ANIMAL ETHICS
Past and Present Perspectives

edited by
Evangelos D. Protopapadakis

λογος

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Introduction

Philosophy, as Aristotle puts it, originates from wonder.[1] And nonhuman animals have always been a constant source of wonder to humans, especially with regard to the treatment they deserve. Reasonably enough Western philosophy has been concerned with the way we ought to treat nonhuman animals since its origins with the pre-Socratic philosophers. (For convenience, I will simply refer to 'animals' rather than 'nonhuman animals' from now on.) Since there is an 'ought to' involved in this question, we might expect that the issue would have been marked out as a primarily moral one from the beginning. Surprisingly, this has rarely been the case. You see, it is often not the question that conditions philosophical debates and determines which direction meditation takes, but the *first spontaneous answer*, as far as it seems reasonable enough and relevant to the issue. Ever since Pythagoras, by whom this debate was allegedly initiated, the most usual answer to the question concerning the way humans ought to treat animals has been: "According to their nature." This is why the issue has never been exclusively confined to ethics: ontology and metaphysics were invited to enter the discussion right from the start, since we needed, first, to account for the nature of animals. In consequence, ontological tenets and metaphysical speculations have dominated the issue of animal ethics from the dawn of Western intellectual history until the present. Unfortunately, however, this starting point has largely proved to be a dubious guide, companion, or supporter for the discussion of animal ethics.

In the course of time three main traditions concerning animal ethics have been developed, *grosso modo* suggesting respectively that: (i) animals are of an entirely different nature to humans, for they lack a rational as well as a sensitive soul; therefore, they can be of no moral concern to mankind; (ii) animals are of a relatively similar nature to men, for even though they lack rational soul, they surely possess a sensitive one; therefore, they should – if not fully, at least in some degree – be deemed susceptible to moral status and consideration; (iii) animals are quite similar to humans, for they have a sensitive as well as a rational soul; therefore, they should be allowed to participate into the covenant of ethics on a par with humans.

I.

The most distinguished and influential among philosophers who fall under the first category are Descartes and Malebranche (although neither is at all original in their views in regard to animals). Descartes dealt with

animal consciousness by extending his mechanistic theory of the universe to them. He thought of animals as complex natural *automata* (*bête-machines*) devoid of reason and feelings, directly analogous to the mechanic ones man creates. The fact that animals have no language, but just mechanically respond to external *stimuli*, was for him sufficient a proof that they lack a rational soul, for even the most imperfect human being finds a way of communicating what there is in his or her soul, while even the most perfect of animals are not capable of this.[2] As to their capability to feel, Descartes believes that, although animals can perceive external stimuli through their senses, they are in no sense conscious, hence they can not feel. "Feeling", he argues, "is no other thing than thinking"[3]; and again: "the feeling of pain exists only in the understanding"[4]. It is clear that, as far as Descartes is concerned, it is impossible to be cruel to animals.[5]

Descartes's rationalism became a strong influence for Nicolas Malebranche. The latter was mostly concerned with metaphysics, especially with proving that there is an omniscient, omnipresent and just God. For Malebranche, this view was totally incompatible with the possibility of animal suffering. In consequence, Malebranche rejected the idea that animals were capable of feeling in general – and feeling pain in particular. (In a way, this very much resembled Spinoza's rejection of the possibility of evil.) Tagging along with the Stoic Chrysippus – who argued that animals feel only "as it were"[6] – Malebranche suggests that animals' incapability of feeling is a necessary demand of reason: believing that animals *could* feel is to believe that God *could* be unjust, which is unacceptable. If animals could feel, they would be capable of experiencing not only pleasure, but also pain and, in general, suffering. If this were the case, God would have permitted the punishment of innocent creatures, since pain and suffering are nothing but punishments for sinning. Animals, however, have not sinned, for they did not eat from the Forbidden Tree; only man did. *Sequitur*, animals can experience neither pain nor pleasure: "… they eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing."[7] To Malebranche, obviously, the most appropriate way of conclusively settling the issue was to lead the discussion to an *absurdum*.

