PALGRAVE HANDBOOKS



THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC (IM)POLITENESS

Edited by Jonathan Culpeper,
Michael Haugh and Dániel Z. Kádár

The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness

Jonathan Culpeper • Michael Haugh • Dániel Z. Kádár
Editors

The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness

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ISBN 978-1-137-37507-0 ISBN 978-1-137-37508-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017935848

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

Acknowledgements

Above all we would like to thank our trusty assistant Melvin De La Cruz, especially for helping standardise the formatting of the multifarious drafts. More generally, thanks are due to our contributors for not only participating in the project, but for meeting deadlines and for patiently bearing with us.

On a sad note, the original plan for the handbook incorporated the notable scholars Geoffrey Leech and Sandra Harris. Neither lived to see its completion—a loss not only to this handbook, but the scholarly world generally. We can only hope that if they could see the book now, they would not be displeased with it.

Chapter 14 uses a small amount of material from *The Role of Prosody and Gesture in the Perception of Mock Impoliteness*, Walter De Gruyter GmbH, Berlin / Boston, 2014. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.

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1

Introduction

Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Z. Kádár

1 (Im)politeness

While (im)politeness research is a relatively young academic field, interest in issues of 'politeness', 'propriety' and so on have long been discussed in social and philosophical works. The earliest writings about politeness stretch back to the civilisations of Ancient Eygpt, Greece, India and China more than two and a half thousand years ago (Pan and Kádár 2011; Terkourafi 2011). Interest in 'proper' ways of behaving has continued unabated across speakers of different languages and cultures since then. This ongoing interest in such matters is perhaps inevitable. Humans are social beings, and so a keen interest in how we are treated by others is only to be expected. Yet despite there

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_1

being widespread interest in such issues, theorists have not gravitated towards a common conceptual framework.

Politeness first garnered serious academic attention in the 1970s with the work of Lakoff (1973), Leech (1977), and Brown and Levinson (1978) sparking interest in systematically examining how we maintain good relations and avoid interpersonal conflict through the use of different linguistic forms and strategies. While academic views of politeness, and subsequently impoliteness, have proliferated since then, these early understandings of politeness have continued to provide a touchstone for the field. In many approaches, (im)politeness is defined through the lens of a particular theoretical framework. For instance, Brown and Levinson (1978) define politeness as attending to the face wants of others, that is, their desire to be approved of (positive face) and their desire to be unimpeded in their actions (negative face). In other approaches, the definition of (im)politeness more closely mirrors the understandings of lay users of that language. For instance, Spencer-Oatey (2005) suggests that we

> take (im)politeness to be an umbrella term that covers all kinds of evaluative meanings (e.g., warm, friendly, considerate, respectful, deferential, insolent, aggressive, rude). These meanings can have positive, negative or neutral connotations, and the judgments can impact upon people's perceptions of their social relations and the rapport or (dis)harmony that exists between them. (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 97)

The diverse ways in which (im)politeness is defined, theorised and analysed ultimately reflects the different agendas of researchers (Locher 2015). There is no one-size-fits-all definition of politeness or impoliteness for the simple reason that the research questions that drive the field are diverse, encompassing a whole range of different theoretical and methodological stances. (Im)politeness research is an increasingly multidisciplinary endeavour (Kádár and Haugh 2013), and the contributions to this volume have been purposefully selected to reflect that wide diversity.

2 Why This Handbook Now?

There are quantitative and qualitative answers to this question. Let us begin our answer by examining the frequencies of the terms *politeness*, *impoliteness* and *(im)politeness* as they appear in journal article titles, abstracts or keywords over the period 1970–2015, as retrieved by the database and program SCOPUS. It must be stressed that the upcoming figures display the quantities of journal articles published in the relevant period that contain those terms.




Fig. 1.1 The frequency of the term *politeness* in journal article titles, abstracts or keywords, 1970–2015 (extracted by SCOPUS)

This excludes the important role that books and chapters in books have had in this field. Nevertheless, although individual frequencies may be misleading with respect to the whole field, the differences between them, we believe, are indicative of broad trends. Figure 1.1 displays the frequency of the term *politeness* in journal articles over the period 1970–2015.[1]

Despite the so-called classic politeness works having their early incarnations in the 1970s (Brown and Levinson 1978; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1977), there was no dramatic explosion of scholarship, but rather a slow increase over the 1990s, with an eventual take-off in the 2000s. Many of the studies in the 1990s were applying politeness theories to varying datasets; in other words, they lent insights into those datasets, rather than offering theoretical insights. As we approach and enter the 2000s, we see the publication of alternative accounts. Most notable here is the work of Richard J. Watts, which reached fruition in terms of a book-length study published in 2003. Other emerging accounts include Arundale (e.g. 1999), Mills (e.g. 2003), Terkourafi (e.g. 2001) and Spencer-Oatey (2000). Such works generated debate, and hence more publications and more citations. Furthermore, a key factor in the rapid increase seen in Fig. 1.1 after 2005 is the establishment of the *Journal of Politeness Research: Language, Behaviour, Culture*, which acted as a focal point for research and also lent more visibility to the field.

[1] We also examined the combined frequencies of all three terms, *politeness*, *impoliteness* and *(im)politeness*. The overall pattern follows that of *politeness*, because instances of *impoliteness* and *(Im)politeness* are relatively few.

A similar trend can be seen in a search of the occurrence of 'politeness' in the titles of academic works appearing in Google Scholar, which includes not only journal articles, but books, book chapters and conference proceedings. Starting from just five academic works in the period 1970–1974, the number has increased exponentially over the past four decades, with 1,540 works featuring 'politeness' in the title in the period 2010–2014. These figures are reported in five-year increments in Table 1.1 below.[2]

While steadily growing in number during the 1980s and 1990s, the number of academic studies of politeness increased markedly from the beginning of the 2000s as an increasing number of alternative approaches to the analysis and theorisation of politeness emerged.

Figure 1.2 displays the frequency of the term *impoliteness* in journal articles over the period 1970–2015.

Table 1.1 The frequency of the term *politeness* in titles appearing in Google Scholar, 1970–2014

Time	Frequency
1970–1974	5
1975–1979	65
1980–1984	85
1985–1989	230
1990–1994	351
1995–1999	485
2000–2004	765
2005–2009	1,260
2010–2014	1,540




Fig. 1.2 The frequency of the term *impoliteness* in journal article titles, abstracts or keywords, 1970–2015 (extracted by SCOPUS)

[2] In some cases, works may be reported more than once, although this is more noticeable for earlier works. These figures should thus be only considered as indicative of publishing trends.

As can be seen, many of the early years return a result of zero. Culpeper (1996), subsequently much cited, hardly produces a ripple in the following five years. But then, as we enter the 2000s, we see a rapid rise. Compared with *politeness*, *impoliteness* is a relatively minor affair (note the scales of these figures are different; for instance, the *y* axis of Fig. 1.2 runs from 0 to 35, whereas for Fig. 1.1 it runs from 0 to 175). However, a closer inspection of the frequencies suggests that this situation may be changing. Comparing the frequency of *politeness* between 2005 and 2009 (i.e. 352 instances) with that between 2010 and 2015 (i.e. 887 instances), we find two and a half times the quantity in the latter. Comparing the frequency of *impoliteness* between 2005 and 2009 (i.e. 30 instances) with that between 2010 and 2015 (i.e. 139 instances), we find over four and a half times the quantity in the latter. The spike seen for 2008 is not surprising, as a number of key works on impoliteness were published in that year (see Culpeper and Hardaker (Chap. 9), this volume).

Figure 1.3 displays the frequency of the term *(im)politeness* in journal articles over the period 1970–2015. The term *(im)politeness* only becomes noteworthy in the 2000s. After 2006 it begins to increase steadily, although it had a couple of dips in 2009 and 2014 (dips and spikes are more salient, of course, when the overall number of data is low, as in the case here). This period of increase parallels that for *impoliteness*, which hints that the use of *(im)politeness* may be partly driven by the increasing visibility of *politeness*, and the idea, which we fully support, that both politeness and impoliteness should be encompassed within treatments of interpersonal interaction.




Fig. 1.3 The frequency of the term *(im)politeness* in journal article titles, abstracts or keywords, 1970–2015 (extracted by SCOPUS)

What all three figures and the accompanying table illustrate is a massive growth in work over the last ten years, and especially in the last five. However, the result of this seems to be a jungle. There is a proliferation of models, approaches and applications. The job for the newcomer to the area is daunting—where does one start? Whilst the classic models are still important, there is a chorus of critique, yet there is no clear single alternative. A negative way of looking at this is that there is fragmentation of effort: scholars pursuing different, almost contradictory, endeavours. A positive way of looking at this is that there has been a paradigm shift, or, more accurately, a widening of the paradigm. (Im)politeness is now a thoroughly multidisciplinary affair, spreading from its original home in pragmatics and interactional sociolinguistics to management, health research, legal research, politics, humour studies and many other fields. The boundaries of (im)politeness have moved away from relatively narrow considerations, such as the pursuit of politeness universals, to include the local and the dynamic. This does not mean that the pursuit of universals is necessarily 'bad' or that the pursuit of the 'local' is necessarily good. They are simply different research questions. Concomitant with this expansion, we have seen an increasingly diverse array of methods. Like Locher (2015), we view the shift in the paradigm boundaries as something that is potentially exciting, offering new possibilities. Nevertheless, navigating an apparent jungle without a map is challenging. A useful map is what we hope this handbook will offer.

3 What is in it?

Including this introduction, the volume contains 30 chapters. A distinctive feature of them is that most have two authors. We made the decision to construct the volume's chapters in this way for three reasons: (1) we could put together scholars with complementary strengths; (2) interesting synergies might emerge; and (3) we could include a greater number of scholars who are engaged in (im)politeness research.

We have grouped the chapters into four broad sections. The first part is labelled 'Foundations'. As this suggests, these chapters are in some sense foundational—they focus on areas that have been enduring and important strands in (im)politeness research for at least 20 years. They cover the role played by pragmatic theory, sociocultural approaches, ideology, face, power, solidarity, indexicality, convention and ritual. The second part is labelled 'Developments'. As one might guess, chapters here relate

to more recent developments, or at least aspects of (im)politeness research that have become salient in recent times. They cover the role played by impoliteness, identity, rationality, emotion, mixed messages, prosody and gesture, experimental approaches and developments in methodology more generally. The remaining two parts focus on (im)politeness in context. The third is labelled '(Im)politeness and variation'. Here, chapters tackle some of the classic aspects of variation, including both diachronic and synchronic forms of variation. The former includes historical (im)politeness more generally, language socialisation, and the learning and teaching of (im)politeness, while the latter encompasses variation across gender, region, and culture (including both cultural and intercultural variation). The fourth and final part is labelled '(Im)politeness in specific contexts'. Chapters in this part are characterised by their focus on particular constellations of situational features. They cover the workplace, service counters, health settings, legal settings, political settings, fictional texts and digital communication.

As we indicated at the end of the first section, readers should not expect to find a single theoretical approach running throughout all these chapters. However, what they all have in common is a concern with interpersonal interaction, and, more specifically, with how language interacts with contexts in the mediation of attitudes, identities and emotions.

4 Looking Forward

No book can include everything. (Im)politeness research is a dynamic and growing field. Emerging areas of interest that we regretfully have not been able to adequately cover here in this volume include research into (im)politeness in the context of television, especially reality TV, where it seems to be especially important (see, for example, Lorenzo-Dus and Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2013). And although we have a chapter on prosody and gesture, the area of multimodality is, quite rightly, gaining in importance, and (im)politeness researchers are likely to increasingly shift their attention to multimodal aspects of (im)politeness. Finally, while language aggression and conflict has recently received significant attention, including the launching of a new journal, there is still much to be done to better understand the intersection between work in (im)politeness and language aggression and conflict more generally. Nevertheless, we hope that we have captured the main elements of the field at this point of time, and, moreover, introduced them to readers in a palatable and useful fashion.

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Part I

Foundations

2

Pragmatic Approaches (Im)politeness

Jonathan Culpeper and Marina Terkourafi

1 Introduction

It is undeniable that the field of (im)politeness research was established within linguistic pragmatics. Thus, it is not surprising that Stephen Levinson, one of the authors of the classic Brown and Levinson (1978/1987), is also a luminary of linguistic pragmatics (cf. Levinson 1983, 2000), or that Geoffrey Leech published his account of politeness within a book on linguistic pragmatics (i.e. Leech 1983). Of course, (im)politeness research has always drawn strength from the fact that it is an interdisciplinary endeavour. Witness, for example, the role of the work of sociologist Erving Goffman, and especially his notion of 'face', in Brown and Levinson's (1987) face-related model of politeness. Over the decades, linguistic pragmatics has become less of a centre of gravity for (im)politeness studies, especially after the rise of socio-cultural approaches to politeness (e.g. Mills 2003; Watts 2003). This development perhaps motivated Leech's (2003) statement linking politeness to linguistic pragmatics:

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_2

> The starting point of pragmatics is primarily in language: explaining communicative behaviour. By studying this we keep our feet firmly on the ground, and avoid getting lost too easily in abstractions such as 'face' or 'culture'. The basic question is: *What did s mean* [*to convey*] *by saying X?*. It is useful to postulate the Politeness Principle (PP), […] because it explains certain pragmatic phenomena […] (pp. 104–5)

If the starting point is pragmatics, one should bear in mind that pragmatics is itself highly interdisciplinary, especially the so-called European view of pragmatics, which takes a superordinate position above the fields of linguistics, sociology, psychology and many more. Leech, though certainly not deaf to sociocultural concerns, clearly has in mind a more limited, more linguistic vision, rather closer to the so-called Anglo-American view of pragmatics.

In this chapter, we focus on: how concepts and theories from linguistic pragmatics have shaped the early politeness theories; the problems that attended those concepts and theories; and how developments in pragmatics have suggested—indeed promoted—developments in politeness research. We will pay less attention to pragmatic phenomena covered elsewhere, notably, the notion of face (O'Driscoll (Chap. 5), this volume), irony and banter (Culpeper, Haugh and Sinkeviciute (Chap. 13), this volume), and impoliteness (Culpeper and Hardaker (Chap. 9), this volume).

2 Classic Pragmatic Theories and Concepts

Two theories in particular are central to pragmatics: speech act theory and conversational implicature. Both, as Leech (2014, p. 77) puts it, converge on the problem: 'Why is what people say often at variance with what they mean, and how is it that (despite this) we humans can nevertheless more or less understand one another?'. Both have had a profound effect on the development of approaches to politeness.

2.1 Speech Act Theory

Speech act theory was founded by the language philosopher J. L. Austin (1962/1975). He observed that some utterances do not 'describe' or 'report' something that is 'true or false', that is to say, they do not express truth conditional meaning. They are not a matter of 'saying' something but of 'doing' an action (Austin 1975, p. 5). Performative utterances (i.e. utterances which

contain a performative verb, such as *I promise to cook you a meal*) are not dependent on truth conditions but on a set of contextual factors or 'appropriate circumstances' (1975, p. 6). When something 'goes wrong', whether in the formulation of the utterance and/or the contextual appropriacy, the act is not 'false but in general *unhappy*' (Austin 1975, p. 14) or infelicitous; it fails to count as bringing about the intended change in the world. For example, if a judge sentenced somebody in a courtroom according to established procedure, but it turned out the judge was in fact the court-cleaner, then the act of sentencing would violate a felicity condition. Later in his lecture series, Austin (1975) proposed that all utterances perform actions, even ones without performative verbs. Thus, *I'll cook you a meal tomorrow* does not contain a performative verb, yet in appropriate circumstances, could amount to an act of promising. The two utterances vary in terms of how explicit they are about what the speaker is doing: the earlier names the action with the performative verb. The relevance of all this for politeness, as we shall see, is threefold. Firstly, the notion of an utterance 'doing an action'—the precursor to the notion of speech act—offered a contextually sensitive unit of analysis. Secondly, it offered the possibility of shifting the focus from language as a tool for exchanging information about the world to a tool for building and maintaining human relationships (i.e. a shift from transactional to interactional). Thirdly, the idea that utterances could vary in terms of how explicitly they performed actions, what later scholars would refer to as (in)directness, was to become an important dimension of politeness theory.

Austin went on to suggest that there are three aspects to every performative act (for more detailed definitions, see Austin 1975, pp. 94–132):

Locutionary act:	'the act *of* saying something' (Austin 1975, p. 94; our emphasis);
Illocutionary act:	'the performance of an act *in* saying something' (Austin 1975, p. 99); and
Perlocutionary act:	'what we bring about or achieve *by* saying something' (Austin 1975, p. 109).

However, in subsequent work the notion of a speech act is virtually synonymous with illocutionary act (sometimes 'illocutionary force'). Austin does not make a case for connecting speech acts with speaker intention. However, later work, especially that of his pupil John Searle (e.g. 1969, p. 17, 43ff.), makes such a case, borrowing ideas from Grice (1975). Speech acts become identified with illocutionary acts which become identified with the performance of speaker intention(s). This was to have implications for early work on politeness.

Table 2.1 Felicity conditions and promising (adapted from Searle 1969, p. 63; clarifications taken from Culpeper and Haugh 2014, p. 162)

Felicity condition	Clarification	Exemplification: Conditions for promising
Propositional content	What the utterance is about (what the utterance predicates)	Future A (act) of S (the speaker)
Preparatory	Real-world prerequisites (the interlocutors' beliefs about ability to perform the act, the act's costs or benefits, its norms of occurrence, etc.)	1. H (the hearer) wants S to perform A 2. It is not obvious that S will do A without being prompted
Sincerity	The beliefs, feelings and intentions of the speaker	S intends to do A
Essential	What is needed for the act to be performed (i.e. the mutual recognition that the speaker intends an utterance to count as a certain act)	Counts as an undertaking by S of an obligation to do A

Searle (1969) formalised Austin's felicity conditions, reworking them as 'constitutive rules' for speech acts; that is, rules that create the activity itself, just as with a game of football or chess. Table 2.1 outlines the felicity conditions for the speech act of promising.

In practice such classification attempts are of limited use, notably because speech acts do not lend themselves to neat categorisation. Nevertheless, this step is a prerequisite to Searle's account of indirect speech acts, which influenced subsequent accounts of politeness.

Searle developed the notion of indirect speech acts, relating them to his felicity conditions. For example, the speech act of request often does not directly match what might be considered its canonical form, the imperative. Thus, *Carry this* can be used to elicit help in carrying something, but *Could you carry this?* is much more common. The second utterance fits Searle's classic definition of indirect speech acts: 'cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another' (1975, p. 60). Searle argues, in Gricean fashion (see below), that you first understand this as a question, then work out that it is actually a request. Importantly, the question is in fact connected with the request: it orientates to a preparatory condition of the request, namely, that the hearer has the ability to carry it out. The (in) directness speech acts has had a huge impact on politeness research. Searle's theory of indirectness assumes a 'dual meaning hypothesis', namely, that both a literal (e.g., question) meaning and an idiomatic (e.g., request) meaning are constructed by the hearer. The presence of the literal meaning is taken by

some theorists (e.g., Brown and Levinson 1987) as the reason why politeness comes about. However, whether recipients of indirect speech acts actually notice this literal meaning has long been debated; Gibbs (e.g. 1999) provides evidence against it, whereas Clark and Schunk (1980) provide evidence for it.

2.2 Conversational Implicature

Herbert Paul Grice (1989), another language philosopher, produced work on meaning and communication that has had a huge impact on pragmatics. His key insight was that meaning in communication is more than the literal (or conventional) meaning of the words one says, a point already made in our discussion of speech acts. Central to the Gricean account are the ideas that:

(a) the key to communicative meaning is 'non-natural meaning' ($meaning_{nn}$), communication which is intended to be recognised as having been intended by the speaker (hence, it is sometimes referred to as 'speaker meaning') (cf. Grice 1957/1989, p. 217);
(b) the key to the management of information in conversational exchanges is the Cooperative Principle (CP), a tacit principle that governs the way language is used to achieve rational efficiency and effectiveness in communication—'Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged' (1975/1989, p. 26)—and is comprised of the maxims of quality (be truthful), quantity (provide the right amount of information), relation (be relevant), and manner (be perspicuous); and
(c) the key to implicit meaning (what is meant but not openly said) is the 'conversational implicature', which can be generated through observing the maxims or, as is more frequently discussed, through violating them (and there is a third possibility: purposefully exploiting them, as with figures of speech) (cf. Grice 1975/1989, pp. 32–3).

Regarding (a), note that, as with speech acts, the focus is on the speaker, something that, as we already observed, was reflected in early politeness theories. Regarding (b), the idea of meanings being governed by tacit principles was picked up by politeness theorists, not least because Grice himself suggests the possibility of a politeness maxim (1989, p. 28). Also, as briefly noted above, Searle appeals to the CP for part of his explanation as to how indirect speech acts work. An utterance such as *I can't see*, said to request an addressee to turn on a light, is not the most informative utterance (compare with *Turn on the light*)—it flouts the maxim of quantity, inviting the hearer to work out

an implicature, i.e. the requestive meaning. Regarding (c), Grice (1989, p. 39) proposed that implicatures have a number of properties. Perhaps the most important is that they are defeasible (they can be cancelled), and thus are not part of the conventional meaning of 'what is said' and are sensitive to context. However, their relationship with context varies. This is reflected in the distinction Grice (1989, pp. 37–40) makes between 'generalized' and 'particularized' implicatures, the latter requiring some specific contextual knowledge in order to be worked out by the hearer, the former not. For example, the requestive meaning alluded to above depends on specific contextual knowledge (compare *I can't see* said in a dark room where the addressee is near the light switch with it said by a driver to their passenger with reference to the dazzling lights of an on-coming car).

What is the connection between politeness and implicature? Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 95) postulate that deviations from the maxims coupled with inferential work result in the intended message (such as a request), which can also include a politeness motive. In other words, politeness involves recovering an additional particularised implicature concerning the speaker's polite intentions (see also Brown 1995). Broadly speaking, Leech (1983) pursues the same line. More recent work, however, has made a case for the importance of generalised implicatures to (im)politeness (see Sect. 3.4).

3 Pragmatic Concepts in Politeness Theories

3.1 Face Threatening Acts

The basic building block of Brown and Levinson's (1987) model is the Face Threatening Act (FTA), and that notion is clearly aligned with speech act theory. FTAs involve 'what is intended to be done by a verbal or non-verbal communication, just as one or more "speech acts" can be assigned to an utterance' (1987, p. 65). A key part of their understanding is that 'certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face' (1987, p. 65). Intrinsic FTAs are classified according to the kind of face threatened (positive or negative) and whether the threat concerns the hearer's face or the speaker's (1987, pp. 65–8). For example, requests threaten the negative face of the hearer; criticisms the positive face of the hearer; thanks the negative face of the speaker (as a debt is acknowledged); and so on. Critiques of Brown and Levinson (e.g., O'Driscoll 2007) often forget that they talk about acts that 'primarily' (1987, pp. 65, 67) or 'mainly' (1987, p. 68) perform such face threats. Intrinsic FTAs are

not an absolute category but a fuzzy one. Counterexamples, such as orders which are beneficial to the hearer (e.g. 'Tuck in!', said to encourage a guest to begin a delightful feast), do not endanger the basic claim. Of course, if the counterexamples are in fact the norm—i.e., they are primary—that would be an issue. Nwoye's (1992) study of the egalitarian Igbo society of Nigeria may be a case in point:

> Requests, criticisms, thanks, and offers have been examined and have been found not to be generally considered as imposing. Rather, they are seen as a type of social insurance from which members of the group draw benefits by virtue of a reciprocal social contract according to which, for example, they can ask for (and get) a small quantity of salt when/if they run out of salt because they expect others to ask for (and obtain) it if they are in need. (p. 327)

Clearly, Brown and Levinson's generalisations about intrinsic FTAs should have been made culture-specific (they would generally hold for middle-class Anglo cultures).

The key problem with FTAs, however, concerns their dependence on speech act theory: 'speech act theory forces a sentence-based, speaker-oriented mode of analysis, requiring attribution of speech act categories where our own thesis requires that utterances are often equivocal in force' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 10). By the 1980s, pragmatics scholars were well aware that classic speech act theory did not capture the complexities of speech acts in context. Leech (1983) observes:

> The indeterminacy of conversational utterances […] shows itself in the NEGOTIABILITY of pragmatic factors; that is, by leaving the force unclear, S may leave H the opportunity to choose between one force and another, and thus leaves part of the responsibility of the meaning to H. For instance,
>
> 'If I were you I'd leave town straight away'
>
> can be interpreted according to the context as a piece of advice, a warning, or a threat. Here H, knowing something about S's likely intentions, may interpret it as a threat, and act on it as such; but S will always be able to claim that it was a piece of advice, given from the friendliest of motives. (pp. 23–4)

Note that in Leech's example the idea that speech acts can have multiple indeterminate meanings also involves the idea that meanings are co-constructed by two or more participants (S 'leaves part of the responsibility of the meaning to H'). Echoing Leech, Thomas (1995, pp. 195–204) writes: 'The concept of ambivalence is particularly important in taking forward the view of

pragmatics as "meaning in interaction" in which both speaker and hearer have a part to play'. Such problems led some politeness theorists to abandon speech act theory, as witnessed notably in the development of the discursive approach (e.g., Locher 2006; Mills 2003; Watts 2003), which emphasises the discursive struggle in shaping meaning.

Other problems with speech act theory we can but briefly mention here (for an early critical commentary, see Levinson 1981, and for a more recent one see Culpeper and Haugh 2014, pp. 155–96). Speech acts depend not only on whatever prior plan or agenda the speaker may have in mind, but crucially on (a) the responses of the other participant(s), and (b) the broader activity or event in which they occur. A consequence of (a) is that speech acts often unfold sequentially, and are thus negotiated over several conversational turns. For example, an utterance such as *Do you need those?* is a fairly frequent type of pre-request (a preparatory utterance testing the waters before a request). However, pre- or post- acts and their relations with head acts are not accommodated within classic speech act theory. Some speech act researchers (e.g., Geis 1995) have attempted to bring Speech Act Theory and aspects of Conversation Analysis together. In politeness studies, researchers such as Arundale (2006) and Haugh (2007a) have emphasised the interactional aspects of politeness. Regarding (b), Levinson himself helped introduce a broader concept, that of activity type (Levinson 1979/1992). An activity type (such as a seminar, a family dinner, or a birthday party) is a collection of particular speech acts (such as requests, questions and offers) that stand in particular relationships to each other and have become a relatively conventionalised whole, such that the activity type we are in makes some speech acts more likely than others. Culpeper (2005, 2011) deploys this notion in (im)politeness research. Other (im)politeness researchers have deployed a variety of contextual notions designed to account for trends or preferences in the way people speak in different situations. Terkourafi (2001) uses the notion of frames, which she sees, like activity types, as intermediate between macro and micro, whilst Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2010) discusses genre, and several studies employ communities of practice (e.g., Mills 2003).

3.2 Politeness Principles and Maxims

Classic approaches to politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983) deploy a Gricean account of meaning as a central component. Although Grice ([1975] 1989, p. 28) had given the lead here, briefly noting the possibility of a politeness maxim, it was Robin Lakoff (1973) who first

posited a full maxim-based view of politeness. In brief, Lakoff proposes that there are two rules of pragmatic competence, 'Be clear', which is formalised in terms of Grice's (1975) CP, and 'Be polite', which is formalised in terms of a Politeness Principle. The latter Politeness Principle consists of the following maxims: (a) Don't impose, (b) Give options, and (c) Make your receiver feel good (her 1990 work offered slightly revised versions of these). Lakoff notes that sometimes the need for clarity may clash with the need for politeness, in which case either politeness or clarity may take priority, depending on the context.

Leech (1983) also posits a Politeness Principle (PP), one which is more elaborate than that of Lakoff and is involved in 'trade-offs' with the CP. A stereotypical example would be the telling of a 'white lie'—sacrificing the maxim of quality in order to be tactful. It is these trade-offs that lend the PP explanatory power: the CP accounts for *how* people convey indirect meanings, the PP accounts for *why* people convey them. The PP reads: "Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs […] (Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs')' (Leech 1983, p. 81). Note that the PP is not confined to dealing with impolite beliefs. Leech's maxims allow for the minimisation of impolite beliefs *and* the maximisation of polite beliefs. For example, the direct command *Have a drink* appears to be impolite by restricting the hearer's freedom of action, but in fact it maximises the polite belief that having a drink is favourable to the target; therefore it can be polite. There is no parallel for this in Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness model, which orientates to the redress of face, and thus hits a problem when it comes to phenomena such as compliments.[1] The PP consists of the following maxims:

1) TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives)
(a) Minimise cost to other [(b) Maximise benefit to other]
2) GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commissives)
(a) Minimise benefit to self [(b) Maximise cost to self]
3) APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
(a) Minimise dispraise of other [(b) Maximise praise of other]
4) MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
(a) Minimise praise of self [(b) Maximise dispraise of self]
5) AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives)

[1] Compliments are exclusively face-threatening in Brown and Levinson's model but can be face-boosting in Leech's model (2014, p. 36).

(a) Minimise disagreement between self and other [(b) Maximise agreement between self and other]
6) SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives)
(a) Minimise antipathy between self and other [(b) Maximise sympathy between self and other]

(Leech 1983, p. 132)

Some scholars have criticised Leech (1983) for postulating a universal theory of politeness (e.g., Wierzbicka 1991/2003, p. ix). However, Leech did not claim that these maxims apply universally to all cultures; rather they can be weighted differently in different cultures (1983, p. 150). A more legitimate criticism is that Leech dwells almost entirely on English data, and builds theory in the light of these data (cf. Terkourafi 2015, p. 958). Leech was aware of this issue, which is one important reason why he wrote Leech (2007), drawing examples particularly from Chinese, Korean and Japanese, demonstrating that his framework, in somewhat revised form, can be successfully applied to other languages. This is not to say, of course, that all the details have been fully tested. Another criticism, this time from Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 4), is that Leech's framework is unconstrained, involving a proliferation of maxims. Leech's response to this accusation is along the lines of the 'pot calling the kettle black': Brown and Levinson's framework contains a proliferation of strategies too (2014, p. 85 fn. 6).

More recently, Leech's 2014 book *The Pragmatics of Politeness* saw the restatement of his PP, along with the bolstering of the formal or pragmalinguistic side of his work, which he saw as something of a corrective to the recent concentration of studies on the 'big-picture view of how politeness relates to social behaviour and society in general' (2014, p. ix). The PP is described as a 'constraint observed in human communicative behaviour, influencing us to avoid communicative discord or offence, and maintain or enhance communicative concord or comity' (2014, p. 87). Following on from this, the PP is recast as a General Strategy of Politeness (GSP): 'In order to be polite, *S* expresses or implies meanings that associate a favourable value with what pertains to *O* or associates an unfavourable value with what pertains to *S*' (*S* = self, speaker; *O* = typically the addressee, but could be a third party) (2014, p. 90). Maxims, now ten of them, are considered more specific realisations of the GSP, and are couched in terms of giving a high or low value to the wants, qualities, obligations, opinions or feelings of *S* or *O* (Leech 2014, pp. 91–8).

3.3 Politeness Strategies

The notion of 'pragmatic strategy' is adopted by Leech (1983), because of its focus 'on a goal-oriented speech situation, in which S uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of H' (1983, p. 15). However, despite the fact that Leech's model is very much oriented to linguistic acts as the means by which certain goals are attained, much of it focuses on pragmatic principles as communicative constraints, not on elaborating pragmatic strategies, and this is also true of his account of politeness. In contrast, the notion of strategy is central to Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of politeness, just as it is with early work on impoliteness (e.g., Culpeper 1996; Lachenicht 1980). Like Leech (1983), they have in mind 'rational means-ends reasoning' (1987, p. 7). Their notion of strategy involves the meaning whereby 'people can be seen to be doing something before doing, or in order to do, something else' (1987, p. 8). They elaborate:

> We continue to use the word 'strategy', despite its connotations of conscious deliberation, because we can think of no other word that will imply a rational element while covering both (a) innovative plans of action, which may still be (but need not be) unconscious, and (b) routines—that is, previously constructed plans whose original rational origin is still preserved in their construction, despite their present automatic application as ready-made programmes. (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 85)

Their idea of mapping out logical, rational choices in order to achieve particular goals is typical of the pragmatics of that era (for plan-based approaches to speech acts, see, for example, Cohen and Perrault 1979). In their scheme, one choice is between doing the FTA and not doing the FTA. They propose five 'superstrategies' (at various levels of indirectness) that are systematically related to the degree of face threat. A rational actor—a 'Model Person' (Brown and Levinson 1987)—will select an appropriate superstrategy to counterbalance the expected face threat. The superstrategies are, from direct to most indirect: (1) Bald-on-record, (2) Positive politeness, (3) Negative politeness, (4) Off-record, and (5) Don't do the FTA. For the superstrategies Positive politeness, Negative politeness and Off-record, they develop charts, which display hierarchies of strategies embedded within the particular superstrategy. For example, 'claiming common ground' is a lower-order strategy embedded within the superstrategy of positive politeness. They use the term 'output strategies' to denote 'the final choice of linguistic means to realise the highest

goals' (1987, p. 92). Thus, for example, claiming common ground might be achieved by the output strategy of presupposing common ground.

Part (b) of Brown and Levinson's quotation above deserves a closer look. Although the elaboration of politeness routines and formulae as output strategies constitutes a large part of their work, there is in fact very little discussion of what these are, though there is a nod towards the idea that they might involve conventions which themselves may—they cite Lewis (1969)—involve rationality (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 85–7). This stands in contrast with the approach taken by, for example, Gumperz (1982):

> I believe that understanding presupposes conversational involvement. A general theory of discourse strategies must therefore gain by specifying the linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge that needs to be shared if conversational involvement is to be maintained, and then go on to deal with what it is about the nature of conversational inference that makes for cultural, subcultural and situational specificity of interpretation. (p. 3)

Instead of an emphasis on the speaker using particular means to pursue particular ends, Gumperz stresses the 'shared' 'linguistic and sociocultural knowledge' that enables understandings of strategies in conversation to proceed. Indeed, Gumperz puts conversational interaction at the heart of his model. The first sentence of his book reads: 'Communication is a social activity requiring the coordinated efforts of two or more individuals' (1982, p. 1). In contrast, Brown and Levinson's model is about the *speaker* as a rational agent (or Model Person) selecting strategies to achieve particular goals. The role of the hearer interacting with the speaker is barely mentioned.

Furthermore, Brown and Levinson's (1987) emphasis on strategies as rational choices presents practical problems. Some output strategies, such as 'Use in-group identity markers' and 'Minimise the imposition', which fall under Positive and Negative politeness, respectively, can involve the same linguistic expressions,[2] making their theory practically unfalsifiable when applied to conversational data (Terkourafi 2001, pp. 91–2). Moreover, while output strategies such as 'Impersonalise S and H: Avoid the pronouns "I" and "you"', are quite specific, others, such as 'intensify interest to H' are more like 'umbrella categories' for the wide array of specific linguistic resources that might fall within them. All those specific linguistic resources within the umbrella categories are equally valid, as rational choices. It is impractical to list them all, yet there is no mechanism for selecting between them, hence the umbrella category.

[2] Brown and Levinson discuss the Tzeltal particle *'ala* as an example of both (1987, pp. 109, 177–8).

There is, however, an alternative way of approaching (im)politeness strategies that focuses, in the spirit of Gumperz, much more on the idea that a strategy involves something that is routine, that is part of sociocultural knowledge within a particular community. From the point of view of the theorist, the emphasis here is not on mapping out a logical means-ends framework of choices and then testing it against the data, but rather on analysing the data and letting the routine 'strategies' emerge from it. Moreover, as regularity is a key part of routinisation, it is perfectly possible to operationalise the identification of output strategies, and to order them in terms of which are most entrenched. More recent work in (im)politeness has dealt with these issues. Terkourafi's (2001) frame-based approach to politeness, for example, acknowledges that not all output strategies listed by Brown and Levinson are capitalised upon in every language/culture or situation. Instead, some will be more frequent than others, creating an asymmetry in terms of social markedness between them, and the output strategies that are frequently used in some situations will tend to pass unnoticed in those situations, achieving politeness by default (via generalised implicature; see the next section), while other output strategies that occur rarely will tend to be noticed and will require more effort to achieve politeness (by means of particularised implicature). This approach shifts the emphasis away from a rational calculation of implicatures on a case-by-case basis, toward the notion of a more or less automatic choice among a range of alternatives prefigured by society. Terkourafi (2005a) suggests that this proposal is compatible with Brown and Levinson's universalising scheme: Brown and Levinson outlined the range of possible strategies for expressing politeness in different language/cultures, while the frame-based approach tries to account for those strategies out of this general scheme that are actually enlisted to the service of politeness at a particular time and place.

3.4 Politeness Implicatures

In early accounts that defined politeness in relation to the CP (Brown and Levinson 1987; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983), politeness was conceptualised as a particularised implicature, providing a face-related explanation of why the speaker chose to phrase her utterance the way that she did in the context at hand. One problem with this idea is that politeness can also be conveyed without deviations from the CP. Saying 'Good morning' to one's colleague at the beginning of the working day can be 'polite', but it does not involve a deviation from the CP. Kallia (2004) develops a politeness maxim as part of the CP, rather than as a separate entity involved in 'trade-offs' with the

CP, as Leech (1983) would have it. She proposes that non-deviant politeness can be accounted for in terms of particularised implicatures which flow from observing the CP, including its politeness maxim. However, the suggestion of a politeness maxim runs into problems of its own; not least that, by claiming that politeness is a particularised implicature, it inextricably ties politeness to the speaker's intention—an assumption that has come under much scrutiny in (im)politeness research (e.g. Haugh 2007b). Moreover, it fails to account for the intuition that there is a qualitative difference between instances where politeness is generated without deviating from the CP (cases of observation of the politeness maxim, as it were) and those instances where a deviation is clearly involved (cases of flouting the politeness maxim), since they all equally generate particularised implicatures.

A different attempt to account for politeness as particularised implicature adopts Relevance Theory (e.g., Christie 2007; Escandell-Vidal 1996; Jary 1998). According to Jary (1998, p. 9), politeness is only communicated as an implicature (that is, it is relevant enough to be worth the addressee's while to process), if it communicates some assumptions that are incompatible with the hearer's current assumptions about his relationship with the speaker, either because it turns out that the speaker holds the hearer in higher regard than the hearer had previously thought, or because it turns out that she in fact holds him in lower regard. In both cases, an implicature[3] (of politeness, in the former; of impoliteness, in the latter case) will be drawn and a corresponding (polite or impolite) intention will be attributed to the speaker. Contrary to Brown and Levinson, for whom 'politeness has to be communicated and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus*, be taken as absence of the polite attitude' (1987, p. 5), Jary's account predicts that politeness is communicated only part of the time. More often than not, the use of polite expressions in conversation fails to generate an implicature because it meets interlocutors' expectations in context and so passes unnoticed.

Theorists before Jary drew a distinction between 'anticipated' or 'unmarked' and 'inferred' or 'marked' politeness (e.g., Escandell-Vidal 1996; Fraser 1990; Kasper 1990; Watts 1992/2005); however, they did not go into details about the pragmatic mechanisms by which politeness is achieved in the former case. The strength of Jary's account lies in detailing two inferential paths for the processing of polite expressions, depending on whether the assumptions they make manifest are relevant to interlocutors (and therefore noticed by them) or not. However, as Terkourafi (2001, p. 144 fn. 50) notes, Jary's account fails

[3] Recall that in Relevance Theory, implicatures can only be particularised. RT does not acknowledge generalised conversational implicatures.

to address how face is brought about when politeness is *not* communicated by means of an implicature. This is problematic because it reduces face to a static notion, one that can pre-exist interaction and remain unaffected by it, whereas much recent research has argued that face is emergent in interaction and omni-relevant to it (e.g., Arundale 2006; Terkourafi 2007). As such, a 'vehicle' for politeness meanings is needed, even in those cases where politeness passes unnoticed. The notion of generalised conversational implicature, Terkourafi (2001) argues, offers such a vehicle.

According to Grice (1975), generalised conversational implicatures (henceforth GCIs) arise in normal circumstances by the simple use of a certain form of words. That is, rather than requiring contextual support to come about in the first place, GCIs accompany the use of certain expressions, *unless* they are unwarranted in the context at hand. The idea that politeness may be achieved with the help of GCIs is pursued in Terkourafi's (2001, 2005a, 2009) frame-based approach to politeness.[4] Based on transcriptions of over 100 hours of conversation in various settings in Cypriot Greek, where she observed that certain expressions were overwhelmingly used to perform particular speech acts compared to other, semantically equivalent expressions, she suggested that, as a result of their frequent use in particular situational contexts, linguistic expressions can become conventionalised (i.e. expected) in those contexts. The notion of conventionalisation relative to a context is an important one because it brings societal norms (or habits) to bear upon interlocutors' situated judgements about politeness. Encountering an expression which is conventionalised (to the hearer's mind) relative to the context at hand triggers a GCI (always in the hearer's mind) that 'the speaker is being polite'. This GCI, however, does not by itself amount to politeness. For that to happen, and the speaker's and addressee's faces to be mutually brought about in interaction, a further step is necessary, whereby the hearer comes to hold the belief that the speaker *is* polite. That belief may (but need not) follow as a perlocutionary effect of the speaker's use of the conventionalised expression in the relevant context.[5] Politeness, that is, in Terkourafi's account, is a belief that the hearer holds about the speaker and it may arise as a perlocutionary effect of the speaker's (linguistic) behaviour on the addressee either by recognising the speaker's polite intention, or by attributing one to her when none was in fact present. Thus, while a GCI of politeness can give rise to politeness, it is not a necessary, or even a sufficient, condition for it. Moreover, politeness as a

[4] Leech (2014, pp. 71–74) also discusses default implicatures in relation to politeness but does not develop these ideas further.

[5] On the notion of perlocutionary effect see Sect. 2.1 above. The idea that politeness is a perlocutionary effect was first proposed by Fraser and Nolen (1981, p. 96).

perlocutionary effect may follow from a particularised implicature of politeness, in the less frequent case that an expression is used in a context relative to which it is not conventionalised *and* evaluated as polite by the hearer in that context. Thus, Terkourafi's account acknowledges both particularised and generalised implicatures of politeness, although it reserves the lion's share for the latter and none of them amount to politeness (or impoliteness) by themselves.

Recently, Haugh (2007b, 2008, 2015) has used the term 'politeness implicature' (as well as 'impoliteness implicature', 'mock politeness implicature' and so on) to refer to 'instances where a polite stance or attitude appears to be indicated through implying something' (2015, p. 2). As Haugh explains, to claim that politeness is an interactional practice along these lines is different from claiming that it is itself the content of an implicature. Rather, politeness (or impoliteness, mock politeness and so on, as the case might be) is an evaluation that the speaker and addressee mutually reach by sequentially interpreting each other's utterances as they occur against the background of their prior experience both as members of society at large and with each other. Haugh's use of the term 'implicature' to describe this interactional practice is clearly an extension of the original Gricean term (see Sect. 2.2) and rather closer to Matsumoto's notion of 'interactional implicatures,' referring to 'an unexpected choice [that] will invite interactional awkwardness and invoke inferences' (1989, p. 210; cf. Haugh 2008, p. 442). Matsumoto proposed this notion to describe honorification phenomena in Japanese, where it is the *in*appropriate use of expressions in context that attracts attention and can invite (usually unwanted) inferences. On the other hand, their appropriate use passes unnoticed, merely confirming the interactional *status quo*, so to speak. In this sense, Matsumoto's account is an early precursor of (and subject to the same criticism as) Jary's relevance-theoretic account, since on both accounts only an unexpected use of an expression generates inferences related to (im)politeness. By contrast, in the accounts by Terkourafi and Haugh, politeness, as either a perlocutionary effect or an evaluation, can result from both unexpected and expected uses of an expression in context (i.e., uses that meet interlocutors' expectations given what they know or assume about each other in the context at hand). Consequently, these recent accounts better respond to the nowadays widely held view that face is continuously brought about through interaction, and to various degrees.

We close this section with a couple of thoughts on the Gricean account that we expect will occupy scholars of (im)politeness in the future. The beauty of the Gricean account is that it delimits what a pragmatic account needs to deal with. As Levinson (2000, p. 13) notes, 'meaning$_{nn}$ (or something

of that sort) draws an outer boundary on the communicational effects that a theory of communication is responsible for'. However, as an account of communication—to put it bluntly—it is lousy, partly because it is thus restricted. Some difficulties include:

- How do we know what the speaker might have intended? As several theorists have pointed out (e.g. Gibbs 1999; Terkourafi 2001, p. 19), intentions are not stable private acts that are easy to grasp, but rather malleable constructs that are formed in interaction and may even be revised in light of future events. This is not necessarily a problem: we can focus on perceived intentions. But note that we are now aligning ourselves with the position that 'how an implicature is understood by hearers is just as important as what the speaker might have "intended" in terms of what implicature arises in an interaction' (Haugh 2007b, p. 93; see also Clark 1996, for how meaning is co-constructed between speaker and hearer).
- Are we just restricted to conversational implicature? What about other kinds of implication/ inference? Haugh (2015) most clearly moves in this direction. Presaging Haugh's exploration of related notions, Mooney (2004) develops an interesting proposal that the CP can involve, in addition to implicatures, social implications. Her basic idea is that how you orientate to the CP may in itself convey social implications. For example, choosing to flout the CP to be ironic or humorous may convey intimacy. Incidentally, one characteristic of implicatures that sets them apart from implications seems to be the fact that they can be more easily cancelled by the addition of extra information; they are more easily defeasible (Haugh 2007b, p. 91).

Some of these problems do not, in fact, lie at Grice's door. As Arundale (2008, p. 235) remarks, Grice was offering a philosophical account of meaning, not of communication. It is subsequent scholars who extended his account to communication (and, indeed, politeness).

3.5 (In)directness

Implicatures of whatever type, involve, in the Gricean perspective, conveying extra speaker-messages indirectly. It is tempting to assume that the adoption of the Gricean account by the classical politeness models partly reflects the fact that, at least in middle-class British English culture, indirectness, inexplicitness, circumlocution, incompleteness, obliquity and so on are often associated with

being polite. Grice offered the leading pragmatic theory for explaining such indirectness; it was a natural choice. By the same token, directness, explicitness and so on are associated with being impolite. Brown and Levinson are most explicit in this regard: their hierarchy of strategies ranging from Bald on record to Don't do the FTA (see Sect. 3.3 above) assumes a uni-directional relationship between politeness and indirectness, whereby the politeness of an utterance increases proportionately to its degree of indirectness. Theoretically then, there should be few cases of impoliteness involving implicitness of any kind. This is not borne out empirically, as shown by Culpeper (2011, pp. 155–94); and, in fact, Leech's (1983) framework incorporates the idea that indirectness increases impoliteness in certain circumstances.

The idea that politeness is linguistically realised as indirectness has been most forcefully challenged by cross-cultural work (e.g., Blum-Kulka 1987; Holtgraves and Yang 1990), which showed that, at least in some cultures, a premium can be placed on relatively more direct expressions (conventionalised indirectness), while the most veiled expressions (off-record indirectness) may be felt to be imposing or manipulative in their own right. Ultimately, however, this idea is problematic for the same reasons that led to the abandonment of classical speech act theory and of particularised implicatures and their replacement by more discursive and interactional models: the fact that it reduces politeness to a matter of individual rational cost-effect calculation,[6] with little or no concern for the social context in which evaluations of (im)politeness are being made.

Moreover, the unidirectional association of politeness with indirectness fails because it turns out that indirectness itself is multifunctional. Contrary to theoretical prediction, indirectness can also arise, not out of rational calculation and interlocutors' wish to 'play it safe', but as an uncalculated reflex of their sociocognitive affinity and shared sociocultural assumptions, as happens between intimates or in high context cultures (Hall 1977). Developing a complementary account of indirectness along these lines, Terkourafi (2014) proposed that indirect speech can arise 'by accident' or 'by design,' the latter including not only 'strategic' but also 'enabling' instances of indirect speech, which in turn cover speaking indirectly as the 'most economical' option (a kind of conversational shorthand for communicating multiple messages at once), or indeed as the 'only' option (as in the case of metaphorical utterances about feelings, which eschew literal expression). One consequence

[6] This assumption also underlies recent game-theoretic accounts of indirect speech (Pinker et al. 2008; Lee and Pinker 2010).

of this account is that direct and indirect speech can be indistinguishable in terms of effort invested and effects achieved: either can be effortless and either can produce additional effects. This highlights a central problem with the notion of indirectness, that is, the extent to which, by taking for granted the priority of one meaning over another, it ignores the fact that all meanings are equally local and context-dependent (Silverstein 2010). It is indeed similar concerns about the notion of indirectness that led Haugh (2015) to shift the focus of his analysis from this overstretched notion to (im)politeness implicatures instead.

3.6 Context and Contextual Variables

If our discussion has made one thing clear, it ought to be that context is all-important to assessments of (im)politeness. Even a bare imperative directive *Shut up* can be polite, if said slowly and evenly with a kind tone of voice to one's chatty sweetheart while gazing at the moon;[7] while the most indirect refusal of an invitation can be eminently impolite, as with George Bernard Shaw's infamous reply to a hostess, who stated that on a certain day she would be 'At home,' that 'So will G. Bernard Shaw' (Rees 1999; reported in Cutting 2002, p. 15). Context, whether understood as the context of situation, the interlocutors' relative positioning on the power–solidarity dimension, or the wider culture at large, features in theories of politeness from the start.

The first concerted attempt to theorise the effects of context on politeness assessments is due to Brown and Levinson, who proposed that three sociological variables, Distance, Power, and Ranking of the imposition, jointly regulate the degree of politeness appropriate to the performance of a face-threatening act. The first two, inspired by Brown and Gilman's (1960) earlier analysis of 'The pronouns of Power and Solidarity' in several European languages, relate to the relationship between speaker and addressee and capture the distance between them on the horizontal (solidarity) and vertical (power) planes, respectively; while the third relates to the act performed and reflects the degree to which this involves an imposition in the culture at hand. Later theorists criticised Brown and Levinson's scheme for being either too rigid (for instance, by failing to acknowledge the mutual interdependence of these variables; e.g., Tannen and Kakkava 1992), or not comprehensive enough; Slugoski and Turnbull (1988), for instance, claimed that it fails to incorporate 'liking' or interpersonal affect. Despite these criticisms, Distance, Power, and

[7] Example courtesy of Bruce Fraser (pers. comm.).

Ranking of the imposition feature regularly in studies of (im)politeness in a variety of cultures.

One problem for empirical implementations of these variables is that the definitions that Brown and Levinson provide are very broad, and may at times lead to counterintuitive results—as when they claim that both frequency of interaction and similarity enter into D (distance) assessments, as do 'measures of social distance based on stable social attributes' (1987, pp. 76–7). The relative abstractness of these definitions has led subsequent researchers to interpret them in different ways, while Brown and Levinson's extensive discussion of English, Tamil and Tzeltal examples unfortunately does not systematically relate these back to the three sociological variables they proposed. A further difficulty lies in the fact that, according to Brown and Levinson, it is interlocutors' internalised, subjective assessments of Distance, Power and Ranking (D, P and R), not some objectively verifiable measure of them, that enter into politeness calculations (1987, pp. 74–6). However, objectively verifiable external measures, such as set assumptions about what values of these variables apply to particular social roles (teacher, classmate, waiter, policeman, etc.) are exactly what empirical studies have had to rely on, whether working with data from observation or eliciting their own, since interlocutors' own internalised assessments are not open to scrutiny and we know of no studies that have attempted to independently elicit participants' reports about these variables' values.

At the opposite extreme of Brown and Levinson's highly abstract generalisations about Distance, Power and Ranking, some recent work has emphasised the importance of the micro-context to attributions of (im)politeness, including participants' body language, their prior knowledge about each other, and the sequential placement of their utterances in the unfolding conversation (see the arguments for the discursive approach in van der Bom and Mills 2015). Clearly, (im)politeness is ultimately a subjective evaluation and, as the examples at the start of this section also suggest, close attention to the minutiae of the context can be paramount to understanding why a certain utterance was felt to be polite or not. Yet, a possible danger of reserving all explanation until the facts are in is that (im)politeness is reduced to an ad hoc judgment with a concomitant loss in predictive power and the ability to generalise across contexts. That seems to be wrong, especially in light of the fact that as speakers we have intuitions about what is polite in a certain context and what is not, which suggests that we have some internalised knowledge about it. It is also wrong in light of empirical findings that particular (im)politeness acts tend to involve a recurring set of expressions, which we earlier called 'conventionalised' (Culpeper 2011; Terkourafi 2001).

One way around this impasse is to seek an intermediate level of context that lies halfway between the most abstract sociological variables and the unique contexts of occurrence of individual interactions. One such notion is that of schematic or 'minimal' contexts (Terkourafi 2001, 2009), which retain information about the gender, age and social class of the interlocutors, the relationship between them, the setting of the exchange, and the sequential placement of an utterance (whether it is the first or a subsequent occurrence of an act), but with all other contextual specificities removed. It is in relation to such minimal contexts that linguistic expressions become conventionalised. Terkourafi (2009) calls the combination of a conventionalised expression with a minimal context a 'frame.'

4 A Case Study

An opportune example of the interplay between macro-social factors and micro-contexts, including the speaker's intentions, in shaping whether and to what extent linguistic behavior is interpreted as polite is provided by the distinction between familiar and polite/respectful address commonly referred to as the T/V distinction (Brown and Gilman 1960). T/V pronominal systems constitute an instance of honorification, the study of which led scholars to emphasise the social context of the interaction and the extent to which this, rather than speakers' intentions, may be driving linguistic behaviour. Ide (1989) used the term 'discernment' to refer to such quasi-mandatory linguistic behaviour, while Matsumoto (1989) coined the term 'interactional implicatures,' discussed earlier, to describe the extra meanings generated when speakers deviate from it. More recently, Leech (2014) suggested a distinction between 'bivalent' and 'trivalent' politeness in an effort precisely to account for the fact that some instances of polite behaviour (T/V usage in particular) seem to be dictated by the interlocutors' relationship irrespective of the activity they are engaged in at the moment, while others are more closely geared to the goals of the ongoing interaction. Leech claims that, for this reason, bivalent politeness falls under sociolinguistics, which 'tends to deal with variables which are relatively stable across time […] such as the gender, age, social networks and social relations as measured according to B[rown] and L[evinson]'s P and D factors' (2014, p. 91), while trivalent politeness, being a kind of 'dynamic goal-driven communicative behaviour […which…] is likely to vary between one encounter and another' is more properly seen as the domain of pragmatics. Nevertheless, as has been claimed by, among others, Kádár and Mills (2013)—and is also acknowledged by Leech himself (ibid.)—the two

types of politeness are not completely separate. Some examples from the use of the T/V system in Greek can help illustrate this.

T/V pronominal systems are found in many languages, which use variable pronominal address to index the social relationship between speaker and addressee. Typically, they involve an alternation between second singular and second plural address, where the non-literalness of the plural form is also brought to the fore by irregular patterns of verbal agreement that may be grammaticalised, as in French and Greek, though other forms (e.g., third person singular or specialised forms), as in Italian and Bengali, are also possible. Brown and Levinson discuss T/V systems under their negative politeness superstrategy, as an instance of impersonalising the addressee (1987, pp. 198–203). That is, by treating the addressee as a member of a larger group and avoiding singling him/her out, V forms constitute the addressee's negative face (his/her desire to remain free from imposition) and as such engender the potential of expressing politeness. While that potential is formally present in the language, however, that does not mean that it is always consistently drawn upon by all speakers of the language and in all situations.

A closer look at T/V usage in Standard Greek, for instance, suggests that the prototypical pattern of asymmetrical T–V address between interlocutors of unequal power (with the less powerful giving V and receiving T) and of symmetric V–V address reflecting either the formality of the setting or the lack of familiarity between interlocutors (symmetric T–T address being used otherwise), identified already by Brown and Gilman (1960), is most closely adhered to in urban speech and by the middle and upper social strata.[8] Beyond social stratification, regional variation can also be important. In Terkourafi's (2001) Cypriot Greek data, V forms were regularly found only in two situations, radio and TV interviews and when addressing speakers of Standard Greek, indicating that their primary function in this non-standard Greek variety is to index code-switches into the Standard. Nevertheless, Terkourafi also identified a range of contexts, involving middle-class customers addressing an unfamiliar service provider, in which V forms were frequent, suggesting that V forms are becoming 'nativised' as an index of politeness in Cypriot Greek as well.[9] Similar regularities of occurrence between linguistic expressions and contexts of use give rise to generalised implicatures of politeness, whereby the politeness of a linguistic expression does not have to be actively inferred by the hearer but is rather taken for granted considering the 'minimal context'

[8] It is a known limitation of Brown and Gilman's work that their conclusions reflect the middle-class speech of their questionnaire respondents.

[9] This shift and the pragmatic mechanisms it involves are taken up in Terkourafi (2005b).

of the exchange (see Sect. 3.6 above). Further, such regularities can actually be constitutive of speakers' social identities—as when a middle-class speaker of Cypriot Greek uses a V form to address an unfamiliar service-provider, thereby providing tangible linguistic evidence of his class membership.

However, this does not mean that an implicature of politeness is excluded in all other situations in Cypriot Greek. Nor is every utterance of a second person plural form in Standard Greek necessarily polite either—or else, contrary to what we claimed earlier, politeness would be semanticised. Bakakou-Orfanou (1989, p. 205) cites the following example of a second person plural form said by a daughter to her mother in Standard Greek:

(1) *θa mas epitrépsete na páme sinemá?*
Will us allow-2pl to go-1pl sinema?
'Will you allow us to go to the cinema?'

Bakakou-Orfanou calls this an ironic use, indicating the daughter's annoyance at some preceding remarks by her mother. In this case, features of the preceding discourse override the generalised implicature of politeness that normally accompanies V forms in Standard Greek, giving rise to a particularised implicature of impoliteness instead. A V form addressed by a niece to her older aunt similarly drew criticism in Cypriot Greek (cf. the discussion in Terkourafi 2005b, pp. 297–9). In this case, the V form was evaluated positively by the addressee (the aunt), but negatively by another family member who happened to be present. This illustrates how the previous experience as well as personal allegiances of interlocutors can lead to different evaluations of the same utterance, i.e. to different particularised implicatures, of politeness and of impoliteness respectively. On all these occasions, features of the unique, micro-context override the preferred interpretation of V forms in Standard Greek and in Cypriot Greek respectively, yielding particularised implicatures of politeness or impoliteness, as the case might be.

5 Summary and Future Directions

This chapter has described the fundamentally pragmatic nature of the classic theories of politeness. They deployed concepts articulated in theories of pragmatics, especially speech act and implicature, but also grappled with directness, strategy and context. In referring to 'classic theories', we must urge caution. As we have pointed out along the way, although these theories share some features, there are important differences amongst them.

Leech (1983, 2014), for example, is not restricted to the redressive side of politeness, as are Brown and Levinson (1987). Much of our discussion has been designed to explore the limitations such pragmatic foundations have for work on politeness (e.g., the difficulty in accounting for anticipated phenomena), and, moreover, to consider the modifications and proposals that later scholars have enacted to remedy those limitations (e.g., the deployment of generalised implicatures). In doing this we may have given the impression that (a) those classic politeness theories are of little value, and (b), more generally, a pragmatic approach to politeness is at best passé, at worst doomed to problems. Neither is the case. Regarding the former, we can do no better than quote the words of Miriam Locher and Richard Watts, two scholars who have been, in fact, in the vanguard of criticisms of classic politeness approaches:

> The Brown and Levinson theory […] provides a breadth of insights into human behaviour which no other theory has yet offered and it has served as a touchstone for researchers who felt the need to go beyond it. […] it is clearly in a class of its own in terms of its comprehensiveness, operationalizability, thoroughness and level of argumentation. (Locher and Watts 2005, pp. 9–10)

Regarding the latter, we already noted that, in its quest for greater coverage and increased flexibility, (im)politeness research has increasingly veered outside of pragmatics, most notably toward the fields of sociology and communication. Yet, at the same time as researchers in (im)politeness seem to be looking elsewhere, researchers in pragmatics have turned their gaze to (im)politeness phenomena with a renewed interest for what their analysis can contribute to experimental and formal pragmatic research. One such exciting development concerns the interpretation of scalar implicatures (utterances involving lexical items such as *some* vs. *all*), where the usual inference from the use of the informationally weaker term that the stronger term does not apply has been claimed not to arise in face-threatening contexts (Bonnefon and Villejoubert 2006; Bonnefon et al. 2009; Feeney and Bonnefon 2012). While shown to hold in a series of experimental tasks, this hypothesis allows for significant refinement in terms of the exact processes by which implicature generation proceeds in these circumstances (for an alternative relevance-theoretic analysis, see Mazzarella 2015).

Another promising line of research is the investigation of the impact of the interlocutors' momentary emotional state (as distinct from interpersonal affect or how much they 'like' each other) on their assessments of (im)politeness. Using offline experimental tasks, Vergis (2015; see also Vergis and Terkourafi

2015) found evidence of a negativity bias whereby a negative emotional state such as being indignant with the addressee consistently led raters to attribute a face-threatening intention to the speaker. This is interesting because it opens up the possibility that factors until now considered too random to systematically include under descriptions of context, may interface with processes of implicature generation in a more principled manner than previously thought.

Finally, (im)politeness has also been the topic of recent research in game-theoretic pragmatics (van Rooij. 2003; McCready and Asher 2014; Quinley 2012). Here, researchers have tried to account for (im)politeness as rational behaviour in both cooperative and non-cooperative contexts by proposing increasingly complex formalisations intended to capture an array of micro- and macro-considerations. 'A key insight' of this line of research, as two of its main proponents explain, 'is that politeness crucially can be taken to involve reputation effects which in turn can arise only in the context of repeated games; this means that the notion of repeated interaction is a key one for understanding polite behaviour' (McCready and Asher 2014, p. 70). Though at one level of remove from the spontaneous conversational data that have typically occupied scholars of (im)politeness, this recent research attests to the richness of (im)politeness phenomena and their potential to continue fuelling pragmatic research into the future.

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3

Sociocultural Approaches to (Im)politeness

Sara Mills

1 Introduction

Sociocultural linguistics is a relatively new approach which, instead of focusing on the language of individuals or particular social groups and the influence of variables such as class and gender on those groups' language production, focuses on the way that individuals engage with and orient to others and to society through their language use. There is an assumption that individuals are not solely responsible for their language production, and that there are resources which they draw on, reinforce and challenge. A sociocultural approach is one which recognises that language, although used by individuals, is not simply invented by each and every one of them. The social context, institutions and perceived norms within the language community will have a profound influence on individual language use and understanding. Over time, habits and conventions develop, which solidify and are taken as the norm. Individuals, being social animals, adopt and adapt these norms. This does not mean that the individual is simply a pawn of social norms and discourses. The individual will contribute to the sense of what is appropriate in that community of practice, by their own usage. Thus, this is not a model of linguistic determinism, but one of individuals in groups developing habitual usages, which in turn have an effect on what individuals can say and how

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_3

what they say can be interpreted. These norms or resources are not stable and they are constantly changing due to individual language use and stance towards these resources. This integrated model of the relationship between individuals and society is foundational for a sociocultural approach to the analysis of politeness and impoliteness, as (im)politeness is fundamentally concerned with judgement of others' behaviour in relation to what are perceived to be norms of appropriate behaviour. Yet these norms are not shared by all language users, and perceptions of what counts as polite or impolite will vary across language groups. It is, therefore, not simply an individual decision about language use, but rather an engagement with linguistic resources which are considered to be already in place. Thus the approach taken in this chapter will be to set politeness and impoliteness in their sociocultural context and see the way in which they are shaped by norms which speakers and hearers assume to be in place. In the process of assuming that they are in place, in a sense, they are conjured into being.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Sociocultural Linguistics

Sociocultural linguistics often focuses on the way that the individual relates to social resources and to the wider social group. As Bucholtz and Hall state in their work on sociocultural linguistics in relation to identity: 'we argue for the analytical value of approaching identity as a relational and sociocultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of interaction rather than as a stable structure located primarily in the individual psyche or in fixed social categories' (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 586). They argue that identity is in fact 'the social positioning of the self and other' (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 387), that is, rather than the self being viewed as a stable self-contained entity, controlled by the individual themselves, it should be seen as relational—that is, constituted in interaction with others. This focus on the relational aspect of identity entails that language is seen to play a fundamental role in identity construction and maintenance. Their view is that identity is constructed 'intersubjectively rather than individually' and it is 'interactionally emergent rather than assigned in an *a priori* fashion' (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 587). Thus, analysis of language enables us to track the range of ways in which identity is constructed. Evaluation is a key concept in their approach to identity; thus, individuals will make a

hypothesis about what types of language and behaviour are appropriate in a community of practice and they will tailor their behaviour in relation to what they think potential evaluations will be. This is obviously of importance in relation to the analysis of politeness, which, as Eelen (2001) has shown, is essentially evaluative.

2.2 Individualistic Views of Politeness

Brown and Levinson's work (1978/1987) developed a model of politeness which was focused on the individual speaker. They considered that each speaker would assess what they wished to achieve in a conversation and that they would then weigh up the degree to which politeness was required in order to achieve their goals. Thus, politeness was here conceived as akin to a monetary system, whereby if the speaker wished to achieve something in conversation which ran counter to the wishes of their interlocutor, (for example, requesting something, or persuading someone to do something), they would need to 'pay' heavily in politeness terms. This would involve using greater degrees of politeness, such as longer sentences ('Would you be so kind as to…), more indirectness ('It would be lovely to visit them…') or more deference or formality ('would you care to dine with us'). Brown and Levinson's concerns were to develop a system of analysis of politeness which would hold true for all languages, but in order to do this, they focused on the individual speaker, rather than on the social system of politeness as a whole. Individuals, for them, seemed to be conceived of in the same way across cultures. Brown and Levinson were very aware of politeness as a social system and they were aware of the ways in which the social context informed the decisions of the individual in relation to their choices about politeness and impoliteness. This is clear from the fact that they built into their model the variables of power and social distance. These factors determine the choices that the individual makes: if the individual assesses there to be a power imbalance between them and their interlocutor, or if there is a great social distance between them, they would need to 'pay' more politeness. However, despite this focus on the role of social factors, Brown and Levinson's focus was more on the way that the individual assessed the social context, rather than the role that the social context played in their decision-making about their use of politeness or impoliteness. Nor did they consider that using politeness might be seen as a way of an individual exhibiting to others their awareness of their position in the social order.

2.3 Traditional Approaches to Variables

Much of the research which has followed the work of Brown and Levinson, has viewed variables as fairly fixed and stable (Holmes 1995; Jandt 2007). Variables such as gender, class, age and race are viewed as external to individuals and as exerting a force on their behaviour. Thus, for example, Holmes (1995) argues that women tend to be more polite than men and different social groups are seen as using particular styles of politeness more than others, working-class people, for example, favouring positive politeness and middle-class groups tending to use negative politeness (cf. Mills 2011b, forthcoming). This led to the view of social norms and appropriateness, which simply assumed that members of a social group would behave according to the norms of that group. As Kadar and Mills (2011) have shown, it is very difficult to generalise about the language behaviour of a language group such as English or Arabic speakers. This is particularly important when we are discussing politeness, because very often the behaviour that we are describing is that associated with or indirectly indexing the behaviour of an elite group (Mills forthcoming).

3 Critical Overview of Research

3.1 Discursive Approaches to the Analysis of Politeness

In response to and in reaction to Brown and Levinson's individual-focused work, a number of theorists have tried to develop approaches which are more concerned with the individual within a social context (e.g. Davies, et al. 2011; Geyer 2008; Culpeper 2011; Linguistic Politeness Research Group 2011) or on 'communities of practice' (Mills 2003). This concern with the role that society and social norms play in the production and understanding of politeness have been central to the discursive approach to the analysis of politeness. Rather than thinking that particular languages or cultures encourage individuals to behave in particular ways, Kadar and Haugh (2013: 46) argue that 'we need to adopt methods that observe culture as an interactionally constructed notion rather than as an inherited property'. Thus, politeness is constructed jointly by individuals in groups, informed as they are about wider social norms relating to politeness (Mills 2011a, b). For these post-Brown and Levinson theorists, such as Locher (2006a, b); Watts (2003); Locher and Watts (2007); Haugh (2007), Terkourafi (2005) Kadar and Haugh (2013)

and Mills (2011a), within the wider society, the social group and the smaller community of practice, the individual learns or hypothesises what is appropriate and either maintains the social norm or challenges it. Thus, the post Brown and Levinson and discursive approach theorists are keen to analyse the interaction between the individual and the wider social norms. Politeness for them is not inherent in individual words and phrases but should rather be seen as social practice and as social interaction. Mitchell and Haugh (2015) state: 'in an account of (im)politeness as social practice, it is claimed that it is the *accountability* of participants for particular kinds of social practice vis a vis particular dimensions of the moral order that lies at the heart of evaluations of impoliteness'. Thus, judging someone's utterance to be polite or impolite is not a simple individualistic act, but one which is firmly embedded within an awareness of social norms and the moral order.

Discursive theorists are concerned with the evaluative nature of politeness and impoliteness and the evaluations that individuals make of others' utterances either implicitly or explicitly (Eelen 2001). A judgement of someone as impolite is not neutral, but involves a moral and emotional stance in relation to them (Kadar and Haugh 2013). This notion of a moral order should not be understood as referring to a fixed, stable set of moral values within society but rather to 'facets of the moral order as conjointly co-constituted by participants through interaction' (Mitchell and Haugh 2015: 245). Because of this concern of discursive theorists with the social nature of politeness, and because they see politeness as, in essence, an evaluation of another's behaviour, they tend to focus on the opinions and interpretations of interactants, as evidenced in their talk, and their assessments of others' talk, rather than their own analytical assessments (Eelen 2001). This may involve interviewing interactants after their interaction has been recorded, playing them the recording of the interaction and asking for their evaluations (van der Bom and Mills 2015; Grainger and Mills 2015). Thus, for these theorists such as Watts (2003), politeness does not reside in utterances themselves, but is agreed upon or disputed by individuals in interaction with one another, who draw on notions which they feel are in play in the society, social group or Community of Practice as a whole.

