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THE BELIEFS OF A PYRRHONIST \*

I

A Pyrrhonist's researches do not end in discovery; nor yet do they conclude that discovery is impossible. For they do not terminate at all: the researches continue (*PH* 1 1, 4), and the researcher finds himself in a condition of *ἐποχή* (*PH* 1 7) <sup>1</sup>. *Ἐποχή* is defined as «a standstill of the intellect, as a result of which we neither deny nor affirm anything» (*PH* 1 10). The Sceptical investigator <sup>2</sup> neither asserts nor denies, neither believes nor disbelieves <sup>3</sup>.

*Ἐποχή* is characteristically produced by argument — indeed, one of the most refreshing features of the Pyrrhonist tracts of Sextus Empiricus is that they are stuffed full of argumentation. When a philosopher offers us an argument, he normally implies that, if we accept the premisses, we ought to accept the conclusion. It is thus

\* Drafts of this paper have been read at Cambridge, Rome and Milan: I am indebted to my three audiences for numerous suggestions and improvements.

<sup>1</sup> *PH* is SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*; *M* is SEXTUS, *adversus Mathematicos*.

<sup>2</sup> I shall use "Sceptic" and "Pyrrhonist" interchangeably: I have nothing to say about the Academic Sceptics.

<sup>3</sup> Modern sceptics customarily reject *knowledge* and they may allow themselves a full measure of *belief*. Ancient Sceptics reject *belief*: they also, of course, reject *knowledge*, but that is only a trivial consequence of their rejection of *belief*.

natural to suppose that a Pyrrhonist's arguments similarly imply an intellectual *ought*: "Consider these premisses", the Sceptic urges, "and you will see that you should suspend judgement". A few Pyrrhonian passages do indeed contain such an intellectual *ought*<sup>4</sup>; but those passages are, I think, misleading. Sextus usually says, not "you should suspend judgement", but "you *will* (or: *must*) suspend judgement". Ἐποχή is «an affection (πάθος) that comes about (γίγνεται) in the inquirer after the investigation» (PH I 7). The onset of ἐποχή is something which simply *happens* to us.

More specifically, Scepticism is a δύναμις ἀντιθετική, «a capacity for opposing what appears and what is thought in any way at all, from which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and statements, we reach first ἐποχή and then ἀταραξία» (PH I 8). The sequence for the Sceptic is: investigation — opposition — equipollence — ἐποχή — ἀταραξία. That sequence is causal: famously ἀταραξία follows ἐποχή «by chance» (PH I 26) or «like a shadow» (PH I 29; Diog. Laert. ix 107); and ἐποχή follows ἰσοσθένεια in just the same fashion. The Pyrrhonist's arguments lie before you: read them, and you will find yourself in a state of ἐποχή<sup>6</sup>.

Any investigation attacks some specific subject-matter and poses some particular question. The state of ἐποχή resulting from any investigation will therefore itself be directed towards some specific subject-matter and some particular question. A Pyrrhonist asks: "Is it the case that *P*?" ("Do there exist gods?", "Can we discern true from false appearances?", "Is the world a structure of atoms and void?"). He then assembles arguments in favour of an affirmative answer, and arguments in favour of a negative answer. The two sets of arguments exactly balance one another. Ἐποχή supervenes — ἐποχή directed towards the proposition that *P*.

Pyrrhonism thus works piecemeal. The δύναμις ἀντιθετική is

<sup>4</sup> E.g. PH I 34 (οὐδέπω γὰρ συγκατατίθεσθαι); Diog. Laert. ix 81 (ἐφεκτέον). Timon, *apud* Aristocles, *apud* Eusebius, PE xiv 18, 3 (μηδὲ πιστεύειν δεῖ).

<sup>5</sup> E.g. PH I 59 (ἐφέξομεν); I 78 (ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι); I 89 (εἰσαγέσθαι τῆ ἐποχῆν).

<sup>6</sup> The point needs stressing: unless it is firmly grasped we cannot begin to understand the Pyrrhonist's bizarre attitude to his own arguments (PH III 280-1).

general capacity, but it can only be exercised on particular issues. Ἐποχή is not a global state — a state of total intellectual paralysis; rather, it is a particular attitude, essentially directed towards some specific issue. Ἐποχή on one issue does not imply ἐποχή on any other issue<sup>7</sup>. Hence if you ascribe ἐποχή to a man you must indicate the object of his ἐποχή: towards what issue is his ἐποχή directed? and if a Pyrrhonist claims that ἐποχή is the route to ἀταραξία we must equally ask him to specify the object of that ἐποχή: over what range of issues is his ἐποχή extended?

It is pointless to ask a Pyrrhonist whether we ought to suspend judgement on this or that specified topic: ἐποχή is not something to be adopted or rejected at will. But it is wholly appropriate to ask where — over what range of topics — a Pyrrhonist will exercise his δύναμις ἀντιθετική, and hence to ask what is the scope of his Scepticism.

## II

We may wonder what is the extent of a Pyrrhonist's Scepticism; and we may ask, equivalently, what a Pyrrhonist believes. (The questions are equivalent since a man may have beliefs on a topic just in case he does not find himself in a state of ἐποχή towards it.) The question, "What may a Pyrrhonist believe?", or "What is the scope of Pyrrhonian ἐποχή?", is of the last importance for an understanding of ancient Scepticism; and it has been the subject of scholarly controversy<sup>8</sup>.

But the question, generally posed, has no general answer. Different Pyrrhonists underwent ἐποχή to different degrees and exercised

<sup>7</sup> Hence the Stoics may consistently indulge in selective ἐποχή: Cicero, *Ac.* II 29, 94; PH II 253; *cf.* Diog. Laert. III 52 (on Plato).

<sup>8</sup> See esp. M. F. Burnyeat, *Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?*, in *Doubt and Dogmatism*, edd. M. Schofield, M. F. Burnyeat, J. Barnes, Oxford 1980. and M. Frede, *Der Skeptikers Meinungen*, «Neue Hefte für Philosophie», 15/16 (1979) pp. 102-29. (*Cf.* M. F. Burnyeat, *Idealism and Greek Philosophy: what Descartes saw and Berkeley missed*, «Philosophical Review», xci (1982) pp. 3-40, esp. pp. 23-32.) My paper is indebted on every page to the work of those two scholars and friends.

their δύναμις ἀντιθετική over different areas. Whether or not we can detect a line of development running through the long history of ancient Pyrrhonism and see ἐποχή becoming gradually more moderate in its claims<sup>9</sup>, there can be no doubt that there was no single Pyrrhonian orthodoxy: Galen, for example, was able to distinguish extreme and moderate Sceptics among the Pyrrhonists of his own day<sup>10</sup>. The unanswerable general question must thus be replaced by a series of specific questions. Here I shall limit my attention to Sextus Empiricus (who is, after all, the chief representative of Pyrrhonism for us today); moreover, to avoid any problems raised by the possibility of change and development in Sextus' own views<sup>11</sup>, I shall restrict myself to one of Sextus' works. My question is this: What is the scope of ἐποχή in Sextus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*? what, if anything, may the Pyrrhonist of the *Outlines* believe<sup>12</sup>?

Two rival answers to that question define two types of Scepticism. The first type I shall call, following Galen<sup>13</sup>, *rustic Pyrrhonism*. The rustic Pyrrhonist has no beliefs whatsoever: he directs ἐποχή towards every issue that may arise. The second type of Scepticism I shall call *urbane Pyrrhonism*<sup>14</sup>. The urbane Pyrrhonist is happy to

<sup>9</sup> See esp. V. BROCHARD, *Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris 1923<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> GALEN, *diff. puls.* vii 711 K; *praenot.* xiv 628 K.

<sup>11</sup> Sextus' extant writings were probably composed in the order: *PH*—*M* vii—xi—*M* i—vi (see esp. K. JANÁČEK, *Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso Erhalten?*, «Philologus», cvii (1963) pp. 271-7. Janáček's various philological studies have shown in detail how Sextus' style altered in the course of his career. I think it is plausible to suppose developments in his thought too — but the topic awaits detailed investigation.

<sup>12</sup> There may, of course, be no determinate answer to that question either — *PH* may, in the end, turn out to offer no coherent view on the extent of ἐποχή. See further below, pp. 40-3.

<sup>13</sup> ἀγροικοπυρρώνειοι: see the passages cited above, note 10.

<sup>14</sup> Myles Burnyeat has called this the country gentleman's Scepticism, in honour of Montaigne. (I take this from an unpublished paper on "The Sceptic in his Place and Time", which he has kindly allowed me to read.) Burnyeat suggests that urbane Pyrrhonists "insulate" their philosophy from the rest of their life, and that only a rustic treats his Scepticism as a philosophy to live by. But "insulation" may be taken in either of two ways. a) Some modern Sceptics claim that their doubts are "philosophical" doubts, not ordinary doubts. "Philosophical" doubt is allegedly compatible with ordinary belief: a

believe most of the things that ordinary people assent to in the ordinary course of events: he directs ἐποχή towards a specific target — roughly speaking, towards philosophical and scientific matters. Thus the rustics hotly reject everything, while the urbane coolly dismiss the rash claims of the *soi-disant* savants.

An interpreter who finds rustic Pyrrhonism in *PH* will appeal primarily to two features of Sextus' work. First, many of the arguments in *PH* appear to demolish *all* beliefs on a given topic if they demolish any beliefs: the attacks on causation or on time or on truth, say, do not appear to restrict their target to scientific or philosophical positions in those areas; and the Five Tropes of Agrippa, in terms of which much of the argumentation of *PH* is conducted, seem wholly indifferent to any distinction between scientific theory and everyday opinion. Secondly, *PH* makes it plain that the opponents of Pyrrhonism regularly construed Pyrrhonism in a rustic fashion — the noto-

man may believe, with everyone else, that roses are red and violets blue — and at the same time he may doubt, philosophically, that violets are blue and roses red. A Scepticism which limits itself to philosophical doubt "insulates" itself from real life, inasmuch as a Sceptic may share in all the beliefs — and hence join in the normal activities — of his fellow men. The distinction between philosophical doubt and ordinary doubt is scarcely to be found in ancient Scepticism. (But some scholars find it at *M* xi 165; and Michael Frede has in effect suggested that it underlies the theorising of the Methodical School of medicine: see his *The Method of the so-called Methodical School of Medicine*, in *Science and Speculation*, edd. J. BARNES, J. BRUNSCHWIG, M.F. BURNYEAT, M. SCHOFIELD, Cambridge-Paris 1982, pp. 18-22). The "insulation" which "philosophical" doubt introduces was no part of normal Pyrrhonism. b) The urbane Pyrrhonist directs his ἐποχή to philosophico-scientific matters; although he never doubts and believes the *same* things, his doubts are still, in a sense, "insulated" from ordinary life — for they touch only on the concerns of professionals. But that is not to say that his doubts have no *practical* manifestations. For, first, in some cases at least he may well part company with ordinary beliefs and practices (see below, pp. 31-2). And secondly, his professional doubts may have a profound effect on his professional practices. One ancient example may illustrate that point. The Empirical doctors were urbane Sceptics; and their Scepticism had a notable effect upon their approach to medicine — it affected their research, their classification of diseases, their diagnoses and prognoses, their therapy. See, most strikingly, the remarks on anatomy and vivisection at CELSUS, *proem.* 40-3 (with 23-4).

rious argument that Sceptics cannot act, evidently presupposes that Pyrrhonists have no beliefs at all.

The rustic interpreter takes his motto from Timon: «That honey is sweet, I do not affirm; that it appears so I allow»<sup>15</sup>.

An interpreter who finds urbane Pyrrhonism in *PH* will also appeal primarily to two features of Sextus' work. First, Sextus frequently characterizes Pyrrhonism by reference to its opponents, the "Dogmatists": «the Sceptic, being a philanthropic sort, wishes to cure by argument, to the best of his ability, the pretension and temerity of the Dogmatists» (*PH* III 280). Pyrrhonism is a therapy, a cure for the mental illnesses induced by scientists, philosophers, and other learned charlatans: it is not concerned with the ordinary beliefs of ordinary men. Secondly, Sextus frequently presents himself as the champion of βίος, of Ordinary Life or Common Sense. Like Berkeley, he is eternally attacking Metaphysics and reducing men to Common Sense. He is a defender, not an opponent, of ordinary beliefs.