A scholar of today might object to Malebranche's argument on the grounds that there either might not be a God at all, or that, even if there is one, God might simply be unjust, thus totally removing any absurdity. However, arguments such as these were almost unthinkable to a devoted Christian philosopher of the 17th century. (Exceptions of any kind were rare: Spinoza, a brilliant contemporary of Malebranche, argued that God could not possibly be either just or unjust, unless it is not truly a God. But then

Spinoza was excommunicated from the Jewish community as a heretic.) But this still left a problem: if the experience of pain is out of the question for animals, then how can we explain the fact that they *seem* to react to the pain that is being inflicted upon them? The Cartesian Jacques Rohault – echoing Philo Judaeus[8] – argued that this is not even a presumptive indication, let alone any kind of positive proof, that animals have feelings: when a musical instrument is being played, it usually produces more noise than an animal that is being tortured, yet we are not inclined to suppose that the instrument has feelings.[9] Dom Trethowan, a modern Cartesian, explains this further: a cat is arranged in such a way that every time one pulls its tail, a noise comes out from the mouth.[10]

The Cartesian universe simply does not allow for animal consciousness: animals can be nothing more than *res extensa*. For his part, Malebranche seems more interested in championing specific theological views than in giving an adequate account of animal psychology. Nowadays we can be sure that both arguments fail, mostly due to arbitrary metaphysical biases: animals are at least capable of feeling pain and pleasure. Nevertheless, no matter how unsubstantiated the tradition Descartes and Malebranche initiated might be, it has proved to be an extremely influential one, as well as an excellent justification for callous practices such as vivisection, experimentation on animals, blood sports, and unprovoked cruelty.

II.

The tradition that ascribes a sensitive soul, but not a rational one, to animals begins with Aristotle[11], was elaborated by the Stoics, and was then promptly adopted by Christian philosophers.[12] Aristotle acknowledges no moral standing for animals on the grounds that, although they are sentient beings, since they possess a sensitive soul, they lack rationality.[13] According to Aristotle's psychology, plants possess a nutritive soul, animals possess a nutritive as well as a sensitive soul, and humans possess not only a nutritive and a sensitive, but also a rational soul, which is the most perfect of all.[14] This means that in the hierarchy of natural beings, the *scala naturae*, animals occupy the level between plants and humans: they are superior to plants and inferior to humans. Since according to Aristotle all forms of life exist for the sake of those forms higher in the chain of being, and given that among corporeal beings humans – by dint of their rationality – occupy the highest position, animals exist only as a means to human ends.[15] Although elsewhere Aristotle seems to imply that some animals might be existing for their own sake[16], it is clear that moral standing is reserved for man alone.[17]

The Stoics obviously took after Aristotle; to them, animals are devoid

of reason and, hence, can be nothing more than a means to human ends: “first of all the rational animal, and for its wants the beasts and everything that stems from the earth.”[18] Following Aristotle’s thread, they elaborated and bolstered this line of reasoning, and it was their overall account that became a determinant of the debate. The Stoics paved the ground for a general theory of rights[19], one that completely deprived animals of moral status and omitted them from any form of moral concern. According to the Stoics *providence* cares for animals in accordance with their nature, to wit less than it cares for humans, since animals are totally devoid of reason. As such, they cannot be members of the moral community; hence, they cannot be the bearers of rights, nor can moral agents be bound to them with duties. *Sequitur*, there exist no legal or moral ties of any kind between humans and other animals. Therefore, humans can do no injustice to them. Although there is a kinship between all beings due to the *pneuma* – or *πύρ* – that has created the world (τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν) in order to inhabit it, Stoic logocentrism limits the moral community only to humans, who are akin due to their *intellectual connection* (νοῦ κοινωνία). Besides, if animals were allowed to partake of reason, there would be no such thing as *justice*, for then men would be unjust whatever they did: they would be unjust to animals if they continued to eat their flesh or use them as means to their ends, but they would also be unjust to themselves if they gave up these practices, since this would render life impracticable and civilization impossible.[20] To the Stoics, then, moral agents cannot afford to allow for such a view, unless they are ready to abandon civilization altogether.