3.2 Politeness as Social

Alongside sociocultural linguists such as Bucholtz and Hall (2005), one theorist who has been very influential in this move towards a more social view of politeness is Agha (2007). He is very interested in 'the materiality of language,'

(Agha 2007: 1) that is, the way that social relations are negotiated through language; in addition Agha is interested in the concrete role that language itself plays in establishing and maintaining social relations, since he argues that 'language mediates social relations' (p. 10). It is because of this concern with the materiality of language that Agha claims that in describing language, we are, in fact, describing social relations: 'when syntacticians claim to describe the concatenation rules of a "language", they are not describing language at all, but only a socially locatable register of a language' (Agha 2007: 8). As I argued earlier, when we analyse politeness what we are in fact analysing is interactants' judgements of politeness, and Agha comments: 'we can only study the intelligibility of social relations for social actors by making reflexive processes a central focus of the study' (Agha 2007: 9). Thus, interactants do not simply use politeness formulae, or express respect or disdain for others, but they are self-reflexive about their usage. Agha argues that individuals can only use politeness and be considered to be polite if those types of utterances have already been categorised as polite by others: 'one condition on politeness being conveyed by an utterance is that expressions that occur in the utterance need to have become valorised in a specific way through a larger social process as polite forms for at least some people (what is polite for one subgroup is often rude for others)' (Agha 2007: 12). Agha argues that politeness, because of its positive connotations within a moral order, is often associated with those within the society who have status and who are educated. Mills (2003) has shown that this is not always unequivocally the case, since she has argued that politeness carries with it ideological associations with middle-class femininity, which is not always positively valorised. However, it is clear that politeness generally within the UK is associated with middle-class values, even when those values themselves may be viewed both positively and negatively.

Enregisterment is a concept developed by Agha (2007) to describe the way that certain styles of speaking, even particular phrases, become associated with certain values, and this association becomes embedded and habitual. He described enregisterment as 'processes whereby diverse behavioural signs… are functionally reanalysed as cultural modes of action, as behaviour capable of indexing stereotypic characterisations of incumbents of particular interactional roles and of relations among them' (Agha 2007: 55). This notion of the embedding of an association between certain styles or language use and certain values or ideologies is important for a sociocultural analysis which wants to examine the way that individuals and social systems interact.

In order to examine social politeness, those forms which seem to be enregistered, it is useful to draw on Watts' (2003) notion of politic and polite. For him, 'politic' behaviour is social politeness, that which the social context has

forced us to adopt; for example, saying thank you when given a gift, even if we do not like the present. The term 'polite', for Watts, should be reserved for when we decide to use more politeness than would normally be expected in the context, in order to gain some benefit for ourselves, for example if we use 'sir' when strictly speaking, it is not normally expected. This notion of social politeness or politic behaviour is important because it foregrounds the fact that it is our awareness of a social norm which determines that we behave in a particular context.

Mitchell and Haugh (2015) and Kadar and Haugh (2013) argue that politeness is tied into social and moral judgements of individuals, as I mentioned above. Mitchell and Haugh (2015) are concerned to show that interactants negotiate with their sense of what is socially appropriate; they state: 'recipients do not simply invoke social norms, or (in some cases) at least simply orient to perceived speaker intentions, in evaluating talk or conduct as impolite.' For them, 'Any recipient… is presumed to have the ability to exercise their own social-mediated agency in construing their evaluation of some prior speaker's action (including their own) as a particular kind of action, thereby licensing their evaluation of that talk or conduct as offensive, and thus impolite' (Mitchell and Haugh 2015: 247). It is this process of evaluation which sets politeness within a social and moral framework.

3.3 Politeness as a System and a Resource

It is clear that politeness is a system which is developed by individuals within a social context. No one individual creates the politeness system and not everyone agrees on what counts as polite or impolite. Nor is the system of politeness created by anonymous and abstract social forces.

Politeness consists of a range of different rules or norms which interactants assume to be in play within particular social contexts. These norms are akin to Bourdieu's (1991) notion of *habitus,* the sense of 'feel for the game', the habits and rituals which are seen to be the common-sense way to behave within particular contexts, which individuals learn over time and become used to (Watts 2003). These are often very similar to what individuals think is appropriate behaviour. Culpeper (2011: 254) states that utterances are classified as impolite when they conflict 'with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be'.

Mills (2003) has described politeness as a resource in that interactants act as if politeness were an agreed upon system which others share with them. Despite the diversity of this resource, and the fact that not everyone agrees

about the constituents of the resource, or for that matter, how those resources are evaluated, nevertheless, interactants do tend to behave as if politeness were a shared system, where, for example, saying 'I'm sorry' counts as an apology. However, it is clear that saying 'I'm sorry' may serve many different interactional functions, only some of which are polite (for example, 'I'm sorry' can be used to convey sarcasm, irony, surprise and so on).

Kadar and Mills (2013), Kadar (2013) and Kadar and Haugh (2013) have all examined the importance of convention and ritual in politeness behaviour. They have argued that, within certain cultures, there is a tendency to use politic or social politeness, and in certain cultures, politeness indicates to others one's awareness of one's position within the social group or interaction. These theorists have described this tendency to focus on social politeness as 'discernment'. For example, in Japanese, individuals use honorifics to indicate, among other things, their position in the hierarchy, or their awareness of the age and status of themselves in relation to their interlocutor. Honorifics are conventionalised, but even here we should not imagine that the individual is passive and simply blindly uses them, as a matter of course. As Yoshida and Sakurai (2004) have shown, even though honorifics seem as if they are a fairly fixed system which convey clear messages to interlocutors about the assessment of social status, individual speakers make informed choices about which contexts demand the use of polite honorific forms and which require the plain style; individuals switch from one to the other in order to signal, for example, a change in role, or a change in style, from formal to informal. As Mills (2011a: 43) argues 'The social order provides a set of linguistic resources which enables the social role to be foregrounded in a conversation, but individuals have a certain amount of latitude in terms of how much this role is brought to the fore.' Linguistic resources, such as honorifics should not be seen as fixed and stable systems. Rather as Geyer (2008: 3) argues they should be seen as 'resources of action accomplishment' and the analyst should attempt to 'identify the connections between their lexical and grammatical characteristics, sequential functions and pragmatic functions'.

3.4 Linguistic Ideologies, Indirect Indexicality and Politeness

Since, as I have argued, politeness is essentially an evaluative process which is situated within a co-constructed moral order, the process whereby behaviour is evaluated as good or bad, appropriate or not, is one where linguistic ideologies are clearly at play. Rather than politeness residing within linguistic items,

we need to recognise the extent to which judgements of what counts as polite or impolite are informed by particular ideologies of how people *should* behave, which are often tied in with ideological beliefs about particular classes of people and the level of education or refinement they have. Williams (2015: 79) argues that 'language ideologies tell us what links are forged between the use of forms of talk, speaker perceptions about the value of language, and the power of their language(s)'. Hill (2008: 34) argues that ideologies 'suggest a way of thinking or a perspective saturated with political or economic interest' but these ways of thinking present themselves as 'natural' or 'neutral'. Hill argues that linguistic ideologies 'sort out language structures as ways of using language as good or bad, correct or incorrect and link these to people who are thought of as good or bad, moral or immoral' (Hill 2008: 34). Politeness consists of evaluations of others' utterances and therefore it is necessarily informed by linguistic ideologies of appropriate behaviour.

Indirect indexing is an important concept to help link together linguistic ideologies and social practice. Ochs (1992) analyses the relation between language and gender; she describes direct indexing as the process whereby direct reference is made, for example, to 'men' or 'girls'. Indirect indexing, however, is where an indexical relation is established between a particular language item or style and a value or ideology. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003: 20) have shown that when girls and boys alter the fundamental frequency of their voices 'they are not trying to sounds like girls or like boys but they are aspiring for some quality that is itself gendered—cuteness, authority'. In this case, higher pitched voices are indirectly associated with qualities such as cuteness, and this process of association is ideological. There is nothing intrinsic about higher pitched voices which makes them index cuteness, but rather simply the conventionalised embedding of this indexical association between certain values and pitch.

There are several theorists who try to link together notions of linguistic ideology and indirect indexing. For example, Christie (2013) and van der Bom and Mills (2015) attempt to 'map out the indexical potential of specific linguistic resources … by addressing the processes by which meanings become associated with social categories and with variables' (Christie 2013: 153). Granger and Mills (2015) in their work on directness and indirectness have also shown that directness, for example, is not a fixed quality that is displayed in particular utterances, but is a judgement made about someone's utterances, in the light of conventions about the indexical relation between directness and certain values, for example, honesty, rudeness, clarity or friendliness. These indexical relations between certain values and certain forms are established over time and are taken at an ideological level to characterise certain language

groups (the English are indirect, Israelis are direct, and so on). The actual linguistic behaviour of Israelis and British people is in fact far more complex, with directness and indirectness being used by all, but with different valences, so that an Israeli being direct might, because of these indexical associations, be interpreted in a different way to a British person using the same direct form.[1]

One of the assumptions which underpins much early politeness research is that politeness consists of behaviour which displays consideration for others or which displays respect for others. For example Holmes (1995: 5) states: 'being polite means expressing respect towards the person you are talking to and avoiding offending them… politeness is behaviour which actively expresses positive concern for others, as well as non-imposing distancing behaviour.' Whilst, clearly politeness indexes concern for others, that is not the only thing that is achieved within interaction. By using the resources of politeness, and this ideological positive valency, interactants are able to achieve many different effects. For example, if in an interaction, someone loses their temper, an individual may be able to achieve some status for themselves by using, in response, the resources of politeness, rather than by shouting and swearing. This can be seen clearly in Bousfield's (2008) analysis of the calm and respectful responses of traffic wardens to angry members of the public whose cars have just been issued with a parking ticket. This is not a fixed function for politeness in response to anger, since within certain communities of practice, polite responses would be judged to be ineffective and weak. However, clearly in the case of the traffic wardens, respectful polite utterances, such as, using 'sir' and 'I'm afraid' are a means of controlling and calming down potentially difficult and threatening interactions through paying lip-service to concern and appearing to offer respect.

It is interesting to examine the work of Pinker (2011) here since he has researched the correlation between what he sees as the development of civilised values and the decline of violence over the centuries. This development of civilisation he sees as strongly related to the development of polite behaviour. He argues, drawing on the work of Norbert Elias, that this is because of changes in the notion of civilised behaviour, the spread of democracy and relations fostered by trade. This notion of civilisation seems very similar to the development of politeness norms, in many respects, for he argues that it consists of rules such as 'control your appetites; delay gratification; consider the sensibilities of others; don't act like a peasant; distance yourself from your

[1] The ideological value of directness can be illustrated in the following statement by the German comedian Henning Veyne (2015) when he summed up an ideology of politeness in the following statement 'The British are too polite to be honest and the Germans are too honest to be polite.'

animal nature' (Pinker 2011: 70). There seems to be a clear relationship here for him between civilisation and politeness: for, stereotypically, politeness consists of consideration for others, and curbing emotions.

Thus, what a sociocultural analysis of politeness and impoliteness would focus on is not linguistic items which appear to express politeness or concern for others. Rather, such an analysis would focus on the linguistic ideologies at play within interaction and the values that are indirectly indexed by the use of politeness or impoliteness. In addition, a sociocultural analysis of politeness would be interested in the way that (im)politeness is responded to, and the effect its use has on an interaction.

4 Case Studies

The data I focus on here is an internet post entitled *25 Manners every Kid needs by Age 9*, which appeared initially in *Parents Magazine*, in 2011, and was written by David Lowry, who characterises himself as an ex head-teacher from Kentucky. Lowry devised the list when he saw a child being 'unintentionally rude' by talking when a teacher was engaged in conversation with another adult: 'the student wasn't being intentionally rude; he simply did not know it was impolite to interrupt'. Therefore, Lowry decided to make the list and send it to the parents in this school. This is significant, because the children themselves were not consulted or talked to. Lowry writes: 'I know that it hangs on a few families' refrigerators'. After being published in *Parents' Magazine*, it was then posted on the internet by Stacey Altamirano (see: staceyaltamirano.com/2011/06/08/25-manners-every-kid-needs-by-age-9)

The post was very widely circulated and has proved to be fairly controversial, eliciting both negative and positive below the line comments. This post is a type of etiquette advice which is very common on the internet.

Etiquette is clearly different to politeness, in that it is more explicitly offered as advice about what individuals should do, and makes explicit what is considered appropriate or polite behaviour. Etiquette books are generally anachronistic, but they give us a clear sense of what values are being imposed on a group, and they also indirectly inform us about the behaviour which is being repressed. Pinker states about etiquette manuals: 'By laying down rules for what people ought not to do, these manuals give us a snapshot of what they must have been doing' (Pinker 2011: 68).

This posting has been very widely circulated since appearing on Stacey Altamirano's webpage. The list is aimed at changing children's behaviour but this is posed in positive terms, bringing benefits to children themselves, rather

than simply the adults who are trying to deal with them at school. The advice is characterised as manners, a form of politeness, particularly associated with middle-class behaviour.

This set of instructions to parents is about trying to ensure that children behave in a way that is respectful of others; thus it fits into the ideology of politeness being concerned with being nice as discussed above (Holmes 1995; Watts 2003). However, it is quite clear that fundamentally these instructions are not aimed necessarily at the children themselves but at the adults who see it as their job to try to control them. The list was distributed by this person to schools and to parents rather than to the children themselves.

In this etiquette list, there are 25 different rules for children, although many of them describe the same types of behaviour. These range from conventionalised 'polite' formulae, which we might see as politic or enregistered utterances, such as 'When asking for something say "Please"' to more complex attempts to control children's unruly behaviour, such as 'When you have any doubt about doing anything, ask permission first'. Many of these 'Dos and Don'ts' listed here are to do with the need for children to be controlled by adults, and for the needs of adults to take priority over the needs of children. This is a complex example of hegemony, that is not just the restriction of someone's behaviour by another who has greater power, but the acceptance of that restriction by the person whose behaviour is being restricted. Thus, what this etiquette advice exemplifies is the elision of politeness with control of children's behaviour, the blurring of the boundaries between being polite, and being docile, 'well behaved', and cognisant of the priority of adult needs. I am not arguing that children do not need to be controlled, as much for their own sakes as for the benefit of adults. What interests me here, rather, is the fact that this need to control children's unruly behaviour, is presented in the guise of advice about politeness.

In what follows, I will give examples of the way that ideological messages about polite behaviour, what children should do in relation to being polite, are in fact ideological messages which are more to do with the primacy of adults and their need to control children's behaviour. Furthermore, the fact that these etiquette guidelines have been widely circulated on the internet suggests that the reality of children's behaviour is, in fact, very different to that which adults would like.

Firstly, I would like to consider the advice where it seems as if conventional politeness is being unequivocally invoked (the numbers given for the examples follow the numbered list of the original).

4.1 Conventional Politeness

1. *When asking for something say please*
2. *When receiving something say thank you*
9. *When you have spent time at your friend's house remember to thank his or her parents for having you over and for the good time you had.*
17. *If you bump into someone immediately say excuse me.*

These examples are clearly simply the type of behaviour which is aimed at ensuring that children recognise when someone has done something for them, which requires formal recognition by the child (examples 1, 2 and 9). Example 17 aims to instil in the child the need to formally verbally recompense someone using a conventionalised politeness formula. All of these examples would be easy to account for in traditional politeness theory.

4.2 Conventional Etiquette

There are other guidelines (23, 24, 25) which are all concerned with using the correct utensils at the table, not reaching for anything at the table and keeping a napkin on your lap. These are not generally analysed by traditional politeness theorists and indicate a lack of connection with what individuals and social groups categorise as politeness.

23. *Use eating utensils correctly. If you are unsure how to do this, ask your parents to teach you or watch what adults do.*

There is an assumption here that certain groups of children will not have learnt how to use knives and forks 'correctly', and either they must then consult their parents (since their parents have clearly not taught them), or if their parents are not able to teach them, they should copy adults who do know the correct way to use utensils. It is assumed here that teachers, being middle class, will know these conventions and will be able to act as role models for the children, whereas their parents may not.

This group of guidelines is not about politeness as such, but more to do with conventionalised etiquette, which may be seen as a subset of politeness, which largely reflects middle class behavioural codes. These conventions are seen as very important in Britain as an indicator of class position. There are also guidelines concerning hygiene, for example:

18. *Cover your mouth when you cough or sneeze.*

There is also guidance about not picking one's nose in public and using a handkerchief when sneezing. Thus, a mixed set of guidelines for children's behaviour concerned with table manners and hygiene are mixed with in with other advice which is more clearly recognisable as politeness advice.

4.3 Assertion of Control of Children by Adults (Hegemony)

Whilst the above guidance seems fairly uncontroversially concerned with politeness and etiquette, as the list progresses the guidance becomes more clearly about adults asserting control over children's behaviour. There is also a directive to children to internalise the legitimacy of adults' primacy, as can be seen in the following example, number 5. Politeness and manners here are the ideological gloss on a set of practices which aim to restrict children's behaviour. For example, in guideline 5, children are advised to always assume that adults' needs come first, and that adults will give them permission to do something or not:

5. *When you have any doubt about doing anything, ask permission first.*

Here it is assumed that children should always seek guidance on their behaviour from adults. However, this advice is posed as a concern with politeness. In the next example, children's language comes under scrutiny, and it is assumed that while adults know 'foul language', children are not allowed to swear.

13. *Never use foul language in front of adults. Grown ups already know these words and they find them boring and unpleasant.*

There is an assumption that grown-ups know swear words and view them negatively when they are used by children. It is assumed here that adults do not use them themselves, but what is being asserted here is that it is problematic for children to swear in front of adults. It is the judgement of the adults which is important here for adults 'find them boring and unpleasant'. In the next example, children are advised to always do whatever an adult tells them to, and in addition to do so with good grace.

21. *When an adult asks you for a favour, do it without grumbling and with a smile.*

Children are also advised not to express their true feelings or opinions about a boring school play, but simply repress these feelings.

16. *Even if a play or an assembly is boring, sit through it quietly and pretend that you are interested.*

Thus, much of this advice to children is concerned with ensuring that children keep quiet, that they do not express opinions or feelings which are at odds with those of adults, and that even when they are asked to do something that they do not want to do, they do so with the appearance of doing so willingly.

4.4 Assertion That Children's Needs Are Less Important Than Adults' Needs

Throughout these guidelines, the needs of children are represented as secondary to the needs of adults.

3. *Do not interrupt grown-ups who are speaking with each other unless there is an emergency. They will notice you and respond when they are finished taking.*

Here it is clear that the rights of the adults to talk without interruption from children takes precedence over children's right to speak. Adults are here represented as having serious work to do which should not be interrupted except if there is an emergency. Children's needs are therefore diminished.

10. *Knock on closed doors—and wait to see if there is a response—before entering.*

It is assumed here that children should wait until an adult allows them to enter a room; but this is less concerned with politeness and more about adult control of children.

20. *If you come across a parent, a teacher or a neighbour working on something, ask if you can help. If they say yes, do so—you may learn something new.*

The child is here characterised as someone with no rights of their own, but rather as someone who must simply obey adults, and who must offer to help the adult. This is even posed as being of benefit to the child 'you may learn something new'.

4.5 Assertion That Children Should Not Express Themselves

In some of the guidance, the opinions of children are represented as being annoying or of little value in comparison to the opinions of adults.

6. *The world is not interested in what you dislike. Keep negative opinions to yourself, or between you and your friends, or out of earshot of adults.*
7. *Do not comment on other people's physical characteristics, unless of course it is to compliment…*

Children are characterised as not being able to express negative beliefs about anything, and here they are advised to either keep silent about their beliefs or ensure that adults are not disturbed by the expression of their beliefs. Thus these guidelines show what children should be like: quiet in the presence of adults, whose needs take priority.

Overall, the linguistic ideologies encapsulated in this advice about politeness are that children are not well behaved but they should be. Politeness rules are one of the ways that we can judge children and make them into compliant individuals who will do what adults want them to. These messages are not simply concerned with respect for others, but largely about asserting that adults' needs to be given priority. It is because of this mixture of conventional politeness, etiquette and advice which attempts to control children's behaviour that we should view these guidelines as driven by particular ideologies.

4.6 Below-the-lines Comments

I would like now to consider the below-the-lines comments on these guidelines, because sociocultural approaches to the analysis of politeness, rather than assuming that what is considered by the analyst to be polite is necessarily considered by other individuals as polite, are concerned not just in the production of politeness but also its reception.[2] These below the line

[2] Below-the-lines comments are comments made largely on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, but also in comments made on online newspaper articles, by individuals who wish to engage with the article or post (see Hardaker 2014).

comments were posted on Altamirano's website on which these guidelines were posted. Many of the posters stated that they would share the guidelines with others in schools:

> RT 2014 'I work in an environment with a number of young adults (18–30 mostly males) I am amazed at their lack of manners, respect and work ethic'.

As you can see from this comment, politeness, seems to slide very easily into other elements, such as 'work ethic' which have very little to do with manners or politeness.

One poster, kwardle 2014, who was a teacher, made explicit why the ban on expressing dislikes was important as advice, 'what I assign has meaning, so the bottom line is, like it or not, they have to do it'. This, more starkly than other posts, draws attention to the control which adults would like to have over children.

Whilst most of the below-the-line comments are broadly positive, the ideological nature of this advice is also starkly drawn attention to in some of the comments, by those who disagree with some of the guidelines; one comments:

> Jen 2015: 'I agree with all but 6 and 21. Kids have a right to say what they dislike… Grownups are NOT always right.'

Furthermore, this next post makes clear that the guidelines are an attempt to limit children's behaviour:

> Mandy 2014 says: 'Children are not slaves or pets, they are people with voices that deserve to be heard as much as adults do'.

Sweden 2014 also objects to the notion that children are being advised not to express negative sentiments saying 'it is unhealthy for kids to hold in negative feelings. Imagine an adult doing that? Not humanly possible so we shouldn't enforce it on our kids.'

Peekster 2014 also commented on the notion that children should always offer to help adults: 'I generally balk at the idea of just having random adults think my children are their personal gophers'.

Thus, these below-the-lines comments make clear that the guidelines are a mixture of politeness guidelines and assertions of control over children by adults. Through the analysis of these guidelines, it is clear that often social control is elided with advice about polite behaviour, particularly when children are the focus of attention. These guidelines, because they are a mixture of advice about politeness and about other aspects of children's behaviour, are profoundly ideological in representing children's needs as being secondary to those of adults.

5 Summary and Future Directions

Thus, this chapter has made clear that analysis of politeness and impoliteness cannot be simply focused on the individual and their linguistic choices, because those choices themselves are fundamentally informed by social forces, and the individual's perceptions of what norms of appropriateness are in play. In turn those social norms are modified or maintained because of the linguistic behaviour of individuals. This more interactive sociocultural model of politeness and impoliteness allows us to describe the role of social forces without assuming either that the individual is solely the originator of their language, nor does it force us to assume that the individual is a pawn at the mercy of social forces. It is the engagement with or orientation to what is considered to be in play that constitutes appropriate behaviour. It is clear that the advice given to children aims to control their behaviour, and it takes a great deal of ideological work to present this control as 'better behaviour'.

One of the further directions that this work could go in is further investigation of etiquette. There are a great number of advice columns on the internet, which speaks of a need that some communities have to be advised on the 'correct' or 'appropriate' way to behave. Although a great number of these are largely concerned with advice in relation to behaviour in very formal contexts (such as weddings, funerals, christenings and bar mitzvahs), there is also a large number of columns about how to behave, for example in relation to using mobile phones in public, in restaurants, etc. (see for example Debrett's and the Miss Manners Column online). Both this more formal etiquette advice and the type of advice which simply gives guidance on how to relate to others is a rich source of data, where advice about politeness becomes ensnared in ideological beliefs about the correct way to behave (Locher and Bolander 2011). A further direction which could be pursued in future research is the relationship between etiquette and politeness and the way that etiquette advice functions in relation to notions of politeness norms. Thus, we may find that etiquette and politeness norms, although seemingly distinct, may be found to influence one another in ways which are interesting in ideological terms.

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4

Ideology and (Im)politeness

Manfred Kienpointner and Maria Stopfner

1 Introduction

Ideology and politeness are both concepts which have been the subject of long-standing scientific debates. In this chapter, we first try to sketch the conceptual history of the term *ideology*, in order to defend a non-pejorative concept of ideology as 'the basis of the social representations shared by the members of a group' (van Dijk 1998, p. 8) (cf. below, Sect. 2). Furthermore, we will review recent developments in politeness theory, especially the 'discursive turn' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 36) and then proceed to clarify the manifold interrelationship of the concept ideology and politeness and try to establish a typology of ideologies of politeness (Sect. 3). A case study (Sect. 4) will illustrate the insights developed in Sect. 3.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_4

2 Ideology

Just like (im)politeness, with its differentiation in first- and second-order politeness (Watts et al. 1992, pp. 3–4), ideology can be conceived of in two ways: as an everyday conception, or as a scientific conceptualisation; and similar to (im)politeness, the dividing line between these two types of ideology is not always clearly drawn. The following chapter serves as a short introduction to ideology and, as such, is based on the original works of the respective thinkers, as well as on the comprehensive synopses found in Decker (2004), Hawkes (1996), and Eagleton (1993, 1994).

The common notion of ideology has a 'pejorative ring' (Eagleton 1994, p. 1) insinuating a distorted perspective caused by faulty, yet obdurate preconceptions often associated with manipulation, propaganda and power. In everyday conversation, ideology is, therefore, normally used as a stigma that is by default attributed to others who are unable, or unwilling, to realise how things *really* are (i.e. the way *we* see it). Scientific approaches to ideology, however, target the concept behind the term and essentially aim to clarify the relation between ideas, i.e. the world in our heads, and matter, i.e. the world 'as it is'.

Even though philosophy's preoccupation with the definition and evaluation of the relation between ideas and matter can be traced back to Ancient Greece (e.g. most notably Plato's famous allegory of the cave), the term *idéologie* itself was actually coined in the wake of the French Revolution by French aristocrat and revolutionary Antoine Destutt de Tracy who wanted to introduce a science of ideas (i.e. ideology in its literal sense) in order to describe the process through which we gain knowledge and make sense of the world—thus, establishing the scientifically grounded second-order notion of ideology. The new discipline was conceived as a branch of zoology and sought to establish a 'scientific genealogy of thought' (Hawkes 1996, p. 55) that would not only uncover the origins of ideas, but would, moreover, allow a discernment and avoidance of erroneous patterns. Ideology was, therefore, initially conceived as some kind of meta-science that would place new and old ideas on a firm rational basis. However, since ideology also targeted political ideas in order to prove their true validity, it was not long before that this strand of science got in the way of major political ambitions: Napoleon Bonaparte became one of the first and most influential opponents of ideology and strategically reconceptualised the term as a stigma for politically biased and erroneous (oppositional) ideas—thus, shaping the way we now normally interpret the term in everyday conversation (i.e. first-order notion of ideology) (Eagleton 1993, p. 82; Hawkes 1996, pp. 54–57).

As we can see, the term ideology is itself the product of an ideological debate, in the course of which, the original concept by Antoine Destutt de Tracy was turned upside down, shifting from sceptical scientific rationalism towards abstract irrational idealism (Eagleton 1993, p. 85; 1994, p. 5). However, it was this latter, first-order, notion of ideology that was taken up by Marx and Engels in their attack on bourgeois doctrine. In their polemical pamphlet *Die deutsche Ideologie*, Marx and Engels set out to tear down the rationalist and idealist doctrine of superimposing ideas over matter; instead they propel a revolutionary materialist perspective that focuses on people's living conditions whence their consciousness arises. In the Marxist tradition, people's consciousness is conceived as 'direkter Ausfluß ihres materiellen Verhaltens' (Marx and Engels 1962, 26), i.e. rooted in their material conditions. Therefore, those who control the material sources control people's consciousness: 'The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force' (Marx and Engels 1994, p. 24). Within class society, ideology (e.g. morality, religion) functions as a 'camera obscura' (Marx and Engels 1962, p. 26) that inverts the 'relation between consciousness and reality' (Eagleton 1994, p. 6), i.e. the individual thinks he/she can act free of any material constraints, when in fact what the individual believes to be his/her consciousness is actually determined by the material conditions. This is why Engels defines ideology as 'a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness' (as cited in Decker 2004, p. 7).

The concept of ideology as false consciousness subsequently became an issue of heightened debate, especially within the Marxist tradition: e.g. Georg Lukács considers class consciousness to be a state of un-consciousness and believes Marxist ideology to be the source of a new form of consciousness that needs to be attained (Lukács 1977); Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand, rejects the concept of false consciousness on the grounds that every system has a historical validity, and as such, historically organic (as opposed to arbitrary) ideology can have a positive influence on social conditions (Hoare and Smith 1999); and, finally, for Louis Althusser, ideology is not a distorting mirror positioned between society and reality, but an affective complex of symbols, pictures and imaginings we subconsciously live by, based on a set of rituals that are entirely naturalised social structures (Althusser 1994)—what Pierre Bourdieu would later call 'doxa' (Eagleton 1993, pp. 182–3). We can see how, in the course of this debate, the concept of ideology as false consciousness evolves into a concept of ideology as common sense, which, according to van Dijk (1998, p. 104), is 'a modern variant of the notion of consciousness', i.e. a set of social beliefs, shared by the members of a group or community that

involves knowledge and opinions (van Dijk 1998, pp. 103–4) that appear to be self-evident and only natural, sometimes even universal, i.e. applicable to all mankind (Eagleton 1993, pp. 63–72). Within the evolution of a scientifically grounded second-order notion of ideology, the concept of ideology as common sense marks the latest step, and will, therefore, provide the basis for our reflections on ideology and (im)politeness.

As for the importance of language, Jürgen Habermas, who pertains to the late Frankfurt School, defines ideology as a form of communication that is systematically distorted in order to support and legitimise the ruling power structures (Edgar 2006). Yet, in an ideal world, free of oppression, everybody would have an equal opportunity to formulate his/her ideas, and convictions would be based on argumentation rather than authority or force. Language is, therefore, not a neutral intermediary between ideas and matter; it is the battlefield of ideological conflict. Valentin N. Vološinov even goes as far as to proclaim that 'wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too' (Vološinov 1973, p. 10), and that 'without signs, there is no ideology' (Vološinov 1973, p. 9). However, according to Michel Foucault (1969), ideology is not about words and their relation to reality, ideology is the realm of discourse:

> Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this *more* that renders them irreducible to the language (*langue*) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe. (Foucault 1972, p. 49)

Linguists, who—in keeping with the war metaphor—find themselves in the front line of the ideological battleground, have since been looking for 'this more', first of all within the discipline of critical linguistics (e.g., Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979). Hodge and Kress (1979, p. 6) which defines ideology as 'a systematic body of ideas, organised from a particular point of view' and language as social practice that is, on the one hand, determined by social structure, and, on the other hand, supports (or changes) that structure (see also Wodak and Meyer 2009); so they want to 'explore the relations between language and thought, language and society' (Hodge and Kress 1974, p. 5). Since then, critical discourse analysis, as legitimate heir to critical linguistics, has become a vibrant linguistic field that has developed three major strands of research: a discourse-historical approach (e.g., Wodak et al. 1990; Reisigl and Wodak 2001), a sociocognitive approach (e.g., van Dijk 1987, 2014), and the Duisburg School of critical discourse analysis (e.g., Jäger 1993, 2012). But critical discourse analysis is, according to Fairclough (1989, p. 1), not merely a passive observer: above all it aims to 'correct a

widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power' and 'help increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation'.

However, also other branches of linguistics have tasked to analyse and describe language in relation to ideology (see also de Saussure and Schulz 2005), such as pragmatics and argumentation theory (e.g., Silverstein 1979; Kienpointner 1999; Verschueren 2014) or cognitive linguistics (e.g., Lakoff 2002; Dirven et al. 2001a, b; Underhill 2013). Interestingly enough, neuroscientists have, most recently, been trying to find the link between genes and political attitudes (e.g., Smith et al. 2011; Hibbing et al. 2014), thus, turning back full circle to Antoine Destutt de Tracy's concept of a science of ideology embedded in zoology.

As can be seen by the length of this introductory section, there seem to be almost as many definitions of ideology as there are thinkers (for a short overview see Eagleton 1994, p. 15). In order to get a hold on the manifold conceptualisations, Geuss (1994) suggests the following categorisation: He distinguishes between descriptive conceptualisations that regard ideologies as the belief systems of social groups or communities that consist of discursive and non-discursive elements; pejorative conceptualisations that consider ideology to be a set of values and convictions that need to be seen critically, because they support repressive forms of power, legitimise unjust power structures, and/or distort social reality by creating shared illusions; and positive conceptualisations that perceive ideology as an arsenal of convictions that provide groups with cohesion and inspiration as they try to reach their political goals.

Still, in the era of postmodernism, the scientific conceptualisation of ideology faces serious problems: As far as the notion of ideology as false consciousness is concerned, there is no longer any firm basis on which to pass a verdict as to whether something is true or false (neither is there a consciousness to begin with); and as far as the notion of ideology as common sense is concerned, since ideology is not 'hiding the real state of things', but is 'written in its very essence' (Žižek 1989, p. 25), theorists of ideology are not even aware that they operate within a (biased) set of beliefs, so that their definitions and analyses of ideology inevitably manifest the phenomenon they want to define (see also Decker 2004, p. 6; Hawkes 1996, pp. 1–12, pp. 155–88). In short, science as discursive practice is not immune to ideology, quite the contrary. This holds all the more true for linguistics, as society has strong beliefs about language, indicated by the concept of language ideology (e.g., Woolard 1992; Rumsey 1990; Silverstein 1979). What is more, linguistic findings might not

only be tempered by biased presuppositions, they themselves might be used to make an ideological point, and, thereby, sustain a certain view (Koerner 2001, p. 269).

In order to escape the vicious circle of *tu quoque* accusations, i.e. refuting any criticism on the basis that it is ideologically biased, Karl Mannheim (1952, p. 128; 1997, p. 276) does not seek absolute objective truth, but aims to capture a dynamic and temporary picture of the different strands of thought in relation to each other—a task, we would like to undertake in view of ideology and (im)politeness.

3 Ideologies of (Im)politeness

3.1 Introduction: (Im)politeness

In this section, we are going to provide a short overview of recent trends in (im)politeness research, with a special focus on their ideological aspects. As far as the concept of 'politeness' is concerned (a parallel distinction can be made concerning the concept of 'impoliteness'), we will take over the by now familiar distinction between 'politeness1' ('the common-sense notions of politeness') and 'politeness2' ('a term within a theory of social behaviour and language usage'), first introduced by Watts et al. (1992, p. 3).

Earlier studies on (im)politeness tended to be dominated by approaches which Kádár and Haugh (2013, p. 13), amongst others, call 'first wave theories' (cf. Lakoff 1975; Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987). Although there is still no general theory of (im)politeness which could fully replace the first wave theories, these are in the process of becoming substituted by more recent approaches originated by the 'discursive turn' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 36). This discursive turn, which typically conceives of (im)politeness as a 'social practice' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 60), emphasises the study of authentic (im)polite utterances and longer sequences of such utterances in context, and was initiated by Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003).

In line with our non-pejorative concept of 'ideology' outlined above (Sect. 2), we would like to maintain a view of first wave theories which does not globally criticise them as distorted views of social reality. However, we uphold the more modest view that at least some aspects of the older theories of (im)politeness are reductionist, not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence and/or biased in some respects and should be replaced by more balanced and comprehensive approaches.

In this section, we will outline a criticism of such aspects in first wave theories of (im)politeness. While the discursive turn challenges all first wave theories, in the following we will specifically refer to criticism directed at Brown and Levinson's (1987) ground-breaking model, simply because it has been so enormously influential over the past few decades:

1. Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 58) start out from the assumption that (im)politeness phenomena can be described in relation to a 'Model Person', 'a wilful fluent speaker of a natural language', endowed with rationality and with two face wants, that is, 'negative face' ('the want to be unimpeded) and 'positive face' ('the want to be approved of in certain respects'). This, however, exaggerates the importance of conscious choice and rational, goal-oriented practical reasoning for (im)polite communicative behaviour (cf. below, section "The Ideology of Rationalisation", on the ideology of 'rationalisation'). And even Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 16) are willing to concede that emotions such as liking 'might be an independent variable affecting choice of politeness strategy' (note that already Leech (1983, pp. 138–9) includes maxims of sympathy and antipathy in his model of (im)politeness).
2. The last point also leads to the criticism of the claims of universality made by Brown and Levinson: 'We wish to emphasize here that our quite specific universal principles can provide the basis for an account of diverse cultural differences in interaction' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 242), and indeed, Brown and Levinson apply their model to an impressive range of data from British and US English, Tamil and Tzeltal. Nevertheless, these claims of universality have repeatedly been challenged, for example, in research on (im)politeness in Japanese and Chinese (e.g., Matsumoto 1988; Ide 1989; Gu 1990; Mills 2003, p. 145; Kádár and Mills 2011, pp. 5–7), Slavic languages (e.g., Wierzbicka 1985) and Romance languages (e.g., Held 1995; Hernández Flores 1999; Bravo and Briz 2004; Bravo 2005), where concerns for individual face and the desire to be unimpeded in one's actions (negative face) seem not to be as important as in Anglo-Saxon speech communities. Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 14) are willing to admit that their model 'perhaps reflects the bias of a culture obsessed with individual rights and wants'. And both at the level of (im)politeness1 and at the level of (im)politeness2, the projection of categories of (im)polite behaviour from one's own culture to another culture is 'a profoundly ideological judgment' (Mills and Kadar 2011, p. 28; cf. below, section "The Ideology of Homogenisation". on the ideology of 'homogenisation').

3. A growing research tradition has shown that Brown and Levinson's model is biased towards politeness. However, impoliteness is not simply a destructive deviation from politeness (impoliteness can be cooperative and socially constructive; cf. below, section "The Ideology of Rationalisation" on the ideology of 'rationalisation'), nor is it simply an effect of strong negative emotions (impoliteness can be sophisticated), nor is it always the marked, exceptional counterpart of politeness (impoliteness can be frequent, in some institutional contexts, it can even be the norm). This has been shown, for example, by Culpeper (1996, 2005, 2011), Eelen (2001), Kienpointner (1997, 2008a), Bolivar (2005), Kaul de Marlangeon (2005), Bousfield (2008), and the contributions in Bousfield and Culpeper (2008).
4. (Im)politeness is a cognitive phenomenon. This means that linguistic forms or utterances or speech acts are not (im)polite per se: 'no linguistic form or strategy can be inherently more or less polite' (Locher 2004, p. 86). This is true at least in most cases, although some strongly conventionalised forms and utterances tend to be inherently (im)polite (e.g., Leech 1983, p. 83; Culpeper 2011, pp. 124–6; cf. below, section "The Ideologies of 'Encoded (im)politeness' and 'Inferred (im)politeness'" on the ideology of 'inferred (im)politeness'). Normally, however, it is the positive or negative assessments of such units of communication, according to cognitive schemata of categorisation, evaluation and expectation, which establish experiences of (im)politeness: 'Impoliteness exists in the mind.' (Culpeper 2011, p. 65). This has been stressed especially by Terkourafi (1999, 2001, 2005), but is also taken into account by other recent approaches to politeness (e.g., Mills 2003, p. 145; Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 207–9).
5. The concept of 'culture', presupposed as a more or less homogeneous background for the analysis of (im)polite utterances, is notoriously vague and undefined in much (im)politeness research (cf. below, section "The Ideology of Homogenisation". on the ideology of 'homogenisation'). In order to account for the fact that every culture is an 'aggregation of subcultures' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 143) and that individuals can belong to several different sub-cultures at the same time, in more recent research the term 'culture' has been replaced as a starting point for (im)politeness analysis by the concepts of 'community of practice', that is, 'a loosely defined group of people who are mutually engaged on a particular task' (Mills 2003, p. 30). Such persons form 'social/relational networks' (Watts 2003, pp. 153–5), which can be defined as 'sets of intersecting social links between persons that collectively form the basis of an identifiable group' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 47).

3.2 Ideologies of (Im)politeness 1

Having discussed scientific theories of (im)politeness we now briefly turn to (im)politeness1, that is, the folk theories of lay people. Politeness is a contested concept, not only as far as competing (im)politeness2 concepts are concerned, but also at the level of lay speakers within a community of practice. The fact that speakers often disagree as to the evaluation of communicative behaviour as an instance of (im)politeness has been especially highlighted by Watts (2003, pp. 262–3) and Mills (2003, p. 101). Differing concepts of (im)politeness in a community of practice often involve 'struggles' about what counts as (im)polite. These 'struggles' have to do with the distribution of power in a social network (Watts 2003, p. 253). And if there seems to be a general consensus, this only highlights that one particular ideology of politeness1 has become internalised to a degree that it is no longer recognised as being the perspective of one social group (usually, the dominant elite; see, for example, Watts 1999). Fairclough (2001, p. 79) calls this process of a closure or restriction of the plenitude of potential meanings 'naturalization'. Social and political relations of dominance thus become 'natural' phenomena, which could not be otherwise. And in this way, '[i]deology is the prime means of manufacturing consent' (Fairclough 2001, p. 3).

There are many factors which, alone or together, can result in certain ideological views of (im)politeness at the lay level, that is, the view of members of particular communities of practice and/or speech communities. Among the most important factors are class, gender, 'race' and age. Evidence for lay opinions/folk theories about (im)politeness can be found in metalinguistic comments made by members of a community of practice in naturally occurring conversation, but also appears in idioms and proverbs, and in etiquette manuals (see, for example, Culpeper 2011, pp. 71–4; Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 181–4).

Class

Classism (over)generalises a view of the alleged (im)politeness of social groups on the basis of social norms, where the norms of dominant groups usually prevail. Classism can manifest itself in the derogatory (impolite) denomination of the lower classes, for example, in English: *trailer trash*, *riff-raff*, *proles*, *the unwashed masses* (cf. similarly German *Proleten*, *Pöbel*, *Gesindel*, *Abschaum*; French *racaille*, *canaille*, *prolos*). These expressions imply generalised negative assumptions about the habits, manners and living standards of the

social groups referred to. Sometimes, these expressions also imply criminal behaviour of social groups denominated in such a way. For example, Nicolas Sarkozy, while French Minister of the Interior, answered a complaint from a female citizen of Argentueil about (young) troublemakers in this suburb of Paris on 25 October 2005 as follows (retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2009/11/24/):

> (1) *Vous en avez assez, hein ? Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racaille ? Eh bien, on va vous en débarrasser!* ('You've had enough of it, haven't you? You have enough of this gang of riff-raff? Well, you will be freed from it!')

These remarks initiated much discussion and criticism. Maybe for this reason, later (14 April 2007), Sarkozy, at the time a presidential candidate, made clear in a public discussion that he did not want to categorise all inhabitants of Argenteuil as hooligans (retrieved from http://www.saphirnews.com/Sarkozy-en-banlieue_a6538.html)

Furthermore, classism can involve the categorisation and evaluation of the communicative behaviour of the lower classes (and ethnic minorities) as being generally rude and primitive (Mills 2003, p. 149):

> Because politeness is often associated with 'civility, 'courtesy', 'good manners', 'good breeding', and 'a good upbringing', all qualities associated stereotypically with the white, upper and middle classes, it is not surprising therefore that working-class people and Black people are characterised as impolite.

Classist perspectives of (im)politeness can also be found in traditional etiquette manuals (discussed by Culpeper 2011, pp. 108–11), for example, when they prescribe polite behaviour which is hardly ever performed by the vast majority of the population, and which applies only to members of the upper class. For example, the Austrian etiquette manual *Der Elmayer* (Schäfer-Elmayer 1991, pp. 107–8.) prescribes a rigorously hierarchical and complicated seating order at the table, where the guests are strictly ordered according to their social rank. The same holds true for Schäfer-Elmayer's (1991, pp. 226–32) prescriptions of dress codes which are hardly affordable for the average citizen.

As a reaction to classism, working-class people coin mocking phrases in relation to over-refined middle class politeness (Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 30). More drastically, as a result of the Cultural Revolution in China (1966–1976), a kind of 'revolutionary rudeness' for a while became the dominant norm, which led to a markedly different speech style, especially in the case of women (Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 32).

Another type of reaction to classism concerns (criminal) outsiders and social outcasts (often at the same time an ethnic minority), who often develop an 'anti-language', in which the norms and values of the dominant groups/the majority are reversed. It is only partially comprehensible for the majority and hence experienced and evaluated as rude. For example, subcultures of thieves and robbers all over the world have developed their own criminal jargon (cf. the *calo carcelário* of criminals in Spain described by Martín Rojo (1994), or the similar jargons of thieves in Buenos Aires mentioned by Fontanella de Weinberg (1987, p. 142) and the underworld language in Calcutta described by Halliday (1978, pp. 172–82) as an anti-language).

Gender

Gender-specific ideologies of (im)politeness1 assume that men, women (and queer people) behave differently, as far as (im)politeness is concerned. Moreover, from a normative perspective, they maintain that men and women should be treated differently, as far as (im)politeness is concerned (cf. traditional politeness norms ('courtesy') which ask for opening doors for women or helping women on with their coats).

The following excerpts from a mail forum ('Yahoo! answers', 23 July 2014) demonstrate the existence of stereotypical beliefs about the (im)politeness of men and women. The contradictory evaluations in the excerpts quoted below also show that (im)politeness1 is a contested concept (retrieved from https://ca.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20140723190440AA647oK):

(2) *Why are men so rude to women?*
Men usually say bad things about a woman's appearance more than vice versa. On youtube it's usually the guy's [sic!] *who say bad things about women. And I always hear about girls say how rude guys are to them. And guys are arrogant to* [sic!]. *If they get rejected, they blame the girl. If a girl gets rejected, she is modest and blames herself.* […]
[Answer 1] *Works both ways on the bad things said between men and women.* [...]
[Answer 2] *Women are every bit as rude if not more than men.* [...]

These stereotypes have been criticised because they fail to correspond to clear and recognisable differences in the communicative behaviour of persons with different gender (Mills 2003, p. 210). More specifically, and interconnected with stereotypes of the working class and middle-class, male and female

(im)politeness seem to be related to the communicative behaviour of white, working-class men and white, middle-class women (Mills 2003, p. 204).

Furthermore, the traditional differences of the treatment of men and women have become contested and controversial, due to feminist critique and social changes, but also because they contradict the egalitarian norms and principles of fairness (Mills 2003, p. 206):

> For those men who open doors for women, courtesy may be intended as a display of care and respect, whereas for many feminists, it seems demeaning because it seems to suggest that the woman is incapable of opening doors, putting on her own jacket, and carrying her own bags, and it also seems to be non-reciprocal.

Another example involves the evaluation of swearing in public. That this is still less tolerated in the case of women can be shown by metalinguistic remarks such as the following one, made by Alice Vincent in her article 'Why the f*** shouldn't women swear?' (5 November 2014, retrieved from the online version of *The Daily Telegraph*: http://www.telegraph.co.uk):

> (3) [...] *even as an independent, ambitious, fairly unapologetic feminist, I still feel quite guilty for swearing*.

'Race'/Ethnicity

Racist/ethnocentric views of (im)politeness assume that members of an ethnic group (especially minorities/outsiders) tend to be impolite. This ideological perspective is clearly manifested in the form of conventionalised meta-linguistic comments (Culpeper 2011, pp. 100–103) in idioms/proverbs, where the positive face of ethnic outsiders/minorities is damaged because they are portrayed as persons who are unable to speak correctly or clearly, or constantly use swear words or otherwise violate politeness norms.

Examples include the pejorative French idiom *parler petit nègre* (literally: 'to speak little negro', that is, 'to speak Double Dutch', an incomprehensible and/or grammatically incorrect variety of French) or the Italian idiom *bestemmiare come un turco* ('to swear like a Turk') or the English, Spanish and French idioms *to take French leave/despedirse a la francesa/filer à l'anglaise* ('to leave without saying goodbye'; note the reciprocally negative perspectives in English and French!).

Of course, there are also more constructive ways of dealing with differing ethnic concepts of (im)politeness1 in everyday interaction. For example, Holmes et al. (2012, p. 1073) show that in business talk at the workplace,

white New Zealanders (Pākehā) and Maori speakers share a similar commitment to egalitarian communicative principles, but have to cope with differences as to their concept of the (im)politeness of silence during interaction: 'other-oriented, responsive behaviour in Māori meetings involves explicit indications of approval or agreement, while in parallel Pākehā contexts, silence is considered polite behaviour, indicating attention and respectful other-oriented behaviour'.

Age

Generation-specific views of (im)politeness hold that different generations talk and behave differently as far as (im)politeness is concerned. The ideology of ageism pretends that young people become ever more rude, or, vice versa, that old people are distrustful, grumpy, morose and lack a sense of humour.

Empirical evidence for the existence of these (im)politeness1 ideologies is provided by the eternal complaint of the older generation that young people are impulsive and reckless or less polite/more impolite than in the past. Some of these stereotypes go back to antiquity and are referred to by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, when he lists prototypical attitudes of young people, such as: 'And they are impulsive and quick-tempered and inclined to follow up their anger [by action]. And they are unable to resist their impulses' (rhet. 1389a, transl. by Kennedy 2007, p. 149).

Almost 2500 years later, the British writer Thomas Blaikie (author of an etiquette manual: Blaikie 2005) complains about the deterioration of the youth's manners (*Daily Telegraph*, 15 June 2006, retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/3653126/Why-are-the-youth-of-today-so-rude.html; see also Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 147):

> (4) But the young of today are worse than preceding generations. This is the depressing conclusion of a survey by the Left-wing think tank Demos.
>
> Employers questioned say that graduate recruits lack 'soft' skills; they don't know how to have a conversation, aren't very flexible, don't listen properly and don't know enough about customer relations or even how to be polite to customers. […].
>
> It is, however, the degree of rudeness that especially bothers employers. According to the Demos survey, the past 10 years have seen a noticeable deterioration.

As far as ageism directed at the old generation is concerned, it is a common theme in literature, for example, in Greek, Roman and French comedy,

where old people are often portrayed as rude, misanthropic, exaggeratedly strict, stingy and inherently suspicious persons, such as the morose old man Knemon in Menander's *Dyskolos* ('The Curmudgeon'), the stingy old man Euclio in Plautus' comedy *Aulularia*, and the rigid old man Demea in Terence's comedy *Adelphoe,* characters which were taken up by Molière in his plays *Le Misanthrope* ('The Curmudgeon'), with the grumpy Alceste, and *L'Avare* ('The Miser'), with the stingy and suspicious Harpagon as main protagonists.

3.3 Ideologies of (Im)politeness 2

The Ideology of Rationalisation

'Rationalisation' as an ideology of (im)politeness is most clearly and explicitly defended by Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 58–9), who assume that their Model Person has 'a precisely definable mode of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends' at their disposal, that is 'a strictly formal system of rational "practical reasoning"'. In this view, norms of polite language usage are 'the outcome of the rational choices of individuals'. There is no doubt that there is some truth to this idealisation. After all, even if one treats intentions as post-facto constructs rather than as a priori entities, it would be 'completely counterintuitive to suggest that people do things without any intention-like notions in their heads' (Culpeper 2011, p. 49).

Still, the assumption of the rationality of social actors as the main basis of polite behaviour (and the corresponding assumption that impoliteness is always irrational behaviour) is a form of rationalist reductionism. (Im)politeness is not always the outcome of rational cost–benefit calculations and the resulting choice of a specific utterance. There are many further factors which have to be considered for its description and explanation, for example, positive and negative emotions, conformity to rituals, and contextual and situational constraints (Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 137–9; 207–9).

As far as emotions are concerned, some can also have rational aspects (such as altruistic love or pity, or justified anger; see, for example, Nussbaum 1996), so rationality and emotionality do not necessarily exclude each other. And of course, emotions can also be truly irrational in the sense that they imply contradictory feelings and, in this way, block the rationality of speakers altogether, creating somewhat contradictory utterances.

The emotional causes of (im)politeness can be illustrated with the fierce dispute between an engaged couple, Blanca and Andrés (taken from a corpus of spoken Spanish: Briz et al. 2002; Kienpointner 2008b, p. 33). In

this dispute, Blanca furiously accuses her fiancé Andrés of not taking their relationship seriously, because Andrés is usually tight-lipped and repeatedly makes hesitating remarks revealing that he is not sure about his love for Blanca. In spite of her frequent, prosodically intensified (on the intensification of impolite utterances see Culpeper 2011, pp. 139–145) and face-threatening accusations (*EGOÍSTA*: 'egoist'), and her use of swear words (*JODER*: 'fuck'; *coño*: 'shit', *cojones*: lit. 'balls/testicles'; when used as interjection: 'damn it!'), her anger seems justified also to Andrés, who emphatically apologises (*LO SIENTO*: 'I am sorry'), although he is seriously insulted by Blanca. She is obviously driven beyond rational calculation by her negative emotions, because in the middle of her accusations, quite paradoxically she addresses him with a term of affection (CARIÑO: 'darling'), probably because she is still in love with him:

(5) B: *PUES BUENO_ ENTONCES ERES UN EGOÍSTA/ ANDRÉS/ CARIÑO/ ES QUE ¡JODER!///* (3') *es que eres un egoÌSta tú y tú y tú_y tú y tú_ te encierras y tú eres todo/ ¡coño! Pues si no compartes conmigo las cosas no sé qué* [*cojones quieres que te diga*]
A: [*VALE_LO SIENTO_*] *LO SIENTO*
(B: 'WELL THEN_SO YOU ARE AN EGOIST/ ANDRÉS/ DARLING/ IT'S JUST THAT FUCK!/// (3') it's just that you are an egoist, you and you and you_ and you and you_ shut yourself off and you are all/ shit! So if you do not share with me things, I don't know what [damn it you want that I tell you]
A: [O.K._I AM SORRY_] I AM SORRY)
Transcription: CAPITALS: marked or emphatic pronounciation; /: short pause; ///: pause of one second or more; (3'): three seconds; []: overlap; _...: rising intonation; …_: falling intonation.

The Ideology of Homogenisation

This ideology of (im)politeness2 appears in scientific research whenever reference is made to whole cultures, or even groups of allegedly similar cultures, without pointing out their rich internal variability. To give but a few examples: Lakoff (1975, p. 70) talks about the styles of (im)politeness of 'the American' or 'the Japanese', Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 81) speak about 'the ranking of impositions in Anglo-American culture', or even more generally about 'the Western emphasis on the intentional agent' (1987, p. 9) and Leech (1983, p. 138) refers to the 'greater value of the Modesty Maxim in Japanese culture'.

This obviously implies another type of reductionism, that is, the neglect of society-internal differences. Okamoto (1999) is an early example of research which criticises this reductionism and takes the variability of (im)politeness within one and the same language and culture very seriously. It has been claimed that, due to the strong grammaticalisation of the use of honorifics (polite grammatical forms: particles, pronouns, verb forms) in Japanese, there is less or no room for strategic choices and the selection of utterances (Matsumoto 1988). In this view, (im)politeness in Japanese is a matter of 'discernment' (Japanese: *wakimae*) rather than 'volition' (Ide 1989). While this may be true as a general tendency, Okamoto has shown that in Japanese, too, there is some room for the strategic selection of honorifics. In the following example, a male Japanese university professor is talking to a female student and uses a mixture of honorific and non-honorific expressions in order to reduce the difference of social status and 'to show some friendliness' (Okamoto 1999, p. 61; p. 63):

(6) P: *Boku ga Furezuno ni ita toki, moo ni-juu-nen, ni-juu-nen wa oogesa ka*,
N-AH N-AH
E, AE, American English/?/ ka nan ka no heddo o yatte ta n desu yo.
AH
('When I was in Fresno, already 20 years (ago), 20 years may be an exaggeration, he was the head of E, AE, American English /?/').

S: *Aa, a, ima mo yatte-rassha imasu yo*.
AH
('Yes, he is the head (of the institute) now, too.')

(Abbreviations: P = professor; S = student; AH = Addressee honorific; N-AH = non-honorific form for the addressee, plain form, without suffix).

In a more recent study, Pizziconi makes similar claims about Japanese (im)politeness. While acknowledging that Japanese honorifics short-circuit discursive inferences and result in conventionalised interpretations, Pizziconi (2011, p. 70) maintains that 'their indexical nature in no way prevents contextually variable interpretations and limitless innovations'.

However, there is one sense of 'culture' where also representatives of the discursive approach are willing to accept the ideology of homogenisation, namely, when 'culture' is identified with the normative, stereotypical view of (im)politeness of the dominant elite. In this perspective, generalisations about the (im)politeness of utterances within a culture is no longer understood as descriptive generalisations about the actual communicative behaviour of

individuals, but as the evaluation of (im)politeness from the standpoint of a conservative ideology, with 'fears about, or traditionalist nostalgia in relation to, social change in general' (Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 24, p. 42; Culpeper 2011, p. 132).

The ideology of homogenisation is not restricted to general remarks about (im)politeness within an entire culture, but also concerns subgroups of cultures/societies. For example, early contributions to feminist linguistics assumed that women and men could be characterised as to their female or male speech style (e.g., Lakoff 1975; Tannen 1986; Holmes 1995), at least as far as statistical tendencies are concerned. Empirical research, however, has shown that power can be a factor overruling gender aspects (O'Barr and Atkins 1980), where powerless people, women and men, adopt the 'female' style (which is supposed to be relatively more cooperative, empathetic and 'polite'). More generally spoken, other types of situational contexts, too, can create or erase gender differences in (communicative) behaviour (Hyde 2005, p. 589).

Furthermore, there are indigenous communities (e.g. a traditional Malagasy speech community, Keenan 1974) where typically women employ the 'male' style (which is relatively more competitive, aggressive and 'impolite'). Moreover, there are subgroups of speech communities, such as the Japanese female teenagers called *Kogal* (*kogyaru*), who intentionally behave in a very rude way in public (Miller 2008).

Finally, meta-studies such as Hyde (2005) have found only relatively small difference values in the communicative behaviour of women and men, on a scale ranging from 'close to zero', 'small', 'moderate', 'large', 'very large'. Difference values for women and men concerning impolite interruptions, length of contributions to dialogues, control of themes and self-disclosure proved to be 'small' on this scale (e.g., Hyde 2005, pp. 583–4; Cameron 2007, pp. 41–6; cf. similarly already Frank 1992; Mills 2003).

Although this criticism is justified in many respects, it would be a hasty generalisation, too, to conclude that the allegedly 'female' and 'male' conversational styles are limited only to white, (Anglo-Saxon) middle-class women and working-class men, respectively.

First of all, there seems to be a well-established consensus that physically aggressive behaviour (violence, sexual assaults) is more typical for men than for women in communities of practice, cultures and societies all over the world (Hyde 2005, p. 286): 'Across several meta-analyses, aggression has repeatedly shown gender differences that are moderate in magnitude' (cf. similarly Mills 2003, pp. 240–241; Cameron 2007, p. 43). What is more important as far as (im)politeness is concerned, at least in some of the studies reviewed by Hyde

(2005, p. 584), is that aggression included verbal aggression and men scored relatively much higher as far as differences of verbal aggression are concerned, with difference-values reaching the categories 'moderate' or 'large'.

Secondly, there are further properties among the categories of communicative behaviour reviewed by Hyde (2005, p. 284), showing clear differences between women and men, for example, frequency of smiling (difference value: 'moderate'). Thirdly, looking beyond the Anglo-Saxon area and specific social classes, we find empirical research based on large corpora of data, for example, on (im)politeness in Turkish and Modern Greek, where speech acts such as greeting, thanking, showing sympathy and passing compliments were used as cooperative ways of communicative behaviour by women much more frequently than by men (Antonopoulou 2001, p. 367; Ruhi and Doğan 2001, p. 367).

In her more recent research on gender-specific speech styles at the workplace, Holmes (2006) uses more cautious formulations such as the 'normatively feminine discourse'. She also admits that the historical dynamics blur the limits of allegedly feminine or masculine conversational styles. But she still maintains that the actual use of (im)polite utterances has differing effects for women and men (2006, p. 221): 'Research which demonstrates the valuable role of certain aspects of normatively feminine discourse in workplace interaction can help to erode associations of seniority with masculinity, and establish associations of effectiveness with femininity'.

The Ideologies of 'Encoded (Im)politeness' and 'Inferred (Im)politeness'

In earlier (im)politeness research, it was often assumed that there are expressions or speech acts which are inherently polite or impolite. For example, Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 65) assume that 'it is intuitively the case that certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face'. As examples, they list orders, threats, criticism (hearer's positive or negative face) and apologies, confessions (speaker's positive or negative face). In a similar way, Leech (1983, pp. 104–5) lists speech acts with intrinsically courteous communicative goals (e.g. offering, greeting) or discourteous communicative goals (e.g. ordering, commanding).

However, this perspective neglects the discourse dimension of (im)politeness. The evaluation of certain utterances as (im)polite, to a large degree, depends on the co-construction of (im)politeness by speakers and hearers. Moreover, they often disagree as to the evaluation, and this problem is not automatically

solved at the (im)politeness2 level. Therefore, analysts of politeness should be self-critical as to their own practice of evaluating utterances as (im)polite and not pretend that they always have the last word (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 99).

Still, 'the current tendency in the (im)politeness literature of emphasising the context rather than linguistic forms risks throwing the baby out with the bath water' (Culpeper 2011, p. 113; cf. also Leech 2014, pp. 15–18). That is, the unwillingness to acknowledge that highly conventionalised formulaic expressions are (im)polite relatively independently of context could be called a reductionist ideology of 'inferred politeness'. In order to prove this for conventionalised impolite formulae (type), Culpeper (2011, pp. 134–6) used the frequency of occurrence of impolite utterances (tokens) in the Oxford English Corpus as a criterion.

4 Case Study

The criticism of first wave theories of (im)politeness sketched above and the discursive turn have obvious implications as far as methodology is concerned. First wave theories very often relied on elicited, observer coded data: discourse completion tests, questionnaires and interviews (Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 30–33). Discourse-oriented approaches now focus on naturally occurring data within longer stretches of discourse, where the perspective of participants is taken into account, too (Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 52–6). More specifically, the recent development of computer corpora for various languages has made it possible to look for (im)politeness phenomena in huge databases, such as the Oxford English Corpus with more than 2 billion words.

Of course, both elicited data and naturally occurring data have their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, elicited data are methodologically strong as far as reliability is concerned: The elicitation procedures can be precisely controlled, the frequency of elicited (im)politeness phenomena can be counted and statistically evaluated. However, the weak point of elicited data is their dubious validity, that is, the danger of creating artefacts of analysis and coding and of neglecting the participants' perspective. On the other hand, naturally occurring data are strong as far as validity is concerned. However, it is often rather difficult to find a particular (im)politeness phenomenon, and the variability of expressions implying (im)politeness cannot be as easily taken into account as in elicited data. An obvious strategy which is able to overcome these difficulties is the combination of methods (cf. the well-designed set of differing methods used by Culpeper 2011, pp. 8–12).

Another important methodological step forward has been the systematic inclusion of the non-verbal aspects of (im)politeness, such as prosody, intonation, facial expression, gaze and body position. This has led to multimodal analyses, which provide a more complete picture of the (im)politeness phenomena (e.g., Culpeper et al. 2003; Culpeper 2011, pp. 145–52; Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 129–33).

The following example will serve to illustrate some ideological aspects of 'doing (im)politeness'. The methodological approach will be discourse-oriented, including some remarks on non-verbal aspects. The focus will be on three of the ideological aspects of (im)politeness as summarised in Sect. 3, namely, gender (politeness1), rationalisation (politeness 2) and homogenisation (politeness2). The example analysis is based on a passage in a TV debate which took place on 21 September 2006, at the ORF, the Austrian national TV service. A few days before the general election for the Upper House ('Nationalrat') of the Austrian parliament (1 October 2006), the former Austrian chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel, also former leader of the Austrian conservative party (ÖVP), and Alfred Gusenbauer, Schüssel's successor as Austrian chancellor and former leader of the Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ), discuss the problem of the large number of Austrian citizens in need of permanent care. The relatives of these people often hire nurses from abroad (mostly from the Czech Republic or Slovakia), who are paid far less money than Austrian nurses. At the time, approximately 40.000 persons were employed in this way, illegally according to Austrian laws, which were, however, reformed later in order to end this situation.

While Schüssel had claimed in earlier public statements that there was no serious problem regarding persons in need of permanent care in Austria, his own mother-in-law being taken care of by nurses from abroad, Gusenbauer attacked him with a 'circumstantial' variant of the argument ad hominem (of the type: 'You are not practising what you preach').

This attack made Schüssel furious and he, too, then in reply used a subtype of ad hominem attack in his reply, namely the 'abusive' variant, which questions the physical and mental (moral) qualities of the opponent (Walton et al. 2008, pp. 140–62) possibly referring to Gusenbauer having wiped his upper lip with his handkerchief a few minutes earlier:

(7) GU: [...] *Ich sag/ich sag Ihnen, was eine WIRKliche Bedrohung ist.*
SCH: *Bitte.*
GU: *Nämlich wann ein Bundeskanzler ein Vorbild an ILLegalität sein will. Weil dass Sie hier im Fernsehen erKLÄRT haben, Sie würden ein ZWEItes Mal es genau so*

machen und anraten, dass Verwandte von Ihnen ILLegal gepflegt werden, des is nicht meine Vorstellung von einem Bundeskanzler, der soll nämlich anstehende Probleme lösen.
[...]
SCH: (1 Sekunde Pause) *Jetz versteh i Ihre Schweißperlen auf der St/auf der Lippe. Mit diesem Untergriff haben Sie sich endgültig disqualifiziert. Ich würde NIEmals Ihre Familie hereinziehen, niemals*.

'GU: [...] I tell/I tell you what's a REal threat.
SCH: Please do.
GU: Namely, when a chancellor wants to be a model of illeGALity. Because you have deCLARED here on TV, that you would do it exactly the same a SECond time and advise that relatives of yours should be taken care of ilLEGally, that is not my idea of a chancellor who is supposed to solve urgent problems.
[...]
SCH: (pause of 1 second) Now I understand the beads of perspiration on your fo-/on your lip. With this unfair trick you have disqualified yourself forever. I would NEver ever involve in your family.'
(Transcription: GU = Gusenbauer; SCH = Schüssel; CAPITALS = special emphasis; [...] = omitted passages; / = self correction.)

Gusenbauer's attack and Schüssel's counter attack are both intended to create serious face-damage: Schüssel is portrayed as an insincere personality by Gusenbauer, who, in turn, is characterised as a person with a low degree of credibility, honesty and stress tolerance (note that perspiration here is interpreted by Schüssel as a sign of bad conscience and/or nervousness).

As Schüssel's private behaviour is not an obviously relevant topic in a public discussion on government policies and Gusenbauer's sweating has nothing to do with his arguments about permanent care in Austria, these mutual ad hominem attacks can be judged as dubious or even fallacious arguments. Apart from that, they can also be analysed as empirical evidence for ideological aspects of politeness.

Above all in this form of argumentation we need to consider the gender aspect. The way in which the arguments ad hominem are presented illustrates the competitive, prototypically male style of political TV-confrontations. Although it has been shown that differences in the conversational style of men and women have been overgeneralised (due to the ideology of homogenisation; cf. above, section "The Ideology of Homogenisation"), it is quite typical that Gusenbauer and Schüssel try to fulfil the normatively expected stereotype

of 'tough' male politicians (thus providing an instance of gender-related impoliteness1). Both do not refrain from trying to 'win' the debate not only by presenting arguments concerning political facts and strategies but also by aggressively trying to create a serious face-damage of the opponent.

Furthermore, this example provides evidence for the problems of rationalisation as an ideology of rationalisation (impoliteness2). Gusenbauer and Schüssel are both experienced politicians; hence, they know that aggressive personal attacks might have a boomerang effect and create a bad image for themselves among the audience. Nevertheless, just a few days before the elections, in the passage quoted above they cede to the emotional impulse to attack the opponent aggressively. This shows the important role emotions play in (im)polite discourse, something that has somehow been neglected within first wave theories of (im)politeness. There is, however, a difference concerning the external visibility of the aggressive emotions. As far as non-verbal behaviour is concerned, Gusenbauer formulates his ad hominem attack in a relatively calm, premeditated manner, which contrasts, however, with its dramatic verbal expression (cf. *eine WIRKLICHE Bedrohung/a REAL threat*). Schüssel, too, tries to present his counter attack in a controlled manner, but nevertheless shows some non-verbal signs of suppressed anger (e.g. some features of an 'anger face' as described by Ekman and Friesen (1975, p. 82): 'The eyebrows are lowered and drawn together, the eyelids are tensed […]').

Finally, this example shows that (im)politeness is an essentially contested concept, both at the individual and at the group level. The ideologies of homogenisation (politeness2), which are often present in modern politeness theories, fail to take this into account. Both Gusenbauer and Schüssel impolitely express their concern about the opponent's poor standards of honesty and sincerity. However, they disagree as to the interpretation and evaluation of their impolite behaviour. But it was not only Gusenbauer and Schüssel who disagreed, as some opinion polls conducted after the TV discussion show: Poll agencies in Austria, such as IFES, Fessler or Gallup, provided differing results portraying either Gusenbauer or Schüssel as more humane and sincere, respectively (cf. the online version of the Austrian newspaper 'Der Standard': http://derstandard.at/2596676/Gallup-und-Fessel-Schuessel-gewonnen-IFES-Gusenbauer-menschlicher).

