

4. Plutarch

Cornu. not. 1059 B-C

= LS 40 G

Scam + Corp

2. Cicero

Academica II. 16

= LS 68 C

3. DL IV 28

= LS 68 D

4. Cicero

De fin II. 2

= LS 68 J

5. Lactantius

Divine institutes

S. 14. 3-5

= LS 68 M

(1) ἐφ' ἣν τις εἶπεν αὐτῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλ' ἐκ προνοίας θεῶν νομίζοι μετ' Ἀρκεσίλαου καὶ πρὸ Carneάδου γενομένην Χρύσιππου, ἃν ὁ μὲν ὑπέθετε τῆς εἰς τὴν συνήθετον ἔβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ὁ δ' ἠβήθησε μάλιστα τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν. (2) Χρύσιππος γοῦν ἐν μέσῳ γενόμενος ταῖς πρὸς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀντιγραφαῖς καὶ τὴν Carneάδου δεινότητα ἐνέφραξε, πολλὰ μὲν τῇ αἰσθησέῃ καταλιπὼν ὡσπερ εἰς πολλοῦσιν ἀποβλήματα, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰς ἐνοχίας τάραχον ἀφελὼν παντάπασιν καὶ διαθροῦσας ἐκάστην καὶ θέμενος εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον.

(1) One Stoic said that in his opinion it was not by chance but by divine providence that Chrysippus came after Arcesilaus and before Carneades, the former of whom initiated the violence and offence against common sense, while the latter was the most productive of the Academics. (2) For by coming between them, Chrysippus with his rejoinders to Arcesilaus also fenced in the cleverness of Carneades; he left sense-perception many reinforcements, for it to stand siege as it were, and entirely removed the confusion regarding preconceptions and conceptions by articulating each one and assigning it to its appropriate place.

(1) Arcesilas Zenoni ut putatur obstrictans nihil novi reperienti sed emendantii superiores immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare voluit, conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere. (2) cuius primo non admodum probata ratio (quamquam floruit cum acumine ingenii tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi), proxime a Laeyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta a Carneade.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) Arcesilaus, so it is thought, criticized Zeno for discovering nothing new but merely correcting his predecessors by altering words; in wanting to undermine Zeno's definitions he tried to draw a veil of darkness over matters of the utmost clarity. (2) His philosophy was not much accepted at first, although he excelled both in sharpness of intellect and a certain admirable charm of discourse. Laeydes alone was the next to keep it going, but subsequently it was perfected by Carneades.

οὗτος ἔστω ὁ τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημείας κατάρξας, πρῶτος ἐπιτυχῶν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητας τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἐκείτην ἐπεχείρησε, καὶ πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε τὸν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος παραδειχόμενον καὶ ἐποίησε δι' ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἐριστικώτερον.

Arcesilaus was the originator of the Middle Academy, being the first to suspend his assertions owing to the contrarities of arguments. He was also the first to argue pro and contra, and the first to change traditional Platonic discourse and, by question and answer, to make it more of a debating contest.

[sc. Socrates] enim percentando atque interrogando clicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum disserbat, ut ad ea quae ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas cum revocavit instituitque ut ii qui se audire vellent non de se quaerent, sed ipsi dicerent quid sentirent. quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed cum qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam.

[Speaker: Cicero, advocating the Socratic method] By thorough inquiry and questioning, he [Socrates] was in the habit of drawing forth the opinions of those with whom he was arguing, in order to state his own view as a response to their answers. This practice was not kept up by his successors; but Arcesilaus revived it and prescribed that those who wanted to listen to him should not ask him questions but state their own opinions. When they had done so, he argued against them. But his listeners, so far as they could, would defend their own opinion.

[sc. Carneades] cum legatus ab Atheniensibus Roman missus esset, disputavit de iustitia copiose audiente Galba et Catone Censorio maximis tunc oratoribus. sed idem disputationem suam postridie contraria disputatione subvertit et iustitiam quam pridie laudaverit susculit, non quidem philosophi gravitate, cuius firma et stabilis debet esse sententia, sed quasi oratorio exercitii genere in utramque partem disserendi. . . Carneades autem ut Aristotelem refelleret ac Platonem iustitiae patronos, prima illa disputatione collegit ea omnia quae pro iustitia dicebantur, ut posset illam, sicut fecit, evertere . . . non quia vituperandam esse iustitiam sentiebat, sed ut illos defensores eius

When he [Carneades] was sent by Athens as an ambassador to Rome, he discoursed at length on justice in the hearing of Galba and Cato the Censor, the foremost orators of the time. On the next day he overturned his own discourse with a discourse on the opposite side, and subverted justice, which he had praised on the previous day, not with the seriousness of a philosopher, whose opinion should be firm and stable, but in the manner of a rhetorical exercise in which argument is given pro and contra. . . With the object of refuting Aristotle and Plato, supporters of justice, Carneades in his first discourse assembled all the arguments in favour of justice in order that he might overturn them, as he did. . . not because he thought justice ought to be disparaged, but to show that its

=LS 40 D

(1) quacivir de Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. (2) ille credo nihil opinatum, quoniam esset quod percipi posset. (3) quid ergo id esset? visum credo. (4) quale igitur visum? tum illum ita definiisse: ex eo quod esset sicut esset impressum et signatum et effectum. (5) post requisitum etiamne si eius modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum. (6) hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est cuius modi ab eo quod non est posset esse. (7) recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum, neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; (8) incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. (9) haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit.

7. SE M

VII 153 - 157

=LS 41 C

λέγοντων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντικαθίστατο, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστι μεταξὺ ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. (7) αὐτῆ γὰρ ἦν φάσι κατάληψιν καὶ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία συγκατάθεσις, ἥτοι ἐν σοφῷ ἢ ἐν φαύλῳ γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐάν τε ἐν σοφῷ γένηται, ἐπιστήμη ἔστω, ἐάν τε ἐν φαύλῳ, δόξα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα ἢ μόνον ὄνομα μετέληπται. (8) εἴπερ τε ἡ κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις ἔστω, ἀνυπακτός ἔστω, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἡ συγκατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεσθαι ἀλλὰ πρὸς λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωματίων εἶναι αἱ συγκαταθέσεις), δευτέρον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς φαντασία εὐρίσκειται οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ὡς διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παραδείγματα. (9) μὴ οὐσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται. ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία συγκατάθεσις, μὴ οὐσης δὲ κατάληψις πάντ' ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκατάληπτων ἀκολουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν. (10) σκοπόμεν δὲ οὕτως: πάντων ὄντων ἀκατάληπτων διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαξίαν τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ συγκαταθίσσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός. μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκαταθίσσεται τῷ ἀκατάληπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκατάληπτῳ συγκατάθεσις δοξάσει ἔστω, ὥστε εἰ τῶν συγκαταθίσεων ἔστω ὁ σοφός, τῶν δοξασιῶν ἔσται ὁ σοφός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τῶν διδασκάλων ἔστω ὁ σοφός (αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἰψήφισι τῆν κατ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῶν ἀμαθιστῶν αἰτίου). οὐκ ἄρα τῶν συγκαταθίσεων ἔστω ὁ σοφός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περὶ πάντων αὐτῶν δεήσει ἀσυγκαταθεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀσυγκαταθεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἔστω ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν. ἐπέχει ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός.