The Stoic approach found its most fervent champion in Augustine, who was eager to refute the Manichaean doctrine that man should abstain from eating the flesh of animals. The Manicheans believed that the divine essence was constantly released from the ground and entered the plants, a fact that allows man to extract it in its purest possible form. When it enters animals in the form of fodder, however, it is being corrupted; hence, the wise man should abstain from eating the flesh of animals. Augustine, formerly a Manichaean himself, severely attacks this *sui generis* early (though not the earliest) approach to vegetarianism by focusing on the fact that brutes have no rational soul, hence they share no common nature with humans. Since they are of no common nature to us, their rights cannot be common to ours. Therefore, animal suffering ought not to be of human concern. Augustine justifies this argument by reference to scripture. As he points out, Christ himself sent demons into a herd of swine, although the poor animals had by no means sinned.[21] “Doeth God take care of oxen?”[22] Apparently God does not. As far as Augustine is concerned, assuming that animals have

moral standing is the height of superstition; the truth is that "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use"[23].

Thomas Aquinas, almost a thousand years after, echoes the same tradition. To him, the way humans treat animals is a matter of indifference. Humans are not bound by moral considerations in their dealing with animals, since God has given men complete dominion over them. Maltreating animals does not make one a villain in the eyes of God, as treating them well does not make one righteous. Humans owe duties only to fellow humans.[24] Even so, treating animals with compassion is of some *indirect* importance: animals are capable of feeling pain, which means that cruelty to them may develop into cruelty for humans. However, Aquinas disapproves only of *unnecessary* cruelty, such as torturing an animal merely for enjoyment; he is not to be taken as objecting to slaying animals for human purposes, such as food or clothing.

Half a millennium later, Kant seems much more eager than Aquinas to condemn cruelty and callousness towards animals, but tagging along with the same Stoic influenced tradition as Aquinas, he finds himself in deadlock. According to Kant, animals do not partake of morality for they are not self-conscious. This means that they cannot be moral agents – only humans can be – and, hence, they cannot be the bearers of rights; conversely, no moral duties are owed to them. The upshot is that animals can only be a means to an end, a human one, of course. Given this, and in order to justify a degree of moral consideration for animals, Kant therefore has to somehow convert any notion of direct duties towards animals, which he regards as nonsensical, to either indirect duties towards humanity or direct duties towards one's self.

As to the *indirect duties* view, Kant maintains that being cruel to animals damages in one's self that humanity which it is [one's] duty to show towards mankind, while tender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind.[25] Nothing, of course, could be more wrong than this: Hitler entertained the tenderest of feelings towards *Blondi*, his beloved German shepherd, and was inconsolable when the poor dog died. That, however, had no apparent effect on his feelings towards mankind. Johannes Brahms, on the other hand, according to widespread (though undocumented) rumors, hated cats so much that he would shoot them with an arrow, allegedly to transpose their dying cries into his scores. Even if this is true, he never hurt any person, and he is said to have taken a fancy to buying candy for the children of his

neighborhood. Though it is not easy to think of a philanthropist who is cruel to animals, it is not at all absurd; even less absurd is it to imagine an animal lover who is cruel to humans.

As to the *duties towards one's self* view, Kant suggests that "with regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to man's duties to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this;…", because "it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality…"[26]. As Passmore argues, even this slight shift in Kant's approach does not alter the fact that Kant "cannot see how men can be said to have a duty to animals as distinct from a duty *relating* to or *concerning* animals"[27], but primarily directed to humans. In his *Lectures on Ethics* Kant makes reference to Hogarth's famous engravings depicting the stages of cruelty, commending that if one is cruel to animals, one damages "the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue to his duties to mankind"[28]. As Hogarth's engravings imply, cruelty towards fellow humans might begin by "pulling the tail of a dog or a cat", then by "running over a child" and "finally the culmination of cruelty in a murder, at which point the rewards of it appear horrifying"[29]. Inurement to the death of animals is also detrimental to our moral sentiments, which is why according to Kant "in England no butcher, surgeon or doctor serves on the twelve men jury, because they are already inured to death"[30].

