahl, 1971; Schrader, 1980; Tuschling, 1997).

Real light can be shed on Marx’s relation to Hegel’s method only by means of an in-depth study of Marx’s manuscripts in conjunction with his detailed notes on his own sources. In undertaking this study, particular attention should be paid to the following four factors. First, in 1857 Marx did not just re-read the so-called Greater Logic (i.e. the *Science of Logic* [WL]). He also took fresh notes on the smaller *Encyclopaedia* Logic, especially on its transitional sections (see O’Malley and Schrader, 1977). Second, Marx found in the canonic texts of political economy something like a spontaneous and raw Hegelian dialectic *avant la lettre*: unbeknownst to their authors, their subject matter itself forced them to follow dialectical procedures. The 1857 notebooks bear ample testimony to Marx’s recognition of this fact. Third, Marx located the source of the analogy between the method of his political economy and Hegel’s logical method in the latter’s account of civil society (understood in the sense of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). Marx was supported in this regard by A. E. Cherbuliez’s concept of an ‘original right of acquisition and its overturning *[ursprüngli- ches Aneignungsrecht und sein Umschlag]*’ (Cherbuliez, 1841). Lastly, Marx, like Hegel, treated the dialectical logic of civil society in the broader context of world history. (As a Hegel scholar, Marx knew Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of world history, of which he owned the 1837 edition by Eduard Gans: see Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe [MEGA] IV/32:320–1 and 326 ff.)

A much simplified schematic rendition of Hegel’s account of the divisions of world history may be given as follows: Ancient Asia was founded on the simple equality of all subjects under one ruler. The Greek and Roman worlds invented the liberty of the few based on the slavery of the many. Modern society establishes the right to private property as the foundation of equal and free personhood. In
keeping with this scheme, Hegel predicted in his *Philosophy of Right* (*RPh*) that the globalization of private property, freedom and equality would spell the end of colonization and slavery (two institutions upon which civil society itself has historically relied) as well as the end of socio-economical personal dependencies predominant in premodern societies.

This far-flung connecting link [of world-wide trade] affords the means for the colonizing activity . . . to which the mature civil society is driven . . . Civil society is thus driven to found colonies . . . [This] is due in particular to the appearance of a number of people who cannot secure the satisfaction of their needs by their own labour once production rises above the requirements of consumers . . . In modern times, colonists have not been allowed the same rights as those left at home, and the result . . . has been wars and finally independence, as may be seen in the history of the English and Spanish colonies. Colonial independence proves to be of the greatest advantage to the mother country, just as the emancipation of slaves turns out to be the greatest advantage of the owners. (*RPh* §248, 248A)

Marx’s account of the economic globalization of capital is consistent with this basic Hegelian scheme. Marx’s and Engels’s 1848 *Communist Manifesto* (*Kommunistisches Manifest*) clearly adopts this last Hegelian perspective in its description of the economic drain on Europe, followed by the world-wide reinvestment of European and American capital. In a fully Hegelian vein, protectionism is explicitly rejected by the communists (who share this same policy with liberals and free traders). In his speech on protectionism and the working class (1847), Marx writes: ‘the system of free trade accelerates the social revolution. And it is only in this revolutionary intention, Gentlemen, that I am advocating free trade’ (*MEW* 4:308). This text argues that local and national protectionism is useless in an economically globalized world where the political sphere has little effective power (ibid.). In these and other texts, such as *The German Ideology* (*Die deutsche Ideologie*) and Engels’s *The Principles of Communism* (*Grundsätze des Kommunismus*), Hegel’s world history – or the movement of world spirit – is translated into, and substantially re-interpreted as, the world market (cf. *MEW* 3:35, 37, 43–4, 56, 60, 192, 453; *MEW* 4:373–4). The main problem that Marx faced in 1857 was that he did not yet have at his disposal the material proofs needed to sustain his thesis on the results of globalization under capitalist conditions. This situation changed radically with the advent of the first global capitalist crisis, which began in 1857. This crisis (supported by new means of communication such as the transatlantic telegraph) was enthusiastically welcomed by Engels and Marx (as is evident in their correspondence; see *MEW* 29). Marx began to document the crisis in large-scale notebooks (*Inventar des Marx-Engels-Nachlasses* [*Inventar* B 84; cf. B 88, 91) at the same time as he began work on the voluminous *Grundrisse*. In the reflections on history and historiography contained in the latter, Marx stressed the necessary character of world historical developments while also insisting on the role of contingency as well as the role of freedom in history. In the characteristically elliptical style of these notes, Marx wrote: ‘This conception appears as a necessary development. But justification of contingency . . . (Of freedom among other things as well.) (Impact of the means of communication. World history did not always exist; history as world history [is a] result.’ (*Grundrisse* MEGA II/1.1.1, p. 44). For
MARX’S HEGELIAN PROJECT