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) We may take him [Arcesilaus] to have asked Zeno what would happen if the wise man could not cognize anything and it was the mark of the wise man not to opine. (2) Zeno, I imagine, replied that the wise man would not opine since there was something cognitive. (3) What then was this? Zeno, I suppose, said: an impression. (4) What kind of impression? Zeno then defined it as an impression stamped and reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is. (5) Arcesilaus next asked whether this was still valid if a true impression was just like a false one. (6) At this point Zeno was sharp enough to see that if an impression from what is were such that an impression from what is not could be just like it, there was no cognitive impression. (7) Arcesilaus agreed that it was right to add this to the definition, since neither a false impression nor a true one would be cognitive if the latter were just such as even a false one could be. (8) But he applied all his force to this point of the argument, in order to show that no impression arising from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it. (9) This is the one controversial issue which has lasted up to the present. [continued at 69H]

(6) Arcesilaus contradicted these statements of the Stoics by proving that cognition is no criterion in between scientific knowledge and opinion. (7) For what they call cognition and assent to a cognitive impression occurs in either a wise or an inferior man. But if it occurs in a wise man, it is scientific knowledge; and if in an inferior man, it is opinion; and there is no further variation except a purely verbal one. (8) And if cognition is assent belonging to a cognitive impression, it is non-existent: first, because assent occurs not in relation to an impression but in relation to language (for assents belong to propositions). Secondly, because no true impression is found to be of a kind such that it could not turn out false, as is attested by many different considerations. (9) But if the cognitive impression does not exist, cognition will not occur either, for it was assent to a cognitive impression. And if cognition does not exist, everything will be incognitive. And if everything is incognitive, it will follow, according to the Stoics too, that the wise man suspends judgement. (10) We may consider it in this way: given that everything is incognitive, owing to the non-existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise man should assent, the wise man will opine. For given that nothing is cognitive, if he assents to anything, he will assent to the incognitive, and assent to the incognitive is opinion. So if the wise man is one of those who assent, the wise man will be one of those who opine. But the wise man is certainly not one of those who opine (for they [the Stoics] claim this to be a mark of folly and a cause of wrongdoing). Therefore the wise man is not one of those who assent. And if this is so, he will have to withhold assent about everything. But to withhold assent is no different from suspending judgement. Therefore the wise man will suspend judgement about everything.

Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, ut nihil scire se sciret; sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset. (4) quibus de causis nihil oportere neque proficere neque affirmare quicquam neque assensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. (5) huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dissensens de sua plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte assensio sustineretur.

So Arcesilaus was in the practice of denying that anything could be known, not even the one thing Socrates had left for himself – the knowledge that he knew nothing: such was the extent of the obscurity in which everything lurked, on his assessment, and there was nothing which could be discerned or understood. For these reasons, he said, no one should maintain or assert anything or give it the acceptance of assent, but he should always curb his rashness and restrain it from every slip; for it would be extraordinary rashness to accept something either false or incognitive, and nothing was more dishonourable than for assent and acceptance to run ahead of cognition and grasp. He used to act consistently with this philosophy, and by arguing against everyone's opinions he drew most people away from their own, so that when reasons of equal weight were found on opposite sides on the same subject, the easier course was to withhold assent from either side.

(1) τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καριεάδην συγχωρήσειν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς, τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" ἀσυγχώρητον εἶναι. γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων. (2) καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλκείας τὸ ἐπ' ἴσως ταύτας ἔναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὐρίσκεισθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσως πληκτικὰς καὶ ἔναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολούθους πράξεις ἐπιτείνουσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπάρ οὐ μὲν δυνῶν ἀρνούμενος ποτὸν ἴδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δευμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕμνους ἢ μὲν δαίχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς δειψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνειν δοκῶσαν, ἀνάλογον δὲ ψήβος τοῖς δευματουμένους... καὶ ἢν τρίτην ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τραυδίωσι φανουμένους πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, οἷον Δίωσι μὲν ὡς Δίωσι, Θέωσι δὲ ὡς Θέωσι προσφερόμενοι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσί τινας. ὁ γούν Ἰπράκλῆς μανεῖς, καὶ λαβῶν φαντασίαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίωσι παίδων ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκόλουθον πράξιν ταύτη φαντασίᾳ συνήψεν. ἀκόλουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἔχθρου παιδῶσι ἀνελεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. (3) εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ τινὲς εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγουσαι ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθειαν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πράξιν συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδὲς τοιαῦται πρῆγμασι, λεκτέον ἀπαραλκείους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους.

(4) οὐδὲν δὲ ἦτρον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἢ κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ [ἢ] κατὰ τύπον. καθόδοι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φανόμενα τοῖς Στωικοῦς. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν, διαφερόντων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀμύχανόν ἐστι διορίξειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου οἷον δυεῖν ψῶν ἀκρως ἀλλήλοισ ὁμοίων (εἰ) ἐναλλάξ τῶ Στωικῶ διδωμι πρὸς διακρίσειν, [εἰ] ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἰσχύσει λέγειν ἀδιαπτῶτος πότερον ἐν ἐστὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον ψῶν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο; ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ διδυμῶν. λήθεται γὰρ ψευδῆ φαντασίαι ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁμῶς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομειωμένην καὶ ἐναεσφραγισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, εἶναι ἀπὸ

Carrades says that he will concede the rest of it to the Stoics, but not the clause 'of such a kind as could not arise from what is not'. For impressions arise from what is not as well as from what is. (2) The fact that they are found to be equally self-evident and striking is an indication of their indiscernibility, and an indication of their being equally self-evident and striking is the fact that the consequential actions are linked to [both kinds of impression]. Just as in waking states a thirsty man gets pleasure from drinking and someone who flees from a wild beast or any other terror shouts and screams, so too in dreams people satisfy their thirst and think they are drinking from a spring, and it is just the same with the fear of those who have nightmares... Just as in normal states too we believe and assent to very clear appearances, behaving towards Dion, for instance, as Dion and towards Theon as Theon, so too in madness some people have the similar experience. When Hercules was deranged, he got an impression from his own children as though they were those of Eurystheus, and he attached the consequential action to this impression, which was to kill his enemy's children, as he did. (3) If then impressions are cognitive in so far as they induce us to assent and to attach to them the consequential action, since false impressions are plainly of this kind too, we must say that incognitive ones are indiscernible from the cognitive... (4) The Academics are no less effective in proving indiscernibility with respect to stamp and impression. They confront the Stoics with appearances. In the case of things which are similar in shape but different objectively it is impossible to distinguish the cognitive impression from that which is false and incognitive. E.g. if I give the Stoic first one and then another of two exactly similar eggs to discriminate, will the wise man, by focusing on them, be able to say infallibly that the one egg he is being shown is this one rather than that one? The same argument applies in the case of twins. For the virtuous man will get a false impression albeit one from what is and imprinted and stamped exactly in accordance

10. Cicero

Academica II. 57

= LS 40 I

(1) quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, - de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant quas non habet diuinitas, retenturam adscensum nec unquam ulli viso adscensurum nisi quod tale fuerit quale falsum esse non possit. (2) sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem qua vera a falsis possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est: ut mater geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internoscos si adueneris.

11. Cicero

Academica II. 28-9

= LS 68 N

(1) sed Antipatro hoc idem postulant, cum diceret ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi [consentaneum esse] unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse conscientaneum esse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat; nam tantum abesse dicebat ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret, qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, cum nihil exciperet; ita necesse esse ne id ipsum quidem quod exceptum non esset comprehendi et percipi illo modo posse.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) I will even concede that the wise man himself, who is the subject of this whole discussion, when he experiences similar things which he cannot keep distinct, will withhold his assent and will never assent to any impression unless it is of a kind which a false one could not be. (2) But just as he has a specific expertise which enables him to distinguish the true from the false in other matters, so he has to apply practice to those similarities you adduce. Just as a mother can distinguish between her twins by the habit of her eyes, so you will do if you practice.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) When he [Antipater] used to say that it was consistent for someone who asserted that nothing was cognitive to say that this one thing, none the less, was cognitive, viz. that everything else was not, Carneades was sharper in his rejoinder: he used to say that so far from being consistent, it was actually the greatest of inconsistencies. For someone who said nothing was cognitive made no exception; necessarily, then, not even this statement, which had not been excepted, could be grasped and cognized in any way

(1) τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ' οἱ πολλὰ παραμαρτυρούμενοι καὶ καταρέωντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς Στωᾶς αὐτῇ τελευτώτερες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν, ὡς πάντα πειθῶναι καὶ σπρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ἡμῶν γενέσθαι συγκατατίθεαι οὐδὲ τῆς παντὶς ἀρχῆν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἰσθησῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐβάνη, μὴ δεξιμένη τοῦ προστεθεῖσθαι.