The urbane interpreter takes his motto from Diogenes' summary of Scepticism: «That fire burns we perceive; as to whether it has a caustic nature, we suspend judgement»<sup>16</sup>.

Is *PH* rustic or urbane? A full discussion of the question would demand an investigation of a major part of Sextus' text. Here I shall consider only three issues raised by the question — the three which seem to me the most significant, both historically and philosophically, of the many which the question suggests. I shall look first at *PH*'s commitment to τὰ φαινόμενα; then at the notion of δόγμα and *PH*'s opposition to οἱ δογματικοί; and thirdly at *PH*'s attitude to βίος and the Meaning of Life. As an epilogue I shall briefly suggest that the question itself may be ill-conceived<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> TIMON, frag. 74 Diels = *DIOG. LAERT.* IX 105.

<sup>16</sup> *DIOG. LAERT.* IX 104; cf. *M* VII 197-9; *GALEN, simp. med.* XI 380 K.

<sup>17</sup> Two troublesome side-issues should be mentioned. a) Very many sentences in the text of *PH* appear to commit the Pyrrhonist to beliefs of various sorts: Sextus says that men's eyes are differently structured from those of cats (*PH* I 47), and his account of the Ten Tropes is largely composed of such observations; he says that Plato was not a Sceptic (*PH* I 222), and his writings are full of such doxographical remarks. Surely all

## III

The major part of Book I of *PH* presents the Ten Tropes of ἐποχή. The characteristic conclusion of the Tropes is this: «how each of the external objects appears (φαίνεται) we can perhaps say; but how it is in its nature we cannot assert» (*PH* I 87). The Pyrrhonist of *PH* is undeniably committed to τὰ φαινόμενα: he is prepared to say how things appear. Surely that in itself is enough to show that he is no rustic? surely in saying how things appear he is exhibiting some beliefs?

The point is not that the phrase "it appears to me" means "I believe": φαίνεται in Greek, like "appears" or "seems" in English, may indeed carry such an epistemic sense; but the word does not do so in *PH* I. There the appearing is "phenomenological" — φαίνεται reports the way things look<sup>18</sup>. (Not necessarily the way they look to perception. Although perceptual appearances predominate in the Ten Tropes, there are also numerous examples of non-perceptual appearances. The phenomenological sense of "seem" or φαίνεται is not in any way tied to perception. I may say, phenomenologically, "That argument looks sound — but don't be taken in by it"<sup>19</sup>.)

that indicates a mass of ordinary beliefs? (So already the ancient critics of Pyrrhonism: see *ARISTOCLES, apud EUSEBIUS, PE* XIV 18, 11.) It does not, and the passages will bear no weight: sometimes we should plainly understand a καθάπερ φαίνω (cf. *PH* I 80, 85) — Sextus is not speaking *in propria persona*; sometimes an εἶναι must be read "catachrestically" as φαίνεσθαι (cf. *PH* I 135, 195, 202; cf. *M* XI 18-19) — Sextus is not saying how things are; sometimes, no doubt, we should simply suppose an understandable carelessness on Sextus' part. If *PH* is urbane, then (some of) those passages may be taken to express Pyrrhonian beliefs; but the passages cannot be adduced as evidence for urbanity. b) Sextus is a Pyrrhonist attempting to describe Pyrrhonism: the attempt, as Sextus is acutely aware, is always close to incoherence — how can someone who purports to have no philosophical beliefs describe his own philosophical position? I am not here concerned with that problem, or with Sextus' efforts to surmount it. For it is a problem independent of the dispute between rustic and urbane interpreters (it arises for the urbane no less than for the rustic). My question is this: how should we, who are probably not Pyrrhonists, describe the philosophy which Sextus advocates in *PH*?

<sup>18</sup> Burnyeat (*Can the Sceptic ...*, pp. 43-6) is convincing on this point.

<sup>19</sup> See further J. BARNES, *Aristotle's Methods of Ethics*, «Revue Internationale de Philosophie», 133/4 (1980) pp. 490-511, at p. 491 note 1.

Rather, the point is that the utterance of phenomenological φαίνεται sentences itself seems to commit the utterer to various beliefs. Sextus' Pyrrhonist will say things like: "The honey tastes sweet to me now", "The tower looks round to me from here"; "Incest strikes me as wrong in Alexandria"<sup>20</sup>. Such utterances appear to imply beliefs in at least four different ways. First, the utterer appears to refer to himself, and hence to presuppose his own existence (and perhaps also certain facts about his own nature, e.g. that he is a being capable of perception and thought). Secondly, the utterer appears to refer to the present time, and hence to presuppose that there is such a thing as time. Thirdly — and more strikingly — the utterer appears to refer to external objects, and hence to assume their existence; for if I say "That tower looks round", I may be in doubt about the "real nature" of the tower, but I can hardly doubt that there *is* a tower there of some sort or other. Finally — and most obviously — the utterer appears to be expressing a belief by his very utterance, namely the belief that the honey tastes sweet to him, etc. For the utterance of an indicative sentence functions characteristically as a manifestation of belief in the proposition expressed by the sentence.

His use of the Ten Tropes, then, commits the Pyrrhonist of PH to at least a limited number of beliefs; and that is enough to show that he is not a rustic.

That argument supposes that the Sceptic's utterances are to be construed as statements or affirmations. And the supposition must not be allowed to go unquestioned. Not every utterance is a statement: modern philosophers are familiar with the notion of a "speech act" and with the idea that there are many things other than stating which an utterer may do in making an utterance; nor do we suppose that every utterance of an indicative sentence must be construed as the

<sup>20</sup> The canonical form of the Pyrrhonist's φαίνεται sentences is: "x appears F to me now" (see e.g. PH I 196: τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτε ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει λέγομεν, cfr. e.g. I 4, 193, 197). Sextus says little about what appears *to others* or to us *at other times*; but I assume that the conclusions of the Ten Tropes, at least, are implicitly limited to what appears *to me now*.

making of a statement. Those notions are not modern: Greek philosophers had recognized, centuries before Sextus, that statements were only one among many speech acts. We must ask — and we may do so without anachronism — what speech act the Pyrrhonist is performing when he utters φαίνεται sentences<sup>21</sup>.

Diogenes says that the Pyrrhonist's utterances are ἔξομολογήσεις, «confessions» (IX 104). Sextus does not himself use that term<sup>22</sup>; but he does say that the Sceptic's utterances "show" or "reveal" his mental state (πάθος)<sup>23</sup>, and his term for the utterances is ἀπαγγελλαι, «avowals»<sup>24</sup>. It is plain that avowals and confessions were supposed by the Pyrrhonists to be speech acts of a different kind from statements or affirmations: Sextus in effect compares them to questions (and to admissions of ignorance)<sup>25</sup> and contrasts them with assertions.

<sup>21</sup> Burnyeat (*Can the Sceptic...*, pp. 25-6) takes a different line. He argues, in effect, that φαίνεται sentences were not regarded by the Pyrrhonists — or, in general, by the Greeks — as being *true* (or false); for truth was, for them, a matter of correspondence with external reality, and φαίνεται sentences say nothing about external reality. Now since belief is tied to truth (believing something is believing it true), φαίνεται sentences do not express beliefs at all. I am not happy with that argument; but I have no room to examine it here. The argument I produce in the text may be regarded either as an alternative or as a complement to Burnyeat's.

<sup>22</sup> At M I 269, 272, ἔξομολογεῖν is merely a synonym for ὁμολογεῖν. Note that ἔξομολογεῖν is the technical term in Christian writings for "confess" (e.g. TERTULLIAN, *paen.* IX 2, and see G.M.H. LAMPE, *Patristic Lexicon*, s.v.). — ἔξαγορεύειν also has the sense of "confess" (e.g. BION F 30 Kindstrand = PLUTARCH, *superst.* 168 D; PTOLEMY, *astrab.* 154); but I have found no occurrences of the word in a Pyrrhonian context.

<sup>23</sup> PH I 187 (μηρυτικός); 197, 201 (δηλωτικός).

<sup>24</sup> See PH I 4, 15, 197, 200, 203. (At M I 255, 258, ἀπαγγέλλειν means no more than λέγειν.) I have not found any clear parallels to this usage outside Sextus. But there is something close in Plotinus, who frequently uses ἀπαγγέλλειν for the "reports" made by, or on the testimony of, the senses (e.g. *Enn.* IV 4.18.35, 19.6., 23.38; 5.4.24) — i.e. for reports of πάθη.

<sup>25</sup> See PH I 188-91: some Sceptics construed οὐδὲν μᾶλλον as a *question*; Sextus himself says that «although the phrase οὐδὲν μᾶλλον has the form of an assertion or denial, we do not use it in this way; rather, we employ it ὀδισφῶς καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, either in lieu of a question or instead of saying "I do not know whether [...]"» (I 191).

The term "avowal" has recently attained currency in Wittgensteinian circles. In a celebrated passage Wittgenstein wrote: «Words are connected with the original and natural expression of feeling [Empfindung = πάθος], and are put in their place. A child hurts itself and cries: adults then talk to him and teach him exclamations and later sentences — they teach the child a new pain-behaviour. — 'Then you're saying that the word «pain» really means crying?': — Quite the opposite: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it» (*Philosophical Investigations* I § 244). Elsewhere Wittgenstein calls such "expressions of feelings" *Äusserungen* or avowals; and he explicitly says that «to call the avowals of a feeling a statement is misleading» (*Zettel*, § 549) <sup>26</sup>.

Children cry when they are in pain: they thereby *express* their pain, but they do not *state that* they are in pain (they state nothing at all). Adults, when they are in pain, may utter the sentence "I am in pain" (or some vulgar equivalent): they thereby *express* their pain, but they do not (according to Wittgenstein) *state that* they are in pain (they state nothing at all). The Pyrrhonist of *PH*, when he is mentally affected, may utter the sentence "The tower seems round": he thereby *expresses* his πάθος, but he does not *state that* he is experiencing a certain πάθος (he does not state anything at all).

The child's cry is not a statement, and it does not manifest a belief. The adult's avowal expresses his pain, not his *belief* that he is in pain. Avowals are not statements; and they by-pass belief. The avowals of a Pyrrhonist may similarly by-pass belief <sup>27</sup>. The Pyrrhonist of *PH* is committed to τὰ φαινόμενα, and he readily assents to φαίνεται sentences <sup>28</sup>. But his utterances are avowals, not

<sup>26</sup> For details and discussion see e.g. P.M.S. HACKER, *Insight and Illusion*, Oxford 1972, ch. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Do they also by-pass truth? There is no need to suppose so, *pace* Wittgenstein. When I say "It hurts" it may be true that it hurts, even if I am not stating that it hurts. (If I say "Suppose it's raining in London" it may be true that it's raining in London though I am not stating that it's raining in London.) A Pyrrhonist who is committed to avowals does not require a metaphysically loaded concept of truth (see above, note 21).

<sup>28</sup> a) Why does he limit his verbal repertoire to φαίνεται sentences? Instead of uttering "x is F" to make a statement he utters "x appears F" to make an avowal — why not retain "x is F" but use it to make an avowal? Not everything can be avowed: at

statements <sup>29</sup>; they express πάθη and do not evince beliefs. Thus if we are prepared to take seriously Sextus' talk of avowals <sup>30</sup>, the Pyrrhonist may support τὰ φαινόμενα volubly while remaining an exemplary rustic.