Marx, as for Hegel, it is not the mere fact of long-distance commerce and communications that constitutes a global market. While these features of early modern history gave rise to new possibilities for social production and reproduction in different geographical and cultural zones, it is only the global expansion of civil society’s principles of private property, individual freedom and bourgeois equality, together with their backing by the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), that merits the proper name of ‘world market’ (see Schrader, 1980). It is the latter that brings about the substantial revolution of the eighteenth century that was prepared by two centuries of early exploitation of the Americas and by the onset of the industrial revolution. It should be noted in this context that both Hegel and Marx regarded modern slavery as a necessary and transitory result of the development of civil society – a contradiction of its juridical norms based in its own internal dynamic (Grundrisse MEGA II:901; cf. Hegel’s 1822/3 lectures on the philosophy of world history [VGesch]).

The topic of world history received special emphasis in Marx’s thought during his final years. Between 1881 and 1883 he filled four voluminous notebooks with excerpts on world history, from 100 BCE to 1700 (Inventar B 157–60). In these notebooks, the major sources – sorted and rearranged in strict chronological order – are F. C. Schlosser, Weltgeschichte für das deutsche Volk (World History for the German People), and C. Botta, Histoire des Peuples d’Italie (History of the Peoples of Italy) (Inventar B 157). Other notebooks treat historical topics as well, particularly issues concerning Central Europe, Russia and Asia (see Inventar B 122 ff., especially the references to L. H. Morgan, J. Phear and W. Cobbett. In this same period, Marx read and corresponded with Z. Zašulic (Inventar C 850–1, D 4647), M. Kovalevskij (C 323–4, D 2698–9) and N. Daniel’son (B 164, C 135–52; cf. D 970–1010) on various contemporaneous forms of pre-capitalist property in Russia. In addition, he discussed G. L. von Maurer’s treatment of the same topics with respect to Western Europe (see Harstick, 1977).

Marx did not synthesize these studies, and some of his sources have yet to be identified. Nevertheless, the notebooks make evident his particular method of treating historical materials as well as the fundamental direction of his interests. He provided in them a chronological reconstruction of sources like Schlosser’s Weltgeschichte, distinguishing between facts that pertain to forms of politics and facts that pertain to relations of property. If one of his sources was not complete in this regard, Marx filled in the gaps by bringing to bear other source materials. Marx’s procedure already marks a sharp contrast with contemporaneous conceptions of world history, which were mostly oriented towards diplomacy (as e.g. in L. von Ranke and H. von Sybel) and cultural life (K. Lamprecht). Marx also expanded the scope of world history (which in nineteenth-century historiography was mainly Eurocentric) to Russia and Asia – parts of the world that were of particular interest to him. His treatment of world history also included – as did Hegel’s – the history of colonization and decolonization. Finally, these manuscripts show Marx’s intense interest in the contemporaneity of private property with other historical forms of property. While the underlying logic of history might seem to dictate otherwise, ancient, feudal and modern property relations exist synchronically on a global scale, and Marx clearly searched for ways in which this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs could be overcome politically – at least outside Western and Central Europe.
It is evident, then, that there is a comprehensive project of world history at work in Marx's late notebook manuscripts. This project, of course, does not have a fully definite shape. Yet it is quite clear that Marx was working with a twofold aim in mind – namely, to expand traditionally Eurocentric world history into a decentralized global history; and to rethink the dominant role played by private property in world history as theorized by Hegel. Similarly to Hegel and other classical modern theorists of civil society, Marx works with a conception of world history that emphasizes the globalization of principles and practices of market society. But Marx did not consider the reality of capitalist market society to be without a historically achievable alternative. That is why towards the end of his life he became increasingly interested in the relations between different property forms coexisting within the same society as well as in political institutions and cultural conditions inside and outside Europe.