Kant's views are scornfully summarized by Schopenhauer: "we are to have sympathy for animals only for practice", an attitude which he finds "revolting and abominable"[31], and which he considers to be mostly due to Kant's susceptibility to draw deductions from Christian theology. Schopenhauer, for whom animals – no less than humans – are phenomenal manifestations of the Will, bolsters his rejection of Kant's approach by invoking the fact that "the whole of Asia" thinks differently about the issue. John Stuart Mill seeks safer grounds for rejecting Kant's approach: he focuses on the obvious fact that, since cruelty to animals only incidentally develops into cruelty to humans, it can only incidentally be morally condemned. However, for Mill, cruelty is a moral wrong *per se*, irrespective of the being to whom it is directed: "It is to be regretted that metaphysical scruples… should induce many warm supporters of laws against cruelty to animals, to seek for justification… in the incidental consequences of the indulges of ferocious habits… rather than in intrinsic merits of the case itself."[32] Mill implies that good intentions are not enough, as long as one's ethics is bound to an unjustifiable metaphysical perspective.

Rather than seeking justification in ontology or metaphysics, it might be much sounder to support the view that, while compassion is morally good,

cruelty is morally wrong.[33] Why is the suffering of a being not sufficient in itself to condemn the cruelty inflicted upon it?[34] To Bentham, when it comes to "…abandoning a sensitive being… without redress to the caprice of its tormentor…", then "the question is not *Can they reason?*, nor *Can they talk?*, but *Can they suffer?*"[35]. Maybe "neither the pongo nor the gibbon are man's brother", and man might not be able to "enter into fraternity with the ape"[36], but does this imply – or, even more, necessarily entail – that humans "may use them… may destroy them at [their] pleasure… provided [they] can give a rational account of what [they do]"[37]? Definitely not, says Bentham, since it is totally irrelevant whether animals can enter into fraternity with humans or not, and it is morally insignificant if they have a share in reason, since they obviously have a share in suffering. Causing pain to a creature that is capable of feeling it is morally objectionable *per se*.

III.

If we take animals to possess not only a 'sensitive soul', but also a 'rational soul', then dilemmas concerning their moral status and proper treatment seem immediately to vanish. To the Pythagoreans, for instance, the issue was quite clear: according to the cornerstone of their metaphysics, the transmigration of the souls doctrine, animals are ensouled creatures just as humans are; their bodies are hosting an immortal, divine soul, one that formerly might have been inhabiting a human body. Moreover, for the Pythagoreans, every living being was a potential destination for a divine soul: Empedocles, influenced by the Pythagoreans claimed that he could recall himself occupying the bodies of "a boy, and a girl, and a bush, and a bird, and a fish that jumps from the sea as it swims"[38] during his former lives. Pythagoras himself is also quoted by Xenophanes to have once recognized the voice of a dead friend in the sob of a puppy that was being beaten.[39] Given these kinds of beliefs, there can be no morally significant differences between men and beasts. It is therefore not surprising that the Pythagoreans are the first sect to have been reported as having strictly abstained from flesh on the basis of their ontological principles and metaphysical tenets.[40] Their version of pantheism allowed for nothing else.

Middle Platonists like Plutarch seem also to have embraced these kinds of views. For Plutarch, animals are capable not only of feeling, but also of reasoning: animals do have perceptions, and hence they enjoy some kind of natural reasonableness, a fact that calls for their equal moral consideration.[41] In Plutarch's view, however, this does not necessarily mean that people should give up training and using animals as means to their own ends, for people are also trained and used as means to other people's

ends. Nor does this imply that animals should not be killed when they threaten human lives, for humans are also killed in such circumstances. However, eating the flesh of animals and using them in sport games is morally objectionable, since humans are not used in such ways. This is a conciliatory response to the Stoic's anxiety concerning the sustaining of civilization if animals are allowed moral standing: meat eating and blood sports are by no means the keystones to human civilization, and humans can very well do without them.[42]

To Porphyry of Tyre, a student of Plotinus with a strong tendency to asceticism, animals are not entirely alienated from human nature; they too partake in reason, only in an inferior degree compared to humans. Porphyry wrote *On Abstinence of Animal Food* to present and support his view that "he who extends harmless conduct to animals most closely approaches the divinity"[43]. For Porphyry, justice consists, essentially, in abstaining from injuring anything that is not noxious.[44]

Although Plutarch and Porphyry seem apt to reconcile Pythagorean and Stoic views, the Sceptics were not at all conciliatory. Having always favored inquiring and circumspective approaches concerning every philosophical issue, they could only be vexed by the Stoics' dogmatism in regard to the ontological and moral status of animals. To Sextus Empiricus it is arbitrary to suppose that animals are not endowed with a rational soul and, hence, to conclude that they should be excluded from the covenant of ethics. On the contrary, as far as cognition is concerned, there are many cases in which animals reveal themselves to be plainly superior to humans.