#### IV

The *PH* Pyrrhonist is not only a supporter of τὰ φαινόμενα: he is also a devoted opponent of οἱ δογματικοί and of their δόγματα. Now according to the urbane interpreter of *PH*, δόγματα are beliefs of a special sort: they are, roughly speaking, philosophico-scientific opinions — doctrines, principles, tenets <sup>31</sup>. In rejecting δόγματα,

avowal is an expression of your πάθη, and sentences of the form "x appears F" were taken by the Pyrrhonists as canonical formulae for expressing πάθη. b) Does the Pyrrhonist hold that "x appears F" is *always* used to make avowals? He need not: *he* uses it to make avowals, but he need not claim that other men do or must use it so, nor that the formula characteristically functions in ordinary speech as an expression of πάθη.

<sup>29</sup> The Cyrenaics held that μονὰ τὰ πάθη καταληπτά (e.g. *PH* I 215; *M* vii 191; *ANON.* in *Tbt* 65, 30). Like the Pyrrhonist of *PH*, they assent only to sentences of the form "x appears F" (for their curious neologisms — λευκαίνομαι, γλυκάζομαι — are merely verbal variants on φαίνεται μοι); unlike the Pyrrhonist, they apparently used such sentences to make statements and express beliefs. (Hence, incidentally, *their* notion of truth was not the one mentioned in note 21 above.) — Galen says of certain people influenced by the Pyrrhonians that ἰσως οὐδ' ἐστι φαίνεται τις αὐτοῖς κινήσιν ἀποφηνασθαι τολήσουσιν, εἰ τὰ πάντα πεφθοντο τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς· ἐκείνων γοῦν ἐπιόφασιν οὐδὲ τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν πάθη βεβαίως γινώσκειν, οὐς καλοῦσιν εἰκότως ἀγροκατηρρωνεῖλους (*diff. puls.* vii 711 K). Galen does not mean that rustics do not assent to φαίνεται sentences: he means that they do not use such sentences to make assertions (ἀποφηνασθαι) or to express knowledge (βεβαίως γινώσκειν) of their own πάθη.

<sup>30</sup> These remarks are an elucidation, not a defence, of Sextus. Sextus means the Pyrrhonist's utterances to be construed as avowals; and that shows that, *in his view*, the Pyrrhonist is not thereby committed to belief, i.e. it shows that the *PH* Pyrrhonist is rustic so far as his φαίνεται sentences go. In order to defend Sextus' account from a philosophical point of view, we should require a decent analysis of avowing. One element in that analysis would presumably be the claim that the Pyrrhonist's utterances are produced as a direct and natural response to external stimuli — just as a child's cry is a direct and natural response to the stimulus of pain.

<sup>31</sup> This is vague — intentionally and harmlessly so. For a more rigorous definition see below, note 86.

then, the Pyrrhonist rejects not beliefs but doctrines; and insofar as the Pyrrhonist is defined as a non-dogmatist, he is apparently able to admit and to profess all ordinary beliefs.

To assess the force of that urbane contention, we must determine the sense and the colour of the word δόγμα. I shall first survey the use of the word outside *PH*<sup>32</sup>, and then consider Sextus' own usage. The survey is, I fear, tedious; but it is an indispensable preliminary to an understanding of Sextus' attitude to Dogmatism.

The noun δόγμα first appears in extant Greek at the turn of the fifth century. Its syntax and its sense are not obscure. Syntactically, δόγμα derives from the verb δοκεῖν<sup>33</sup>. (Δογματίζειν<sup>34</sup> and δογματικός are later formed from δόγμα.) Semantically, δόγμα takes its sense from its parent verb: as a πράγμα is ὁ πράττει τις or a τάγμα ὁ τάττει τις, so a δόγμα is ὁ δοκεῖ τι.

The verb δοκεῖν presented itself to fifth century Athenians, with monotonous frequency, in public documents: ἐδόξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ. And δόγμα, in its earliest surviving occurrences, has a political colouring: a δόγμα is what δοκεῖ to an official or to an authoritative body; it is a decree or a resolution<sup>35</sup>. The word is found in Plato with the same political tone<sup>36</sup>; and throughout its history it appears frequently in political or semi-political contexts<sup>37</sup>. I shall return to the fact later.

<sup>32</sup> The survey is impressionistic: I have not conned every occurrence of δόγμα and its cognates in Greek. In addition to the authors mentioned in the text, I have consulted concordances or indexes to all the major prose-writers from 400 BC to 250 AD: the general conclusions I reach in this section would doubtless be refined by further study, but I hardly think that they would be overthrown.

<sup>33</sup> For verbal nouns in -μα see C.D. BUCK-W. PETERSEN, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives*, Chicago 1944, p. 221: they suggest that the -μα termination was an intellectual's favourite. See also POLLUX, *onom.* vi 180.

<sup>34</sup> See DIOG. LAERT. III 51: αὐτὸ τοῖνυν τὸ δογματίζειν ἐστὶ δόγματα τίθεναι ὡς τὸ νομοθετεῖν νόμους τίθεναι [= SUDA, s.v. δογματίζει]. δόγματα δὲ ἑκατέρως καλεῖται, τὸ τε δοξαζόμενον καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτῆ [i.e. a man's δόγματα are either the things he believes or his believings].

<sup>35</sup> E.g. LYSIAS, vi 43 (399 BC); ANDOCIDES, iv 6 (c. 395); XENOPHON, *Anab.* III 3, 5 (c. 375); IG II<sup>2</sup> 96 (375/4), 103 (369/8), 123 (357/6).

<sup>36</sup> E.g. *Laws* 644 d 3, 797 c 9, 926 d 2; *Rep.* 403 a 2, 506 b 9, 538 c 6; cf. *Minos* 314 b-e; *Def.* 415 b 8, 11, c 2.

<sup>37</sup> See, e.g., Mauersberger's Lexicon to Polybius or Rengstorff's concordance to

Plato was perhaps the first philosopher to use the word δόγμα<sup>38</sup>. In the maieutic section of the *Theaetetus* Socrates states that his task will be to bring Theaetetus' δόγματα into the light (157 d 2). As the context shows, the δόγματα of Theaetetus are simply ἃ δοκεῖ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ (157 c 2, 5)<sup>39</sup>. Since the things which δοκεῖ to Theaetetus are his beliefs or opinions, we should surely translate δόγμα as "belief"<sup>40</sup>. In the six centuries that separate Plato from Sextus, words had time to change their senses; but I find no evidence that the word δόγμα underwent any semantic change, and I suppose that, outside political contexts, "belief" generally conveys the sense of δόγμα.

But the sense of a word is only one component of its meaning. Another equally important component is tone or colour: if the English "belief" conveys the sense of δόγμα, it may still be false to its colour<sup>41</sup>. To discover the colour of δόγμα we must learn the contexts in which it was customarily used and the types of belief which it standardly designated.

The beliefs which Plato denotes by δόγμα are usually philosophical opinions<sup>42</sup>. Aristotle uses the word once or twice, again of philosophical tenets<sup>43</sup>; so too does Epicurus (who may have been the first

Josephus; cf. δογματίζειν = to decree (e.g. JOSEPHUS, *Ant.* xiv 249; LXX, II *Macc.* 10.8, 15.36).

<sup>38</sup> At HERACLITUS, B 50 D.-K. (= 26 M, from HIPPOLYTUS (?), *ref. haer.* ix 9, 1), the text read δόγματος: editors generally accept Bernays' λόγου (see M. MARCOVICH, *Heraclitus*, Mérida 1967, p. 113), but δόγματος has recently been defended by D. HOLWERDA, *Sprünge in die Tiefe Heraklits*, Groningen 1979, pp. 9-10.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 506 b 8, τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ... δόγματα, picking up b 6, τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. — Δόγμα occurs some 30 times in the Platonic corpus, usually in political contexts (see Brandwood's concordance).

<sup>40</sup> LSJ s.v. offer "notion" for δόγμα at *Thi.* 158 d 3; and the *Supplement* s.v. discovers a new sense for the word, viz. "thought, intention", for which *Tim.* 90 b and *Laws* 854 b are cited. But at *Thi.* 158 d and *Tim.* 90 b the word is used in the same way as in *Thi.* 157 c; and at *Laws* 854 b the δόγμα is a decree or resolution.

<sup>41</sup> The distinction between sense and colour (*Färbung*) is due to Frege: see M. DUMMETT, *Frege - Philosophy of Language*, London 1973, pp. 83-9.

<sup>42</sup> E.g. *Laws* 791 d 5, 798 e 2, 900 b 4; *Phlb.* 41 b 5; *Tim.* 48 d 6, 55 d 1; *Soph.* 265 c 5.

<sup>43</sup> See *Phys.* 209 b 15 (Plato's ἄγραφα δόγματα); *Metaph.* 992 a 21, 1076 a 14. (But at *Top.* 101 a 31-2 the word appears to have a broader denotation.) See also *Metaph.* 1062 b 25; *MAG* 974 b12; *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430 b1, 1443 a 25 (and Bonitz's *Index*).

philosopher to use the verb *δογματίζειν*)<sup>44</sup>. But the word only comes into its own some centuries later: Philo of Alexandria is the first author we know to have made frequent use of *δόγμα*; *δόγματα* pervade his writings, and the *δόγματα* he adverts to are almost invariably philosophical tenets or religious beliefs — the *δόγμα* that the soul is immortal, the *δόγμα* that the world was created by God, the *δόγματα* of Moses<sup>45</sup>. *Δόγματα* are weighty, substantial beliefs — tenets, doctrines, principles. It is significant that Philo uses the adjective *δογματικός* in a commendatory sense to mean “full of import”<sup>46</sup>.

Philo's usage is typical. In Plutarch's *Moralia*, for example, the word *δόγμα* is not infrequent: outside a few political contexts, Plutarch's *δόγματα* are philosophical doctrines — I have found no text in which Plutarch uses *δόγμα* to denote a common or garden belief<sup>47</sup>. Again, Alexander of Aphrodisias uses *δόγμα* to refer to the philosophical beliefs of the Peripatetics and of their rivals: *δόγματα* in Alexander, are beliefs of weight and substance<sup>48</sup>.

The theological writers, as we might expect, love *δόγμα*. Early patristic Greek is crammed with references to *δόγματα*<sup>49</sup>. Lampe, in

<sup>44</sup> For *δογματίζειν* see frag. 562 Us. = DIOG. LAERT. x 121 (cf. M. F. BURNYEAT, *Can the Sceptic ...*, p. 48 note 50). For *δόγμα* see esp. frag. 29 Arr., at 28.5, 6, 10, 12 (with Arrighetti's note, pp. 602-3); cf. frags. 30 (31.1), 31 (2, 4, 6), 36 (10.3), and Arrighetti's index. Note also the title of Colotes' pamphlet: *περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν* (PLUTARCH, *adv. Col.* 1107 E). For *δόγμα* in later Epicurean texts see the index to Philodemus by Voouys; and cf. DIOGENES OF OENOANDA, frag. 27 Ch., 1 8.

<sup>45</sup> See Leisegang's index (vol. VII of the Cohn-Wendland edition of Philo). — I say “almost invariably” only because Philo occasionally uses *δόγμα* of decrees.

<sup>46</sup> *Leg. alleg.* II 25, 100; *migr. Abr.* 21, 119.

<sup>47</sup> See Wytttenbach's index.

<sup>48</sup> See the indexes to the relevant volumes in *CIAG*; e.g. *de fato* 164.16; 165.1: 177.6; 187.9, 12, 27; 188.17, 22; 190.6, 12; 192.21; 199.23; 205.23; 212.2; *in Met.* 40.31: 78.2, 24; 197.1, 8; 652.33. See also, e.g., ΑΠΤΙCUS, frags. 2 (83, 113, 149), 4 (33, 60), 1 (10, 12, 35) des Places; LUCIAN, *vit. auct.* 17, *bis acc.* 21.

<sup>49</sup> The way was prepared by the LXX (e.g. III *Macc.* 1.3; IV *Macc.* 10.2) and the NT (e.g. *Col.* 2.14, 20). See further G. KITTEL (ed.), *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament*, II, Stuttgart 1933-5, pp. 233-5.

his *Lexicon*, gives the main sense of *δόγμα* as “fixed belief, tenet”. He indicates that the word is used to denote philosophical principles, the tenets of pagan religion, the teachings of Moses, and — above all — the doctrines of Christianity. The Fathers use *δογματίζειν*, in the sense of “lay down as doctrine”; and we also find *δογματικός*, *δογματισμός*, *δογματιστής*, *δοματοθεσία*, *δοματοποιία*. The writings of Clement and Hippolytus and Origen are rich in evidence: the *δόγματα* they allude to are always philosophical, religious, or scientific beliefs<sup>50</sup>.

