


THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE

THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION

Edited by

JONATHAN BARNES

VOLUME ONE



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CATEGORIES

J. L. Ackrill

1 . When things have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different, they are called *homonymous*. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is to say what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions. 1^a
5

When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called *synonymous*. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the definition of being is also the same; for if one is to give the definition of each—what being an animal is for each of them—one will give the same definition. 10

When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called *paronymous*. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery. 15

2 . Of things that are said, some involve combination while others are said without combination. Examples of those involving combination are: man runs, man wins; and of those without combination: man, ox, runs, wins.

Of things there are: (a) some are *said of* a subject but are not *in* any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. 20
(b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) 25
For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also 1^a
said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse—for nothing of 5
this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject.

10 3 . Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things
said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. For example, man is
predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated
15 of the individual man also—for the individual man is both a man and an animal.

The differentiae of genera which are different¹ and not subordinate one to the
other are themselves different in kind. For example, animal and knowledge: footed,
winged, aquatic, two-footed, are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a
20 differentia of knowledge; one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by
being two-footed. However, there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate one to
the other from having the same differentiae. For the higher are predicated of the
genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be
differentiae of the subject also.

25 4 . Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance
or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or
having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are
man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of
21 a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of
when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having:
has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-
cut, being-burned.

5 None of the above is said just by itself in any affirmation, but by the
combination of these with one another an affirmation is produced. For every
affirmation, it seems, is either true or false; but of things said without any
10 combination none is either true or false (e.g. man, white, runs, wins).

15 5 . A *substance*—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily,
and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the
individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily
called substances are, are called *secondary substances*, as also are the genera of
these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and
animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called
secondary substances.

20 It is clear from what has been said that if something is said of a subject both its
name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For example, man
is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since
you will be predicating man of the individual man), and also the definition of man
25 will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man).
Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But as for
things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is
30 predicated of the subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from
being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be

¹Read τῶν ἑτέρων γενῶν.

predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the
subject; for a body is called white. But the definition of white will never be
predicated of the body.

All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in 35
them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is
predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of
none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, colour is 21
in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual
body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are either said of the
primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances 5
did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.²

Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus,
since it is nearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primary
substance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species than the 10
genus. For example, it would be more informative to say of the individual man that
he is a man than that he is an animal (since the one is more distinctive of the
individual man while the other is more general); and more informative to say of the 15
individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a plant. Further, it is because the
primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are
predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all. But as
the primary substances stand to the other things, so the species stands to the genus:
the species is a subject for the genus (for the genera are predicated of the species but 20
the species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera). Hence for this reason too
the species is more a substance than the genus.

But of the species themselves—those which are not genera—one is no more a
substance than another: it is no more apt to say of the individual man that he is a 25
man than to say of the individual horse that it is a horse. And similarly of the
primary substances one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is
no more a substance than the individual ox.

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera 30
should be the only other things called secondary substances. For only they, of things
predicated, reveal the primary substance. For if one is to say of the individual man
what he is, it will be in place to give the species or the genus (though more
informative to give man than animal); but to give any of the other things would be
35 out of place—for example, to say white or runs or anything like that. So it is
reasonable that these should be the only other things called substances. Further, it is
because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called 31
substances most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so
the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are
predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical, then you
5 will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases.

²The Oxford text continues: 'For all the other things are either said of these as subjects or in them as
subjects; so that if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to
exist.' Most scholars excise those sentences.

It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. And as for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not *in* the individual man. Similarly, animal also is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not *in* the individual man. Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. But the definition of the secondary substances, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the individual man, and also that of animal. No substance, therefore, is in a subject.

This is not, however, peculiar to substance, since the differentia also is not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a subject; neither two-footed nor footed is *in* man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said. For example, if footed is said of man the definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed.

We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we spoke of things *in a subject* we did not mean things belonging in something as *parts*.

It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from them are so called synonymously. For all the predicates from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. (For from a primary substance there is no predicate, since it is said of no subject; and as for secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly, differentiae too are predicated both of the species and of the individuals.) And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. Similarly, both the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae. But synonymous things were precisely those with both the name in common and the same definition. Hence all the things called from substances and differentiae are so called synonymously.

Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of man or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification—for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things. However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does. White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance—they signify substance of a certain qualification. (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species, for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.)

Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them. For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to animal. This, however, is not peculiar to substance but holds of many other things also, for example, of quantity. For there is nothing contrary to four-foot or to ten or to anything of this kind—unless someone were to say that many is contrary to few or large to small; but still there is nothing contrary to any *definite* quantity.

Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any given substance is not called more, or less, than which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less.

It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything else that is not substance. A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good.

Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case, unless perhaps someone might object and say that statements and beliefs are like this. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false. Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him. However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the *way* contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely unchangeable in every way; it is because the *actual thing* changes that the contrary comes to belong to them. For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one time and false at another. Similarly with beliefs. Hence at least the *way* in which it is able to receive contraries—through a change in itself—would be distinctive of

5 substance, even if we were to grant that beliefs and statements are able to receive
contraries. However, this is not true. For it is not because they themselves receive
anything that statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries, but
because of what has happened to something else. For it is because the actual thing
10 exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false, not because it is
able itself to receive contraries. No statement, in fact, or belief is changed at all by
anything. So, since nothing happens in them, they are not able to receive contraries.
A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it
15 itself receives contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and
darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be
able to receive contraries. It is, therefore, distinctive of substance that what is
numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. This brings to an end our
discussion of substance.

20 6 . Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are
composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not
composed of parts which have position.

Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and
25 also, besides these, time and place. For the parts of a number have no common
boundary at which they join together. For example, if five is a part of ten the two
fives do not join together at any common boundary but are separate; nor do the
three and the seven join together at any common boundary. Nor could you ever in
30 the case of a number find a common boundary of its parts, but they are always
separate. Hence number is one of the discrete quantities. Similarly, language also is
one of the discrete quantities (that language is a quantity is evident, since it is
measured by long and short syllables; I mean here language that is *spoken*). For its
35 parts do not join together at any common boundary. For there is no common
boundary at which the syllables join together, but each is separate in itself. A line,
5¹ on the other hand, is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common
boundary at which its parts join together, a point. And for a surface, a line; for the
parts of a plane join together at some common boundary. Similarly in the case of a
5 body one could find a common boundary—a line or a surface—at which the parts of
the body join together. Time also and place are of this kind. For present time joins
on to both past time and future time. Place, again, is one of the continuous
10 quantities. For the parts of a body occupy some place, and they join together at a
common boundary. So the parts of the place occupied by the various parts of the
body, themselves join together at the same boundary at which the parts of the body
do. Thus place also is a continuous quantity, since its parts join together at one
common boundary.

15 Further, some quantities are composed of parts which have position in relation
to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position. For example,
the parts of a line have position in relation to one another: each of them is situated
somewhere, and you could distinguish them and say where each is situated in the
20 plane and which one of the other parts it joins on to. Similarly, the parts of a plane

have some position here again: one could say where each is situated and which join
on to one another. So, too, with the parts of a solid and the parts of a place. With a
number, on the other hand, one could not observe that the parts have some position
in relation to one another or are situated somewhere, nor see which of the parts join
25 on to one another. Nor with the parts of a time either; for none of the parts of a time
endures, and how could what is not enduring have any position? Rather might you
say that they have a certain *order* in that one part of a time is before and another
after. Similarly with a number also, in that one is counted before two and two before
30 three; in this way they may have a certain order, but you would certainly not find
position. And language similarly. For none of its parts endures, once it has been
uttered it can no longer be recaptured; and so its parts cannot have position, seeing
35 that none of them endures. Some quantities then are composed of parts which have
position, others are not composed of parts which have position.

Only these we have mentioned are called quantities strictly, all the others
derivatively; for it is to these we look when we call the others quantities. For
5¹ example, we speak of a large amount of white because the *surface* is large, and an
action or a change is called long because the *time* is long. For it is not in its own right
that each of these others is called a quantity. For example, if one is to say how long
5 an action is, one will determine this by the time, saying that it is a-year-long or
something of that sort; and in saying how much white one will determine it by the
surface—whatever the size of the surface one will say that the white too is that size.
Thus only those we mentioned are called quantities strictly and in their own right,
while nothing else is so in its own right but, if at all, derivatively. 10

Next, a quantity has no contrary. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious
that there is no contrary; there is, for example, no contrary to four-foot or five-foot
or to a surface or anything like that. But might someone say that many is contrary
15 to few or large to small? None of these, however, is a quantity; they are relatives.
For nothing is called large or small just in itself, but by reference to something else.
For example, a mountain is called small yet a grain of millet large—because one is
larger than other things of its kind while the other is smaller than other things of its
20 kind. Thus the reference is to something else, since if a thing were called small or
large in itself the mountain would never be called small yet the grain of millet large.
Again, we say that there are many people in the village but few in Athens—though
there are many times more here than there; and that there are many in the house
25 but few in the theatre—though there are many more here than there. Further,
'four-foot', 'five-foot', and the like all signify a quantity, but 'large' or 'small' does
not signify a quantity, but rather a relative, since the large and the small are looked
at in relation to something else. So it is clear that these are relatives.

Moreover, whether one counts them as quantities or does not, they have no
30 contrary. For how could there be any contrary to what cannot be grasped just in
itself but only by reference to something else? Further, if large and small are to be
contraries it will turn out that the same thing admits contraries at the same time,
and that things are their own contraries. For the same thing turns out to be at
35 the same time both large and small—since in relation to this thing it is small but in