[Speaker: Plutarch on behalf of the New Academy] (1) Nor was suspension of judgement about everything disturbed by those who toiled away and wrote lengthy arguments against it. But having finally confronted it from the Stoa with 'inactivity' like a Gorgon, they faded away, since for all their twisting and turning, impulse refused to become assent, and did not accept sensation as tipping the balance, but was seen to lead to action on its own initiative without needing assent

13. SE M, VII 158

= LS 69 B

(1) ἀλλ' ἐπιμετὰ τοῦτο εἶδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν, ἧς οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδιδόσθαι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τούτεστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρητημένη ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεύλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φύλας καὶ κοινὰς τὰς πράξεις τῶ ἐυλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προσερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· (2) τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγυνέσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθώμα εἶναι ὅσπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογία. (3) ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῶ ἐυλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.

(1) But since after this it was necessary to investigate the conduct of life too, which is not of a nature to be explained without a criterion, on which happiness too, i.e. the end of life, has its trust dependent, Arcesilaus says that one who suspends judgement about everything will regulate choice and avoidance and actions in general by 'the reasonable'; and that by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; (2) for happiness is acquired through prudence, and prudence resides in right actions, and right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification; (3) therefore one who attends to the reasonable will act rightly and be happy.

14. SE M VII 159

= LS 70 A

(1) ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιατάσσεται περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. (2) καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ' ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος, οὐκ αἰσθήσις, οὐ φαντασία, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα σφαλῆβδη διαμειθεύεται ἡμᾶς.

(1) On the subject of the criterion, Carneades marshalled arguments not only against the Stoics but also against all previous philosophers. (2) His first argument, aimed against all of them jointly, is one on the basis of which he establishes that there is not, in an unqualified sense, any criterion of truth - not reason, not sensation, not impression, not any other existing thing. For all of these alike deceive us.

15. Cicero

Academia II. 7-8

= LS 685

(1) neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo et audiendo clicant et tamquam expriment aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. (2) nec inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur quicquam interest nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea vera sint quae defendunt, nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, affirmare vix possumus, hoc autem liberos et solutores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulli cogimur.

16. Cicero

Academia II. 32

= LS 682

(1) nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi, "si ea quae disputentur vera sint tum omnia fore incerta," respondent: "quid ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit." (2) alii autem elegantius, qui etiam quaeruntur quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit inter incertum et id quod percipi non possit docere conantur eaque distinguere. (3) cum his igitur agamus qui haec distinguunt, illos qui omnia sic incerta dicunt ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit quasi desperatos aliquos relinquamus. volunt enim . . . probabilis aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) Our arguments have no other objective than, by speaking pro and contra, to draw out and fashion something which is either true or comes as close to truth as possible. (2) Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who think that they know something except that they have no doubt that their positions are true, whereas we hold many things to be convincing which we can easily follow but scarcely assert. In this respect, moreover, we are more free and unconstrained, because our power of judgement is unimpaired, and we are not compelled by any necessity to endorse all the rules and virtual commands of certain people.

[Speaker: the Antiochian Lucullus] (1) Nor in fact can I adequately decide what their [the Academics'] policy is or their intentions. For sometimes when we apply this kind of discourse to them, 'If your arguments are true, then everything will be non-evident', they answer: 'What, then, has that to do with us? It is not our fault, is it? Blame nature for having utterly buried truth in an abyss, as Democritus says.' (2) But others give a more subtle response, and even complain at our accusing them of saying that everything is non-evident; and they try to explain the extent of the difference between what is non-evident and what is not cognitive, and to distinguish between them. (3) Let us, therefore, deal with those who make this distinction, abandoning as hopeless the others who say that everything is as non-evident as whether the number of the stars is odd or even. For they want . . . there to be something convincing or resembling the truth, and to use it as a yardstick both in the conduct of life and in investigation and discussion.

17. Cicero

Academia II. 99-100

= LS 421

et enim is quoque qui a vobis sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probabilia non comprehensa neque percepta neque ad sensa sed similia veri, quae nisi probet omnibus vita tollatur. quid enim, conscendens navem sapiens num comprehendit animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? qui potest? sed si iam ex hoc loco profisciscatur. Puteolos stadia triginta probo navigio bono gubernatore hac tranquillitate, probabilis videatur se illuc venturum esse salvum.

[Speaker: Cicero, in defence of the New Academy] Indeed, even the wise man whom your school [the stoicizing school of Antiochus] brings onto the scene follows many things which are convincing - not known, perceived or assented to, but likely. Were he not to accept them, all life would surely be abolished. After all, when the wise man boards a ship he surely doesn't know and perceive in his mind that the voyage will be successful - how can he? But if he were now setting out from here for Puteoli, a journey of thirty stades, with an honest crew and a good steersman in the present calm weather, it would seem convincing to him that he would get there safely.

(1) ταῦτα μὲν ἀντιπαρεξέγγων τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις ὁ Καρνεάδης εἰς τὴν ἀντιπαρῆξαν τοῦ κριτηρίου διεξήγαγετο ἀπαρτούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός τι κριτήριον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξωγαγῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περικτήριον, δυναμίει ἐπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦτου διατάττεσθαι, προσλαμβάνων τὴν τε πιθανὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν πιθανὴν ἀμα ἀπερίσταστον καὶ διεξωδευμένην. (2) τίς δὲ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦτων διαφορά; συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον. ἡ τοῦτων φαντασία τινὸς φαντασία ἔστιν, ὅταν τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται καὶ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, καὶ (τοῦ) ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γίνεται, ὅταν τοῦ ἑκτὸς ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίνεται καθάπερ ἀθροώπου. τοιαύτη δὲ ὅσα ὄμο ἂν ἔχοι σχέσεις, μίαν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ φανταστον, δευτέραν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον, κατὰ μὲν ὅταν τὴν πρὸς τὸ φανταστον σχέσιν ἡ ἀληθῆς γίνεται ἢ ψευδῆς, καὶ ἀληθῆς μὲν ὅταν σύμφωνος ἢ τῷ φανταστοῦ, ψευδῆς δὲ ὅταν διάφωνος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον σχέσιν ἡ μὲν ἔστι φανωμένη ἀληθῆς ἢ δὲ οὐ φανωμένη ἀληθῆς, ὡν ἡ μὲν φανωμένη ἀληθῆς ἐμφάσις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία, ἡ δ' οὐ φανωμένη ἀληθῆς ἀπιφάσις τε προσαγορεύεται καὶ ἀπιθῆς καὶ ἀπιθανος φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀντὶθεῖν φανωόμενον ψευδὲς οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν, μὴ φανωόμενον δὲ ἡμῶν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν. (3) τοῦτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ μὲν φανερώς ψευδῆς καὶ μὴ φανωμένη ἀληθῆς παραγρῆμῶς ἔστι καὶ οὐ κριτήριον, [ἐάν τε (<...> ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, διαφώνως δὲ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὅμοια τῆν ἢ ἀπὸ Ἠλέκτρας προσεσοῦσα τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, μίαν τῶν Ἐρηνῶν αὐτῆν δοξάζοντι καὶ κεκραγόντι. "μέλλει μί' οὖσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρηνῶν."] (4) τῆς δὲ φανωμένης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μὲν τίς ἔστιν ἀνωδρά, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικρότητα τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἢ παρὰ ἱκανὸν διάστημα ἢ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ὄψεως συγκεκριμένης καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύπτως τι λαμβανόντων, ἡ δὲ τις τῆν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθῆς ἔτι καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτῆν ἀληθῆ. ὡν τῶν ἡ μὲν ἀνωδρά καὶ ἑκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ μήτε αὐτῆν μήτε τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτῆν τραυῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς πείθειν οὐδ' εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπιπαύσασθαι. ἡ δὲ φανωμένη ἀληθῆς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐμφανωμένη κριτήριον ἔστι τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην. (5) κριτήριον δὲ οὖσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἱκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτενωμένη αὐτῆ ἀλλῆν ἀλλῆς ἐν εἰδει πιθανώτερον τε καὶ πηκτικωτέραν ἰσχυρὰ φαντασίαν. τὸ δὲ πιθανὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἀληθὲς τε ὃν καὶ φανωόμενον ἀληθὲς, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ψευδὲς μὲν καλλεστῶς φανωόμενον δὲ ἀληθὲς, κατὰ δὲ τρίτον τὸ ἀληθὲς (φανωμένον ὅπερ ἔστι) κωνὸν ἀμφοτέρων. ὅθεν τὸ κριτήριον ἔσται, μὲν ἡ φανωμένη ἀληθῆς φαντασία, ἦν καὶ πιθανὴν προσήγορευον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐπιπύττει δὲ ἐσθ' ὅτε καὶ ψευδῆς, ὡστε ἀνεγκύκλιον ἔχειν καὶ τῆ κωνῆ ποτὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς φαντασίᾳ χρῆσθαι. οὐ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ὁπῶν ταύτης παρέμππτωσαν, λέγω δὲ τῆς μιμουμένης τὸ ἀληθὲς, ἀπιστητέον ἔστι τῆ ὡς (ἐπὶ) τὸ πολὸν ἀληθευούση· τῷ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὸν τὴς τε κρίσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις κανονίζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