Not every belief is appropriately called a *δόγμα*. I believe that Rome is north of Naples and that Oxford is west of Cambridge; but no Greek would call such beliefs *δόγματα*. The *Suda* has a brief entry running thus: *δογματίζειν*· *θεολογεί*, *φυσιοῦται* — «he dogmatizes — he theologizes, he is puffed up»<sup>51</sup>. Its hostility apart, the notice is just.

And recall Galen's standard nomenclature for the medical schools of the day. The Logical Doctors are also called *δογματικοί*: they propound and rely upon *δόγματα* — theories about the internal structure of the body or the typology of diseases, doctrines about the nature of causation or the relation of perception to knowledge. The Dogmatists are opposed by the *ἐμπειρικοί*. These Empirics abjure *δόγματα*; they are against theory and for observation. But in abjuring *δόγματα* they do not, of course, abjure belief. On the contrary, they rely wholly on the rich store of beliefs which experience — their own and other men's — has amassed for them<sup>52</sup>. Galen's use of the term

<sup>50</sup> See e.g. Stählin's index to Clement, Wendland's to HIPPOLYTUS, *ref. haer.*, Koetschau's to ORIGEN, *c. Cels.*

<sup>51</sup> For *φυσιοῦται* in this metaphorical sense see Lampe's *Lexicon s.v.*, sense A.

<sup>52</sup> See, e.g. GALEN, *in Hipp. vict. acut.* xv 728 K (those who construe Hippocrates as a *δογματικός* think he is referring to *τόποι*, *διαθέσεις* and *αίτια*; those who make him an *ἐμπειρικός* hold that he is talking about *ᾠραι*, *χῶραι*, etc.); *in Hipp. art.* xviii A 735 K (Heraclides advances his views οὐθ' ἔνεκα *δόγματος κατασκευῆς* φρεσάμενος ὡς ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν *δογματικῶν* ἐποίησαν...); cf. *opt. sect.* I 146 K (the *ἐμπειρικοί* say that when ὁ ἰστορῶν ἰστορῆ μὴ διὰ *δόγματος* προσπαθῶς ..., τότε ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἔαμεν ἡμεῖς τὸ ἰστορούμενον). — Note that Galen may supply a new term from the



δόγμα is not idiosyncratic, and Galen is especially close, both in date and in interests, to Sextus. His works show clearly that a man may reject all δόγματα and yet retain innumerable beliefs<sup>53</sup>.

That conclusion is apparently controverted by one important set of texts — I mean the writings of the Stoic philosophers. The word δόγμα rarely occurs in the surviving fragments of the Old Stoa<sup>54</sup>; but it is very common in the works of the imperial Stoics, in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius<sup>55</sup>. There its range of application is not limited to philosophico-scientific tenets; and if Sextus' chief opponents were the Stoics, it might be thought that Stoic usage of the term δόγμα was peculiarly relevant to the interpretation of *PH*.

At first sight, Epictetus seems prepared to call any belief a δόγμα. At all events, he offers the sentences οὗτος τέκτων ἐστι, οὗτος μουσικός, οὗτος φιλόσοφος, as paradigm expressions of δόγματα (*Diss.* iv 8, 4); and he says, quite generally, that ἐκάστου δόγματος ὅταν ἡ χρεία παρῆ πρόχειρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐπ' ἀρίστῳ τὰ περὶ ἀρίστου, ἐν βαλανείῳ τὰ περὶ βαλανείου, ἐν κοιτῇ τὰ περὶ κοιτῆς (*Diss.* iii 10, 1) — δόγματα about breakfast, bath, and bed are unlikely to be philosophical tenets. If such beliefs are δόγματα, then surely any beliefs are δόγματα.

Yet it would be hasty to conclude that, in Stoic usage, every belief may be called a δόγμα. Epictetus' δόγματα fall, almost all of them, into one of two classes. First, δόγματα are often philosophical tenets<sup>56</sup> — here Epictetus is not departing from normal Greek usage.

δόγμα family, viz. ἀδογματικός or ἀδογματιστός (see *subfig. emp.* 65.15: the Latin has in *dogmatibus*, emended by Schöne to *indogmaticus*).

<sup>53</sup> Compare also the use of δόγμα in the stock definition of αἰρέσεις: *PH* i 16; *DIOG. LAERT.* i 20; *CLEMENT, Strom.* viii 5.16.2 (p. 89.24 St.); [*GALEN*] *hist. phil.* 7; *def. med.* 13, xix 352 K; *SUDA*, s.v. αἰρέσεις.

<sup>54</sup> See *DIOG. LAERT.* vii 199 (a title of a work on ethics by Chrysippus: πιθανὰ λήμματα εἰς τὰ δόγματα πρὸς Φιλομαθῆ); *ORIGEN, c. Cels.* viii 51 (from Chrysippus' περὶ παθῶν θεραπευτικόν); *STOBAEUS, ecl.* ii 62, 112; *PHILO, om. prob. lib.* 97 (v 28.5-9).

<sup>55</sup> Compare also Seneca's frequent use of *decretum* (see below, note 58).

<sup>56</sup> E.g. *diss.* ii 22.37; iii 7.20-29, 16.7.

Secondly, δόγματα are far more often practical or evaluative judgements — judgements which, by grounding προαιρέσεις, lead to action<sup>57</sup>. Typically, such δόγματα are judgements about what is good or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Those are the δόγματα to which Epictetus refers in his monotonous injunctions to maintain ὁρθὰ δόγματα; for those are the δόγματα over which a man has control and in virtue of which he is the sole determiner of his moral well-being. Such judgements, in Epictetus' view, run through our whole lives: we need them at breakfast, in the bath, in bed.

Epictetus' usage, narrowly considered, does not suggest that any belief at all may be called a δόγμα. His first class of δόγματα is familiar. His second class reflects what I earlier called the political colour of the word δόγμα: in public life, a δόγμα is an official decree; in the Stoic's private life, a δόγμα is a practical resolution. The use of δόγμα for evaluative judgements, which seems to be peculiar to the Stoics, is a natural extension of the original public use.

From the fact that Epictetus uses δόγμα to refer to two different types of judgement, we should not infer that the word is ambiguous. Consider Cicero. He determined to translate δόγμα, in its philosophical applications, by the Latin *decretum*<sup>58</sup>. Why? He could, after all, have called upon *credo* or *opinor* had he wanted a general word for "belief"; he could have used *doctrina* or *perceptum* had he wanted a specific term for "tenet". Instead, he appealed to *decerno*, a word primarily at home in the language of politics and the law. Cicero was a conscientious and sensitive translator<sup>59</sup>. His choice of *decretum* shows

<sup>57</sup> The same is true for Marcus — see Dalfen's index. For Epictetus see the index to Schenk's edition.

<sup>58</sup> See *Acad.* ii 9, 27: ... *de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant δόγματα* (cf. 29; 34, 109; *Tusc.* ii 11; *fin.* ii 28, 99). Seneca uses *decretum* frequently in this sense (see the Concordance of Busa and Zampolli). See esp. *Ep.* 95.12: *decreta sunt quae muniant, quae securitatem nostram tranquillitatemque tueantur, quae totam vitam totamque rerum naturam simul contineant*; cf. *ibid.* 45: *persuasio ad totam pertinens vitam — hoc est quod decretum voco*. See further *TLL s.v.* — The word *dogma* was itself used by Cicero (it had already been Latinised by the poet Laberius), and it is common in later authors, always with reference to principles or tenets: see *TLL s.v.*

<sup>59</sup> See, e.g., his worries over the translation of ἐποχή, where he is explicitly concerned to get the colour right: *Ad Att.* xiii 21, 3.

that he perceived a political colouring to δόγμα even in its philosophical applications; and if Cicero perceived it, so, I suppose, did the Greeks.

There are two striking things about official δόγματα, about what ἐδόξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ. First, they are weighty, formal things. Secondly, they are practical, aimed at action. I suggest that those two features colour the word δόγμα throughout its life, and explain its range of application. In some cases, where the δόγμα is a tenet or principle, the notion of weight is uppermost. (But even abstract tenets may have an influence upon action: Hellenistic philosophy was, above all else, an Art of Living.) In other cases, where the δόγμα is an evaluative judgement, the notion of practicality is uppermost. (But practice and theory must not be divorced: in Epictetus' philosophical principles are never far from the surface of the practical texts.)

Δόγμα, in sum, has a single sense: a man's δόγματα are what δοχεῖ to him, the things which seem good or right. But the word has a distinctive colouring, derived from its public use: the colouring of that of weight and practicality.<sup>60</sup>

It is time to return to Sextus. First, some rough statistics: Sextus uses δόγμα some 25 times, δογματίζειν 30 times, δογματικῶς 200 times, δογματικῶς 20 times.<sup>62</sup> About 150 of those passages are texts where Sextus uses οἱ δογματικοί to refer to the Pyrrhonist opponents. By my count, in 45 of those 275 places, δόγμα (or one of its cognates) indubitably refers to a philosophico-scientific tenet. As far as I can see, in only two texts does δόγμα certainly *not* refer to such a tenet (*M* xi 150, 166); and in each of those passages the δόγμα

<sup>60</sup> That conclusion may seem pretty unexciting. But it is not uncontroversial. Burnyeat (*Can the Sceptic ...*, p. 48 note 50) concludes that δόγμα in Hellenistic usage is a broader and more nearly neutral term than δόξα, not a term for a more stringently defined type of belief; it means «belief» or «judgement»: in the broad sense in which it is a component of knowledge.

<sup>61</sup> See Janáček's index.

<sup>62</sup> Note that over half (c. 140) of those occurrences are in *PH*, though *M* is the same length of *PH*. I detect no difference in Sextus' use of δόγμα between *PH* and *M*.

in question is a practical or evaluative judgement — a δόγμα falling into the second Epictetan class. Although the remaining passages are, strictly speaking, neutral, it would, I think, be wholly perverse to suppose that in them δόγμα usually or even often referred to ordinary beliefs. It is really plain that when Sextus uses a term from the δόγμα family he is designating a philosophical principle or a scientific theory. In short, Sextus' use of δόγμα is entirely comparable to the usage of Galen or of Clement or of any other Greek of that era.

Sextus also has some explicit remarks to make about the sense of the word δόγμα. When he considers the question «Do Pyrrhonists dogmatise?»<sup>63</sup>, he begins by distinguishing two senses of δόγμα:

«We say that Sceptics do not dogmatise not in the sense [i] in which some people say, fairly broadly, that dogma is τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινὶ πράγματι [...]; rather, we say that they do not dogmatise in the sense [ii] in which some people say that dogma is an assenting to some object from among the unclear things being investigated by the sciences.» (*PH* I 13).

There are two senses of δόγμα: in the narrow sense, sense [ii], Pyrrhonists have no δόγματα; in the broad sense, sense [i], Pyrrhonists do have δόγματα.

The narrow sense, as Sextus characterizes it, corresponds closely enough to the colour of the word δόγμα in the vast majority of its occurrences: δόγματα in sense [ii] are, roughly speaking, philosophico-scientific tenets. Of course no Pyrrhonist accepts such δόγματα. But a Pyrrhonist *does* accept δόγματα in sense [i] — and surely that is an explicit recognition on Sextus' part that a Pyrrhonist will have some beliefs.

Sense [i] requires scrutiny.<sup>64</sup> Sextus explains it by the phrase τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινὶ πράγματι. The verb εὐδοκεῖν is not classical, but it is common in prose from Polybius onward, and its meaning emerges

<sup>63</sup> Cfr. *DIOG. LAERT. IX* 102-4 (see below, note 70).