Still, despite their divergence, the ways in which Hegel's and Marx's respective conceptions of world history coalesce are quite striking. For both thinkers, the key elements of the theory of world history are equality and liberty, culminating in freedom of the person; and the triumphal march of the principles of equality and liberty takes place by means of the real dynamic of private property and capital. As Hegel already recognized, this dynamic inevitably engenders material inequality and class struggle – which are thus revealed as the essence of the historical dynamic itself:

When social conditions tend to multiply and subdivide needs, means and enjoyments indefinitely . . . this is luxury. In this same process . . . dependence and want increase ad infinitum, and the material to meet these is permanently barred to the needy man because it consists of external objects with the special character of being property, . . . and hence from his point of view its recalcitrance is absolute. (RPh §195)

When civil society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in population and industry. The amassing of wealth . . . is one side of the picture. The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs. This results in the dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort . . . (RPh §243)

When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain subsistence level . . . the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers. . . . (T)his brings with it, at the other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands. (RPh §244)

It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e., its own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble. (RPh §245)

Hegel and Marx, then, were concerned with one and the same subject matter: the intrinsic logic of the historical expansion of civil society. Yet their methodological approaches to world history, and especially their criteria of evaluation, differ greatly. What Hegel regarded primarily from juridical and political points of view Marx regarded primarily sub specie oeconomiae.

At first sight, Marx's explanation of world history primarily in terms of the emergence of a world market may seem to be a form of reductionism. But even Hegel suggested that the world market is produced and sustained by the inherent imperialist tendencies of capitalistic civil society: 'This inner dialectic of
civil society thus drives it . . . to push beyond its own limits and seek in other peoples . . . consumers [Consumenten] and is its necessary means of subsistence’ (RPh §246 – Knox translation revised). As this passage suggests, global expansion is the universalizing principle of capitalist market production. Thus, despite Marx’s claim that his method is opposed to Hegel’s, the manuscripts cited above show that Hegel represents much more than a ‘coquetterie’ on Marx’s part. There are numerous points of intersection between the ‘absolute idealist’ and the ‘historical materialist’ with respect to their conceptions of the globalization of market (or civil) society. Indeed, one might say that these manuscripts show the following: Marx was working on the same construction site as Hegel, and there were direct lines of communication between their respective workshops.

NOTES


2 A Chinese edition has appeared in the wake of a Russian publication in the Архив Маркс Зиндельса (Marx and Engels Archive), Moscow 1938–46; 马克思历史学笔记, 红旗出版社, Beijing 1992. Various interpretative issues result from the fact that the Chinese text here in question is a translation of a Russian rendering of a text that Marx wrote in German, English, and French. To this day, however, no research has been done on the original source materials.

3 Surprisingly, Marx shows relatively little interest in the United States with regard to this subject. This does not mean, of course, that he ignored the North American continent (to which he devoted many articles and manuscripts). But this continent does not play a prominent role in the particular aspect of global history here in question, namely, the contemporaneity of different forms of social property relations.
PART VI:
CHRONOLOGIES
NOTABLE DATES IN HEGEL’S LIFE

STUTTGART, 1770–88

1770  27 August, Hegel born to Georg Ludwig Hegel and Maria Magdalena Louisa Hegel.
1781  Kant publishes first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.
1785  C. F. Pfleiderer becomes Professor of Mathematics and Physics in Tübingen and Director of the Tübingen Observatory, which he renovates.
1786  Kant publishes *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.
1787  Kant publishes second, revised edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.
1788  Completes Gymnasium in Stuttgart (Abitur).

TÜBINGEN, 1788–93

1788–93  Studies Theology & Philosophy (and physics under Pfleiderer); befriends Hölderlin.
1788  Kant publishes *The Critique of Practical Reason*; Schiller becomes Professor of History at Jena.
1789  French Revolution.
1790  Earns MA; befriends Schelling; Kant publishes *The Critique of Judgment*.
1791–1804  Haitian Revolution.
1791–1817  In Weimar, Goethe acts as advisor for the University of Jena, officially so after 1807.
1792  At Kant’s recommendation, Fichte anonymously publishes Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, widely assumed to be Kant’s until Kant reveals otherwise.
1793  Passes final exam (*Konsistorialexamen*). Kant publishes first edition of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.
NOTABLE DATES IN HEGEL'S LIFE

BERN, 1793–6

1793–6  Private Tutor, Steiger von Tschugg family; access to excellent libraries.
1794  Kant publishes second, revised edition of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*; Fichte becomes Professor at Jena.
1794–5  Fichte publishes *The Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (*Wissenschaftslehre*).
1796  French invasion of Württemburg.

FRANKFURT AM MAIN, 1797–1800

1797–1800  Private Tutor, Gogel family.
1796–7  Fichte publishes *The Foundations of Natural Law according to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre*.
1798  Kant publishes the complete *Metaphysics of Morals*, also *Anthropology*.
1799  Hegel’s father dies; Fichte forced to withdraw from post; Schelling takes up Fichte’s chair at Jena; Hölderlin begins to deteriorate.