5 Conclusion

We have tried to defend a concept of 'ideology' as a general perspective organising our attitudes and beliefs in relation to the (social) world, which does not assume that ideologies should generally be criticised as distorted perspectives

of the world. However, this does not prevent a criticism of more specific, reductionist aspects of ideologies. Consequently, we have reviewed first wave theories of (im)politeness, arguing that recent developments, initiated by the 'discursive turn', are an important step forward in overcoming such reductionist ideologies of (im)politeness.

Furthermore, we have outlined a classification of ideologies of (im)politeness both at the level of (im)politeness1, that is, folk theories assumed by discourse participants (e.g. classist, ethnocentric, gender-specific and ageist ideologies), and at the level of (im)politeness2, that is, scientific theories of analysis (e.g. rationalistic, homogenising, code-based or inference-based ideologies).

Future research should elaborate the classification of ideologies of (im)politeness sketched above in order to provide more comprehensive typologies. Moreover, a continued criticism of certain ideological aspects of first wave approaches to (im)politeness could contribute to the establishment of more balanced and sophisticated theoretical frameworks.

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5

Face and (Im)politeness

Jim O'Driscoll

1 Introduction

Like many terms used in the study of politeness—or, indeed, the social sciences generally—the form 'face' is also a word in the everyday English language. And, as is also often the case, this identity of form is not just an accident. (That is, there is a relation of polysemy between the technical term and the everyday denotations.) It points to the fact that the term as used in politeness studies involves people 'presenting' themselves to one another and perceiving one another, and it involves appearances, in particular those kinds of appearances which, though they are by definition to do with the surface of things, are nevertheless habitually read to make inferences about much deeper things. However, while the most basic meaning of the English word denotes something concrete (a part of a person's body), the specialist term denotes something abstract, and in that sense the former is a metaphor for the latter.[1]

But a metaphor for *what* exactly? What exactly is the 'something abstract', what the 'deeper things'? The characterisation above may seem irritatingly

[1] The fact that it is a term drawn from the *English* language in particular is not, of course, an accident either. It reflects the history of the term in sociopragmatic studies and the near-exclusive use of that language in international scholarship. But, as exemplified below, this close lexical relation with an everyday item in just one language carries dangers.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_5

vague. Unfortunately, it is not possible to be any more specific without falling foul of one or other use of the term in scholarship. For example, while most scholars see face as a property of individuals, not all do so (see below). A major purpose of this article, then, is to outline the various ways in which the term is understood and used. That they *are* so various, while it may say nothing for the ability of social scientists to agree on terms, testifies to a general sense among them that the concept of face is a valuable tool with which to explore phenomena of vital importance in the study of human relationships and interaction.

Then there is the fact that this chapter is located in the 'Foundations' section of this book, suggesting an integral relation between the term 'face' and politeness. A hint of the central role played by face in politeness studies is a search on Google Scholar (conducted on 24 August 2015) which found that of all works with the word 'politeness' in them, only fractionally more than a quarter did *not* also contain the word 'face'.[2] How did this close relation come about? This article answers this question by taking a historical (though not strictly chronological) approach to the use of face in politeness studies. And in doing so, it explains and explores the meaning and use of face in this field.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Face as the Explanation for Non-Gricean Behaviour

Historically, the major reason why the concept of face is so often employed in politeness studies is undoubtedly the work of Brown and Levinson ([1978] 1987). This work was inspired by an attempt to explain why it is that people so often diverge from maximally efficient conversation as understood by Grice (see Culpeper and Terkourafi (Chap. 2), this volume). Grice offers an explanation of how people manage to understand each other when they don't spell out what they mean; Brown and Levinson took this enquiry a step further by asking *why* they don't spell out what they mean in the first place. Other early seminal works in the field of politeness, having noted the high frequency of this divergence, realised there was a whole other area of communicative

[2] About the same proportions were returned when the search was limited to those which also included the terms 'pragmatic' or 'pragmatics'. See also O'Driscoll (2011, pp. 21–2) for similar web-search evidence of the yoking together of face and politeness.

behaviour to describe, and consequently proposed certain principles of communication to go alongside Grice's (Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983), but it was Brown and Levinson who, by using the notion of face, offered the first principled explanation.

Starting from their perception that people in several widely separated parts of the globe in manifestly different cultures seem to diverge from maximal Gricean efficiency in the same kinds of ways (using equivalent linguistics resources), they reasoned that the motivation for this divergence could be neither anything to do with individual character on the one hand nor anything to do with culture on the other. Rather, it must be something intrinsic to the nature of human beings when they interact with each other (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 56–9). The answer which they propose, avowedly derived from Goffman (see below) and 'the English folk term' (ibid., p. 61) is (what they call) face.

Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 61) define face as 'the public self-image that every member [of a society] wants to claim for himself'. Being 'public' and an 'image' (rather than simply what s/he thinks or feels about him/herself), a person's face depends on the demonstrated attitudes of others. For this reason, 'it will in general be to the mutual interest of [people] to maintain each other's face' (ibid., p. 60) and

> In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' [sic] face … (ibid., p. 61)

This mutual vulnerability of face is all the more vulnerable because it 'is emotionally invested' (ibid., p. 61) and also—and crucially—because a vast number of frequently performed speech acts have the potential to threaten face. For example, if I want to request something from you, there is a risk that, in performing this directive speech act, I bestow on you the image of someone who can be ordered around at will; if you want to disagree with me, there is a risk that, in making the assertion that I am wrong, you bestow on me the image of someone who is either disapproved of or not to be taken seriously; when reacting to a compliment you have just been given, you risk presenting yourself either as someone who is self-satisfied to an unseemly degree (if you

accept it) or (if you reject it) as someone who does not after all have the positive attribute and thus desirable image which has just been bestowed on you (as well, of course, as the above risks attendant on disagreement).

As a result of such risks, I don't just tell you to 'Do X', you don't just tell me 'No, you're wrong' and, when reacting to a compliment, you neither blandly accept it nor flatly disagree with it. Instead, people perform these and many other acts in ways which mitigate the threats intrinsic to them.

And *that*, according to Brown and Levinson, is why people habitually behave in these Griceanly inefficient ways—they want to be thought well of and they know that for that to happen, it is wise to show that they think well of others. The kind of behaviour motivated by these concerns for face is what they call 'politeness'.

2.2 Face as Bestowed by Others and Emotionally Invested

This article began with Brown and Levinson's conceptualisation of face because it was through their use of the term that most scholars of language and pragmatics in the 1980s and 1990s first encountered it. Indeed, so influential has been their theory of politeness that, at the time of writing, this route to face probably continues to be the most well-trodden one. But as their acknowledgement indicates, the author who first introduced it to the world of international scholarship (that is, who borrowed from the folk-notion and turned it *into* a term) was the North American sociologist, Erving Goffman. His essay 'On Face-work', originally published more than 20 years previously (Goffman [1955]1967a), has become the 'ur' text to which those wishing to further explore the concept of face subsequently progress.

Examination of this text shows that Brown and Levinson took up some of the features of the concept of face expounded there in toto, some partially and some not at all. They adopted in toto from Goffman the conceptualisations of face as something to which people have an emotional attachment and whose precise quality is bestowed on them by other people (rather than themselves). Goffman defines a person's face as the result of what 'others assume' (Goffman 1967a, p. 5) and later comments that

> while [a person's] social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it' (ibid., p. 10)

2.3 Reciprocal Face-Maintenance

Brown and Levinson also adopted—though now we move on to the partial category—the observation of the concomitant tendency for interactants to practice reciprocal face-maintenance. However, whereas they offer an essentially personal, utilitarian motivation for this practice which evokes contractual exchange (equating to the English saying 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours'—see Sect. 2.1 above), Goffman (1967a, pp. 10–12) stresses that the existence of the practice does not in itself tell us anything about individual motivations for it, which may be very various. Rather, he speaks of a 'rule of considerateness' (ibid., p. 11) and sees the practice as 'a condition of interaction, not its objective' (ibid., p. 12).

2.4 Face as Universal

Another feature inherited from Goffman is the claim, notwithstanding manifest cultural variation in detail, that face itself is universal. But whereas Brown and Levinson support this claim through observation of similar behaviour across widely divergent cultures and from assumptions about what any rational person wants, Goffman does so through a more impersonal route:

> If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact the societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. (Goffman 1967a, p. 44)

Indeed, for Goffman, face is inevitable whenever people are together. This is because a person's face is the result of 'the line' s/he takes, a line being

> a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which a person expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. (ibid., p. 5)

Thus, face is universal simply because interaction is universal.[3]

[3] This fact that, by their behaviour in the presence of others, people *cannot help* projecting a view of (1) what is going on, (2) who they are and (3) who the others present are—and, we may add, (4) their relationship—is by now axiomatic in the study of the interpersonal aspects of interaction.

2.5 A Person's Face: Temporal Perspective

As can be seen, the divergence in the explanations offered for both reciprocal face-maintenance and the universality of face stem from the same difference in focus—Brown and Levinson emphasise the rational desires of individuals while Goffman emphasises the requirements of interaction. This difference in emphasis also hints at one of perspective, a difference which becomes apparent from the full definition of face proposed by Goffman as

> the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact (Goffman 1967a, p. 5)

While Brown and Levinson's face is something that a person 'wants to claim', Goffman's is something that, as a result of the line 'he *has taken*' (my italics), s/he already possesses. Thus the former is a 'before' perspective, the latter an 'after' perspective, the claim occurring only 'effectively' rather than being motivated.

2.6 A Person's Face: Contents

The only classification of faces which Goffman offers (ibid., pp. 6–8) is that of being 'in face' (a person's line is sustained), 'in wrong face' (the line is contradicted by 'information which is brought forth' and so cannot be sustained) and 'out of face' (the person has no 'ready line' all). Moreover, his subsequent account tends to conflate the latter two types. He offers no further typology of distinct faces which people may find themselves with at any one time, or of the ingredients out of which a person's face is composed or simply of types of face which can be in play. Brown and Levinson, on the other hand, conceiving of face as wants, were free to propose a typology of the last of these aspects. On the basis of the consistency they see in behaviour across different cultures, and with acknowledgements to Durkheim (1916) and Goffman, they propose two aspects which, like face itself, are universal. These are:

> Negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction … the want of every [person] that his actions be unimpeded by others (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 61, 62)

and

> Positive face: the positive, consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants … the want of every [person] that his wants be desirable to at least some others (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 61, 62)

Understandably, much of the subsequent scholarly exploration of face has focused on this typological matter of what comprises faces. Remarkably, despite myriad criticism of Brown and Levinson's proposed constituents, most proposed typologies make use of them, directly or indirectly, in one way or another (see Sect. 3.4 below).

2.7 The Locus and Scope of Face

The account so far indicates that face is on the one hand something pertaining to a person but on the other hand something to do with interaction. As can be inferred from the account and definitions above, while Brown and Levinson's conceptualisation stresses the former, Goffman's stresses the latter. Indeed, his definition includes a feature entirely absent from Brown and Levinson's. This is the emphasis on situational contingency. For Goffman, face, while it may pertain to participants, is a phenomenon of interaction, indeed of 'particular' instances of it, the precise nature of a person's face at any one time being the result of that person's behaviour up to that point in a particular encounter; that is, the 'line' s/he is assumed to have taken. For Goffman, face may be universal, but only interactively so. (This radically situational emphasis, together with the fact that situations are so manifestly various, explains the lack of typologising in Goffman's account.)

Subsequent interpretations and developments of the concept of face have, in different ways, placed more or less emphasis on either the personal or the interactional aspect, sometimes to the extent that the other aspect almost disappears. This variation in viewpoints concerning where exactly face resides, and what exactly it is a property of, is the main reason that, as noted in the introduction, it is so hard to come up with a generally agreed definition of much substance. The next section explores this and other matters.

3 Critical Review of Research

3.1 Politeness, Face and Facework: A Tale of Amicable Separation

Whereas, the term 'face' denotes a property (whether of people or interaction, see below), the term 'politeness' denotes a kind of behaviour. The equivalent descriptive term (i.e. denoting behaviour) with regard to face is 'facework', Goffman's original definition (1967a, p. 12) of which is 'the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face'. As Brown and Levinson's

explanation for what they call politeness is face, in their model, politeness and facework are essentially the same thing (see Locher and Watts 2005).

Much research in the previous century is the story of face(work) and politeness being disentangled. One strand in this project was cross-cultural. It came from scholars around the world (e.g. Wierzbicka 1985; Matsumoto 1988; Ide 1989; Gu 1990; Nwoye 1992; Pandharipande 1992) who objected to the instrumentality in Brown and Levinson's theory (the idea that S does x *in order to* achieve y), claiming that in their cultures politeness is as much (or even more so) about appropriate behaviour and upholding social harmony as it is about maintaining face.

The other strand started from the simple observation that Brown and Levinson's theory has little to do with what people at large—in any culture—understand by the English lexeme 'polite(ness)' or its equivalents in other languages, if only because whether an utterance is deemed polite is a matter for the person to whom it is addressed (see Fraser and Nolan 1981, p. 96). This realisation led to a distinction between first-order politeness (what people understand by the lexeme(s) in their language) and second-order politeness (a theoretical construct) and to the notion of politic behaviour (see Watts 1989, 1992; Watts et al. 1992), and subsequently to a shift in emphasis towards the study of first-order matters such as participant evaluation of behaviour (e.g. Eelen 2001; Watts 2003). This first-order perspective on politeness has no *intrinsic* need for the concept of face: in some languages the equivalent (first-order) lexeme for 'face' has little general currency (whereas lexemes denoting a moral evaluation of interactive behaviour—such as 'politeness'—always do); in other languages the equivalent *is* much used but mainly in idiomatic expressions rather than in interpretations and evaluations of behaviour; even in cultures where the equivalent lexeme has both considerable general currency and *is* related to understandings of behaviour, it does not appear to have any consistent linkage to the concept of politeness in that culture (see e.g. Hinze 2012; St. André 2013; Sifianou 2013) nor does its reach approach that which theoretical conceptions of the term 'face' attempt to cover (St. André 2013).[4]

From these perspectives, then, face(work) is merely one possible aspect of politeness. The issues raised by these developments are addressed elsewhere in this book. What concerns us in this chapter is that it is now possible to discuss face and facework in a way which does not demand constant reference to

[4] For reasons explained in Sects. 3.3 and 3.4 below, first-order studies of face nevertheless have a valuable contribution to make. Studies of general understandings and/or use of the equivalent lexemes have been conducted for Greece (Sifianou 2011), Japan (Haugh 2007), Turkey (Ruhi and Işık-Güler 2007), Tunisia (Labben 2017), South Asians in America (Baig et al. 2014) and on numerous occasions for China (e.g. Yang 2010; Wang and Spencer-Oatey 2015), including one comparative study of China and Britain (Yu 2001). In all these cases, the concepts can pertain to both individuals and groups in their relation to others.

theories of politeness. This is true even when addressing Brown and Levinson's theory, since this can now be seen as a theory of facework (Locher and Watts 2005). The advantage of this separation of concepts is that it becomes easier to see that there are aspects of interactional behaviour which have little or nothing to do with politeness but which face can help us to understand. From *this* perspective, politeness is just one possible aspect of facework (typically, the hearer-oriented, supportive kind—see below).

The first case of a study of face divorced from the discussion of politeness is, of course, the first one. In his long essay, Goffman (1967a) uses the word 'politeness' only in passing and makes no attempt to define it. But such was the impact of Brown and Levinson's work that relatively few studies (examples being Scollon and Scollon 1983; Tracy 1990; O'Driscoll 1996) in the remainder of the twentieth century addressed themselves to face while either entirely ignoring or explicitly excluding from discussion notions of politeness. It is only in this century that face(work) has come into its own.[5] There have been, for example, two special editions of the *Journal of Pragmatics* devoted entirely to it (Mey 2003; Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini 2010) and in 2010 a symposium on 'Face' was held at the University of Huddersfield which explicitly excluded discussion of politeness. Arundale (2013), Haugh (2013) and Kádár and Haugh (2013, pp. 50–52) all explicitly argue the value of studying face independent of politeness. Perhaps the most stark indication that the concept has fully freed itself from its decades-long subservient position can be found in the index to the edited volume *Face, Communication and Social Interaction* (Bargiela-Chiappini and Haugh 2009), in which the lemma 'polite(ness)' doesn't even get an entry!

3.2 The Range of Face and Facework Study

Both the cause and result of this independence for face has been the realisation that it may be relevant in a far wider set of circumstances than that for which Brown and Levinson employ it (and even somewhat wider than that presented by Goffman—see below). Ironically, much of the impetus for this realisation has come from a partial misinterpretation of Brown and Levinson's theory. This theory's emphasis on the notion of face-*threat* (see Sect. 2.1 above) has given rise to a significant strand of criticism objecting to the apparently

[5] A rider needs to be added to this sweeping generalisation here. In referring to the new-found independence of face, I refer only to the community of scholars who belong to the constituency covered by politeness studies in its widest sense. The North American School of Communication, having never grappled with the notion of politeness in the first place and not especially awed by Brown and Levinson's work, adopted face as a stand-alone, relatively unproblematic, concept much earlier and have been mainly concerned with applying it. Works such as Ting-Toomey (1994), Cupach and Mets (1994) and Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998) exemplify this constituency.

gloomy view of human interaction thereby presented. Their list of intrinsically face-threatening acts, labelled FTAs to underline their importance (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 65–8), appears to cover just about the full gamut of speech-act types—and, as Sifianou (2001, p. 399) has remarked, they do not describe a single speech act as *not* carrying this intrinsic threat. Moreover, this threat is presented as the main reason for the existence of facework (aka politeness)—as a means of mitigating it, thereby presenting a picture where the best that can be hoped for is a maintenance of the face status-quo, hence the theory's characterisation as a 'a zero-sum game' (e.g. Fraser 1990, p. 235) presupposing 'a fundamental antagonism between the speaker's intentions … and social aspects' (Werkhofer 1992, p. 180). This picture of a world where interactants constantly walk on eggshells has also been bemoaned as one that 'if always true, could rob social interaction of all elements of pleasure' (Nwoye 1992, p. 311) and simply as 'paranoid' (Schmidt 1980, p. 104).

In reaction, numerous scholars from around the world have pointed out that in their culture, many acts such as small requests, offers and invitations are not perceived as face-threatening at all. Among many examples are Matsumoto (1988—Japanese culture), Gu (1990—Chinese), Nwoye (1992—Igbo), Sifianou (1993, p. 78—Greek), Koutlaki (2002—Persian), Eslami (2005—Persian) and Yang (2010—Chinese).

No doubt these observations do indeed point to cross-cultural differences in the standard (context-free) values attached to certain acts. But as a criticism of Brown and Levinson, they are somewhat misguided. It's a matter of temporal perspective. Brown and Levinson picture acts before they have been performed. These are FTAs in the sense that they all have, in the abstract, the potential to cause face-damage if the circumstances are right. As they readily exemplify, however, in many cases, the circumstances mean that the threat is minimal. And as they point out (Brown and Levinson 1987, pp. 1, 33, 47), their scheme relies heavily on Goffman's (1971, pp. 138–9) notion of the 'virtual offence'; that is, the 'worst possible reading' of an act, not the actual reading which occurs after it has been performed. The acts they refer to are only acts-in-embryo, before they have seen the light of day.

The above-mentioned scholars, on the other hand, are referring to the intention of the speaker and/or the effect of the act after it has been performed.[6]

[6] One particular act that is often cited in this context is that of issuing an invitation to dinner, which, it is argued, is not experienced as face-threatening by either speaker or hearer. Well, one can be pretty sure it is not usually *experienced* that way in *any* culture. Brown and Levinson's conception of FTAs pertains to a property of the act, without reference to speaker intention or its conventional effect. And, of course, Brown and Levinson would argue that it is not normally experienced as threatening precisely because the face-redress strategies they itemise have been successfully employed. That such a convivial directive *can* be face-threatening is argued by Leech (2014, p. 183).

Notwithstanding its role in this misinterpretation of Brown and Levinson, this perspective, by foregrounding both situated intentions and effect, has helped to expand greatly the interactional phenomena to which the concept of face is applied. As regards intentions, it has been convincingly argued that facework can arise not only as a response to face threat (e.g. O'Driscoll 1996; Pizziconi 2003, pp. 1485–7; Spencer-Oatey 2008, p. 19; Hernandez-Flores 2008, p. 694; Gao 2009, p. 183; Leech 2014, p. 99). As regards effects, it has been observed that there are acts, when no threat is on the horizon, whose conventional effect (and default intention) is to enhance the hearer's face—congratulations, compliments and invitations spring to mind. Even a bluntly issued directive can have this effect (see Leech 2014, p. 46 for an example). Such acts have been variously labelled face-boosting acts (Bayraktoğlu 1991), face-flattering acts (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1997, 2005) and face-enhancing acts (Sifianou 2001; Leech 2014—this last being the term which is most commonly used) as a counterbalance to the notion of FTAs. Behaviour of this unmitigated kind has been referred to as a face-giving strategy (Lim 1994, p. 213) and as 'outright face support' (Arundale 2006, p. 211, 2010, p. 2078). But when we focus squarely on situation, any act, however prototypically face-threatening or face-supporting, can have the opposite effect (see O'Driscoll 2007a, pp. 247–8; Terkourafi 2005, pp. 251–2). From this perspective, *no* act can be identified as either threatening or supportive in itself. To describe it as one or the other is to describe its intention and/or effect *in situ*, not any abstract property of it. Sifianou (2012), for instance, shows that neither the face-related intentions nor the effect on face of acts of disagreement can be predicted out of context.

Facework, then, can be studied not only as a reactive but also as a proactive phenomenon. And it is more productively applied not to acts but to situations. The notion of face threat can, of course, still be relevant but it is a more Goffmanian one, pertaining not to an act or an utterance but to a particular moment in a particular encounter, denoting a particular vulnerability that the trajectory of interaction has caused. Like Brown and Levinson, Goffman emphasises the supportive aspects of facework. However, he also expounds (Goffman 1967a, pp. 24–6) on its 'aggressive use', in which at least one interactant's face is attacked. Work on this antagonistic behaviour has further expanded the study of face and facework. It was kick-started when Culpeper (1996) presented a mirror-image of Brown and Levinson's framework, this time devoted to face attack. Since then, a large field of impoliteness studies has opened up (see Culpeper and Hardaker (Chap. 9), this volume). Such behaviour can be incorporated into the field circumscribed by facework, as in Tracy's (1990, p. 210) characterisation of it as 'the communicative strategies

that are the *enactment*, support or *challenge*' of face. My added italics here are intended to draw attention to the possibility that what we study is limited neither to reactive nor to supportive behaviour. The concept of face can be useful when studying the initiation of interaction, when faces are established (rather than just maintained or altered during it), and also for studying conflict. Indeed, it has been argued (Tracy 2008) that face is a more useful concept than politeness for this last focus.

Finally, in addition to the above considerations of different aspects of facework, there is the matter of to whom or what specific instances of it are addressed. Of central importance to Goffman's notion of face is that it is reflexive. The face which one person projects onto another is not projected in an emotional vacuum. The other is simultaneously casting their own projections onto the first person, both interactants finding themselves making face claims which are subject to modification as a result of their own continuing projections and projections from the other, so that all facework is simultaneously addressed to both self and other(s). Much of Goffman's exposition assumes that the face wants of self and those of other are thus conflated, the enhancement (or damage) of the one entailing the enhancement (or damage) of the other. However, notwithstanding this essential interdependence of faces, whereby all facework operates on all participants' faces simultaneously, it sometimes does so unequally. Goffman (1967a, pp. 15–18) recognises that specific instances of facework attend mainly to either the speaker or the hearer(s).

Although Brown and Levinson's theory is speaker-centred in the sense that it is a theory of what goes on in the speaker's mind (in order to account for what s/he says), its emphasis on rational instrumentality means that its exposition is overwhelmingly biased towards considerations of the hearer's face. This bias is detectable in the majority of subsequent accounts of face and facework. In order to redress it, Hymes (1986, pp. 81–3) uses Goffman's (1967b) distinction between deference and demeanour. While the former is 'what one owes to the other' the latter is 'what one owes to oneself' (1986, p. 82). Kendall (2004) does the same thing (though without reference to Hymes), while reminding us of Goffman's (1967a) point that the former is one of the ways through which the latter is achieved; that is, attention to the other's face is a crucial aspect of attention to one's own face.

The study of facework, then, encompasses reactive and proactive, supportive and antagonistic interpersonal phenomena, intention and effect, and behaviour addressed to self, other(s) or both. A number of typologies of facework have been devised which take some or all of these distinctions into account (e.g. Bayraktoğlou 1991; Tracy 1990; Hernandez-Flores 2008, p. 694).

This breadth of behaviour should not surprise us. It follows from Goffman's conception of face as the result of lines taken, lines which are unavoidable whenever people come into contact with each other. As a result, 'while face concerns are not necessarily focal, they are always immanent' (Tracy 1990, p. 217—see O'Driscoll 2011, pp. 28–9 for a discussion of the situational factors influencing the extent to which it is foregrounded). Terkourafi (2008, p. 47) goes so far as to claim that 'all linguistic expressions do "information work" *and* "facework" at the same time all the time'. Scollon and Scollon (2001, p. 148) aver that 'there is no faceless communication'.

3.3 The Locus and Scope of Face

Having gone beyond its role as a contributor to the study of politeness in the narrower sense, the concept of face has established its place in politeness studies in its widest sense (i.e. the sense on which this volume is based). As such, it features in frameworks which attempt to encompass the whole field of the interpersonal in interaction. Thus, it is an essential building block in the framework named relational work (e.g. Watts 2003; Locher and Watts 2005)—in which this term is presented as virtually synonymous with that of facework in its widest sense, but preferred in order to avoid the impression that only the narrower understandings of 'facework' as supportive and/or reactive only (see above) are being addressed.[7]

This wide field of behaviour which involves face raises a problem, however. How is face to be conceptualised so that it offers a sharp enough focus to be meaningful and useful? One attempt to do so is Spencer-Oatey's rapport management framework, which positions face as just one of three interactional concerns of participants, the others being 'rights' (what people feel they are, or should be, entitled to) and situationally specific goals (what they hope to achieve) (Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2008, 2009). In this way, face is reserved for the notion of personal value, separate from interactants' expectations and goals. Likewise, Arundale's face-constituting theory positions face as principally relevant to just one of three dimensions along which people relate to the each other (Arundale 2006, 2009, pp. 41–2).

Like the rapport management framework (but unlike Arundale's theory—see below), the majority of the numerous studies which have made use of the

[7] It is perhaps because of this danger that some scholars use the term 'face practices' (e.g. Chang 2016; Cardon 2009), 'face-related practices' (Kendall 2004) or 'face-related activities' (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010) as a way of making clear that the behaviour pertaining to face being examined is not limited in these ways.

concept of face in the examination of instances of interaction have assumed that face is a property of the self. But what kind of self and what aspects of him/her? What is it about the self that the concept of face denotes?

One matter that by now appears to be largely agreed is that, notwithstanding Brown and Levinson's formulation (see Sect. 2.6 above), a person's face-wants and a person's actual face are not the same thing. As Lim (1994, p. 210) emphasises, it is because our faces depend on the evaluations of others that the concept is different from that of self-concepts such as ego and self-esteem. O'Driscoll (1996, p. 12) describes face as that 'aspect of our self-esteem … that depends on others' attitudes towards us'.

But other questions remain. Are we talking about the individual per se, the one we can identify at any time (e.g. in memory or a photo), or some more limited aspect of the self, such as his/her relationships with others and/or the participant in interaction? A related question is whether or not people have face when they are not interacting.

The equivalent or nearest lexemes for 'face' in most languages seem to denote concepts which largely overlap with notions such as honour, reputation and identity. When such conceptualisations are carried over into theorising of face, the question arises as to why we need the concept of face at all, rather than just using one of those other terms. One possible answer is simply that 'identity' (and the other two terms) is generally understood to refer to more enduring aspects of the self while face pertains to ephemeral ones (see Joseph 2013 for a discussion). However, as Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini (2010, p. 2073) observe, because, on the one hand, culture-specific notions of face invariably encompass aspects of the self which hold constant across encounters while, on the other hand, the notion of identity has been increasingly characterised as something 'rooted in interaction and thus less enduring than previously thought', confusion over the notions of face and identity has become especially acute. (See also Blitvich and Sifianou (Chap. 10), this volume).

The problem, then, is how to avoid this potential terminological confusion. One way to do this is to continue to claim the whole field for face by identifying different aspects of it. Spencey-Oatey (2005, pp. 100–103), for example, recognising this divergence between the 'pan-situational' (i.e. enduring across interactions) quality of culture-specific conceptualisations and Goffman's theoretical concept, which pertains to interaction alone, suggests labelling the former 'respectability face' (or—2002—'quality face') and the latter (in the light of the paragraph above, somewhat confusingly) 'social identity face'. Likewise, Hatfield and Hahn (2011) refer to the former as 'persisting face'.

Another kind of response to the problem, which goes some way to incorporating the abovementioned view of identity as also 'rooted in interaction' and emergent in it, is to see face as something smaller and more particular than identity, either as a part of it (see Garcés Conejos-Blitvich 2013; Miller 2013, pp. 75–6) or as something with ramifications for it (Arundale 2009, 2010) and/or as something which operates at a smaller time scale (Joseph 2013). This smaller part of identity which comprises face seems to have two aspects. One is its fundamental relationality. For example, Ruhi (2010, p. 2134) suggests that face 'is claimed and/or attributed in relation to 'image of other', that is, the categorizing(s) of others' and is thus always constructed in relation to the other. In Terkourafi's (2007, 2008) conceptualisation of face, this is the characteristic which she calls 'intentionality'. The other aspect is its emotional element. For example, Spencer-Oatey (2007, p. 644) suggests the difference is that 'face is only associated with attributes that are affectively sensitive to the claimant'.

A somewhat different, although not entirely incompatible, way of sharpening the concept of face is to exclude completely the reputational aspects of the self from its purview; that is, to insist that, while face may be a property of the self, this is exclusively the *interacting* self. In this view (e.g. Terkourafi 2008; O'Driscoll 2011), people only have faces when they are in the presence of other people; when they are alone, there is no such thing. This view probably accords most closely with Goffman's original definition (see above). However, it appears to downplay—some would say ignore—the above-mentioned relational element. Sifianou (2011, 2013) shows that face is relational in the sense that it exists by virtue of one's relationships with other people but, she argues, not necessarily interactional in that my face with you is built out of all our previous dealings with each other, and events may occur outside our encounters with each other which can affect these faces. Indeed, she argues, these events may simply be self-reflections on past encounters, an example of which is the study by Wang and Spencer-Oatey (2015), who argue that the enduring aspects of face deserve more research.

If it is accepted that face endures beyond interaction, then an additional proposed aspect of face swims into view. Given that the actions of others with whom one is associated will have a bearing on one's own face, and that conversely one's own actions will have repercussions on the image of those others, we arrive at the notion of group face. This notion was first proposed largely in reaction to the perceived bias towards individualism in Brown and Levinson's notion of face (Nwoye 1992; Morisaki and Gudykunst 1994; De Kadt 1998; Obeng 1999) and is still being advanced more recently (e.g. He and Zhang 2011). As Hatfield and Hahn (2014, pp. 222–4) show, however,

it is not always clear whether this notion really does involve groups actually having faces or whether it is just a way of emphasising that in more collectivist cultures a person's face is in the gift of the group.[8] Taking it as the former, of course, entails face existing outside specific instances of interaction because a group as a whole cannot take a 'line' in the Goffmanian sense (Hatfield and Hahn 2014, p. 223) and in nearly all cases of interaction not all of its members are present (O'Driscoll 2011, p. 33). And even then, it may not be clear whether we are talking about the face of the group as such or rather what Hatfield and Hahn (2014) call 'third party face'. (A member of a group apologises to an outgroup member for the behaviour of another member of the ingroup—does this facework operate on the face of the group or just the face of the offender?) Given these considerations, it is again not clear how group face as presented in many of these works is to be distinguished from (the self-evidently valid concept of) a group's reputation / image /identity. Nevertheless, it is possible to come across examples in which the notion of group face does indeed appear to have a relatively distinct meaning (e.g. Spencer-Oatey 2007, pp. 645–6).

A more radical way to separate identity and face is to foreground both the interactional and relational aspects of face. If face is 'grounded in the interactional dyad' and 'cannot be an attribute of individuals in isolation' (Terkourafi 2008, p. 52), then maybe it is not an attribute of *any* kind of individual. In this view, while identity is an individual phenomenon, face is not. It has been claimed (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini 2003) that, notwithstanding Goffman's emphasis on interaction, his concept of face, while richer than Brown and Levinson's notion, is still too grounded in a distinctively Western individualist concept of the self.

It is from this perspective that Arundale's face-constituting theory (FCT) (e.g. 2006, 2009, 2010, 2013) has been proposed. This theory designates face a phenomenon which pertains to the relationship between interactants, with the understanding that a relationship cannot simply be derived from the sum of those involved in it (i.e. the aggregate of identities). In this theory, face is described as the 'interpreting' of persons-in-relationships, thus highlighting the momentary, fleeting aspects of its quality (since this interpreting can naturally change from moment to moment in the course of interaction). It is part of 'dialectic' between person-centred and 'macro-social' phenomena; that is, between the individual and the social. FCT is thus an attempt to privilege

[8] And in fact it is not necessary to partake of such a culture for the group to be influential. As Spencer-Oatey (2005, pp. 106–7) demonstrates, a person's sense of wellbeing may be very much bound up with the standing of the group with which s/he identifies.

neither of these in order to avoid the limitation of explaining individual phenomena only in terms of the social (as with an appeal to social norms or values) and the limitation of explaining social phenomena only in terms of the individual (as with Brown and Levinson's explanation of people's social behaviour through an appeal to their social wants).

While this theory has not as yet gained wide acceptance (but see Chang 2016), the notion of faces being constituted in interaction—that is, created and modified—has. This acceptance has encouraged the detailed analysis of stretches of interaction in which the evidence available in the data is given more credence than the categories imposed by scholars. The relatively minute attention to interactional detail which FCT demands has the advantage of guarding against the tendency to stereotyping across cultures. This can only be a good thing. At the same time, and given that most encounters take place between people who have encountered each other before, the interpersonal history of interactants cannot be ignored (see 'relationality' above). In this sense, as Haugh (2009) advocates, face needs to be seen as not just constitut*ed in* interaction but also constitut*ive of* it. In other words, it is both cause and effect.

3.4 The Contents of Face

Given the range of desires, attributes and situations in which face is involved, it is not surprising that many have seen Brown and Levinson's identification of two specific kinds of face—positive and negative—as erroneously poverty-stricken, observing that there must be many more aspects of the sense of self which are involved in face (e.g. Tracy 1990, p. 215). Moreover, their claim to the universality of these two kinds of face quickly encountered a barrage of cross-cultural criticism, with scholars from around the world pointing out that people in their culture are relatively unconcerned about individual autonomy in interaction and that therefore the notion of addressing negative face does not seem to be relevant. Examples are Wierzbicka (1985) for Polish culture, Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989) for Japanese, Gu (1990) and Mao (1994) for Chinese, Nwoye (1992) for Igbo and Sifianou (1992) for Greek (see Watts 2003, pp. 102–3 for further references).

Nevertheless, the notions of positive and negative faces have been found at least partially useful in many subsequent empirical studies, especially in Anglo cultures, and they have become established as basic items in the descriptive toolbox of scholars (albeit often applied somewhat sloppily). Occasionally (e.g. Holmes and Marra 2004), they are explicitly upheld.

Moreover, it is remarkable how the kernel insight of the distinction between positive and negative faces has survived, or is at least reflected in, numerous suggested modifications, revisions, and even radical reconceptualisations of the contents of face. As O'Driscoll (2007b) has observed, Brown and Levinson's two faces are not of equal size: while negative face is quite specific, positive face covers a more general field of what is desirable. In particular, it has both a general approval aspect and a similarity/belonging aspect. One way of overcoming this disparity is to split it in two. This is the course taken by Lim and Bowers (1991), who propose replacing it with competence face and fellowship face. Another way (O'Driscoll 1996, 2007b) is to remove the 'approval' aspect from the equation, so that we are left just with the belonging aspect and the two faces are of the same order, both concerned only with an axis of togetherness–apartness. And nearly all theorising on the components of face has come up with largely the same two qualities addressed to the same matter. Table 5.1 lists the various labels accorded these two. These are conceived by the different scholars at varying levels of abstraction, as covering varying proportions of the totality of face, with varying claims to universality. But the similarity is instructive. It is reminiscent of Goffman's (1971, p. 64) aphorism that 'whenever one individual rubs against another, he is likely to say hullo [see column A below] or excuse me [column B]'

Some scholars (e.g. O'Driscoll 1996, 2007b; Scollon and Scollon 2001) present the togetherness–apartness axis as pertaining exclusively to social distance; that is, as operating on only the horizontal dimension of relationships. It is obvious, though, that to be so specific means that there must be more to face. Accordingly, Scollon and Scollon (2001, pp. 43–59) attempt to relate togetherness–apartness to the vertical (hierarchical) dimension of relationships to

Table 5.1 The togetherness and apartness sides of face: varying terms used

A	B	
Positive face	Negative face	Brown and Levinson (1987), O'Driscoll (1996, 2007b)
Connection face	Separation face	Arundale (2006, 2009)
Approach	Withdrawal	Terkourafi (2007, 2008)
Interpersonal face	Personal face	Janney and Arndt (1992)
Ideal social identity	Ideal individual autonomy	Mao (1994)
Involvement face	Independence face	Scollon and Scollon (2001)
Affiliation face	Autonomy face	Bravo (1996, 2008)
Fellowship face	Autonomy face	Lim and Bowers (1991)
Solidarity face	Autonomy face	Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010, 2011, pp. 237–57)
Union	Autonomy	Hymes (1986)

identify three different relational 'systems' (which they call deference, solidarity and hierarchical), while O'Driscoll is explicit that the other aspects of face cannot be specified outside the cultural or situational context, so that while the togetherness–apartness axis can be advanced as universal, other aspects of face can only be identified as empty shells which these different contexts will fill differently. Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010, 2011, pp. 237–57) takes a similar approach. In addition to the two sides of togetherness/apartness, she proposes the empty containers of prestige face (containing the enduring, cross-situational elements of face), relational face (containing the situation-specific elements) and moral face (capable of containing both elements).[9]

On the other hand, those scholars who have worked with the togetherness–apartness axis to propose an all-encompassing, culture-general account of face have necessarily conceptualised it at a very abstract level. Arundale's connection face / separation face (2006, 2009, 2010) and Terkourafi's (2007, 2008) approach / withdrawal cannot simply be read off in actual observable behaviour. Rather, the dimension will take many varied forms in different cultures, so that in order to understand how interactants from that culture construe it, and thus how it manifests itself in interaction, 'ethnographically grounded research' (Arundale 2009, p. 43) is necessary (such as Haugh's 2007 study of the Japanese concepts of *uchi* and *tachiba*), as well as the use of additional conceptual tools (such as Terkourafi's 2009 use of the sociological distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*).

4 Case Study

Face is not a methodology or a framework. It is a concept which attempts to denote a phenomenon of crucial relevance to many aspects of interactive behaviour and which therefore offers a means of exploring and understanding this behaviour. The case study here demonstrates its use for that understanding. It shows how face can, as Brown and Levinson assert, be used to explain why people do not follow Gricean maxims. But it goes further than that. While Brown and Levinson's explanation involves an appeal to rationality, this example allows us to understand behaviour which is apparently *ir*rational. In doing so, it also exemplifies the ubiquity of face and people's pervading concern for it, even under apparently unpromising circumstances (i.e. when

[9] The first two of these 'containers' are reminiscent of quality/reputation face and identity face in Spencer-Oatey's rapport management model (see Sect. 3.3 above). This latter framework, however, is one that does not give a central role to the togetherness–apartness axis. It merely observes some tangential correlation between Brown and Levinson's positive and negative faces and some, but not all, face concerns (Spencer-Oatey 2007, pp. 649–51).

one would not expect face to be salient). Moreover, it illustrates both intention and effect. It is a brief exchange between the referee of a rugby union football match and one of the players.

First, two pieces of contextual information: (1) The rules of rugby are myriad and complicated. Partly to make proceedings more accessible to TV viewers, referees at top-flight matches wear a microphone.[10] (2) Rugby is a violent game. To help reduce the physical risks, there are certain precautionary protocols. One of these pertains to the danger of concussion. A referee who suspects a player might possibly be concussed is obliged to order him to leave the pitch immediately for a medical check-up.

At one point in the Ireland v France world cup match played on 11 October 2015, one of the Irish players could be seen on one knee, the TV commentator explaining that 'Chris Henry's taken a bit of a bash to the head'. Play at this point had stopped and the screen showed the referee, Nigel Owens, and Henry exchanging words. From what can be directly heard of their exchange and the commentator's explanatory summary of it afterwards,[11] the following can be reconstructed:

Nigel Owens:	Had a bang on the head, have you?
Chris Henry:	No, I'm alright
Nigel Owens:	Do you need to go off for a test?
Chris Henry:	[indicates 'no' as he gets up to standing position]
Nigel Owens:	OK?
Chris Henry:	[confirms]
Nigel Owens:	Are you sure?
Chris Henry:	[confirms]
Nigel Owens:	What's my name?
Chris Henry:	[smiling] François
Both trot back to the action, with Henry patting the referee on the back.	

[10] But the referee's words are not designed for viewers. The referee talks only to players and other match officials and the microphone is not connected to any PA system (as it is, for example, in American football). In terms of Goffman's participation framework (1981, pp. 129–43), spectators at the event, TV viewers and TV commentators all remain as bystanders to this talk. However, the latter two groups can overhear much of what is said. Note also that there is lots to hear because modern rugby referees are far more vocal than in most other sports. Not only do they explain what rule has been contravened when they have blown the whistle; to help a match 'flow', they also warn players when they appear *about* to contravene one.

[11] TV recording checked on ITV Player, accessed 25 October 2015 https://www.itv.com/itvplayer/rugby-world-cup-2015/series-1/episode-40-pool-d-france-v-ireland.

The relevant sequence occurs at 1:35.50 to 1:36.30. The commentator's summary was 'Nigel Owens there, a little a bit concerned about—er—Chris Henry, whether he'd got concussion, so he asked him what his name was and Chris Henry said "François", which confirmed in Nigel Owen's mind that he was all right'. It is actually very hard to notice Henry's smile in this recording, but this could be seen on a still photo on http://www.irishrugby.ie/sixnations/squads_ireland.php?player=19881&includeref=dynamic accessed 25 October 2015.

The issue here is with the final exchange in this encounter, in which Chris Henry responds to Nigel Owen's question with an incorrect name. To identify your referee so spectacularly wrongly might well be taken as an indication of concussion, which would mean that he would have to leave the pitch. And yet the referee does *not* send him off, interpreting the response as confirmation that he does *not* have concussion.

The response is a blatant flout of the maxim of quality. It 'successfully' generates the implicature that for Henry to respond so promptly and smilingly with a statement that they both know to be untrue indicates that he is in full working possession of his faculties. The precise (incorrect) name given by Henry assists in this regard—a name so obviously French can be interpreted as an insinuation that the referee is being biased in favour of the French team, thus suggesting that Henry is in such full possession of his faculties that he can even indulge in 'banter'.

So far, so good. But *why*, when so much was at stake for this Irish player, did he choose to respond in this way? There must surely have been a risk, however small, that the referee would not 'get the joke' and interpret the response as indicating concussion (the French name indicating a loss of the capacity to distinguish the people present)—or if not concussion, as a blunt accusation of favouritism, which could have incurred some sanction from the referee detrimental to his team.[12] Why did he behave so irrationally? Why didn't he just take the safe course of action and respond with 'Nigel', 'Nigel Owens' or 'Mr Owens'?

The answer is that even in this situation where instrumental concerns—both general (the outcome of the match) and personal (the desire to remain part of the match)—are paramount for Henry, face has become salient to him. The referee's question is not a genuine request for information (Nigel Owens already knows his own name). Rather, it is part of an enquiry into whether Henry is fit to remain on the field. So far, this enquiry has been direct, asking Henry himself what the case is (Do you need …? OK? Sure?), thus having something of a solicitous quality. But now, this last question, in asking something to which the questioner already knows the answer, positions Henry as one whose assessment cannot be trusted. The referee has changed from personal enquirer after his wellbeing to quizmaster, and Henry is cast in the subordinate role of one undergoing a test. Moreover this test is of the most basic of human competences, an image of which every person wishes

[12] Unlike those in football (soccer), rugby referees penalise *any* kind of verbal dissent from players about their decisions. This practice may explain the fact that Henry pats Owens on the back afterwards—to assure him it was a joke.

to project about themselves. While it is probably easy enough for Henry to accept this subordinate role (the activity type makes him subordinate to the referee anyway), it is a threat to his face to have his word doubted and an even greater face-threat to have this most basic human competence called into question. For him to answer simply with the correct name would be to acquiesce in this procedure, thus assenting to the need for such a test and thus accepting meekly this humiliating status. The imperative to defend his face under these circumstances is apparently so strong that it leads him to risk giving the 'wrong' answer. This answer, by implying that the question was not necessary in the first place, extricates Henry from the face-damaging position in which the question has placed him. Thus he saves his face.

Now, if we step back and take the more general interactional perspective, we can see that this self-face-saving response by Chris Henry may not be as irrational as it appears at first sight. If we accept, as Goffman presents it and Haugh (2009) argues, that face is not merely an aspect of interaction but actually constitutive of it, and that therefore there is a general default expectation that we all behave with proper concern for our own faces, then *not* behaving with this concern could be interpreted as a major indicator of incapacity (albeit perhaps temporary). In the light of this general expectation, Henry's response, by instantiating such concern, is in itself a demonstration that he is not concussed. In this case, then, as in many others, there is perhaps not really much conflict between face concerns and instrumental ones. Perhaps a 'correct' response from Henry (i.e. 'Nigel Owens') would have been marginally less convincing as a demonstration of being compos mentis than the 'wrong' one which he gave.

We arrive at the same conclusion if we take a different scenario and posit a reason other than the instrumental for the ref asking that bizarre quiz question. It is possible that at this point in the encounter the instrumental matter (whether Henry might be concussed) has in the ref's mind already been settled but that he has his own face-related concerns. That is, maybe he was already largely satisfied that Henry was not concussed but wished not to end the encounter on the note that has been established. Perhaps it would feel wrong to him for his contribution to the encounter to comprise solely the solicitous concern which he has been evincing, indexing an inappropriately intimate relationship (like that of a parent or friend) and thus possibly opening him to the charge of partiality in favour of the Irish team. By suddenly posing a test question, he can reassert his role as impersonal arbiter of proceedings. The fact that (assuming he is satisfied Henry is not concussed) it is such a ridiculously easy test question would support this reading; that is, for him it has little or no instrumental function but is rather oriented to his

own face. He can enact himself as impersonal arbiter (test question) but one with a light touch (ridiculous question). In this scenario, Henry may have interpreted the question as actually *inviting* banter, so that Henry's response is again appropriate—again the 'correct' answer (a form of the ref's name) would have signalled a failure to catch on to this face-related intention. In both scenarios too, Henry's response, by displaying confidence in the ref's ability to get the joke (first scenario) or by showing ability to catch on to the ref's interpersonal concerns, achieves some 'togetherness' facework.

Note finally that this case has nothing to do with the notion of intrinsically threatening speech acts. The challenge to Henry's face posed by the ref's last question was not contained in the act itself. This was an explicit request for information, the provision of which asks for minuscule effort (i.e. no significant imposition). Rather, it is in the fact that it was an indirect way of asking 'Are you OK to continue playing?' It was the indirectness itself—that is, the manner of the enquiry—which caused the threat (contra Brown and Levinson, where indirectness is supposed to be a means of mitigating the threat), the more so because it occurs in a co-text where the same question has previously been asked directly—a nice illustration of the fact that face-threats need not, and in cases like this cannot, be attached to single utterances.

5 Summary and Future Directions

The above account has done no more than scratch the surface of the vast amount of scholarly enquiry into the interpersonal aspects of interaction in the last 40 years or so which has theorised on the concept of face and/or made use of it in examinations of particular cases. The size of this body of work is testament to the fascination which it holds and the value it is regarded as having. This value has something to do with the concept capturing a phenomenon which lies at the intersections of personal identity, group identity, personal reputation, personal self-esteem, the flavour of relationships and the nature of interaction.

And perhaps the fact that there is no general agreement as to the precise locus and scope of face highlights its reality (as not just a fashionable term for something else). Although it is possible to argue that it is a phenomenon confined to relationships and constituted only in interaction, it is also possible to find counterexamples suggesting that face appears to be also attached firmly to the individual and his/her feelings of self-worth. Even on occasions such as the 'exploitative' British TV game show *The Weakest Link*, when face-attack is the norm, understood as part of a game, the forewarned victims of this attack

can still feel, by their own report afterwards, acute loss of face (Culpeper 2005, p. 42; Bayraktoğlu and Sifianou 2012, p. 146). An incident where all participants experience severe face-threat regardless of the nature of their relationship is also exemplified by O'Driscoll (2011, pp. 18–19). There do indeed seem to be phenomena concerned with people and their interaction which no term other than face can capture.

There is no doubt, however, that face can be—and has been—overapplied as an explanatory phenomenon, especially in that aspect of it which seems to pertain to the individual. Intachakra (2012) and O'Driscoll (2011, pp. 20–21) both demonstrate that it is not the same thing as feelings of self-worth, and O'Driscoll (2007a, pp. 240–42) offers an example to argue that a threat to negative face and a threat to one's freedom of action can be entirely different, even opposed, things.

This essay started by describing face as a metaphor. That this is indeed the case is underlined by the fact that it is now routinely made use of in studies of modes of interaction other than the face-to-face. And Arundale (2013) has suggested that, in its calling to mind a foregrounded person against the background of the social, it may not be the most helpful metaphor for exploring relational and interactive phenomena. If some other metaphor could be found, what remained for face could become a bit sharper. Even with the present state of affairs, however, it remains a powerful tool for the investigation of the interpersonal aspects of interaction, all the more so as it has helped to show that such aspects can crop up at the most apparently unlikely junctures.

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6

Power, Solidarity and (Im)politeness

Helen Spencer-Oatey and Vladimir Žegarac

1 Introduction

'Power', 'solidarity' and 'distance' are ordinary words that are used as technical terms in research on human communication. Although there is no consensus about what the theoretical contents of these technical terms should be, their importance is generally taken for granted in pragmatics, sociolinguistics and social psychology, because empirical research has shown repeatedly and consistently that explanations of relational work in communication, including politeness phenomena, can be given only provided the variables of 'power', 'solidarity' and 'distance' are taken into account.

The distribution and dynamics of power between the interactants, as well as the solidarity/distance between them, guide and constrain cooperation in communication. For this reason power and solidarity/distance have had an important place in linguistic (im)politeness research, including the seminal works of Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) and Leech (1983), who both identified them as key variables.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_6

Although people enter into social interaction with more or less clear and more or less strongly held assumptions about their respective statuses and their social roles (including assumptions about the power differential, the likely social distance and the degree and type of solidarity between them) as well as personal attitudes towards each other, their interrelationships take shape in and change during the social interaction. In this chapter, we explore the conceptualisation of these variables, critically review research into their impact on (im)politeness, and illustrate the points we make through a case study. We end with a brief comment on areas for future research.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Power

The term *power* (henceforth, P) refers to the ability to exercise control or exert influence on other people. P has been defined from both an individualistic perspective and from a group perspective. Probably the best known definition proposed by Max Weber is cast in individualist terms:

> By power is meant that opportunity existing within a social [relationship] which permits one to carry out one's own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests.
>
> Weber 1968: 212

Weber's definition is cast in terms of an individual's opportunity to 'carry out' their own will and similarly, within the field of pragmatics the most influential definitions of P are also cast in individualist terms:

> One person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he is able to control the behavior of the other. Power is a relationship between at least two persons, and it is nonreciprocal in the sense that both cannot have power in the same area of behavior. There are many bases of power – physical strength, wealth, age, sex, institutionalized role in the church, the state, the army or within the family.
>
> Brown and Gilman 1972: 255

> P [power] is an asymmetric social dimension of relative power, roughly in Weber's sense. That is, P(H,S) is the degree to which H [hearer] can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S's [speaker's]

> plans and self-evaluation. In general there are two sources of P, either of which may be authorized or unauthorized – material control (over economic distribution and physical force) and metaphysical control (over the actions of others, by virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those others).
>
> In most cases an individual's power is drawn from both these sources, or is thought to overlap them. The reflex of a great P differential is perhaps archetypally 'deference'
>
> Brown and Levinson 1987: 77

Different authors have emphasised different aspects of the power relationship: power of control (e.g. Brown and Gilman 1972; Brown and Levinson 1978/1987), social status or rank (e.g. Cansler and Stiles 1981), authority, or the legitimate right to exert influence (e.g. Leichty and Applegate 1991), and a general notion of equality-inequality (e.g. Holtgraves 1986). Also useful is French and Raven's (1959) distinction between five main sources or types of P, and it is one that we draw on in the case study:

(a) Legitimate P, which is a function of the formally institutionalised social roles of the participants in relation to each other.
(b) Referent P: the power a person has due to the qualities they are perceived as having by others.
(c) Expert P: the power a person has in virtue of their knowledge and skills.
(d) Reward P is determined by the extent and ways in which a person is in a position to reward others for acting in ways that person regards as desirable.
(e) Coercive P involves the use of pressure on others to comply.

Conceptualisations of P, such as those introduced briefly above, are important for explaining and describing its role in (interpersonal) communication. When mentally represented, P is likely to be part of the initial context of individuals who are about to engage (or have just engaged) in communication. Clearly, the dynamics of the interaction will depend on whether these assumptions are (correctly) presumed shared or whether one or more participants want to challenge them. This may call for the (re)negotiation of the initial assumptions, leading to the suspension or rejection of initial assessments and the provisional or more lasting acceptance of new assumptions relating to P. These assumptions will in turn inform the production of communicative acts and guide their interpretation. They will also influence their affective-emotional impact on the participants.

2.2 Solidarity/Distance

'Solidarity' or 'distance' or 'social distance' (henceforth D) (see Spencer-Oatey 1996, for an exhaustive overview of the terms used for this variable) can be thought of as a manifestation of a symmetrical social relationship between the participants in relation to some relevant aspect of their social relationship. According to Brown and Levinson:

> D [distance] is a symmetric social dimension of similarity/difference within which S [speaker] & H [hearer] stand for the purposes of this act. In many cases (but not all), it is based on an assessment of the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including face) exchanged between S & H (or parties representing S or H, or for whom S and H are representatives). An important part of the assessment of D will usually be measures of social distance based on stable social attributes. The reflex of social closeness is, generally, the reciprocal giving and receiving of positive face.
>
> Brown and Levinson 1987: 76–7

Like P, D can be described at the individual level and at the group level. At both levels, distance is defined in terms of the perceived and/or actual differences which are deemed relevant. These might be racial, sexual, religious, political or ethnic, they may pertain to wealth and status and/or be related to social class. D has a major impact on social interaction between people, their acceptance as members of particular social groups, and their potential for interaction with particular individuals.

Social distance between groups is often codified or institutionalised in the form of social norms about the ways group members relate to each other in social interaction. It is the basis of criteria for group membership which underlie the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', i.e. between those who are group members and those who are not. D can also be characterised in terms of the frequency of communication between groups or individuals. The distance between groups or individuals who interact frequently can be seen as smaller than the distance between those who interact relatively infrequently. Another dimension of social distance, sometimes termed 'affective distance' concerns the affective-emotional disposition towards and perceptions about other individuals or groups. There is no consensus as to what the components of distance are. To give but one example, Slugoski and Turnbull (1988) take the view that the affective-emotional relationship between the participants should be treated as distinct from D. However, other authors, most notably Brown and Levinson (1978/1987), include the affective-emotional relationship in their construct of D, as this allows for a simpler account of facework in analysing linguistic (im)politeness.

Both the situation-independent (relatively stable, a priori) aspects of P and D, as well as their manifestations in the dynamics of social interaction, are relevant to the analysis of (im)politeness. The stable, situation-independent aspects of P and D are part of the background or the initial context of the interaction. They can be communicated, (re)negotiated and challenged, as in the authentic situation described below:

Situation A group of six professionals working in a university in the UK are members of a job interview panel. They are meeting before the interviews to agree on the various details of how those are to be conducted. The members of the panel (whose real names are not given here) are:

1. James Jones, Professor
2. Dr Susan Smith, Lecturer
3. Ms Melinda May, student representative
4. Mr Bill Browne, Head of Department
5. Professor Rachel Roberts, Faculty Dean
6. Dr Peter Paterson, external panel member from another faculty

The meeting started five minutes later than scheduled because Rachel (the Faculty Dean) was late, due to attending another meeting. James (Professor Jones) suggested that the panel discuss and agree on who will ask what questions. During their discussion Rachel arrived and sat at the seat at the table which the other members had left for her (following a solidarity strategy based on a priori situation-independent contextual assumptions about the respective power differential and distance between the panellists). Rachel thanked (in a very sincere and informal manner) the panel members for their decision to get on with finalising the interview arrangements (showing an orientation towards minimising distance and the importance of the power differential, as she would have been within her rights to challenge the other decision to start before her arrival). James suggested that a panel member who had good handwriting should volunteer to write down the list of questions that would be asked and each person dictate their question (this showed an orientation towards equality in terms of power and distance, at least in overt communication, as no one assumed that the Dean would note down the questions and the student representative probably did not have the right to do so; it was Susan, the most junior person who volunteered, but she was not explicitly asked to do this task). When Peter started dictating his question with the words: 'What contribution to the post will you make as a team player', Bill interrupted him suggesting that he should begin by describing why team work was important for the job and then asking the question. (Peter perceived this as Bill's attempt to make a bid for coercive power over him, something which he felt he had got some support for,

as he noticed that Rachel had winced at the point of Bill's intervention; another possibility, which Peter did not consider at the time, was that Bill may have intended to make a bid for greater referent power, perhaps in order to impress Rachel.) Peter explained informally and calmly that he would give the context in the actual interviews, but was just dictating his question in the form needed to be kept on record (and his response was motivated by his preference for ignoring the challenge, as he felt it was most appropriate to let it pass, because the threat to his face was not significant enough to be worth responding to by a counterchallenge).

This example illustrates the importance of P and D in communication. While these variables have received considerable attention in analyses of linguistic (im)politeness, there is no generally agreed framework for the best way of taking account of them. In the following section we explore it using Haugh's (2007a) tripartite perspective on politeness.

3 Critical Overview of Research

Haugh (2007a), building on ideas put forward by Eelen (2001: 33), suggests three perspectives on (im)politeness: expressive politeness1, classificatory politeness1, and interactional achievement politeness1. Expressive politeness1 refers the speaker's perspective; in other words, to the speaker's choice of phrasing/behaviour in order to convey politeness or impoliteness. Classificatory politeness1 refers to the hearer's perspective; in other words, to the evaluations of politeness or impoliteness that hearers make of other people's speech/ behaviour. Interactional achievement politeness1 refers to the joint accomplishment of politeness or impoliteness by both the speaker and hearer. Haugh (2007a: 306–7) explains it as follows:

while making a distinction between expressive politeness1 and classificatory politeness1 is useful if one wants to focus on disputes between participants about particular (im)politeness evaluations in an interaction, it is less useful in accounting for instances where (im)politeness emerges through interaction. In other words, while (im)politeness may be *projected* by speakers or *interpreted* by hearers, if our aim is to better understand how perceptions of (im)politeness arise through interaction, it is important to also focus on how (im)politeness is *interactionally achieved* as a joint accomplishment of both the speaker and the hearer. … In other words, politeness research can benefit from focusing on the interactional achievement of both converging and diverging evaluations of (im)politeness1, as well as on how (im)politeness1 norms, or more broadly ideologies, are shared or constructed through social life.

We use this tripartite perspective in this section as a framework for exploring research perspectives on power and solidarity in relation to (im)politeness.

3.1 Expressive (Im)politeness

As explained above, Brown and Levinson's model of politeness identified P and D as two of the key factors that speakers take into account when considering how to perform a face-threatening act. It is very widely accepted that these two factors are of crucial importance, yet there are a number of questions associated with this.

How Do People Make Assessments of P & D?

First of all, how do people make assessments of P and D? According to Brown and Levinson there are three possibilities, which we label absolute P/D, role relative P/D and context relative P/D. For absolute P/D, an individual would be attributed an absolute amount of P and D, irrespective of whom they were interacting with or in what context, while for role relative P/D, an individual's level of P/D would vary according to the role of their interlocutor. Cansler and Stiles (1981: 460) differentiate these two possibilities like this: 'A person's *status*, or social rank, may be construed both absolutely in a stable social hierarchy (e.g., an academic department, a business organisation, an army, a street gang, or a neighbourhood) and in relation to another member with whom he or she is currently interacting. Thus one's *relative* status[1] is high in a conversation with a subordinate and low in a conversation with a superior, but one's *absolute* status is the same in both conversations.' They carried out a study to explore the impact of absolute and role relative status, using respondents who were all members of a psychology department (professors, third-year undergraduates and first-year undergraduates) and found (unsurprisingly) that relative status was a better predictor of presumptuousness than absolute status.

So does this mean that there is no such thing as absolute P/D? It certainly seems to have much less validity than other types of P/D, yet there may nevertheless be elements of absolute P/D that affect interaction and (im)politeness. For example, might children have low absolute P in society, or might a high-ranking political figure like prime minister or president have high absolute P in that country?

[1] In other words, role relative P/D.

A second possibility for assessing P/D is role relative P/D; in other words, that P/D is not attached to individuals but to roles or role sets. This interpretation has been very widely used in pragmatics research, and especially in cross-cultural pragmatics research (e.g. (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Lorenzo-Dus 2001; Wood and Kroger 1991; Yeung 1997); for a more extensive list, see Spencer-Oatey (1996)). Scenarios specifying different role relations have been used to manipulate different levels of P/D in order to explore their impact on people's language use. For instance, strangers (high D) and (close) friends (low D) have frequently been used in scenarios to manipulate D, and teachers/students and boss/employee have often been used in scenarios to manipulate P. However, as Spencer-Oatey (1996) points out, while the interpretations of the P/D relations of many of the role dyads are uncontroversial, others are less obvious. For instance, Olshtain (1989) treats 'waiter/customer' as an unequal relationship while Wood and Kroger (1991) classify it as an equal one. Similarly, Wood and Kroger (1991) treat 'taxi driver and passenger' as an equal relationship, while Blum-Kulka et al. (1985) refer to 'driver and passenger' as an unequal one.

It seems, therefore, that although some role dyads have fairly uncontroversial role relative P/D associated with them, others do not. A further issue is whether different people, especially if they come from different cultures, make similar judgements about the P/D of role relations. Brown and Levinson (1987: 74, 76) point out that people's assessments of P/D are 'not intended as *sociologists'* ratings of *actual* power, distance, etc., but only as *actors'* assumptions of such ratings, assumed to be mutually assumed, at least within certain limits.' This indicates that in intercultural contexts there is potential for there to be some degree of a mismatch between the interlocutors' perceived levels of P/D, since their role relative P/D assumptions may be different. Little research has been carried out on this, although Spencer-Oatey (1997) found that British and Chinese tutors and postgraduate students held significantly different perceptions of the tutor–student relationship. Chinese respondents judged it to be significantly closer and to have a significantly greater power differential than British respondents did. Moreover, for the British respondents, P and D were positively correlated; in other words, the greater the power differential they perceived, the greater the distance they felt there to be between tutors and students. Or put more simply, for the British, high P and low D seemed to be incompatible. For the Chinese respondents, on the other hand, there was no significant correlation, suggesting that the two are unconnected and that high P and low D, for instance, are as possible as high P and high D.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 243) point out that there may be differences between societies, with some social groups generally valuing status differentiation and others being more egalitarian, and that this is likely to be reflected in the relative frequency of high- or low-P judgements. In status oriented societies, high-P judgements are likely to be widespread, while in egalitarian societies low-P judgements are likely to be more common. In fact, this links interestingly closely with work in psychology and organisational behaviour on cultural values. For example, Hofstede (2001), House et al. (2004) and Schwartz (e.g. Schwartz (1992), Schwartz and Bardi (2001)) all identify power (variously labelled as power distance or simply power) as a fundamental dimension of value variation across societies. They all used different methods for researching cultural values and yet this same dimension emerged across all the studies, suggesting a level of validity.

The third perspective that Brown and Levinson suggest for assessing P & D is context relative P/D. They explain it as follows:

> A third view would be that stable social valuations, whether of individuals or of roles, are only one element that enters into the assessment of P. Other situational sources of power may contribute to or adjust or entirely override such stable social valuations. Momentary weaknesses in bargaining power, strength of character, or alliances may all play a role in the assessment of P.
>
> Brown and Levinson 1987: 79

Brown and Levinson find this third perspective the most adequate because it is much more dynamic and nuanced. It is particularly compatible with the interactional achievement perspective on politeness. However, as explained in Sect. 2, in our view there are quite a number of situations in which, at least at the start of an interaction, people have to make role relative P/D assessments, even if they are quickly jointly negotiated as the interaction unfolds. This corresponds to the distinction that Argyle and Kendon (1972) make between 'standing features' that 'change little throughout a given encounter' and 'dynamic features' (p. 25) and to the distinction that Kecskes (2014) makes between 'a priori' and 'emergent' elements of the communication process.

How Do P and D Interconnect?

A second question is how P and D interconnect. In Brown and Levinson's model there is a summative relation: speakers add the values for P + D + R to compute (albeit subconsciously) a total degree of 'weightiness', and then use this to decide how to perform a face-threatening act. The formula indicates

that the greater the weightiness, the greater the politeness that is needed. Leech (1983) originally also made that assumption, but more recently he (2014) has expressed doubts about it.

One of the challenges came from Wolfson's Bulge Theory. Wolfson (1988) argued that language does not get increasingly polite as interlocutors become more distant; rather, people speak least politely with those whom they either know very well or else know very little, and speak most politely with those in between. In other words, there is a 'bulge' in the middle, in which greater politeness is shown with those who are neither intimate nor distant. Wolfson comments on it as follows:

> On the face of it, this may seem very strange and even counterintuitive. What do intimates, status unequals, and strangers have in common that non-intimates, status equal friends, co-workers, and acquaintances do not share, and what does the last mentioned group have in common that the first does not share? Very simply, it is the relative certainty of the first relationships in contrast with the instability of the second. Put in other terms, the more status and social distance are seen as fixed, the easier it is for speakers to know what to expect of one another.
>
> Wolfson 1988: 74

Wolfson's evidence for the Bulge Theory came from various studies of speech acts such as compliments, invitations, thanks and apologies (e.g. Beebe et al. 1985; Eisenstein and Bodman 1986; Holmes 1988, 1995; Wolfson 1988). Others, however, have not found convincing evidence for it. For example, Boxer (1993) found no support for it in her study of indirect complaints.

Other researchers have tried to ascertain the relative importance of P and D. For example, Wood and Kroger (1991) examined people's choice of address terms for a number of different role dyads and found that status seemed to have a greater impact on choice than solidarity did. In contrast, Baxter (1984) investigated requesting behaviour towards people of varying levels of status and closeness, and concluded the opposite—that solidarity had a greater impact than power. Tamaoka et al. (2010), on the other hand, found a cultural difference in the relative impact of P and D. They investigated the politeness that Japanese and Korean students would use when asking various people to purchase a concert ticket, and used a decision tree analysis to reveal hierarchies of factors predictive of politeness. They found that for Japanese, distance had the strongest influence while for Koreans it was power. It seems that the relative importance of P and D is a complex issue which is strongly influenced by a range of contextual factors.

How Do P & D Influence (Im)politeness Strategies?

According to Brown and Levinson, the weightiness (P + D + R) of a particular face-threatening act affects the level of indirectness chosen for performing it. If a message is judged to be highly face-threatening (i.e. its weightiness is high), then to be polite the person would convey it very indirectly (i.e. off-record) or may even decide not to say it at all. At the other extreme, if a message is judged to be barely face-threatening at all (i.e. its weightiness is very low), then the person can convey it very directly (i.e. bald, on-record) and still be polite.

A number of scholars have disagreed with Brown and Levinson over this. One criticism is that Brown and Levinson's model implies certain communicative acts intrinsically threaten face while others do not. Matsumoto (1989) has argued that in Japanese, *all* use of language is potentially face-threatening. She, as well as some other Japanese researchers, notably Ide (1989) and Hill et al. (1986), argue that much politeness in Japanese means behaving according to *'wakimae'*. This is a term that is difficult to translate, but which Ide explains as follows:

> The closest equivalent term for *wakimae* in English is 'discernment' […] Whereas Brown and Levinson dealt with face wants, the discernment aspect of linguistic politeness is distinguished by its orientation toward the wants of roles and settings: discernment is oriented mainly toward the wants to acknowledge the ascribed positions or roles of the participants as well as to accommodate to the prescribed norms of the formality of particular settings. The speaker regulates his or her choice of linguistic forms so as to show his or her sense of place. The sense of proper place is determined by what Brown and Levinson termed the weight of power (P), distance (D), and rank (R). The weight is perceived by the speaker against the background of the social norm.
>
> Ide 1989: 230–31

Ide (1989) and Matsumoto (1989) contrast 'discernment' with 'volition', in which the speaker makes more active, strategic choices in use of language. They then argue that the relative importance of 'discernment' and 'volition' can vary across cultures. They base this on a study by Hill et al. (1986) which compared Japanese and American evaluations of the range of expressions that people would choose to use with different people when asking to borrow a pen. They plotted their results in a chart, and for both American and Japanese respondents there was a very clear association between expression and role. However, for the Americans a wider range of expressions were mapped against more roles than for the Japanese. Hill et al. (1986) therefore argued that 'discernment' is more important in Japan than in America.