<sup>64</sup> With what follows compare *M. FREDE, Des Sceptikers ...*, pp. 120-6.

clearly from the texts it appears in <sup>65</sup>: εὐδοκεῖν τιμι means "be content with something". Often the contentment is minimal, and "acquiesce in" is an appropriate English translation; sometimes — particularly in Christian texts — the contentment is maximal, and "rejoice in" is required <sup>66</sup>.

Pyrrhonists, then, "are content with" certain things — why does Sextus say that?

«[...] τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τιμι πράγματι. For the Sceptic assents to the affections [πάθη] which are forced upon him κατὰ φαντασίαν [cf. PH II 10] — e.g. when he is warmed or cooled he will not say, 'I believe (δοκῶ) that I am not being warmed (or: cooled)» (PH I 13).

If a Pyrrhonist experiences a feeling of warmth he will *not* say "I think I'm not being warmed"; and that is what τὸ εὐδοκεῖν is for him.

It is clear that τὸ εὐδοκεῖν is being used to convey a minimal notion of contentment — a Pyrrhonist *acquiesces* in his πάθη, he does not speak out against them or deny them <sup>67</sup>. It is clear, too, that his acquiescence, as Sextus describes it, does not involve any *beliefs*. For Sextus' language is scrupulously careful. He says that a Pyrrhonist will *not* say "I believe I'm *not* being warmed". From that it does not follow that a Pyrrhonist *will* say "I believe I *am* being warmed": his εὐδοκία is a matter of *refraining* from belief (he will not say "I believe..."), and not a matter of believing anything at all. If a Pyrrhonist dogmatizes in sense [i], he may do so while preserving his rusticity; for a δόγμα in sense [i] is not a belief of any sort <sup>68</sup>.

<sup>65</sup> See Lampe's *Lexicon s.v.*; G. KITTEL, *Theol. Wört. ....* II 736-48; Mauersberger's *Lexicon to Polybius*. Typical texts: POLYBIUS, II 38.7; III 8.7; IV 22.7; VIII 14.8; cf. SUDA, s.vv. εὐδοκεῖν, etc.

<sup>66</sup> So at NT, *Mark.* I 11 («Thou art my only begotten son: in thee I am well pleased»), the Greek is: ἐν σοὶ εὐδόκησα.

<sup>67</sup> See BEKKER, *Anec. Gr.* II 260: εὐδοκούμενος: ὁ συγκατατιθέμενος καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγων, where I take καὶ to be exegetical. Note that συγκατατίθεσθαι, outside its Stoic use to mean "assent", regularly means "accept", "acquiesce in", see e.g. POLYBIUS XXI 30.8, where εὐδοκεῖν and συγκατατίθεσθαι appear in the same sentence as synonyms.

<sup>68</sup> Why does Sextus think that τὸ εὐδοκεῖν gives a sense of δογματίζειν? I have

Thus from PH I 13 we learn two things: that a Pyrrhonist will *not* accept any scientific or philosophical theories; and that he will *acquiesce* in his πάθη <sup>69</sup>. And that information is peculiarly unsatisfying. A Pyrrhonist rejects science and avows his πάθη; but what attitude does he take to ordinary beliefs? The sentences of breakfast-time, bath-time, and bed-time — "The butter's hard", "The water's cold", "The springs are protruding" — do not express scientific δόγματα, nor yet do they serve in avowals. If we are concerned to discover the scope of ἐποχή in PH, it is precisely such humdrum sentences which will most exercise us; yet of them Sextus says nothing.

It might be suggested that, since ordinary beliefs patently do not fall under the heading of δόγματα, they must somehow be accommodated under the heading of εὐδοκία <sup>70</sup>. Alternatively, it might be

found no texts outside PH I 13 where δόγμα or its cognates are used in that weak way. I can only suppose that the "broad" sense of δόγμα is a dialectical concession by the Pyrrhonists (who do not indulge in φωνομαχία: PH I 195, 297). An opponent urges: "Of course you Pyrrhonists dogmatise — after all, you avow your πάθη". The Pyrrhonist retorts: "If you like to use 'dogmatise' in *that* sense, we do indeed dogmatise — but *that* does not imply that we also dogmatise in the normal, narrow sense".

<sup>69</sup> [GALEN] *def. med.* 14, XIX 352-3 K, should be quoted: δόγμα ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἰδίως τὸ δὲ κοινῶς λεγόμενον· κοινῶς μὲν ἢ ἐνεργεῖα πράγματος συγκατάθεσις, ἰδίως δὲ πράγματος συγκατάθεσις· διὸ δὴ μᾶλλον ἢ λογικὴ αἴρεσις δογματικὴ κέκληται. The text is hardly sound. Ἐνεργεῖα for ἐνεργεῖα is easy enough; but I suspect the corruption is more extensive. E.g. κοινῶς μὲν ἢ [ἐνεργεῖα] πράγματος συγκατάθεσις, ἰδίως δὲ πράγματος <ἀδήλου> συγκατάθεσις. If something like that is right, then [Galen] may be recognizing "belief" as the general sense of δόγμα (i.e. he may be allowing that, in one sense, *any* belief may be called a δόγμα). Then [Galen] is close to DIOG. LAERT. IX 102-4 (see below, note 70) and his distinction of senses is not the same as the one in PH I 13.

<sup>70</sup> That urbane suggestion may appear appropriate to DIOG. LAERT. IX 102-4. Replying to the charge that they dogmatise, the Pyrrhonists there are made to concede that οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέρα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ διαγιγνώσκωμεν. In other words, they allow that, if δόγμα may cover ordinary beliefs, then they do dogmatise. Of course, if that is the meaning of Diogenes Laertius' Pyrrhonists, it does not follow that the same is true of PH. And in any event, the meaning of Diogenes Laertius' Pyrrhonists is by no means clear-cut. For the sentence I have just quoted is introduced by the remark that περὶ ὧν ὡς ἀνθρώποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν, and

thought that ordinary beliefs, evidently escaping the net of εὐδοκία, must somehow be caught in the snares of δόγμα. I shall end my remarks on δόγμα by pursuing that second suggestion.

Δόγμα in sense [ii] is ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητούμενων ἀδήλων συγκαταθέσεις. The phrase κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητούμενα does not function as a restrictive qualification on τὰ ἀδήλα. Sextus is not insinuating a distinction between those ἀδήλα which are subject to scientific investigation and those which are not when he later adverts to δόγματα in sense [ii] he drops the reference to the sciences — a “dogmatic supposition” is defined simply as «assent to something unclear» (PH I 197), and that is Sextus’ normal way of identifying δόγματα<sup>71</sup>. Τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητούμενα ἀδήλα are simply τὰ ἀδήλα.

And τὰ ἀδήλα here are what Sextus later distinguishes as τὰ φύσει ἀδήλα, i.e. «those things which do not have a nature of the sort to fall under our direct perception (e.g. imperceptible pores)» (PH II 98). Τὰ ἀδήλα contrast with τὰ πρόδηλα (or, equivalently with τὰ ἐναργῆ or τὰ φαινόμενα<sup>72</sup>). Paradigm sentences which involve only πρόδηλα are “It is day”, “I am conversing” (PH II 97; M VIII 144). Now those sentences, being explicitly said to involve πρόδηλα, cannot be taken to express δόγματα. On the other hand, they surely do express ordinary beliefs. And an easy generalisation is on hand: all or most sentences expressing ordinary beliefs will involve only πρόδηλα; hence all or most ordinary beliefs will fail to be δόγματα.

That simple argument might seem quite enough to scotch the suggestion that ordinary beliefs should be somehow subsumed under

followed by the assertion that μόνὰ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. Thus ἡμέρα ἐστὶ and ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐσμέν like are apparently to be construed as expressions of πάθη. Diogenes Laertius’ Pyrrhonists accept ordinary beliefs — but only because they reconstrue them as beliefs about their own πάθη. Hence they are not exactly urbane (though they are not rustic either): we insist on the claim that they know — γινώσκομεν — their πάθη). It must be said however, that the text of this passage in Diogenes Laertius is very confused, and it would be unwise to rely upon it for the interpretation of any piece of Pyrrhonism.

<sup>71</sup> E.g. PH I 16, 193, 198, 200, 202, 208, 210, 219, 223; II 9; cfr. I 18, 201.

<sup>72</sup> See Janáček’s index, s.v. ἐναργής; cfr. [GALEN] *opt. sect.* I 175-6 K.

the heading of δόγματα. But there is, in fact, an equally simple counterargument available.

The Pyrrhonian attack on “logic” is rehearsed twice by Sextus, in PH II and in M VII-VIII. In each case the strategy is the same<sup>73</sup>. The Dogmatists claim knowledge in two areas: since they possess a “criterion of truth”, they have knowledge of τὰ ἐναργῆ or τὰ πρόδηλα; since they can employ “signs” and “proofs”, they have knowledge of τὰ ἀδήλα. Now the Pyrrhonists dispute *both* parts of that dual claim. They produce reasons for doubting the existence of a criterion (PH II 14-96; M VII 24-VIII 140); and they argue against signs and proofs (PH II 97-192; M VIII 141-481). By the end of the attack on “logic” it seems that the Pyrrhonist will entertain beliefs neither about τὰ ἀδήλα nor about τὰ πρόδηλα. Both parts of the Pyrrhonian attack are directed against the Dogmatists. Sextus’ presentation makes it appear that τὰ πρόδηλα, no less than τὰ ἀδήλα, are the subject-matter for δόγματα. But τὰ πρόδηλα are the subject-matter for ordinary beliefs. Hence ordinary beliefs are, after all, to be classified as δόγματα.

Thus there seems to be an inconsistency within PH over the status of ordinary beliefs<sup>74</sup>, and that inconsistency makes it unclear what the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to such beliefs is supposed to be. But in fact the inconsistency is only apparent.

Consider the ordinary bath-time belief that the water is tepid. That belief makes no reference to τὰ ἀδήλα, nor is it a δόγμα. For all that, we cannot *affirm* that the water is tepid unless we have a criterion of truth — a way of judging that the πάθος with which the water affects us corresponds to the actual state of the water. The criterion is needed not to *infer* that the water is tepid (there is nothing to infer it from) but rather to *judge* that the water is tepid; we require

<sup>73</sup> See esp. PH II 95; M VII 25; VIII 140-1.

<sup>74</sup> There is another connected inconsistency in the same stretch of argument. Sextus plainly states that the Pyrrhonian attack on κριτήρια undermines belief in τὰ ἐναργῆ (PH II 95; M VII 25); he also expressly defines a κριτήριον as μέτρον ἀδήλου πράγματος (PH II 15; M VII 33). I see no escape from that inconsistency — except the appeal to a systematic and unexpressed ambiguity in such terms as ἀήλος, πρόδηλος, ἐναργής.

not reasons for an inference but grounds for a judgement — and unless we have such grounds we are not warranted in making the judgement.

A Pyrrhonist will only believe that the water is tepid if he judges it to be so; and he can only judge it to be so if he possesses a criterion of truth by which to judge it. But the thesis that there is a criterion of truth is itself a δόγμα — indeed it is a perfect specimen of those philosophico-scientific tenets which the Greeks called δόγματα. Now the Pyrrhonist of *PH* rejects all δόγματα. Hence he will not have — or rather, will not believe that he has — a criterion of truth. Hence he will not be able to judge, or to believe, that the water is tepid.

In general, the Pyrrhonist of *PH* will have no ordinary beliefs at all. Ordinary beliefs are not δόγματα<sup>75</sup>, nor do they advert to ἀδηλα. Nonetheless, in rejecting δόγματα the Pyrrhonist must reject ordinary beliefs; for the possession of ordinary beliefs presupposes the possession of at least one δόγμα — the δόγμα that there is a criterion of truth.

In that way, the apparent inconsistency within *PH* is dissolved<sup>76</sup> and the *PH* Pyrrhonist emerges as a rustic. In rejecting δόγματα he explicitly rejects any scientific-philosophical theory; but he implicitly rejects all other beliefs as well<sup>77</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> Myles Burnyeat has suggested to me that anything which depends on a δόγμα must itself be a δόγμα. Hence ordinary beliefs are δόγματα in the Pyrrhonists' eyes.