To bolster his thesis, Sextus turns against the Stoics an example first formulated by the latter for opposite purposes, namely the so-called *Chrysippus' Dog* argument: "[Chrysippus] declares that the dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, on arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without stopping to smell. For the dog implicitly reasons thus: 'The animal went either by this road, or by that, or by the other: but not this, nor that, therefore the other'"[45]. Chrysippus, of course, could not by this be conceding that a dog really reasons, but only that it has perceptual appearances.[46] Philo Judaeus had already interpreted the argument that way. Philo rejected the possibility that any dog could reason, by resorting to a *reductio ad absurdum*: if a dog could draw logical inferences when in a *trivium*, then all men in similar circumstances would be able to do the same; that, however, is contrary to common experience. Instead, it is *us* that interpret the dog's instinctive movements as indications of reasoning.[47] Animals are not capable of reflecting upon their options. To

Sextus the argument Philo employs seems not convincing at all: he argues that the Stoics have no justification for denying the possibility that a dog may go through an internal process of reasoning. Judging from evidence, a dog's behaviour points towards the opposite conclusion. The Stoics therefore err in insisting that animals cannot partake in reason – and, therefore, that they should be excluded from moral consideration – on the grounds that they allegedly lack internal and external *logos*, that is, reason and uttered speech, respectively.

As to reason, the Sceptics stress the fact that dogs, for example, seem to be able to distinguish between persons, like *Argos*, Ulysses' dog, which – unlike Penelope's suitors who, unluckily for them, failed to do this – recognized his master despite the fact that Ulysses had been away for so many years[48]; dogs seem also to be able to judge and deliberately choose between alternatives, as Chrysippus' dog does. This suggests that they do indeed possess internal reason (ἐνδιάθετος λὸγος)[49] and that – *prima facie*, at least – they should therefore be included in the covenant of ethics: "They prefer what is appropriate to them and avoid what is harmful; they chase their food and draw back when one raises the whip; they cannot be expelled from morality for, if justice is to give each one one's dues, dogs obviously pay back their familiars and benefactors by guarding them, and they keep away (from) villains and strangers. If they possess the virtue of justice, they might possess other virtues, as well."[50] (There is also a passage in the *Republic* in which Plato makes reference to the philosopher-like virtues of a dog.[51])

As to uttered speech (external *logos*), the Sceptics suggest that the Stoic argument that animals lack rationality since they do not speak is at least poor, for there are also dumb humans, and yet they are not considered to be devoid of reason. Besides, animals such as dogs use different 'voices' in various circumstances to express different feelings. The fact that we do not understand them is no evidence that they do not speak; we also do not understand foreigners, but we do not thereby suppose that they do not speak, but only moan.[52]

Being a Skeptic at the time of Sextus obviously meant having a lot of philosophical enemies – actually, everyone who wasn't a Skeptic – as well as a very heavy schedule. But nothing could be more joyful for a Skeptic than the opportunity to oppose a fundamental Stoic view. Even so, Sextus should be credited for being at one with common experience as far as higher animals are concerned. It is not surprising, then, that Skeptic dubiousness in regard to the Stoics' views on animals continued to be appealing. Centuries after Sextus, Montaigne thinks that it is absurdly presumptuous to believe "conclusively that Man – for all his 'reason' – is in any way higher of the

other animals. They, too, have reasoning powers"[53]. After all, "what kind of human competence cannot be found in animals?"[54] But even if animals lack reason, "yet there is a certain consideration, and a general duty of humanity, that binds us not only to the animals, which have life and feelings, but also to trees and plants"[55].