Chen et al. (2013) have recently semi-replicated this study with Chinese respondents. They found that their Chinese respondents used a smaller number of request expressions than their American counterparts and that these expressions were the more careful ones. Chen et al. (2013: 150) interpret this as 'the Chinese appear more *formal* – for want of a better word – than the Americans in requests.' They also compared the Japanese, Chinese and American ratings of the various roles for 'perceived distance' and found noticeable differences both in the range of 'perceived distance' ratings and also in the rank orderings. This supports the contention discussed in the previous subsection that there may be cultural differences in people's perceptions of the P/D of role dyads (cf. Spencer-Oatey 1997).

Chen et al. (2013: 153) conclude that 'there is clear evidence that Brown and Levinson's P and D are relevant factors in determining speakers' choices of expressions when making requests. Leech (2014) takes this a step further by distinguishing between 'bivalent' and 'trivalent' politeness. He explains that some languages, such as Japanese and Korean, have elaborate honorific systems that enable speakers to convey different degrees of deference or respect to addressees. These systems can show both honour to the addressee and humility on the part of the speaker. Leech argues that this honorification system needs to be separated from the transactional politeness associated with speech acts. He points out that honorification is based on just two variables, P and D, while transactional politeness is based on three, P, D and R. So he calls the former 'bivalent' politeness and the latter 'trivalent' politeness.

Some people have questioned whether there may be more variables that influence politeness than P, D and R. For example, as mentioned in Sect. 2, Slugoski and Turnbull (1988) propose that affect should be a separate element, and Leech (2014: 103) mentions two additional possibilities: strength of socially defined rights and obligations, and 'self/other' territory. But as he also points out, these could be regarded as already included within P, D and R. For example, 'self/other' territory could be regarded as an aspect of D, since it relates to the distance/closeness of out-group and in-group members. Similarly, role dyads have rights and obligations associated with them and if a message falls outside of them, it could be argued that the extra cost will add to the weightiness of the message through R. This, in fact, is in line with Brown and Levinson's position. Speaking of P, D and R, they say:

> our claim is not that they are the *only* relevant factors but simply that they *subsume* all others (status, authority, occupation, ethnic identity, friendship, situation factors etc.) that have a principled effect on such assessment.
>
> Brown and Levinson 1987: 80

On the other hand, Tamaoka et al. (2010) propose Gender (G) as an additional factor, including both gender identity and gender congruence. This is because their study of requesting behaviour of Japanese and Korean respondents revealed strong effects of gender on levels of politeness that were independent of P and D. They argue, therefore, that gender is a good potential candidate for inclusion in Brown and Levinson's formula, so that it becomes $W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + G(GI, GC) + R_x$. They speculate that this model may have 'specific application to "Asian" populations who are likely to maintain traditional and conservative values associated with gender-related factors' (p. 37).

3.2 Classificatory (Im)politeness

In the previous section we have focused on the impact of P/D on speakers' choice of polite language. The majority of theorising and research on (im)politeness, in fact, has explored it from that perspective and yet another very important one is classificatory (im)politeness. This is the impact that P/D has on people's perceptions of (im)politeness. According to Fraser and Nolan (1981: 96), 'whether or not an utterance is heard as being polite is totally in the hands (or ears) of the hearer'.

Only comparatively few studies have explored this empirically, especially in terms of the impact of P/D on hearer evaluations. For instance, Fukushima (2004) and Spencer-Oatey et al. (2008) have both investigated evaluations of politeness from the hearers' or recipients' perspective, but although they controlled for P/D, their results are reported from a cross-cultural perspective, without any explanation of the impact of P/D. An exception to this dearth is a study by Culpeper (2011). He explored the impact of power differentials on people's perceptions of the impoliteness of three different directives to be quiet, each of which had different degrees of directness: 'You be quiet' (direct), 'Could you be quiet' (conventionally indirect), and 'you aren't being quiet' (non-conventionally indirect). There were six scenarios in all, three of which entailed a speaker with higher power than the hearer (H to L condition), and the other three of which entailed a speaker with lower power than the hearer (L to H condition). Students rated each wording on a seven-point Likert-type scale for the following: *patronising, rude, aggressive, inappropriate, hurtful, impolite.* He found that in the H to L condition, all three wordings were rated low on the scale of impoliteness (i.e. they were not regarded as impolite), with the conventionally indirect wording receiving a very low score (less than 1, where 1 = disagree). In contrast, in the L to H condition, all three wordings were rated high on the scale of impoliteness, but there

was less difference between them than for the H to L condition. These findings broadly support Brown and Levinson's predictions that the greater the speaker's power, the less impoliteness is attributed to them, while the lower the speaker's power, the more impoliteness is attributed to them.

Brown and Levinson argue that the reason why speakers are likely to pay attention to other people's face is because if they do not, others may retaliate with a return attack on their own face. Yet another equally important perspective is that the speaker is concerned about external evaluations per se (a perspective that was key historically in many countries). This could be for self-presentation reasons or in order to 'fit in' with the social group and to be evaluated positively by them. In this respect, Haugh (2007b) refers to the concept of 'place'. He argues that 'place' underlies Japanese conceptions of face and (im)politeness and explains it as follows:

> The notion of place underlying 'face' in Japanese is also closely related to external evaluations by particular 'imagined communities' […] that are perceived as constantly having the potential to judge one's actions as (in)appropriate […]. In other words, the perceived evaluation of one's place by a particular 'imagined community' […] has much to do with the loss, gain or maintenance of one's own face, or that of one's group. The kind of 'face' that arises through interactions is thus dependent on what one thinks others in a wider 'imagined community' […] show or can show they think of one's conduct relative to the place one stands or belongs.
>
> Haugh 2007b: 663

Haugh (2007b) gives a few examples to illustrate this, one of which entails evaluations of P. He comments that if a CEO of a Japanese company makes tea for his guests, he is likely to lose face in their eyes as this behaviour is not appropriate for his 'place'. It is inconsistent with his guests' expectations of the behaviour of someone in his position and so they are likely to evaluate it negatively. Haugh goes on to argue that the public evaluations he refers to do not exist prior to or independently of interaction, but rather unfold during the interactional process. So this brings us to the third perspective on (im)politeness: interactional achievement.

3.3 Interactional Achievement (Im)politeness

Researchers who hold a strong social constructionist stance would disagree with both expressive and classificatory perspectives on (im)politeness. They would not accept that there are any *a priori* positions of P or D, and would

argue that they are created and negotiated in interaction. Cook (2006) explains it as follows:

> Although speakers tacitly know social norms, they are not passive observers of them. They are active social agents who construct their social world. In the process of creating a social world, language is seen as a tool available to members of society for constructing who they are, what they are doing, and how they define the situation, among other things.
>
> Cook (2006: 269)

On the other hand, those who hold a pragmatist stance (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Morgan 2007), as we do, would also attach importance to an interactional achievement perspective, but would not discard expressive and classificatory perspectives completely.

In an interactional achievement perspective on (im)politeness, the analytic focus is typically on the unfolding and/or negotiation of (im)politeness across stretches of discourse and/or sequences of behavioural interaction. Sometimes this may be strategic, whereby one or more of the interlocutors deliberately tries to challenge or alter their P and/or D relations, with consequences for their respective perceptions of (im)politeness. At other times, it may simply be co-constructed with modified relations simply emerging without any particular prior strategic intent. Such an interactional orientation is reflected both in the discursive approach to (im)politeness as well as in recent work in interpersonal pragmatics (Haugh 2007a; Haugh et al. 2013; Locher 2006). A study by Lauriks et al. (2015) illustrates this approach very well and so we outline it here to help unpack this perspective.

Lauriks et al. (2015) report an ethnographic study that took place in a car tyre and exhaust service centre in Grahamstown in South Africa. They identify several hierarchical relations and, with field notes as data, they provide a number of examples in which interlocutors strategically managed P/D, sometimes resulting in changes or challenges to the nature of the role relationship. For instance, on one occasion the owner of the small business (Gareth) said to a subordinate, in front of three white, male customers, 'No wonder you're a driver; you have no brains!' He said this first in English and then in Xhosa, after which he turned to the three customers and said 'Even in his own language he doesn't know what I'm talking about'. Gareth and the customers then laughed. The researchers analyse this interchange using Spencer-Oatey's (2000, 2008) rapport management framework, and conclude that the boss, Gareth, 'uses humour and insults as devices to exert control and hierarchical power, whilst trying to enhance rapport with his customers through solidarity' (p. 31).

3.4 Researching P, D and (Im)politeness

Studies that have taken an expressive or a classificatory approach to (im)politeness have typically tried to manipulate P and D through using different role dyads. As explained in Sect. 3.1, it is possible for people to perceive the P and D of (some) role dyads rather differently, especially when they each hold different types of power or when there are cultural differences. However, comparatively little (im)politeness research has grappled with such issues. Occasionally, participants have been asked to rate the P/D of a role dyad (e.g. Chen et al. 2013; Hill et al. 1986), and even more rarely, P and D have been assessed through behavioural measures (Spencer-Oatey 1997). However, in the vast majority of studies, in both expressive and classificatory approaches, researchers themselves have decided on the P and D of relationships, assuming that role dyads provide a near-enough proxy of any variations. The research focus is then on the ways in which variations in P and D in role dyads impact on choice of linguistic strategies or on people's evaluations of the degree of (im)politeness of using given strategies. Much of this work has entailed self-report questionnaires, but even in ethnographic-type studies, researchers typically make their own judgements of P and D, with observation templates often suggesting this (for example, see Ishahara and Cohen 2010: 44–6). In contrast with the self-report survey methods that are so common in expressive and classificatory (im)politeness research, studies focusing on interactional achievement (im)politeness typically seek recordings (audio and/or video) of authentic interaction. Again, the researchers may make assumptions about *a priori* evaluations of P & D or try to interpret it from the unfolding discourse. However, as Haugh (2007a, 2010) and Spencer-Oatey (2007) point out, this is a complex and challenging endeavour and is not always sufficient in itself. Valuable supplementary insights can often be gained by conducting post-event interviews with the interlocutors, and a number of studies (e.g. Chang and Haugh 2011; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2008; Tyler 1995) have yielded fascinating complementary data in this way. Nevertheless, there are numerous challenges associated with this, both in terms of collecting the data (e.g. Chang and Haugh 2011) as well as in assessing the validity of this data, since the participants are engaged in post-event reconstruction. Nevertheless, our view is that it can usually be extremely valuable, and the application case study that we explore in the next section takes this approach.

4 Case Study

As just mentioned, the data for this case study were collected using an ethnographic-type technique, and comprised audio recordings, field observations and follow-up interviews. The study was conducted by Miller (2008) and our aim is to illustrate as many of the points discussed above as possible.

The extract from Miller (2008) that we focus on concerns an interaction that took place in a Japanese advertising agency between an American copy editor, Ember (E), and a Japanese co-worker, Nakada (N). They are reviewing some advertisements for which Ember has provided the English copy. Miller states that 'as an account executive, Nakada is in a position of more authority in this firm' (2008: 233). In other words, she clearly positions Nakada as having greater P than Ember, and she attributes this to his role in the company, which gives him higher status. In other words, she attributes greater *a priori* power to Nakada.

The interaction starts with Ember explaining his advertisement and with Nakada making some initial evaluative comments which, at face value, sound neutral or positive. Then the following interchange takes place:

14 N But too much pitch for the vi(hihi)sual
15 E too (hihi) much? [No no no no]
16 N [too much visual] no?
17 E no (.) no I don't think so
18 (0.2)
19 N {smacks lips} (.hhh) maybe
20 E (maybe?)
21 N ye[ahh]
22 E [I thin] I think it's okay

Here we can see that Nakada makes a negative evaluation in line 14, but that Ember disagrees with him explicitly, saying 'no no no no' (line 15). He disagrees again in line 17, this time in a little more mitigated manner, after which there is a two-second pause. Nakada then comments 'maybe' (line 19) and shortly afterwards Ember (line 22) reiterates his personal viewpoint. Miller does not provide the transcript of the interaction beyond this point, but she reports that at the end of the conversation, Nakada tells Ember to 'think about' the advertisement for a little longer. In fact, it turned out a few days later that the advertisement was excluded from their current campaign and this news surprised Ember.

Miller talked with both Nakada and Ember about the interaction afterwards, and reports that they had noticeably different interpretations and evaluations from each other. Ember felt that Nakada had deliberately misled him, while Nakada felt that Ember was 'churlishly argumentative'. Miller's analysis of the interaction focuses very much on the implicit signals (e.g. pausing, smacking of lips, in-breath) that Ember failed to pick up on and, of course, those are important elements. However, P issues also had a major impact. Miller reports that in her follow-up interview she discovered Nakada and Ember held differing understandings about the nature of the communicative task:

> I spoke with the participants later, and found out that Ember thought the meeting with Nakada was simply in order for him to explain his ideas for the ads. Nakada, on the other hand, saw the meeting as an occasion for a senior (himself) to tell a subordinate (Ember) which ad copy had been selected for use and which had been retracted.
>
> Miller 2008: 234

Ember clearly misjudged how appropriate it was to express his own viewpoints and to try to negotiate them with Nakada, and it is likely that this stemmed (at least in part) from differing interpretations of their hierarchical relationship. In French and Raven's (1959) terms, both Nakada and Ember were aware that Nakada had legitimate power over Ember. From an operational point of view, Nakada clearly had both reward and coercive power over Ember, since he could decide whether or not to include Ember's advertisement in the campaign. But it seems that Ember was unaware of the extent of these various aspects of Nakada's power. Ember, on the other hand, may have regarded himself as having a certain amount of expert power—that he was in a better position to judge the suitability of an advertisement for an English-speaking audience than Nakada was.

These differing interpretations of P affected all three (im)politeness perspectives discussed in Sect. 3. For example, in terms of expressive (im)politeness, Ember clearly felt able to disagree explicitly with Nakada, without redress, even though disagreement is typically regarded as a face-threatening act, especially with superiors. From a classificatory (im)politeness perspective, Nakada and Ember both made (im)politeness judgements about each other that were in line with their respective assessments of their hierarchical relationship. In fact, both of these aspects of (im)politeness behaviour were probably not strictly due only to assessments of the hierarchical gap, but were also related to the interlocutors' respective beliefs about the rights and obligations associated with their hierarchical relationship. Ember may have felt it was his

responsibility as a competent employee to explain and argue his viewpoints, while Nakada may have felt a 'good' employee would be respectful of the boss's decision. From an interactional achievement perspective, it seems that the interlocutors' *a priori* P assessments, albeit misaligned ones, remained stable through the encounter. Ember's attempts to persuade Nakada as to the strengths of the advertisement failed, and Nakada's attempts to let Ember know very implicitly that he had already decided against the advertisement also failed. The hierarchical gap between them was not lessened, but could possibly have become greater. This may also have happened with regard to the distance between them. Ember was annoyed with Nakada, and Nakada evaluated Ember negatively. So if D is interpreted at least partly in affective terms (Slugoski and Turnbull 1988), then the outcome of their co-constructed interaction was probably greater distance.

From a methodological point of view, Miller (2008) collected three types of data: recordings of authentic interaction, ethnographic observations and post-event interviews with the participants. As can be seen from the above analysis, the post-event interviews in particular provided extremely valuable insights into the interaction, from the perspectives of both interlocutors, and without them, our understanding of their perspectives on P, D and (im)politeness would have been considerably more sketchy.

5 Summary and Future Directions

In the preceding sections we have explored the concepts of P and D, demonstrating the major role they play in the performance, interpretation and negotiation of linguistic (im)politeness.

The controversial issues discussed above also point to some directions for future research. It is clear that the relative importance of P and D is a complex issue which is strongly influenced by a range of contextual factors. There is no evidence to suggest that our estimates of P and D are consciously calculated and absolute; rather they seem to be intuitive and comparative. Future research is needed to cast more light on how people's intuitive judgements are made, and how the context (including cultural context) influences them. In addition, the interplay between individual, cultural and universal aspects of the impact of P and D needs to be explored more extensively.

From a methodological perspective, a key question for further work relates to the assessment of P and D. The researcher's perceptions may not be reliable (and, as pointed out earlier, different researchers have in the past made different assessments of the same role relationship) and the participants may

not report their perceptions sincerely or accurately (as their reports may be ex post facto reconstructions). This question interconnects with the conceptualisations of P and D, because any assessment needs to be based on a construct. Thus more research is needed into facets of P and D, and the extent to which it is helpful or unhelpful to distinguish them in any given context.

One facet that seems particularly important is the question of the domains of power and distance: are P and D single variables or are P and D umbrella terms for several variables? If they are single independent variables, then more variables, such as gender (Tamaoka et al. 2010) and affect (Slugoski and Turnbull 1988) need to be introduced in providing plausible explanations and descriptions of linguistic politeness. If P and D are cover terms for several variables, what exactly then are the criteria for grouping particular variables together under P and D? These are all issues requiring further research.

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7

Indexicality and (Im)politeness

Barbara Pizziconi and Chris Christie

1 Introducing Indexicality and (Im)politeness

As an introduction to the type of analysis that an indexical approach to language entails, let us consider the following exchange.

Andy and Florrie are a constantly bickering couple in a famous British comic strip;[1] Andy is mostly unemployed and spends most of his time at the pub or napping on the sofa, 'Flo' is a hard-working house-cleaner.

Flo (toward open door)	Bye mum!
(to Andy)	Well, that wasn't funny to keep offering her peanut toffees.
Andy	I was being a good host.
Flo	You knew she'd forgotten her teeth!

[1] Source: http://chesscomicsandcrosswords.blogspot.co.uk/2011/07/andy-capp-and-hagar-horrible-and-their.html [Accessed on 14 November 2015].

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_7

If we were to adopt Leech's (1983, p. 104) framework, we might argue that the exchange contains an instance of the speech act of 'criticism', and we might categorise it as a conflictive kind of act. And if we were adopting Brown and Levinson's (1978 [1987]) framework we might categorise this as a threat to the hearer's positive face. Beyond the identification of 'face-threatening acts' and 'impoliteness', however, other important aspects of the interaction could be scrutinised. For example, we could investigate the transparency of the criticism, i.e. the degree to which the formula 'that wasn't funny', is recognised as meaningful across *social groups*, investigating what *'type' of people* use it, with which addressees and in which *social contexts* it is likely to occur; or in which *registers* it is likely to interact with other (*co-occurring*) signs. We could explore how each sign contributes to the overall effect. For example the *deictic* 'that' in Flo's first turn, which, though not obviously or conventionally associated with criticism, might be seen to reinforce the criticism if it was categorised as a marker of empathetic distancing (Levinson 1983, p. 81; Lyons 1977, p. 677). We could also speculate about a possible hidden agenda in Flo's utterance, effectively a self-*positioning* act, through which she projects herself as a 'considerate/caring' person. Through Andy's retort, i.e. his laying claims to a recognisable (*typified*) persona, we could explore an arguably common-sense (*normative*) etiquette regulating polite conduct (e.g. the good host makes sure guests are offered a reasonable supply of treats). We could account for the humorous effect of the cartoon by recourse to the socially recognisable *'script'* whereby the relation between mothers-in-law and sons-in-law is typically thorny. Some knowledge of the troubled *history* of the exchanges between these particular participants would additionally explain Flo's frustration with Andy (graphically rendered, in the last box of the strip, through her body language and facial expression, i.e. other *semiotic systems* interacting with language). We could examine the strip in the context of 'mother-in-law jokes', premised on a particular set of *stereotypifications* that derive from misogynistic *ideologies* of age and gender that give this particular cartoon its meaning, explore notions of sexism and interrogate its morality.

The terms in italics in the commentary above point to issues and questions raised by scholarship on indexicality which we articulate in the next section. Some of these have been addressed in recent (im)politeness studies, thanks to felicitous contaminations from other disciplines (as we note in Sect. 3). Our primary aim in this chapter, however, is to demonstrate that considerations of this kind are the object of enhanced and systematic

attention in an indexical approach to language (and particularly to the language of social relations) and to sketch out how they might contribute to the study of linguistic (im)politeness.

2 Indexicality

The development of indexicality as an analytical tool of interest to work in (im)politeness can be traced back to Charles Sanders Peirce's distinction between signs as icons, indices and symbols, depending on the kind of relation they encompass with some object. Peirce distinguishes indices from other signs in these terms:

> An *index* stands for its object by virtue of a real connection with it, or because it forces the mind to attend to that object. Thus, we say a low barometer with a moist air is an *indication* of rain; that is, we suppose that the forces of nature establish a probable connection between the low barometer with moist air and coming rain. (Peirce 1998b [1895], Ch. 3, p. 14)
>
> Psychologically, the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity and not upon association by resemblance [icons, a.n.] or upon intellectual operations [symbols, a.n.]. (Peirce 1901, p. 531)

Scholarship that has developed Peirce's notion of indexicality has produced a substantial body of research within different traditions. One is represented by works in semiotics, logic and philosophy of language and articulates a theory of the mechanisms whereby indexical forms achieve reference;[2] another, represented in social semiotics, linguistic and sociocultural anthropology (e.g. Ochs 1993, 1996; Agha 2007; Hanks 2000, 2009; Silverstein 2003, 2010), articulates what these indexical properties entail for the construction of social meanings, which is more closely relevant to the study of linguistic (im)politeness.

Indexicality is not unique to language, but a general property of semiotic systems (barometers point to weather conditions, weathervanes to wind direction). When the concept is applied to language, it is used to refer to the capacity of linguistic signs of various kinds to 'invoke' some other object, while not explicitly describing or referring to it. An engagement with indexicality therefore calls for some focused attention to a sign, but also allows for different interpretations of that sign, which depend on the contextual conditions of utterance. Such conditions include not only the time or location of the utterance, but also many other norms of interpretation specific to local contexts,

[2] We do not appraise this here but see Ponzio (2006) for reviews of Buhler, Jakobson, Sebeok; Lyons (1977, p. 106) for Abercrombie or Bar-Hillel.

which contribute to the definition of the type of activity under way. To the extent that language mediates social activities, the study of indexicality therefore demands a study of the social processes that create and regulate them.

2.1 Indexicality as the Study of Deixis

Lyons (1977) highlights two different senses in which Peirce used the term 'index' and which his followers elaborated on: the first is as 'signs that reveal personal characteristics of the writer or speaker' (and hence fall into the province of 'stylistics', Lyons 1977, pp. 106–7), the second as signs whose meaning varies from one occasion of utterance to another, as they are context-dependent. The latter—deictics—have received much attention in pragmatics, and several 'types' are commonly discussed: time, space, person, discourse and social deictics (e.g. Levinson 1983; cf. also the seminal 1971 treatise by Fillmore [1997]). Deictics have specific properties, which are able to 'organise' (i.e. structure) the context, anchoring perceived objects (referents) to a centre radiating from the speaker's self and mapping out their positions in relation to that centre. Spatial deixis, for example, is traditionally conceptualised as a principle for organising physical space based on the parameter of 'proximity' (of an object to self).

Among the many types of deixis discussed in the literature *social deixis* is most obviously relevant to (im)politeness. Levinson (2004, p. 119) defines social deixis as that which 'involves the marking of social relationships in linguistic expressions, with direct or oblique reference to the social status or role of *x*'. Social deictics have been seen as a metaphorical transposition from a physical space (Shibatani 1990, p. 374; Hiraga 1999; Marmaridou 2000), and as signs that organise social space on the basis of (culturally salient) parameters such as the status or role of an individual (e.g. superior or subordinate), or the nature of the relationship between individuals (e.g. intimate or distant). Classic examples of social deictics are the distinctions between T/V personal pronouns in European languages,[3] or the far richer repertoires of some Asian languages, in which comparable distinctions are observable not only in (generally larger stocks of) personal pronouns, but also nouns, predicates, adverbs and so on (cf., e.g., Errington 1988 for Javanese Indonesian; Pizziconi 2011 for Japanese; Brown 2011 for Korean).

[3] Note that Silverstein (1976, p. 31, 38) considers deferential pronouns as *pragmatic metaphors* borrowing from the referential categories of 'person' and 'number', and distinguishes them from 'distinct indexical expression of social deference with unique formal signals'.

Levinson's early work distinguishes the study of social deixis from that of other sociolinguistic matters, on the grounds that the former concerns itself with the study of grammaticalisation ('or encoding in language structure of social information' 1983, p. 93) and the latter a study of language use. This distinction is however not unproblematic (see Pizziconi forthcoming for a discussion), for two reasons. First, it limits the range of phenomena considered in examinations of (im)politeness to a relatively closed set of conventionalised forms, and, secondly, it may suggest that grammaticalised markers can index objective, if symbolic, realities, and that their interpretation is socially uncontroversial. However, to the extent that the interpretation of a deictic form depends on the subjective value attributed to it on the part of speakers who may be variably acquainted with that form and/or who may interpret it through different 'ideological' filters, variability is likely to be observed as much as in other sociolinguistic phenomena. When it comes to the symbolic and ideological reality of social matters, variability is likely to be the norm rather than the exception.

In the following section we summarise one perspective that sets out to explain the statement that 'deictics organise context' by looking at the mechanisms that appear to enable this, i.e. the interpretive categories specified by various deictic forms, which guide the identification of referents. We also elaborate further on the question of variability in Sects. 2.3 and 4.

2.2 Schema of Interpretation

A description of the functional properties of indexicals, and in particular of their social function, requires a description of their modes of signification. A seminal paper by Silverstein argues that attention to these mechanisms allows us 'to describe the real linkage of language to culture, and perhaps the most important aspect of the "meaning" of speech' (Silverstein 1976, p. 12). The challenge in the description of these mechanisms lies in the fact that several layers of 'meaning' appear to be conflated in individual indexical forms. Agha's work (e.g. 2007) provides the most full-fledged and systematic discussion of such composite meanings. Deictic forms provide 'schema' of interpretation (2007, p. 46), or a 'sketch of referent', which therefore 'organises' context but needs context for their (situated) meaning to be 'fleshed out'. This context-dependence is beautifully illustrated by Fillmore's (1997) example of the impossibility of interpretation in an extremely poor context, e.g. a note contained in a bottle floating in the ocean which reads: 'meet me *here* at noon *tomorrow* with a stick about *this* big' (italics added) (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Schema for some deictic forms in English and Japanese

		Deictic form	Denotational schema	Interactional schema	Interpersonal schema
English	a	I	[+ human] [± subject-of-verb]	S of E^S	
	b	this/that	[+ thing] [+ adnominal]	proximal/distal to E^S	
	c	now/then	[+ time] [+ adverbial]	proximal/distal to E^S	
Japanese	a′	*boku*	[+ human] [± subject-of-verb]	S of E^S	[non-formal, intimate]
	a′′	*watakushi*	[+ human] [± subject-of-verb]	S of E^S	[humble, formal]
	b′	*kore/sore/are*	[+ thing] [+ adnominal]	proximal/medial/distal to E^S (distal to S)/(distal to both S and A)	
	c′	*ima/ato*	[+ time] [+ adverbial]	proximal/distal to E^S	[non-formal]
	c′′	*genzai/nochihodo*	[+ time] [+ adverbial]	proximal/distal to E^S	[formal]

Adapted from Agha (2007, p. 47) for English [*E* 'speech event, current utterance (-event)', *S* speaker, *A* addressee]

The person deictic *I,* for example, provides first of all a model of its denotational value, which in this case indicates a semantic trait ('human') as well as a semantic role in the proposition (here the role of 'subject' of the proposition). Together with this, it also provides a model of its interactional value. That is, it identifies which (participant) role that entity ('human') plays in the speech event (in this case 'the person who occupies the role of utterance Subject). The 'corresponding' Japanese terms (in a′ and a′′) are partially comparable, at least in terms of denotational and interactional schema. However they additionally provide information of a third kind, commonly referred to in discussions of honorific register (here: '± intimate', ± humble', etc.). This third category therefore provides a sketch of the interpersonal relationship between participants.

Spatial deictic forms like *this/that,* while comparable to the Japanese terms in b′ in relation to their denotation values, differ in relation to the interactional sketch they can index, as the space or region distinction they mark ('proximal' or 'distal') is 'cut out' in less detail than in Japanese. Finally, time deictic forms like *now/then* are also comparable to the Japanese terms in c′ and c′′ with regards to denotational and interactional schema, but the latter additionally convey information ('± formal') which can contribute to a schema of interpersonal relationship. It is important to note here the various realisations under the category of 'interpersonal schema' ('± intimate', '± formal', etc.);

these are to be understood as variations of, perhaps, a metaphorical source notion of DISTANCE (as noted in Sect. 2.1). Regardless of the particular gloss, to the extent that, for example, the indexing of formality can require observation of etiquette norms which involve the marking of mutual social positioning (e.g. status), it can be said to provide a sketch of social deixis (i.e. it schematises the social relationship between participants to the speech event *indexically*, without describing it explicitly).

From this perspective, deictic forms thus provide schema of interpretation, and sketch out denotational and interactional information; they are performative, or constitutive, in character as they do not merely reflect objective realities (although language socialisation can result in a certain degree of uniformity in the way they are conceptualised within certain social groups) but can evoke such dimensions such as time, space or 'social' space (e.g. deference entitlements, or rank), and configure them. Different configurations are evident in different languages, as we saw for English/Japanese spatial deictics, even when the categorial parameters involved are comparable. In this 'structuring' sense, deixis can be seen as one of several 'resources for thinking and acting with language' (Hanks 2000, p. 21)

While the existence of differently schematised configurations appears uncontroversial when we describe deictics in different languages (see Hanks 2009, p. 11 for a list of works on various languages), the same point can be made about 'all linguistic categories, […which are] categories-*for* a particular social domain of language users (a sociohistorical population of users)' (Agha 2007, p. 47). This qualification accounts for the documented variability in the interpretation of such forms within social groups—as we discuss further in the next section. Uses of the English pronoun 'we', for example, show that while in some cases—e.g. a face-to-face interaction in which the speaker refers to him/herself and at least another person—its interpretation would be highly congruent between a speaker and his/her addressee, in some others—say, when used as a 'royal we' or *pluralis majestatis*—the successful identification of its referent is dependent on the hearer's ability (linguistic knowledge of this usage) or willingness (assumptions about its legitimacy) to read the pronoun as a first person singular pronoun (plus some residual effects).

2.3 Indexicality as a Social Process

Silverstein's work on indexicality has stimulated a field of scholarship that theorises indexicality as a culturally situated process by which linguistic (and other semiotic) resources acquire social meaning through the contexts in which those resources typically occur (for a detailed discussion, see Blommaert 2007;

Eckert 2008). The model, which Silverstein describes as bringing 'theorized order to a large number of what once appeared to be disparate phenomena' (2003, p. 194) has fed into a paradigm shift in variation studies, leading to the conceptualisation of linguistic forms as resources whose social meanings are ideologically generated and are therefore not precise or fixed.

According to Silverstein (2003), social actors use language in ways that presuppose some reflexive model of an on-going activity. They choose linguistic resources they consider appropriate for that activity, based on their own assumptions about how people in certain social roles speak in those contexts, i.e. based on their notions of *register*. For example, an individual will speak like a teacher in a classroom, like a mother at home, or like a stranger to someone they meet in the street.[4] Notably, our notions of register do not apply to individual linguistic forms,[5] but generally to configurations of forms that tend to co-occur. This is evident in speakers' sensitivity to violations of anticipated co-occurrence. Perceptions of regularity, coherence and stability in registers are observable at all linguistic levels, be that phonological (for example 'posh' accents), morphological, lexical or syntactic, but also across verbal and non-verbal channels (e.g. the body language or the attire of people with 'posh' accents). Register models, however, based as they are on idiosyncratic communicative experiences which are never entirely replicable across individuals, are probabilistic rather than categorical, and they are subjectively flavoured: they represent linguistic *ideologies*. Note that notions of linguistic ideologies, or 'sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as rationalisation or justification of perceived language structure and use' (Silverstein 1979, p. 193, quoted in Woolard 1998, p. 6; see also Kienpointner and Stopfner, Chap. 4 of this volume) do not pertain to language alone. 'Rather, they envision and enact ties to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology' (Woolard 1998, p. 3).[6] A register is one such ideology, providing a recognisable model of the linguistic behaviour considered to be 'typical of' or 'appropriate to' particular contexts of usage, of particular kinds of speakers. Silverstein (1998, 2003) uses the term *indexical order* to refer to the patterned associations observed in the linguistic forms which participate to specific registers.

[4] Irvine's 'style' is similar to what has been presented here as *register*, and characterised as a 'social semiotic of distinctiveness' (generated when a style, and the social meanings signified by that style, contrast with other styles, and their associated social meanings), which is ideologically mediated.

[5] It is possible, however, that some forms may appear to contain enough information to do this characterising job alone (cf. the rich associations a mere interjection like 'oi!' can generate in British English).

[6] Woolard (1998, p. 6) points out that in recent theory, arguably of particular relevance to (im)politeness, ideology is 'not necessarily conscious, deliberate or systematically organised thought, or even thought at all; it is behavioural, practical, prereflective and structural'.

Indexicals of deference-and-demeanour and honorific registers are good examples of indexical orders (Silverstein 1998, p. 131). Honorific forms which are perceived to denote specific *addressees* or *referents* (first-order indexicality) commonly generate an additional layer of meaning (second-order indexicality), when they also come to be seen as emblematic of *speaker* features, e.g. properness, sophistication, education.[7] Further orders of indexicality can be produced by reiterative processes, if the precedent order achieves sufficient stability. Thus a second-order meaning may potentially be redeployed, through ideologically informed characterisations of gender (e.g. stereotypifications of 'feminine' speech) or social class (e.g. upper class), generating *n*th orders of indexicality. Because such developments are ideologically driven, we can expect them to delineate complex patterns of variation across and within social groups.[8]

Observing indexicality in language means recognising that all linguistic forms have the potential to index a range of different social meanings. This range represents 'an indexical field, or constellation of ideological meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable' (Eckert 2008, p. 454). This is evident despite the fact that any given form appears to trigger relatively consistent characterisations (i.e. be linked to assumptions about the behaviour of typical social personae) or typical interactional effects. We can see this particularly clearly in folk rationalisations of the meaning of honorific forms, stereotypically construed in both lay and scholarly discourse as indexing 'deference' but in reality enabling the expression of a far broader range of interactional meanings (see for example Agha 2007; Pizziconi 2011). This variability occurs because, once established, a first-order form-meaning association is open to a cultural reevaluation and can be reinterpreted in a second (third, *n*th) order of usage. Hence—despite perceptions of stability—indexical orders are never entirely settled.

In studies on indexicality the relation between language and social categories is formulated as dynamic, multidirectional and complex. Rather than assuming simplistic and direct correlations of specific linguistic features with

[7] Notably, the development of additional indexical orders over the course of historical processes are discussed—though naturally with different terminology—in Brown and Gilman's (1960) work on terms of address (ToA), or second person singular (non-honorific) vs. plural (honorific) pronouns. This work looked not only at the reconfiguration of deictic categories of honorification targets but insightfully linked these to concomitant ideological and social changes, and additionally noted how such reconfigurations (the universal T in the Plain Speech of Quakers, in Communist Yugoslavia, etc.) trigger important social controversies and personal dilemma.

[8] While variation studies brought to the fore questions about the relation between linguistic forms and the social characteristics of speakers, the main contribution of indexicality studies to the conceptualisation of linguistic variables is seen by some to be in the '*ideological embedding* of the process by which the link between form and meaning is made and remade' (Eckert 2008, p. 463, emphasis added).

certain social identities, Elinor Ochs proposes that such signs index instead socially characterised acts, activities and stances, which are then recognised as typical of certain social identities. For example, an imperative form directly indexes the act of ordering in English; respect vocabulary indexes the activity of oratory in Samoan. These acts and activities may then be associated with stances and social roles. For example, an act of assertion might index a specific epistemic stance (of certainty of knowledge) and this, in conjunction with other acts and stances, might index a specific role: 'one might display the stances of knowledgeability, objectivity and care to build a certain kind of medical professional identity' (Ochs 1996, p. 424). In addition, acts, stances and activities may be associated with 'speaking like a man' or 'speaking like a woman', according to culturally specific normative models of behaviour (Ochs 1993, p. 151), and will also positively constitute such identities (rather than merely reflect them). Together with the constitutive function of indexical signs, another important feature further pointed out by Ochs is their 'non-exclusivity': very few linguistic forms index gender, or even the sex of speakers/addressees/referents categorically (e.g. as some kinship terms do); in most cases, this relation is distributional and probabilistic (Ochs 1993, p. 149). This means that while variable forms of language are used by/with/for both sexes, they will be used more or less frequently by one particular social group, and can therefore 'suggest' gender based on local models of 'typical gendered conduct'.

Social categories, such as gender or class, or social values, such as deference or intimacy, are recognised, reproduced, or challenged through users' reflective awareness of linguistic indexicality and indexical orders. But the notion of 'order' must be appreciated in another sense too, operating on a higher plane. Indexical orders of various kinds coexist in a broader semiotic habitat,

> a stratified general repertoire, in which particular indexical orders relate to others in relations of mutual valuation—higher/lower, better/worse. […] That means that such systemic patterns of indexicality are also systemic patterns of authority, of control and evaluation, and hence of inclusion and exclusion by real or perceived others. That also means that every register is susceptible to a politics of access.' (Blommaert 2007, p. 117)

Evidence of ordered associations is commonly observable through metapragmatic activity (Silverstein 2003, pp. 203, 242; Verschueren 2000; Hanks 2009, p. 18). In particular, folk-metapragmatics (lay rationalisations of indexicality) provides evidence of ideologies through charted attributions of cultural values to patterns of linguistic behaviour. For Agha (2003, p. 242),

to say that such behaviours 'have cultural *values* associated with them is simply to say that certain regularities of *evaluative behaviour* can be observed and documented as data'. Agha articulates a key tenet of indexicality theory here, one that—as we show below—has important methodological consequences for indexical approaches to (im)politeness behaviour. Since 'socially locatable' persons (2003, p. 242) inhabit positions of interest, through the observation and documentation of evaluations carried out by specific social groups or individuals, the analyst can avoid essentialist attributions of meaning and instead bring into view (and justify) different cultural values attributed to specific linguistic resources.

In the preceding sections we have charted the scope of the indexical approach from accounts that analyse the workings of linguistic forms to the implications of this view for sociolinguistic, politically sensitive, analyses of language use. In the next section we consider some of the ways in which problematic issues in politeness research might be resolved by the adoption of an indexical approach, and in Sect. 4, we critically evaluate the way in which indexical approaches have been applied in this field.

3 (Im)politeness

As a linguistic phenomenon with obvious social reflexes, (im)politeness has been approached from many and diverse perspectives within linguistic research with an interest in context and sociocultural matters, such as sociolinguistics, pragmatics, ethnography of speaking, discourse and conversation analysis, social cognition, language acquisition, and so on (for reviews see: Sifianou 2010; Locher 2012). Early studies focused on 'polite' linguistic structures and were premised on a relatively narrow conceptualisation of politeness. Examples of these would be classic works on modals or speech acts (Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983) in Western languages, or sets of honorific markers in Asian languages (e.g. Martin 1964), up to Brown and Levinson's (1978 [1987]) wide-ranging analysis of (mostly sentence-level) putatively universal strategies. These mostly linked politeness phenomena to presupposed macro-sociological variables, such as gender, age, or in/out-groupness. More recent approaches problematise such categories, no longer seeing them as independent variables but types of social meanings actively and creatively constructed through language: the 'performative' function of linguistic forms that has been noted in the theorisations of indexicality cited above. The shift in interest toward authentic types of texts, e.g. conversations stretching over multiple turns, as well as descriptions of actual, situated, contexts (the

'discursive approach' to (im)politeness, e.g. Watts 2003; Locher 2004; Mills 2003, 2011) have enriched the appreciation of the diffuse quality and jointly constructed nature of (im)polite effects, including effects inherited from the preceding histories of encounters. These new interests in (im)politeness scholarship resonate with the interest, in indexicality theory, in how meaning emerges from co-textual interactions rather than being coded in individual linguistic forms (not even in arguably dedicated forms such as markers of 'social deixis', as noted in Sect. 2.1), and how it develops from historically traceable trajectories of development, involving chains of encounters and the constantly evolving metapragmatic discourses surrounding them (Agha 2007, pp. 69–71).

An important debate opened by Watts et al. (1992) and developed in Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) pointed out a crucial epistemological distinction between politeness as a common-sense notion that speakers develop in the course of socialisation and participation in social practices (politeness1) and as a scientific construct (politeness2). While the latter aimed at providing theoretically informed generalisations (especially by those with an interest in universal pragmatic principles), the former refers to participants' uses of *evaluative,* and *argumentative* (Eelen 2001) terms like 'polite', 'rude' and so on informed instead by personal social agendas. It was observed that the two do not invariably correspond, and that unless scientific analyses adopt participants' lay and emic perspectives (i.e. the meanings users generate and discern in authentic, pragmatically rich, historically situated contexts), scientific politeness definitions risk misfiring, finding politeness where users perceive none, and attributing polite or impolite meanings to linguistic forms or strategies—e.g. imperatives, indirect speech acts, honorific markers—which in actual contexts can generate very different, sometimes inverse, effects.

Locher and Watts (2005, pp. 14–16) make this point by considering the following contrasting utterances:

(a) Lend me your pen.
(b) Could you lend me your pen?

They maintain that while a theoretical discussion of politeness2 would argue that (b) will be perceived as more polite than (a) (because of the indirect formulation of the request), in actual contexts of use a speaker may consider (b) simply appropriate, and not conveying any particular polite effect. Conversely, (a) may be perceived as direct, but not necessarily impolite. We could moreover note that these forms may be appreciated differently (or be differently valorised) by different 'types' of interactants, some commonly

favouring (a) and some (b) for the same requestive act in the same context, depending on their (ideological) model of appropriate register.[9]

The 'classic' (im)politeness frameworks—Lakoff (1973), Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]), and Leech (1983)—conceptualised politeness as departures from the CP's rational efficiency. These frameworks maintain, by and large, that regardless of whether politeness-related meanings are evoked by means of specific markers (e.g. formulae, honorific terms, mitigators) or linguistic 'strategies', meaning interpretation is based on inferential processes, that is the contextual resolution of the implicatures generated by the (motivated) disregard of one or the other of the CP's maxims.[10] As frameworks that attempted to account more comprehensively for *pragmatic competence,* their interest in an extra-linguistic context, understood as the social conditions of language use, is indisputable.[11] Nevertheless, the contexts envisaged by these frameworks were not fully 'social', but reduced instead to minimal and abstract parameters; this prevents the analysis of the wealth of social facts they allegedly pattern, including the variable, often disputed, evaluations of acts of behaviours, not only across different cultures but also culture-internally. Acknowledging indexicality in language therefore requires the adoption of disciplinary approaches and methodologies able to articulate the significance of the very authentic social contexts in which (im)politeness lives.

More recent (im)politeness theorisations have increasingly problematised such implicit homogenising assumptions regarding culture-wide patterns, and have attempted to produce much 'thicker' descriptions of (im)politeness. These take into account the existence of normative patterns but at the same time acknowledge alternative ones (coexisting at any one time) and explore their mutual relations. Specifically, these approaches (a) recognise that users' formulations of such norms may be distinct from actual behaviour, and they therefore explore the social motivations for such inconsistencies, and (b) bring into view the multifunctionality of utterances in order to explore the multiple, parallel, expressive effects that users exploit in order to carry out, among other things, some form of social positioning. In order to reduce the inevitable

[9] An example of this are the different valorisations of T/V pronouns in Europe (Brown and Gilman 1960, p. 257) up to the nineteenth century, where V is the reciprocal term of address for nobility and bourgeoisie, including family members, but T the reciprocal term of address for servants and peasantry (i.e. the pronoun's valorisation is dependent on social-class membership). Cf. a similar note by Silverstein (1998, p. 142).

[10] See Terkourafi (2005) and Christie (2007) for a discussion.

[11] This is already evident in Lakoff's (1973, p. 298) pioneering proposal to pair 'Rules of Politeness' with the Gricean 'Rules for Clarity', or the CP. In Brown and Levinson the dimensions of Distance and Power are explicitly modelled, together with a dimension ranking acts as more or less imposing within a certain culture.

essentialism of culture-wide generalisations, researchers try to tie accounts of regularities to specific *frames* (Terkourafi 2005, p. 247; Locher and Watts 2008, p. 78) or to specific and contained *communities of practice*, fleeting as these may be (e.g. the papers in of Bargiela-Chiappini and Kádár Part II 2011; Mills 2003, 2005; Graham 2007). They also discuss *identities*—often the multiple ones that individuals inhabit at any one time—rather than stylised 'roles' or macro-sociological categories such as gender or age, and understand interactional achievements not as the result of summative contributions by speech participants, but as *co-constructed, discursive negotiations* between them.

4 Researching (Im)politeness and Indexicality

To date, few studies apply an indexical approach to the analysis of (im)politeness phenomena in a systematic way (e.g. Errington 1988; Agha 1994, 1998; Irvine 1998), and these are all studies carried out by linguistic anthropologists. Moreover, the (im)politeness scholarship that does embrace an indexical approach tends to build on selected formulations in Ochs', Agha's and Silverstein's theorisations that have informed the development of third-wave variationist sociolinguistics (see Eckert 2008). However, the influence of research on indexicality is gradually permeating into (im)politeness studies in many ways—some (for example, Holmes et al. 2012; Hultgren 2011) are increasingly adopting its vocabulary, although not always fully consistently. This is not surprising, given the radically different view of language, and its workings, that the approach is predicated on. As noted above, it requires us to question long-held assumptions about meanings being 'encoded' in linguistic forms, and instead requires us to fully engage with the idea that linguistic meaning is underdetermined by form; that meaning is actively construed by users, and that it emerges on the basis of any kind of available and relevant evidence (local and more global discourses, past and current events, linguistic and non-linguistic contexts). Engaging with the notion of indexicality therefore represents a considerable paradigmatic shift. Correspondingly, the analysis of such, often volatile, circumstances constitutes a considerable methodological challenge.

4.1 The Social Significance of Indexicality in Linguistic (Im)politeness

(Im)politeness theorists also have to contend with received wisdom specific to their field. The spread of the concept of *wakimae* (or 'discernment') is a case in point. Initially proposed in research on Japanese honorifics (Hill et al. 1986;

Ide 1989) as a principle regulating honorification arguably distinct from the principle (dubbed 'volitional') regulating polite strategies in English, the concept was readily adopted in other research on non-Western as well as Western languages, and the distinction legitimised and further propagated. Dissenting research has argued that the mechanisms regulating Japanese honorific or English propositional strategies (e.g. direct/indirect speech acts) are the same, as indeed both hinge on the interactional schema indexed by either honorific forms or other verbal strategies (Pizziconi 2011). Recognising these indexical commonalities allows researchers to focus instead on the social significance, for language users, of differences in language affordances. This is not to be considered in the narrow sense of linguistic relativity (i.e. that 'language determines thought'), but in relation to the social consequences of such different affordances, for example for language socialisation practices or metapragmatic discourses of politeness.

Burdelski (2013), for example, draws on the work of Silverstein, Ochs, and Agha to account for the broad range of social meanings that honorific usage by Japanese caregivers expose preschool children to, and documents the extensive scaffolding ('prompting', 'speaking for') they adopt to encourage children's use of context-appropriate forms; it also notes that children appear to use honorific forms as indices of social identity or social roles at a very early age (3 years), possibly before they appreciate the (stereotypical) meaning of 'honorification' proper (and see Pizziconi 2013, p. 150, for an account of further challenges that children face with other deictic properties of honorifics). Importantly, socialisation to the use of politeness routines appears to be 'multimodal', involving talk as well as embodied actions, such as tactile guidance to encourage respectful bowing (Burdelski 2011, p. 260), which inevitably builds up further cross-modal indexical associations. As noted by Agha (2007), cross-modal iconism 'blurs the boundaries between language and non-language'; as a consequence, linguistic acts are perceived to be more or less felicitous depending on whether they appear congruent to other, non-linguistic or paralinguistic signs (2007, p. 22), including the posture, gaze, attire and so on regularly associated with them. Adults' encouragements to bowing in Burdelski's study arguably aim to enhance the felicitousness of the child's performative act of 'self-introduction'.

The observation that users' interpretations of linguistic behaviour cannot be dissociated from webs of indexical associations demands an increased focus on various aspects of the users' reflexive activity ('activities in which communicative signs are used to typify other perceivable signs', Agha 2007, p. 16), which provides evidence of linguistic ideologies. In an ethnographic study of honorific usage in Tongan 'chiefly language' (*lea faka-'eiki)* Philips's (2011)

makes a call for an analysis of different aspects of language ideology, as they are revealed in metapragmatic comments. While reporting a generalised difficulty on the part of Tongan speakers in verbalising norms of honorific usage beyond the listing of broad categories of typical targets of deference, or in providing details of who uses which specific forms, Philips notes how her participants nevertheless produced elaborate explanatory narratives to account for instances of non-use.[12] These interpretive frames drew variably from ideologies regarding education, religion or politics and were closely linked to the participants' own local experiences. Some participants explain non-use as a consequence of the speaker's father (a noble) having married a commoner, others imputed it to the speaker's overseas experience and Westernisation. Crucially, these indexical orders (and others) exist simultaneously (i.e. a speaker could variably use religion, schooling or exposure to overseas cultures to socially differentiate Tongans) and can be drawn on differentially, depending on the occasion of interaction.

In studies such as these we can recognise themes that have also emerged as concerns of recent (im)politeness research, especially the strand of studies on identity construction and 'relational work' (see Locher 2008 for a review). Indexicality thus offers a rich paradigm to account for the semiotic multifunctionality of linguistic meaning, and its social, cultural, and fundamentally ideological embeddedness.

4.2 Direct Marking of (Im)politeness Versus Marking of Stances, Activities, Identities

The study of indexicality in language (and in particular its characterisation of 'stereotypifications', the underdetermination of linguistic meaning and the ways in which context 'fleshes out' emergent interactional meanings, as noted in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3) has opened up, for (im)politeness theorists, a means of engaging with the full range of potential meanings that can be generated in interaction. Thus the analysis of forms that would previously be assumed to unproblematically presuppose deference, such as honorifics, or forms that would be assumed to be routinely associated to '(im)polite' manners (such as tag questions, hedges, indirect constructions, swearwords), reframed through the conceptual apparatus of indexicality studies, has begun to generate more nuanced accounts of the dynamics of signification and the contextual effects of these linguistic structures. Cook (2013), for instance,

[12] These are said to respectively instantiate 'normative' and 'phenomenological' ideologies.

explains the (otherwise puzzling) variability observed in the use of referent honorification for the same participant during a single interactional exchange (and a single participation framework) as the evocation, or the very construction, of the dual participant identity of 'salesman' and 'scientist'. Both speaker and addressee are observed to orient to these different personae in the course of the exchange, and crucially, they do so through recourse to the enregistered indexical associations implicit in honorific usage.[13]

An increased interest in the construction of social personae (see also Blitvich and Sifianou, Chap. 10 in this volume) through variable usage of linguistic forms (honorific or otherwise) is what characterises the so-called 'third wave' sociolinguistic variation studies (e.g. Eckert 2008). These, too, draw inspiration from indexicality theory. An example that illustrates the influence of the third-wave variationist model is Sclafani's (2009) study, which explores the characterisation of 'women's language' as an index of personhood. Sclafani analyses two televised parodies of American celebrity Martha Stewart, who she describes as being known as a prototypical Good Woman ('ingenious and successful in traditional homemaking enterprises like cooking, gardening, and craft making'), but later entangled in a widely publicised scandal which saw her indicted for insider trading and serving a five-month prison sentence (Sclafani 2009, p. 106). Stewart's style in the parodies is rendered through elements indexically associated to a powerful ideological notion of femininity, such as (among other things) use of super-polite forms, hedges (e.g. if you like), empty adjectives (e.g. utterly fantastic), etc., (features listed in Lakoff's 1975 study on feminine language). Sclafani argues that the parodic effect is achieved through the juxtaposition of the viewers' knowledge of Stewart's 'behind-the-scenes Bad side' (p. 624) with the exaggeration ('iconizing') of linguistic features stereotypically associated with 'Good Woman speech', some of which are deployed far more frequently than in the real Stewart's style. She also notes that previous analyses of style fail to capture the role of extra-linguistic behaviour in the achievement of a stylisation and its parodic effects, as these signs too are part and parcel of users' knowledge of an indexical field.

A key premise in this, and other works in this tradition, is that the use of a linguistic resource (such as a tag question) does not directly index aspects of

[13] A similar argument is presented by Pizziconi (2009) on the function of various modal markers; assuming a direct link with honorification or 'facework' is maintained to be rather 'coarse', since this is only one of many interpretive possibilities, and not an invariable effect of the use of these markers. Rather, such linguistic forms must be seen to mark, at best, interactional stances: for example, epistemic uncertainty can be associated with a speaker reluctance to claim authority on a subject matter, and the contextual reading of the utterance may highlight the emergent meaning of unassuming 'humbleness'.

social identity captured by demographic categories such as 'female' or 'male' (or, for that matter, a specific interactional meaning such as 'politeness', as in Cook's work above, or Okamoto 2004). Rather, within a specific cultural grouping, the social meanings that are typically indexed through the contextualised uses of a linguistic resource might be a stance (e.g. authoritativeness, friendliness), which might in turn index a particular social role (see Sect. 2.3) or a particular aspect of social identity, such as 'female'. Where such associations occur regularly, they are the result of 'stance accretion' (Eckert 2008, p. 469). For example, a linguistic form that indexes sensitivity to another's face needs may indirectly index femininity if it occurs in a context that is informed by this particular 'sedimentation' (Hall and Bucholtz 2013, p. 125). Such associations (e.g. femininity with 'sensitive stances') are culturally specific: there are examples, such as that provided in Ochs' work on the Malagasy in Madagascar, where it is men who are ideologically associated with this form of behaviour.

Irvine's (2001) indexical notion of style as a 'system of distinction' (cf. footnote 4) has percolated in various works, including Peterson and Vaattovaara's (2014) analysis of the indexical fields of two Finnish lexical politeness markers: *kiitos,* the native politeness marker for 'thank you/please', and the loanword *pliis*. Through an online survey asking users' assessments of the type of person likely to use one or the other marker, as well as their reported likelihood of using these markers themselves, they discuss the distinctive styles these markers arguably index. While the native *kiitos* appears to have a wide distribution, and be likely to be used throughout Finland and by people of all ages, *pliis* appears to be consistently characterised as a marker distinctive of female speakers aged 20 or less in urban areas. More women than men (78 per cent vs. 41 per cent) also declare they are willing to use *pliis* but interestingly, more men claim they would be using *pliis* than all respondents consider men likely to use it—this appears to show a bias in the users' metapragmatic awareness (or their stereotypical ideologies of speakerhood). Finally, they propose that 'female user' is only a first order index of *pliis*, concluding that *pliis* 'instils a sense of positive politeness, at the same time bringing with it connotations of youth, urbanity, and, given its source as an English loanword, globalism' (p. 265). An exhaustive or categorical account of a linguistic form's indexical range is, therefore, theoretically impossible. The broad scope of an indexical field means that chains of associations can be generated which may feed into each other in a circular process, whose start and end is indistinguishable at any one time, discernible only over long-term processes of diachronic variation, when one of the other

typification 'stabilises' as the dominant index, and it is used as departure point for further typifications.

5 Case Study

In this section we outline some of the aims, methods and findings of a study that has adopted an indexical approach to (im)politeness phenomena.

5.1 Aims

In her (2013) study of the indexical scope of strong swearwords, Christie locates her analysis within the indexical paradigm by claiming that it is designed to bring 'theorized order' (Silverstein 2003, p. 194) to disparate phenomena that have been subject to analysis within different disciplines. Her point of departure is the often-conflicting set of findings (and explanations of those findings) in studies that have addressed swearword use as a sociolinguistic variable, and in qualitative studies of swearwords as an (im)politeness resource,[14] the former linking the use of swearwords to concepts such as covert prestige, which in turn is linked to masculinity; the latter linking the interpersonal and social effects of swearword use to specific contexts of use or conventionalised associations. Christie's aim in adopting an indexical approach to swearword use is to consider how the approach can account for both shared and individual attributions of social meaning to linguistic resources, and to show that it can do so without addressing individual attributions as nonce interpretations or as affirmations or rejections of the 'conventionalised' meanings attributed to linguistic formulae.

Culpeper, (2011, p. 129) building on Terkourafi's (2005) work, defines conventionalised (rather than conventional) meanings as those achieved when 'particular expressions are associated in one's mind with particular contexts'. While accepting this definition, as well as Culpeper's (p. 124) proposal that regularities in the evaluation of (im)politeness formulae occur because they are constrained by the conventionalised associations that interlocutors share, Christie argues that, from an indexical perspective, such an account raises many further questions for (im)politeness research. She proposes that where there is evidence that a linguistic resource appears to have a conventionalised meaning, within an indexical paradigm this would function as a starting point,

[14] Christie glosses (im)politeness resources as 'communicative resources that are subject to (im)politeness evaluations' (Christie 2013, p. 153).

generating research questions such as: For whom do these specific associations exist? Do these associations exist for a specific person; a specific category of person; a community of practice; or a whole culture? Following Agha, Christie argues that in asking these questions, an indexical analysis of (im)politeness phenomena could include the following aims: (a) to seek evidence, in the form of 'regularities of evaluative behaviour' by 'socially locatable persons' (Agha 2003, p. 242 and Sect. 2.3 above), that can be observed and documented in support of any claim that specific conventional associations are being activated in the interpretation of linguistic formulae (Christie 2013, p. 155); (b) to identify and articulate the ideologies informing such associations; and (c) to explore the extent to which alternative associations are documented.

5.2 Method

Christie's study follows the trajectory mapped out above by first identifying the conventionalised association between the use of strong swearwords and particular contexts of use. She shows that sociolinguistic studies as well as corpus analyses provide documented evidence of a link between male working-class speakers and strong swearwords. Her point is that, although this association would be taken as self-evident for most native speakers of British English, it is necessary to start from documented evidence of that link if the ideologies that this first-order association generates (see Sect. 2.3) are to be understood. In continuing to follow the trajectory of the indexical method further, Christie builds on Eckert's proposal that a first-order index simply indexes membership of a population, but that once a form has acquired an indexical value it can always be re-interpreted so that it acquires 'an n+1st value' (Eckert 2008, p. 463, in turn building on Silverstein 2003): if strong swearwords index membership of the population of British working-class males, this will be the basis upon which the use of strong swearwords are able to index a wider range of social meanings. The second stage of her analysis therefore charts the scope of the social meanings (i.e. their indexical field) through the active assignment of cultural values to swearwords in newspaper reports that comment on public uses of strong swearwords. However, Christie also argues that the sociolinguistic approach does not address the processes by which indexing is achieved. Her analysis therefore extends the sociolinguistic model by addressing metapragmatic discourse (see Sect. 3) from a relevance theoretic perspective, showing how the explicatures, implicated premises and contextual implications generated by newspaper commentary can bring into view ideologies of class and gender that derive from the first-order index.

5.3 Sample Analysis

The following is an example of a newspaper report in which Christie identifies ideologies of class that justify swearword use by the footballer Wayne Rooney by relating it to the Football Association's previous acceptance of this behaviour:

> In May 2005, in one match with Arsenal alone, he [Rooney] was caught swearing at referee Graham Poll at least 20 times. The FA did not act, despite the incident being highlighted, because they understand the football field to be a workplace and industrial language part of its currency.
> (Daily Mail, 27 April 2011)

Focusing on the italicised element of the extract, Christie argues that the cultural evaluation of swearing evident in this report indicates that swearing is justified in certain circumstances. She also argues that, in British culture, working out what those circumstances are requires the reader to be able to link a particular type of workplace and a particular type of worker to the use of swearing: i.e. industrial rather than office workplaces; and working class rather than middle class workers. Her analysis shows how the application of relevance theory can account for such an interpretation.

In the analysis, Christie identifies key presuppositions (which within relevance theory would be categorised as implicated premises) that a reader must activate in order to arrive at the above interpretation of the italicised element of the extract. These include:

(a) the football field is a workplace setting
(b) swearing always occurs in workplace settings.

Christie also draws on relevance theory to argue that certain 'explicitly' communicated elements must be pragmatically modified if the statement in the italicised section is to generate relevant propositions: the term workplace must be narrowed to signify 'working-class, industrial workplaces' (e.g. rather than offices or shops); and the term industrial language must be narrowed to signify 'swearing'.

In arguing that the extract implies that swearing is to be expected on the football field, Christie's analysis shows that this implication is enabled by ideologies of class: if the football field is a working-class, industrial workplace and swearing always occurs in such workplaces, then swearing will occur on the football field. This is seen to be a relevant interpretation of the italicised elements in the context of the remainder of the article because it explains why

the Football Association had not responded to Rooney's previous swearword use. The report therefore provides a justification of Rooney's use of swearwords by associating it with working-class behaviour.

5.4 Findings

Christie's analysis of further examples of metapragmatic commentary shows that recurring ideological assumptions about gender and class are activated in the rationalisation of acts of swearing. These ideological assumptions are evident in the metapragmatic commentary whether the acts are evaluated as justified (such as above) or as unjustified and therefore subject to negative evaluation. She also shows that all swearword use is regularly measured against the characteristics of justified uses, which demonstrates that the social meanings attributed to swearword use are enabled and constrained by the ideologies that inform the metapragmatic commentary. Christie's further analyses show, for example, that swearword use is only able to index positive stances if it is evaluated as justified because a speaker is responding to emotion or if it is ratified by an aspect of social identity (i.e. the speaker is male and working class). Her analyses of the metapragmatic commentaries also show that, since this is the basis of the evaluation, women—and particularly middle-class women—who use strong swearwords tend to be judged as carrying out 'inauthentic' acts. The following extract from a report on a female celebrity's use of a strong swearword on a television programme illustrates this:

> Gwynnie, I swear you're a foul-mouthed old phoney: there seemed to be something curiously staged about the incident (Mail on Sunday, 1 May 1 2011)

Christie's findings suggest that when evaluated in the context of apparently justified uses of swearwords (i.e. emotionally or situationally justified uses by male working-class speakers) women's use of swearwords is often found to be unjustified. Her findings show therefore that the conventionalised meanings associated with swearword use are documented (and therefore) perpetuated in public iterations of ideologically informed evaluations of acts of swearing. She points out that although it would be possible to chart alternative evaluations of swearword use in other metapragmatic commentaries commentary, the specific evaluations set out in the news reports that she analysed suggest that these ideologies constrain the indexical scope of swearword use: according to that metapragmatic discourse, it is possible for men, but not women, to index a stance such as 'authenticity' through the use of strong swearwords.

6 Summary/Conclusions

Studying (im)politeness from an indexical perspective requires an engagement with context above and beyond generic statements that 'contexts affects meaning'. Meaning is affected by local and volatile contexts of interaction because is it not encoded in linguistic forms but 'emerges' from the interaction of linguistic forms with co-textual and contextual signs. Meaning is also affected by broader diachronic or synchronic contexts, such as historical contexts (accretions of particular indexical associations over time) or large sociocultural contexts (the multiple indexical orders in which the same sign receives different valorisations). While the latter can account for constraints that contexts can exercise on speaker choices—through the particular landscape of recognisable registers available to speakers—the former can illustrate and explicate instances of speaker 'creativity', and the processes that enable the generation, or 'constitution', of novel meanings. For this reason, studying (im)politeness as an indexical phenomenon requires a programmatic engagement with authentic, situated data, such as actual occasions of utterance or observable evidence of metadiscourses about (im)polite behaviour, as well as an account of the broader cultural and historical background against which these occur.

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, pragmatically as well as ethnographically inspired accounts are necessary to investigate the different facets of (im)politeness as an indexical phenomenon. Honorific forms, often characterised as 'social deictics', have obvious structuring properties, i.e. they can schematise patterns of participant role; this feature is shared with other forms (e.g. pronouns, or speech acts), and pragmatic accounts can illustrate how these properties are relied upon in the characterisation of social activities (for example, actions that are carried out 'humbly' or non-coercively); other non-honorific or non-deictic forms, as linguistic features recognised as components of specific registers, carry additional information on the social positioning of such participants, and ethnographic accounts can illustrate how these forms participate in membership categorisation (for example, 'educated', 'refined', 'authoritative' speaker types). Social evaluations, of which (im)politeness is but one type, have a central position within an indexical framework, as evidence of the distinct ideologies shaping different valorisations of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour; the characterisation of a linguistic form as 'justified' or 'proper' (as opposed to 'inauthentic' or 'rude', 'typical' or 'parodic'), is dependent on speakers' ideological 'take' on how people should, or are expected to speak, and in which circumstances.

Recent research on (im)politeness has begun to interrogate some of these issues (the 'emergent' nature of some social meanings, the role of ideologies in interpretation, and the social instrumentality of (im)politeness). Further research may benefit from other observations brought into view in an indexical approach: the need to support claims about conventional associations with some sort of empirical evidence; the need to address (and identify) documented evidence of ideology when making claims about meaning; the need to consider the significance of the mediating elements (stance, style) between an index and social identity before attempting generalisations about patterns of indexing.

Many other issues germane to indexicality remain underresearched, at least within the dedicated field of (im)politeness studies. Future research could explore further other semiotic systems which co-exist with linguistic (im)politeness (e.g. etiquette, rituals, or other cultural practices), or pursue documented accounts of systematic 'violations' of canonical usages which have generated significant shifts in the meaning of (im)polite forms. Much is left to explore regarding processes of typification (or 'essentialisation') or the dynamics of '(mis)alignment' in adult second-language learning.

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8

Convention and Ritual (Im)politeness

Marina Terkourafi and Dániel Z. Kádár

1 Introduction

'Convention' and 'ritual' are extensively used concepts in the field (Terkourafi 2015a)—at the same time, convention and ritual are often used in vague and interchangeable ways,[1] making it necessary to carefully define these concepts and consider the main differences between them. Convention and ritual differ in a number of ways, briefly summarised below (see also Kádár 2017):

- Audience: Convention is primarily carried out for the benefit of the interactants, while the raison d'être for ritual is to be carried out in front of an audience other than the interactants themselves; that is why ritual is a performance (Bax 2010a; see also Sect. 2) which constitutes one's face for either a real or an imaginary audience.

[1] For more on this problem see Kádár (2013).

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_8

- Salience: Conventions tend to be salient (or 'marked') only for those who are outside of the group/culture in which the convention operates. Rituals, on the other hand, are salient primarily to those who perform them or take part in them as an audience (Kádár 2017), whilst culture/group-outsiders may or may not perceive their salience.
- Time and place: Conventions are only loosely constrained by context, while rituals can only take place at certain times and places. In addition, a ritual interaction has limitations of length, as it triggers intense emotions and affect. Consequently, conventions operate within a 'minimal context' (Terkourafi 2009), i.e. they are latently present in any interaction, whereas rituals require 'maximal' (or enriched) contexts (Kádár 2017), i.e. they can only operate in specific interactions and for a restricted period of time.
- 'Ratification': Usually, ratification (in the sense of Goffman 1979) is not an issue when it comes to convention, as it occurs implicitly when all interactants follow situated conventional practices (and there are no formal consequences when it does not). Ritual, on the other hand, can only be operationalised by ratified personae, and non-ratified performance of a ritual tends to be sanctioned (Bell 1997).

In sum, we take convention to be a recurrent and schematic practice, which provides a ready-made solution to a frequently encountered problem; conventions are normative, in that by acting in conventional ways interactants meet contextual expectations and their behaviour is positively evaluated as a result. We take ritual, on the other hand, to be a recurrent action, which re-enacts the ideologies or ethos of a relational network or broader social group as a 'performance', and generates intense emotions and affect (relational emotions) (cf. Kertzer 1988, p. 67). To provide a simple example, singing the national anthem can mean more to many people than simply an interactional convention: it has the potential to be a ritual because by singing it the group of performers are re-enacting their national identities; as with any ritual, this singing event operates for the benefit of a specific audience, it is noticed,[2] emotionally invested, and occurs at a specific time and place.

The boundary between convention and ritual is nevertheless blurred by a number of shared characteristics, including:

[2] Alternatively, abstaining from signing the national anthem in a context where this is expected would also be noticed.

- Recurrence: Both convention and ritual are recurrent practices.
- Normativity: Both carry penalties in case of non-compliance or defective performance; these penalties can range from negative evaluation to more serious ones.
- Formality/sequentiality: Both convention and ritual have certain formal and sequential properties, which make them recognisable and differentiate them from other practices.

Due to these shared characteristics, convention and ritual play a key role in relational language use at both the paralinguistic and linguistic levels (Hall 1993). Moreover, while both can be interactionally (co-)constructed and are subject to variability and contestation (e.g. Watts 2003), importantly, they represent the 'normative' aspect of interpersonal politeness (Kasper 2008).

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Convention

In a sense, all language is conventional. Outside of cases of onomatopoeia (and perhaps iconicity more generally; Meir and Tkachman 2014), there is no causal relationship between the forms (sounds or gestures)[3] that humans employ to communicate with each other and the meanings conveyed by them. Instead, the relationship between the two is based on consensus among a group of language users rather than found in nature independently of such a group. It follows that the meanings of linguistic expressions cannot be universal but rather are attached to a particular group at a particular time and place. This idea goes back to Plato's *Cratylus* and has been a tenet of modern linguistics at least since Saussure (1916/1983) used it to characterise the relationship between the two parts of the linguistic sign, the signifier (*signifiant*) and what is thereby signified (*signifié*), as a fundamentally *arbitrary* one.