<sup>76</sup> Again (see above, note 30), I am concerned to explain Sextus, not to defend him. Against the argument advanced in the text it might be objected that, although in order to judge that *p* I must possess a criterion, it is not true that in order to judge that *p* I must believe that I possess a criterion. Thus the Pyrrhonist may possess a criterion even if he himself does not believe that he does; and in that case he is in a position to judge that *p*. That is perhaps true; but could a Pyrrhonist judge that *p* after reflecting on the existence of a criterion and reaching ἐποχή on the matter? Sextus might plausibly argue that, having reached ἐποχή on the δόγμα of the criterion, a Pyrrhonist will naturally find himself in a state of ἐποχή vis-à-vis ordinary judgements.

<sup>77</sup> Something must be said about the word ἀδόξαστος, which occurs 16 times in *PH*, all but once in its adverbial form. The word is rare outside *PH* (it does not appear in *M*). It is found in a fragment of Sophocles (frag. 223, where it means 'unexpected'), at *Phaedo* 84 A (where τὸ ἀδόξαστον is joined with τὸ ἀληθές and τὸ θεῖον to characterize the objects of the soul's proper study), at *DIOG. LAERT. VII 162* (Aristotle's μάλιστα προσέτιχε τῷ Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σοφὸν ἀδόξαστον [Scaliger: δόξαστον

## V

Sextus frequently characterises his Pyrrhonist negatively, as an opponent of Dogmatism. But he also sometimes characterizes him positively, as a champion of Life. Βίος in classical Greek usually

should be ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους: cf. *ibid.* 16 — πῶς ἀσυγκατάθετοι καὶ ἀδόξαστοι γενοίμεθ' ἄν;). In *PH* the adverb ἀδοξάστως usually qualifies either a verb describing the Pyrrhonist's way of life (βιοῦν: I 23, 231; II 246, 258; λισθαι τῷ βίῳ: I 226; III 235; etc.) or a verb describing the Pyrrhonist's utterances (ἀπαγγέλλει: I 15; φημέν: I 24, III 151; συγκατατιθέμενοι: II 102). The word may be part of the Pyrrhonist vocabulary adopted by Sextus; but it is not clear to what extent Aristotle is citing Timon's own words, and ἀδοξάστους could well be his own gloss on ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους (which are presumably genuine Timon). What does ἀδόξαστος mean in *PH*? Plainly, it means "having no δόξα"; but that is capable of three importantly different glosses, according to the colour we see in δόξα here. (α) "Having no mere opinions"; that is the word's meaning in *DIOG. LAERT. VII 162* (and in the *Phaedo* «not an object of mere opinion»). If the word was used by Timon, then it might well bear that meaning in his sentence: "having no mere opinions", i.e. "fixed", "firm" (cf. ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους). In many — but not all — the passages in *PH* a sense like "fixedly", "unwaveringly", fits perfectly well. (β) "Having no δόγματα": this meaning is hardly suggested by the word's etymology or by its history; but ἀδόξαστος is frequently contrasted with δογματικός *vel sim.*, and such a contrast could well give the word that particular colouring. (And some might see a neat polemical point: the Stoic Sage lives ἀδοξάστως, with δόγμα but without δόξα, and so in tranquillity; the Pyrrhonist lives ἀδοξάστως, without δόγμα, and so in tranquillity.) All the *PH* passages will readily accept that meaning. (γ) "Having no belief of any sort": that is surely how Aristotle intends the word at *xiv 18, 16* — and therefore how he intends us to understand it in Timon. That sense is, I think, compatible with most of the occurrences in *PH*, if not with all. (The coupling ἐμπειρώς τε καὶ ἀδοξάστως at II 246 does not sit easily with [γ] inasmuch as ἐμπειρία normally is supposed to involve beliefs; and [γ] does not have any obvious intelligibility at I 239 and 240, where Sextus talks of using technical terms ἀδοξάστως.)

If sense [γ] is correct for *PH*, then there are two corollaries of immediate relevance to my theme. First, we have Sextus explicitly stating that the Pyrrhonist's avowals do not involve him in any beliefs: τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως (I 15). Secondly, we have Sextus explicitly claiming that the βιωτικὴ τήρησις (below, pp. 31-40) does not require belief in the Pyrrhonist who follows it: ἔπειτα ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρησὶν (III 235). (See further, below notes 96, 98). Indeed, if [γ] is right, then that alone virtually makes *PH* rustic. Unfortunately, I can see no way of determining the sense of ἀδόξαστος without presupposing the rustic/urbane dispute solved; hence I have relegated ἀδόξαστος to a footnote and shall not rest any argument upon its interpretation.

means "way of life", "life style". Sextus employs the word in a somewhat different way: βίος contrasts with φιλοσοφία<sup>78</sup>, βιωτικός with δογματικός<sup>79</sup>. The contrast is roughly that between the layman and the professional, between real life and theory. Βίος means something like "ordinary life", "everyday life". Thus οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου (M xi 49) are ordinary men, non-professionals; τὰ βιωτικὰ κριτήρια are the standards used in everyday judgements, as opposed to the technical or "logical" standards invented by the philosophers (PH ii 15; M vii 33)<sup>80</sup>; βίος itself is often used to mean "Everyman" (e.g. M ii 18; ii 50).

Sometimes βίος is connected with language: βίος denotes ordinary language as opposed to technical usage (M i 232; viii 129). Here Sextus is following the terminology of the grammarians<sup>81</sup>. Indeed, the Sextan use of βίος is not peculiar to him: in later Greek the word frequently marks off the lay from the professional<sup>82</sup>; in the patristic writers βίος invokes the affairs of the world as opposed to the affairs of heaven and οἱ βιωτικοί are laymen as opposed to clerics and monks<sup>83</sup>.

Sextus is not unreservedly favourable to βίος. In a few passages the views of Everyman are subjected to the δύναμις ἀντιθετική along with the δόγματα of the professionals<sup>84</sup>; and the First Trope α

<sup>78</sup> E.g. PH i 165; M vii 322, viii 355, ix 138; i 232.

<sup>79</sup> E.g. PH ii 105, 258, iii 235; M ix 50.

<sup>80</sup> Cfr. τὰ βιωτικὰ κριτήρια at NT, i Cor. 6.3-4.

<sup>81</sup> E.g. APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS, *adv.* 130.6; *conj.* 245.21, 246.10; *syn.* 40.1; GALEN *meth. med.* x 269 K. For the various locutions for "ordinary usage" see Schneider's note in *Grammatici Graeci* ii 1, 2, p. 45.

<sup>82</sup> E.g. PLUTARCH, *mor.* 25 c, 1033 a, 1116 c; EPICTETUS, *diss.* i 15.2, 26.1, 3, 7, ii 3.3, 5; frags. 1, 2; GALEN, *subf. emp.* 68.7; *diag. puls.* viii 78 K; SORANUS, *gyn.* i 41 iii 3.1. See EPICTETUS, frag. 16: εἰδέναι χρῆσθαι οὐ θάδιον δόγμα παραγένεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ εἰ μὴ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ λέγει τις καὶ ἀκούει καὶ ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ πρὸς τὸν βίον.

<sup>83</sup> See Lampe's *Lexicon s.vv.* βίος (6), βιωτικός (cfr. e.g. NT, Luke 21.34; ii Tim 2.4). In Christian writers βίος is often contrasted with δόγμα (e.g. EUSEBIUS, PE viii 41); but that is only verbally comparable to what we find in Sextus: the Christian contrast is between deeds and words, between works and doctrine.

<sup>84</sup> See M ix 50, 138.

Agrippa — the ubiquitous trope of διαφωνία — makes explicit reference to βίος: «we discover that there has arisen an undecidable dissension both among ordinary men (παρὰ τῷ βίῳ) and among the philosophers» (PH i 165)<sup>85</sup>.

But an urbane interpreter of PH should not be discountenanced by such references. Laymen and professionals do sometimes make pronouncements on the same subjects. If a Pyrrhonist directs ἐποχή toward all δόγματα, he will in consequence direct ἐποχή toward some beliefs of Everyman. (Most obviously, there will be an overlap between δόγμα and βίος in the area of religion; and it is just there that we find Sextus being sceptical about βίος.) That does not commit a Pyrrhonist to a uniformly hostile attitude to βίος<sup>86</sup>.

Moreover, Sextus frequently expresses a friendly attitude toward Everyman. «It is enough, I think, to live by experience and ἀδοξάστω, in accordance with the common observations and preconceptions, suspending judgement about what is said out of dogmatic embellishment and far beyond the needs of ordinary life (ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς χρείας)» (PH ii 246; cfr. 254; iii 235)<sup>87</sup>. Such passages seem to

<sup>85</sup> Cfr. DIOG. LAERT. ix 88: ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας [sc. τρόπος] ὁ ἄνθρωπος προτεθῆναι ζήτημα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἢ τῇ συνήθειᾳ πλείστης μάχης καὶ ταραχῆς πλήρες ἀποδεικνύει. Here συνήθεια, as often, is synonymous with βίος.

<sup>86</sup> The contrast between βίος and δόγμα, like the term δόγμα itself, is vague. I do not think the vagueness is harmful (see above, note 31), but a little precision can readily be supplied. For Sextus' remarks enable us to define δόγμα as follows:

(Δ) A sentence expresses a δόγμα iff (i) it expresses a proposition and (ii) it contains at least one term which denotes something ἀδηλον.

Most ordinary beliefs will not be δόγματα; most philosophico-scientific tenets will be δόγματα. But βίος will include *some* δόγματα, notably (a) those involving reference to the Gods, and (b) those involving moral concepts (for, in the Pyrrhonist's eyes, terms like ἀγαθόν and κακόν denote ἀδηλα). If an urbane Pyrrhonist defends the beliefs of βίος, he does so only for the most part.

<sup>87</sup> See also M ix 165. A similar respect for βίος was ascribed to Pyrrho himself by Galen (*subf. emp.* 62.20), by Aenesidemus (DIOG. LAERT. ix 62), and perhaps by Timon (frag. 81 Diels = DIOG. LAERT. ix 105 — but see F. DECLEVA CAZZI, *Pirrone - Testimonianze*, Naples 1981, pp. 236-41). It was a commonplace among the Empirical doctors: e.g. GALEN, *diff. puls.* viii 783 K; *Med. Exp.* xviii 5 Walzer.

imply a limited ἐποχή: a Pyrrhonist will suspend judgement on δόγματα, but he will not allow his ἐποχή to spill over into "common observations" and the beliefs of "ordinary life".

The crucial passage on βίος occurs near the beginning of *PH*. It requires detailed analysis.

«Attending to the appearances, we live ἀδοξάστως in accordance with ordinary observation (κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν), since we cannot be altogether inactive. And this ordinary observation seems to consist of four parts and to depend first upon instruction of nature, then upon necessity of affections, then upon tradition of laws and customs, and finally upon teaching of arts: on natural instruction, in virtue of which we are capable of perception and of thought; on necessity of affections, in virtue of which hunger guides us to food and thirst to drink; on tradition of customs and laws, in virtue of which we accept in accordance with ordinary life (βιωτικῶς) pious action as good and impious action as wicked; on teaching of arts, in virtue of which we are not inactive in the arts we accept.» (*PH* I 23-4 cfr. 226, 237).

That paragraph details the Pyrrhonist's allegiance to βίος, and the context in which it does so is of some importance.

Dogmatists had charged Pyrrhonians with inactivity; if a Pyrrhonist is consistent, he will never *do* anything; for, having no beliefs, he will have no motive for doing anything<sup>88</sup>. In *PH* I 23-4 Sextus gives his reply to that charge: the four-part "ordinary observation" is meant to explain how it is that a Pyrrhonist can *act* despite his Scepticism. Thus we must construe the elements of the βιωτικὴ τήρησις as types of explanation of action: the Pyrrhonian *does* act; the four-part τήρησις categorises the possible explanations of *how* he can act.