This Skeptic influenced trend proved even more inspiring for Hutcheson, leading him to the rather high-flying view for his times that animals are capable of virtue of a primitive kind, like that of a child: "Again, 'tis plain there is something in certain Tempers of Brutes, which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem, tho' we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues."[56] Hutcheson's outstanding pupil, David Hume, devoted a section of his *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding* to "The reason of animals". To him, apart from abstract reasoning, human and animal minds function similarly: "It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water… and of the effects which result from their operation."[57] An animal can also learn from proper application of rewards and punishments, and it can "infer some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses"[58]. As to inferences from argument and abstract reasoning in everyday life, these usually escape even the generality of humankind – and children for sure – "since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them"[59].

Even so, "no matter how far they [animals] can be said to possess reason", since they obviously lack the ability to compel humans in a covenant of justice, humans are bound by "the laws of humanity" to "give gentle usage to these creatures".[60] This applies not only to animals but also to "barbarous Indians" and to women: "Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength… that they were incapable of all resistance…; the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property… This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals… above barbarous Indians… the female sex", that "…are reduced to like slavery, and are rendered incapable of all property…"[61] Hume obviously was

eagerly concerned for the weak, though not inclined to allow them equal moral standing or consideration. No doubt he was an affectionate master to his dogs, and he would have surely been a tender husband.

IV.

As one can easily tell, philosophers so far seem to have fervently favored a line of reasoning based on a *modus ponens*, namely, an argument of the form: "if p, then q / p / therefore q", or "if animals are of *this* specific nature, then they should be assigned to *this* kind of moral status; animals *are* of this specific nature; therefore, they *should be* assigned to this kind of moral status". This simple rule of inference is often extremely misleading and, in my opinion, entirely inappropriate for moral arguments, especially when an *is* proposition needs to be mingled with an *ought* one in the initial, conditional claim. To make this clear, consider the Stoic line of reasoning: "if animals are irrational beings and lack self-awareness, then they cannot be granted any moral status, nor can they be of any direct moral concern to us; animals are devoid of reason and self-awareness; therefore, they cannot be granted any moral status, nor can they be of any direct moral concern to us." Such an argument may seem to be a properly demonstrative one, but it suffers from a range of problems. First, it can only be valid or invalid (this one is valid), but not true or untrue, since it includes an *ought* proposition, which, as with all moral claims, cannot be verified. Second, one could object – as some do – that, *although* animals are irrational and not self-aware, they should nevertheless enjoy a certain moral status and be of moral concern to humans; indeed, one could even maintain that *because* animals are irrational and not self-aware, they should be included to moral consideration. After all, we consider ourselves to have a range of moral obligations – even an especially high standard of moral obligations – in regard to humans who are irrational or not self-aware, or both, such as infants, comatose patients, the insane, persons who suffer from the Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, and so on. Third, we can in any case argue that even certain kinds of *things* are of moral concern, such as natural or artificial monuments, works of art, the corpses of the deceased. Thus, to infer that an entity is ineligible for moral consideration *because* it lacks reason or self-awareness seems to be a typical *non sequitur*. Such an entity might have no possibility of being a moral agent; however, as has now been argued by many ethicists, it is not only moral agents that are of moral concern or deserving of consideration.

This introduction has offered a rough outline of three significant strands in the history of animal ethics. However, the story of animal

ethics does not end here of course. Rather, this introduction represents an invitation to you, the reader, to pursue the story further. The essays in the first part of this book therefore probe pivotal theories and examine key issues of the history of the debates in this area, sometimes shedding new light on past views, sometimes revealing unknown aspects of these previous philosophical reflections. As for contemporary approaches, although the temptation was great, I thought it rather superfluous even to refer to them in this introduction, since most of the major contemporary tendencies in animal ethics are amply represented in the second part of this book, some of them by their very initiators. I therefore wish the reader an enriching journey.