(1) These [see 70A] were the arguments which Carneades set out in full as a strategy against the other philosophers, to prove the non-existence of the criterion. But since he himself too has some criteria demanded of him for the conduct of life and the attainment of happiness, he is virtually compelled, as far as he himself is concerned, to adopt a position on this by taking as his criterion both the 'convincing' impression and the one which is simultaneously convincing, undiverted and thoroughly explored. (2) What the difference is between these must be briefly indicated. The impression is an impression of something, i.e., both of that from which it arises and of that in which it arises: the former is, for instance, the external object of sensation, and the latter, say, a man. Being of this kind, it would have two dispositions, one relative to the impressor, the other relative to the person experiencing the impression. Now in regard to its disposition relative to the impressor, it is either true or false—true when it is in agreement with the impressor, and false when it is not in agreement. But in regard to its disposition relative to the person experiencing the impression, one impression is apparently true and the other not apparently true; of these, the apparently true is called 'manifestation' by the Academics, and 'convincing' and 'convincing impression', while the not apparently true is called 'non-manifestation' and 'unconvincing impression'. For neither what appears immediately false, nor what is true but does not appear so to us, is of a nature to convince us. (3) Of these impressions, the one which is apparently false and not apparently true is to be ruled out and is not the criterion. (4) Of the apparently true impressions, one kind is dim, e.g. in the case of those whose apprehension of something is confused and not distinct, owing to the weakness of their vision; the other kind, along with appearing true, is additionally characterized by the intensity of its appearing true. Of these again, the dim and feeble impression could not be a criterion; for since it does not clearly indicate either itself or its cause, it is not of a nature to convince us or to pull us to assent. But the impression which appears true and fully manifests itself is the criterion of truth according to Carneades and his followers. (5) As the criterion, it has a considerable breadth; and by admitting of degrees, it includes some impressions which are more convincing and striking in their form than others. Convincingness, for our present purpose, has three senses: first, what both is and appears true; secondly, what is actually false but appears true; and thirdly, <what appears> true, <which is> common to them both. Hence the criterion will be the impression which appears true — also called 'convincing' by the Academics — but there are times when it actually turns out false, so that it is necessary actually to use the impression which is common on occasion to truth and falsehood. Yet the rare occurrence of this one, I mean the impression which counterfeits the truth [i.e. the second], is not a reason for distrusting the impression [i.e. the third] which tells the truth for the most part. For both judgements and actions, as it turns out, are regulated by what holds for the most part.

1 τοὺς ἔληθοι τε πράγματα ἢ εὐρεῖται ἐπακολουθεῖν εἶκος ἢ ἀνῆλθον εὐρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταλήθιας ὁμολο-
 2 γίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ἔληθσεως. διότι περ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἔληθμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρη-
 κέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφάνησαν μὴ
 3 δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπι-
 ἔληθοσαν. καὶ εὐρηκέναι μὲν δοκοῦσαν οἱ ἴδιαι
 καλοῦμενοι δογματικοί, οὐκ οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην
 καὶ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τοὺς στωικούς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές,
 ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφάνησαν οἱ περὶ
 Κλεντόμαχον καὶ Καρυείδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδη-
 4 μαϊκοί, ἔληθοσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί.

(1) καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Πυρρωνείων λόγων οὐδὲν φησιν εὐρίξειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φανομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. ταῦτ' ἀδὲ λέγει κεν τῷ Κατὰ σοφίας κεν τῷ Περί ἔληθσεως. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζεῦξις ὁ Αἰνεσίδημου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ Περί διττῶν λόγων καὶ Ἄρτιος ὁ Λαοδικεὺς καὶ Ἀμελλᾶς ἐν τῷ Ἐγρίππῳ πῶθεναι τὰ φανοίμενα μόνα. (2) ἔστιν οὖν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς Σκεπτικούς τὸ φανοίμενον, ὡς καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος φησιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρος. Δημόκριτος δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν φανοίμενων, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι... (3) τέλος δὲ οἱ Σκεπτικοὶ φασὶ τὴν ἐπισχῆν, ἢ οἰκίας τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἢ ἀταραξία, ὡς φασὶν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον.

Ὅτι οὖν περὶ Ἀμελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τοῦτο ἠπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνος ἔπιπον γράψων καὶ τὸν ἀφρόν τοῦ ἔπιπον μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουληθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύχωνεν ὡς ἀπετύχων καὶ τὴν σπογγίαν εἰς τὴν ἀμείψασε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου χροῖματα προσοῦμαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσαιχμαμένην ἔπιπον ἀφροῦ ποιῆσαι μίμημα. καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἠλπίον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναληφθεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ τῆν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φανομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικροῦμαι, μὴ δυναθῆναι δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχόσοι δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐκ οὐκ τυχκῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρεκκολούθησεν ὡς οὐκιά σῶματι.

ἔστιν οὖν ὁ Πυρρωνεὺς λόγος μυθία τις τῶν φανοίμενων ἢ τῶν ἀπιστοῦν νοουμένων, καθ' ἣν πάντα πασι συμβάλλεται καὶ συγκρινόμενα πολλαπλῶν ἀνωμαλίαι· καὶ ταραχῆν ἔχοντα εὐρίσκαται, καθὰ φησιν Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῇ εἰς τὰ Πυρρωνεῖα ὑποτυπώσει.

The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be incomprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring. Those who believe they have discovered it are the "Dogmatists," specially so called—Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as incomprehensible: the Sceptics keep on searching.

Aenesidemus, in the first of his *Pyrrhonist discourses*, says that Pyrrho determines nothing in doctrinaire fashion, because of the opposition of arguments. This follows appearances. He says the same in his *Against wisdom* and (*In inquiry*... Hence according to the Sceptics it is what appears that arrives as a criterion, as Aenesidemus also says... (3) As end disturbance follows suspension of judgement, upon which freedom from Aenesidemus, put it.

The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspension, even as a shadow follows its substance.

Pyrrhonist discourse is a kind of recollection of appearances, or of ideas of any kind, on the basis of which they are all brought into confrontation with each other and, when compared, are found to present much disparity and confusion. This is what Aenesidemus says in his *Outline introduction to Pyrrhonism*.