This weak sense of convention is not the one we are concerned with in this chapter, although it is not unrelated to it. The notion of convention of interest here contrasts perhaps most strongly with the notion of intention that lies at the heart of Grice's account of speaker's meaning (non-natural meaning or meaning-nn, for short; Grice 1957). In explicating this, Grice was careful to distinguish it from what is more narrowly understood as conventionality in language (1957, p. 379), pointing out that the crucial determinant

[3] Note, however, that sign languages tend to be more iconic than spoken ones (Meir and Tkachman 2014).

of meaning-nn is the speaker's intention: it is in virtue of recognising the speaker's intention, not by an appeal to convention, that the audience is supposed to produce the particular response that the speaker is aiming to secure. By making the speaker's intention primary, Grice was seen by some as ignoring the role of conventionality in language altogether (Searle 1965). However, although perhaps he did not emphasise it enough, Grice was clearly not oblivious to it (Grice 1957, p. 368, 1975, pp. 50, 58): outside of language phylogenesis, about which only speculation is possible, the speaker's intention in producing an utterance of a sentence[4] is never completely unconstrained by convention, since, to be understood by the addressee, the speaker must draw from the range of expressions available in the language. Thus, in the case of linguistic communication, the speaker's intention is not free to create meaning at will but operates within the limits of convention in the weak sense that we saw above.

It is, then, possible to distinguish between two types of convention: conventions in a weak sense are, at their most basic, necessary for sequences of sounds to become meaningful, that is, to become signifiers in the first place; conventions in a strong sense, on the other hand, invest linguistic expressions with additional meaning based on how speakers use them in conversation. It is conventions in this second sense that are most relevant to (im)politeness, as we shall see below.

This distinction is not new. Strawson touched on it in his seminal article 'Intention and Convention in Speech Acts' (Strawson 1964, pp. 442–3), and Morgan took it up in 'Two Types of Convention in Indirect Speech Acts' (Morgan 1978/1991). Calling the former 'conventions of language' and the latter 'conventions of usage', Morgan argued that conventions of language are 'arbitrary, a matter of knowledge of the language' (1978/1991, p. 246), while conventions of usage are 'a matter of culture (manners, religion, law …)' and come about as a result of a conjunction of three elements—occasion, purpose and means (1978/1991, p. 247). However, the two types of convention are not mutually exclusive: 'as the connections between purpose and means become obscured, […] the convention of usage is reinterpreted as a convention of the language' (1991, p. 247). In other words, conventions of usage are the 'lifeline' of conventions of the language—a fact capitalised upon by scholars of language change to propose pragmatically motivated accounts of semantic change (Traugott 1999). But if conventions of the language and conventions

[4] Grice saw linguistic utterances as only a special case of meaning-nn. Non-linguistic behaviours can also be cases of meaning-nn and those (e.g. some gestures) 'may not be conventional at all' (Grice 1957, p. 379).

of usage are thus related, the latter are also at no more than one remove from the speaker's intention. For, as Grice himself noted, there can be a close relationship between conversational implicatures (to which recognition of the speaker's intention is key)[5] and conventional ones, and 'it may not be impossible for what starts life as a conversational implicature to become conventionalised' (1975, p. 58). In this way, conventions of the language, conventions of usage, and the speaker's intention, although analytically distinct, are mutually interdependent and interact in generating meaning through language.

Yet, while the relevant notion of intention has been formalised in Grice's analysis of meaning-nn (1957, 1969), the notion of convention remains a matter of some controversy. Philosophers have identified various sources for conventions—agreement (which can be explicit but is more commonly tacit), salience and precedent—yet there is no widely accepted view about which of these are necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the emergence of a convention. One prevalent account is that of Lewis (1969), who analysed social conventions (of which language conventions are one type) as solutions to recurring coordination problems. Casting his analysis in game-theoretic terms, Lewis emphasised how conventions can emerge out of rational calculation of payoffs, bringing them closer to the deliberative end of language use. Lewis gives the following definition of a convention:

'A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a *convention* if and only if, in any instance of S among members of P,

(1) everyone conforms to R;
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S is a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a proper coordination equilibrium of S.' (Lewis 1969, p. 42)

As phrased, this definition is rather strong, applying to perfect cases of convention, that is, cases where everyone without exception follows the convention. Since perfect cases of convention are hard to come about in the real world, Lewis eventually settled on a revised definition that allowed exceptions and made application of the convention a matter of degree, thereby opening the possibility of degrees of conventionality (1969, pp. 78–9).

[5] Grice distinguished particularized from generalized conversational implicatures, which arise in 'normal circumstances' (1975, p. 37). Developing a theory of the latter, Levinson (1995, 2000) explains that recognition of the speaker's intention is circumvented in this case by the regularity of use.

Critics have challenged various aspects of Lewis's definition. Of special interest to us here are objections that not all conventions arise in response to coordination problems and that Lewis ignored the normative aspect of social conventions. With respect to the first objection, critics (e.g., Davis 2003; Marmor 2009) have pointed out that conventions in the sense of regularities of behaviour can also arise in competitive situations but such regularities (despite being equilibria in game-theoretic terms) would not qualify as conventions in Lewis's sense. Moreover, Lewis is said to have overlooked a type of convention that does not involve coordinating one's actions with those of other players but rather 'constitutes' a social practice, in the sense of helping to define what the practice is and how to engage in it correctly. This latter type of constitutive convention would seem to be especially pertinent in the case of (im)politeness, as it can respond to self-presentational concerns such as, for instance, tipping one's hat in greeting, or using cutlery vs. chopsticks to eat. If such examples do not seem to involve explicit (linguistic) communication (although they are clearly part of social etiquette), consider the practice of 'ritual insults' first described by Labov (1972). Communicators who engage in this practice do so on the expectation that the other will respond—what is more, the more competent the response, the more the prestige of the party that manages to counter it will be raised, so it is in the interest of both communicators that the other be a worthy opponent—but the goals of the two parties in this case are clearly at odds (one is trying to outdo the other). Therefore, although this practice gives rise to a regularity in the behaviour of members of a population, this regularity would not qualify as a convention in Lewis's sense since it does not arise in response to a coordination problem.

With respect to the second objection, it has been pointed out that Lewis's definition cannot account for conventions honoured in the breach. For instance, Gilbert (1989) argues that sending thank-you notes after a dinner party is a convention in some circles, although few people abide by it these days. By making convention a matter of people's actual behaviour (clause (1) of his definition above), Lewis must deny that sending thank-you notes is a convention, contrary to many critics' intuition (cf. Davis 2003; Millikan 2005). If in the case of thank-you notes (and, generally, conventions that seem to be falling out of fashion) the consequences of non-compliance are negligible, the opposite is true of conventions that are in full effect, such as waiting for one's turn to be served at a food stall: here, non-compliance can lead to serious consequences, ranging from negative evaluation to tangible forms of punishment or exclusion. In both cases, the problem seems to be that, by tying convention to precedent, Lewis is ignoring another important source of enforcement of existing conventions, namely sanction from other

people. Conventions aren't just about how people actually behave; they also set the standard for how people *should* behave. In this, conventions are normative and it is precisely this normative aspect that Lewis is thought to have overlooked. This aspect could be captured in a game-theoretic account by attaching payoffs to conforming behaviour directly (or, conversely, making non-conforming behaviour a deterrent) and this seems to be the direction in which Lewis himself was inclined (1969, pp. 97–100). Yet, he was also keen to distinguish conventions from norms and that is why he did not build evaluative judgements into his definition from the start. However, while this solution addresses the normativity of existing conventions, it does not sufficiently acknowledge the inherent normativity of conventions, according to some critics.

At the heart of the matter seems to lie a third problem: that of determining the population P that an agent is a member of. By taking this to be given from the outset, Lewis appears to be ignoring another possibility: that convention-conforming behaviour can itself become grounds *for claiming* membership into a population or group. In other words, what population P an agent belongs to may not be objectively assigned once and for all prior to interaction. Instead, it may dynamically emerge through the convention-conforming behaviour, an outcome of this behaviour rather than input to it.[6]

This possibility is captured in sociolinguistic constructs such as Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's notion of Acts of Identity (1985, p. 182) and underlies Terkourafi's proposal that conventionalisation can be the optimal solution to the dual problem of constructing identity and constituting face at one and the same time (Terkourafi 2002, 2015b; see below). On this view, the normativity of conventions becomes the raison d'être of conventions themselves: behaving as others do is not only a way of securing their positive judgement but also of being seen to be one of them. And since the impetus for group-belonging is one of the most important determinants of human behaviour, we have here an important reason for humans' tendency to form conventions in the first place. Moreover, what is positively evaluated within a group may be negatively evaluated outside of it. In other words, the conventions of different populations may be in conflict and an agent may have to choose between them. An agent's preferences will then depend on which population the agent wants to be seen to be a member of for the purposes of the current

[6] It is important to clarify here that in this case the speaker's and the hearer's perspectives would come apart: while a knowledge of the population that the speaker wants to be seen to be a member of may be guiding the speaker's behaviour and in this sense be an input into this process on the speaker's side, it will not be fixed in advance for the hearer who will have to use the evidence of the speaker's convention-conforming behaviour to determine the population that the speaker wants to be seen to be a member of.

action. In a game-theoretic account where 'the various presumptive reasons why an action ought or ought not to be done are balanced off against each other' (Lewis 1969, p. 98), when an agent has a choice of catering to different populations, which population the agent wants to be seen to be a member of will be an additional reason to build into the payoff matrix of the act at hand. One objection that might be raised at this point concerns the effort involved in all this: if seen as a psychological model of actual speakers' behaviour, the resulting reasoning process appears to be impossibly taxing. Yet, a consideration of how the population P that an agent is a member of is determined would seem to bring Lewis's account closer to the facts on the ground—and it is required to explain how conventions change over time, a point which, in current accounts, whether they emphasise normativity or not, remains moot.

2.2 Ritual

Ritual has been studied in anthropological research since the 19th century, but in sociology and linguistic studies it has gained prominence following Goffman's (e.g. 1967, 1971) ground-breaking research. Goffman aimed to translate traditional ethnographic concepts of ritual research 'to grasp some aspects of urban secular living' (Goffman 1967, p. 95). Importantly, Goffman uses ritual in an abstract and scientific sense, and this notion covers all types of interpersonal interactions that involve facework. Goffman argues that, as our faces are sacred (just like deities in tribal societies), in modern societies '[w]hat remains are brief rituals one individual performs for or to another, attesting to civility and good will on the performer's part and to the recipient's possession of a small patrimony of sacredness' (Goffman 1971, p. 63). This interpretation of 'ritual' is adopted by Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 43), who describe their framework as a 'model or prototype' for politeness. It is worth noting that unlike in Goffman's case, the notion of 'ritual' does not seem to be applied as an integral analytic category in Brown and Levinson's work. In addition, whilst in Goffman's work ritual comes into existence in interaction, as an effect, Brown and Levinson's model is not interactional and it focuses on production rather than interactional effects. It is thus not surprising that ritual has remained relatively marginal in research inspired by Brown and Levinson's theory (see Bargiela-Chiappini 2003).

On the other hand, ritual in its popular/anthropological sense has been thoroughly studied. Ferguson published an article on the ritual use of politeness formulas as early as 1976. Ritual has played an important role in two areas of politeness research, in particular: cross-cultural and historical

politeness research. As regards the former, a considerable number of studies have explored ritualistic politeness in areas that are relatively 'less studied' in Anglophone academia, such as Arabic (Farghal and Al Khatib 2001), Persian (Koutlaki 2002; Eslami-Rasekh 2005; Bucar 2012), Japanese (Ide 1998; Ohashi 2008) and Chinese (e.g. Pan 2000; Pan and Kádár 2012). In addition, ritual politeness has been a topic of study in historical politeness research (e.g. Bax and Streekstra 2003; Held 2010; Kádár and Culpeper 2010). This latter interest is due to the fact that certain forms of historical pragmatic data are highly ritualistic, and also that the above formalised and sequential features (see Sect. 1) facilitate the reconstruction of ritual in historical data, compared to other interactional politeness phenomena.

Key concepts that ritual research has brought into the field of politeness in particular include *performance*, *recurrence* and *ratification*. As regards 'performance', Bax (2004, 2010a, b) points out in a series of insightful articles that the essence of ritual is that it follows formal and/or sequential features, which are associated with 'etiquette', as a 'liminal' performance (hence its above-mentioned characteristic of operating with an audience in mind; see Sect. 1). For example, when two medieval knights challenge each other with courteous words, or when ritual compliments are exchanged, the interactants follow ritualistic patterns, somewhat like actors in a stage play. Liminality here means that once participation in the performance is accepted the interactants enter into a specific interactional status, as they are supposed to follow what is associated with the performance (Kádár 2016b). If this does not happen, the interaction becomes idiosyncratic, as the following extract from the film *Bridget Jones II* illustrates:

(1)
Mark Darcy: Would you step outside please?
Daniel Cleaver: I'm afraid it's not possible.
Mark Darcy: Look, are you gonna step outside or do I have to drag you?
Daniel Cleaver: I think you're gonna have to drag me.
(*Bridget Jones II*, 2004; cited in Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 158)

This interaction represents a contemporary gentlemanly challenge made by Mark Darcy for the honour of a 'lady', the protagonist Bridget Jones. The source of humour is that this challenge is refused in a clearly cowardly tone by Daniel Cleaver who knows that Darcy is stronger than him, i.e. he fails to follow the formal and sequential patterns (accept the challenge) that is associated with the ritual performance of a duel.

The term 'recurrence' describes two characteristics of the ritual phenomenon: (a) ritual is recognisable to the participants as it follows recurrent

formal and sequential characteristics (Sect. 1), and (b) in certain cases ritual triggers impact as it occurs repeatedly within a relational network. This latter characteristic becomes particularly salient in ritualistic impoliteness: as Kádár (2013, p. 150) points out, an offence gains a ritual character if it occurs repeatedly. For example, if a person is ignored repeatedly, i.e. the normative and anticipated action of acknowledging their action does not take place several times in a row, this action of 'recurrent non-acting' transforms into a ritual and highly offensive pattern. Importantly, recurrence operates differently in the case of rituals and conventions: whilst recurrent conventional practices are usually not salient for the participants, ritual practices are salient due to their above discussed performance characteristics (see also Sect. 1).

The previously mentioned notion of 'ratification' becomes important when researchers look into interactions with complex participation statuses. As ritual operates as a performance, those who participate in it are usually ratified to do so. Once an unratified (or self-ratified) participant steps on stage, their actions are likely to trigger metapragmatic comments (and retrospective discourses) on its appropriateness (see more in Kádár and Márquez Reiter 2015).

3 Critical Overview of Research

3.1 Conventionality and (Im)politeness

As was mentioned in Sect. 2 above, the conventions that are most relevant to (im)politeness are conventions of usage, since conventions in this strong sense involve already meaningful linguistic expressions acquiring additional meaning that can then be put to the service of (im)politeness. Conventions in this strong sense, as Strawson pointed out, are 'statable conventions, relating to the circumstances of utterance, such that an utterance with a certain meaning, pronounced by the appropriate person in the appropriate circumstances, has the force it has as conforming to those conventions' (1964, p. 443). Examples are not limited to social institutions or rule-governed activities but can be found in all aspects of social life; according to Strawson, introducing someone and surrendering are two such acts.

As presaged in these observations, the notion of conventionally indirect speech acts has a considerable history in pragmatics, as it raises interesting questions regarding the assignment of illocutionary force to utterances. Specifically, an account of them as idioms has been wheeled in to support the Literal Force Hypothesis—roughly, the assumption that illocutionary force is either lexicalised in a performative verb or else grammaticalised via sentence

type (Levinson 1983, pp. 268–70). However, it wasn't until Brown and Levinson analysed conventional indirectness as effectuating a compromise between the want to DO THE FTA ON RECORD and the want NOT TO COERCE THE ADDRESSEE (1987, p. 132ff.) that an explicit link between conventional indirectness and (im)politeness was drawn. Brown and Levinson attribute this link to the fact that conventionally indirect speech acts tend to satisfy wants motivated by negative face (1987, pp. 135–6), making conventional indirectness the most populous output strategy under their negative politeness super-strategy. And although they repeatedly emphasised that different indirect speech acts will become conventionalised in different communities, their focus is on the universal motivation for conventionally indirect speech acts rather than their culturally varying realisations (1987, pp. 140–142). They also claimed—by assuming that they will be chosen for acts of lower face-threat as illustrated in their hierarchy of strategies (1987, p. 60)—that conventionally indirect speech acts are less polite than off-record ones, a claim which turned out not to always be true.

The first to put this claim to the test was Blum-Kulka (1987). Drawing on questionnaire data from English and Hebrew, she found that conventionally indirect requests were judged most polite across the board but judgements about the politeness of hints (off-record indirectness) varied: whereas English speakers consistently ranked them second only to conventional indirectness, Hebrew speakers ranked them quite low. She accounted for this by surmising that the amount of inferential work the listener must do to extract politeness from the speaker's utterance constitutes a separate imposition on the hearer's cognitive resources that can subtract from the politeness of the utterance. This inferential work and the corresponding imposition can be reduced if the speaker chooses an expression already conventionalised for this purpose, thereby boosting the politeness of pro forma indirect utterances. Others have obtained similar results. Comparing American English with Korean requests, Holtgraves and Yang (1990) found that, while English speakers ranked hints second after conventional indirectness, Korean speakers preferred them for small requests resorting to conventional indirectness for larger ones—a finding that goes directly against prediction, since we have *less* indirectness with *greater* face-threat. What these findings suggest is that the ambiguity inherent in hints does not always get resolved in favour of politeness. When the speaker wants to implicate politeness she is on safer grounds doing so using an expression already established for this purpose rather than an illocutionarily ambiguous one.

Findings from studies of corpus, L1 and L2 acquisition and impoliteness data support this line of reasoning (Terkourafi 2015a), cementing the belief

that it is the property of being conventional rather than the property of being indirect that is important to (im)politeness. Based on these, Terkourafi (2001, 2012, 2015a) forwarded an account of politeness as conventionalisation, where conventionalisation is understood as a three-way relationship between an expression, a context and a speaker. On this view, an expression is conventionalised for some use relative to a context for a speaker if it is used frequently enough in that context to achieve a particular illocutionary goal to that speaker's experience. 'Expression' in this context refers to a form of words, including their prosodic contour, that tend to be used together to achieve a particular illocutionary goal. Expressions can have some of their parts fixed and others being open variables, making them akin to constructions in the sense of Goldberg (2006). 'Context', on the other hand, refers to the situational context which, by a process of abstraction over real-world contexts, comes to be stored in memory as a schematic combination of extra-linguistic features that include, but are not limited to, the age, gender and social class of the interlocutors, the relationship between them and the setting of the exchange—what Terkourafi (2009) calls a 'minimal context.' Finally, since conventionalisation is a matter of experience, the degree to which an expression is conventionalised relative to a context will depend on who the speaker is and can vary for different speakers, as well as for the same speaker over time. The central claim, then, is that conventionalised expressions (whenever available for a situation to a speaker) are used *all else being equal*, irrespective of the degree of face-threat. They can be adapted to a wide range of frequently experienced situations with minimal effort and, while they are the most expedient means of achieving politeness, departing from conventionalised expression is also possible and may be associated with either increasing politeness or increasing impoliteness.

A comparison between this definition and that of Brown and Levinson reveals some important differences, chief among them their assumption that the conventionalised meaning of an expression and its literal one will be different. That assumption is not made here. Because the current definition is frequency-based and the polite evaluation falls out from the association of the expression with the context directly, any expression (not only negatively polite ones) can be conventionalised and it is perfectly possible for an expression's literal meaning (if we admit of such a notion)[7] and its conventionalised one to coincide. This accounts for a host of empirical studies that found that not only negatively polite strategies, but also positively polite ones (requests

[7] Criticisms of literal meaning range from the well-known weaknesses of the Literal Force Hypothesis (Levinson 1983) to more recent contextualist critiques (Récanati 2003).

stating a future course of action in Ojibwa; Rhodes 1989), off-record ones (irony used by women in informal settings in Tzeltal; Brown 1995) and even bald-on-record ones (bare imperatives as requests in Cypriot Greek; Terkourafi 2001) can be the most frequent realisations of speech acts in particular contexts, making the speaker's goal illocutionarily transparent to the addressee and her utterance polite at one and the same time. On this view of conventionalisation (which contrasts starkly with the semantic one in the rest of the literature), the listener who receives, say, an imperative in Cypriot Greek in a context where imperatives are the normal way of requesting (which is most contexts in this variety of Greek, including employee to boss and seller to customer), will not only likely[8] interpret it as a request but will also be aware that this is the most common way of performing requests in this context. Conventionalisation consists precisely in having this kind of meta-knowledge about not *what* expressions mean but *how often* they mean that. This meta-knowledge is crucial to politeness: using what is in the listener's experience the most common way of requesting in this context serves as a token of the speaker's familiarity with the norms governing the current exchange and, assuming the speaker and hearer agree on what these norms are, by using it the speaker has done what is 'right' (positively evaluated by the hearer) in this context.

However, as Culpeper (2011, pp. 130–132) has pointed out, information about norms doesn't just come from direct observation but also from (im)politeness meta-discourse; that is, discourse *about* politeness and impoliteness. This is especially important in the case of *im*politeness, which is less available to be directly observed in everyday life and generally marked. He therefore extends the frequency-based account presented above to include 'mentions rather than uses' (Culpeper 2011, p. 131), such as characterisations of specific behaviours as 'impolite' or 'rude', which are also part of a speaker's experience about the use of a particular expression in context. Indeed, given its psychological salience, such mentions are bound to be much more frequent in the case of impoliteness. This move makes it possible to respond to critiques of Lewis's notion of convention as inadequate if based solely on precedent (Sect. 2 above), which otherwise apply to the account of conventionalisation proposed here as well. By incorporating (im)politeness meta-discourse alongside frequency into our definition of conventionalisation, we capture more transparently the fact that another reason for conforming to convention is because doing so is evaluated as 'good' and not doing so is evaluated as 'bad.'

[8] Since the proposed account does not take the Literal Force Hypothesis as a starting point, interpretations of illocutionary force are probabilistic and no semantic expression has privileged relationship with a particular illocutionary force.

This in turn highlights another central property of conventionalisation: the fact that it is *inherently evaluative*. When we learn, through exposure or mention, that 'this is the way to do something', what we are implicitly learning is that this is the *right* way of doing this thing in this type of context. That is, the polite evaluation is part and parcel of conventionalisation and politeness falls out as a by-product of uttering the expression in this context rather than being communicated as a separate message of the speaker's utterance. At the same time, the evaluative link between expression and context to the speaker's experience renders the use of other expressions in this context marked to various degrees for this speaker, requiring extra steps to decide whether they are polite or not. This habit-based concept of politeness is in stark contrast with the rationality-based one championed by previous work. It is also clearly a second-order concept, unrestricted by first-order understandings of politeness, which are tied to particular cultural settings and groups.

3.2 Ritual

In terms of politeness, ritual has two important and interrelated characteristics to be discussed: (1) its interactionally situated nature, and (2) its complex relationship with (im)politeness.

Interactional Situatedness

This chapter has already noted the interactional characteristic of ritual (see Sect. 2). This characteristic not only implies that the complex operation of ritual cannot be captured by focusing on the utterance level, but also that rituals are constructed in the discourses of a wide variety of social units, and consequently the 'normative' character of certain ritual practices is relative and potentially contested. For example, Bax and Kádár (2013) identify 'in-group' ritual practices that are specific to the language use of a certain relational network and which are often unintelligible to group-outsiders. Thus, as far as we define 'politeness' in a broad sense—as a collective term for practices by means of which interactants manage to get on with each other—it is clear that certain ritual practices count as normative and 'polite' within certain groups but not necessarily in language use situated outside of these groups.

This situated approach to ritual contrasts to some extent with the bulk of previous research: the majority of studies dedicated to ritual and (im)politeness. describe ritual as a social-level phenomenon (e.g. Rash 2004; Zhu 2005; Traverso 2006). This view follows from a narrow interpretation of rituals as

phenomena that are, of necessity, recognised by the whole of a society, or at least substantial groupings within a society, in order to qualify as rituals. This criterion of 'public recognition' can be encountered, for example, in the work of historians such as Norbert Elias (1994 [2000]). Defining rituality from a social-constitutive perspective also occurs, quite interestingly, in ritual theories such as Bell's (1997, pp. 43–6), who argues the need for rethinking the elusive notion of society in the context of ritual studies. Furthermore, the restricted perspective can be encountered in perceptive studies on ritual language use too; Labov (1972), for one, has analysed ritual formats as widely used macro-level linguistic forms with 'local' (re-)interpretations and modifications.

This narrow interpretation of rituals creates a methodological problem: limiting one's focus on what is accepted as 'normative' implies that one cannot capture a wide range of ritual phenomena (Collins 2004), and, in terms of politeness ritual, research focuses only on 'etiquette' (Kádár and Mills 2013). However, the properties discussed in our definition of 'ritual' (Sect. 1), which are widely accepted in the field, clearly allow ritual research to go beyond 'society' (or 'culture', cf. Eelen 2001) as the only applicable social unit of analysis. With this problem in mind, Kádár (2013) proposed the following ritual typology:

- Covert rituals: Concealed and usually clinical (medically problematic) ritual practices of the individual, which count as normative and compulsory for the individual but are evaluated negatively by others;
- Personal rituals: Ritual practices formed by the individual, which are accepted by others;
- In-group rituals: Ritual practices that count as normative within certain relational networks but are not part of the social norms.
- Social rituals: Rituals that count as socially normative (but not necessarily normative in the interaction of certain relational networks).

Kádár (2013) approaches these ritual types via the observer/participant concepts of 'transparency' and 'accessibility'. Regarding transparency, obviously, covert ritual is the least and social ritual is the most transparent from an observer perspective. Accessibility means that, in terms of ratification, others are the least likely to be ratified (Sect. 2) to participate in a covert ritual practice, and the most likely to be allowed to participate in a social ritual practice. An advantage of this typology is that it helps connect pragmatic research on rituals with other disciplines such as clinical linguistics and psychology (e.g. Marks 1987; Rapoport 1989; Ciarocchi 1995), education studies (e.g. Sears and Sears 2005) and anthropology (e.g. Turner 1967).

Politeness and Ritual

This typology draws attention to the above-mentioned complex relationship between politeness and ritual. As ritual manifests itself in the interactional practices of different social units, it is clear that studies that use 'ritual politeness' as an umbrella term for socially normative politeness or etiquette only represent a segment of the ritual politeness phenomena. In the politeness literature, social rituals have gained interest after the high-impact publication of Ide (1989) who describes Japanese ritualistic behaviour as 'discernment' and contrasts it with the alleged 'volitional' behaviour of 'Western cultures'. Ide basically argues that in Japanese one's behaviour tends to be judged as polite when one discerns the appropriate interactional norm that applies in the situation, and this overrides individual rationality. This differs from dominant Western models of politeness, which operate through the means–ends reasoning of individuals. Whilst Ide (1989) did not explicitly venture into ritual theory, she used ritualistic examples to illustrate 'discernment', and in a large body of research that applies 'discernment' as an analytic concept for politeness—such as Watts (2005), Jucker (2010), Bax (2011)—'discernment politeness' is used to capture social rituals. This view has been recently revisited by Kádár (2013) who argues, in light of previous arguments in the area (e.g. Pizziconi 2003, 2007) that 'discernment' can be retained in cross-cultural pragmatics, provided that it is used clearly as a descriptor for cultures in which social ritual plays a salient role in the metapragmatics of politeness.

In addition to the discernment–volition debate, the approach to rituals as interactionally situated practices helps politeness research draw a distinction between (im)politeness and rituals. Arguably, ritual and politeness phenomena have a large interface; nevertheless, as soon as one goes beyond social etiquette, it becomes evident that there are a wide variety of ritual practices with no direct relationship to (im)politeness. For example, practices of ritual abuse (Muir 2005), which do not count as socially normative, might function as a way of reinforcing in-group relationships from the perspective of the abusers, whilst from the victim's perspective such practices are certainly impolite. In scenes of heckling (Kádár 2014)—which is another situated ritual—the heckler often argues that it is a 'moral duty' to interrupt the public speaker, i.e. from the heckler's perspective interruption is not genuinely impolite. Or, to refer to a more politeness-related example, according to Collins (2004) seemingly 'polite' dating rituals tend to be interpreted as an early part or 'foreplay' within a sexual relationship, and as such they differ from ordinary 'politeness' as it is broadly understood.

4 Case Studies

4.1 From Urban Streetball to Academia and Beyond: The Emergence of an Interactional Convention

As was mentioned earlier, conventionalisation is a matter of degree: an expression can be conventionalised for two people, for members of a group (e.g., a sports team), for a social category (e.g., men), or for an entire language variety/culture (e.g., American English). An example will make this clearer. The expression 'my bad!' is described as 'an American idiom … made popular by basketball players in playground games in the 1970s and 1980s. It usually means "my fault", "my mistake", "I apologise" or "mea culpa". It gained popularity with urban players of streetball and then spread into mainstream popularity.'[9] Pullum (2005) relates how he heard it used 'by an assistant professor of philosophy from Princeton giving a lecture in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard.' At that point, we can say that the expression 'my bad!' had gone through all the stages of conventionalisation described above, going from a 'convention of usage' to a 'convention of the language' (Morgan 1978/1991).

The first time a basketball player said 'my bad!' to another to apologise, the listener would have had to derive the meaning of apology as a Particularized Conversational Implicature (Grice 1975) from what is, after all, an elliptical expression in conjunction with the real-world context—and to decide whether that was a polite way of apologising drawing on the available contextual clues (body language etc.). However, once other basketball players started using 'my bad!' to apologise, it became less and less necessary to go through the full process of implicature derivation: exposure to repeated uses of it *as an apology* in that *type* of context would be enough to ensure prompt identification of its illocutionary force by group members. 'My bad!' would then be understood as an apology via an I-type Generalized Conversational Implicature (Levinson 2000) associated with the minimal context of being basketball players on the court (the stereotypical way of apologising in that minimal context, an $_{mc}$GCI; Terkourafi 2005, 2009).

At the same time, by virtue of being stereotypical for apologies in that context, 'my bad!' would be understood as *polite in that context*: per the definition of politeness in Sect. 3 above, it evidences the speaker's familiarity with the norms of urban streetball and constitutes the speaker's face ('claims a positive value' Goffman 1955, p. 213) on account of that. As the expression spread

[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_bad; accessed 1 June 2015.

beyond basketball courts, its gradual detachment from context progressed further, and more and more of the meaning of apology with associated evaluation as polite that was originally bolstered by context began to 'rub off' on the expression itself becoming part of its default (presumed) meaning irrespective of context (a GCI; Levinson 2000). By the time Pullum heard it at Harvard in the mid-2000s, 'my bad!' could be considered conventionalised for apologies in AmE as a whole (although possibly still associated with young males), and it has since spread to other varieties of English as well (M. Haugh and J. Culpeper, personal communication).

Importantly, compared with alternative apology realisations and given its particular trajectory (its origins in urban streetball), this way of conveying an apology indexes (in the sense of Silverstein 2003; see also Eckert 2008) a laid-back attitude of coolness and relaxed acceptance of one's mistake. It is, then, this indexical meaning which has enabled its spread to situational and cultural contexts further afield, making it characteristic not so much of a particular variety or speech event but rather of a social persona that may be found across localities and speech events. Returning to the features listed at the outset, this makes this a case of convention rather than ritual, since this use is only loosely constrained by time and place, can be performed by pretty much anyone who wishes to present him- or herself in a certain way (or at least no *formal* consequences follow its performance by non-ratified participants, except perhaps laughter and disbelief if, e.g., a child uttered it), and is salient only to those unfamiliar with this practice.

The following example represents a case of in-group ritual, i.e. a ritual practice specific to a smaller community's language use. The analysis of this example reveals a key difference between conventional and ritual (im)politeness: ritual, unlike convention, is a highly salient interactional event. The main difficulty to studying ritual (im)politeness is that ritual practices, which are not socially codified, can be difficult to recognise for the out-group observer. In order to capture such ritual practices, the researcher first needs to identify recurrent phenomena in interaction, and then study whether these phenomena show the various features of ritual that have been discussed in Sect. 1. The following case study, drawn from Hungarian interactional data, illustrates the operation of ritual. For the sake of clarity, the previously discussed features of rituals are underlined in the analysis following the extract.

(2)

1.	A:	belegondolva lehetséges= anyád
	B:	=lenne bunkókám (.) ha (.) felfogtad volna időben hogy
2.	A:	(hhh)

B: női társaságban az ember nem (.) viselkedik bunkó módon mint aki nem tudja
1. A: thinking about it might be= your mother is
B: =could be yokel (.) should (.) you have realised in time that
2. A: (hhh)
B: in female company you don't (.) behave in such a yokel-like way as one who doesn't know
(Cited from Kádár 2013, p. 12)

This short fragment occurs in a longer recording belonging to a set of recordings of interactions between A and B, two males in their thirties, which was provided by one of the participants (B). As the recordings reveal, A and B used a Hungarian rude form of endearment, *bunkókám* (lit. my little yokel, trans. yokel), in order to tease each other in an amiable way. This is a *ritualised/formalised* language use between these two people. As B disclosed in the course of a post-event interview, this in-group use of the offensive term *bunkókám* originates in secondary school where he and A were classmates. This form occurs in example (no.) in which B reproaches A for repeatedly failing to secure a date with a girl he wanted to go out with. Importantly, *bunkókám* is not an invention of this group as it is a conventional Hungarian swearword (cf. Culpeper 2011 on conventional impoliteness); what *is* the in-group 'invention' of A and B is the adoption of *bunkókám* as ritual teasing.

Bunkókám can be evaluated as a ritual term due to the following interrelated characteristics. Firstly, it is a *recurrent* form with a specific relational function: in the approximately 4 hour and 30 minute-long recordings that B provided, this word occurs 42 times, in contexts in which A and B negotiate (predominantly dating-related) life strategies, that is, it seems to serve as a tool to facilitate the in-group discussion of certain issues. Secondly, it operates as an *affective action* (cf. González et al. 1998), which becomes obvious from its contextual usage. In an already challenging context (the other's dating skills are questioned) a deprecatory word such as *bunkókám* would normally further increase the imposition, and so the most plausible explanation for its usage resides in its positive affective value (see this expression in Grabenhorst et al. 2008). The 'harmless' affective function of *bunkókám* is illustrated by its interactional effect. Although in line 1, A reacts to this word by using the mild swearword *anyád* (your mother [is a bitch]…)[10] as a ritualistic counterchallenge, *bunkókám* is not visibly evaluated by the interlocutor. And after the very short counterchallenge, A does not attempt to retake the 'floor': *bunkókám* seems to create an affective ritual 'frame', which allows B to freely

[10] In Hungarian *anyád* can either function as a reference to the other's mother or as a swearword, and one needs to rely on contextual and prosodic clues to properly interpret this form.

advise his listener. The affective function of this term seems to originate in the interactants' relational history, i.e. it was previously a term used in banter when the interactants were secondary school students. Consequently, the use (or, more precisely, reactivation) of this form is bound to an *in-group ethos* (A and B's school days); its 'harmlessness' resides in its association with a *performance*: by using *bunkókám* B not so much speaks as an individual, but rather he animates the voice of a historical group of school children. The difference between the usage of this ritual form and any other non-ritualised form which the members of a relational network used in the past is that *bunkókám* is a common 'property' of A and B.

5 Summary and Future Directions

In this chapter we discussed the main characteristics of the philosophical concepts of 'convention' and 'ritual' as they apply to (im)politeness phenomena. Section 1 provided brief definitions of the two phenomena as well as brief lists of their differences and points of contact. Section 2 distinguished conventions of language from conventions of usage, and elaborated on the latter as social conventions that emerge out of rational calculation of payoffs but are also inherently normative. It also examined the concepts of 'performance', 'recurrence' and 'ratification', which are key to an analysis of ritual and bring new insights into politeness research. Section 3 further elaborated on the relationship between conventionality and (im)politeness, putting forward an account of the latter in terms of the former. Moreover, it discussed the situated nature of ritual, by arguing that ritual politeness is not limited to etiquette (social rituals), but rather encompasses a variety of 'local' ritual practices, which are not necessarily 'transparent' from the outsider observer's perspective and 'accessible' to out-group participants. Finally, in Sect. 4, we provided an example of each phenomenon to illustrate their application to real-world data.

Looking forward, an important challenge for research on conventionalisation lies in devising methodologically sound ways of identifying conventions in conversational data. Two such ways were discussed in the present chapter: frequency counts and (im)politeness meta-discourse. While both of these are potentially useful, they must clearly be further refined before they can be applied, ideally semi-automatically, to large bodies of naturally occurring conversations. Turning to ritual, the most significant areas for future research include cross-cultural and intercultural pragmatic inquiry. There has been little research done on these areas (but see Kádár and Ran 2015), in spite of

the fact that ritual practices, in particular those that are normativised below the social level, tend to cause interactional difficulties in intercultural interactions and/or cross-cultural accounts to members of another culture. It is hoped that future research will pursue interest in this area, by exploring ritual practices in a wide variety of languages and interaction types.

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Part II

Developments

9

Impoliteness

Jonathan Culpeper and Claire Hardaker

1 Introduction

A saying in the UK, often delivered by parents to children, runs: 'Sticks and stones may break my bones but words can never hurt me.' Research suggests that this is false (e.g. Burman et al. 2002; Greenwell and Dengerink 1973; Nicholson and Griffin 2015). In fact, the consequences of even relatively low-level hurtful words can be serious. In the hospital context, Riskin et al. (2015) conducted experiments which demonstrated that a patronising comment by a visiting surgeon reduced the ability of the medical team to diagnose. The symbolic violence of language matters. Yet none of the research mentioned in this paragraph focuses squarely on the language used to achieve this violence. This is one area where research on linguistic impoliteness has much to offer. The foundations of this field are largely in the discipline of linguistics, specifically pragmatics and interactional sociolinguistics. This is where much work on linguistic politeness has been produced, and so it is natural that its apparent antithesis should be here. We write 'apparent antithesis', because linguistic impoliteness is not a simple mirror image of linguistic politeness, as we will discuss at various points in this chapter, but especially in Sect. 2. The field of linguistic impoliteness developed first in a rather fitful fashion, then gathered pace in the mid-1990s, but only really took off around 2008.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_9

Sinkeviciute (2015, p. 317) even claims that now it 'has become one of the most researched topics in pragmatics in the 21st century'. More recently, the production of a number of review articles (Blitvich 2010; Culpeper 2013; Dynel 2015) suggest that it has come of age.

If we consider impoliteness more broadly (i.e. without the modifier 'linguistic'), we discover that it has been approached from a wide array of disciplines, each gravitating towards different labels, even where they each deal with language. For example, in communication studies, we find *hostile interpersonal communication*; in social psychology, we find *verbal aggression*; in sociology, we find *verbal abuse*; in conflict studies, we find *verbal conflict*; in history, we find *rudeness*; and so on. (For some evidence of this variation, see Culpeper 2011a, pp. 76–8.) Of course, it is not the case that all these researchers have exactly the same concept in mind, though there is certainly overlap: all notions of impoliteness seem to involve behaviours that are considered emotionally negative by at least one participant. Note the focal point here of 'behaviours'. Language is virtually absent from many studies of impoliteness. For example, the book *Incivility: The Rude Stranger in Everyday Life* (Smith et al. 2010), written by sociologists, examines rude behaviours performed by strangers mainly in crowded public places in Australia. There is no detailed discussion of language, just the occasional broad description (e.g. 'verbal abuse'), and virtually no linguistic examples are supplied. This is understandable, if one takes into account that most of those rude behaviours—61.2 per cent in their data (Smith et al. 2010, p. 26)—involve no language but relate to movement and space management (e.g. pushing in, blocking somebody, bumping into somebody). Even fewer seem to relate to communicative behaviour: 77.7 per cent were considered by informants to be accidental (Smith et al. 2010, p. 33). All this is not surprising since their study focused on strangers in everyday face-to-face encounters, and negative encounters with strangers frequently occur in crowded public places where jostling for space, deliberately or otherwise, is a natural hazard. Studies of linguistic impoliteness—a label that is often abbreviated to just impoliteness, as indeed we do in this chapter—have encompassed a wider range of social relations and situations, including some where the means of achieving impoliteness is entirely, or predominantly linguistic, as is the case with the digital media of text messaging, Twitter, blogs, emails and so on. Linguistic impoliteness studies have also focused primarily, though not exclusively, on communicative behaviours—something that is in tune with their background in pragmatics.

This chapter focuses on genuine linguistic impoliteness. The distinction between genuine and non-genuine impoliteness seems to have been first

explicitly proposed in Bernal (2008), though one can see it foreshadowed in Leech (1983). We focus on genuine impoliteness, because non-genuine impoliteness—that is, mock impoliteness, banter, sarcasm and so on—is covered in Chap. 13 of this volume on mixed messages. In Sect. 2 we discuss some of the important concepts and features that are often central in impoliteness studies. In selecting these, we avoid concepts/features which have also been prominent in debates about linguistic politeness, and consequently are covered in other chapters of this handbook (see especially the chapters in the first part of this volume). Thus, we cover meta-language, intentionality and emotions. One might argue that a fourth area, impoliteness strategies and formulae, is conspicuously central to many impoliteness studies. Because that area has a diachronic dimension, we cover this in Sect. 3, which includes a critical overview of the development of research on impoliteness. Section 4 focuses on some social aspects, commencing with a discussion of the social impact of impoliteness and concluding with some discussion of contextual dynamics. Section 5 contains a case study designed to illustrate some of the practicalities of analysing impoliteness.

2 Concepts and Other Distinctive Features of Impoliteness Frameworks

2.1 Impoliteness Meta-language

All areas of study need labels. As we indicated in our introduction, within language-related studies, *impolite/impoliteness* is often used, but is that the best choice? Tracy (2008, p. 173) argues that *face-attack* would be the better term, as '"[i]mpolite" is too tame a descriptor for serious acts of face threat'. Face-attack, however, may not be optimal, as the label 'face' may not best cover all the phenomena impoliteness studies wish to treat (see, for example, Spencer-Oatey 2008) and is somewhat remote from any label the non-academic might use.

Rude/rudeness is sometimes promoted on the basis that it is by far the most commonly used by the general public out of all the impoliteness-related terms. In the two-billion word Oxford English Corpus, the most frequent item is *rude*, used 18,387 times, whereas the least frequent item is *impoliteness*, used 30 times (Culpeper 2011a, p. 79). However, Tracy could have made a similar criticism of *rude/rudeness*: it is associated with rather tame offences. The bottom line is that all possible terms occupy their own semantic space, semantic space that is not broad enough to encompass all the phenomena that impoliteness studies typically deal with. One solution is to adopt a relatively

neutral periphrasis such as *negatively marked behaviour*, as indeed Hardaker (2010, 2013) did. Another, proposed by Culpeper (2011a, p. 80), is that the very paltry currency of *impoliteness* makes it ideal for appropriation as a blanket term for the semantic areas covered by all the other terms.

Perhaps the more important issue is not what academics can, should or actually do by way of labels, but what non-academics do. More recent politeness theories (e.g. Eelen 2001; Watts 2003) have called for more attention to be paid to the layperson's usage of politeness terms (e.g. *polite*, *tactful*, *courteous*). Politeness, they argue, is a notion that is constructed and contested in discourse, and looking at those constructions and contexts will provide a firmer ontological basis for politeness studies than has been the case. Rather oddly, however, only a handful of research exists that investigates the layperson's politeness meta-language of today (see, for example, Haugh 2004; Haugh and Hinze 2003; Pizziconi 2007). Impoliteness has fared somewhat better, perhaps because—one might speculate—languages seem to be better stocked with terms related to impoliteness than to politeness, and this is something that researchers have not been able to ignore. In English, such terms include: *impolite*, *rude*, *discourteous*, *hurtful*, *insulting*, *disrespectful*, *derogatory*, *arrogant*, *brusque* and *sarcastic*. Culpeper (2011a, Chapter 3), using traditional thesauri, noted that the items *impolite*, *rude*, (*verbally*) *abusive*, *offensive* and, to a slightly lesser extent, (*verbally*) *aggressive* form a cohesive semantic set with some specific characteristics. Further, using corpus analyses, Culpeper established that *impolite* is not synonymous with *rude* but more precisely matches a subset of its meanings (essentially, all with the exception of sex-related ones). Needless to say, this is for English; there can be no assumptions that such mappings hold for seemingly similar terms across languages and cultures. Taylor (2015a) showed, for example, that English *sarcastic* and Italian *sarcastico* do not occupy the same semantic space, the English term being associated with behaviours that are more negatively evaluated.

The pursuit of impoliteness phenomena need not, of course, be restricted to the simple mapping of the semantic space of single-word labels. Culpeper (2009) used corpus-based methods to reveal the statistically distinctive grammatical complements of the word *rude* in British English. These included words such as *bartender*, *waiter* and *staff*, suggesting that *rude* is regularly applied in public service contexts where there are expectations of service entitlements. He also revealed the infinitival complements of *rude* to be words such as *eavesdropping*, *interrupting*, *pointing*, *ignoring* and *declining*, actions which relate to unwarranted impositions or exclusions, in other words sociality rights (Spencer-Oatey 2008). Waters (e.g. 2012) has conducted similar corpus-research research for Australian English and French. Taylor (2015a, b)

examined the collocational networks of impoliteness-related terms and their social characteristics (e.g. gender) in both English and Italian. Such work clearly has much potential.

2.2 Intention

It is not a surprise that intentionality has been discussed in a number of works on impoliteness, as it would seem to be an important element in helping us distinguish intentional cases of impoliteness (where somebody intended to offend, hatched a plan to carry out that offence and carried it out with full awareness) from cases where somebody accidentally caused offence, through, for example, a *faux pas*. Consider Bousfield's (2008, p. 72; our emphasis) definition of impoliteness:

> Impoliteness constitutes the communication of *intentionally* gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts which are *purposefully* delivered: (1) unmitigated […], and /or (ii) with *deliberate* aggression […].

The intentionality of the speaker is clearly key here. Of course, from the target's point of view we are dealing with perceptions of speaker intentionality. Culpeper's (2005, p. 38; slightly simplified; our emphasis) impoliteness definition accommodated both the speaker's and the hearer's perceptions of intentionality:

> Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack *intentionally*, *or* (2) the hearer *perceives* behaviour as *intentionally* face-attacking, *or* a combination of (1) and (2).

However, we should note that some approaches to impoliteness have not factored in intentionality at all. This is the case with discursive and relational approaches (e.g. Locher and Watts 2005; Mills 2003; Watts 2003). Perhaps this is partly because intentionality and intentions generally have been tainted by classic work in linguistic pragmatics, which tends to treat them as stable and knowable. (For a more enlightened, contrasting view, see Gibbs 1999). What is certainly clear is that full intentionality is not a necessary condition of impoliteness. Two studies, Culpeper (2011a, pp. 50–3) and Gabriel (1998), produce empirical evidence that sometimes people both construe an act as both unintentional and offensive, and also describe it as rude or impolite. Culpeper (2011a, p. 52) explains this finding by arguing that not all impoliteness is intentional, because (1) sometimes the producer of impoliteness is not

aware of the impoliteness effects they are causing (being aware is a key part of the notion of intentionality; cf. Malle and Knobe 1997), and (2) the act is considered impolite nevertheless, because the producer is blamed for not predicting those effects (see Ferguson and Rule 1983 on attributions of blame).

It is instructive at this point to examine Bousfield and Culpeper's more recent definitions of impoliteness, as they reflect a shift in the field. Bousfield's (2010) solution to the kind of problems noted above is to take a prototype approach. He proposes four prototypical features of impoliteness, and then plots 12 possible impoliteness scenarios against these features. The features are:

(1) speaker intent/projectability;
(2) speaker awareness of possible face-damaging effects of their utterance(s);
(3) hearer perception/construction of the speaker's intent/hurtfulness of their words, leading to;
(4) hearer face actually being, or not being, damaged.

(Bousfield 2010, p. 124)

These features move away from 'speaker only' bias, and also accommodate awareness (or perception). Thus, they address notable flaws with earlier definitions. Culpeper's (2011a; our emphasis) revised definition is:

> Impoliteness is a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. It is sustained by expectations, desires and /or beliefs about social organisation, including, in particular, how one person's or a group's identities are mediated by others in interaction. *Situated behaviours are viewed negatively—considered 'impolite'—when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be*. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to have emotional consequences for at least one participant, that is, they cause or are presumed to cause offence.

Clearly, this is partly designed to avoid the tendency of early definitions to overly emphasise both the perspective of the speaker and the role of intentionality. The downside of this definition, however, is that it is very broad and does not give one much sense of the variation amongst the phenomena it covers.

2.3 Emotions

As Locher and Langlotz (Chap. 12, this volume) elaborate, work on politeness does mention emotion, but tends to accord it little further attention. Impoliteness fares slightly better, though given the importance of emotion

here, research seems thin. Blitvich (2010, p. 69; referencing Kienpointner 2008, p. 41) points out that 'we tend to associate impoliteness, but not necessarily politeness, with true emotions'. A sense of this can be gained from the fact that it is easy to imagine the kind of emotion associated with impoliteness—anger, hurt, fear or surprise all spring to mind—but harder to imagine what we would feel when somebody thanks us for holding a door open. A vaguely positive emotion? Unsurprisingly, no politeness researcher attempts to spell out what those vaguely positive emotions might be. In fact, even in the context of politeness studies, mention of emotion seems both to correlate with loss of face or the violation of rights and to be negative. Goffman notes the emotional consequences of face loss:

> If events establish a face for him [sic] that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to 'feel good'; if his ordinary expectations are not filled, one expects that he will 'feel bad' or 'feel hurt'. (1967, p. 6)
>
> He may become embarrassed and chagrined; he may become shamefaced. (1967, p. 8)

Little empirical research within linguistics has focused on the emotions that are associated with impoliteness. Culpeper (2011a, pp. 63–5) hypothesised that different emotions are felt by the target when they experience face-related impoliteness (e.g. being called a moron) as opposed to rights-related impoliteness (e.g. someone jumping ahead of them in a queue). A study consisting of 100 reports supplied by British undergraduates in which the students documented conversations that had caused them to feel bad lent support to this hypothesis. For reports of face-related events, descriptors of emotions clustered into groups such as *embarrassed*, *humiliated*, *stupid*, *hurt* and *upset*. For reports of sociality rights-related impoliteness, specifically to do with equity (i.e. fair, reciprocal treatment), those groups were important too, but we see a doubling of items relating to *anger*. This is broadly consistent with Smith et al. (2010), who studied perceptions of interactions between strangers in Australia; anger was the strongest emotion experienced by 'victims' (2010, p. 81). Given that the events in that study seem to concern rights to space in particular, this fits.

We should not assume, of course, that emotions, or indeed other concepts such as intentionality, are free from cultural conditioning. Emotions are linked to contexts, including cultural contexts, through cognition (see Locher and Langlotz, Chap. 12 this volume; see also Kádár 2013). Culpeper et al. (2014), examining the reports of impoliteness events reported by 500 undergraduates from five nations, noted that—contrary to the generalisation

in the above paragraph—the Chinese informants, instead of feeling angry about such rights violations, tended to be prone to sadness and a sense of being let down.

3 Overview of Research

3.1 A Brief History of Impoliteness Research

Consistent with work on politeness groups described for work on politeness (e.g. Culpeper 2011b; Grainger 2011), three waves can be identified in the development of impoliteness. The first wave was thoroughly anchored in classic models of pragmatics (see Culpeper and Terkourafi, Chap. 2 this volume). Perhaps the first comprehensive and theoretically grounded paper on the topic of impoliteness, and also one which addresses communicative issues, is Lachenicht (1980). However, it did not trigger a surge in impoliteness research. Instead, it was research into politeness, not impoliteness, that gathered momentum, especially within (interactional) sociolinguistics and (socio)pragmatics. This might seem somewhat odd, given the salience of impoliteness events and the amount of public discussion they attract. A consequence of these developments was an ever increasing gap between the theoretical and descriptive apparatus and actual language use. Note here that the dominant politeness theory, Brown and Levinson (1987), is geared to mitigating threats to face; it ignores impoliteness. Even models of facework paid scant attention to aggressive or aggravating facework. Goffman (1967), for example, does discuss the 'aggressive use' of facework, but devotes little more than a couple of pages to the issue (1967, pp. 24–6). It is perhaps the wish to counter this gap that drove a growth in studies, starting in the mid-1990s and truly taking off around 2008, showing that impoliteness can be strategic, systematic, sophisticated and not uncommon.

Craig et al. (1986, pp. 456–61) argue that an adequate account of the dynamics of interpersonal communication should consider hostile as well as co-operative communication. Indeed, Craig et al. (1986) seem to have been the first to publish a paper discussing face-attack or face-aggravation in relation to politeness theory. They point out the consequences for Brown and Levinson (1987) of failing to treat face-attack strategies systematically, demonstrating that descriptive holes will be left in the analysis of data. Culpeper (1996) was specifically designed to answer Craig et al.'s (1986) call for a comprehensive treatment of face-attack strategies. To an extent, the framework developed here is the face-attack 'flip-side' of Brown and Levinson's (1987) work on politeness.

As this is also true of Lachenicht (1980) and Austin (1987, 1990), Culpeper (1996) is not the first Brown and Levinson inspired model of impoliteness, but the specific impoliteness strategies it mentions have been deployed in much research and across a variety of discourses. (We focus on those strategies in the following sub-section.) A common weakness of opposite-of-politeness studies, however, is the very fact that they typically draw on Brown and Levinson (1987), and thus many weaknesses of that politeness model are carried over, although some studies do make modifications in order to address at least some of them. Moreover, Eelen (2001, pp. 98–100), for example, argues that politeness theories are generally not well equipped, conceptually or descriptively, to account for impoliteness. He points out that they tend to give the impression that impoliteness is either some kind of politeness failure, a consequence of not doing something, or anomalous behaviour, unworthy of consideration. We need to be careful, however, about the precise targets of such critical comments. Leech (e.g. 2014, pp. 220–4) has always argued that his model, though usually considered a member of the 'classic politeness theories' category, can cope equally with politeness and impoliteness.

An alternative to the classic politeness models emerged in the shape of the discursive or postmodern approach, as notably articulated by book-length studies such as Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) (see also, Locher 2006a, b; Locher and Watts 2005). This second wave politeness approach was also articulated in relation to impoliteness. In fact, a key point about second wave approaches is that they are not in the business of distinguishing politeness or, for that matter, impoliteness. Instead, they revolve around a particular approach to social interaction within which politeness or impoliteness is said to be accounted for. Thus, the focus is on how the lay-person's (or member's own) conception of impoliteness is revealed in their discourse, and not on how the lay-person's discourse fits a conception devised by academics (see Sect. 2.1). This approach emphasises that impoliteness is constructed in the ebb and flow of interaction, and that the very concept of impoliteness itself and its definition is subject to discursive struggle. This departs from earlier impoliteness models which tended to (a) focus on the impoliteness meanings the speaker intended to the exclusion of everything else, and (b) treat impoliteness as a relatively stable aspect of particular linguistic forms—another topic we will discuss in the following section. It is thus not surprising that some discursive scholars, including Watts (2003), have deployed a hearer-based pragmatic theory, Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Of course, as with classic politeness theories, not all discursive works articulate the same approach. Eelen and Mills are perhaps more purist, whilst Locher and Watts have some of what we might see as third-wave characteristics.

The year 2008 was important for impoliteness scholarship. The field saw the arrival of its first monograph, Bousfield (2008), its first volume of papers, Bousfield and Locher (2008), and the first journal special issue devoted to impoliteness: 'Impoliteness: Eclecticism and Diaspora' (*Journal of Politeness Research* 4(2), edited by Bousfield and Culpeper). As Locher and Bousfield (2008) note, work on impoliteness was moving towards a middle ground between the classic and the discursive approaches. This coincides with the rise of relational approaches (e.g. Spencer-Oatey 2001, 2008), the frame-based approach to politeness (Terkourafi 2001) and impoliteness (Terkourafi 2008, 2009), and the interactional approach (e.g. Arundale 1999; Haugh 2007b). Such third-wave approaches encompass both speaker and hearer perspectives, and pay attention to context yet accommodate more stable meanings arising from particular linguistic forms. It is to the latter that we now turn.

3.2 From Strategies to Formulae

Some debate has revolved around the issue of whether impoliteness is inherent (fixed and stable) in particular strategies and formulae or not. Some of this debate, however, is mis-framed. It is not a matter of those who think it is not inherent versus those who think it is. It is rather difficult to find any mainstream representatives of a (im)politeness camp that think it is. (Culpeper 2011a had to resort to a statement from a scholar in semantics.) Instead, it is better to think of this debate in terms of the degree to which impoliteness is not inherent. We will start by discussing impoliteness strategies, and then move on to impoliteness formulae.

Brown and Levinson (1987) make a distinction between politeness superstrategies and output strategies, and early work on impoliteness followed suit. The former are of a higher order and involve the overall orientation of the act; the latter are the more specific means by which the superstrategies are pursued. Culpeper (1996, pp. 356–7) proposed the following impoliteness superstrategies and output strategies (incorporating one revision to the status of sarcasm proposed in Culpeper 2005):

Impoliteness Superstrategies

Bald on-record impoliteness: the face-threatening act (FTA) is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimised.

Positive impoliteness: the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants, e.g. ignore the other, exclude the other from an activity, be

disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic, use inappropriate identity markers, use obscure or secretive language, seek disagreement, use taboo words, call the other names.

Negative impoliteness: the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants, e.g. frighten, condescend, scorn or ridicule, be contemptuous, do not treat the other seriously, belittle the other, invade the other's space (literally or metaphorically), explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect (personalize, use the pronouns 'I' and 'You'), put the other's indebtedness on record.

Off-record impoliteness: the FTA is performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others.

Withhold politeness: the absence of politeness work where it would be expected. For example, failing to thank somebody for a present may be taken as deliberate impoliteness.

Impoliteness Meta-strategy

Sarcasm or mock politeness: the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations.

As with Brown and Levinson (1987), Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle (CP) underpins these strategies. Bald on-record impoliteness, for example, involves upholding the CP and is considered direct, whilst off-record impoliteness involves flouting the CP, and is considered indirect. Describing impoliteness in terms of a *Cooperative* Principle may sound odd. However, as has been argued by a number of scholars (e.g. Pavlidou 1991; Thomas 1986), the CP applies to co-operation in the exchange of information, not in facilitating social goals. To be impolite, one still needs to co-operate in the exchange of information, i.e. uphold the CP at some level, in order to get one's impolite message across (for further elaboration, see Bousfield 2008, Chapter 2). Nevertheless, impoliteness theorists, with the exception of Terkourafi (2008, 2009), have done little to think through a Gricean account of impoliteness. Most treat the strategies as rhetorical strategies: conventional ways of using communicative resources to facilitate goals (see the discussion of strategies in Culpeper and Terkourafi, Chap. 2 this volume).

These impoliteness strategies have been challenged, largely on the same grounds that people have challenged Brown and Levinson's (1987) work. Most of the challenges have been to do with the superstrategies. Bousfield (2008) suggests two revisions of the superstrategies. One is to combine positive and negative impoliteness. This helps solve the problem that positive and negative impoliteness, as with politeness, are often so thoroughly

mixed that meaningful separation is difficult. The other is the insight that the bald on-record category involves face as well. In contrast, the impoliteness output strategies constitute a robust set. Bousfield (2008) utilises the same basic set as Culpeper (1996) with a couple of additions. Moreover, a number of other studies deploy that set, or part of it, showing it to be effective (Cashman 2006; Lorenzo-Dus et al. 2011; Murphy 2014; Shum and Lee 2013). However, three points relating to context need to be borne in mind. Firstly, this is a list of impoliteness strategies used in British English culture—there may be differences for other cultures, though the fact that these strategies have facilitated analyses of, for example, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans living in the United States and speaking varieties of Spanish or English (e.g. Cashman 2006) and Cantonese-speaking residents of Hong Kong (e.g. Shum and Lee 2013) suggests that these differences are not great. Secondly, a category such as 'British English culture' belies the diversity within it. Some communities of practice develop rather specialised impoliteness strategies, as Hardaker (2013, 2015) revealed for certain online fora and the phenomenon of 'trolling' (see, also, Graham and Hardaker, Chap. 30 this volume). Thirdly, and finally, the general point needs to be stressed, as it was in the original publications (though often ignored), that we can never assume that an impoliteness strategy is always performing impoliteness. Calling somebody names, for example, could be for the purpose of banter and thus a matter of cementing solidarity, not causing offence.

Some scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the notion of a strategy and what it encompasses (see the discussion of strategies in Culpeper and Terkourafi, Chap. 2 this volume). Blas Arroyo (2001), for example, points out that impoliteness strategies vary wildly, from those characterised by specific linguistic details (e.g. 'personalise, use of the pronouns "I" and "you"') to broad functional categories (e.g. 'frighten'). In addition, arranging impoliteness strategies along a dimension of directness is tricky because of the complexities involved in pinning down directness. A more concrete solution is to focus on conventionalised expressions or routinised formulae. A way forward is to take inspiration from the path proposed by Terkourafi (e.g. 2001) in her frame-based politeness approach. Terkourafi (2005, p. 213) argues that expressions become conventionalised when there is a 'relationship holding between utterances and contexts, which is a correlate of the (statistical) frequency with which an expression is used in one's experience of a particular context'. For such formulae to count as polite, they must go unchallenged (e.g. Haugh 2007a; Terkourafi 2005). Thus, typically, a compliment is accepted; holding a door open for somebody receives 'thank you'; 'please' accompanying a request is

met with compliance or polite refusal. These are the routinised formulae and/or actions of everyday politeness events. Note here that there is absolutely no claim that such items have completely stable polite meanings, that they are polite in *all* contexts of use; the claim is for particular contexts of use. Turning to impoliteness, we can deploy the same notion of conventionalisation, though with impoliteness 'one's experience of a particular context' is often indirect experience. As Culpeper (2011a, p. 131) argues, impoliteness 'casts a much larger shadow than its frequency of usage would suggest'; 'it is more noticed and discussed than politeness'. For such items to count as impolite they must go challenged. Evidence of challenges includes, notably, counter impoliteness (tit-for-tat pairings), but also meta-pragmatic comments (e.g. 'that was so rude'), indications, verbal or non-verbal, of offence being experienced (i.e. symptoms of emotions such as humiliation, hurt or anger). Such actions are part of what constructs impoliteness contexts.

The beauty of impoliteness formulae is that they do not suffer the vagaries of strategies, and can be derived through empirical methods. Culpeper (2011a, Chapter 4) identified candidates for impoliteness formulae by studying discourses in which impoliteness is central (e.g. army training, exploitative TV shows, graffiti), drawing on a varied collection of data accumulated over 15 years, and also impoliteness event report forms filled in by 100 British undergraduates. To establish whether these candidate formulae are regularly associated with impoliteness effects (i.e. whether they are challenged), Culpeper (2011a) checked all items in the two-billion word Oxford English Corpus,[1] to make sure that more than 50 per cent of the instances of each type occurred in contexts which could be interpreted as involving impoliteness. The resulting list of formulae that met this criterion is displayed in Table 9.1.

Some items that one might expect to be in Table 9.1 simply did not occur frequently enough. For example, taboo words can trigger a judgement of impoliteness, but they seem to do this per se rarely. In most cases, taboo words operate in conjunction with impoliteness formulae such as those in Table 9.1. We should note that, whilst Culpeper (2011a) acknowledges the existence of conventionalised non-verbal impoliteness behaviour (e.g. spitting, a two or one fingered gesture), he does not investigate them. Also, this is of course a list of impoliteness formulae in British English. Whether the same types of impoliteness formulae emerge in other languages and cultures is an unanswered empirical question, though one might note that Kleinke and Bös (2015) successfully accommodated German data.

[1] See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oxford-english-corpus

Table 9.1 Conventionalised impoliteness formulae (drawn from Culpeper 2011a, pp. 135–6)

Impoliteness formulae type	Example
Insult (Personalised negative vocatives)	*you fucking moron*
Insult (Personalised negative assertions)	*you are such a bitch*
Insult (Personalised negative references)	*your little arse*
Insult (Personalised third-person negative references in the hearing of the target)	*the daft bimbo*
Pointed criticisms/complaints	*that is total crap*
Challenging or unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions	*why do you make my life impossible*
Condescensions	*that's being babyish*
Message enforcers	*listen here*
Dismissals	*fuck off*
Silencers	*shut the fuck up*
Threats	*I'm going to bust your fucking head off if you touch my car*
Curses and ill-wishes	*fuck you*

3.3 Co-texts and Contexts

We have already stressed that impoliteness is context sensitive. Here we pick out some of the key co-textual and contextual issues that have been discussed in relation to impoliteness.

3.4 Co-texts

An approach focusing solely on impoliteness strategies only gets one so far. It is patently obvious that discourse is not built out of one-shot strategies contained in single turns. So, if someone uses an impoliteness strategy, the key issue is: What does the target of that strategy do? Do they use another impoliteness strategy back, or do they do something else? These were the issues that Culpeper et al. (2003) sought to address. Culpeper et al. (2003, p. 1563) proposed the typology of impoliteness response options displayed in Fig. 9.1.

Although these were designed as a set of rational choices, much like the classic politeness strategies, each choice is certainly attested in the data. One could simply ignore impoliteness and not respond at all, but if one responds, one has a choice as to how to respond. The choice seems to be between accepting the impoliteness or countering it. Acceptance involves agreeing with an insult, complying with a rude directive and so on (e.g. A: 'You moron', B: 'You're right, I'm a bit of a dim-wit', etc.), countering involves actively challenging




Fig. 9.1 Impoliteness response options

the impoliteness (e.g. A: 'You moron', B: 'You idiot', etc.). Finally, how one counters is an issue, and there seems to be a range of options varying from being offensive (as in the previous example), to being defensive (e.g. A: 'You moron', B: 'No, I've got a PhD …'). (For brevity, examples in this paragraph are constructed. For naturally occurring examples, see Culpeper et al. 2003.)

In fact, the data do not distribute evenly across the categories just mentioned. People tend not to 'turn the other cheek' by either staying silent or accepting. Instead, at least as far as British and North American cultures are concerned, they retaliate in kind—they use offensive counter impoliteness. Research in aggression has repeatedly shown that verbal insults and taunts are often reciprocated (see the references given in Baron and Richardson 1994), potentially leading to an escalating conflict spiral. Countering with impoliteness—something which Kienpointner (1997, p. 266) labels 'reactive rudeness'—is a way of restoring face loss that might have resulted from the initial impoliteness. Note that countering impoliteness with impoliteness picks up on one of the key ways in which conventionalised impoliteness formulae are recognised, as mentioned above.

This is not to say that all contexts display this pattern. Culpeper et al. (2003, pp. 1563–5) observe that in interactions between car owners and traffic wardens the basic pattern is impoliteness followed by a defensive counter, because traffic wardens are constrained by their social roles. (Countering with impoliteness could lead to dismissal.)

The response options displayed in Fig. 9.1 were elaborated further in Bousfield (2007), and also in Dobs and Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2013). One notable limitation that the latter publication addressed was the fact that the options of Fig. 9.1 assume a simple dyadic model of communication. However, despite the increasing level of sophistication, one might argue that the models are still restricted to speakers performing social actions to cause offence or to defend themselves. What does not often enter the picture so

explicitly is the taking of offence. This is the point made by Haugh (2015) of impoliteness models in general. He suggests that 'taking offence can be understood as a social action initiated by the recipient in which he or she construes the actions or conduct of the prior speaker (or some other person or groups of persons) as offensive' (Haugh 2015, p. 37); it is a 'pragmatic act that is afforded and constrained by the activity type in which it arises' (2015, p. 41). In his data analyses, Haugh shows that such pragmatic acts can include withholding any indication that one has taken offence or only implicating that one has. This kind of approach would lead to another set of options that are parallel to and interface with the kind of options displayed in Fig. 9.1.

3.5 Contexts

Situations, constituted by language and contextual features, and described in terms of, for example, communities of practice or activity types can sanction or legitimate impoliteness (see, for example, Culpeper 2005; Mills 2003). In army training discourse, for example, the training officers are licensed to use forms of language that might be construed as impolite (see Bousfield 2008). This licensing is sustained by institutional power structures. Another case is the British House of Commons, where normally impolite accusations of, for example, incompetence or lying are licensed, as long as certain discourse practices are adhered to (e.g. particular terms of address) (Harris 2001). Culpeper (2005) argues that we must be careful not to conflate the terms 'sanctioning' and 'neutralising'. One can have a context in which the use of impoliteness is sanctioned but people can still take offence—it is not necessarily neutralised. Impolite behaviours are highly salient and closely associated with particular emotional reactions. It is difficult for an awareness of the context to be more salient and thus for the context to neutralise the impoliteness. Thus, for example, contestants on game shows may be offended by negative comments on their performances, even though they know that it is all a game. One might note something of a parallel here with some kinds of ritualised banter. The signals that it is banter (e.g. smiles and laughter) and not genuine impoliteness need to be strong enough to rule out the possibility of taking offence, but despite these signals, participants may still end up offended.

Much of politeness theory, especially the classic theories, limits its contextual purview to a handful of interpersonal dimensions. How do these figure with impoliteness? The most important factor here seems to be power. Witness the full title of the first collected volume on impoliteness: *Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice* (Bousfield and Locher 2008). Similarly, in Culpeper's (2011a) study

of 100 impoliteness events recorded by British undergraduates, 133 of the 200 descriptive labels that informants supplied for those events fell into six groups (in order of predominance): *patronising*, *inconsiderate*, *rude*, *aggressive*, *inappropriate* and *hurtful*. Patronising behaviour (including condescending, belittling, ridiculing and demeaning behaviours) involves an abuse of power, including producing or perceiving a display of power that infringes an understood hierarchy.