Here I am not concerned with the adequacy or the plausibility of Sextus' explanatory scheme. My sole question is this: does the βιωτικὴ

<sup>88</sup> The argument had a long history and went through different forms; see e.g. M. F. BURNYEAT, *Can the Sceptic ...* p. 22 n. 4; G. STRIKER, *Sceptical Strategies*, in *Dogmatism and Dogmatism*.

τὴρησις commit the Sceptic to any *beliefs* at all? The *PH* Pyrrhonian supports βίος just insofar as his actions are explicable by appeal to the βιωτικὴ τήρησις: if that appeal does not invoke beliefs, then the Pyrrhonist may support βίος while remaining rustic; if the appeal *does* invoke belief, then his support for βίος makes the *PH* Sceptic urbane.

I shall consider each part of the τήρησις<sup>89</sup> in turn — though for dramatic reasons I shall not follow Sextus' order.

[1] Ἀνάγκη παθῶν, the necessity of affections, causes little trouble. Pyrrhonians eat and drink. How is that to be explained? — By the fact that they are hungry and thirsty. There is no need to advert to anything else: his πάθη alone suffice to drive the Sceptic — like any other man or animal — to food and drink. Sextus does not explicitly say that ἀνάγκη παθῶν invokes no beliefs; but he will surely have thought that it does not<sup>90</sup>. That part of the τήρησις seems compatible with rusticity.

[2] Διδασκαλῶν τεχνῶν, teaching of arts, is needed to explain the professional activities of a Pyrrhonist. Some Sceptics, like Sextus himself, were doctors<sup>91</sup>, and other trades were Pyrrhonianly permissi-

<sup>89</sup> The word τήρησις has the same ambiguity as the English "observation" — observation of rules etc. (i.e. obedience), or observation of objects and events (i.e. perception etc.). Sextus generally uses the word in the latter sense (see Janáček's index), but the former is more appropriate at *PH* I 13.

<sup>90</sup> But surely "Because he was hungry" will not by itself explain why men eat? We need in addition, some reference to *beliefs*. "Why did he eat that tough steak?" — "Because he was hungry, and thought that the steak was the only food available". The πάθη by themselves are not sufficient to explain even our simplest actions. But that objection misses the point: Sextus is *not* implying that "Because he is hungry" explains, in general, why a man eats; he may properly allow that in all normal cases an explanation will invoke beliefs as well as πάθη. His point rather is that such actions *can* be explained *even* if the agent has no beliefs: strike a man on the knee and his foot will kick, by a sort of natural necessity; similarly, if a Pyrrhonian is thirsty he will drink, by a sort of natural necessity. Non-Pyrrhonian drinking is no doubt only explicable *via* beliefs; but, according to Sextus, drinking *can* be explained even in the absence of belief — and that is all a Pyrrhonian requires.

<sup>91</sup> See the list of Pyrrhonists at *DIOG. LAERT.* IX 115-6 (Menodotus, Sextus).

ble<sup>92</sup>. The Sceptic's professional actions will be explained, in part at least, by reference to what his master taught him.

Now it might seem that teaching ineluctably involves belief. Tradesmen believe things; doctors have professional opinions; "teaching, of arts" — in Medical School, Agricultural College, or Naval Academy — will surely consist in the transmission of facts and the inculcation of beliefs. But I do not think that a Pyrrhonist is obliged so to understand the activity of teaching<sup>93</sup>. Why may he not construe teaching as the instilling of know-how, of skills and capacities? Teaching a man medicine, on that view, is like training him to ride: you are attempting to impart a *power* or skill to him; you are not trying to give him any *beliefs*. A Pyrrhonist doctor's professional activities can thus be explained by reference to his professional training, without supposing that the explanation involves belief.

That view of teaching is not found in any Sextan text; but it is strongly suggested by a curious passage from the end of *PH* I. At *PH* I 236-4 Sextus the Empiric argues that Pyrrhonism is incompatible with medical Empiricism, and he assimilates Scepticism rather to medical Methodism. The first of two points of association which Sextus finds between Pyrrhonists and Methodists leads him to say that «everything said by the Methodists can be subsumed under the necessity of affections» (239).

For «just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the necessity of his affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger to food, so the Methodical doctor is guided by the affections to their corresponding treatments — by contraction to dilation [...], by fluxion to its staunching [...]» (238). A Methodical doctor will observe his patient's condition, and that condition will guide him — by a kind of natural necessity — to the appropriate therapy. That must seem fantastical

Saturinus); add, e.g., Cassius (*GALEN, subf. emp.* 40.15), Dionysius of Aegae (*PHOTIUS bibl. cod.* 185 ≈ cod. 211).

<sup>92</sup> *M* v 1-2 accepts farming, seamanship and astronomy as legitimate professions.

<sup>93</sup> There is in any case a tension within *PH*; for Sextus argues at *PH* III 257 (cfr. *M* XI 216-56; I 9-18) that *διδασκαλία* is impossible, and his argument does not appear to make any exceptions for the *διδασκαλία τεχνῶν* which *PH* I 23 accepts. (It will the distinction between transmitting beliefs and inculcating skills help: many of the arguments against *διδασκαλία* are equally applicable to each sort of teaching.)

an account of medical practice; but I suppose it is to be taken seriously. And Sextus explicitly connects his account of professional medical practice to his description of the βιωτική τήρησις<sup>94</sup>.

Presumably that account of medical practice will be extended by the Pyrrhonist to cover all the professions. Thus professional expertise is not a matter of factual — still less of theoretical — knowledge and belief: it is a matter of capacity or skill; a professional is a man who responds in the appropriate way to the relevant stimuli. If that is so, then teaching an art is simply the inculcation of a capacity. Sextus' account of medical practice indicates that medical τέχνη is to be conceived of as skill or know-how. It is plausible to generalize that account, and to construe all τέχναι as skills or know-hows. If a τέχνη is a skill, then διδασκαλία τεχνῶν is the instillation of a skill. And thus — finally — a Pyrrhonist may explain his actions by reference to διδασκαλία τεχνῶν without thereby admitting to any beliefs. So far, the βιωτική τήρησις is compatible with rusticity.

[3] Παράδοσις ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων, the tradition of customs and rules, will explain certain conventional acts which the Pyrrhonist performs. Why does Sextus wear trousers, spell his name with a sigma, take off his hat in churches, drive on the right? — "Because that is the custom, that is the law". Sextus' primary point is doubtless this: a Pyrrhonist does not have to believe that *it is a good thing* to wear trousers or drive on the right — having abandoned beliefs about goodness and badness, he may still act as other men do, and he acts "because that is the done thing".

But it is plausible to go further. A Pyrrhonist need not believe that it is good to drive on the right; nor need he believe that it is the custom to drive on the right nor, indeed, need he believe anything at all about driving on the right. He drives on the right because that is the custom — not because he believes that it is the custom (nor because he believes anything else)<sup>95</sup>. Thus the tradition of laws and customs is also compatible with rusticity.

<sup>94</sup> *PH* I 237 (ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν) refers back explicitly to I 23-4.

<sup>95</sup> Again (see above, note 90), Sextus does not imply that other men's conventional actions are explicable without invoking beliefs: his point is simply that a Pyrrhonist may act conventionally, "because it's the custom", without subscribing to any beliefs.



It is, I said, plausible to go further in that way; but is it faithful to Sextus' intentions? The answer might seem to be No. For Sextus' illustration of custom and law appears to invoke beliefs of some sort: he says «we accept (παράλαμβάνομεν) [...] pious action as good» — and does not that mean “we believe that pious action is good”? Moreover, at *PH* III 2, prefacing his remarks on dogmatic theology, Sextus expressly states that «following ordinary life ἀδοξάστως, we say that there are gods and we revere the gods and we say that they care for us»<sup>96</sup>. The ordinary customs which the Pyrrhonist of *PH* accepts include religious beliefs as well as religious practices.

That may be right, but it is not actually forced upon us by the texts. At *PH* I 24, the phrase «we accept [...] pious action as good» may mean, not “we believe pious action to be good”, but rather “we adopt pious action as though it were good”<sup>97</sup>. So construed, the phrase does not imply any beliefs on the part of the Pyrrhonist. As for III 2, it must be allowed that the Pyrrhonist will say “The gods exist”, “The gods care for us” and the like; but Sextus asserts only that he will say such things, not that he will believe them<sup>98</sup>. A Pyrrhonist who goes to church will do the customary things — he will bare his head, genuflect, cross himself, and so on; and he will also say certain things. Those utterances are parts of the ritual: they do not betoken belief any more than the Sceptic's other ritual gestures do<sup>99</sup>.

<sup>96</sup> τῷ [...] βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φημὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβοντες (cf. εὐσεβεῖν, I 24) θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φημὲν. I incline to construe ἀδοξάστως with κατακολουθοῦντες, rather than with the three finite verbs. See below note 98.

<sup>97</sup> παράλαμβάνειν may certainly indicate adoption without any implication of belief (see e.g. *PH* I 191, 195, 240). But ὡς ἀγαθόν is more difficult to construe in a belief-neutral way. (See e.g. *M* I 201, where τὴν συνήθειαν... ὡς πιστὴν παράλαμβάνειν means “to accept ordinary usage as reliable”, i.e. to believe that it is reliable.)

<sup>98</sup> If ἀδοξάστως is construed with φημὲν (see note 96) and if the adverb means “without belief” (see note 77), then *PH* III 2 actually asserts this; for Sextus there expressly argues that the Pyrrhonist will say “There are gods” but will not believe that there are gods.

<sup>99</sup> Again, Wittgenstein might be invoked: see, e.g., his *Lectures and Conversations on ... Religious Belief*, esp. pp. 53-9. (But according to Wittgenstein, all churchgoers are playing the language game which in the text I prescribe for the Pyrrhonian.)

Thus a rustic interpretation of the “tradition of laws and customs” can be produced. But I confess that I find the interpretation forced; for although Sextus' abstract description of “tradition” is perfectly compatible with rusticity, his illustration of the Pyrrhonist's traditionalism strongly suggests belief — if Sextus intends *PH* I 24 (and III 2) to be understood in a rustic fashion then his language is misleading and perhaps disingenuous.

[4] Ὑφήγησις φυσική, natural instruction<sup>100</sup>, seems, from its name, a probable source of belief; and when Sextus glosses the phrase by reference to perception and thought, that probability increases — for perception and thought are surely prime originators of belief. But what exactly has Sextus got in mind when he refers to “natural instruction”? A part of the answer to that question comes from Book II of *PH*.

In *PH* II, as I have already remarked, Sextus argues against the Dogmatists' use of signs and proofs. But his rejection of signs is not wholesale; on the contrary, he carefully records a distinction between two types of sign, and explicitly states that he is arguing against only one of those types. “Indicative” signs allegedly enable us to learn about naturally unclear objects (τὰ φύσει ἀδηλα): Sextus will have nothing to do with them. But in addition to indicative signs there are “recollective” signs; and for them Sextus has more respect.

«They call a recollective sign something which has been directly observed together with the thing signified and which, at the same time as it strikes us, while the latter is unclear, leads us to a recollection of the thing which was observed together with it and is now not striking us directly — as in the case of smoke and fire» (*PH* II 100). Smoke is a recollective sign of fire because (a) we have often directly observed smoke and fire together, and (b) when we directly observe smoke and do not directly observe fire, the smoke leads us to think of fire<sup>101</sup>.

<sup>100</sup> For ὑφήγησις with the sense “instruction” (not “guidance”) see *PH* I 6, II 120; *M* VII 22, VIII 300, XI 47; I 35, 172, 258, III 18, V 3.

<sup>101</sup> This is a rough characterisation; for a detailed and subtle treatment see now M.F. BURNYEAT, *The origins of non-deductive Inference*, in *Science and Speculation*.