(1) ἐπεὶ δὲ | Θεαίτητος ἐπερωτηθεὶς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, | τί ἐστίν, εἶπεν
 "καὶ ὡς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται", | ἀποδέχεται Σωκράτης ὅτι οὐκ ἔκρετ
 λέγειν | ὅ φαίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ νομίζει εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. | οὐ γὰρ
 ἐκείνῳ φησιν | τὸ Πυρρώνειον, ὅτι οὐδὲν καθοριστικῶς | αὐ τῆ|ς δογμα-
 τῆ|ς, | ἀλλὰ φησιν φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ. (2) κατὰ γὰρ τὸν | αὐδρα οὕτε ὁ
 λόγος | κριτήριον οὕτε ἀληθῆ|ς φαντασία οὕτε | πιθανῆ| οὕτε καταληπ-
 τικῆ| οὕτε ἄλλο | τι τ|λοιοῦ|τόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι | νῦν αὐτῷ φαίνεται|. | (3) εἰ δὲ
 τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν | ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀποφάνεται, διὰ τὸ οἰεῖσθαι ἰσοκράτει
 εἶναι τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήμια λόγους, καὶ ἐξομαλίσσειν τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ
 μηδεμίαν ἐν | αὐταῖς ἀποκρίσσειν | διαφορὰν κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος,
 πιθανὸν ἢ ἀπιθανόν, | ἐπισηρῆς ἢ ἀμυδρόν, | καταληπτόν ἢ ἀκαταληπτόν,
 ἀλλὰ πᾶσας εἶναι ὁμοίας, (4) οὐδὲ τοῦτο δογματῆ|ζοντος, ὡς ἔπεται, | τὸ
 διεξάγειν κατὰ | τὴν ἀεὶ προσπιπτοῦσαν φαντασίαν, οἷ|χ ὡς ἀληθῆ|, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι | νῦν αὐτῷ φαίνεται|.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῶν ὑποσεεῖν,
 καὶ τοὺς πρώτους ὑποθήσομαι δι' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐποχῆ| συναγεται, οὕτε περὶ τοῦ
 πλῆθους οὕτε περὶ τῆς δυναμέως αὐτῶν διαβασιούμενος· ἐπιδέχεται γὰρ
 αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων. (7) (8) Περὶ τῶν
 δέκα τρόπων·) παραδίδονται τοῖων συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις
 Σκεπτικαῖς τρόποι, δι' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐποχῆ| συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμῶν,
 οὗς καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους συνωνύμων καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, (8) πρώτους
 ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῶων ἐξᾶλλαντῆν, δευτέρος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 διαφορὰν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφοροῦς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς,
 τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ
 διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τρόπους. ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας, ἑβδόμος ὁ παρὰ
 τὰς ποσότητας καὶ οὐκειασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι,
 ἕνατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς
 ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστες καὶ τὰς
 δογματικὰς υπολήψεις. Χρῆμαθε δὲ τῆ| τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς. (9) τούτων δὲ
 ἔπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρῖνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 κρῖνομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶ| μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρῖνοντος ὑποτάσσονται καὶ
 πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἢ ζῶον ἐστίν ἢ ἀνθρώπος ἢ αἰσθησις καὶ
 ἐν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρῖνομένου (ἀνύγοντα) ὁ ἑβδόμος
 καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύμβητον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ
 ὄγδοος καὶ ἕνατος. (10) πᾶσιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι,
 ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκό-
 τας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανόν
 λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυναμέως τῶδε.

(1) Since Theaetetus, when asked what knowledge is, replied '... and as it
 appears to me at present ...', Socrates [Theaetetus 151e] welcomes his lack
 of hesitancy in saying what appears to him and what he believes
 knowledge to be. For what he is saying is not the Pyrrhonian dictum,
 namely that one would not determinately assert any doctrine but just
 says that it appears to one. ✕ For according to Pyrrho, what is the
 criterion is neither reason, nor a true impression, nor a convincing
 impression, nor a cognitive impression, nor anything else of the kind, but
 what now appears to him. ✕ Whether it is or is not such as it appears he
 does not assert, because he thinks that the arguments for the opposing
 views are of equal strength, and he makes the impressions on a par with
 each other, leaving no difference between them in respect of their being
 true or false, convincing or unconvincing, self-evident or obscure, or
 cognitive or incognitive, but holds that they are all alike. ✕ He does not
 even assert as a doctrine the consequence – to live his life in accordance
 with whatever impression befalls him at each time, not on the grounds
 that it is a true impression, but because it now appears to him.

.. (6) To give us a more accurate impression of
 these oppositions, I shall add the modes through which suspension of
 judgement is deduced. But I shall make no assertions about either their
 number or their cogency: it is possible that they are both unsound and
 more numerous than those which I shall be listing. (7) Well, the familiar
 tradition among the older Sceptics is of modes, ten in total, through
 which suspension of judgement seems to be deduced. They also use the
 terms 'arguments' and 'outlines' as equivalents to 'modes'. They are as
 follows. (8) (1) the mode depending on the disparity between animals (2)
 that depending on the difference between men; (3) that depending on the
 different structures of the sense-organs; (4) that depending on situations; (5)
 that depending on positions, distances and locations; (6) that depending on
 admixtures; (7) that depending on the quantities and configurations of the
 objects; (8) that derived from relativity; (9) that depending on regularity or
 rarity of meeting; (10) that depending on ways of life, customs, laws,
 legendary beliefs, and doctrinaire opinions. We adopt this order
 arbitrarily. (9) There are three modes superordinate to these: that derived
 from the judging subject, that derived from the object of judgement, and
 that derived from both. Modes 1-4 fall under that derived from the
 judging subject, since the judging subject is either an animal or a man or a
 sense, and in some situation. Modes 7 and 10 are referred to that derived
 from the object of judgement. And modes 5, 6, 8, and 9 are referred to
 that derived from both. (10) Then again, these three are referred to the
 mode of relativity. Hence the mode of relativity is the most generic, the
 three are species, and the ten are sub-species. We say this about their
 number in accordance with what is plausible.

(1) ἀγεγνώσθη Διγγοιδήμιον Πυρρωνίων λόγος ἡ ἢ μὲν δὴ γὰρ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι οὐδὲν βέβαιον εἰς κατάληψιν, οὔτε δὲ αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' οὔτε μὴν διὰ νοήσεως. (2) διὸ οὔτε τοῦ Πυρρωνίου οὔτε τοῦ ἀλλοῦ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴσιν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ ἀλλήν αἴρεσιν φιλοσοφούντας ἀγνοεῖν τε τὰλλα καὶ ἑαυτοὺς μάτην καταρββεῖν καὶ δαπανᾶν συνεχέσταις ἀνίας, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν δοξάτων εἰς κατάληψιν ἐληλυθέναι κατέληπται. (3) ὁ δὲ κατὰ Πύρρωνα φιλοσοφῶν τὰ τε ἄλλα εὐδαμονεῖ, καὶ σοφὸς ἔστι τοῦ μάλιστα εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ βεβαίως κατέληπται· ἃ δὲ καὶ εἰδείη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τῆ καταφάσει ἢ τῆ ἀποφάσει γενναῖός ἔστι συγκαταβέθεσθαι.

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(5) ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ διαφορὰν τῶν τε Πυρρωνίων καὶ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν εἰσάγων μικροῦ γλώσση αὐτῆ ταυτὰ φησιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας δογματικοὶ τὲ εἰσι καὶ τὰ μὲν τίθενται ἀδιστακτως, τὰ δὲ αἴρουσιν ἀναμφιβόλως, (6) οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πύρρωνος ἀπορητικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ παντὸς ἀπολελυμένοι δόγματος, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν τὸ παράπαν οὔτε ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἴρηκεν οὔτε καταλήπτα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοιάδε ἢ τοιάδε, ἢ τότε μὲν τοιαῦτα τότε δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα, ἢ ᾧ μὲν τοιαῦτα ᾧ δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα ᾧ δ' οὐδ' ὄλως ὄντα· οὐδὲ μὴν ἐφικτὰ πάντα κοινῶς ἢ τινα τούτων ἢ οὐκ ἐφικτὰ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐφικτὰ ἢ οὐκ ἐφικτὰ, ἢ τότε μὲν ἐφικτὰ τότε δ' οὐκέτι, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἐφικτὰ τῷ δ' οὐ. (7) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἀληθινὸν οὐδὲ ψεῦδος, οὐδὲ πιθανὸν οὐδ' ἀπιθανόν, οὐδ' ὄν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐ μᾶλλον ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, ἢ πιθανὸν ἢ ἀπιθανόν, ἢ ὄν ἢ οὐκ ὄν, ἢ τότε μὲν τοῖον τότε δὲ τοῖον, ἢ ᾧ μὲν τοιούδι ᾧ δὲ καὶ οὐ τοιούδι. (8) καθόλου γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁ Πυρρωνίως ὀρίξει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαρίζεται· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχοντες, φησὶν, ὅπως τὸ νοούμενον ἐκλαλήσωμεν, οὔτω φράζομεν. (9) οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας φησί, μάλιστα τῆς νῦν, καὶ Στωικαῖς συμφέρονται ἐνίστε δόξαις, καὶ ἐκ Χρητὰ ληθές εἰπεῖν, Στωικοὶ φαίνονται μαχόμενοι Στωικοῖς.