4 Case Study: 'Lose some Weight Baby Girl'

Let us put three of these concepts—context, power and impoliteness formulae—to the test now with a brief case study.

4.1 Context

The example below is transcribed from CCTV footage that was originally captured on 16 April 2015 and released shortly afterwards by news outlet, *LiveLeak*. In the video, whilst paying a fine to recover her confiscated vehicle, *ESPN* presenter Britt McHenry verbally attacks the towing company worker numerous times. Prior to the confrontation, McHenry had left her car in a restaurant carpark the night before, contrary to the restaurant's sign forbidding overnight parking, and the company in question had towed the vehicle away.

A contextual factor well worth highlighting is that in the United States, the UK and probably other countries, employees that work in the arena of 'policing' bad parking, such as traffic wardens and towing companies, are regularly subjected to abuse, threats and even physical violence. Government and council employees may defend themselves by pointing out that they have little personal interest invested in fining drivers or towing their vehicles, and that their primary concern is keeping roads and byways clear and safe. However, commercial enterprises are typically operating for profit and, as a result, they may be perceived as assuming a position of power and parasitically using laws purely as an opportunistic means of extracting money from others.

To return to our example, the footage, which runs for one minute, eight seconds, appears to have been edited in at least five places, though it is unclear whether this was done by the towing company or by *LiveLeak*. The transcript of the incident is as follows:

BM = Britt McHenry
CW = Company Worker
UF = McHenry's unidentified friend
Text = speech/actions overlap
***text* = actions**
[????] = unclear speech
[text] = best guess at/description of unclear speech
\text\ = spoken quietly

1. BM: I'm in the news sweetheart that's what
2. BM: I will fucking sue this place
3. CW: oh aaaaare you
4. BM: okay that's-
5. CW: okay that's fine and I will play your video so careful
6. BM: *looks at CCTV camera*
7. CW: I'll play the video-

EDIT

8. BM: that's why I have a degree and you don't
9. CW: sorry I-

EDIT

10. BM: \I wouldn't work in a scumbag place like this\
11. UF: [?*murmured in a sympathetic tone*?]
12. BM: makes my skin crawl even being here
13. CW: hmmm well let's get you outta here [?quickly?]
14. BM: yep that's all you care about is just taking people's money
15. CW: [????????????]
16. UF: \yeah I know\
17. BM: \with no education, no skill set\
18. UF: \I know\
19. BM: \just wanted to clarify that\

EDIT

20. BM: do you feel *good* about your *job*?

EDIT

21. BM: so I could be a college dropout and do the same thing?

EDIT

22. BM: why cause I have a *brain* and you don't? *sarcastic smile*
23. CW: don't say that
24. BM: maybe if I was missing some teeth they would hire me huh
25. CW: [????????????? little bit]
26. BM: oh like *yours* cause they look so stunning
27. UF: *disbelieving laughter* [?????????]
28. CW: yeah
29. BM: cause I'm on television and you're in a … fucking … trailer honey
30. CW: I know yeah yeah
31. BM: lose some weight baby girl
32. CW: have a nice day yeah yeah

4.2 Power

In the transcript, perhaps the most obvious dynamic is a power struggle between the two women. Obliged to pay despite her strong objections, McHenry gives vent to her feeling by striving to inflict a wide range of attacks on the worker. Many of those attacks, as we will see, are designed to realign personal values so that McHenry's status goes up whilst the worker's goes down. However, each participant is also constrained by vulnerabilities, and these are discussed further below.

McHenry's Power

As a television presenter, McHenry is in an interesting position. On the one hand, she wields the power of celebrity, but on the other, she is constrained by, and arguably held to a much higher standard of conduct in every interaction outside of her own home. In other words, fame might confer power, but it can also confer the obligation of maintaining a professional reputation even in the face of provocation. To complicate matters further, McHenry also has support in the shape of an unnamed friend, and, at moments, this friend appears to validate and encourage McHenry's behaviour.

McHenry makes ample use of an array of factors that she presumably believes will give her leverage, superiority or authority over the worker. McHenry refers to being 'in the news' (line 1), perhaps as an attempt to indicate that she has the capacity to expose malpractice. She also threatens legal action (line 2), claims intellectual superiority (lines 8 and 22), implies that she has higher standards of morality and hygiene (lines 10 and 12) and positions her job and achievements as higher status (line 29). At the same time, McHenry attempts to diminish the worker's status and authority by suggesting that she is uneducated (lines 8, 17, 21 and 22), immoral (lines 10 and 14), physically unattractive (lines 24, 26 and 31) and occupies an undesirable position through the semantically loaded term 'trailer' (line 29).

The Worker's Power

Whilst the towing company's power to enforce punitive measures for parking offences ultimately derives from legislation, the towing clerk who stands as a representative of that power is merely an employee, and she could lose her job if her conduct is considered to be unsatisfactory. Similarly, just as McHenry is both assisted and hindered by her fame, the employee is equally protected and left exposed by the constant observation of a silent, powerful witness with

an unimpeachable memory: the CCTV camera. The attacks against her may become a matter of permanent record that she can later use as evidence, but she is also less able to defend herself, lest that defence is viewed as misconduct by her employer.

Due to the editing of the video, we have little to analyse from the clerk but it is precisely the presence of the camera that gives us our one noteworthy instance. In lines 5 and 7, as McHenry threatens to sue, the worker counters with a threat to 'play your video'. However, no context or audience is specified. To whom would the video be played? Why would that matter? Like McHenry, we are left to infer a potential audience, such as the internet or the media, and the probable consequences of this. As is obvious from the fact that we are analysing this data, the worker's threat is ultimately carried out and we are able to empirically observe the kind of power that the clerk was threatening to draw upon.

The Audience's Power

The leaked video very quickly invoked a far greater force than any single celebrity: public shaming. Indeed, the towing clerk's threat was interesting precisely *because* it not only rendered the power of McHenry's celebrity status ineffective, it actually hinted at how that fame could be a serious liability. A story about an unknown person being rude to a clerk is unlikely to make even the local news. Footage of a celebrity behaving badly, however, is prime material for countless media outlets.

Sure enough, within hours of the video being leaked, the television network *ESPN* found itself under intense and mounting pressure from other viewers, rival media outlets and even some of the presenter's own colleagues to fire McHenry. This pressure took the form of thousands of stories across most major news outlets, and an influx of abusive and angry messages on social media. One general theme that emerged from these articles and messages was the judgement that McHenry had behaved like an elitist bully with an overdeveloped sense of entitlement.

In response, *ESPN* suspended McHenry for a week, and she subsequently posted the following on the Twitter platform:

> *In an intense and stressful moment, I allowed my emotions to get the best of me and said some insulting and regrettable things. As frustrated as I was, I should always choose to be respectful and take the high road. I am so sorry for my actions and will learn from this mistake.* (@BrittMcHenry, 9:18 PM – 16 Apr 2015)[2]

[2] https://twitter.com/BrittMcHenry/status/588798710684987393

In short, a private dispute between three people (if we include McHenry's unnamed friend) became a very public affair involving millions of viewers and online users, such that McHenry was obliged—whether by *ESPN*, her own judgement or other motivations—to broadcast her apology just as publically, rather than directing it solely, and, one might argue, more properly, to the individual she had attacked. This demonstrates the capacity for overhearers or bystanders, potentially numbering in the millions, to comprehend themselves as part of the offended-against group, even if the actions in question were not directed at them.

4.3 Impoliteness Formulae

Finally, it is worth revisiting Culpeper's (2011a, pp. 135–6) impoliteness formulae to see how well they apply to McHenry's transcript. In fact, we can find most of the formulae he suggests occurring in the transcript (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 McHenry's use of impoliteness formulae (drawn from Culpeper 2011a, pp. 135–6)

Impoliteness formulae type	Example
Insult (Personalised negative vocatives)	–
Insult (Personalised negative assertions)	*cause I'm on television and you're in a … fucking … trailer honey*
Insult (Personalised negative references)	*oh like your [teeth] cause they look so stunning*
Insult (Personalised third-person negative references in the hearing of the target)	*I wouldn't work in a scumbag place like this* *makes my skin crawl even being here*
Pointed criticisms/complaints	*yep that's all you care about is just taking people's money* *with no education, no skill set* *that's why I have a degree and you don't* *why cause I have a brain and you don't?*
Challenging or unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions	*do you feel good about your job?* *so I could be a college dropout and do the same thing?* *do you feel good about your job?* *maybe if I was missing some teeth they would hire me huh*
Condescensions	*lose some weight baby girl*
Message enforcers	–
Dismissals	–
Silencers	–
Threats	*I will fucking sue this place*
Curses and ill-wishes	–

As with any framework of this nature, we find that some utterances are readily categorised under multiple formulae. For instance, we have classified, 'lose some weight baby girl' as condescending particularly because of the 'advice' it contains, and the use of *baby girl*. This vocative especially entails a wealth of cultural, semantic baggage involving popular 'mean girls' and exclusionary high-school cliques, and this is presumably invoked to mock the towing clerk who, McHenry is perhaps intimating, would have been excluded by such groups. However, we could also classify that same utterance as secondarily containing an uncharitable presupposition (i.e. that the clerk is overweight), a personalised negative assertion or perhaps even a pointed criticism. In short, the framework helps to demonstrate just how complex, multilayered and multifaceted language, and especially impoliteness, can be.

To conclude this case study, though the transcript is short, it provides a wealth of empirical support for many of the theoretical developments in the field of impoliteness.

5 Future Directions

As a new and fast-growing field, impoliteness may have firmly arrived, but we would argue that it has not yet achieved the stability of widespread consensus on certain key points. These include issues such as the interplay between verbal and non-verbal behaviour, the meta-language surrounding the concepts under scrutiny, and the role of intentions and emotions in our understanding of both politeness and impoliteness. Through this lack of agreement, however, we are seeing the development of exciting new approaches. For instance, the recently emerging field of corpus pragmatics is identifying large-scale patterns of politeness and impoliteness norms (e.g. see Diani 2015; Jucker 2013; Romero-Trillo 2008). New studies in forensic linguistics, and, perhaps more accurately, forensic pragmatics draw together the intersection of language and the law by offering us unique insights into the legal consequences of engaging in criminal linguistic behaviour such as threats and hate-speech (e.g. see Carney 2014; Fraser 1998; Willard 2007). And pragmatic analyses of one of the newest forms of data—computer-mediated communication—are shining a light on some of the darker aspects of online communication (e.g. see Avgerinakou 2003; Herring et al. 2013). These and more promise exciting developments in the coming years as the study of impoliteness enters its newest wave.

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10

(Im)politeness and Identity

Pilar Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Maria Sifianou

1 Introduction

Despite its conceptual proximity to face, one of the core constructs of (im)politeness research, identity has not constituted a main focus of (im)politeness scholars until recently. Probably, that was due to the traditional approach of the two fields. Politeness scholarship mostly relied on Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) framework and was therefore top-down in orientation. Discursive identity models have been greatly influenced by constructionism and are thus bottom-up in orientation. This presented serious problems of incompatibility until the advent of discursive approaches in the 2000s (Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Watts 2003) which adopted a bottom-up methodology to the study of (im)politeness. Not surprisingly, it was around this time when scholars started including identity in their accounts of (im)politeness.

In this chapter, in Sect. 2, we will first take a look at the implicit and explicit relationship between identity and (im)politeness. Then, we will focus on the views of those politeness scholars who have contrasted face and identity by mostly emphasising their differences. Since we argue that discussions

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_10

of identity in (im)politeness scholarship need to be more grounded in identity theory, we will provide a high-level overview of key ideas about identity as constructed in discourse. Our discussion will be focused on three dialectics essential to the understanding of discursive identity. Once the basic tenets of identity construction have been clarified, in Sect. 3, we will revisit claims made by politeness scholars regarding identity to check whether they are tenable in light of the theoretical overview presented. This overview makes quite evident that face and identity are difficult to tease out at the theoretical level and thus more theoretical discussion and empirical research are needed to establish the relationship to each other and to (im)politeness research. To that end, we will continue the theoretical discussion focusing on scholarship that has tackled (im)politeness research by tying it to the concept of identity. We crucially argue that assessments of (im)politeness can also be linked to the notion of identity. In Sect. 4, we provide empirical evidence of how models developed for the analysis of identity can be fruitfully applied to studies of (im)politeness. Analysing data extracted from a documentary on Golden Dawn, a Greek, neo-Nazi political party, and their views on immigration, we will argue that (im)politeness and aggression play a strong role in the construction of the out-group in processes of othering. Finally, we will conclude by recapping the main highlights of the theoretical discussion and the analysis.

2 Face and Identity in (Im)politeness Research

2.1 Face and Identity

Studies of face and identity have formed the cornerstones of (im)politeness theories and modern sociological thought, respectively. Yet despite their obvious conceptual proximity, their paths have seldom intersected. Furthermore, in regards to possible intersections between identity and face, very little work has tackled the entirety of the phenomenon. The two constructs have served their constituencies well, and for the most part the separation has not been questioned. A notable exception is the work of scholars within the American School of Communication whose definitions of face have always made explicit the connections between face and identity. For example, Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998, p. 190) define face as a cluster of identity and relational-based issues. In the 1990s, Tracy (1990) strongly suggested that face theorists should

pay close attention to self-presentation claims found in identity scholarship, but this recommendation was for the most part ignored.

Identity has a long, multidisciplinary tradition. Edwards (2009, p. 20) points out that 'identity … is central to all the "human" or "social" sciences, as it is also in philosophical and religious studies'. However, as Joseph (2010, p. 12) notes, modern linguistics—due to its traditional emphasis on structure and representation rather than communication—was slow but steady in embracing the function of identity as central to language. Once it did though, the number of language-based approaches to the study of identity proliferated. These can be roughly categorised into two main groups: the variationist/quantitative tradition initiated by Labov (1963, 1972) which stands in dialogue with the sociological or discourse analytical tradition (see Sect. 3), which approaches identity construction from a qualitative standpoint (Mendoza-Denton 2008, p. 475).

Face, as the inspiration of the core concept in Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) framework, was developed by Goffman (1967[1955]). However, identity is also a staple in Goffman's work and a thread through his otherwise discontinuous production. As Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013b) has argued, Goffman conceptualised face as being tied to a line (a role, an identity).[1] However, Brown and Levinson's conceptualisation of face altered its essence, as they separated face from line and presented it as a cognitive construct possessed by a rational, rather than an emotional, person. Politeness as a field grew exponentially from the 1980s onwards and although the framework itself and its core concept, face, were problematised (Wierzbicka 1985; Matusmoto 1988; Ide 1989; Gu 1990; Nwoye 1992; Sifianou 1992; Strecker 1993; Mao 1994; Bravo 1999, among others), the intrinsic relation of the latter with identity was for the most part treated as a non-issue, at least from a theoretical standpoint.

A cursory look at the literature, however, indicates quite a different reality. In fact, remarkably popular subfields of pragmatics, such as intercultural and interlanguage pragmatics, whose main focus is politeness realisations, routinely associated different manifestations and levels of politeness with social demographic categories such as nationality or ethnic group, both of which are social identities (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Kasper and Blum-Kulka 1993, among many others). In these lines of work, for the most part, nationality or ethnicity is presented as a reified and essentialist construct and is never problematised (see Hatipoğlu 2007; Elias 2013 for recent illustrations).

[1] As a matter of fact, Goffman dropped the term 'face' and substituted it unproblematically with identity in the bulk of his work.

Another social identity that has received quite significant attention from scholars and has been related to politeness manifestations is gender. The interest in the interconnections between gender and politeness started out early with Lakoff (1975) and Brown (1980, 1990). Holmes (1995), in a very comprehensive body of evidence, characterised women as more polite than men. Comparisons between men and women, either to support or argue against this finding, are still frequent (see García-Gómez 2012; Sung 2012; Fidaoui and Bahous 2013; Jones 2013, among many others). Gender studies was subsequently greatly influenced by constructivist approaches to identity, however. In those later studies, gender was seen as cultural, emergent, and constructed. This trend has also had an impact on gender and politeness research (see, for example, Mills 2003; Takano 2005; Mullany 2008).To a lesser degree, links have been established between other social identities and politeness.[2]

What can be gleaned from this brief account is that face, politeness and identity have been intertwined in scholarship, albeit in an implicit way. In these studies, politeness was clearly understood as an indirect index of identity (see Sect. 2.2), in the sense that different perceptions and manifestations of politeness were seen as an intrinsic part of people's identities (see also Locher 2008, p. 529), but the connection between the two or the fact that identity categories were at the heart of the analysis was not made explicit.

The explicit connections between face/politeness and identity construction came as a side-effect of the discursive turn that politeness scholarship experienced in the 2000s. Eelen's (2001) model inspired the emergence of the discursive or postmodern, politeness1 approach (Mills 2003, 2011; Watts 2003; Locher and Watts 2005) which established itself as an alternative to the traditional, theory based, predictive, politeness2 models and opened the field to the analysis of the whole gamut of relational phenomena, from politeness to impoliteness (Locher and Watts 2005; Culpeper 2011). Crucially, the proponents of the discursive approach (see Watts 2008) argued that the construction and reproduction of mental concepts by means of language (such as polite, rude, aggressive, etc.) is carried out discursively, and that a more adequate approach to (im)politeness is constructionist rather than rationalist. Further, they advocated for a return to a more pure Goffmanian conceptualisation of face and the need for more interdisciplinary inquisitiveness and the search for a new language to discuss (im)politeness phenomena

[2] For instance, religion (Dzameshie 1995; Ariff 2012), age (Bella 2009; Bagwasi 2012; Guo et al. 2012; Fukushima 2013; Schneider 2012), social class (Morgan 2010; Clancy 2011; Guo et al. 2012; Meacham 2014) and race (Morgan 2010).

(Bargiela-Chiappini 2003; Terkourafi 2005; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009). Not surprisingly, politeness scholars started to concern themselves with the relationship between face and identity by progressively introducing matters of identity in definitions of (im)politeness, as well as in analyses of (im)politeness phenomena (see, among others, Spencer-Oatey 2007; Locher 2008; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013a, b).

However, with a few exceptions which will be discussed below, those politeness scholars that have tackled the relationship between face and identity in more depth have established mostly differences between them.

Arundale (see among others 2010, 2013a, b), in his discussion of Face Constituting Theory (FCT), argues that face is a social attribute, whereas identity is an individual one. His main thesis is that, in Western scholarly tradition, identity is defined as the property of monadic individuals. Therefore, although it may be changed, maintained and created in human interaction, it remains an individual summative phenomenon. In Arundale's view, face is conceptualised in terms of a social system and thus is a non-summative phenomenon.

Furthermore face, due to its social nature, is seen as emerging in interaction. Arundale (2013a, p. 139) states that face, a non-summative phenomenon, 'is a property of a system of individuals, arising in dialog, rather than in the weak sense of the social as summative aggregate of attributes of independent individuals'. Identity has been described as 'an image that other people have when calling this type of person to mind' (O'Driscoll 2011, p. 25). As a result, face is seen as a punctual phenomenon and identity as an enduring one (Arundale 2009).[3]

Elaborating on her ideas on identity–face (Spencer-Oatey 2005), Spencer-Oatey (2007, 2009) argues that face and identity are cognitively similar, as they both relate to the concept of self-image. The main difference between them, in her view, is that only face is associated with attributes that are affectively sensitive to the claimant.

In our view, what is missing from the discussion of the similarities between face and identity in politeness scholarship (for exceptions see Locher 2008; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009) is a clear understanding of identity and how it has been defined and studied in identity related fields, especially by qualitative, discursive approaches. In the next section, we will provide a succinct—due to space constraints—review of the identity theories and models on which to ground our follow-up discussion of its similarities/differences with face.

[3] In a recent article, Arundale (2013b) argues that other metaphors such as 'ba' (field) are better suited than face to account for Face Constituting Theory's focus on relationships.

2.2 Dialectics: The Understanding of Discursive Identity

Along the same ways as politeness1 approaches, social constructionism underlies many current approaches to the study of identity, a consequence of the impact of the discursive turn on identity scholarship. The discursive turn in identity theory resulted in the reconfiguration of the subject as something sociocultural and sociohistorical: an unfinished product of discourse. This constructivist model views identity in anti-essentialist terms, as all meaning is situated not within the self, but in a series of representations mediated by semiotic systems. As a consequence, identity has been relocated from the private realms of cognition and experience, to the public realms of discourse and other semiotic systems of meaning-making (Benwell and Stokoe 2006; Wetherell 2007).

Therefore, although linguistic approaches to identity vary substantially, they share the view that identity is acquired and developed in interaction and that it is discursively realised. For example, Bucholtz and Hall (2005, pp. 585–6) argue for approaching 'identity as a relational and socio-cultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of interaction rather than as a stable structure located primarily in the individual psyche'. Thus, discourse is fundamental in understandings of identity as the primary locus to negotiate distinctions regarding identity categories, such as gender, ethnicity, race and immigration (Bamberg et al. 2011).

As has proven to be the case with other constructs, such as face or identity, discourse is also a complex term to deal with. However, to come to grips with identity, we need to take into consideration the two most common understandings of discourse—discourse at the macro versus micro level (Benwell and Stokoe 2006), Big D-discourse versus little d-discourse (Gee 2005; Bamberg et al. 2011) and discourse versus genre/text (Fairclough 2003). The different senses of discourse actually establish marked differences among the approaches to the analysis of identity: big D-discourse proponents argue that existing discourses construct the person. Little d-discourse proponents believe that the person has agency—the mediated capacity to act (Ahearn 2001)—in constructing who they are through the use of discourse. This last perspective is summed up well by Canagarajah (2004) who, building on Foucault's (1972) argument of the struggle for voice, states that we construct a voice for ourselves when we negotiate a position in the interstices of discourses and institutions to represent our values and interests in a favourable light. For Canagarajah (2004), voice manifests agency through linguistic means. These two conceptualisations lead to quite diverse ways of analysing discourse. Despite these differences, there seems to be an agreement that the construction of identity

is at the heart of both big D- and little d-discourses (Gee 2005; Fairclough 2003). This dialectic[4] in the understanding of discourse (reconciled, among others, by Giddens 1984) is one of the many nuances that the scholar of identity who adopts a constructivist approach has to take into consideration.

Other dialectics that complicate the understanding and application of identity as a category of analysis are (1) permanency/transiency and (2) difference/similarity. The first of these have been referred to as the 'strong' and 'soft' understandings of identity. According to Brubaker and Cooper (2000, pp. 10–11), strong versions of identity put the emphasis on sameness over time or across persons. On the contrary, soft versions view identity as multiple, unstable, fragmented, negotiated and so on. Discursive approaches to identity fall into the second category. Identity politics [5] falls into the first. Reflecting on this dialectic, Butler (1990) refers to a process of sedimentation by means of which people repeatedly draw on resources that gradually build up an appearance of fixed identities. Whereas it is true that certain aspects of person, role and social identities are more stable, even those are always overlapping with each other and are constantly changing (Burke and Stets 2009). Barker and Galasinski (2001, p. 31) sum this up well when they state: 'Identities are both unstable *and* temporarily stabilized by social practice and regular, predictable behaviour.' Similarly, for Joseph (2014, p. 145), identity is not permanent or unchanging, but it is also not invented anew in each discursive act.

Regarding the other dialectic, i.e. difference versus similarity, identity has an individual and a social dimension. Although some approaches to the analysis of identity would seem to lean more towards one or the other constituents of the dialectic (Social Identity Theory, Membership Categorisation Analysis, among others), in reality, it is difficult to establish clear boundaries between the two. Social Identity Scholars such as Tajfel and Turner (1986, p. 16) defined social identity as 'those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories which he[sic] perceived himself as belonging'. More recently, Edwards (2009, p. 20) argues that no rigid distinction can be made between personality and social identity:

> Our personal characteristics derive from our socialization within the group (or, rather, groups) to which we belong: one's particular social context defines that

[4] A dialectic here is understood along the lines of Arundale (2013b, p. 111) not in terms of thesis/antithesis/synthesis but as Yin and Yang 'two co-existing but opposing elements that contain elements of each other and that at points merge to become the other element'.

[5] Political activities or movements based on or catering to the cultural, ethnic, gender, racial, religious or social interests that characterise a group identity.

> part of the larger human pool of potential from which a personal identity can be constructed. Thus, individual identities will be both components and identities of particular social (or cultural) ones, and the latter will always be, to some extent at least, stereotypical in nature because of their necessary generality *across* the individual components (emphasis in the original).

The issue of difference becomes even more complex when tackled from another perspective. Many scholars (see Hall and Du Gay 1996; Mendoza-Denton 2008, among others) strongly argue that identity construction is all about marking difference. According to Hall and Du Gay (2008), identities emerge within different power systems, and thus they are the product of difference and exclusion rather than unity. What's more, it is only in relation to the *other*, to what one is not, that recognition is produced (Mouffe 2005, p. 129).Thus, the *us*, for its mere existence, is dependent on a constitutive outside.

Along the same lines, Bucholtz and Hall (2005) and Kiesling (2013) maintain that identity is eminently relational and not the property of isolated individuals. Thus, the foremost way in which identity relationships can be conceived is in terms of similarity/difference, genuineness/artifice or authority/delegitimation. Kiesling (2013, p. 450) provides a clear synopsis when he states: 'Identity is a state or process of relationships between self and other; *identity is how individuals define, create, or think of themselves in terms of their relationships with other individuals and groups* … [this definition] provides a foundation for investigating how language and identity are related by moving the focus from static individuals to the process of *how speakers use language to create relationships*' (emphasis in the original).

In addition to tackling the dialectics just discussed, when discussing the construction of identity in discourse, a reference to indexicality is a must. Language is indexed in complex and multilevel ways for identities of many kinds (Joseph 2013). An index is a sign in which the signified is inherently connected to the signifier (smoke to fire, for example). An important contribution to the analysis of indexicality in discourse is Ochs's (1992) distinction between direct and indirect indexicality. For example, in English, tag questions have been assumed to directly index tentativeness or uncertainty. Indirect indexicality develops when the relationship between the linguistic form, tag questions in this case, and tentativeness or uncertainty is associated with an identity group, such as women. Thus, the conclusion may be that tag questions index femininity, since women are perceived as tentative, uncertain or subservient.[6]

[6] For an extensive and update review of indexicality, see Silverstein (2003) and Kiesling (2013, pp. 457–63).

After this brief overview of some key tenets of identity theories and models, which we hope will provide a solid basis for our ongoing discussion, we return to our discussion of the relationship between face and identity.

2.3 Face and Identity Revisited

As discussed in Sect. 2, according to politeness scholars, the four main differences between face and identity are generally regarded to be:

(a) Face is a social attribute, identity is an individual one.
(b) Face is relational, the result of a non-summative process; identity is the property of monadic individuals, the outcome of a summative process.
(c) Face is a punctual phenomenon; identity is a durative one.
(d) Face is invested with emotion; identity is not.

Regarding the first and second differences, identity is seen by identity scholars (Bucholtz and Hall 2005; Kiesling 2013) as also being fundamentally relational and exceeding the individual self. Thus, in their view, identity emerges in interaction and is the product of relationships created through language. The key identity relationship is seen in terms of similarity/difference: a dialectic, not essentially different from Arundale's separation/connectedness, on which face is constituted. It could be argued, in that respect, that separation/connectedness could be subsumed under similarity/difference.[7] What is more, Joseph (2004, p. 81) states that identity belongs as much to the individual who interprets it as to the one who constructs it. Therefore, identity scholars—similarly to current politeness scholarship—put the emphasis on uptake and hearers' evaluations. Joseph (2013, p. 38) summarises the essence of this common methodological focus:

> Whether or not a speaker is trying to project an identity is a relatively minor issue, compared to the much more important one of how that speaker's identity is perceived by other people—if only because everyone we encounter constructs an identity for us, based on whatever indices they interpret us as projecting, whether or not we are aware of projecting them, let alone intending it … If identity, face, stance or politeness are to be investigated empirically, it must be in terms not of the speaker's intentions, which are impervious to observation,

[7] According to Haugh (personal communication) similarity/difference is just one manifestation of separation/connectedness. However, the latter, according to Baxter and Montgomery (1996), is meant to be much broader in scope.

> but of hearers' interpretations, which are open to observation, questioning, cross-checking and other methodological reassurances.

Statements regarding the durable nature of identity, as those made by politeness scholarship, take the 'strong' view of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, pp. 10–11) which puts the emphasis on sameness over time or across persons. Soft versions, such as the discursive approaches discussed here, view identity as multiple, unstable, fragmented, negotiated, etc. Discursive approaches (see de Fina et al. 2006, among many others) define identity as a process, not a product, that yields constellations of identities, rather than individual, monolithic constructs. If identity is a process, it cannot be static or fixed, but must be in constant transformation. More fundamentally, identity work also involves those very ephemeral subject positions that we occupy in unfolding discourse (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 2008). With respect to face, certainly, more theoretical discussion and empirical research is needed to ascertain whether it is indeed fleeting.[8] Comparing face to identity, Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini (2010, p. 2073) already cautioned that the durable/fleeting distinction is not as straightforward as previously argued: 'The problem with that distinction is that, on the one hand, identity has increasingly been conceptualized as rooted in interaction and thus less enduring than previously thought … while, on the other hand, according to emic or folk conceptualizations, face is often seen as enduring across interactions unless otherwise challenged.' In our view, this problem is compounded by Goffman's initial conceptualisation of face as emergent among actors who were for the most part unacquainted (Manning 2004; Sifianou 2013). Analyses of face or (im)politeness among intimates or people who are in regular contact with each other or ethnographic studies of face are infrequent (but see Haugh 2010). Therefore, we need more empirical evidence of face emergence and maintenance in long term relationships to be able to see how it unfolds under those conditions. To that effect, Sifianou (2012, p. 1558) has argued that personal identities and relational histories 'affect the development and outcome of any interaction'. Haugh (2013b, p. 67) agrees with Sifianou's view and claims we need to go beyond an examination of situated talk-in-interaction to consider also relational histories and participant identities in analysing (im)politeness in interaction. Furthermore, Haugh (2013a) makes a strong case for the study of face1 and politeness1. Discussing politeness1, Sifianou (2011) argues that since 'lay people conceptualise face as a kind of possession, then a related theory should be able to

[8] Sifianou (2013) argues that lay Greek conceptualisations of face involve not only fleeting but also more durable aspects, which are part and parcel of any current interaction between acquainted interlocutors, and any ensuing evaluation does not normally ignore them (cf. Mills 2003, p. 108).

incorporate this conceptualisation as an option'. Haugh (2013a) concurs with this statement, with the proviso that face should not be reified, and concludes that face1 should be incorporated as both arising through interaction *as well as* being constitutive of interaction.

The last of the differences between face and identity discussed by politeness scholars is related to emotions. Spencer-Oatey (2007, 2009) claims that—although cognitively similar—face is invested with affectivity and linked to certain positive attributes the claimant wishes to be associated with and certain negative attributes s/he does not want associated with him/her. The implication here is that identity is not affectively loaded. However, this is in contradiction with the views of identity scholars on the matter. Burke and Stets (2009) argue strongly that identity is vested with emotion, despite its having mostly been approached as a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon. Along the same lines, Barker and Galasinski (2001, p. 28) state that identity is better understood as 'an emotionally charged description of ourselves'. Goffman also endowed identity with emotion throughout the bulk of his work (see Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013b). Therefore, both identity and face are essentially affective phenomena.

After contrasting politeness scholars' views with those found in identity scholarship, it becomes apparent that the differences between face and identity are not as clear-cut as it would first appear. In part, we believe that is due to the facts that (i) both concepts are related to the presentation of self and (ii) face and identity are both categories of practice and categories of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). In the next two sections, we first discuss the work of those scholars that have tackled (im)politeness and face from an identity standpoint and then, in Sect. 4, we provide empirical evidence of how impoliteness and aggression play a major role in the construction of identity by focusing on hate speech and processes of othering.

3 Identity and (Im)politeness

Since the late 2000s, a growing number of scholars have advocated for a more inclusive and multidisciplinary theoretical base from which to approach the analysis of (im)politeness (Locher 2008; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009, 2010; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. 2010, 2013; Locher et al. 2015). Due to the common origin of identity and face—both concepts can trace back their roots to Goffman—and their close connections with the presentation of self, identity theory and models constitute one of the alternatives of choice. Their new ways of thinking about how to advance the field can be summarised in four related statements:

(a) (Im)politeness manifestations/assessments can be tied to identity (co) construction, not just to face.
(b) Identity and face are inseparable as they co-constitute each other.
(c) (Im)politeness can be analysed as an index in identity construction.
(d) Models developed for the analysis of identity construction can be fruitfully applied to the study of (im)politeness.

We will expand on these general statements in the remainder of this section.

As Haugh (2013a) has pointed out, almost every approach in the field shares the assumption that face is what underpins various forms of (im)politeness. However, his view is that face should be theorised in its own right, and not only related to (im)politeness. Other scholars have explicitly related (im)politeness assessments to identity. For example, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2009, 2013) argues that politeness evaluations can ensue as a result of (i) identity verification and/or an (ii) implicit/explicit recognition of the authenticity/self-worth/self-efficacy attributes associated with one's identity. Whereas impoliteness evaluations can ensue as a result of (i) identity partial or non-verification and/or (ii) a threat to the authenticity/self-worth/self-efficacy attributes associated with one's identity. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. (2010), Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. (2013) and Bou-Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2014) demonstrate empirically the close interconnections between (im)politeness and identity construction. This work shows how participants' identities, as they are co-constructed in discourse, are closely tied to (im)politeness assessments. In this regard, Locher (2008) has argued that we can gain much from equating face with identity.

As is shown in the papers referenced above, it would seem that theorising about the differences or similarities between face and identity needs to be supported by ample empirical work. When that happens, however, it becomes apparent that, in practice, it is very difficult to tease them apart. This is certainly Joseph's (2013, p. 51) conclusion regarding his own analysis: 'What has emerged from this analysis is the difficulty of separating identity work and face work, at least in any conversation where language and identity are part of the subject matter.' Along these lines, Kádár et al. (2013) see national face arising through the dynamic intersection of macro/micro discourses about national identity. Similarly, Bousfield (2013) argues that face and identity whilst distinct and discrete concepts interlink and that both concepts apply in instances of ethnic or international conflict and aggression. Therefore, Bousfield continues, face and identity should be considered central to research or theorising on all aspects of aggression, conflict and conflict resolution. Taking it a step further, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013) argues

that relational work is part of identity work and sees face as closely related to identity, indeed embedded in identity. In this, she coincides with Miller (2013) who sees face and identity as mutually co-constituting each other and with Chaemsaithong's (2011, p. 247) statement that face and identity are reflexive, indexed and constructed through the discursive accomplishment of the interactants' communication.

Above, we discussed that the traditional, implicit relationship between identity and (im)politeness was related to (im)politeness being seen as an indirect index of identity construction. More recently, the indexical nature of (im)politeness in the construction of identity has been discussed more explicitly. Joseph (2004) reminded us that it is not utterances but participants who are assessed as im/polite. Similarly, Locher (2008) argues that to be perceived as polite may be one of the many possible attributes that an interactant wishes to display and hopes to have accepted as part of their identity. Also, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2009) illustrated how identity theory could be applied to the study of impoliteness by focusing on the major role that impoliteness plays as a linguistic index in the identity construction of the hosts, the guests and the audience of cable TV news programs currently broadcast in the United States. In fictional settings, Barke (2010) analysed in detail the role that honorifics play in the construction of social identities in Japanese drama and Ajtony (2013) shows how Downton Abbey's characters use of politeness contributes to the construction of stereotypes of Englishness.

Due to the field of (im)politeness research becoming more interdisciplinary, some scholars have approached the analysis of manifestations of (im)politeness by applying models traditionally associated with the study of identity construction. As Locher et al. (2015) argued, relational work and identity construction can be combined fruitfully in a straightforward manner. For example, Locher (2008) showed how Bucholtz and Hall's (2005) framework for the analysis of identity can be productively applied to relational work. Miller (2013) drew on positioning theory and Bamberg's (2005) three-level analytic approach to show how identity construction and relational work implicate one another and are co-constitutive processes in local interactions. Positioning theory was developed within a socio-psychological paradigm (Davis and Harré 1990). Discursive practices are at its core. According to its proponents, social reality arises from three different discursive practices: conversations, institutional practices and the use of rhetoric. Conversations constitute the essential element of social reality, where daily reality is reproduced and transformed. By describing themselves and others in certain ways rather than others, speakers carry out discursive actions that construct acts

of identity. In recent years, within critical psychology, positioning theory has been combined with narrative analysis.

It is precisely from a narrative perspective that Georgakopoulou (2013) put together a proposal for studying (im)politeness-in-interaction. Narrative discourse is especially relevant for identity work and analysis. According to Bamberg et al. (2011), discourse in general functions in the construction of agency and differentiation; narratives provide a spatio-temporal dimension to the sense of self and identity. Georgakopoulou's (2013) proposal is based on small stories as a framework for narrative and identity analysis. A small story approach focuses on how people use narrative in their daily engagements to construct a sense of who they are. Her analysis of high school students' engagement with new media showed how (im)politeness related notions can play a pivotal role in storytelling. Furthermore, her analysis also showed the usefulness for (im)politeness research of ways of telling-sites-tellers and of positioning, initially developed for the interactional analysis of identities. Thus, Georgakopoulou (2013) concluded that a discursive account of (im)politeness could emphasise narrative activities and transfer tools of identity analysis to the study of (im)politeness.

Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2009) and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. (2013) did precisely that. They transferred tools traditionally used for the analysis of identity to the study of impoliteness. Applying Anton and Peterson's (2003) model of subject positions in identity co-construction in interaction, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2009) illustrated how impoliteness and confrontation may ensue when one's asserted subject positions are questioned and delegitimised in an attempt to undermine the view of the world that comes along with them. In turn, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. (2013), also applying Anton and Peterson's model to a corpus of data extracted from talent shows focusing on Simon Cowell, corroborated Garcés-Conejos Blitvich's (2009) thesis that impoliteness ensues when the identities and positioning we are trying to construct are not verified by interlocutors—an argument that is also supported by the tenets of Identity Theory (Burke and Stets 2009). Applying another established framework for the analysis of identity construction, i.e. Zimmerman's (1998) tripartite distinction, to focus groups' response data to a Spanish confrontational talk show (see Garcés-Conejos Blitvich et al. 2010) and to naturally occurring classroom discourse (see Dobs 2013) found that impoliteness and identity are intrinsically related and co-constructed in co-constitutive processes.

Thus far, our discussion has shown that face and identity are difficult to tease out at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Furthermore, recent scholarship has proven that (im)politeness manifestations and assessments

can be tied to the notion of identity, not just face, and that models that were initially developed for the analysis of identity can be productively applied to the study of (im)politeness. Also, it has become apparent that (im)politeness is highly functional and ideologically loaded. That is the main reason why (im)politeness can be such a powerful indirect index in identity construction processes.

4 Case Study: Golden Dawn: Solidarity/Deference and Aggression as Indexes of Identity Construction

It is the main goal of this analysis to ascertain the role that solidarity/deference and verbal aggression play in identity construction, not only of the *other* but of the *us*. In addition, we aim to show how models developed for the analysis of identity construction can further our understanding of the functionality and ideological load of solidarity/deference and verbal aggression as indirect indexes of identity construction. We will argue that Golden Dawn's (a Greek neo-Nazi party) rhetoric has as its main aim the construction of new social identities in the context of modern Greece. These new identities are constructed on the basis of the difference/similarity dialectic discussed above.

4.1 Data and Background

The extract analysed in this section comes from Konstantinos Georgousis's (2013) film, 'The Cleaners' which depicts members of Golden Dawn (GD) in central streets of Athens.

Founded in 1983 by its current leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, GD defines itself as a popular nationalist party. Although it became more active politically in the 1990s, GD stayed in the fringes of parliamentary activity until quite recently and was mostly notorious for incidents of violence and propaganda. Greece being in the throes of one the worst economic crises in its history and a general disillusionment with the political establishment are two of the reasons behind GD's breakthrough in the 2012 electoral results and its ascension to the position of the third political force in Greece, as shown by the results of the January and September 2015 general elections

GD's unmitigated and relentless xenophobic discourse is one of the party's most recognisable trademarks. A good example is their anti-migrant slogan for the 2012 elections: 'Let's rid this land of filth.' Xenophobic, anti-immigration,

racist discourse has been widely researched (see among many others Wodak et al. 1999; Wodak and van Dijk 2000; Kopytowska 2015, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Dijk 2005, 2006; Wodak 2015a, b) and, in the European context, it has traditionally been associated with Northern and Central Europe. The emergence of xenophobic discourses in Southern Europe has received significantly less attention (Ellinas 2013) and even less is known of GD's rhetoric from a discourse analytical perspective (but see Paraskeva-Veloudoyanni 2015).

However, GD's ideology and rhetoric make it especially interesting analytically. Most critical approaches to the discourse of racism or xenophobia need to carry out close readings and analyses to unveil the structures of power and othering processes that the political and media elites seem to try to obscure and legitimate (Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Dijk 2005, 2006). That is why Wodak (2007) argues that those pragmatic theories and methodologies that focus on devices such as insinuations/allusions, wordplay, presuppositions and implicatures can be very fruitfully applied to the critical discourse analysis of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. While the focus on implicit meaning has been a main trait of critical discourse analysis, implicitly conveyed meanings are certainly not the resources of choice in GD's anti-system, anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Furthermore, GD members explicitly position themselves as anti-political and anti-media elites. As an example, Zaroulia, a GD legislator and Michaliolakos's wife, blames the political establishment for 'equating Greek expatriates with every sort of subhuman that invaded our country, with various diseases he carries' (cited in Ellinas 2013, p. 550). Despite being critical of the establishment, however, they are careful not to be considered anti-democratic as they identify themselves with the 'pure people' that the political elite has abandoned to the hazards of uncontrolled immigration (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2014).

4.2 Procedure and Framework

Extracts from Georgousis's film, which can be accessed through the link to his 2013 interview on UK's Channel 4 (http://www.channel4.com/news/racist-anti-semitic-violent-the-true-face-of-golden-dawn), were downloaded and then transcribed following the conventions found in the Appendix. A lengthy extract was then selected for qualitative analysis applying van Dijk's (2006) ideological square. Van Dijk (2006) argues that all structural properties of discourse (see van Dijk 2006, pp. 735–9 for a list of examples) can be used to instantiate the four strategies of the ideological square, but in a way in which

all positive meaning will be associated with the in-group whereas the opposite will be the case for the out-group, the others. We would like to argue that solidarity/deference and aggressive language are part of those properties of discourse that can play a role in *othering* processes.

4.3 Analysis

In this extract, Alekos Plomaritis (AP), at the time a GD candidate for the Greek parliament, relaxes with three more GD members at a cafe in Athens's Agios Panteleimonas neighbourhood, known for being home to many immigrants as well as to older, mainly working-class, Greeks. The conversation turns to immigration.

01.33 min
Outside a café[9]

1 ΑΠ: Λοιπόν το οικονομικό θέμα θα λυθεί από το - από τη στιγμή που θα φύγουν οι λαθρομετανάστες.=
AP: Well, the economic crisis will be resolved once the illegal immigrants leave. =
2 Μόλις ξελαφρώσουμε από τρία εκατομμύρια χαραμοφάηδες +που μας πίνουν το νερό,
Once we get rid of (these) three million parasites + who drink our water,
3 μας τρώνε το φαΐ, μας εεε αναπνέουν τον αέρα το δικό μας τον ελληνικό (2)
eat our food, breathe our own air, the Greek air (2)
4 και ΜΑΣ ΣΚΟΤΩΝΟΥΝ. + Λοιπόν [να φύγουν αυτοί] +
and KILL US. + So [once they leave] +
5 Π: [Πες τα πες τα πες τα]
PB: [Yes you are right]
6 ΑΠ: να μείνουν τα λεφτά σε μας να μπορέσουν κι οι συντάξεις ν' ανέβουν κι οι μισθοί
AP: the money will stay with us, so the pensions will increase and the salaries too and
7 νααα να μην έχουμε ανέργους. + Είναι πρωτόγονοι είναι μιάσματα είναι υπάνθρωποι

[9] Abbreviations: AP = Alekos Plomaritis, PB = Passerby, G = Giorgos, MGD = Member of Golden Dawn.

there will be no unemployment. + They are primitive, a miasma, they are subhuman

8 δε μας ενδιαφέρει καθόλου η ύπαρξή τους. + Γιατί είμαστε έτοιμοι ν' ανοίξουμε
we do not care at all about their existence. + Because we are ready to turn on

9 τους φούρνους. + Σαπούνια γιατί ναι και ωραίο ξέρεις.= Όχι για ανθρώπους
the ovens. + (Turn them to) Soap because it's nice, you know. = Not for people

10 γιατί είναι και είναι χημικοί, αυτοί - γιατί μπορεί να πάθουμε κανά + να βγάλουμε κανά
because they are chemical, they are - and we may suffer from + we might get a

11 + καντήλα κανά τέτοιο. + Θα τα 'χουμε σαπούνια για τ' αμάξια σαπούνια να πούμε
+ rash, blisters or something. + We'll have soap for the cars, soap let's say

12 για τα πεζοδρόμια + συμφωνείτε κύριε Γιώργο; =Θα φτιάχνουμε κτίρια
for the pavements + do you agree Mr. Giorgos? = We will make buildings

13 να πούμε - κανά λαμπατέρ να φτιάξουμε από το δέρμα τους - τα μαλλιά
let's say - maybe a lamp shade from their skin - Giorgos will take their hair

14 θα τα παίρνει ο Γιώργος θα τα πουλάει στο Μοναστηράκι, να πούμε
and sell it in Monastiraki, say

15 να τα κάνουν μπεγλέρια οι ξένοι.=
for foreigners, to make worry beads. =

16 Τι άλλο ρε Γιώργο θα πάρεις από τους αριστερούς; (2) Ε;
What else *re* Giorgo will you get from the left-wingers? (2) Eh?

17 Γ: Τα δόντια τους θα πάρουμε για κομπολόγια.
G: We will take their teeth to make worry beads.

18 ΑΠ: (έντονα γέλια)
AP: (very loud laughter)

19 ΜΧΑ1: Και όσοι έχουνε χρυσά;
MGD1: And those who have gold (teeth)?

20 ΑΠ: Χρυσά δεν επιτρέπεται.
AP: Gold (teeth) are not allowed.

21	ΜΧΑ2:	Τα παίρνουμε.	[Τα ξηλώνουμε και τα πουλάμε αυτά ρε.]
	MGD2:	We'll get them.	[We will uproot and sell them *re*.]
22	Γ:		[Τα χρυσά + Τα χρυσά πάνε στο κράτος.]
	G:		[The gold ones, + the gold ones will go to the state.]

In general terms, we can see that AP deploys the two strategies that modern and postmodern societies use to deal with strangers: *devouring* (lines 8–21) and/or *vomiting the strangers* (lines 1–8) (Bauman 1995). In line 1, AP resorts to GD's ideological line regarding the scapegoating immigrants for the economic crisis and minimising or not mentioning at all the responsibility that the dominant society may have in the country's current status quo (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2014). From the start, there is a clear divide between 'us' and 'them': the Greek and illegal immigrants. 'They' drink 'our' water, eat 'our' food, and breathe 'our' air, the Greek air. Not only are they parasitic on Greek society, but they also 'KILL' 'us'. 'We' have become their victims. Besides, they take away 'our' money, so once we get them deported, pensions and salaries will rise and unemployment will be a thing of the past, silencing the fact that they have been used as cheap labour for positions Greeks would not occupy. Clearly, we see here what van Dijk (2006) describes as the burden topos. Illegals are represented as a burden on Greek citizens and this burden is presented in hyperbolic terms 'they KILL US' (see van Dijk 2006, p. 737). However, it is not only their actions but the others' 'essential' characteristics that are presented in very pejorative terms: primitive, miasma, subhuman. Thus, all actions and features associated with *them* are depicted in extremely negative terms while the in-group's possible responsibility in the current situation is de-emphasised, as predicted by the ideological square.

However, this 'us' is not constructed unproblematically. In lines, 15 and 21, GD members selectively dissociate themselves (García-Bedolla 2003) from other Greeks (left-wingers and 'the state', i.e. the elites). Selective dissociation is a process whereby a subject continues to identify with a specific group identity (Greeks, in this case), but excludes from his/her definition of this identity those groups that 'they see as perpetuating the negative image of their group' (García-Bedolla 2003, p. 276). GD argues that it is the left-wing parties, with their defence of immigrants' rights and politically correct discourse regarding immigration, along with the established government, which did not implement adequate anti-immigration policies, that are responsible for the precarious situation in which 'local citizens' the 'pure people' are in (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2014). Thus, Greeks in AP's discourse refers to the 'pure people' and those who have given voice and stepped up for them, i.e. GD.

The burden topos along with the use of the victimisation and the hyperbolic rhetorical strategies and processes of selective dissociation are here used to legitimatise (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) the actions that pure Greeks (us) are 'forced' to take against the *others* to defend democracy and the nation and save the nation from their 'inferior' culture and religious beliefs (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2013, p. 15). These actions, which AP proceeds to enumerate, resonate with intertextual references to Nazi Germany and the treatment of the Jews and other minority groups at the hands of Hitler's followers. These intertextual references are aligned with GD's identity as a neo-Nazi party (Ellinas 2013). AP's diatribe can very appropriately be described as hate speech: 'We' will burn 'them' in ovens and will make soap from 'them'. But because 'they' are so toxic, 'we' 'people' cannot use that soap as we may get skin ailments from it. 'We' will use 'them' (soap) just to clean cars and roads with. 'We' will use 'their' remains to construct buildings, 'their' skin to make lamps, 'their' hair to sell at Monastiraki (a well-known, open-air market near the Acropolis frequented by tourists) to make worry beads but not for Greeks (us, the people) but for another out-group, foreigners. Since they are subhuman, we are 'allowed' to treat them as commodities. This position aligns with GD's extreme nationalistic, anti-European ideology.

In the last six lines, AP who had dominated most of the conversation tries to involve the other GD members present and the five of them together continue to co-construct the *others* in a jocular manner. If before, it was just immigrants that 'we' were going to get rid of and sell their parts at the market, now it is yet another out-group, left-wingers, who 'we' 'the pure people' need to get rid of. As 'we' will do with immigrants, we will also (implicitly conveyed) kill them and then make worry beads with the left-wingers' teeth. To the question, 'What will we do if they have golden teeth?' implying: 'Will we sell those as well or keep them for ourselves?' G responds that 'the gold ones will go to the state' referencing another out-group 'the elite, the state' with the implication that the state is taking away from 'us, the pure people' everything of value.

As can be gleaned from the analysis, extremely aggressive language is deployed in this extract (and in others) to construct the out-group, the others. However, this aggression is legitimised as being the other's fault (both their actions and their essential characteristics): it is not 'us' who are intolerant; it is them who are intolerable. Concurrently, verbal aggression also constructs the in-group, who 'we' are. 'We' (GD and the 'pure people'), through the strategic use of physical and verbal violence, have risen against the real problems that ail the nation. This use of aggression in private/public discourse fortifies the in-group, makes it a coalition, whose sole interest is safeguarding the

wellbeing of the national in-group (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009; Dobs and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013). This 'private' use of discourse (later recontextualised by Georgousis as public) is a good example of how ideologies are constructed and reconstructed at macro and micro/local levels (Blackledge 2002).

Verbal aggression is also an indirect index of individual/group identity. Verbal aggression in public and private discourse is often judged as anti-normative (Culpeper 2011; Kádár and Haugh 2013). GD members see themselves as anti-establishment, anti-elite. Thus, their use of anti-normative discourse fits in well with their overall party ideology. Furthermore, aggression (verbal or physical) is also commonly seen as an index of hypermasculinity (McElhinny 1995; Kiesling 1997; Iwamoto 2003; Salter and Blodgett 2012). In this context, all GD members construct themselves as forceful men who are ready to take action to rid their country and those they give voice to (the 'pure' people) of all the problems associated with illegal immigration. Their strong, protector, male identities are reinforced by organising community activities such as pantries (but only for Greeks) and by using verbal and physical violence against the out-group.

As shown, in-groupness can be constructed through the use of verbal aggression. In-groupness, in addition, can be also constructed through solidarity/deference. In the extract under analysis, deference is displayed by AP to G, an older member of GD, by addressing him with the deferential Mr plus first name as well as by trying to get his opinion on the discussion at hand (lines 12 and 16). In the first instance, assuming that G agrees with him, AP does not wait for a response but proceeds, including G in his suggested actions ('Giorgos will take their hair and sell it in Monastiraki'). In the second instance, AP addresses him with the informal particle *re* plus first name, a particle also used by another GD member later on (line 21).[10] Solidarity also creates in-groupness by GD members completing each other's sentences, repeating or rephrasing each other's words, and agreeing and laughing at each other's occurrences when discussing what to do with left-wingers' teeth.

The analysis has shown that, as argued by Hall and Du Gay (1996), identities are the product of difference and exclusion rather than unity, as it is only in relation to the *other*, to what one is not, that recognition is produced. Thus, the 'us', for its mere existence, is dependent on a constitutive outside (Mouffe 2005, p. 129). Furthermore, our analysis proves that solidarity/deference and aggression can be crucially connected to the construction of identities (not just to face) and that models, such as van Dijk's (2006) ideological square, initially developed for the analysis of social identity (us/them, in-/out-group)

[10] *Re* is an untranslatable particle typically indicating solidarity between in-group members.

can be fruitfully applied to further our understanding of solidarity/deference and verbal aggression as ideologically loaded indirect indexes of identity construction.

5 Conclusion

Our theoretical discussion leads us to conclude that face and identity are difficult to tease out at the theoretical level and that they become even more difficult to separate at the empirical one. The main reason for this, in our view, is that they co-constitute each other and are thus intrinsically related. In Greek and Chinese (at least) both in lay understandings and in certain contexts, the two (identity and face) can be used interchangeably (Yu 2001; Sifianou 2013).

Our analysis, along with other pioneer work in this area, has shown that solidarity/deference and verbal aggression, notions broadly related to (im)politeness, can be tied to processes of identity construction, functioning as ideological indirect indexes of identity construction. As (im)politeness scholarship strives to become more interdisciplinary, models developed for the analysis of identity construction like the one applied to the data in our case study can further our understanding of (im)politeness phenomena in individual and social identity construction.

We hope that our work will inspire further necessary discussion and empirical research needed to ascertain the close relationship between face and identity and its relevance to (im)politeness research.

Appendix

Transcription Conventions

YES	Capital letters indicate emphatic stress
(laughs)	Paralinguistic features in brackets
+	Pause of up to one second
(3)	Pause of specified number of seconds
[.....]	Simultaneous speech
?	Rising intonation or question
-	Incomplete or cut-off utterance
….	Section of transcript omitted
=	Latching
{bye}	Transcriber's best guess at an unclear utterance

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11

(Im)politeness and Relationality

Jun Ohashi and Wei-Lin Melody Chang

1 Introduction

A series of research publications during the early 2000s, including Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003), contributed to liberating politeness studies from a singular focus on investigating strategies to mitigate face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987). As a result, all sorts of relational phenomena, such as face, identity, politeness and impoliteness, all of which arise in interaction through discursive struggle, have become central themes in interpersonal pragmatics.

In this chapter, we will argue that relationships form an important basis for any investigation of (im)politeness. 'Relationship' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) as 'the way in which two or more people or things are connected, or the state of being connected'.[1] Its Chinese and Japanese

[1] Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd edition (2010) online. Retrieved 11 October 2015 from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/definition/english/relationship.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_11

counterparts (關係*guanxi*[2] and関係 *kankei* respectively) suggest that this concept reflects a phenomenon emerging between two or more people or things. The Japanese notion of *ma* (間) further emphasises what is between people. *Ma* basically means 'an "interval" between two (or more) spacial or temporal things and events' (Pilgrim 1986, p. 255), and it is used in the compound 人間 (human-being), which is read *ningen*.

> *ningen* [人間](human being), for example, *ma* [間](read *gen* here) implies that persons [人](*nin, hito*) stand within, among, or in relationship to others. As such, the word *ma* clearly begins to take on a relational meaning—a dynamic sense of standing in, with, among, or between. (p. 256)

The notion of *ma* gives prominence to 'in-betweenness', and it presupposes that individuals can only exist in relation to others. In other words, the notion of *ma* does not assume static and self-contained individuals. This resonates with Blitvich and Sifianou's (this volume) discussion of (im)politeness and identity. They reject the static model of identity that is relationally unaffected in the course of interaction. In so doing, they highlight the fact that 'identity is eminently relational and not the property of isolated individuals' (p. 234), and that 'identity emerges in interaction and is the product of relationships created through language', building on previous work by Bucholtz and Hall (2005) and Kiesling (2013).

Yet, while the importance of relationships has long been acknowledged in (im)politeness research, relationships themselves have not been the primary focus of attention until recently with the advent of interpersonal pragmatics. Locher and Graham's (2010) edited volume, titled *Interpersonal Pragmatics*, identifies relationships as a central focus of interpersonal pragmatics. The research focus is essentially 'the dynamics of relationships between people and how those relationships are reflected in the language choices that they make' (Locher and Graham 2010, p. 2). In this chapter, we will look at the concept of 'relationship' first in Sect. 2, in particular, how the concept has developed in (im)politeness studies. In Sect. 3, we will identify some key debates and unexplored areas in interpersonal pragmatics, before presenting two case studies in Sect. 4 which demonstrate some new approaches to fill the identified empirical gaps and shed new light on what occurs between persons.

[2] *Guanxi* may have some negative connotations depending on the context. It may imply 'going through the back door'. *Guanxi* itself, if used independently, is neutral. *Renji guanxi* refers to 'interpersonal relationship'. However, in the latter phrase, the emic notions of obligation and entitlement embedded in *guanxi* are not necessarily implicated. For that reason we prefer to use the term *guanxi*.

2 Key Concept and Theories

Before we move on to our view on relationality, it is essential to trace back how the concept of 'relationship' has developed in the field of (im)politeness. Traditionally, two key dimensions, power and distance, have been widely adopted to theorise 'relationship' or 'relationality' in linguistic research, particularly in the fields of sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics. Power and distance have been long discussed as influential parameters for language production and interpretation based on the interlocutor's perceptions of the social variables in different settings. In other words, the interlocutor's linguistic choice is relevant to one's social roles (teacher/student, superior/junior) and distant/intimate status (acquaintances/strangers) with one's corresponding interactant in their interpersonal relationship. The most influential model of politeness—proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987)—is built on these two social parameters and the ranking of imposition, all of which are said to determine the interlocutor's strategies in 'politely' producing a particular speech act. Research about speech acts has become increasingly significant and many researchers have worked to develop this area. Power, distance and the ranking or degree of imposition have been found, through empirical investigation (e.g. discourse completion test or questionnaire), to be key parameters in determining the language choice of speech acts by the speakers, including in the case of requests (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al. 1985; Holtgraves and Yang 1990; Lim and Bowers 1991), apologies (Holmes 1990; Olshtain 1989; Olshtain and Cohen 1983; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984), disagreement (e.g. Beebe and Takahashi 1989) and directives (e.g. Holtgraves et al. 1989).

However, the individualistic model person whom Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) draw from in theorising politeness is insufficient to explain mutually and socially owned relational phenomena. In the research tradition where individualism is assumed and unquestioned, it follows that the 'self precedes communication, rather than being constituted in communicative practices between persons' (Baxter 2011, p. 56). Individualism, however, assumes a self-contained being and autonomous self, as defined by Baxter (2011), who takes full control over his/her language use.

> According to individualism, personhood is privately owned. Cognitions, personality traits, motivations, and other psychological concepts are located inside the person and thus controlled exclusively by him or her. (pp. 55–6)

Accordingly, the definition of face which Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) employ for their face-based politeness theory is thus the desires or wants that the individualistic model person claims for themselves.

> Central to our model is a highly abstract notion of 'face' which consists of two specific kinds of desires ('face-wants') attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in one's actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive face).
>
> (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 13)

Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 61) state that '[o]ur notion of "face" is derived from that of Goffman (1967)', but Goffman's original sense of face, which has an airy, fuzzy and interdependent nature was somehow lost. Goffman defines face as 'the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact' (1967, p. 5), and its recognition is of an unfixed nature, 'diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter' (p. 214). Brown and Levinson's politeness theory undermines the social and interpersonal aspects of face that Goffman emphasised in his original notions of face and face-work (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003). As a natural consequence, those analysts who study the relational aspect of interaction, in interpersonal pragmatics for instance, employ Goffman's original notion of face, and perceive selfhood to be more open to negotiation. Such selfhood can be described as a social self or interdependent self.

The focus on the individual is still prevalent in (im)politeness research, but it has been challenged by many researchers (just to name a few: Hill et al. 1986; Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988, 1989; Gu 1990; Mao 1994). Perceived social roles assigned in a given context also arguably have a significant influence upon language use in Japanese (e.g. the roles of beneficiary and benefactor in thanking [Ohashi 2013] or the roles of guest speakers at Japanese wedding receptions [Dunn 2005]), or perceived relational connections between the interactants in Chinese (e.g. *guanxi* in business contexts [Chang and Haugh 2011; Chang 2016]).

The use of 'self' or participant's perspectives in interpreting relationality in interaction thus requires a further critical look. On this particular point, Arundale (2010b) advocates the importance of distinguishing two positions in conceptualising relationships.

> [on the one hand] a relationship is understood to be the aggregate of the independent individuals who comprise it, the properties of the social entity being understood as the sum of the properties of the individuals. […] [On the other hand] a relation is understood to be a single, integral system of interdependent individuals, the properties of the social entity being understood as the non-summative properties that arise within that system, apart from the properties of the individuals. (p. 140)

In essence, the first position seeks explanations about what happens relationally in interaction from a social psychological view of individuals. The second view, on the other hand, does so from the perspective of a social system that emerges as a product of an encounter (or set of encounters).

Work by Locher and Watts (2005, 2008), for example, is representative of the first position. They use the term 'relational work' to highlight the negotiable nature of relationships with others, and to include any meta-pragmatic evaluations and judgments which conversational participants make during interaction or post event reflection. Locher and Watts (2008, p. 96) define 'relational work' as 'all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those engaged in social practice'. The notion of 'relational work' in interaction rejects any fixed *a priori* definition of what counts as polite, and thus politeness is subsumed into conversational participants' diverse spectra of social, psychological and emotional reactions and evaluations in interaction. Conversational participants' positive and negative reactions and evaluations depend on their understanding of what is appropriate in a given context, which is also subject to change. Therefore, what is (im)polite is not a prescriptive assignment of the labels polite or impolite, but rather (im)politeness emerges through discursive struggle (Locher and Watts 2008).

Arundale's Face Constituting Theory (FCT) (2006, 2009, 2010a, 2013) is an example of the second position. Based on Relational Dialectics Theory (Baxter and Montgomery 1996), he defines 'face', in contrast to Goffman, as 'connectedness and separateness in human relationship' (Arundale 2009, p. 42), emphasising that 'face is not an individual phenomenon, but rather a relational phenomenon in that face arises in the dialectic interplay between what is individual [separateness] and what is social [connectedness]' (p. 43, brackets added by the authors).[3] The second position thus seeks an explanation grounded in the ongoing tension between the two forces of separateness and connectedness.

Both positions contribute to our understanding of relationality in interpersonal pragmatics, and various interactional data should be incorporated to make sense of what occurs relationally. However, it is important for us to understand the nature of specific data obtained (e.g. naturally occurring conversations and post event interviews) and to remind ourselves of the implications and limitations of this. In the following section, some key studies on relationality will be reviewed critically to highlight key empirical gaps.

[3] It should be noted that Arundale's FCT is primarily a theory of a particular aspect of relationships/relating, not 'face' as it is commonly understood in the field.

3 Critical Overview of Research

'Relationships' or 'relating' have been the focus of increasing attention in the field of (im)politeness and pragmatics in recent years, with an increased focus on relationality in interpersonal pragmatics (Arundale 2010b; Enfield 2009; Spencer-Oatey 2011, 2013). Here it is argued that taking a relational perspective is different from the traditional view of (im)politeness which focuses on the individual's performance (Culpeper et al. 2010), and that it should be treated as 'a key focus for pragmatics' (Enfield 2009, p. 60). In this section, we would like to address key issues and debates that have emerged in the field with regards to (im)politeness and relationality.

One of the issues that has not yet been fully addressed in the literature in interpersonal pragmatics is the reciprocal nature of human relationships. We argue that reciprocity is fundamental to human interpersonal relations. Reciprocity as a social norm creates interdependency in social relationships. Gouldner succinctly explains the norm of reciprocity in his much cited paper:

> We owe others certain things because of what they have previously done for us, because of the *history of previous interaction* we have had with them. It is this kind of *obligation* which is entailed by the generalized norm of *reciprocity*. (Gouldner 1960, pp. 170–71, emphasis added)

Gouldner's account of reciprocity extends across time. In this sense, we are part of an ongoing reciprocal relationship. Goffman (1967), however, approaches this reciprocal obligation from a point of view of situated encounter, and he illustrates the rules of social interaction on the basis of face-to face talk, emphasising tacit mutual requirements in interaction.

> The combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants. This means that the line taken by each participant is usually allowed to prevail, and each participant is allowed to carry off the role he appears to have chosen for himself. (…) This kind of mutual acceptance seems to be a basic structural feature of interaction, especially the interaction of face-to-face talk. (Goffman 1967, p. 11)

Together with his notion of face, the 'rules' of social interaction are governed by an overarching norm of reciprocity. Especially in a face-to-face interaction, conversational participants are entitled to feel good about themselves in such a way that a participant is responsible for his/her conversational partner's

positive self-projection and vice versa. For a successful interaction, that is to say, a positive relational outcome, it is expected that conversational partners are to balance their obligations with each other. Therefore, the norm of reciprocity is fundamental to relationality. However, this has rarely been taken up by researchers in interpersonal pragmatics. Case study 1 in Sect. 4.1, will thus illustrate an example of making sense of face-to-face interaction using the norm of reciprocity, specifically 'a balance sheet of obligations' as an investigative tool.

The second issue is the ongoing debate between the interactional and social-cognitive perspectives on theorising (im)politeness and face (see also O'Driscoll, Chap. 5 this volume). Spencer-Oatey (2013) argues that while many scholars are taking a social constructionist perspective in theorising face and (im)politeness (Locher and Watts 2005; Bargiela-Chiappini and Haugh 2009; Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini 2010; Arundale 2010a), it is essential to also take a sociocognitive perspective into consideration (Chang 2016; Haugh 2009, 2010).

On the latter view, communicative practices are processed and understood through the situated social orientations of individual participants based on their experiences with cognitive interpretations.

The sociocognitive construct of face-as-relationship is argued to be constitutive of interaction in that it influences recipient design of sequences of social action,[4] which is what occasions relational practices in the first place. According to Arundale's FCT, the cognitive-interactive grounding of face-as-relationship lies in the cultural construal of connectedness and separateness, for instance, relational ties and relational entitlement[5] in the Chinese business context, as it is these sociocognitive constructs that underpin the manifestation of face/relationship in interaction. That is to say, face/relationship is both constituted in and constitutive of interaction. Or put differently, face/relationship can be both a 'cause' of behaviour and an 'effect', since if 'a mental representation of face/relationship was employed when formulating an utterance, then face/relationship is a cause of some sort' (Hahn and Hatfield 2011, p. 1305). The former refers to a person's interpretations of relational ties and separation, which are conjointly co-constituted through sequences of interaction with others

[4] Recipient design refers to 'a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 727).

[5] Relational ties and relational entitlement emerged as key aspects of face-as-relationship in Chang's (2016) analysis of business interactions. This will be further discussed in the case study in Sect. 4.2.

(Arundale 2010a), while the latter refers to expectations in regard to face entering into interaction through recipient design (Haugh 2009, 2010).

According to FCT, although the 'interpretation of face is perforce always an interpretation formed by an individual' (Arundale 2013, p. 18), face interpretings are themselves (conjointly) co-constituted. Participants, however, can (conjointly) co-constitute interpretings of face at three different levels: direct face interpretings, displaced face interpretings and reflexive face interpretings (Arundale 2010a, p. 2090). These interpretings reflect the cognitive states of individuals when interacting with others. A direct face interpreting is defined as a participant's own provisional or operative interpreting of face which is interactionally achieved or conjointly co-constituted in talk with another participant, while a displaced face interpreting refers to a participant's interpreting of another participant's direct face interpreting. A reflexive face interpreting involves one participant forming an interpreting of the other participant's interpreting of the first participant's direct face interpreting (Arundale 2010a, p. 2090). In recent work, Arundale (2013) has further explicated these three levels of face interpreting, describing them as 'my interpreting of our-connection-and-separation-at-this-moment' (direct interpreting), 'my interpreting of your interpreting of our-connection-and-separation-at-this-moment' (displaced interpreting) and 'my interpreting of your interpreting of my interpreting of our-connection-and-separation-at-this-moment' (reflexive interpreting) (p. 18).