E. D. Protopapadakis
February 2012

Notes

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 982b 12-13: "It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize"; Aristotle here seems to quote Plato's *Theaetetus* 155d: "For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy."
2. René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, translated by F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin, 1968), 5th Discourse, 74. See also Peter Harrison, "Descartes on Animals", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 42 (1992): 219-227, 226.
3. René Descartes, *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, translated by F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin, 1968), 2nd Meditation, 107.
4. René Descartes, *Letter to Mersenne*, 11 June 1640, AT III, 85.
5. John Passmore, "The Treatment of Animals", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975): 195-218, 204.
6. Ibid.
7. Nicholas Malebranche, *Œuvres Completes*, edited by G. Rodis-Lewis (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958-70), vol. II, 394.
8. Philonis Alexandrini, *De animalibus*, translated by Abraham Terian (Ann Arbor: Scholar Press, 1981), § 84.
9. Passmore, op. cit., 204.
10. Dom Illtyd Trethowan, *An Essay in Christian Philosophy* (London: Longmans & Green, 1954), 41.
11. Marc R. Fellenz, *The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights* (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 19, 91.
12. Robert Renehan, "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 85 (1981): 239-259, 253.
13. Aristotle, *De anima* 413b 11 ff; also Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 641b 8.
14. Aristotle, *De anima* 413a 32 ff.

15. Aristotle, *Politics* I256b I5 ff: "…and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all events most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all the animals for the sake of men."
16. See Aristotle, *Historia animalium* 488a 7-10, where animals such as bees, wasps, ants and cranes are on a par with humans considered as *social animals* that have common activities, and *Politics* 1253a 7-9, where humans are described as of a *more* social nature in comparison to other beings.
17. Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a 10-18: "The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another, but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state."
18. SVF II 1156 [translation mine].
19. With reference to the Stoics the term *rights* is only used as an anachronism. See Myrto Dragona-Monachou, "Stoicisme et droit l'homme", *Dirscorsi* 2 (1985): 209-236; also her "Zeno's moral and political radicalism", in *The Philosophy of Zeno*, edited by Th. Scaltsas and A. Mason (Larnaka: The Pieridis Foundation, 2002), 325ff.
20. SVF III 373.
21. Passmore, op. cit., 197.
22. Paul, *Corinthians* 9:9.
23. Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, edited by G. P. Walsh (London: Aris & Phillips, 2006), i, 20.
24. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pt 2:2, Q. 64: "Dumb animals… are devoid of the life of reason… they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others", and "He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery." See also A. Linzey, *Animal Theology* (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 12-15.
25. See Immanuel Kant, "Duties to Animals and Spirits", in his *Lectures on Ethics*, translated by P. L. Heath (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 213.
26. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, translated and edited by M. Gregor (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 192-193.
27. Passmore, op. cit., 202.
28. Kant, *Lectures*, 212.
29. lbid.
30. lbid., 213.
31. As quoted in Passmore, op. cit., 214.
32. John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 872.
33. See Herbert L. A. Hart, "Legal and Moral Obligation", in *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, edited by A. I. Melden (Washington: University of Washington, 1966), 83.
34. John Laird, *A Study in Moral Theory* (London: George Allen & Unwin, I926), 302.

35. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, edited by Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988), 311.
36. Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Ideas for a Philosophy for the History of Mankind* [as quoted in Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez and Francesca Greensides, *The Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader* (London: Routledge, 2003), 7].
37. John H. Newman, *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), 80.
38. "Ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπυρος ἰχθῦς..." Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* VIII 77: 5-6; DK 31 B 117.
39. "…καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα φασὶν ἐποικτῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος· 'παῦσαι μηδὲ ῥάπιζ', ἐπεὶ ἦ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων'". Ibid., VIII 36: 12-15; DK 21 B 7.
40. Ibid., VIII 37:11.
41. See Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium* 961a ff.
42. Ibid., 964a ff.
43. Passmore, op. cit., 207.
44. Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 3, 26: 13-14.
45. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* I, 69:1-70:1.
46. Richard Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), 25-26.
47. Philonis Alexandrini, *De animalibus* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), 102-103.
48. Sextus, op. cit., I, 68:6-9.
49. Ibid., I, 66:2.
50. Ibid., I, 66:1-68:2.
51. See Plato, *Republic* 376a 2 ff., especially 376b 1, where Plato speaks of the dog's "exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom (ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον)".
52. Sextus, op. cit., I, 72:7-77:7.
53. Michel de Montaigne, *An Apology for Raymond Sebond*, translated by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1988), xxi.
54. Ibid., 19.
55. Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, translated by J. Cohen (London: Penguin, 1993), 189.
56. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises*, edited by W. Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 244.
57. David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 165.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 166.
60. David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
61. Ibid., 186.