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τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οἱ μὲν περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος διαπορῶντες τὸ τε οὐτοῖχον διατηροῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὐ μάχονται, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς οὐ συνίσασιν· τὸ γὰρ ἅμα τίθειν τι καὶ αἰεῖν ἀναμφιβόλως, ἅμα τε φάναι κοινῶς (μὴ) ὑπάρχειν καταλήπτα, μάχην ἀμολογουμένην εἰσάγει, ἐπει πῶς οἶον τε γνώσκοντα τὸδε μὲν εἶναι ἀληθές τὸδε δὲ ψεῦδος ἔτι διαπορεῖν καὶ διατάσαι, καὶ οὐ σαφῶς τὸ μὲν λέπειν, τὸ δὲ παραιστέπειν.

I read Academicus' eight Pyrrhonist discourses. The overall aim of the book is to establish that there is no firm basis for cognition, either through sense perception, or indeed through thought. ~~X~~ Consequently, he says, neither the Pyrrhonists nor the others know the truth in things; but the philosophers of other persuasions, as well as being ignorant in general, and wearing themselves out uselessly and expending themselves in senseless torments, are also ignorant of the very fact that they have cognition of none of the things of which they think that they have gained cognition. ~~X~~ But he who philosophizes after the fashion of Pyrrho is happy not only in general but also, and especially, in the wisdom of knowing that he has firm cognition of nothing. And even with regard to what he knows, he has the propriety to assent no more to its affirmation than to its denial.

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In the first discourse he differentiates between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics in almost precisely the following words. He says that the Academics are doctrinaire: they posit some things with confidence and unambiguously deny others. ~~X~~ The Pyrrhonists, on the other hand, are aporetic and free of all doctrine. Not one of them has said either that all things are incognitive, or that they are cognitive, but that they are no more of this kind than of that, or that they are sometimes of this kind, sometimes not, or that for one person they are of this kind, for another person not of this kind, and for another person not even existent at all. Nor do they say that all things in general, or some things, are accessible to us, or not accessible to us, but that they are no more accessible to us than not, or that they are sometimes accessible to us, sometimes not, or that they are accessible to one person but not to another. (7) Nor indeed, do they say there is true or false, convincing or unconvincing, existent or non-existent. But the same thing is, it might be said, no more true than false, convincing than unconvincing, or existent than non-existent; or sometimes the one, sometimes the other; or of such a kind for one person but not for another. ~~X~~ For the Pyrrhonist determines absolutely nothing, not even this very claim that nothing is determined. (We put it this way, he says, for lack of a way to express the thought.) (9) But the Academics, he says, especially those from the present-day Academy, are sometimes in agreement with Stoic beliefs, and to tell the truth turn out to be Stoics fighting with Stoics.

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Above all, the Pyrrhonists, by entertaining doubts about every thesis, maintain consistency and do not conflict with themselves, whereas the Academics are unaware that they are conflicting with themselves. For to make unambiguous assertions and denials, at the same time as stating as a generalization that no things are cognitive, introduces an undeniable conflict: how is it possible to recognize that this is true, this false, yet still entertain perplexity and doubt, and not make a clear choice of the one and avoidance of the other?

(1) πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ ἀνὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται. (2) οἷον ἡ αὐτὴ σταδία ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρωμένη μετέωρος φαίνεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλαιον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστῶς, ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινουμένον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος. ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, (3) παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν ἀκρότῳ δὲ λαμπρόν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κύπη ἕναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη ἕξαλος δὲ εὐθεία. . . (4) παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπταζομένη μὲν λεία φαίνεται, ποσῶς δὲ ἐπιγευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχει δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ πράχτηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρώμα.

(1) ὀγδοὺς ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθ' ὃν συνάγουμεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολόγως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. (2) ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρῆ γινώσκωμεν ὅτι ἐναυθα, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοίς, τῷ "ἐστὶ" καταχρῶμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ "φαίνεται", δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγουμεν "πρὸς τι πάντα φαίνεται." (3) τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἀπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον (τὸ γὰρ ἕκτος ὑποκειμένου καὶ κρινομένου πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον φαίνεται), καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ δεξίον πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν. (4) ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ ἕμπερσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴνδε τὴν αἰθήρην ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς τοιαύδε περιόχασιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὅτι πρὸς τὴνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τὸνδε τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν συνθεσιν τὴνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται. (5) καὶ ἰδιὰ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων· πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἔπειτ' αὖτ' ὁ διαφέρων πρὸς τι ἐστὶν (λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐ διαφέρει), πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν. (6) τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀωτάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ' ἔσοχα εἶδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη· πάντα δὲ ταυτὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. εἰ τι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, καὶ σημαινόμενα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαινόμενα δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φαινόμενων τὰ ἀδηλα· ὅλης γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδηλῶν τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαινόν καὶ τὸ σημαινόμενόν ἐστι πρὸς τι· πρὸς τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα. πρὸς τοῖσι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅμοια τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. (7) καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι βεβαίωτό τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δεικνύσι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῶν ἐναντιοῦται. (8) πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω παριστάμεν ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, δηλῶν ἐστὶ λοιπὸν ὅτι ὅσιον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καὶ ἐλευθέρως λέγειν οὐ δυνατομέθεα, ἀλλ' ὅσιον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι. ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

(1) The fifth mode is the one depending on positions, distances and locations. For according to each of these factors too the same things appear different. (2) For example, the same colonnade seen from one end appears tapering, and seen from the centre appears completely symmetrical. The same ship appears small and stationary from far off, large and moving from near by. The same tower appears round from far off but square from near by. These are examples depending on distances. (3) Examples depending on locations are that the light of a lantern appears dim in sunlight but bright in the dark, and that the same oar appears bent in water but straight when out of the water. . . (4) Examples depending on positions are that the same picture appears flat when lying on its back but at a certain angle seems to have concavities and convexities; and that pigeons' necks seem differently coloured depending on the angle of inclination.

(1) The eighth mode is the one derived from relativity, on the basis of which we deduce that, since all things are relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely and in nature. (2) It must be recognized that here, as elsewhere, we use 'are' loosely to stand for 'appear', so that what we say is tantamount to 'all things are relative in appearance'. (3) This has two senses. One is in relation to the judging subject, since the external object being judged appears in relation to the judging subject. The other is in relation to the things perceived with it, like right in relation to left. (4) That all things are relative we have also argued earlier: so far as concerns the judging subject, that each thing is relative in appearance to the particular animal, the particular man, and the particular sense, and also to the particular situation; so far as concerns the things perceived with them, that each thing is relative in appearance to the particular admixture, the particular location, the particular composition, the particular quantity, and the particular position. (5) It can also be specifically deduced that all things are relative, as follows. Are differentiated things different from relative things, or not? If not, they too are relative. But if they are different, since everything different is relative, being called different in relation to that from which it differs, differentiated things are relative. (6) Also, of existing things, some are *similia genera* according to the doctrinaire thinkers, others *infirmæ species*, and yet others genera and species. And all of these are relative. Therefore all things are relative. . . (7) Even someone who denies that all things are relative *eo ipso* confirms that all things are relative. For by his means of opposing us he shows that 'All things are relative' is relative to us, and not universal. (8) It remains to add that, in view of our proof that all things are relative, it is clear that we will not be able to say what each object is like in its own nature and absolutely, but just how it appears in its relativity. It follows that we should suspend judgement about the nature of things.

H Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.129-32

(1) The seventh mode, as we said, is the one which depends on the quantities and configurations of the objects. By 'configurations' we mean quite generally their composition. This is another mode according to which we are clearly forced to suspend judgement about the nature of things. (2) For example, filings of goatshorn, when perceived simply and not in composition, appear white, but composed in the actual horn they are perceived as black . . . Isolated grains of sand appear rough, but composed as a heap they produce a smooth sensory effect . . . (3) Wine drunk in moderation invigorates us, but taken in larger quantities incapacitates the body. And food likewise displays different powers depending on the quantity. Often through heavy consumption it purges the body with indigestion and diarrhoea. (4) Here too, then, we will be able to describe the quality of powdered horn and of the composite of many filings . . . and in the cases of the sand . . . and the wine and the food to describe their relative qualities. But we will not be able to describe the nature of the things in itself, thanks to the disparity among impressions which depend on composition.

B Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.40-61

(1) The first argument we mentioned was the one according to which depending on the difference between animals the same objects do not produce the same impressions. We infer this from their different modes of generation and the variety of their bodily make-up. (2) The point about modes of generation is that some animals are generated asexually, some sexually; and of those generated asexually some are generated from fire, such as the tiny creatures that appear in ovens, others from putrescent water, such as mosquitoes . . . Of those generated sexually, some have homogeneous parents, like the majority of animals, others

have heterogeneous parents, as mules do . . . It is likely, then, that the generative dissimilarities and divergences should produce great contrasts in the way the animals are affected, bringing in their wake incompatibility, incongruity and conflict. (3) Another potential source of conflict among impressions depending on the disparity between animals is the difference in the principal bodily parts, especially those whose natural function is to discriminate and to perceive. People with jaundice say that those things are yellow which appear white to us, and people with bloodshot eyes call them blood-red. Since, then, with animals too, some have yellow eyes, some bloodshot, some white, some of other colours, it is likely, I think, that they register colours in different ways . . . (4) The same argument applies to the other senses. How could the tactile processes of shelled, fleshy, prickly, feathered, and scaly creatures be called similar? How could hearing be called alike in creatures with the narrowest auditory ducts and those with the widest, or in those with hairy and those with bare ears, considering that even our own auditory processes are different when we block our ears from when we leave them alone? . . . (5) Just as the same food when digested becomes here a vein, here an artery, here a bone, here a sinew, and so on, revealing different capacities depending on the differences in the parts which absorb it . . . so too it is likely that external objects are perceived differently according to the different structures of the animals undergoing the impressions. (6) A more self-evident understanding of the matter can be obtained from animals' choices and avoidances. Perfume seems delightful to men but unbearable to beetles and bees. Olive oil is beneficial to men but sprinkled to exterminate wasps and bees. Sea water, if drunk, is unpleasant and poisonous to men, but delicious and drinkable for fish. Pigs get more pleasure from wallowing in foul-smelling sewage than in clear pure water . . . If the same things are unpleasant to some animals but pleasant to others, and pleasant and unpleasant depend on impressions, the animals are receiving different impressions from objects. (7) If the same things appear unlike depending on the difference between animals, we will be able to say how the objects are perceived by us, but will suspend judgement as to how it is in its own nature. For we ourselves will not be able to adjudicate between our own impressions and those of other animals: we are ourselves parties to the disagreement, and hence in need of an adjudicator, rather than capable of judging for ourselves. (8) Besides, we cannot judge our impressions superior to those found in irrational animals either without proof or with proof. For in addition to the possibility that proof does not exist, as we will note later, the so-called proof must itself be either apparent to us or non-apparent. If it is non-apparent, we will not propound it with confidence. But if it is apparent to us, since our inquiry is about what is apparent to animals and proof is

apparent to us, who are animals, it will itself in so far as it is apparent be subject to inquiry as to its truth . . . (9) If, then, impressions differ depending on the divergences between animals, and there is no way of adjudicating between them, it is necessary to suspend judgement about external objects.

C Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.79-91

(1) Such [see B] is the first mode of suspending judgement. The second as we said, is that derived from the difference between men. For even if one hypothetically grants that men are more credible than the irrational animals, we will find inducements to suspend judgement even so far as concerns our own differences. (2) Now man is said to have two constituents, namely soul and body, and we differ from each other in respect of both. In respect of the body, we differ both in form and in our individual mixtures. For the body of a Scythian differs from the body of an Indian in form. This divergence is, it is said, the result of different predominance of humours. And in accordance with different predominance of humours impressions also differ, as we established in the first argument . . . (3) Such are the differences of our individual mixtures that some men digest beef more easily than rock-fish, and get an upset stomach from a drop of Lesbian wine. There was reportedly an old Attic woman who could swallow thirty drams of henlock without ill-effect. Lysis also used to take four drams of opium without upset. Demophon, Alexander's butler, shivered in the sun or in the bath but felt warm in the shade . . . (4) Since (if we may make do with listing a few of the many cases recorded by the doctinaire writers) the divergence between men with regard to their bodies is so great, it is likely that they also differ from each other with regard to their actual souls. For the body is a sort of outline sketch of the soul, as is also shown by the science of physiognomics. (5) But the strongest indication of men's great and limitless mental differences is the disagreement between what the doctinaire thinkers say, especially about what to choose and what to avoid . . . (6) Since, then, choice and avoidance lie in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in sensation and impression, when some people choose what others avoid the natural consequence is for us to infer that they are not moved in even similar ways by the same things, since if they were they would have the same choices or avoidances. (7) But if the same things move us differently depending on the difference between men, that too might reasonably induce us to suspend judgement. Perhaps we are capable of saying how each object appears, with respect to each human difference, but not of asserting what its power is, with respect to its own nature. (8) For we will trust either all men, or some. If all, we will be attempting the impossible and accepting

contradictories. If some, let them tell us whose view we are to assent to. The Platonist will say Plato's, the Epicurean Epicurus', and the others likewise. And by this inabitable dispute they will once again bring us round to suspension of judgement. (9) Anyone who says that we should assent to the *majority* opinion is accepting a childish idea. Nobody is capable of approaching all the men in the world and calculating what is the majority opinion. It is possible that in some tribes unknown to us things rare among us are found in the majority of people, while attributes which belong to the majority of us are rare . . . (10) Certain self-satisfied people, the doctinaire thinkers, say that in judging things they should rate *themselves* above other men. We know the absurdity of this evaluation. They are, after all, themselves parties to the disagreement, and if their way of judging between appearances is to give themselves precedence they are, by entrusting the judgement to themselves, begging the question. But even so, in order to achieve the suspension of judgement by focusing the argument on a single man, such as their dream-figure the wise man, we adopt the third mode.

D Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.91-8

(1) This [the third] mode', cf. C10] is how we label the mode which derives from the difference between the senses. That the senses are at variance with each other is pre-evident. (2) Pictures seem to the sense of sight to have concavities and convexities, but not to the touch. Honey seems pleasant to the tongue on some things, but unpleasant to the eyes, so that whether it is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant is impossible to say. Likewise perfume: it delights the sense of smell, but displeases that of taste . . . (3) Hence what each of these is like as regards its nature we will be unable to say. What we can say is how it appears on each occasion. (4) . . . Each of the sense-objects which appear to us seems to make a complex impression on us. For example, the apple strikes us as smooth, pleasant-smelling, sweet and yellow. Consequently it is not evident whether it really has these and only these qualities; or whether it has a single quality, but appears different according to the different structures of the sense-organs; or whether it has more qualities than those apparent but some of them do not strike us. (5) The idea that it has a single quality can be worked out on the basis of our earlier remarks . . . [see B 5] (6) Our argument for the apple's having more qualities than those apparent to us is as follows. Let us imagine someone who from birth has had the senses of touch, smell and taste, but has lacked hearing and sight. He will start out believing in the existence of nothing visible or audible, but only of the three kinds of quality which he can register. It is therefore a possibility that we too, having only our five senses, only register from the qualities belonging to the apple those which we are capable of registering. But it

may be that there objectively exist other qualities, and that these are the objects of further sense-organs which we do not share, so that we do not register the corresponding sense-objects either. (7) Someone will reply that nature made the senses co-extensive with the range of sense-objects. What kind of nature, in view of the great inarbitrable disagreement among the doctrinaire thinkers about natural existence? For anyone arbitrating the very question whether nature exists would, if he were a layman, according to them be unreliable. But if he is a philosopher, he will be a party to the disagreement, and himself subject to judgement, not a judge.

E Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.100-13

(1) In order also to be able to end up suspending judgement by focusing the argument on each individual sense, or even without reference to the senses, we adopt in addition the fourth mode. This is the one which we say depends on 'situations', a word which we use for 'dispositions'. We say that it is observed in the natural or unnatural state, in being awake or asleep, and depending on age, on motion or rest, on hating or liking, on want or satiety, on intoxication or sobriety, on predispositions, on confidence or fear, or on depression or elation. (2) For example, things strike us differently depending on whether our state is natural or unnatural, because those who are deranged or possessed seem to hear the voices of spirits, while we do not. . . . And the same honey appears sweet to me but bitter to those with jaundice. (3) If someone says that it is an interrupting of certain bodily humours that produces, in those in an unnatural state, improper impressions deriving from objects, we must reply that since the healthy also have mixtures of humours, it is possible that external objects are in their nature such as they appear to people in the so-called 'unnatural' state, and that these mixtures make them appear different to the healthy. For to assign a power of distorting objects to one set of mixtures, while denying it to the other set, is artificial. Indeed, just as the healthy are in a state which is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so too the sick are in a state which is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick. So we should have faith in the sick too, as being relatively speaking, in a natural state. (4) . . . The point about 'depending on age' is that the same air seems chilly to the aged but mild to the youthful, and the same colour dull to the elderly but strong to the youthful. . . . Things appear different 'depending on motion or rest' because things which we see as stationary when we are standing we think are moving when we sail past them. . . . 'Depending on intoxication or sobriety': things we think infamous when sober appear not at all infamous to us when we are drunk. 'Depending on predispositions': the same wine appears dry to those who have just eaten dates or dried figs.

but sweet to those who have been tasting nuts or chick-peas. . . . (5) Given that there is also such a great disparity depending on dispositions, and that men are differently disposed on different occasions, while it is perhaps easy to say how each object appears to each person, it is by no means easy to say what the object is like. For the disparity is inarbitrable: its arbitrator is either in some of the dispositions we have mentioned, or in no disposition whatsoever. Now to say that he is in absolutely no disposition – neither healthy nor sick, neither moving nor stationary, of no age, and likewise lacking the other dispositions – is completely incoherent. But if he is going to arbitrate our impressions while himself in some disposition, he is a party to the disagreement, and in any case he is not a neutral judge of external objects, his viewpoint being obscured by the dispositions he is in.

G Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.124-8

(1) The sixth mode is the one based on admixtures, by which we deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by itself. (2) That nothing external strikes us by itself, but always along with something, and that, depending on this, it is perceived as different, is I think pre-evident. Our colour appears one way in warm air, another in the cold, and we would not be able to say what our colour is like in its nature, but just how it is perceived along with each of these accompaniments. The same sound appears one way when accompanied by a rarefied atmosphere, another way when accompanied by a dense atmosphere.

Smells are more pungent in a bath-house or in sunshine than in chilly air. And the body is light when immersed in water, but heavy when in air. (3) To pass on from external admixture, our eyes have membranes and liquids in them. Hence visible objects, since they are not seen without these, will not be accurately grasped. For what we are registering is the mixture, and that is why jaundice-sufferers see everything as yellow and those with bloodshot eyes see everything as blood-red. . . . (4) Nor does the mind [register external objects accurately], especially since its guides the senses make mistakes. It may also be that it itself adds some admixture of its own to the reports of the senses. For we see certain fluids belonging to each of the regions in which the doctrinaire thinkers believe that the commanding-faculty is located – be it the brain, the heart, or whatever part of the animal one may care to put it in. (5) So according to this mode too we see that, being unable to say anything about the nature of external

K Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.145-63

(1) The tenth mode, which is also the most relevant to ethics, is the one depending on ways of life, customs, laws, legendary beliefs, and doctrinaire opinions. (2) A 'way of life' is a choice of lifestyle or of a certain behaviour adopted by one or many people, such as Diogenes [the Cynic] or the Spartans. (3) A law is a written agreement within the body politic, infringement of which incurs punishment. A custom, or convention (which is the same thing), is the acceptance of a certain behaviour in common between many people, infringement of which does not necessarily incur punishment. For example, not to commit adultery is a law, whereas not to have sexual intercourse in public is (for us) a custom. (4) A legendary belief is the acceptance of unhistorical and fictional events. A good example is the legends about Cronos, which induce many people to believe them. (5) A doctrinaire opinion is the acceptance of something which seems to be confirmed through analogical reasoning or through some proof, for example that as elements of existing things there are atoms, homogeneous substances, minima, or whatever. (6) We oppose each of these sometimes to itself, sometimes to each of the others. (7) For example, we oppose custom to custom as follows. Some Ethiopians tattoo their babies, but we do not. Persians think it proper to wear lurid ankle-length clothing, while we think it improper. And Indians have sexual intercourse in public, while most other races think it shameful. (8) We oppose law to law as follows . . . In Scythian Tauri, there was a law that foreigners should be sacrificed in propitiation of Artemis, while here human sacrifice is banned. (9) We oppose way of life to way of life when we oppose that of Diogenes to that of Aristippus, or that of the Spartans to that of the Italians. (10) We oppose legendary belief to legendary belief when we observe that in some places legend makes Zeus the father of men and gods, but in other places Ocean, quoting 'Ocean who begat the gods, and Tethys their mother' [Homer, *Iliad* 14.201]. (11) We oppose doctrinaire opinions to each other when we observe that some people declare that there is one element, others infinitely many; some say that the soul is mortal, others immortal; some say that our affairs are governed by divine providence, others that they are unprovidential. (12) We also oppose custom to the other things. For example to law, when we say that among the Persians intercourse between males is customary, whereas among the Romans it is prohibited by law . . . (13) Custom is opposed to way of life when most men go indoors to have intercourse with their wives, while Crates [the Cynic] did it with Hipparchia in public. (14) Custom is opposed to

legendary belief when the legends say that Cronos ate his own children, while our custom is to take care of children. And it is conventional among us to revere the gods as good and impervious to harm, whereas the poets introduce gods who sustain wounds and bear grudges against each other. (15) Custom is opposed to doctrinaire opinion when our custom is to pray for blessings from the gods, whereas Epicurus says that divinity pays no attention to us . . . (16) We could have taken many more examples of each of the oppositions mentioned, but this will suffice as a summary. It just remains to add that since this mode too reveals such a great disparity among things, we will not be able to say what each object is like in its nature, but just how it appears in relation to this way of life, to this law, to this custom, and so on for each of the others. Therefore this is another mode which makes it necessary for us to suspend judgement about the nature of external objects. (17) That then is how, by means of the ten modes, we end up suspending judgement.

J Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.141-4

(1) Here now is some explanation of the mode which we listed as ninth the one depending on regularity or rarity of meeting. (2) The sun is much more astonishing than a comet, but because we see the sun regularly but the comet rarely, we are so astonished at the comet as to think it a portent, but not at the sun. If, on the other hand, we imagine the appearance and setting of the sun as rare, and the sun as all at once illuminating the whole world, then suddenly casting it all into shade, we might expect to witness immense astonishment at it . . . (3) Also, rare things seem precious, whereas familiar and plentiful things do not. If we imagine water as a rarity, how much more precious it would appear to us than all the things that are thought precious. Or if we imagine gold simply scattered over the earth like stones, to whom could we expect it to be precious or worth hoarding? (4) Since, then, the same things seem astonishing or precious at some times but not at others, depending on regularity or rarity of confrontation, we will be unable to state what each of the external objects is like by itself. Hence this is another mode that leads us to suspend judgement about them.

Appendix C

The Five Modes of Agrippa (Sextus, PH I 164-9)

- 164 The later sceptics hand down the following five modes of suspension of judgement:
- first, the mode deriving from dispute,
 - second, the mode throwing one back *ad infinitum*,
 - third, the mode deriving from relativity,
 - fourth, the hypothetical mode,
 - fifth, the reciprocal mode.
- 165 According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter in question has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or to disqualify anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement.
- 166 In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a warrant for the matter in question needs another warrant, which itself needs another, and so *ad infinitum*, so that we have no point from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement follows.
- 167 In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above [135-6], the existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is like in its nature.
- 168 We have the mode from hypothesis when the dogmatists, being thrown back *ad infinitum*, begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a concession.
- 169 The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object of investigation has need of warrant from the object of investigation; then, being unable to take either to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.

Appendix D

The Two Modes (Sextus, PH I 178-9)

- 178 They also hand down two other modes of suspension of judgement. Since everything apprehended is thought to be apprehended either by means of itself or by means of something else, they are thought to introduce puzzlement about everything by suggesting that nothing is apprehended either by means of itself or by means of something else.
- That nothing is apprehended by means of itself is, they say, clear from the dispute which has occurred among natural scientists over, I suppose, all objects of perception and of thought – a dispute which is undecidable, since we cannot use either an object of perception or an object of thought as a standard, because anything we may take has been disputed and so is not credible.
- 179 And for the following reason they do not concede either that anything can be apprehended by means of another thing. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of another thing, they throw one back on the reciprocal or the infinite mode; and if one should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, this is met by the fact that, for the above reasons, nothing is apprehended by means of itself.