A third issue is that relational work may intersect with the emergence of identities. Relational work and identities in interactional pragmatics are conceptualised as interdependently related through the individual–social dialectic (Haugh et al. 2015, p. 78). According to Arundale (2009, p. 40; 2010a, p. 2085), 'what is individual in nature and what is in social in nature are fully interdependent, while at the same time, individual phenomena and social phenomena are distinct and functionally contradictory poles of human experience'. Arundale (2010a) thus suggests that '[a] relationship is a phenomenon conceptualized in terms of a social system, whereas identity is a phenomenon conceptualized in terms of an individual system, (…)' (p. 2091). Building on the interactional approach, which focuses on participants' interpretations and evaluations of persons and relationships in locally situated discourse (Arundale 1999, 2006, 2010a, b; Chang and Haugh 2011, 2013; Haugh 2007, 2010), recent work by Haugh et al. (2015) has also drawn a clear analytical distinction between identities and relationships in examining the participants' interpretations and evaluations of persons and relationships in computer mediated communication. It is argued in their analysis that while relational practices and identities are interdependent, they should be

analytically theorised in distinct positions. Relevant definitions of identities and relationships are as follows:

> Identities are defined as arising through interpretations and evaluations of persons (or summative aggregations of persons in the case of collective identities). Such evaluations work to 'cast' a person (or a group of persons) into 'a category with associated characteristics or features' (Antaki and Widdicombe 1998, p. 3)
> […]
> A relationship refers to a non-summative system of two or more persons. It broadly involves 'establishing and maintaining of connection between two otherwise separate individuals' (Arundale 2010b, p. 138), in systems ranging from dyads to relatively closed social grouping through to large, diffuse social networks. In Arundale (2010b, p. 140), the 'reciprocal conditionality or systemic interdependence' of the persons that constitute that relationship. This means that relationships cannot be fully explicated in terms of the identities of persons in interactions. (Haugh et al. 2015, pp. 78–9)

In other words, it is argued that persons should be conceptualised as dialectically constructed through relationships (Arundale 2006, 2009, 2010a, b). Persons are consequently defined as socially constructed individuals in a particular social/relational network.

Taking the example of face which has commonly been the focus of (im)politeness research, it has long been theorised as a claimed or desirable self-image, building on Goffman's (1967) seminal work. The grounding of face in notions of identity (Locher 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2009) is thus a logical development of Goffman's original formulation. However, it is arguably problematic if face, the core of relational practice and (im)politeness, is treated only as a personal belonging without taking interpersonal relationships into account. He and Zhang (2011), in examining face, reduce the notion of relationship to relational identities and thereby emphasise individual attributes. However, such an analysis highlights only one's social attributes within a social network but neglects the level of the actual relationship between the persons, thereby arguably overly constraining our understanding of face (Haugh 2013, pp. 11–12). That is to say, face can involve not only an awareness of one's position within a network of relationships with others, but also those relationships in themselves (Chang and Haugh 2011, 2013). Thus, while identities and relationships are dialectically interrelated, it is essential not to conflate these two when theorising (im)politeness (Haugh et al. 2015, p. 79). Both should be taken analytically as distinct concepts so to avoid under-analysing relationality itself in examining relational practices in interpersonal pragmatics.

The final key issue is that emotion/emotivity or the affective quality of reactions has been relatively neglected in much of the theorisation of face and (im)politeness to date (Spencer-Oatey 2011; Culpeper 2011; Culpeper et al. 2010; Kádár and Haugh 2013). Although Goffman's (1967) seminal work suggests that face is emotionally sensitive, leading to outcomes such as feeling good, bad, ashamed, embarrassed and chagrined (pp. 6–7), work on the role of emotions themselves in interpersonal pragmatics have been remarkably limited (see Locher and Langlotz, Chap. 12 this volume). Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2002, 2007, 2008), Ruhi (2009a, 2009b), Culpeper (2011), Langlotz and Locher (2013) and Chang (2016) are some of the researchers in interpersonal pragmatics who draw attention to the importance of emotions. In Spencer-Oatey's theory of Rapport Management (2000, 2002, 2007, 2008), for instance, it is claimed that emotions naturally arise when there is an expectation associated with social behaviours, and thus emotion is the product of interactions in which face is involved. If one's perceptions of others' behaviour are not in conformity with one's expectations, some emotional reactions might arise (Spencer-Oatey 2007, p. 644). She also examines 'rapport-sensitive' incidents in which either negative or positive 'noticeable impact' could arise, such as feeling annoyed, embarrassed, proud, happy, etc., in order to explore the interactional concerns which underlie people's reactions (Spencer-Oatey 2002, p. 534; cited in Spencer-Oatey 2011, p. 3568). Similarly, Culpeper (2011, pp. 63–5) has collected a number of emotional labels which he associates with offences involving 'quality face', 'equity rights' and 'association right' based on Spencer-Oatey's (2002) original rapport management categories. He suggests that self-conscious emotions dominate all his data, but that other-condemning emotions, such as anger, take on increased importance during incidents involving equity rights, which are more to do with others and have less implications for oneself.

The issue of emotion in interpersonal pragmatics is also addressed by Langlotz and Locher (2013). In their paper, they propose a multimodal approach by which analysts committed to a discursive approach might develop an analysis of the display of emotions by participants. One of the key arguments is that emotions are signalled through composite signals in addition to, or in complement with, verbal talk. Another key claim is that inclusion of emotional cues in the analysis, such as gestures or facial expressions, is needed in order to improve our understanding of interpersonal relationships, and thus that the analysis of displays of emotions should play a central role in interpersonal pragmatics.

Chang's (2016) recent study of face practices in a business context found that our understanding of emotion/emotivity should not be overly constrained in the theorisation of face and/or relational practices, at least in the analysis of business interactions, to simply a response or outcome of interaction. According

to Chang (2016), displays of emotion/emotivity can also be constitutive of the interaction when face is involved, either in claiming or offering face, and so invariably enters into the recipient design of turns in interactional sequences. She argues that since the notion of face originates from Chinese emic concepts, it should come as no surprise that it is a fundamentally emotively invested construct, as, when we trace back to the emic perspective on face, we find it involves key folk notions of emotivity in Chinese, such as *ganqing*/*renqing* (emotive quality/human emotion) and *chengyi* (sincerity). The emic concept of face in Chinese, *mianzi*, according to Chang and Holt (1994), is defined as showing emotional concern. By '"[g]iving" and "claiming" *mianzi*, relational participants acknowledge the mutual bond between them, thereby showing emotional support' (p. 109). On the other hand, acknowledging emotivity (*ganqing*/*renqing*) entails mutual obligations within a reciprocal relation (*guanxi*), and so face (*mianzi*) can thus be employed as a relational resource in interaction (Chang and Holt 1994; Hsiang 1974). In other words, these face practices originate from emic collocations in which emotivity inheres, meaning that *mianzi* is thus inherently emotively invested. Since these folk notions of emotivity in Chinese are at the core of a sociocognitive construct of face, they are more than simply the outcome of face practices, but are also elements driving face and relational practices in the interaction in the first place.

Such findings lend support to Ruhi's (2007, 2009a, b) work, which also draws significant attention to the links between face, affect and the self-presentational choices that people make to effect outcomes that are in line with their goals both during and after an interaction. For instance, interlocutors sometimes display irritation and concern for the other through rising tones that indicate the impact of affective responses to self/other-presentation. According to Ruhi (2009a, b), affect grounds face and relational work. It is also suggested that displays of feelings, that is, emotive discourse, can become an important dimension of face in social interaction, as showing feelings can be used strategically to achieve interactional goals (Chang and Haugh 2011; Işık-Güler and Ruhi 2010, p. 633; Ruhi, 2009b, p. 107).

Taking account of the issues raised above in relation to (im)politeness and relationality, two case studies are presented in the following section.

4 Case Studies

Case study 1 specifically aims to illustrate how reciprocity, or balancing obligations as a social norm (thus an unmarked phenomenon), can be used in interpreting relationality in relation to (im)politeness. Case study 2 aims to

demonstrate how relationality is manifested in mediation interactions, where the participants evoke their interrelated relational ties and relational entitlements in order to achieve their interactional goals.

4.1 Case Study 1: Balancing Obligations

The first case study investigates: (1) whether the conversational participants observe reciprocity, or in other words, whether they balance obligations in interaction, and (2) the extent to which reciprocity contributes to participants' positive or negative evaluations of the interaction. Therefore, it aims to explicate the relationship between reciprocity and participants' positive or negative evaluations concerning the interaction they engaged in.

The following example is drawn from a data set of a research project in progress.

A: Female 68 years old (housewife, learning Italian at a Japanese university)

B: Female 49 years old (administration staff member in a Japanese university)

A was recruited as a participant when she was visiting the annual cultural festival at a Japanese university, enjoying food and drink. She has been taking Italian language subjects in this university as an adult learner over the last three years. B is an administrative staff member of the university, and she volunteered to be a participant in the project. In a relatively small meeting room, a table and two chairs are set in close proximity with a video and audio recorder. The participants were put in this rather artificial situation where they felt obliged to fill time to avoid awkward moments, silence and communication breakdown. It is, therefore, expected that they make some kinds of effort to engage in small talk.

A started the conversation with an apology for having drunk some beer and thus that she may be under the influence of alcohol. She jokingly said that '*tanoshi sugi chau kamo shire masen*' (I may enjoy [chatting with you] more than I should). B responded by saying '*iidesune*' (That's good). Cheerful laughter continues while they talk about beer and other alcohol sold at the festival. None of them disclosed their identity until B answered, 'I am an administrative staff here' in response to A's question, 'Are you working for this project?' After a significant pause of three seconds, B initiated a topic with the following question[6]:

[6] Key for abbreviations: Ag: agreement; Ans: answer; COP: copulative verbs; D: denial; FB: Feedback; Res: Respectful form; Hum: Humble form; IP: interactional particles; N: Nodding; Passive: passive form; P-suffix: Polite verb suffix; Q: question; Qm: question marker; SD: self denigration; Sta-V: stative verb; Tag: tag question; @: laughing.

(1)

B(16): nanika sakki ohanashisaretete italia go wo yatte rashitan desu ka? Q
something a moment ago Res-talk Passive-Res Italian O do Res COP Qm
(Well, a moment ago, I heard you saying that you learnt Italian, didn't you?)

Tag B:N A:N
A(17): iyaiya ano open karejji shite masu yone? Italia, de, watashi wa italiago de Ans
no no well open college do P-suffix IP Italy and I S Italian
(No, no. Well, you are offering an open college [programme], aren't you?
Italy, and I took Italian,)

B:N
B(18): a-sounandesu ka FB
ah is that so Qm
(Ah, is that so.)

A(19): kochirani dakara maishuu uka[ga]
here therefore every week Hum-come
(and I come here every week.)

B:N
B(20): [ira]shiterun desu ne
Res-come COP IP
(so you come).

A(21): yoru anoo:: ukagatte orimashite=
night well Hum-come Hum-Sta-V
(I have been coming here at night.)

B(22): =ah::ah:: FB
FB

A:N
A(23): maru san nen tatte ima yonenme desu
a whole three year do now the 4th COP
(for a whole three years and now the fourth year.)

B:N
B(24): ah soo desu ka FB
ah so cop Qm
(Is that so?)

A(25): sonowariniwa zenzen shabere nai= SD
for that degree absolutely speak Pote. neg
(I cannot speak the language at all to that degree,)

D
B(26): =EH? [ie ie]@
no no
(eh? none? No, no.)

A(27): [desu]kedo @
COP but
(but,)

B(16) breaks the silence by asking A about A's Italian language learning experience, as B earlier overheard A and the researcher talking about this at the far end of the corridor. This is B's contribution to engage in interaction with A, perhaps in an attempt to end the previous awkward silence. It is labelled as Q (question) at the right end of the transcriptions as shown above. This Q is not necessarily information seeking but it is significant as a relational contribution. A(17) responds with *iya iya* (no, no), which does not deny her Italian language experience, but plays down her skill.[7] She then reminds B of the Italian language subjects that the university offers, saying that 'you are offering open college [programmes], aren't you?', to which B quickly nods (B:N denotes B nods). A then makes it clear that she takes Italian language there. B interjects with an *aizuchi*, '*sounandesu ka*' (Is that so) in B(18), and A continues to say that she comes to the University every week (A19) at night (A21). Note that in B(20), *irassharu*, respectful form of *kuru* (to come) is uttered responding to and almost simultaneously with A(19), *ukaga*, the stem of the humble form of *iku* (go) which is, in effect, cut off by B(20). A(21) then completes the sentence, and B(22) reacts with an *aizuchi*. Here, social norms of denigrating self (I go [humble form]), and elevating other (you come [respectful form]) is observed as unmarked phenomena of balancing obligation (Ohashi 2013, also Kádár 2007 notes this phenomena in relation to Chinese). A(23) continues to talk about her experience learning Italian language, stating that this year marks the fourth year she has been learning it, accompanying nodding at the end of her utterance. A(17)–A(23) constitute an answer to B's initial Q. This is labelled as Ans (answer), and B's interjections of feedback (aizuchi, backchanneling) are labelled as FB. B(24) interjects with further FB, *soodesuka* (Is that so?) along with a nod. A(25) comments that her competency in Italian is not commensurate with the long time she has spent learning Italian. Whether her statement is true or not is debatable, but what is important to note is that her self-denigration (labelled as SD) is expected here and denial (D) of that self-denigration is expected as a response. B(26) reacts with emphatic voice, *EH?* and *ie ie* (no no) while A(27) completes the sentence. It is observed that A and B balance obligations, 'self denigration–denial' and they are also marked by reciprocating laughter, @. 'Self-denigration–denial' is a common form of relational work in Japanese (see Ohashi 2013 for further examples). It appears that, at least locally, they balance obligations.

The conversation goes on for the next seven minutes, but due to limitations of space, let us turn our attention to data from quantitative analysis in order

[7] See Ohashi (2013) for the use of denial as a self-denigration in thanking episodes in Japanese. Self-denigration is a significant form of relational work and politic behavior in many contexts in Japanese.

to see to what extent the participants contribute to the interaction. As shown above, asking a question (Q), *aizuchi* or back-channelling as feedback (FB), nods (N), self-denigration (SD) and laughter (@) are all important forms of relational work. Also in adjacency pairs such as 'question–answer' and 'self-denigration–denial', the second pair part 'answer' and 'denial' respectively, are expected by convention. This is in a wider sense a realisation of their reciprocal obligations. Therefore, it is hypothesised that conversational participants are likely to have positive evaluations of a given conversation, or at least they will not have negative ones, if they balance these interactional obligations. To see if the balancing of obligations is related to positive evaluation of the conversation, the participants were interviewed separately after their conversational session. In the individual follow up interview, the following four questions were asked.

(1) What did you and your partner talk about? (Who initiated the conversation? What did s/he say? How did you respond? And then …)
(2) How do you evaluate the conversation with your partner? (If they do not know, can they give any adjectives to describe the conversation.)
(3) How do you rate the conversation between you and your partner (1-the least pleasant to 5-the most pleasant)?
(4) What contributed to your negative/positive impressions of the conversation?

There were no significant discrepancies between A and B in their views on Question (1), but A responded to it, saying '*dochira kara tomonaku*' ([topics] emerged organically [so it is not a matter of who initiated the conversation]), while B said '*watashino houkato omoimasu*' (I think I did [intiate the conversation]). In fact, B chose Italian language as a topic as she overheard that A was learning it. She said she asked A about her Italian language learning experience, because she thought it was '*bunan de sashisawariga nai topikku*' (a safe and non-evasive topic).

In relation to Questions 2, 3 and 4, A evaluated the conversation 4 out of 5, and she said '*tanoshikatta desune*' (it was enjoyable), but she thought she spoke a lot and wondered if B enjoyed the conversation as much as she did. A said '*tada watashi ni awasete irudakenanokana toiu tokoroga wakaranainde*' (I wasn't sure if she was simply being agreeable with my interests). B, on the other hand, evaluated the conversation rather negatively, 2 out of 5. B described the conversation as '*kiwo tsukau kaiwadatta*' (It was a careful and mindful conversation [from my side]). She elaborated on this by explaining that she was mindful of her duty to make sure the interlocutor was happy. She also said, 'she was a lot older than me and looked a little worried, and I tried to make her feel comfortable'.

Table 11.1 Balance sheet of obligations

	A (F68)	B (F49)
Q: Question	3	2
Ans: Answer	2	3
FB: aizuchi (back-channelling)	12 (13%)	82 (87%)
@: laugh	7 (37%)	12 (63%)
N: Nodding	67 (41%)	97 (59%)
TQ: tag question, じゃないですか、sentence final particles ね、よね、よ	35 (51%)	33 (49%)
Ag: Agreement そうですよね	11 (46%)	13 (54%)
Honorifics: Humble forms (Respectful forms) counts	5 (4)	3 (5)
SD: Self denigration	3	0
D: Denial	0	3
Total	105 (32%)	217 (67%)
Final character count	4476 (60%)	1773 (40%)

Let us see how their comments and evaluations on their interaction are reflected in counts of these different forms of relational work (Table 11.1).

As previously discussed, asking a question (Q) is relationally significant and an answer is obligatory. A opted for Q three times and B twice, and all Qs were answered. There was a disparity in the distribution of feedback (FB), as in *aizuchi* (back-channelling). B invested in FB significantly more than A. It is a reflection of A's dominance which is made clear at the bottom of the column, in the final character count[8]—A(60%):B(40%), even though it is clear that B's contribution in FB is disproportionately greater than A's. B also invested more in @ (laughter) and N (nodding) than A did, although this was to a lesser degree. TQ (tag questions and sentence final particles) and Ag (agreement) are also relationally effective. If we consider B's frequent use of these tokens (FB, @ and N) in light of B's comments in the follow-up interview, the following points are revealed. B commented that, '*aiteni hobo 100% awasete, aitega tanoshikunaru youna ohanashini naruyouni shita*' (I gave my full attention to my interlocutor's interest to make her happy). B's negative evaluation of the interaction appears to be related to her self-imposed caretaker role. She did not enjoy the talk with A, but invested in FB, @ and N in an attempt to make A feel happy and comfortable. It is also true that B's caretaker role is reflected in the imbalanced distribution in those tokens (FB, @ and N) in the balance sheet. A also thought that A spoke significantly more than B, something which is objectively true. This imbalance also led A to wonder if B really enjoyed the conversation with her (and in fact B didn't) and this suggests that A and B observed reciprocal obligations. In other words, reciprocity is in place

[8] This is a count of each participant's utterances by character as a unit.

for their evaluation of the conversation. It can be said, then, that even though balanced obligations are not achieved, the conversational participants seem to observe their reciprocal obligations. An imbalance in the balance sheet may lead to a negative evaluation of interaction, and thus impoliteness may arise. Although this is necessarily a preliminary case study and requires more data involving speakers of various languages, the notion of reciprocal obligations and the balance sheet of obligation may be useful tools in analysing the role of relationships in interaction with respect to (im)politeness.

4.2 Case Study 2: Relational Ties and Relational Entitlements

The following example illustrates the dialectic interplay of relational ties and relational entitlement in a mediation setting, where the involved participants were seeking a mutually agreeable financial compensation between the at-fault party and the victim party over a death caused by a car accident (Chang 2016).[9]

(2) [100727_12:3:08]

1 Wu: %*Ci ci*% *to woo kuí jîn tāi-piáu ah guá*
this time then have several people represent PRT I
(.)*i sī kiò guá kū-kong ah lí tse tsik-kong*
3sg be call me granduncle PRT you this granduncle
līng-guā mài tsham tī tsia luī hònn (.)*ah to guá*
in addition N mix in here CP PRT PRT just I
í kuân–puè lâi >kā< tàu- kuan-sim tsit-tsām tāi-tsì
as senior come ASP help concern this C matter
hònn(.)*ah to guan tāi-piáu lâi kā lín lâi- gī-uân*

[9] Transcription symbols and abbreviations used in morphological glosses (Jefferson 2004)

(.)	micro-pause
-	cut-off of prior sound in a word
underlining	stressed word or part of word
><	rushed or compressed talk
%	code-switch (between Taiwanese and Mandarin Chinese)

Abbreviations used in morphological glosses (Wu 2004)

ASSC	Associative (-de)
CP	Complement
C	Classifier
INT	Interjection
N	Negation
PRT	Particle
Q	Question marker

PRT PRT then we represent come give you come MLC[10]
tann ū tāi-tsì sin tsáu ah (.) *hònn sóo-í guá*
now have matter first leave PRT PRT so I
tī siūnn- kóng kin-á-jit >khuànn ē-tàng tú-hó< khuànn
ASP think CP today see if can just see if
ē-tàng tú-hó tak-ke- > tak-ke-< ū tsit ê (.)
can just give everyone everyone have one ASSC
%*Chiu xiensheng*% *mai-* %*women do buyao keqi* <u>*hònn*</u>
(surname) Mr N we all N modest PRT
jiran fasheng do yijing shiqing fasheng dajia jiu
since occur all already matter occur everyone then
(.)*yao*(.)*lai zenmeyang lai jiejue*% *hònn*(.)*ah guá*
need come how come resolve PRT PRT I
siong-sìn lí a-kū tī tē-hng siōng kā lán tsiah
believe your uncle ASP local in with we these
tak-ke long tsin kuan-sim tē-hng ah guá khuànn
everyone all very care local PRT I see
(.)*hoo lín a-kū lái lái kóng tse uē ah guan*
give your uncle come come say some words PRT our
lín tāi-piáu hònn >lai<(.)*lai siang*
(surname)representative PRT come come mutual
hong-bīn lái %*go-tong*% *tsit-ē >ah lán< ū*
sides come communicate a little bit PRT we have
būn-tê <u>*bô-kín*</u> *tak-ke thê-tshut-lâi thó-lūn ah*
questions okay everyone raise CP discuss PRT
<u>*guá tse tsok su-gî*</u> *sing gah lín khui-tiûnn* <u>*hònn*</u> *ah*
I this as emcee first help you open PRT PRT
lín tsài tshiánn lín- °####°
you then please you-

'This time we have a few representatives. Me, he called me granduncle (maternal) ((pointing to the at-fault party)) and you [call me] granduncle (paternal) ((pointing to Chen, the victim party's representative)). But [we] don't mix [the relationship between Chen and me] here. I, as a senior, come to [help] care about this matter. We represent [on behalf of the victims and the people at fault] to come to….. the MLC[11] (Tsai) has something on so he has already left. I am thinking that if today everyone is able to have a……, Mr Chiu, don't *keqi* (be modest/to hold back), since this matter has occurred, [let's see] how to resolve [this issue]. I believe that your uncle (D) and we all care about the

[10] Member of Legislative Council.
[11] MLC, member of Legislative Council.

> local (matters). I think, let your uncle speak [first] and let representative Lin host the mutual negotiation with everyone. It's okay if you have any questions. Everyone can bring up [your questions] for discussion. I, as the emcee, take the opening [speech], and all of you please-'

This excerpt begins when the chair of the mediation committee, Wu, takes the role of host and gives an official opening speech, along with a brief introduction of himself and the participants. By doing so, Wu starts by acknowledging the footings of the involved participants in the interaction. Particularly in the case of multiparty interaction, when there are numerous participant footings, different participation footings can lead to multiple meanings and evaluations (Haugh 2013; cf. Goffman 1981). In the following analysis we consider how relationality in this particular setting is evoked by the Chair of the committee in this introductory turn, in particular, how relational ties and relational entitlements between the participants are accomplished via three main social actions.

Firstly, the chair, Wu, establishes the way in which he should be addressed by the co-participants. Wu explicitly states his relationship to the at-fault party (Kuo and Kong) and then the victim's party (Chen) in this negotiation before the mediation formally begins. The context and their respective social distance thus become salient through use of the address terms employed in the introduction (Su 2009, p. 329). In this case, it highlights his insider relationship with the participants (Pan and Kádár 2010), as well as decreasing the social distance between himself and the named participants, since terms of address are drawn on to establish associations or connections between the participants in the mediation session. In other words, the use of address terms mirrors their claimed psychological connections, and thereby implicitly invokes the relational ties amongst the participants, as well as minimising their relational distance, in order to engage the participants in the mediation (Yang 2007; Ye 2004). On the other hand, Wu also specifies himself as an 'elder member' within both their relative and contextual relationships, and thereby casts himself as having certain entitlements in this context. According to Chinese traditional beliefs, a person with a superior or an elder role, for instance, should be highly respected (Sung 2001; Sung and Kim 2009).

Secondly, Wu, code-switches to Mandarin Chinese to address the son of the victim (Chiu), who is in his early twenties, presupposing that Mandarin Chinese is Chiu's dominant language (Su 2009, p. 320), as it is the most common dialect among younger people in Taiwanese society nowadays. Wu asks Chiu not to be *keqi* during the mediation, which refers to not showing

any 'restraint in expressing one's wants or acknowledging one's own abilities' (Haugh 2006, p. 20; cf. Chang and Haugh 2011). This imperative directive involves asking Chiu to freely express his opinions and the desired amount of compensation, and thus leaves open negotiation space for Lu and Chiu. This directive thus serves as an implicit acknowledgement of Chiu as the beneficiary of the compensation, showing concern for Chiu's speaking rights in the mediation.

Thirdly, Wu subsequently code-switches back to Taiwanese dialect in the talk that follows, and in doing so, acknowledges Lu's participation in the mediation, and Lu's concern and care about this matter. At this point, it appears Wu is treating Chiu as the direct recipient of the comment and yet, simultaneously, Lu is evidently treated as the indirect addressee through the code-switching back to Taiwanese, thereby implicitly assuming Lu will speak up for Chiu as he is his senior (i.e. being Chiu's uncle). Instead of inviting Chiu to speak, then Chiu is welcomed to ask or raise any concerns in the discussion following between Lu, the IA (the insurance agent) and Lin (the at-fault party's advocate). In other words, Wu creates a particular participation footing for Lu, as occupying the primary negotiation role in this interaction on the side of the victim. The comments indirectly addressed to Lu thus implicitly serve as a compliment and give face (*mianzi*) through elevating Lu's personal character by alluding to his voluntary participation in the mediation. On the other hand, through issuing the compliment of giving the speaking turn to Lu, Wu at the same time attributes institutional authority to himself by asserting the right to select the next speaker. Wu simultaneously displays his relational entitlement to take the leading position in this meditation context, as well as highlighting Lu's and Chiu's (the victim party) entitlements that arise from being relationally connected with Liu, and being the beneficiary respectively. Wu thus endorses interactionally what might have been previously assumed by the participants in relation to their participation footings. However, Wu goes further in complimenting a side participant, namely, Lu, in order to achieve particular situational goals in the mediation.

The setting up of a participation framework through Wu's three key actions in his opening turn acknowledges the roles and attendant responsibilities of the participants, but also acknowledges their relational entitlements as well as the speaking rights of the involved participants. Managing the participation footings and rights in institutional contexts is expected in Chinese settings (Gu 2011), and so failing to define the situational goal might be considered as a failing on the part of the institutional mediation system. In other words, it is critical to recognise the interrelated ties, entitlements and speaking rights of the involved participants, so that the involved participants are able

to act accordingly without violating their perceived institutional (relational) entitlements and obligations, and thus achieve their interactional goals in a more harmonious manner (Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2009). The setting up of the participation framework is arguably interpretable as orienting to face and so constitutes a face practice in the negotiation context, since invoking the participants' footings appropriately is critical for acknowledging their relational entitlements.

Wu volunteered the following comment after the interactional recording:

(3)

38 Wu: %*zhe tiaojie dai ganqing* (.) *dai difang*
this mediation carry emotive quality carry local
renshi de qingmian (.) *wo shi qian*
human matter ASSC emotive face I be former
xianyiyuan-%
MLC
'This mediation involves emotive quality and the emotive face from the local people. I am the former MLC'

Wu explicitly claims that the negotiation requires *ganqing* (emotive quality) as well as *qingmian* (emotive face). In other words, the display of an emotive stance, such as showing sympathy, empathy or consideration, and face concerns are significant strategies in facilitating negotiations and achieving mutually agreeable resolutions. On the other hand, Wu also explicitly indicates his position as a former MLC, relating his important role in broader society and his relational ties (*guanxi*) with people who are involved, through which he shows his reflexive awareness of the significant role in this mediation.

What can be seen here is that the practice of establishing a participation framework is a means of co-constituting the basic parameters of the participant's relational ties and entitlement, so that the individuals are aware of their interconnectivity as well as their speaking rights, vis-à-vis their respective interactional footings. This constitutes one way in which relationality can be legitimately invoked in this interaction, with any subsequent evaluations of (im)polite behaviour being grounded in this participation framework.

4.3 Summary

The first case study demonstrates that the balance sheet of obligations can reveal imbalances in the use of some conversational tokens. B invested significantly more in FB (Feedback: aizuchi, back-channelling), N (Nodding)

and @ (laughter). In light of the norm of reciprocity, such imbalanced areas are marked and may constitute (im)politeness phenomena. The follow-up interviews reveal that B who invested more in FB, N and @ in fact evaluated the conversation negatively. She described the conversation as '*kio tsukau hanashi*' (careful and mindful conversation), and it seems that she did not enjoy it. A, even though she enjoyed the conversation with B, wondered if B was genuinely involved in the conversation. The balance sheet of obligations as a hypothetical norm of interaction, therefore, can be a useful tool to identify phenomena requiring further investigation and explanation. Through the process of deploying the balance sheet in analysing interaction and cross-examination with follow-up interview data, the researcher does not have to impose his/her interpretation. Some marked features identified in the balance sheet are mapped with the participants' meta-pragmatic evaluations, therefore, the researcher can achieve his/her second order interpretation in view of participants' first order understandings.

The second case study demonstrates how relationality is evoked through the dialectic interplay of relational ties and entitlement. The data has shown that the chair of the committee initiated the mediation session by establishing a participation framework, namely, allocating the participants' speaking authority as well as acknowledging their various responsibilities. By allocating the speaking authority and responsibility at the very beginning of his opening speech, he attempted to evoke the involved participants' awareness of each individual's footing in this particular social environment, that is, the interactional positions, which encompass different roles and responsibilities across the participants (Goffman 1981). There are arguably two underlying purposes for allocating their interactional footings in this way. On one hand, the participants are acknowledged vis-à-vis the interconnected relationships between all parties, that is, their relational ties (*guanxi*). For instance, while the chair of the committee initiated the mediation session, he specifically mentioned the people with whom he has familial relations by using specific terms of address. By so doing, the involved participants are reminded of their insider relationships as well as their relational ties (*guanxi*). Therefore, the emic concepts relating to their relational ties, such as *ganqing*/*renqing* (emotivity) are also evoked, and consequently a sense of mutual favour and obligations is implicitly suggested.

On the other hand, through this allocation of interactional footings, all the participants are acknowledged vis-à-vis each individual's rights to speak and make proposals. Through this practice the committee chair thus also co-constitutes each participant's relational entitlements, and therefore highlights

the relationality inevitably involved when evoking different interactional positions. However, it is important to note that this entitlement only exists in the context of these situated relationships, rather than constituting a component of their individual identities. For example, in the analysis presented, the chair of the committee invokes the power to allocate the speaking rights vis-à-vis the involved participants in the mediation context. Moreover, in the same analysis where the chair acknowledged the relationship between Lu and Liu (the deceased victim), Lu was given the speaking authority in the brother–sister relationship with Liu, although the main beneficiary of the compensation is Chiu. Lu then obtained the relational entitlements on behalf of Chiu through the acknowledgement of his contextual footing for the entire mediation.

5 Conclusion and Future Directions

In this chapter, the relatively under-explored relational aspects of (im)politeness have been discussed and exemplified. The two case studies in both Japanese and Chinese, in particular, have highlighted the significance of studying emic concepts of relationality and related concepts, including the balance sheet of obligation in Japanese contexts, and relational ties and relational entitlements in Taiwanese interactions. It has thus been proposed that (im)politeness should be analysed and interpreted through an emic lens in order to tease out the nuances of relationality arising in interpersonal interactions across different cultural contexts. In so doing, we arguably avoid an under-theorisation of (im)politeness through simply imposing the researcher's interpretation on data. We have also suggested that emotion/emotivity, which have not been given sufficient attention to date, should be incorporated into our understanding of relational phenomena. We have argued that it is important to theorise and analyse relationality and identities as distinct phenomena in their own right, even though the co-construction of identities and relational practices is interdependently related through individual–social dialectic in interaction itself. We have thus suggested complementing the traditional focus on relational identities of relational practices, with a greater focus on the actual relationships between the persons themselves in future research. In this way, it is hoped that this chapter has highlighted another window into understanding interpersonal reality in various contexts across languages and cultures.

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12

(Im)politeness and Emotion

Andreas Langlotz and Miriam A. Locher

1 Introduction

This chapter explores the interconnectedness of emotions with (im)politeness from a theoretical and methodological perspective. Consider the following paraphrased examples, which all contain potentially face-challenging situations:

(1) A wife asks her husband to open a window for her while both are guests at a dinner party in a relative's house and the hostess is in a different room. This causes irritation in his wife. The husband, while acknowledging that the temperature is hot and that his wife has legitimate claims to get the window opened, first refuses to comply by referring to the host's rights at granting permission to open a window in her own house. Once the host's consent is won, he opens the window. (See Locher 2004, for a detailed discussion.)
(2) Commentators of online newspaper articles often attack each other ad hominem rather than concentrating on a factual discussion. These face-attacks are loaded with emotionally charged vocabulary and often result in further rounds of face-aggravating behaviour. (For examples of English newspapers see, e.g. Neurauter-Kessels 2013; Langlotz and Locher 2012.)

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_12

(3) An interactant goes to a tourist office to enquire about accommodation. The interaction with the clerk proceeds 'as usual' and is not particularly noteworthy with respect to face-enhancing or face-challenging behaviour. Instead, both interactants have established a face-maintaining stance that allows the interaction to run smoothly so that the expectations of both interactants are met. (See Langlotz 2015, for a detailed discussion.)

In all three examples we see human beings engaged in interaction who use language to achieve their aims. We argue that the examples all contain emotional, relational and socionormative elements. In (1) we witness the negotiation of rights and obligations of husbands, wives and hosts. Not complying with expectations about rights, or fulfilling rights, will trigger negative and positive emotions that influence the continuation of the exchange. In (2), we encounter conflictual behaviour, which triggers defence mechanisms that are emotionally loaded. In (3), we find a non-conflictual encounter, which, however is an interactional achievement in itself since both participants adhere to norms of what is expected of clerk and client in this particular encounter. Even here, we argue, emotions play a role. Furthermore, all examples serve as illustrations of how acquired knowledge of sociality and the connected sociocultural norms shape interactions and relationships. In this chapter, we will focus on emotions within interpersonal pragmatics with the aim to establish their role in the complex interplay of human interaction.

As the study of emotions is a fundamental concern for studying humanity, it is not surprising that many scholarly disciplines have dedicated considerable efforts to theorising emotions. Giving a comprehensive overview of this field from philosophy to cognitive science is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Turner and Stets 2005; Turner 2007). Instead, we aim at touching upon important research strands throughout the chapter to establish the research interface that is fruitful for (im)politeness research and to outline better what we understand by emotions. In Sect. 2, we provide a schematic overview of systemic components involved in emotion. By means of this skeletal system we will situate central approaches to emotion and outline the position of interpersonal pragmatics relative to them. On the basis of this general overview, we then review contributions within the (im)politeness literature that have worked on emotions (Sect. 3). Since this discussion does not present a unified picture, we will use this literature review as a springboard to elaborate on three concerns that the research raises (Sect. 4): Cognition and emotions, sociality and emotions, and the communicative observables of emotions. How these fundamental links between emotion and interpersonal pragmatics pan out will then be illustrated by drawing on examples of interaction in Sect. 5. Finally, we offer concluding remarks and suggestions for further research paths in Sect. 6.

2 The Fundamental Links Between Emotion and Interpersonal Pragmatics

The three scenarios described in the introduction may not have left you cold. While reading them, you may have shown emphatic or sympathetic reactions and felt some of the emotional states that the participants to these situations might have experienced themselves.[1] Thus, although being absent to these situations the human imaginary power of thinking about possible experiential contexts holds the latent potential for triggering emotions associated with them. This informal insight points to the central role of emotions in human and non-human life: they regulate the relationship of an experiencer to a given environment and mediate his/her/its orientation towards it (Damasio 1999, 2003). Emotions such as happiness, anger, love, disgust, embarrassment, shame or guilt can make us orient positively towards a given object, organism or person and approach them, or they can make us sense more negative feelings and cause us to shun away from them. Based on their emotional reactions, agents may thus perform a variety of (re)actions towards the environment ranging from destructive aggression to great happiness. This highly simplified system consisting of five fundamental components is illustrated by the bold terms in Fig. 12.1.

Neurobiological research shows that basic ways of emoting can already be found in basic organisms such as *Aplysia californica*, a sea snail, which emits black ink when being molested (Damasio 1999, p. 70). With regard to the components (1)–(5), human beings are, of course, much more complex agents than the mollusc.

(1) Extending their physiology (1a), human organisms have brains designed for complex cognitive capacities, including conceptualisation, memorisation, planning and decision-making (1b).
(2) Humans are social beings living in complex physical (2a) and social environments (2b) that are shaped through sociocultural practices (2c). These practices are bound to social norms and conventions. Moreover, humans are highly conscious of themselves. To some extent, they can conceptualise their inner-psychological states to make them become part of their worlds of direct experience (2d).

[1] Note that we use a broad notion of emotion that also includes concepts such as affect and feeling. A substantial definition follows below. Other studies have differentiated them (for an overview see Langlotz and Soltysik Monnet 2014).




Fig.12.1 Emotions as regulators of relationship between organism and environment

(3) Due to (2b) the most important connections between humans and their environments consists in social relationships (3b) ranging from dyadic engagements to differentiated roles within groups and societies. An individual's position in his/her social environment is defined through degrees of status/power, familiarity and duration (short to long-term engagements) (Langlotz 2015). Having concepts of their own selves and their own feelings (3c), humans also establish relationships to themselves and engage in identity construction.

(4) Due to the complexity of their environments and social relationships, human beings possess a very broad range of emotions to regulate their behaviours (see, e.g. Plutchik 2003).

(5) In their (re)actions, humans are not restricted to a repertoire of physical responses (5a). Being highly communicative beings and possessing the symbolic power of language, they can express and also describe emotions through an array of non-verbal and verbal cues (5b). Moreover, they may use language to conceptualise emotional states, to describe them and to talk about them through meta-comments (5c).

Several different approaches to and definitions of the concept of emotion exist. However, still 'there is little consensus on what emotion is or is not' (Barrett 1998, p. v, quoted in Schwarz-Friesel 2007, p. 43). In our view, this is mainly due to the differing ways in which different approaches to emotion have analysed, researched and interpreted the complex interaction between the components and subcomponents in (1)–(5).

In neuropsychology the main focus has been on the connections between (1a), (2) and (4), i.e. on the neurophysiological status of emotions as part of the human 'homeostasis machine' (Damasio 1999, p. 55; see also Damasio 1994, 2003, 2004; James 1884; LeDoux 1998). While the precise mechanisms underlying emotions as physiological reactions are not of central interest here, it is important to emphasise that these approaches underline the fundamental role for emotions in the architecture of human psychology and behaviour. Importantly, they show that rational thinking is not possible without the evaluative influence of emotional components and that higher-level cognitive capacities seem to be fundamentally shaped by these lower-level somatic survival mechanisms (Damasio 2003, pp. 145–9).

In cognitive psychology, the complex interrelation between the environment (2), emotions (4) and cognition (1b) in the intelligent human regulation of organism–environment interaction has been of central interest. Most importantly, *appraisal theory* proposes that emotions are triggered by the cognitive interpretation of a stimulus event (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Scherer et al. 2001). These evaluations (positive vs. negative) then lead to emotional arousal. Unlike neuropsychology, appraisal theory thus stresses the importance of cognitive interpretations (1b) of the world of experience over the prior presence of physiological arousal (1a).

Sociological theories of emotion have been primarily concerned with the links between (2b), (3), and (4), i.e. how emotions are linked to patterns of social organisation and how they are involved in relationship building (3b). Among others, *dramaturgical theories* stand in a Goffmanian tradition and are interested in how 'individuals make dramatic presentations and engage in strategic actions directed by a cultural script' (Turner and Stets 2005, p. 26). In this tradition we find a strong interest in sociocultural norms (2c) and strategic orientations towards them, including emotional impression management (Goffman 1967; Hochschild 1979, 1983). *Symbolic interactionist theories* place their central focus on how individuals seek to confirm their self-conceptions and identities (2d), i.e. they wish to verify the emotional relationship to themselves in interaction with others (3c):

> When self is verified by others responding to self in a manner that is consistent with self's own view, the person experiences positive emotions, such as pride and satisfaction. When self is not confirmed, however, the incongruity between self-directed behavior and the responses of others generates negative emotions such as distress, anxiety, anger, shame, and guilt.
>
> (Turner and Stets 2005, p. 29)

Finally, *social constructionist* approaches, as for example proposed by Harré (1986), have opposed biological and psychological theories, claiming that emotions are not empirically measurable objects of analysis but socially constructed entities that are highly culture specific. Most importantly, they propose that culture-specific ways of speaking about emotions (5c) shape culture-specific ideologies of what they are. A similar approach is taken in anthropological studies, which are interested in how complex culture-specific forms of performing and speaking about emotions and emotionality (5a)–(5c) shape emotions (4), social and cultural environments (2b, 2c), relationships (3b) and culture-specific identities (3c) (Wilce 2009; Wierzbicka 1994).

In communication studies, (1b), (2) and (3) are also highly important. However, unlike the previously mentioned approaches, communication studies start from (5b) and are interested in how emotional communicative cues are used to express emotions in different types of communication (e.g. family, marital, conflict, business or intercultural communication) and how these forms of emotional communication influence relationships (3b) and self-concepts (3c) within such contexts. Communication studies are also interested in how emotional communication can be managed to improve communication between interactants.

With regard to language-related fields of study distinct from linguistic pragmatics and (im)politeness research, emphasis has been primarily been on the verbal component of (5b). The Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric has focused on how *verbal pathos* can be used to influence the orators' relationship to their audience (3b) and thus use language to cause changes in (2b) or (2c) (see Micheli 2008). In literary and cultural studies, different styles of articulating emotionality in combination with the question of how such styles shape ideologies and conceptions of what emotions (4) are have been of central interest (Langlotz and Soltysik-Monnet 2014). In linguistics, the structure of verbalising the emotional component of experience has been of recent interest (Bednarek 2008; Foolen 2012; Oster 2012; Schwarz-Friesel 2007).

Where can interpersonal pragmatics be positioned within this skeletal overview? Interpersonal pragmatics is centrally interested in how interactants use language to construct, negotiate, maintain, challenge and change social relationships. With regard to Fig. 12.1, the use of emotional cues (5b) as well

as emotional meta-comments (5c) for the emotional regulation of interpersonal relationships (3b) thus constitutes the central object of analysis with regard to linking emotions to (im)politeness (see Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 99, Fig. 2). However, as the previous literature review has shown, we should also be strongly interested in the impact of emotions on cognitive processes of interpretation and the impact of cognition on emotional reactions (1b) (Locher and Langlotz 2008; Culpeper 2010; Culpeper et al. 2014). In addition, the construction of relationships must always be understood relative to sociocultural environments and interactional contexts in which they take place (2c). Finally, as the idea of 'face' is linked to the conceptualisation of the self (3c) and corresponding inner-psychological feeling states (2d), these dimensions involved in activating situated identities in relational work also play a central role in the complex system of connections between emotion and the management of (im)politeness in relational work (Langlotz 2010). This leads us to a short overview of research foci on emotions and (im)politeness in (im)politeness research.

3 Emotions and (Im)politeness in (Im)politeness Research

It would be a gross misrepresentation to say that the importance of the role of emotions and feelings has not been pointed to within (im)politeness research. However, many of the most popular works on politeness mention emotions only in passing and do not discuss their influence or role within interpersonal pragmatics in great detail. For example, Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 67, 68) primarily mention the display of emotions or lack of control of emotions as potentially face threatening and refer to the 'communication of affect' (display rules[2] and emotional stance) when claiming that '[i]nsofar as the display of affect is socially constructed, with cultural and situational expectations about what and how feelings should be displayed, work here links directly with our discussions of [face-threatening acts, positive politeness strategies, and cultural ethos]' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 28). They maintain that studying how 'appropriate levels of affect' are conveyed is of concern for linguists studying politeness. Leech's *Pragmatics of Politeness* (2014, pp. 4–9) does not include mention of the involvement of emotions

[2] The concept of emotional *display rule* was proposed by Ekman and Friesen (1969) with regard to the communicative management of facial expressions. Communicators may change the expressive surface of their emotional states by simulating, inhibiting, intensifying, de-intensifying or masking their actual emotions in order to follow culture-specific norms of appropriate emotional display (see Sect. 4.2; Langlotz and Locher 2013).

in the assessment of politeness as one of his proposed 'eight characteristics of politeness' (see also Leech 1983), but does refer to the role of affect and familiarity as being part of Brown and Levinson's D variable (horizontal distance) in his discussion of requests (p. 139). Kienpointner (2008, pp. 246–7) further argues that, along with proposing that affect and familiarity in themselves are important factors when assessing the weightiness of an imposition, the variables power and distance proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987) also contain elements of emotions. This is because the relational history of interactants and meeting face-concerns against the backdrop of local expectations about roles in interaction have a fundamentally emotional component (see, e.g. Arndt and Janney 1985). Screening the literature, we also find a number of contributions that study meta-comments about relational work that contain emotional assessments and emotional cues within interaction in order to gain a better understanding of breaches and maintenance of norms (for examples in this tradition, see Chang and Haugh 2011; Culpeper 2010, 2011; Culpeper et al. 2014; Kienpointner 2008; Langlotz and Locher 2012, 2013; Locher and Langlotz 2008; Locher and Koenig 2014; Ruhi 2009; Ruhi and Isik-Güler 2007; Spencer-Oatey 2011).

It is apparent, then, that the literature refers to emotions, on the one hand, as being displayed and conveyed, and, on the other hand, as being taken into account when choosing and assessing relational strategies. In this way they are thus part of creating and processing relational meaning. Consider what Culpeper (2011, p. 60) argues in his work on impoliteness:

> Displaying emotions such as contempt or anger has nothing in itself to do with impoliteness. However, somebody displaying great contempt for and anger at someone and doing so publicly may be judged […] to have acted in an inappropriately and unfairly hurtful way […], causing an emotional reaction such as embarrassment or anger […]. (Culpeper 2011, p. 60)

Culpeper here refers both to the explicit conveying of emotions, i.e. making manifest to an interlocutor how the speaker feels, and to the reactions to this display, which are emotional in turn. The former concerns the study of a surface structure, while the second is more fundamentally concerned with theorising how emotions cognitively contribute to relational understandings. Culpeper (2011, pp. 60–61) draws on Haidt's (2003) work on moral emotions and especially elaborates on the link between face and emotions (Goffman 1967). The latter is also of particular concern in Spencer-Oatey's (2005) work. In her discussion of rapport management (Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2011), she shows that 'emotional reactions' of the speaker and addressee play a fundamental role in the negotiation of face concerns (see Fig. 12.2).




Fig. 12.2 The base of dynamic perceptions of rapport (from: Spencer-Oatey 2005, p. 116)

This is true for expectancy reactions (positively, neutral or negatively eventful) and in what she terms 'emotional reactions' (joy, surprise, anger, sadness and their subgroups) in the dynamic perception of rapport.

In Garcés-Conejos Blitvich's (2013) discussion of the connection of the concept of face and identity, she argues that both concepts should be linked to emotions (see also Ruhi 2007, pp. 140–1, 2009, p. 170):

> Identity verification is according to Burke and Stets (2009) a central process in identity construction […]. Identities can be verified, partially verified or not verified by other agents. Verification/non-verification is associated with very positive/negative emotions. These emotions, which are usually associated with face, as Spencer-Oatey argues (2007: 644 see above), are also crucially connected with identity. Those positive/negative emotions associated with the maintenance/enhancement/threat to face can then be associated as well with the verification/non-verification of an identity. Thus, (im)politeness evaluations can be tied to identity, not just to face. After all, a way to get people very upset is to tell them (explicitly or implicitly) that they are not who they claim to be or think they are. A person may feel very offended if somebody whom s/he considers a friend introduces him/her to others simply as a colleague or an acquaintance. Positive feelings, traditionally associated with politeness assessments, may result when a friend tells you that you are more like a sister than a friend to her. In both cases, (im)politeness may ensue as a result of the construction of a given social identity for an individual. (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, p. 17)

Identity construction, in this line of reasoning, is the outcome of relational work/facework/rapport management that entails the assessment of whether expectations about emotional orientation and fulfilling of roles are met in situ (see also Locher 2008).

When Haugh et al. (2013, p. 4) assess the research scope of interpersonal pragmatics, they identify three areas of interest: (1) interpersonal relations; (2) interpersonal attitudes and emotions; and (3) interpersonal evaluations (see also Culpeper and Haugh 2014, p. 197):

(1) 'The primary area of concern in interpersonal pragmatics is naturally *interpersonal relations*, which encompasses "mutual social connections amongst people that are mediated by interaction, including power, intimacy, roles, rights and obligations" (Culpeper and Haugh [2014, p. 197]).' (emphasis in original)
(2) '[T]he area of *interpersonal attitudes*, which encompasses "perspectives, usually value-laden and emotionally charged, on others that are mediated by interaction, including generosity, sympathy, like/dislike, disgust, fear and anger" (Culpeper and Haugh [2014, p. 197]),' and the 'area of

interpersonal emotions, which encompasses embodied feelings or state-of-mind often characterised by participants as "irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate [and] genuine rather than artificial" (Edwards 1999: 273).' (emphasis in original)

(3) The area of '*interpersonal evaluations*, which involve "appraisals or assessment of persons, or our relationships with those persons, which influence the way we think and feel about those persons and relationships, and consequently sometimes what we do" (Kádár and Haugh 2013: 61).'[3] (emphasis in original)

While in area (2) emotions are explicitly mentioned, (1) and (3) also involve emotions, since they are part of relationship building and appraisals are cognitively linked to emotional reactions. As the authors point out, these three levels are in fact interrelated and 'in practice the analysis of face and (im)politeness is often necessarily intertwined' (Haugh et al. 2013, p. 4). The same comment is valid for emotions as they play a role on all three levels, too.

What we take from this overview is that we have to be especially aware of what level of study we are referring to when making claims about emotions and their roles within interpersonal pragmatics. We propose three areas that can be disentangled to better understand the nature of emotions:[4]

- Cognition and emotions: What are emotions and what role do they play in cognitive processes of sense-making?
- Sociality and emotions: What is the connection of emotions and interpersonal pragmatics? What is at stake when emotions come into play (e.g. identity construction and relationship negotiations)?
- Communicative observables of emotions: While the discussion of the first two areas is of a fundamental, theoretical nature, analysts in the field of interpersonal pragmatics only have direct access to what is observable in interaction (e.g. emotion display rules, emotion meta-comments, words expressing emotional connotations; visible somatic states, etc.). What does the literature offer us as tools to describe surface structures of emotional stance for a systematic description?

[3] In Culpeper and Haugh (2014, pp. 197–8), the authors subsume interpersonal emotions and interpersonal evaluations within interpersonal attitudes.

[4] Arndt and Janney (1985, p. 286) propose to study '(1) emotions generally, (2) how they are expressed, suppressed or otherwise modified in face-to-face speech [our third point], and (3) how emotive expression affects transitory interpersonal relationships [this is part of our second point].' Arndt and Janney (1985, p. 282) also argue that '[t]he domain of relevance in studying or teaching politeness, we suggest, is *emotive communication*—the communication of transitory attitudes, feelings and other affective states'. They thus clearly highlight the importance of emotions within any (im)politeness framework.

We will flesh these areas out in Sect. 4 by drawing on further literature on language and emotions and other disciplines working on emotions. How these levels are connected will be illustrated in Sect. 5.

4 The Links of Emotions to Cognition, Sociality and Communicative Observables

Before we elaborate on the three areas raised in the previous section, we need to posit that emotions and emotionality cannot be restricted to internal physiological states of anger, fear, etc. Instead, they are multicomponential 'syndromes' that, according to Plutchik (2003, pp. 108–11), derive their conceptual complexity from three definitional perspectives: (a) structural, (b) sequential and (c) derivational. These distinctions are useful in better understanding the positions on emotions taken within and across the three areas outlined below.

The *structural perspective on emotions* tries to compare different types of emotions and their relationship to one another. For instance, according to Plutchik's (1962, 1980, 2003) famous multidimensional structural model, emotions can be metaphorically compared to a spectrum of colours and arranged according to an emotional 'colour-wheel'. The wheel contains eight basic emotions (anger, anticipation, joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust) that have a certain similarity and polarity. For instance, joy is more similar to trust and anticipation than to fear and it stands in polar opposition to sadness. Like colours, these emotions can also vary along a range of intensity. Thus, joy ranges from serenity to ecstasy, while sadness lies on a continuum between pensiveness and grief. Finally, the basic emotions with their different degrees of intensity can also be blended, which results in secondary and tertiary emotions. According to Plutchik (2003, p. 105), contempt can be seen as a blend between the primary emotions disgust and anger. A similar classificatory grid for the structural dimension of emotions is offered by Schwarz-Friesel (2007, see Table 12.1).

Table 12.1 Classificatory grid for emotion categories, based on Schwarz-Friesel (2007, Ch. 3.3, see also Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 90)

Emotion:	
A. Type and function:	emotion categories
B. Quality:	positive vs. negative evaluation
C. Intensity:	strong–weak continuum
D. Duration:	permanent vs. temporary

It is important to emphasise that such structural models have been severely criticised in anthropological, anthropological linguistic and social constructionist research (see, e.g. Harré 1986; Wierzbicka 1994). These researchers claim that different 'structural' emotion categories must be seen as highly culture specific rather than universal. It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on this controversy more profoundly.

From a *sequential perspective on emotions*, it is not the structural distinctions between different emotion types that are of interest, but how emotions are part of complex behavioural processes. Every type of emotion, as classified from a structural perspective, can be seen to establish a complex behavioural sequence, which turns emotions into intricately distributed and dynamic phenomena. For example, the emotion 'contempt' involves the complex sequence of seeing or experiencing the behaviour or actions of a person, evaluating these actions as immoral, despicable or inappropriate, activating a corresponding physiological state of contempt, leading to the potential overt behaviour of a sneer or snub and avoiding him or her. Often such action tendencies can also be regulated. For instance, a politician may shake hands with a competitor from a different party despite wishing to dodge them. In accord with Planalp (1999, pp. 11–34; see also Scherer 1984), we can thus present the following sequential model for the emotional process of developing contempt for a person who speaks, for example, against the protection of sharks in Western Australia[5] in Table 12.2 (see also Langlotz and Locher 2012, p. 1595).

It is important to note that from the linguistic perspective of interpersonal pragmatics, action tendencies as in column 4 in Table 12.2 comprise all the communicative dimensions of expressing and describing emotions 5a–c in

Table 12.2 Sequential model of the emotional processes for 'contempt'

1	2	3	4	5
Stimuli (object, event)	Appraisal processes	Physiological changes	Action tendencies	Regulation
Offender shows a special behaviour, e.g. he/she says: 'I think that all killer sharks should be hunted down'	*Interpretation of this statement as immoral or inappropriate*	*Potential reactions related to the basic emotion of disgust (bodily symptoms of repulsion)*	*Avoid the person, give him/her a snort, tell him/her what one thinks of such attitudes towards animals*	*Keep one's calm, enter into a debate about animals rights, etc.*

[5] This example was inspired by an article in a Swiss online newspaper (http://bazonline.ch/panorama/vermischtes/Australien-macht-Jagd-auf-Weisse-Haie/story/16123282).

Fig. 12.1. Thus, stimuli for emotions and the reactions to these stimuli in human affairs are communicative in many cases and involve negative and positive appraisals within the communicative situation (see Culpeper 2010).

The *derivational perspective on emotions* (Plutchik 2003, pp. 108–11) claims that emotions are part of derivational processes on phylogenetic, ontogenetic as well as psychological levels. The human sneer can be seen to be a phylogenetic derivative of the wolfish snarl (Darwin 1872). Similarly, emotional patterns that are part of baby–parent interaction can be reactivated later for adult–adult interaction. For instance, baby talk is often part of lovers' talk. Finally, personality traits and psychological disorders are also derived from more basic emotional states. Thus, a timid personality is based on fear and may lead to dependent-avoidant disorders.

These three perspectives on emotions play a role in debates and controversies that also reverberate for discussions concerning the link between emotions and (im)politeness. We can now turn to a more detailed discussion of the links between cognition and emotions, sociality and emotions, and their communicative observables as distilled from the literature review above and relate them to research interests in interpersonal pragmatics.

4.1 Emotions and Cognition

In our view, the link between emotion and cognition must be regarded from two different perspectives: (a) the fundamental links between emotion and cognition in emotional processes and (b) the role of cognition for framing expectations about appropriate behaviours in a specific situation. These connections between emotion and cognition can be discussed relative to the derivational as well as the sequential perspectives introduced above.

Extensively discussing the case of Phineas Gage—a railway worker who suffered a massive lesion in his prefrontal cortex, i.e. a brain centre that is very important for linking emotions and concepts—and relating this case to further neurocognitive evidence, Damasio (1994) presents very strong neurobiological arguments for the impact of emotions on cognitive processes of decision making. The empirical evidence shows that whenever we reason about a specific situation, prior emotional experiences with comparable situations strongly influence how we appraise the situation at hand (Damasio 2003, p. 149). With regard to our example (1), the husband's hesitation may thus be explained on the basis of his uneasy feelings about the situation. He cannot reason about the tricky constellation without emoting about it.

Damasio (1999) presents these insights in a complex sequential model of emotional processing that implies an evolutionary perspective on how consciously perceptible emotional states have developed from evolutionarily more basic, uncontrollable and subconscious emotional reactions. In a discussion of the pragmatics of communicative choice making, Beeman (2014) reveals that such automatic emotional processes have an impact on the stylistic 'decisions' taken by a speaker. In a highly abbreviated form, Damasio's neuropsychological process model suggests that perceived stimuli directly activate emotion-triggering sites such as the amygdala, which themselves activate emotion-execution sites that cause uncontrollable bodily changes: facial expressions, increased heart rate, skin reaction, body posture, emotion-specific behaviours (see James 1884). Human beings are able to perceive and conceptualise such physiological and physical changes in our own bodies (Damasio 2003, p. 30). Thus, when we feel uneasy about something, we are able to perceive a change in our bodily state in combination with the thoughts that are momentarily associated with this state.

Through personal experience, certain concepts may become automatically linked with emotional reactions, which makes it possible to activate positive or negative feelings by thinking about a certain constellation without directly experiencing it. For instance, we can think about our colleagues and feel happy when doing so because we have had many happy encounters with them. Of course, such feelings may change, when more negative experiences modify the associative patterns between the concepts of our colleagues and the less pleasant bodily states experiences when they treated us badly.

Damasio's neurocognitive theory is compatible with the cognitive psychological theories of *appraisal* (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Scherer et al. 2001). They purport that emotions are triggered by cognitive processes of interpreting, i.e. appraising a given situation. Unlike Damasio's process model, which is grounded in the basic physiology of emotional reactions, appraisal theorists thus put their central emphasis on the different cognitive dimensions underlying the evocation of emotional/feeling states. Such appraisal processes are determined by our relationship to a specific situation, the goals we have in a specific situation as well as how relevant the situation is to our lives (Lazarus 1991). With regard to example (2) in our introduction, we will probably react rather soberly to a negative comment in an online newspaper commentary forum if we are occasional users of this service, if it is not our central goal to convince others of the correctness of our opinion and if the discussed issue is not very important to us. However, strong negative emotions such as contempt or anger would be triggered if we are frequent commentators and pursue the mission of convincing other readers because the argument

at hand is highly relevant to our worldview. Accordingly, appraisal theory would predict that higher degrees of personal involvement, goal satisfaction or goal interruption as well as the personal relevance of a situation would trigger stronger emotions and feelings than lower ones.

Beyond having an intimate connection with emotional processing, cognition is also important for memorising and activating pre-established knowledge about appropriate context-specific behaviours, including situationally appropriate emotional behaviours (Andersen and Guerrero 1998, pp. 64–65; Locher and Langlotz 2008). Such knowledge is acquired through socialisation (see Cook and Burdelski (Chap. 18), this volume). According to Hochschild (1979, 1983) two types of socially appropriate emotional behaviour must be distinguished. On the one hand, we must learn *feeling* rules, i.e. we must learn how to feel in a specific situation. For example, medical doctors must learn to express empathy with their patients without, however, feeling the same as them all the time (see also Locher and Koenig 2014; Locher 2017). Flight attendants must learn to project being in charge and positive even in highly stressful periods. Such feeling rules are closely related to *display rules* (Ekman and Friesen 1975). According to Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 54): 'these products of emotional socialization involve a learned response that modifies spontaneous emotional displays to be socially appropriate'. Thus, flight attendants must put on a smile even if they feel exhausted, whereas doctors should signal empathy about their patients' fate even if they cannot and should not feel sad about all their patients' misfortunes. The knowledge about feeling rules and display rules is stored in the form of corresponding cognitive schemata that are activated for judging and appraising the appropriateness of a given social situation. Thus, with regard to example (3) in the introduction, we know that a service transaction in a tourist office is linked to a certain (often highly culture-specific) transactional style. This style also involves expectations about appropriate emotional displays. In Switzerland, for instance, one would expect a certain degree of friendliness as signalled through a positively intonated voice and an occasional smile (see Langlotz 2015). But extreme displays of happiness as well as signals of annoyance or disinterest would violate the transactional norms for emotional displays. Such behaviours, which deviate from established feeling and display rules, would violate the expectations represented in culture-specific frames and activity types and most likely lead to negative appraisals. In other words, feeling rules and display rules provide emotion-specific benchmarks for appraisal processes.

For (im)politeness research the interface between emotion and cognition should therefore be of central interest with regard to the following perspectives. First, researchers should be interested in finding out how

communicative situations and communicative acts lead to positive or negative appraisals and how such appraisals lead to emotion-driven (communicative) reactions. Research stressing this central role of appraisals in reactions to (im)politeness has been conducted by Culpeper and his colleagues (Culpeper 2011; Culpeper et al. 2014). Second, scholars working in interpersonal pragmatics should investigate the norms of emotionality (feeling rules) and emotional display (display rules) that specific speech communities associate with particular activity types. Breaching such expectations will again lead to negative appraisals and, in many cases, to negative emotional reactions including (im)politeness and conflict.

4.2 Emotions and Sociality

Emotions are both personal and social phenomena. From the perspective of communication studies, Planalp (1999) claims:

> The mere fact that we communicate emotion implies that emotion itself is both personal and social. If our feelings were *entirely personal,* with no shared meaning and no implications for others, there would be no need to communicate them. Emotions might help us as individuals to orient to important concerns and guide our actions, but they would not interest anybody else. At the opposite extreme, there would also be no need to communicate emotions if they were *entirely social.* If members of a community felt in unison, emotions would serve to orient the group to common concerns and to coordinate behavior, but there would be no individual variation from one member to another. But emotions are neither purely personal nor purely social; they are *both*. Through communication, our personal emotional experiences are made available to others in society, and at the same time, social expectations about emotion are made known to us as individuals. Communication is a way of bridging the gap between the personal and the social sides of emotion. (Planalp 1999, p. 135, emphasis in original)

What we take from this quotation is that emotions have a fundamentally personal *as well as* social side—an observation which we can easily link to the current debate around the concept of face and identity construction. Both face and identity are bound to personal evaluations but are also shaped by communicative processes and thus turn into social phenomena (see also, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, p. 17; this volume). Emotions are intricately linked to sociality along three derivational levels: (i) phylogenetic, (ii) ontogenetic and (iii) social interactional. Many of the theories that deal with the construction of sociality along these levels are fundamentally important for

(Im)politeness. They show that emotion management is a crucial element for the symbolic construction of relationships.

From a phylogenetic perspective of human evolution emotions cannot be merely regarded as internal control mechanisms that manage the interaction of an organism with its environment. As Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 50) put it, emotions evolved 'as relatively universal communication systems that promoted the group survival of humans'. A very similar argument is also put forward in Turner's evolutionary theory of human sociality as grounded in emotionality (Turner 2000):

> Every facet of human endeavor is emotional. Without emotions, humans could not choose among behavioral alternatives, see themselves as objects, engage in face-to-face interpersonal behavior, organize groups, and construct large scale institutional systems cutting across entire societies and, today, a global network of societies. As much as language and the complex cultural systems that are made possible by language, humans' emotional capacities are what make patterns of human organization viable. (Turner 2000, p. 119)

Turner's theory puts forward that our biological ancestors were rather poorly equipped when they were forced to leave the arboreal habitats (due to retreat of tropical forests) and when they had to become adapted to the more open space of the African savanna. This pressure caused in hominoids the 'reorganization and elaboration of subcortical limbic structures, and their rewiring to neocortical and brain-stem systems, so as to produce an animal that could use and read a wide variety of emotional cues for enhanced social bonding' (Turner 2000, p. 20). Simply put, hominoids managed to survive because the development of highly differentiated emotional communicative skills allowed them to live in social groups that were strong and organised enough to face the odds of the savanna (see also, Baumeister and Leary 1995, p. 497). Emotional communication allowed them to produce positive and negative sanctions that helped them manage interpersonal relationships before language existed (Turner 2000, pp. 47–52). Such emotionally loaded social sanctions thus allowed hominoids to influence their communicative partners' orientation towards the social environment.

Moreover, the emotional repertoire had to be linked to *moral codes* (Turner 2000, pp. 52–6). Moral codes are expectations of appropriate behaviours including prescriptions and proscriptions. As cultural constructs, they have the power of compensating the absence of genetically endowed bioprograms for social behaviour. Moral coding makes the sociocultural management of emotions possible and corresponding interaction rituals (frames, including

feeling and display rules) are the communicative solution for implementing moral codes in socially appropriate behaviours. In this sense, interaction rituals are the cultural substitute for instinctive social behaviours.

This phylogenetic perspective is also reflected in the ontogenetic development of children and their bonding to their caretakers. As the research by Trevarthen and his colleagues has shown (Bråten 2007; Bråten and Trevarthen 2007; Trevarthen 1999, 2002; Powers and Trevarthen 2009), newborns are highly sensitive to emotional signals (facial expressions, pitch and force of voice) and pre-linguistic babies are able to establish basic communicative bonds to and empathy with their parents through emotional cueing from the age of two months onwards:

> [M]icro-analyses of proto-conversations with two-month-olds have revealed that infants are endowed with a cerebral system that enables direct perception of interests and feelings in an other person and responsive attunement permitting delicate, emotionally regulated engagements. (Bråten and Trevarthen 2007, p. 21)

Emotional communication can thus be taken as an ontologically basic form of intersubjective engagement (Foolen et al. 2012). Emotional communication is highly important for the generation of empathy, which can be considered the emotional 'glue' of sociality (DeWaal 2007). This insight is also supported by modern neurobiological research (Bauer 2005). The importance of emotional cues in interpersonal interaction is also evidenced by Tronick's (2005) *still face experiment*, which shows how the absence of emotional signalling destroys the social bonds between babies and their mothers and causes great distress in them. Therefore, the socioemotional roots constitute the foundation for further dialogic and interactional competence including the complex management of relationships through language. Humans have a 'need for frequent, affectively pleasant interactions with a few other people in the context of a temporally stable and enduring framework of affective concern for each other's welfare' (Baumeister and Leary 1995, p. 497). Following Plutchik's derivational perspective on emotions, we therefore claim that the emotional component in human social interaction and communication remains quintessential for the management of interpersonal relationships throughout an individual's life (see Arndt and Janney 1985, p. 282). This leads us to the social interactional links between emotions and human sociality.

The link between emotions and human sociality is highly reciprocal. On the one hand, as the phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives suggest, emotions are the glue for social bonding and give the edge to acts of social sanctioning (see Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997). On the other hand, interpersonal relationships also constitute the most important source for emotions. Andersen and Guerrero (1998, p. 64) argue that 'the primary

Table 12.3 Emotions and their social-interactional elicitors (summarised from Andersen and Guerrero 1998)

Emotion:	Social elicitor:
Happiness/joy	Sharing happy and euphoric states with others (non-social antecedents are rare)
Love/affection	Shared times and experiences with partner (unrequited love causes distress)
Pride	Positive self-evaluation based on other's approval
Anger	Other's interference with one's personal goals is the most frequent source of anger Communicative moves of others: insults, criticism, rejection
Fear/anxiety	Instigation through threats Fear of presenting oneself to others/interacting with others
Sadness *Grief* *Depression*	Sadness is mainly caused by social interaction. Grief is caused by loss of relationship. Depression is associated with social isolation.
Jealousy	Central social emotion: caused by real, anticipated, or imagined interaction of close friend or partner with third party
Guilt *Shame* *Embarrassment*	Self-conscious emotions Result from social interaction, i.e. transgressions of norms and their appraisal by oneself and the interactional partners

elicitor of emotions is interpersonal interaction. […]. Moreover, people often strategically induce emotional states in others as a way of achieving interpersonal goals.' In their meta-analysis, they discuss how a number of emotions are triggered and elicited through social interaction (Table 12.3).

As Table 12.3 shows, communication as a source of emotion thus involves a number of aspects that are of direct relevance for relational work and (im)politeness and provide a sharper picture of how emotional reactions and feeling states are tied to social interaction and corresponding norms. With a view to the social elicitors, the process model of emotion can be given a social interactional reinterpretation (Table 12.4).

This social reinterpretation of the sequential model of emotions leads us to the problem of how emotions are communicated through emotional cues.

The perspective presented in this section thus ties in with the connection between emotion and cognition discussed above. When analysing acts of (im)politeness, researchers should pay close attention to the social-interactional causes of (im)polite behaviours and how these causes affect the interactants' emotional orientation to the current speech activity, their communicative partners and the negotiation and understanding of roles.[6] It is this link

[6] Arndt and Janney (1985, p. 294) have proposed a valuable model for the 'cross-modal modulation of positive and negative feelings'. Their framework outlines how emotion-related parameters, such as confidence, positive and negative affect, and involvement, are cued in interpersonal communication.