JENA, 1801–6

1801  January: Moves to Jena; 27 August: Habilitation.
1802–3  Co-editor, with Schelling, of *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*.
1803  Schelling takes post in Würzburg.
1804  Unanimously appointed Assayer of the Jena Mineralogical Society; joins Westphalian Society for Natural Science. Kant dies.
1805  Schiller dies; Fichte becomes Professor at Erlangen.
1805–6  Appointed Irregular (*Auserordentlicher*) Professor.

BAMBERG, 1807–8

1807–8  Editor-in-Chief, *Bamberger Zeitung*.
1807  Joins the Heidelberg Society of Physics.
NOTABLE DATES IN HEGEL'S LIFE

NÜRNBERG, 1808–16

1808–16  Rector, Gymnasium, which he very successfully reforms.
1811–15  September, marries Marie Helena Susanna von Tucher.
1812    Emancipation of German Jews opens official posts to them.

HEIDELBERG, 1816–18

1816    Appointed Professor of Philosophy.
1817    Co-editor, *Heidelbergschen Jahrbücher der Literatur*.

BERLIN, 1818–31

1818–31  Appointed Professor, obtaining Fichte’s chair, vacant since 1814.
1820    August, Prussian ‘Karlsbad Decrees’ against demagoguery.
1820–1  Appointed Dean, Faculty of Philosophy.
1822    Visits Brussels and Holland, when returning visits Carnot in Magdeburg.
        Emancipation Edict revoked to block professorial appointment of Hegel’s
        student Eduard Gans.
1824    Visits Vienna, via Dresden and Prague.
1827    Visits Paris; when returning visits Goethe in Weimar. Founding of *Jahrbücher
        für wissenschaftliche Kritik*.
1829–30  University Rector.
1829    Visits Prag, also Goethe. Visits Karlsbad spa, unexpectedly meets Schelling.
1830    Second French Revolution.
1831    Goethe completes *Faust*.
1831    Dies quickly of ill health on 14 November.

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WRITINGS, PUBLICATIONS AND BERLIN LECTURE SERIES

(Titles in square brackets are supplied by Hegel’s editors; published articles are set in quote marks, book titles are italicized.)

BERN, 1793–6

1793–4 [Fragments on Folk Religion and Christianity].
1795–6 [The Positivity of the Christian Religion].
1796–7 [The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism] (authorship disputed).

FRANKFURT AM MAIN, 1797–1800

1797–8 [Drafts on Religion and Love].
1798 Confidential Letters on the prior constitutional relations of the Wadtlandes (Pays de Vaud) to the City of Bern. A complete Disclosure of the previous Oligarchy of the Bern Estates. Translated from the French of a deceased Swiss [Jean Jacques Cart], with Commentary. Frankfurt am Main, Jäger. (Hegel’s translation is published anonymously.)
1798–1800 [The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate].
1800–1802 The Constitution of Germany (draft).

JENA, 1801–7

1801 De orbitis planetarum; ‘The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy’.
WRITINGS, PUBLICATIONS AND BERLIN LECTURE SERIES

1802  ‘On the Essence of Philosophical Critique in general and its relation to the present state of Philosophy in particular’. (Introduction to the Critical Journal of Philosophy, edited by Schelling and Hegel.)

1802  ‘How Commonsense takes Philosophy, Illustrated by the Works of Mr. Krug’.

1802  ‘The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy. Presentation of its various Modifications and Comparison of the latest with the ancient’.

1802  ‘Faith and Knowledge, or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Completeness of its forms as Kantian, Jacobian and Fichtean Philosophy’.

1803  ‘On the Scientific Approaches to Natural Law, its Role within Practical Philosophy and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law’.

1807  The Phenomenology of Spirit.

BAMBERG, 1807–8

1807  ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition’. (Preface to his Philosophical System, published with the Phenomenology.)

NÜRNBERG, 1808–16

1808–16  [Philosophical Propaedeutic].

HEIDELBERG, 1816–18

1812–13  Science of Logic, Part 1
          (Books 1, 2).
1816  Science of Logic, Part 2
          (Book 3).
1817  ‘Review of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Works, Volume Three’.
1817  ‘Assessment of the Proceedings of Estates Assembly of the Duchy of Württemberg in 1815 and 1816’.
1817  Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1st edition.

BERLIN, 1818–31

1820  The Philosophy of Right, or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline.
1827  Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 2nd rev. edn.
1831  Science of Logic, 2nd edn, with extensive revisions to Book 1 (published in 1832).
1831  Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, 3rd rev. edn.
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BERLIN LECTURES

Logic 1818–31, annually.
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Philosophy of World History 1822–3, 1824–5, 1826–7, 1828–9, 1830–1.
Philosophy of Art 1820–1, 1823, 1826, 1828–9.
Philosophy of Religion 1821, 1824, 1827, 1831.

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