Sextus admits such signs. «Recollective signs are relied upon in ordinary life. When a man sees smoke he infers (σημειοῦται) fire, and when he has noticed a scar he says that a wound has been received. Thus not only do we not fight against ordinary life, but we actually struggle at its side, assenting ἀδοξάστως to what it relies upon and opposing the private fictions of the Dogmatists» (PH II 102) <sup>102</sup>.

The ordinary man sees smoke rising from the hillside or a speck of blood on your chin (there he relies on αἰσθησις). He then infers (σημειοῦται) that there is a brush-fire or that you cut yourself shaving (there he exercises νόησις). He starts from one belief, based upon perception; and his deduction leads him to another belief. The Pyrrhonist accepts recollective signs and fights on the side of βίος. It is natural to infer that the Pyrrhonist is thereby committed to those beliefs which Everyman employs when engaged in sign-inference; and it is plausible to regard that as a particularly good illustration of ὑφήγησις φυσική. In that case, the Pyrrhonist of PH, siding with βίος and relying on recollective signs, is urbane and not rustic.

A rustic interpreter must explain three things if his interpretation is to survive the acceptance of recollective signs. He must explain (i) how the Pyrrhonist can *embark upon* the inference — how he can rely on αἰσθησις and report the smoke; (ii) how he can *end* the inference — how he can come to report the fire; and (iii) how he can *make* the inference — how he can infer from the smoke to the fire. For all three of those things apparently involve beliefs, and the rustic interpreter does not allow beliefs to his Pyrrhonist.

Now it is easy to see how the rustic interpreter will proceed. Or (i) and (ii) he will suggest that, in uttering the initial and the final stages of the sign-inference, the Pyrrhonist is not stating beliefs but simply avowing his πάθη: "It looks like smoke over there", "It looks like fire over there" <sup>103</sup>, he will say; and those utterances, employing

<sup>102</sup> Cfr. M VIII 156-8, which makes the same point in similarly forthright terms.

<sup>103</sup> But it does *not* look like fire over there. The whole point of the sign is that it allows us to grasp that there *is* fire there even when we *cannot* see or otherwise perceive the fire: the fire is ἀδηλον — ἐδηλον πρὸς καιρόν, not φῶσεν ἀδηλον — and if it were not, we should have no need of a sign. The rustic must say, in reply, that when

typical φαίνεται sentences, will commit him to no beliefs. As for (iii), the inference, that may be interpreted, analogously to the ἀνάγκη παθῶν, as a piece of natural necessity: having the πάθος reported by "It looks like smoke", the Pyrrhonist finds that he also has the πάθος reported by "It looks like fire" — he makes no inference at all, strictly speaking; rather, as Sextus says, nature "leads him" to the second πάθος. A Pyrrhonist, like Everyman, uses recollective signs; and he therefore produces utterances of the form "*p*, so *q*". But in those utterances neither "*p*" nor "*q*" expresses a belief (they merely avow πάθη); and the word "so" does not signify an inference (it marks a psychological compulsion). The whole affair takes place without any beliefs being invoked.

That is, I hope, a moderately coherent account of the way in which a "sign-inference" might work; and it shows that a rustic Pyrrhonist could give a coherent explanation of his use of recollective

experiences the πάθος normally reported by "It looks like smoke", he *also* experiences the πάθος normally reported by "It looks like fire" — i.e. he experiences the πάθος which he normally experiences when (as a non-Pyrrhonist would put it) he is actually looking at the fire itself. Naturally, he reports the second πάθος in the standard way, saying "It looks like fire" — there is no reason why all cases of its looking like fire should be qualitatively indistinguishable. (But is that really coherent? Suppose a rustic looks at an oar in water: why shouldn't he say "It looks straight"? For there is no reason why all cases of oars looking straight should be qualitatively indistinguishable. Maybe a Pyrrhonist *will* sometimes say "It looks straight": he is, after all, simply reporting his πάθη, and there is nothing in Pyrrhonism which demands that the πάθος caused (as a non-Pyrrhonist would put it) by a submerged oar should always be the πάθος normally reported by "It looks bent"). The second example of a recollective sign in PH II 102 introduces an important point which Sextus nowhere develops. For the "conclusion" of the second sign is "He looks as though he has been wounded", and this contains a reference to *the past*. The Pyrrhonist's φαίνεται sentences are always present-tensed: he reports his *present* πάθη (see above, note 20). But the *contents* of those πάθη may themselves advert to past — or to future — times. A Pyrrhonist may say — to make the point fully explicit — "The man *now* appears to me as *having been* wounded", "The clouds *now* appear to me as *being about to* produce rain". In that way a rustic Pyrrhonist may have some purchase on the past and the future; and plainly some purchase on the future is necessary if his actions are to be given any adequate explanations.

signs<sup>104</sup>. But that is not enough. I am not asking whether a rustic *could* give such an explanation: I am asking whether the account in *PH* II is rustic. And it is, I fear, hard to read the account I have just given into the text of *PH*. Everyman surely has beliefs and makes inferences when he employs recollective signs. Sextus says that his Pyrrhonist sides here with Everyman: he does not say that the Pyrrhonist transmutes Everyman's statements of belief into avowals of  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ ; he does not say that the Pyrrhonist replaces Everyman's inference by a psychological event. Had Sextus wanted to indicate that the Pyrrhonist's use of recollective signs involves no beliefs he could have done so quite easily. He does not do so. If, nevertheless, he intends a rustic reading of recollective signs we must suppose, again, that his language is misleading and perhaps disingenuous.

What, in sum, are we to make of Sextus' account of the  $\beta\omega\tau\iota\kappa\iota$ ,  $\tau\eta\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ? Three general conclusions seem to me to emerge from an analysis of the texts. First, it is possible to construct an interpretation of the  $\tau\eta\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  which is compatible with a rustic view of *PH* — adherence to the  $\tau\eta\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  does not positively demand a commitment to belief. Or rather, a rustic Pyrrhonist might argue, with some show of plausibility, that his beliefless state is consistent with his following the  $\tau\eta\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . Secondly, if we insist upon a rustic construal of the  $\tau\eta\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ , then we must dismiss Sextus' claim that his Pyrrhonist side with  $\beta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ : Everyman has everyday beliefs; a rustic Pyrrhonist has no beliefs; it is merely disingenuous for a rustic to pretend that he is on the side of Everyman. (Just as it was disingenuous of Berkeley to pretend to be vindicating Common Sense.) A rustic may with more plausibility suggest that his own style of life need not differ markedly in its external form from the life of Everyman, and to that extent he may reasonably claim an affinity to Everyman. But exactly the same claim could be made — with more propriety — by any Dogmatist and the claim does not constitute a justification for enrolling the

<sup>104</sup> My standard of coherence is pretty low: I mean only that this account of recollective signs is at least as plausible as, say, Sextus' account of Methodical medicine.

rustic Pyrrhonist as an ally of  $\beta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$  in its alleged battle against  $\delta\acute{\omicron}\gamma\mu\alpha$ . Thirdly, and most importantly, I fear that we must conclude either that *PH* is not uniformly rustic or else that *PH* is culpably disingenuous: if we take Sextus' remarks about  $\beta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$  at their face value we shall adopt the former conclusion, if we take them with a large pinch of salt we shall adopt the latter conclusion.

And there, for the moment, I rest the case. The general tenor of *PH* is, I think, indubitably rustic. But *PH* also contains important intrusions of urbanity.

## VI

The problem I have been discussing concerns the range or scope of Pyrrhonian  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$ . It was granted that different Pyrrhonists may well have set different limits to their  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  — that some may have permitted themselves to believe more than others. But it is a presupposition of the problem, as it has been posed, that any particular Pyrrhonist must, if he is to have a coherent philosophy, define the scope of  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  within his own version of Scepticism. I shall end this paper by questioning that presupposition, and hence by suggesting that the problem of the scope of  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  is in a certain sense unreal.

The goal of Pyrrhonism is  $\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\zeta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ , and the original cause of Sceptical investigations is "the anomaly in things" and the disquiet which such anomaly arouses (*PH* I 12). We become aware of an "anomaly" in, say, the alleged facts about death: do we survive our deaths, as some hold, or do we rather perish utterly, as others maintain? The anomaly upsets us — we are  $\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\sigma\sigma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$ . We begin an investigation of the subject in the hope, initially, of discovering the truth and so setting our minds at rest. But we possess a  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\eta$ ; we find that the arguments pro are equally balanced by the arguments contra; we end in  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  over the question — and upon  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  there supervenes the desired  $\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\zeta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ .

Will every Pyrrhonist exhibit  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  towards the possibility of an afterlife? Surely not. For a Pyrrhonist will only reach  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\chi\eta$  if he exercises his  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\eta$ ; he will only exercise his  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\eta$  if he finds himself suffering from  $\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\chi\eta$ ; he will only

suffer from *ταραχή* if he perceives a worrying *ἀνωμαλία* in things. Nothing obliges us to think that *ταραχή* over death is a universal phenomenon (still less, *ταραχή* over the nature of time and place, the possibility of causal interconnexions, the existence of numbers). Some men may never light upon the anomaly in the thing. Others may discover the anomaly and laugh it aside. Untroubled, such men have no motive for exercising their *δύναμις ἀντιθετική* on the puzzles of dying, and hence no means — and no motive — for achieving *ἐποχή*.

The point of Pyrrhonism is *ἀταραξία*. Pyrrhonist strategies are relevant only where *ταραχή* exists. A man who suffers only mildly from *ταραχή* may be a perfect Pyrrhonist; for he may achieve complete *ἀταραξία* by exercising his *δύναμις* and reaching *ἐποχή* in a very modest way. Others, who find the whole of life a sea of troubles, will not be set at rest until they have achieved universal *ἐποχή*.

The medical simile which the Sceptics loved is helpful here. *Ταραχή* is a disease, *ἐποχή* the cure. The Pyrrhonist is a doctor — a psychiatrist — who claims the ability to cure *ταραχή* in most of its forms<sup>105</sup>. How much medicine does a man need to be healthy? How far will a competent doctor apply his plasters and administer his drugs? Plainly, it all depends on the disease. Some conditions require massive doses and major surgery, others are assuaged by an aspirin. It is absurd to imagine that doctors can produce a single formula, applicable to all men in all conditions, or pronounce generally that every patient needs so many pills a day.

How much *ἐποχή* does a man need for *ἀταραξία* or mental health? How far will a competent Pyrrhonist apply his Tropes and exercise his *δύναμις ἀντιθετική*? Plainly, it all depends on the disease. Serious mental conditions require strong remedies, minor maladies are righted by a simple argument or two. It is absurd to suppose that a Pyrrhonist can produce a single formula, applicable to all men in all conditions, or pronounce generally that every patient needs so much *ἐποχή* and so many Tropes a day.

<sup>105</sup> A certain amount of *ταραχή* is inseparable from the human condition: that the best the doctor can do is produce *μετριοπάθεια* (*PH* I 25; III 235-6).

Yet that absurd supposition lies behind the question I have been discussing. "What is the extent of *ἐποχή* recommended by the Pyrrhonist of *PH*?" The question is misconceived, for it rests upon a silly presupposition. *Ἐποχή* may be broad or narrow. Pyrrhonism may be rustic or urbane. Everything depends on the state of the particular patient.

That, I suggest, is the answer which Sextus *should* have given to the question. I do not claim that Sextus *did* give that answer. But I am inclined to imagine that he *would* have given it had the question been put to him directly. For, first, the answer is an obvious corollary of the general remarks about the nature and goal of Pyrrhonism with which Sextus prefaces *PH*. Secondly, the answer makes sense of the closing paragraphs of *PH*: there, at *PH* III 280-1, Sextus makes some curious comments on the power of his own arguments, and he exploits the medical simile in a self-conscious way. Finally, the answer provides an escape from the dismal conclusion to which the body of this paper has led us: we need not accept that *PH* is inconsistent or incoherent or indefinite in its attitude to the scope of *ἐποχή*; if the scope of *ἐποχή* is determined by the patient's condition and not by the doctor's theories, then we should not expect the doctor's theories to contain a coherent thesis — or any thesis at all — about the range and scope of *ἐποχή*.