Table 12.4 Sequential model of the social side of emotional processes

1	2	3	4	5
Stimuli: social-interactional causes	Social-normative appraisals relative to personal goals and moral codes	Socially determined physiological changes and feeling states	Socially expected action tendencies, actions, and expressions for specific roles within social practices	Social-normative regulatives = Display rules
Customer is confronted with a harsh service provider.	*As customer wishes to be treated in a friendly manner, this conduct is considered inappropriate.*	*Customer feels annoyance.*	*The feeling rules of the social situation demand a 'balanced' form of emotional display. This is in conflict with the customer's current emotional state.*	*The customer may inhibit the display of his/her anger or let the emotion out, thereby socially sanctioning the service provider's unfriendly behaviour.*

between sociality and emotions that allows us to reiterate the importance of research that is concerned with the link between face, emotions and identity construction within interpersonal pragmatics (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Locher 2008; Ruhi 2007, 2009; Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2011), as exemplified in the block quotation by Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013, p. 17) in Sect. 3.

4.3 Communicative Observables of Emotions

As the juxtaposition of the hidden, personal side of emotion, with the social side of emotion suggests, the communicative sharing of emotional states is centrally determined through complex patterns of emotional signalling. We can distinguish two communicative perspectives through which emotions become observable for linguistic analysis: (i) emotional cues as they are produced in interpersonal interaction and (ii) meta-comments on and descriptions of internal emotional states.

With regard to (i), interactants combine emotional cues from different communicative modalities (verbal, vocal, facial, bodily) in dynamic conversational exchanges (see Arndt and Janney 1985; Planalp 1998; Döveling et al. 2010; Micheli 2008, pp. 5–6; Tables 12.5 and 12.6).

From the perspective of interpersonal pragmatics, it is of central interest how participants signal their emotional stances to their interlocutors, and how these signals are taken up by the recipient in order to analyse the

Table 12.5 Planalp's (1998) overview of emotional cues (see Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 94)

Class of cues:	Forms of realisation:
vocal cues	voice quality: low, loud, slow, fast, trembling, high-pitched, monotonous, animated
verbal cues	language-specific emotion vocabularies metaphors speech acts emotional discourse practices, e.g. therapeutic discourse
body cues	animated, energetic movement physical actions: throwing things, making threatening movements, kissing, caressing gait: walking heavily, lightly, arm swing, length/speed of stride body posture: stiff/rigid, droopy, upright hands/arms gestures: hand emblems, clenching hands or fists
physiological cues	blushing, pupil dilation, heart rate, breathing, skin temperature
facial cues	facial expressions of emotions through forehead and eyebrows, eyes and eyelids, and the lower face (mouth, lips, labionasal folds)

Table 12.6 Ochs and Schieffelin's (1989) classificatory grid (see also, Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 97)

Level of analysis:	Type of cue:
vocal features	loudness
voice quality	lengthening stress
morphosyntax	pronouns: the use of third person pronouns to refer to the addressee
lexicon	interjections descriptive terms for humans
discourse structure	affective speech acts: laments threats exclamations

complex and multimodal semiotic construction of relational meaning. From an interactional perspective the analytical focus thus lies on the external emotional 'representations' in communicative moves (see Pfänder and Gülich 2013), rather than on the 'internal' psychological or neuropsychological research perspective on how people emote and feel (e.g. Bänziger and Scherer 2010). These insights suggest that in the analysis of any communicative act of relational work, the set of emotional signals that accompany such messages should be considered. This invites multimodal analyses of 'speech acts' (see, e.g. Goodwin et al. 2002; Matoesian 2005) rather than traditional linguistic

analyses of the verbal structure of communicative acts alone. Research on emotional displays in psychology used to focus on facial expressions. Most prominently, Ekman and his colleagues argued for a universal set of six basic emotions that are automatically displayed in highly similar ways and recognised with a considerable degree of accuracy across cultures (Ekman 1992, 2003; Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978). This limitation of emotional expression to the face and a presupposed set of basic emotions has been criticised and contested in communication studies (e.g. Planalp 1998, 1999) and linguistic anthropology (e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2011; Enfield and Wierzbicka 2002; Pavlenko 2002; Wilce 2009). This literature has demonstrated the multimodality, performativity and cultural relativity of emotion concepts and corresponding emotional expressions. In addition, coding schemes for facial (Ekman and Friesen 1978), vocal (Goodwin et al. 2002; Reber 2012), verbal (Fiehler 2002; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989; Schwarz-Friesel 2007) and bodily cues (Streeck 2009) exist. But these coding schemes primarily concentrate on one communicative modality. Hence, Planalp's assessment from 1998 regarding the lack of integration of these findings into a coherent model is still valid:

> Even though researchers tend to study amputated heads, decapitated bodies, disembodied and content-free voices, and decontextualized words, we know that in some way they go together. What is singularly lacking is any plausible account of how cues are combined into complex multichannel messages about emotion, much less accounts of how they are produced and interpreted. (Planalp 1998, p. 37)

In more recent linguistic work, interesting frameworks have been proposed to chart the multimodal dimensions of emotional signalling (e.g. Fiehler 2002; Wilce 2009). But only very few studies—mostly from the fields of conversation analysis, praxeology and anthropological linguistics—have actually investigated the dynamics of this multimodality in actual embodied practices of relational work (Goodwin and Goodwin 2001; Goodwin et al. 2002; Matoesian 2005; Pepin 2008). In line with these multimodal interactional perspectives, Langlotz and Locher (2013) have proposed a framework for analysing emotional signalling in relational work. Their model is rooted in Clark's (1996) theory of language use. He proposes that interactors do not merely encode meanings into symbolic units but rather engage in complex processes of multimodal signalling for describing, indexing and demonstrating their stances to one another. Moreover, Clark highlights that the creation of meaning is achieved by joint actions in which the speaker and the listener simultaneously play active roles. Joint processes of emotional signalling serve the semiotic construction and management of relational meaning between

the interactional partners. The interactional partners employ multimodal emotional displays to perform complex communicative acts of social sanctioning and moral coding.

From an interactional perspective it is therefore necessary to focus on the interactional design as well as the recipient take-up of communicative moves with a socioemotional impact. Both the signalled emotional values and their reception are claimed to be essential for discursively modulating interpersonal relationships. When analysing interactions, researchers are faced with a dynamic activation of the repertoire of emotional cues. While conspicuous emotional displays may be absent, interactors can also become entangled in emotional 'interaction chains', i.e. emotions which trigger further emotions. Furthermore, interactants may make rhetorical/strategic use of emotional cues.

Emotional cues play a central role in the immediate communication of emotion and interpersonal supportiveness, as highlighted by Arndt and Janney (1985). Thus, they belong to the social side of emotionality. However, as outlined below, emotions also have a personal side. Through such cues a recipient can make judgements or hypotheses about this personal side. However, in many cases to move beyond the level of emotional stance and to know what another person really feels, we depend on his or her explicit description or meta-comments. Along these lines, Culpeper et al. (2014) have proposed an analytical framework to compare intercultural differences in the emotional reactions to impolite communicative situations. Locher and Koenig (2014) and Locher (2017) have also analysed emotional meta-comments by medical students reflecting on how they experienced their relationships to and interactions with patients (e.g. some students reported on their fear of coming across as impolite and rude). Meta-comments thus allow us to gain post hoc access to the feeling states experienced by interactors in relational episodes.

5 Sketching Paths for Empirical Analysis

With regard to the dimensions outlined above, researchers of (im)politeness can refer to the following toolbox of analytical concepts presented in Table 12.7 when analysing the link between (im)politeness and emotion in actual interaction.

While we lack the space to present detailed empirical work, we will briefly sketch the analysis of a Monty Python's Flying Circus (series 2, episode 5, 1970) clip of a shop interaction building on what we presented in Table 12.4 as a sequential model for the social side of emotional processes (Transcript 1).

Table 12.7 Dimensions of analysis of emotions within interpersonal pragmatics

Dimension:	Characteristic:	Why/what:
Communicative cues	Repertoire of verbal and non-verbal cues to display emotion [see Tables 12.5 and 12.6]	Analyse how people establish emotional stance
Social norms	Feeling rules	Investigating conventions/norms of appropriate emotional states in a given situation
	Display rules	Investigating conventions/norms of appropriate emotional display in a given situation
	Emotional socialisation	Learning of feeling rules and display rules according to cultural norms
Relationship building	Relational work (positioning, footing, etc.)	Study the interactional negotiation of relationship against the normative background of these norms (enhancing vs. reducing sense of relationship).
Cognition	Frames/scripts[a]	Explore frames/scripts of situationally appropriate (emotional) behaviour and situationally appropriate emotional display. Such frames constitute the benchmark for appraisal.
	Appraisal of a. the use of communicative cues: *How are you talking to me?* b. the adherence to/violation of norms: *That's (not) the way to communicate in this situation.* c. the transactional state relative to communicative goals: *That's not the way to achieve our transactional goals.* d. the ongoing relationship: *The chemistry between the two of us is not working.*	Trace cognitive processes of evaluating a situation as the basis for an emotional reaction.
Emotion	Type Intensity Duration	Establish types of and degree to which emotions are displayed in interaction.

[a]Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013, p. 22) voices concerns about the concept of frame, which is one of the pillars within the theoretical discussion of relational work (Locher and Watts 2005, 2008). She argues that 'frame' in the Goffmanian sense is too inflexible and static and proposes to use the concept of 'genre' instead. In contrast to her view, our definition of frame always included the notion of historicity and its cognitive grounding. It clearly posits that the norms underlying the frames are negotiable and changing over time. For this reason, we see no need to switch concept since our definition of frame allows for negotiation in situ.

The humorous scene shows a shop assistant and a customer interacting with each other in a butcher's shop; however, the interaction does not follow the to-be-expected script.

Transcript (1): Monty Python's Flying Circus: Live from the Grill-O-Mat, The Man Who is Alternately Rude and Polite (series 2, episode 5, 1970).

Setting: Butcher's shop; shop assistant (SA) behind counter; customer (C) in front of the counter.

1	C:	[friendly smile]	**Good morning, I'd care to purchase a chicken, please.**
2	SA:	[looking unfriendly]	Don't come here with that posh talk you nasty, stuck-up twit.
3	C:	[puzzled look]	I beg your pardon?
4	SA:	[friendly smile]	**A chicken, sir. Certainly.**
5	C:	[friendly smile]	**Thank you. And how much does that work out to per pound, my good fellow?**
6	SA:	[looking grim]	Per pound, you slimy trollop, what kind of a ponce are you?
7	C:	[puzzled look]	I'm sorry?
8	SA:	[friendly smile]	**4/6 a pound, sir, nice and ready for roasting.**
9	C:	[friendly smile]	**I see, and I'd care to purchase some stuffing in addition, please.**
10	SA:	[looking grim]	Use your own, you great poofy poonagger!
11	C:	[puzzled look]	What?
12	SA:	[friendly smile]	**Ah, certainly sir, some stuffing.**
13	C:	[friendly smile]	**Oh, thank you.**
14	SA:	[looking grim]	'Oh, thank you' says the great queen like a la-di-dah poofta.
15	C:	[puzzled look]	I beg your pardon?
16	SA:	[friendly smile]	**That's all right, sir, call again.**
17	C:	[friendly smile]	Excuse me.
18	SA:	[looking grim]	What is it now, you great pillock?
19	C:	[no longer smiling]	Well, I can't help noticing that you insult me and then you're polite to me alternately.
20	SA:	[friendly smile]	I'm terribly sorry to hear that, sir.
21	C:	[friendly smile]	That's all right. It doesn't really matter.
22	SA:	[looking grim]	Tough titty if it did, you nasty spotted prancer.

In transcript 1 the text in bold shows the expected interaction for shop encounters in England, which is carried out with a positive emotional orientation to each other indicated by the accompanying friendly smiles and the careful and respectful choice of vocabulary. Intervening between the turns, we find breaches of the expected conduct by the shop assistant (this incongruity constituting the source of the humour; Attardo 1994). In contrast to the expected response, the shop assistant breaks the frame of the shop interaction by insulting the customer. The visibly puzzled customer reacts by stating 'I beg your pardon?' and immediately receives a perfectly adequate response to the original request. The reassured customer returns to the activity frame of the shop interaction by

voicing the next request, only to be at the receiving end of more insults. This pattern is repeated several times. In line 17, the customer moves the interaction to a discussion of appropriateness and uses meta-pragmatic comments to express his puzzlement about the alternation of insults with polite behaviour. In what follows, we will make selective comments on the analytical dimensions in Table 12.7 with reference to salient instances in this sketch. We intend to illustrate the potential for interpersonal pragmatic research rather than providing a detailed analysis.

A number of emotions seem to play a role in the transaction. The shop assistant expresses contempt for the customer and directs his anger against his interactional partner (2). These negative emotions are immediately followed by the seller's shift to a state of happy support (4). The customer also starts by addressing the shop assistant in a positive and happy mood (1, 5, 9, 13), but in reaction to the butcher's take-up of his requests, his emotional state shifts to puzzlement (3, 7, 11, 15) and increasing irritation (17). We can perceive the interactors' emotional stances through the communicative observables performed by them.

With regard to the repertoire of multimodal cues to communicate emotional stance, vocal, facial, verbal and body cues seem particularly salient in the sketch. Whenever the shop assistant switches from taking a positive and polite stance to taking an aggressive and impolite one, this is marked by a change of intonation. While negative stance is expressed through more stress and vocal force (e.g. 2), positive stance is mediated through the higher pitched voice and rising intonation (e.g. 4). This is usually accompanied by a smiling versus grim facial expression, which could be more precisely described by applying Ekman and Friesen's *facial action coding system* (Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978, see also Ekman 2003). The emotional force of the seller's lexical choices is immediately evident. He uses highly offensive, derogatory and negatively connoted *membership categorisation devices* (Sacks 1992). The customer's reactions primarily show tokens of puzzlement along the same dimensions of cues. Interestingly, the customer's orientation away from and towards the shop assistant can also be seen in the former's upward and downward head movements (14–17), which support both avoidance and establishment of eye contact. His puzzlement becomes best apparent in the meta-communicative comment he makes in (19).

Concerning the links between these emotional displays and corresponding social rules, every adult having been socialised in a British context will immediately recognise that the shop assistant breaks the norms of appropriate social conduct in a seller–buyer interaction. Of course, this break of convention constitutes the backbone of humour in the sketch as the shop assistant breaches both feeling rules and display rules. The conventional feeling rule

for a seller is: be friendly to your customer and make him/her feel at ease. Obviously, this is not the seller's intention here: He vents his annoyance with the stilted customer in a very unrestrained way. In doing so, he also violates emotional display rules. Even if a service provider were annoyed with customers or irritated by their behaviour, by convention he/she would not be given free lease to express anger and contempt by activating the arsenal of negative emotional cues outlined above. Thus, the butcher not only breaks the conventional feeling rule of being friendly but also violates the display rule: if you don't like your customer, don't show your negative attitude. These feeling rules and display rules are part of the knowledge we associate with the seller–buyer frame. Their violation triggers appraisal processes and emotional reactions. The audience may also vicariously experience the hidden pleasure of breaking such rules.

The client's meta-comment in (19) directly addresses the shop assistant's communicative oscillation between two frames: (a) seller–buyer talk and (b) abuse. Throughout the interaction the frames are cued through typical features such as the bold-type moves in the transcript, which are conventional for (a). The rapid and unmediated switch to (b) comes with a conspicuous change of speech style. Both for the audience of the sketch as well as for the protagonists within the fictional setting, these frames constitute benchmarks for appraisal processes. On the one hand, as spectators we may laugh at the shop assistant's inappropriate and norm-deviating use of cues and the 'schizophrenic' situation that is evoked through them. The customers' appraisal, on the other hand, is rather characterised by surprise and increasing irritation as he is repeatedly faced with the unexpected frame of abuse.

The relational work conducted by the interactional partners in the sketch here is also funny because it plays with the sequentiality of social positioning. Whenever the customer attempts to adapt his emotional stance to the shop assistant's highly unconventional impoliteness, the latter changes back to the normal frame and thus puts the customer into the sequential offside. While the customer believes that everything is back to normal again, he is always one 'step' behind throughout the interaction and he does not manage to adapt his emotional stance to the outrageous impoliteness. As a result, he stays trapped in a state of puzzlement and his reactions do not really succeed in sanctioning the latter's inappropriate behaviour. This 'pattern' is even maintained after the customer has asked for clarification of the seller's stance-taking by his meta-comment in (19). Thus, while the interaction in the sketch appears to be highly emotional in an unconventional way, the emotional displays do not seem to have a direct impact on the way the relationship between the interactors is negotiated. Instead of establishing a negative emotional contagion

chain of abuse and counter-abuse, as would be typical of intense conflict talk (Dersley and Wootton 2001), the sketch stages a scene of communicative oscillation. This adds further abnormality and incongruity to the sketch.

6 Conclusions and Outlook

In this overview of the importance of emotions for the study of (im)politeness and interpersonal pragmatics more generally, we have aimed to give background knowledge to those not familiar with research on emotions and, on the basis of a short literature review, to point out research interfaces that warrant further research. Let us recapitulate some of our observations.

We are not saying that emotions are the same as relations and we are not suggesting we should replace the concept of 'relational work' with 'emotional work'. Instead, we want to highlight that emotions play a fundamental role in the creation of any type of pragmatic meaning, no matter whether there is recognition of intentions or awareness of intentions (by S or H).[7] We wish to point out the fundamental emotional component in cognitive appraisals which are at the heart of judgments about appropriate or inappropriate behaviour (see Locher and Langlotz 2008; Sect. 4.1 on emotions and cognition). Emotions thus play an important part in arriving at emic judgements on relational work so that they have a clear place in the theoretical arguments of interpersonal pragmatics.

In line with others (Ruhi 2007, 2009; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Locher 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2011), we claim that emotions are intricately tied to the concepts of face and identity construction. While our self-concepts are linked to personal emotions that we do not always wish to share with our communicative partners, what we think and feel about ourselves is to a very large extent shaped through interaction and the emotional stances that our interlocutors express towards us. This is because emotions are directly linked to sociality and relationship building. In addition, our understanding of who we are and what lines of identity we want to project are fundamentally linked to the understanding of rights and obligations of particular situated roles. Being successful or unsuccessful in creating identities has emotional consequences that will impact ensuing interaction.

From a phenomenological point of view, we addressed communicative observables of emotions. Here we offered a set of lists that might help scholars to identify multimodal emotional cues. Emotional stance can thus be signalled

[7] In other words, we are not, as Kádár and Haugh (2013, p. 225) claim, arguing that emotions only go together with recognition of intentions or with awareness of intentions (by S or H).

in a combination of different modes. However, we are not arguing that analysts can or should only work with those cues that can be easily identified in the surface structure of communication. Our previous comments about the fundamental nature of emotions for cognition and sociality also pave the way for in-depth (critical) discourse analysis that engages with the underlying ideologies involving emotions that are behind feeling and emotion display rules. As we point out elsewhere (Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 104), '[w]hen scrutinizing naturally-occurring data one also has to be acutely aware of the fact that emotional display rules may supress explicit emotional signalling in a given interaction'. As a matter of fact, we find data that presents unmarked, smooth interaction as interesting as behaviour that is clearly marked as negative or positive. Having said this, it is probably safe to say that we can usually only observe the tip of the iceberg of the complex and full emotional world of interactants and their potentially different interpretations of events and the related emotional components. Nevertheless, 'those emotional orientations that are signalled as well as the striking absence of expected emotional displays must be considered to play an important role for the study of relational work as a discursive phenomenon' (Langlotz and Locher 2013, p. 105).

In theory, scholars of (im)politeness could be satisfied with acknowledging the fundamental importance of emotions for interpersonal pragmatics and leave it at that. This seems to have been the path that many of the early politeness theories have taken (with the exception of Arndt and Janney 1985). However, we believe that more research efforts in this field are warranted since emotions are such a fundamental part of appraisals and of relating and thus also of assessing relational work. Even when we analysts cannot always access explicit surface structures or clearly assignable emotional stance, emotions are underlying any human interaction. It is worthwhile studying this quite simply because our concepts of ourselves are at stake and we are quite clearly emotionally involved with these projections/understandings. We thus suggests that the (im)politeness field can benefit from further exploring the link between emotions, identity construction and sociality.

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13

(Im)politeness and Mixed Messages

Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh,
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1 Introduction

Whilst it was noted in early work theorising politeness that seemingly impolite acts or forms can be a means of showing friendliness or solidarity, and that, conversely, ostensibly polite acts or forms can function as coercion or aggression (Leech 1983), most research to date has focused on more straightforward instances of politeness or impoliteness. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that a notable proportion of interpersonal work does not in fact straightforwardly fit politeness or impoliteness, however one defines those terms. Instead, interpersonal interactions can also involve *mixed messages*, that is, messages which contain features that point towards a polite interpretation

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_13

mixed with features that point towards an impolite interpretation (Culpeper 2011; see also Rockwell 2006). We are thus not using the term mixed messages to cover the mixing of any kind of meaning. Mixed messages in the context of this chapter concern mismatching *interpersonal* messages in interaction that are incongruous on at least one level of interpretation or generate a sense of interpretive or evaluative dissonance. Relevant phenomena that have been discussed inside and outside academia typically fall under such labels as *sarcasm*, *banter*, *teasing*, *jocular mockery*, *jocular abuse*, *ritual insults*, *mock impoliteness*, *mock politeness*, *insincere* or *manipulative politeness*, *pushy politeness*, *under politeness* and *over politeness*. It needs to be stressed that a simple mixing of messages, as might happen in puns or equivocation (cf. Bavelas et al. 1990), is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the phenomena we have in focus. Puns by definition contain more than one meaning, but those meanings are not necessarily mismatching interpersonal meanings.

The next section begins by introducing some background to mixed messages, specifically linguistic pragmatic approaches to irony, ritualised banter and teasing. Sect. 3, our most substantial section, focuses on mixed messages in the context of (im)politeness. Here, we describe the treatment of mixed messages within classic politeness theories, before going on to discuss their metapragmatics, the nature of their 'mix', their functions and the perception of mixed messages. Sect. 4 contains a case study designed to show extended examples of the phenomena we have been discussing, and also to give a sense of how one might approach their analysis.

2 Some Background on Irony, Ritualised Banter and Teasing

2.1 Irony and Conversational Implicature

Grice, in his paper on 'Logic and conversation', suggests that irony involves flouting the first maxim of quality, 'Do not say what you believe to be false.' Grice's (1989, p. 34) specific example is 'X is a fine friend', said when X discovers that the addressee (A), a friend, has betrayed a secret. Grice's (1989, p. 34) description of how this works in the light of his co-operative principle is worth quoting in full:

> It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that what A has said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A knows that this is obvious to the audience. So, unless the utterance is entirely pointless,

> A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.

One may note here the obvious affinities with the classical understanding of irony as being based on contradictory opposites. But what exactly is in opposition here? In this chapter, we are focusing on interpersonal mixing, and Grice's example 'X is a fine friend', involves interpersonal opposites. Describing somebody as a fine friend is ostensibly a compliment, and in this case interpretable as giving face. This clashes with the implied message driven by the context, namely, that A is not a fine friend, so there is an incongruous mix of interpersonal messages. Grice did not specifically focus on this aspect of the incongruity though, nor did he attempt to explain the interpersonal consequences of using such a mix.

Nevertheless, Grice evidently felt that 'something is missing' (Grice 1989, p. 53) from the above account of irony, and, in his follow-up paper, 'Further Notes', returned to the subject. He wrote that:

> irony is intimately connected with the expression of a feeling, attitude, or evaluation. I cannot say something ironically unless what I say is intended to reflect a hostile or derogatory judgement or feeling such as indignation or contempt. (Grice 1989, pp. 53–4)

In cases like *fine friend*, this attitude would be consistent with the implied interpersonal message driven by the context. The 'vehicle of signification' for this feeling, attitude or evaluation is an 'ironical tone' (Grice 1989, p. 54) (he does not explicitly say what is meant by the vague term 'tone', but we may surmise that it largely concerns prosodic features):

> I suspect that an ironical tone is always a contemptuous tone, an amused tone, or some other tone connected with one or more particular feelings or attitudes. (Grice 1989, p. 54)

Grice doubts whether there is a specifically ironical tone. His reason for this doubt is that irony, in his view, involves pretence (something which is consistent with the original meaning of irony). A conventional ironical tone would 'spoil the effect' (1989, p. 54) by giving away the pretence. So what we need, according to Grice, 'at least for the unsophisticated examples', is a tone that

is 'suitable' to the hostile, derogatory, contemptuous, etc. feelings or attitude accompanying irony. What is important for us here is that there is now an additional incongruous mix. In addition to the clash between the message expressed and the one implied by the context, there is a multimodal clash between the words and structures used and the non-verbal aspects. We will have much more to say about these kinds of mixes in Sect. 3.3.

Note that complimentary insults[1] seem to be excluded if this kind of negative attitude accompanies irony. Grice (1989, p. 54) is explicit about this:

> I can for example say *What a scoundrel you are!* when I am well disposed toward you, but to say that will be playful, not ironical, and will be inappropriate unless there is some shadow of justification for a straightforward application—for example you have done something which some people (though not I) might frown upon.

The claim he makes is weak—we only need a 'shadow of justification for a straightforward application', that is to say, that the addressee really is a scoundrel in some way—but it is there nevertheless. Intuitively, it seems that many cases of complimentary insults do have such a shadow, but ultimately this is an empirical question that has not been fully addressed.

It is worth noting here that insulting compliments (or ironic insults, sarcastic irony and so on), such as 'You're a fine friend', are often referred to as *sarcasm* in the literature (e.g. Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Jorgensen 1996; Toplak and Katz 2000; Pexman and Olineck 2002). Whilst the relationship between *irony* and *sarcasm* is not well defined, it is generally the case that the more interpersonally negative forms of irony attract the label sarcasm. Indeed, Lee and Katz (1998) provide experimental evidence that people's perceptions of sarcasm, unlike irony, include the ridicule of a specific victim (see also Bowes and Katz 2011). In lay discourse, however, sarcasm is deployed for a somewhat more diffuse and culturally variable set of phenomena, as Taylor (2015a, b) demonstrates (see Sect. 3.2).

[1] The literature (e.g. Gibbs 1986; Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Pexman and Olineck 2002) uses the terms 'ironic compliments' and 'ironic insults', where the head nouns, compliment or insult, denote the ironic message. To the uninitiated, they can easily be erroneously understood in the opposite way: an ironic compliment has the literal message of a compliment but the implied message of an insult (e.g. Grice's 'What a fine friend you are!'); an ironic insult, on the other hand, has the reverse, the literal message of an insult but the implied message of a compliment. In an attempt to make the meaning of the literature more transparent, we will adopt the terms 'complimentary insults' and 'insulting compliments'. These terms make transparent the interpersonal mix of messages.

2.2 Irony and the Echoic Account

Grice's approach to irony is not, needless to say, the only one. Subsequent theorists have argued that it is inadequate on a number of counts, including that it simply continues the classical idea of opposites, and in so doing fails to capture the range of phenomena that are claimed—the theorists have not fully done the relevant empirical work to establish the facts—to fall under that label, including hyperbole, litotes, ironic quotations and allusions. However, the point of this chapter is not to evaluate theories of irony. Instead, we focus here on what is probably the leading contender to Grice, namely, the echoic account of irony embedded in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), for the reason that it incorporates an attitudinal component. Proposed in early work such as Sperber and Wilson (1981), the echoic account has been articulated in various publications, with minor changes in the detail. We will base our description here on Wilson and Sperber (2012), which is not only relatively recent, but dwells particularly on matters of attitude.

In the echoic account,

> irony consists in echoing a thought (e.g. a belief, an intention, a norm-based expectation) attributed to an individual, a group, or to people in general, and expressing a mocking, sceptical or critical attitude to this thought. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 125)

The ironic utterance of 'You're a fine friend' would neither mean that the speaker asserted their belief that the addressee is a fine friend nor that he or she was the opposite, but would express an attitude of scorn towards, for instance, those who might have said or made clear that they were thinking that the addressee was a fine friend. Attitude, then, is explicitly a constitutive part of this definition of irony. It is not just any attitude though, but one drawn from a range of dissociative attitudes, 'falling anywhere on a spectrum from amused tolerance through various shapes of resignation or disappointment to contempt, disgust, outrage or scorn' (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 130). They add that the 'ironical tone of voice' is a 'natural cue' to this kind of attitude (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 143). This is not dissimilar to Grice's notion that the tone of voice should be 'suitable' for the attitude. Again, 'tone of voice' seems to be pointing towards the important role of prosodic features in irony, and especially the idea that there could be a multimodal mix with the prosody suggesting one thing and the words another (see Sect. 3.3).

Note that the attributed thought that is echoed need not have been uttered in the immediately preceding utterances, but could be unexpressed (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 130). Importantly for our purposes, although studiously avoiding explicit discussion of politeness or impoliteness itself, their account is evidently connected with those notions in their discussion of social norms:

> Norms, in the sense of socially shared ideas about how things should be, are always available to be ironically echoed when they are not satisfied. People should be polite, smart, handsome, actions should achieve their goal, the weather should be good, the prices should be low, and so on. So, when these norms are not satisfied, utterances such as 'She is so polite!', 'That was smart!', 'What a handsome man!', 'Well done!', 'Nice weather!', 'This is cheap!', and so on are readily understood as ironical because they echo a norm-based expectation that should have been met. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 142)

It is the availability of social norms, they argue, that accounts for the negative orientation of irony.

And what of complimentary insults? They argue that:

> it takes special circumstances to be able to say ironically 'She is so impolite!' when someone is being polite, 'Horrible weather!' when the sun is shining, or 'This is an even number' when talking about an odd number. For irony to succeed in these cases, the thought that the person in question might behave impolitely, that the weather would be horrible, or that the number was odd must be entertained or, even better, expressed. Only then is there some identifiable thought that can be ironically echoed. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 142)

We will have more to say about contextually driven mixed messages in Sect. 3.3. For now, we note that complimentary insults could be considered a kind of banter, a not uncommon phenomenon, which we discuss in the next section.

2.3 Ritualised Banter

The study of banter has notable roots in sociolinguistics and social anthropology. In such work it is generally considered to be a heavily ritualised form of insulting or a type of language game, and referred to as 'sounding', 'playing the dozens' or 'signifying' in the United States (e.g. Abrahams 1962; Labov 1972; Kochman 1983). The key to 'sounding' is that the insult is understood to be

non-genuine. In other words, the literal insult is incongruent with what one might expect in the particular context, which almost always comprises friends. As Labov (1972) shows, these ritualised insults are often sexual, directed at a third person related to the target and couched in rhyming couplets. The formulaic, stylised nature of the insults makes them easier to recognise as 'sounding', rather than being meant as genuine personal insults, and the more bizarre or creative they sound the better. Labov comments:

> Among young adults, to say *I fucked your mother* is not to say something obviously untrue. But it is obviously untrue that 'I fucked your mother from tree to tree' / Your father said, 'Now fuck me!' (1972, p. 340).

The effect of ritualised banter is to reinforce in-group solidarity. It seems to act as a societal safety-valve; it is a place where we can be impolite with impunity, since 'in ritual we are freed from personal responsibility for the acts we are engaged in' (Labov 1972, pp. 352–3). It also offers a mechanism for competitive play or duelling by which pecking orders within groups can be established, maintained or challenged (see also Bax 1981). Of course, ritualised banter occurs in other cultures as well, even though that label may not be applied. In present-day British culture, Crowley's (2007) description of 'rudeness' amongst football crowds fits. Here, formulaic insults mixed with elements of witty creativity are delivered in chants, with the function of these being 'not to insult, but to produce a communal bond and identity through repeated performances of empty hostility' (Crowley 2007, pp. 121–2). Ritualised banter is thus closely associated with positive functions such as reinforcing solidarity or creating entertainment.

Banter is clearly not, however, confined to ritualised manifestations.[2] In fact, when treated in the traditional politeness literature of the 1980s (see Sect. 3.1), ritualised forms are only ever briefly mentioned. Instead the focus is on such phenomena as complimentary insults, that is, implying a complimentary message through an insult. Such phenomena have the same kind of interpersonal message mix as ritualised banter. However, it is important to note that not all mixed messages with both a literal message that is impolite and an implied one that is polite function in the same way, an issue to which we will return to in Sect. 3. In addition, rapid exchanges of teasing or mocking remarks may also be considered to be a form of banter (Norrick 1993), as we will see in the following section.

[2] For more on ritual and interaction, see Kádár (2013), and on ritual and (im)politeness, see Terkourafi and Kádár (Chap. 8), this volume.

2.4 Teasing

Teasing is an action that by definition involves mixed messages, specifically, the mixing of elements of (ostensible) serious provocation with (ostensible) non-seriousness. On the one hand, teasing provokes some kind of affective response (or set of responses) from participants, ranging from amusement, to annoyance or irritation, through to offence, shame or even anger. On the other hand, teasing is framed by participants as playful, sportive, jocular, in pretence and so on. Teasing involves, in English at least, two interrelated forms, namely instances of figuratively *cutting down* the target (e.g. jocular mockery, goading) and instances of figuratively *setting up* the target, sometimes for the purposes of subsequently cutting down the target (e.g. jocular pretence, sexual teasing) (Haugh 2017). In the following example, the grandmother (G) responds to a compliment from her daughter (D) with (jocular) self-deprecation. This self-deprecation (lines 66–67) then forms the basis of a teasing insult from her grandson, Eddie (E) (line 69) (Haugh 2014, p. 83).[3]

[1] [A family has gathered for dinner]

61 D: that looks supe:rb mum.
62 G: ↓go:od=
63 D: =it re:ally does.
64 G: look all right (.) or.
65 D: =mmm
66 G: two four six eight (.) looks good enough-
67 good enough to eat.
68 (0.2)
69 E: almost.
70 G: good enough to eat

The study of ritualised forms of teasing banter has its roots in anthropology (Radcliffe-Brown 1940), but teasing more generally has since been studied by social psychologists who generally draw a distinction between 'pro-social' and 'anti-social' forms of teasing (Kowalski 2007; DiCiocci 2010), and scholars in pragmatics who hold that different forms of teasing lie on a continuum from 'bonding' to 'nipping' through to 'biting' teases (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997). While social psychologists have consistently found that instances of teasing are often construed differently by those initiating the teasing and the

[3] Examples (1) and (8) are transcribed using standard CA conventions (Jefferson 2004). Examples (9) to (11) are transcribed using conventions outlined in Gumperz and Berenz (1993).

targets of the teasing, in pragmatics different forms of teasing have been found to have various different interpersonal functions. Similar to ritualised banter these include fostering solidarity and entertaining participants (albeit sometimes at the expense of the target of the tease), but can also include indicating moral transgressions (e.g. Drew 1987) and other forms of socialisation (e.g. Schiefflin 1986). Banter in the context of teasing involves reciprocating (i.e. the target remains the same) or countering (i.e. the target shifts) prior teases (Haugh 2014).

In general, teasing and especially banter have been associated with 'mock impoliteness' (e.g. Leech 1983; Haugh and Bousfield 2012), the idea being that while the tease or insult may be something that can be evaluated as 'impolite', it is not evaluated in that way in the context in question. However, participants, in particular targets, may sometimes orient to teases as offensive (Plester and Sayers 2007; Sinkeviciute 2014), even within groups where such teasing is relatively frequent, a point to which we will return to discuss in the following section.

3 Mixed Messages and (Im)politeness

3.1 Mixed Messages in Classic Politeness Theories

Perhaps the most striking thing about the treatment of mixed messages in Brown and Levinson (1987) is that it is so minimal. There is, of course, discussion of multiple messages underpinning the indirectness of negative politeness (e.g. conventionally indirect requests such as 'Could you help?') and off-record strategies (e.g. 'I'm thirsty' as an off-record hint that you would like somebody to make you a drink). However, this is generally not a matter of *interpersonal* mixing. Irony, for example, is described as an output strategy for off-record politeness, which, following Grice, involves opposites and the breaking of the maxim of quality. But there is no consideration of interpersonal incongruence. The examples given do not seem to illustrate this either (though, for some, too little context is given to be sure), and the function of irony seems to be limited to mitigating serious face-threatening acts (FTAs) (see, for example, Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 265). Banter is not mentioned at all. While 'joking' is touched upon as a positive politeness strategy that stresses shared background or values (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 124), more strategic uses of joking to assert intimacy or solidarity, and to minimise requests by making a 'large' request in jest, are only mentioned in passing (p. 229).

Though not accorded a full treatment, mixed messages fare much better in Leech (1983), specifically through his treatment of irony and banter. Leech proposes an Irony Principle (IP):

> If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of an implicature. (1983, p. 82)

So far, this seems similar to Brown and Levinson's notion of off-record politeness. However, Leech (1983, p. 142) later expands:

> Apparently, then, the IP is dys-functional: if the PP promotes a bias towards comity rather than conflict in social relations, the IP, by enabling us to bypass politeness, promotes the 'antisocial' use of language. We are ironic at someone's expense, scoring off others by politeness that is obviously insincere, as a substitute for impoliteness.

This is the opposite of the politeness supposedly promoted through Brown and Levinson's off-record politeness. A brief illustration from Leech is 'DÒ help yoursèlf (won't you?)', said to someone who is greedily helping themselves already. The polite assumption that the addressee is holding back from the feast until invited to tuck in is obviously 'insincere', and so an opposite impolite assumption is implicated. Thus, mock politeness is used to implicate impoliteness. As Leech (1983, p. 142) points out, irony is a 'second-order principle', that is, one which is dependent on the first-order principle of politeness.[4] Leech (1983) does acknowledge that irony can vary from comic irony to sarcasm, but in his definitions and description he does not allow for non-offensive irony. Generally, although the idea of a flout of the Maxim of Quality is echoed here, what is of particular note in Leech's proposals is the centrality of interpersonal issues.

Leech (1983) also accounts for banter, which he sees as involving mock impoliteness. He proposes a Banter Principle:

> In order to show solidarity with *h*, say something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to *h* [and this will give rise to an interpretation such that] what *s* says is impolite to *h* and is clearly untrue. Therefore what *s* really means is polite to *h* and true. (1983, p. 144)

[4] A second-order principle is thus not to be confused with the use of that term elsewhere in the (im)politeness and pragmatics literature; with Leech, it denotes a second level of interpretation in which the first level of interpretation is embedded.

The fact that banter is obviously impolite is an important part of flagging an interpersonal mismatch between messages (i.e. that conveyed by the utterance and that conveyed by the context). The role of saying something which is 'obviously untrue' plays a role in many insults. Addressing a friend you admire with 'you arsehole' flouts the Maxim of quality, whether you take the literal or the figurative meaning of 'arsehole'. But not all banter involves neatly analysable insults like this, as we will see.

More recently, Leech revisited the notions of irony and banter in his 2014 book on politeness. Here, he restates his position, but adds some clarifications and enrichments. These include:

- The association of irony with mock politeness and banter with mock impoliteness is made sharper (2014, p. 100).
- He adds an explanation as to why people might opt for irony: in a nutshell, 'irony tends to be more complex, ingenious, witty, and/or entertaining than a straight piece of impoliteness. An advantage of this is that it boosts the face of the ironist whilst attacking the face of the target *O*. In plain language, *S* scores at *O*'s expense' (2014, p. 235).
- Because of the polite surface, irony is less easy to retaliate against, as the speaker can always claim that the polite surface was the intended meaning. Nor is it conducive to tit-for-tat conflict spirals.
- An ironic interpretation can be reinforced by pragmaticalisation, that is, linguistic material becoming conventionally associated with irony. Developing the example used by Grice, Leech notes that the intonational placement in 'A fine friend YOU are!' adds to the ironic markedness of the expression. The same can be said of banter.
- The irony in a remark need not be propositional with a truth value. It could be, for example, in the expressive feeling of the prosody or discourse marker (e.g. expressing feigned surprise)
- Irony, he argues, is a second-order (or level) principle, as it derives its force from the Politeness Principle. If it can become conventionalised, as illustrated by 'A fine friend YOU are!', this also opens up the possibility of banter as a third-order principle; that is to say, politeness (following the first-order Politeness Principle) is used to implicate mock politeness (following the second-order Irony Principle), which is then used to implicate mock mock politeness (following the third-order Banter Principle). He notes Bousfield's term for this phenomenon, 'mock sarcasm' (Bousfield 2008, p. 119; Bousfield also provides an excellent example and discussion, pp. 119–22). 'Mock banter', however, seems not to exist.

Leech (2014) thus makes it clear that mock politeness and mock impoliteness cannot be understood without recourse to (presumed) understandings of politeness *and* impoliteness. However, mock politeness and mock impoliteness are not limited to sarcasm and banter respectively, as they can arise through a range of different actions or practices (Haugh and Bousfield 2012; Taylor 2015a, b).

3.2 The Metapragmatics of Mixed Messages

The fact that mixed messages involve recourse to both politeness and impoliteness means that participants inevitably must have some degree of awareness of the way in which a message understood literally as polite, for instance, may at the same time be indicating an impolite attitude. A focus on participants' awareness of language use takes us into the territory of *metapragmatics*, that is, the study of linguistic manifestations of awareness on the part of users about their use of language, a central example of which is metapragmatic comments—comments about pragmatic phenomena. In order to be able to understand any form of social behaviour, it is essential to bear in mind that '*conceptualizations* and *practices* are inseparable' (Verschueren 1999, p. 195, original emphasis). In other words, what we will describe here refers to reflexive awareness, that is, the ability to not only interpret one's own linguistic behaviour but also the behaviour of others and to judge its appropriateness. This form of metapragmatic awareness is not always accessible or articulated (Culpeper and Haugh 2014, p. 258) and, needless to say, it does not necessarily coincide with the conceptualisations of verbal behaviour seen from the second-order or analysts' perspective. It manifests itself in various ways, including through indicators such as pragmatic markers, contextualisation cues, metapragmatic commentary and so on.[5]

Descriptive metapragmatic comments are one of the main sources of 'assessments of the communicative status and meaning of the described speech events' (Verschueren 2000, p. 450). Such remarks provide valuable information about people's attitudinal and/or emotional evaluations when they are faced with or hear about potentially humorous messages. For instance, metapragmatic evaluations can indicate 'lack of appreciation of the attempted humour' (Bell 2009, p. 1835) ranging from such comments as 'that's not very funny' and 'what the hell kind of joke is that' (pp. 1828–9) to 'I'm so confused', 'are you kidding me, this is stupid' and 'is this a real joke

[5] For a more comprehensive list, see Verschueren (2000, p. 44) or Culpeper and Haugh (2014, p. 241).

or just a joke to make me feel dumb?' (Bell 2013, pp. 181–2, 184). Skalicki et al. (2015) suggest that claiming to be 'just kidding/joking' is also a means by which (American) speakers of English can 'inoculate' themselves from negative reactions to humour. Haugh (2016) proposes that disavowing a serious stance in this way not only pre-empts but may also block the taking of offence, given taking oneself or things too seriously is itself generally a sanctionable behaviour amongst (Anglo) speakers of English. Yet in spite of this, people do nevertheless at times take offence at ostensibly jocular behaviour.

While a number of studies have focused on the metapragmatics of (im)politeness (Culpeper 2011, 2012; Haugh 2010; Fukushima and Haugh 2014; Spencer-Oatey 2011; Inagaki 2011), there are few studies that deal with the emic, lay terms for what we collectively label mixed messages, for example, *irony*, *teasing*, *banter*, *sarcasm* and so on, with the notable exception of work by Taylor (2015a, b) and Sinkeviciute (2013). Yet such analyses are critical for better understanding the relationship between such phenomena and (potential) evaluations of (im)politeness. For example, work focusing on the conceptualisation of jocular verbal practices like teasing and 'taking the piss/mickey' by adult speakers indicates that while these jocular behaviours are commonly regarded as non-serious, they can nevertheless involve *criticism* or *disapproval* of some sort. Consider the following examples of metapragmatic comments analysed by Partington (2008, p. 773), Olivieri (2003, p. 69) and Sinkeviciute (2013, p. 290), respectively:

[2] Yet it all sped by so quickly in a welter of laughter and **teasing**.
[3] If you **take the piss (out of someone)**, you are making fun of them, or not being serious.
[4] One neighbourhood policeman was known among colleagues (and some members of the public) for his proclivity for dispensing parking tickets. This was something about which he was continually **teased**, as a means of exerting informal pressure on him to desist.

Other corpus-assisted analyses have examined how ironic and sarcastic behaviour is defined, interpreted and understood by people. The use of 'explicit irony' markers ('isn't it ironic?'), for instance, extends our understanding of irony, since 'an additional semantic feature *coincidence* may appear' (Barbe 1995, p. 132), while Simpson (2011) points out that the users of language show an elaborated comprehension of degree of irony, its affective dimension and a range of evaluative stances ('heavy irony', 'bitter irony' as well as 'delicious irony').

Furthermore, more recent work on the metapragmatics of mock politeness (irony and sarcasm) by Taylor (2015a, b) not only focuses on the adjectives *ironic* and *sarcastic* in English and Italian and on verbal behaviours that are described by these terms, but also investigates the correlation between these emic understandings of *irony* and *sarcasm* and the second-order notion of mock politeness. Taylor (2015b) argues, contrary to Leech (1983, 2014), that the terms *sarcasm* and *mock politeness* should be disassociated, as the former is not the only possible realisation of the latter, and the latter can be realised without attracting the label of the former. She also provides firm metalinguistic evidence that *irony* (in English) and *ironico* (in Italian) do not cover exactly the same conceptual territory (Taylor 2015a). It is clear that any study of different forms of mixed messaging should be grounded in the metapragmatics of the language in question. As we can see, then, the metapragmatics of mixed messages is an area that is deserving of further exploration.

3.3 The Mix of Mixed Messages

Culpeper (2011, pp. 155–6) proposed two ways in which interpersonal messages can be mixed, each with two variants:

Convention-driven:

(a) Internal: the context projected by part of a behaviour mismatches that projected by another part; or
(b) External: the context projected by a behaviour mismatches the context of use.

Context-driven:

(a) Unmarked behaviour: an unmarked (with respect to surface form or semantic content) and unconventionalised behaviour mismatches the context; or
(b) Absence of behaviour: the absence of a behaviour mismatches the context.

We will briefly look at these two groups in turn.

Convention-driven

Consider this example:

[5] [Ebay listing question and answer (our emphasis)]

> **Q:** This car is a 1984–1986 biturbo as they were fuel injected from 1987 onwards and the engine looks entirely different than what you have pictured! The carburettor plennum chamber is completely different on an injected car. Why are you listing this as a 1990 car when it is clearly anything but that?
> **A: Thank you for your rude message** […]

'Thank you' is a conventionalised politeness expression (the meaning of 'conventionalised' here follows Terkourafi e.g. 2001). 'Your rude message' is a conventionalised variant of an insult (cf. Culpeper 2011, p. 135); to describe someone as rude or impolite typically violates the positive values people claim as part of their face. Thus, within the text there is a blend of two messages with incongruous interpersonal values. Leech (2014, p. 238; see also Culpeper 2011, p. 174) makes an interesting observation regarding such examples, namely, that the

> 'polite' piece of text tends to precede the 'impolite' piece, so that if we run through the text in real time, there's an opportunity for the target of irony to be 'led up the garden path by the 'polite' bit […], before being forced to retrospectively reinterpret it as ironical in the context of what follows.

This fact may well contribute to the perception of an insult as even more offensive than if it were delivered without the preceding thanks.

However, not all internal mismatches are mixed in this way. Rather than being mixed in linear series, they can be mixed in parallel through multimodal mismatches. Prosodic features, for example, can be (mis)matched with various other features. Our focus on prosody here is not coincidental. Wichmann (2000, p. 146) comments that '[m]any intonationally conveyed attitudes […], in particular negative ones, are the result of some kind of mismatch'. To illustrate, we will briefly discuss part of one of the examples in Culpeper (2011, pp. 171–4). Taken from the quiz show *The Weakest Link*, an exploitative quiz show now franchised across the world, the show's famously rude host, Anne Robinson, speaks with the contestant Shaun. Anne has noted Shaun's job title, 'traffic management operative', and asks him to explain what he 'actually' does:

[6] Shaun: er put traffic cones in in the road
AR: you don't
Shaun: I do
AR: well what an interesting person you turned out to be




Fig. 13.1 An instrumental analysis of 'well what an interesting person you turned out to be'

Shaun's job, by any account, is somewhat mundane. We will focus on Anne's final utterance, an instrumental analysis of which is displayed in Fig. 13.1.

The relatively flat, declining intonation contour is consistent with boredom, but not the expression of amazed interest suggested by the words that are said. It is a multimodally incongruent case of mixed interpersonal messaging. Of course, even if we had not heard this utterance, we would probably still take the words as sarcastic, given their incongruence with the context—the job Shaun does. The prosody thus reinforces this implicit contrast.

The above cases fit the label sarcasm and result in negative evaluations. But convention-driven internal mixing can result in relatively positive evaluations, or indeed invite intimacy. Reviewing the literature on teasing, Keltner et al. (1998, p. 1233) suggest that devices accompanying the tease indicating that it is 'off-record, playful, and not be taken seriously' include 'unusual vocalisations, singsong voice, formulaic utterances, elongated vowels, and unusual facial expressions'. Drew's (1987) study of teasing also points out that non-seriousness is signalled by laughing in an affiliative fashion just before or after the tease (Bernal 2008 makes the same observation in relation to insults).

Turning to external mismatches, the following example is a letter in Lancaster University's electronic staff bulletin:

[7] I just want to thank whoever left the lager for my kids on the slide in the children's playpark this morning. Unfortunately, they don't like beer but I do so thanks anyway!
On a serious note—when are we going to tackle the flagrant disregard for littering on campus?

Here, a conventionalised polite expression, 'I just want to thank', is recontextualised so that the projected polite context contrasts with the current ostensibly impolite context of use, i.e. a complaint. Moreover, it is incongruent with contextually driven expectations: it is not a situation where thanks is expected. Such conventionalised politeness expressions are useful candidates for maximising the contrast between the contexts associated with the expression and the current context.

Similar to internal mismatches, there is no restriction on external mismatches such that they must result in an overall impolite interpretation. The use of impoliteness formulae associated with contexts that are dramatically at odds with the situation within which they are uttered can occasion evaluations of mock impoliteness. The recontextualisation of impoliteness in socially opposite contexts may reinforce socially opposite effects, namely, affectionate, intimate bonds amongst individuals and solidarity amongst members of that group.

Context-Driven

In contrast with the above category of mixed messages, in the case of context-driven mixed messages the utterance or behaviour is not conventionalised for politeness or impoliteness. The interpersonal interpretation is primarily driven by the strong expectations about the context. This is somewhat reminiscent of the point made in Sect. 2, when discussing the echoic account of irony, that some utterances echo particular social norms.

Not surprisingly, there are very few behaviours that can be described as neither marked nor conventionalised. We use conventionalised regularities to facilitate real-time on-line processing, and marked utterances to signal particular pragmatic meanings. Brown and Levinson's (1987, pp. 69, 94–101) bald-on record strategy does involve, however, the use of unmarked utterances in a Gricean (rather than social) sense. It is a *politeness* strategy in specific contexts, such as an emergency situation or when the power differential is considerable (e.g. a parent talking to a young child); in other words, when the context is congruent (i.e. the behaviour is appropriate and expected). However, occasionally, such unmarked utterances are used in such a way that they mismatch

the context. A paradigm example is a child using imperative commands to a parent—'Hurry up', 'Eat your food', 'Be quiet', etc. (see Culpeper 2011, pp. 181–2, for naturally occurring examples).

Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 5) discuss the face-damaging implications of withholding politeness work: 'politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus,* be taken as the absence of a polite attitude' (see also Watts 2003, p. 169; and also pp. 131, 182). A participant understands a context to require the performance of certain behaviours; their absence creates incongruence. Paradigm examples include a failure to return thanks for, or at least acknowledge, a gift, or to reciprocate a greeting. Consider the following example taken from Hutchby and Wooffit (2008, p. 45).

[8] [Two colleagues pass in the corridor]
1 A: [Hello.
2 B: [°Hi°
3 ((B continues walking))
4 A: ((shouting)) Hello!

In this case, A's repeat of the greeting with a markedly louder volume (line 4) not only marks the absence of a greeting in response to his initial greeting in line 1 (at least one he could hear—cf. line 2), but indicates he has taken offence (see Culpeper 2011, pp. 182–3, for other naturally occurring examples).

Note that the overall interpretation for our context-driven examples is one oriented to impoliteness. Clear-cut examples which orient to politeness seem rare. To qualify, the utterance needs to be unmarked (in a Gricean sense), unconventionalised for (im)politeness, or entirely absent, and said in a context where there are expectations of impoliteness. One might suppose that some variants of Brown and Levinson's (1987, p. 72) 'Don't do the FTA' strategy would qualify. For example, if, when an army recruit failed to clean their boots—something that habitually attracts significant impoliteness, not least because it is an act of insubordination—and a sergeant major says nothing or even the unmarked 'Clean your boots', it is conceivable that the recruit might take it as an act of politeness. However, apparent politeness in cases like these is liable to be construed as mock politeness (sarcasm).

3.4 The Conventionalisation of Mixed Messages

Mixed messages can, of course, lead to confusion or disorientation. However, in many cases, just as in the above examples, one overall interpretation looms larger. Besides this, there is the possibility of recurrent ways of accomplishing mixed messages becoming conventionalised themselves. Leech (2014), as we observed in Sect. 3.1, noted that an ironic interpretation can be reinforced by pragmaticalisation, that is, linguistic material becoming conventionally associated with irony. Rockwell (2004), for instance, found 'thanks' in North American data to be common in sarcastic statements. Indeed, that item appeared in two of the examples above. Moreover, in writing, regular typographical features of sarcasm include capitalisation and exclamation marks (see Yus 2000, on such written features in ironic interpretation), just as in spoken discourse sarcasm is aided by prosodic features, as we will discuss below. The interpreter need not work through all the inferential steps to resolve the incongruities of mixed messages, but can short-circuit the process by recognising linguistic material conventionally associated with the mixed device. Vergis and Terkourafi (2015) suggest that the conventionalisation of particular terms of abuse to show solidarity with the addressee rather than to insult or express negative emotions on the part of the speaker, such as the Greek collocation *re malaka*, occurs relative to particular minimal contexts for particular groups, in this case, young male Greeks in a close relationship. In other words, particular mixed messages can become conventionalised relative to various sorts of social groups or networks.

Nowhere has the hunt for that linguistic material been more vibrant than in relation to the issue of a conventionalised prosody for sarcasm. Fónagy and Magdics (1963, pp 297, cited in Murray and Arnott 1993, p. 1105) suggest that the most important feature of sarcasm is the '"portamento" of the stressed syllables gliding to a low level in a "wide arc"', and also noted 'a lengthening of stressed syllables, "restrained" tempo, "tense" articulation leading to "grumbling, purring"' (similar features, but particularly reduction in pitch and changes in vocal quality, were confirmed in a fairly recent study, Chaeng and Pell 2008; see also Ackerman 1983 and Rockwell 2000). A tempting assumption underlying discussions is that the 'ironic tone' is negative, reflecting negative emotions such as disgust, and indeed the kind of emotions that are consistent with the overall negative interpretation of the irony/sarcasm. This is a point made by Grice, as well as Sperber and Wilson (see Sect. 2). However, the expression of fake positive emotions is possible. A case in point concerns the delivery of 'you don't' in example [6], which feigns the prosody of polite amazement (for a discussion of this, see Culpeper 2011, pp. 171–2).

Furthermore, a weighty study conducted by Bryant and Fox Tree (2005, pp. 273–4) failed to find an 'ironic tone of voice' which could be mapped in a one-to-one fashion onto irony or sarcasm: 'The perception of any such tone appears to be a result of the integration of multiple sources of information (including, we believe, non-acoustic) and thus likely more an illusion than an actual speech production phenomenon.' This is, of course, in tune with Grice's scepticism, as noted in Sect. 2. Ultimately, we need more sensitive analyses taking into account interactions between different modalities and between those and the context (see Woodland and Voyer 2011, for an experimental examination of interactions between tone of voice and context). One possible line of investigation might be the *contrastive* use of prosodic contours, such as a shift to a 'deadpan' intonation that has a lower pitch and compressed pitched range in contrast to preceding and following utterances of that same speaker in episodes of irony (Attardo et al. 2003; Wilson 2013, p. 45) or teasing (Keltner et al. 2001, p. 243). However, such cues are not unambiguous and can only be seen as part of an array of linguistic, prosodic, gestural and contextual factors that recurrently point towards an ironic or non-serious interpretation (McKinnon and Prieto 2014). In sum, while pragmaticalisation of particular expressions for use in mixed messages is readily apparent, there still remains considerable debate about whether there are sets of prosodic features that can be readily associated with sarcasm, irony and the like.

3.5 The Functions of Mixed Messages

While the use of banter and humorous insults to reflect and foster social intimacy and solidarity has long been noted (e.g. Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987), subsequent work has established that there are a range of functions. For example, high status participants sometimes disguise 'oppressive intent' with humour as a more socially acceptable way of doing power, of doing 'cloaked coercion' (Holmes 2000, p. 176).[6] The functions of mixed messages more generally can be broadly divided into their affective, instrumental and interpersonal functions (although these functions are not, of course, mutually exclusive).

The affective functions of mixed messages include speakers expressing or engendering positively and negatively valenced emotions amongst participants. Sarcasm, for instance, allows speakers to mask aggression as deniable

[6] Interestingly, Plester and Sayers's (2007) study of the functions of banter shows that 'the higher the status the less banter that was used and instigated' (p. 182).

(e.g. Fine 1984; Taylor 2011). It also is a means by which speakers can register offence at a perceived transgression on the part of the addressed recipient (Haugh 2015, pp. 288–9). For example, honorifics, which are typically associated with 'polite' interactions in Japanese and Korean, can be used in close relationships to signal anger or offence (Brown 2013; Okamoto 2007). Sarcasm can also be used, similar to jocular mockery and other forms of mock impoliteness, to prompt amusement, particularly, for the (over-hearing) audience (Culpeper 2005, 2011; Taylor 2015a); or, alternatively, to prompt more negative emotions amongst participants, in particular on the part of the target, including annoyance, irritation, anger, embarrassment, shame and so on (cf. Sinkeviciute 2013). An (implicit) claim to 'non-seriousness' (Bateson 1955) often underpins mixed messages. For this reason, some instances of mixed messaging may be regarded as an attempt on the part of the speaker to be humorous or witty. Humour or jocularity is one form of non-seriousness, but there are others, including being 'playful' or 'competitive' (e.g. Decapua and Boxer 1999; Partington 2008), for instance.

The instrumental functions of mixed messages include indicating moral transgressions (Drew 1987), socialising members into group norms and promoting conformity amongst members as a form of (covert) social control (Schieffelin 1986; cf. Plester and Sayers 2007), and gaining power over others (e.g. Holmes 2000; Culpeper 2011). Jorgensen (1996) found the most frequent function of sarcasm in 'everyday discourse' to be complaining to or criticising close friends or intimates, especially about trivial mistakes. Teasing, banter and other forms of mock impoliteness may also be drawn upon in accomplishing sensitive or delicate social actions, including criticisms, reproaches and complaints amongst intimates (Alberts 1990) or between previously unacquainted persons (Haugh 2014).

Finally, the interpersonal functions of mixed messaging encompass both relational and identity work. Mixed messages can be used to both include and exclude. While jocular teasing and insults may well foster solidarity amongst participants, thereby creating a sense of in-group, it may also create and maintain out-groups (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997; Plester and Sayers 2007). Mixed messages can also contribute to the negotiation of relationship boundaries, including degrees of intimacy (Haugh and Pillet-Shore 2014; Mills and Babrow 2003). Teasing may also be implicated in claiming or ascribing identities (Heisterkamp and Alberts 2000), as well as in managing the relative status of members within a group hierarchy (Decapua and Boxer 1999). Sarcasm, on the other hand, may be implicated in the speaker enhancing his or her own face (Harris 2001).

The interpersonal functions of mixed messages are, however, invariably fitted to the particulars of the context in which they occur, including the relationships that are perceived to hold between the interactants in question. Importantly, a mock impoliteness event can have a range of functions, can be perceived in different ways by different participants and can be regarded as offensive despite the target recognising that it was not (fully) intended to be so. What a particular instance of mixed messaging counts as doing is dependent to varying degrees, like all pragmatic phenomena, on the context in which it occurs.

3.6 The Perception of Mixed Messages

Many experimental studies have considered mixed messages. However, they certainly have not encompassed the full variety of mixed messages. The study of context-driven behavioural absences, for example, is rare: Bober (1991; cited in Tedeschi and Felson 1994, p. 216) is one such rarity, finding that absent behaviours were judged equally intentional and blameworthy as present behaviours, when they resulted in harmful consequences. Instead, the bulk of work has focused on irony and sarcasm. Of course, as we pointed out, not all irony involves mixed interpersonal messages. Furthermore, even when studies are discussing apparently relevant interpersonal phenomena, labels such as sarcasm are applied in varying ways, with the consequence that phenomena are difficult to compare across studies.

A key issue in much literature is whether mixed interpersonal messages actually cut deeper than non-mixed alternatives, such as simply using a conventional impolite formula. Of course, this is a complex issue that depends on, minimally, the salience of possible elements of politeness or impoliteness derived from the message and from the context, and also the ordering of those elements (cf. the garden-path processing issues briefly mentioned in Sect. 3.4). There is a lack of definitive empirical evidence. Research relating to insulting compliments such as 'a fine friend you are' has seen mixed results. Colston (1997) and Toplak and Katz (2000) found evidence that irony enhances the criticism conveyed by a more direct insult. Similarly, Bowes and Katz (2011) found that sarcasm was perceived as more negative than direct insults. In contrast, (Dews et al. 1995; Dews and Winner 1995, 1997) did not find that irony exacerbated judgements. This supported their 'tinge hypothesis', the idea that positive literal meaning of the utterance tinges the interpretation, leading to an impression of less aggressiveness (see Giora 2003, pp. 86–9, for additional empirical evidence).

Such contrasting results can partly be explained by differing methods. However, there is particular need to factor in the specifics of context. Pexman and Olineck (2002) found that the underlying intended message of insulting compliments was interpreted as more 'mocking' than their direct counterparts, as long as the context was sufficiently clear to rule out the positive impression created by the surface meaning of the statement itself (see especially p. 215). This is also consistent with Kotthoff (1996) whose qualitative analyses showed that what was of crucial importance were the social relations amongst participants. The effect of social relations on the interpretation of mixed messages is, however, quite complex. Slugoski and Turnbull (1988), for instance, found that *relational* affect (i.e. liking vs. disliking) can modulate the interpretation of mixed messages in otherwise close relationships, while Vergis and Terkourafi's (2015) recent study indicates that relational affect may be trumped, in turn, by the speaker's emotional state (i.e. negative vs. neutral). Such results lead Vergis and Terkourafi (2015) to propose that complimentary insults may be considered marked or unmarked by participants relative to minimal contexts. One possibility, then, is that the use of conventional politeness *strongly* mismatching a context in which a polite interpretation is not sustainable could end up exacerbating the impoliteness of the message. This could apply to examples like [5], [6], [7] and [8]. Indeed, Colston (2002) provides evidence for the importance of this contrast. There can be no claim, however, that all participants experience an equal level of exacerbation. For instance, there is evidence that teased participants tend to have a more negative experience than teasers (Keltner et al. 1998; Kowalski 2007), and there is similar evidence of differing participant perceptions for sarcasm (Pexman and Olineck 2002; Bowes and Katz 2011).

In the following case study we further explore the ways in which mixed messages may occasion different evaluations of (im)politeness, not only amongst the various participants present but in subsequent interactions.

4 Case Study: Frontstage and Backstage Evaluations of Teasing

Mixed messages, be it teasing, irony, (ritualised) banter or some other form, can easily create a certain degree of confusion not only for the targets but also for researchers. Even though in some (rare) cases, they may be explicitly commented upon, they are inevitably part of 'a relational process' (Keltner et al. 2001, p. 229). Thus, it is essential to analyse instances of mixed messages in

situ, that is, within the particular (cultural) context where the type of relationship between the instigator and the target plays an important role. The case study presented in this section focuses on mixed messages in a British cultural context. The main objective is to illustrate how the perspectives provided by the participants on the same verbal behaviour can vary depending on whether their evaluation is offered *frontstage*, i.e. immediately after the target has been confronted with a mixed message and in front of the instigator and/or the third parties present, or when the setting has changed and more personal feelings, attitudes and thoughts can be voiced, i.e. *backstage*.[7] The following examples, which involve an insulting but allegedly humorous remark and a range of subsequent evaluations by various participants, are taken from the national version of the reality television gameshow *Big Brother* UK 2012.

By day 46 two groups—popular and unpopular—had clearly formed in the British *Big Brother* house. Since Adam, Deana, Lauren and Luke are the members of the latter, they are frequently nominated for eviction by their fellow housemates. This means they face public voting and, if they receive the fewest votes, they will have to leave the show. Extract [9] is from the morning of the eviction day.

[9] [*Big Brother* UK 2012, Day 46: All the housemates are waking up. Becky is addressing Luke]

Becky: {[in a smile voice] morning evictee}
Luke: {[slowly and slightly confused] what}
Becky: {[approaching and smiling] morning evictee}
Luke: {[slowly] morning Becky (.) (hon)}
end of the conversation

That morning, Becky—who has recently become an active member of the popular group—in a smile voice greets Luke saying 'morning evictee', which suggests that Luke will be the one to leave the show later in the day, as well as proposing this to be laughable. Being an evictee is the worst outcome in the show, since it means having to leave the show and losing the chance to win the prize money. Luke's initial reaction displays slight confusion about what he has just heard, and in initiating repair he provides Becky with an opportunity to say something else. Even though Becky is fully aware that this term of address is insulting and potentially hurtful, she repeats the same greeting,

[7] Cf. Goffman (1959); for more details on the frontstage/backstage distinction in reality television, see Sinkeviciute (2017).

this time with a smile. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that Luke knows that Becky could indeed intend to hurt him and Becky knows that he knows this, the target does not ignore her remark or explicitly reject it, thereby not revealing that he is offended. What Luke seems to be doing is to try and conceal his spontaneous negative feelings and frustration[8] and follow the patterns of frontstage, or 'certain standards [that] are sometimes referred to as matters of politeness' (Goffman 1959, p. 107). However, his reaction cannot be classified as acceptance of Becky's jocular behaviour either. Using an ironic and, undoubtedly, insincere term of endearment and affection 'hon', Luke, in turn, responds with a subtle mixed message to Becky, who, however, fails to, or chooses not to, interpret it as hinting at a negative evaluation of her prior greeting.

If the data were limited to this particular extract with no follow-up metatalk, it would not be possible to unequivocally suggest that Luke really felt offended and how exactly he evaluated Becky's comment. Reality television data is rather useful in that respect in that it regularly provides us with a glimpse into the participants' subsequent evaluations of prior events. Indeed, this access to the backstage is a very useful source of observing not only the instigator's evaluations of his/her own behaviour but also those of the target (as well as those of third parties and other non-participants). Consider the following conversation:

[10] [Later in the smoking area, Luke mentions to his friends Adam and Lauren what Becky said in the morning]

Luke:	she came to me this morning and she was like {[impersonating Becky] good morning evictee}
Adam:	yeah I know
Lauren:	WHAT?
Luke:	I don't know if she's trying (.) it's like she's rubbing it in
Lauren:	I'll tell you what er some people in this place are fucking horrible people
Luke:	do you think (..) the thing is that when she said that I didn't know if she meant it in a funny way or not
Adam:	well she says all of her insults are in a funny way

[8] Later on the same day Luke said: 'I believe in having an argument or a confrontation in private.'

Lauren: yeah
part of the conversation omitted
Luke: hehe (..) in my mind I was thinking good morning bitch face
Lauren: you should've said it

Since Luke is among his friends in the house, he does not feel the need to pretend and hide his feelings about Becky's remark. Contrary to his immediate reaction, he decides to mimic Becky and even though it becomes clear that he feels insulted, he still confesses that he is not entirely sure about Becky's intentions when she greeted him in that way ('I didn't know if she meant it in a funny way or not'), and, indeed, seems to give her the benefit of the doubt as if hoping that she was really being jocular and not mean. Adam, however, is less open to any negation of the meaning of Becky's remark and points out that what she constantly does is insult people, but then she claims that it was humorous. In doing so, Becky places the responsibility for the offence with the target, since having a good sense of humour 'appears to be a generally recognized highly valued characteristic of self and of others' (Cann et al. 1997, p. 78). At the end of the conversation, Luke appears to express his seemingly suppressed emotions and reveals how he wanted to refer to Becky in the morning—'bitch face'—which not only shows his (possible) immediate evaluation of the comment and, thus a difference between his frontstage and backstage evaluations, but also that he suspended it in favour of maintaining a culturally valued front of not taking himself too seriously (Fox 2004).

Extract (11) presents Luke and Becky's interaction the following day. They have not spoken for some time but now decide to clear the air.

[11] [Day 47: Luke finally talks to Becky]

Luke: {[smiling] when you said good morning evictee when you barely even say good morning to me most days}
Becky: {[not looking at Luke] you've probably been really sensitive about it and I'm sorry I am really really sorry that you feel that way {[Hh] but} it was a bloody (.)} nothing bad I wasn't meaning anything bad by that Luke bloody hell luv
Luke: [smiles]

Prior to this excerpt, they have both agreed to be 'civil', which encourages Luke to ask Becky why she said 'morning evictee when [she] barely even say[s] good morning to [him] most days'. In order to show his willingness to be 'civil' Luke smiles while talking to Becky as he proffers an opportunity for her to apologise for the perceived transgression on her part. What is interesting is that during the conversation, Becky tries to avoid eye contact and instead of apologising for the insulting remark, she claims to be 'sorry that [Luke] feel[s]' bad about it, thereby implicitly blaming him for lacking a good sense of humour. Her insincerity in delivering this apology is also suggested by the suppressed laughter after saying 'I'm really really sorry'. Becky concludes by claiming that she 'wasn't meaning anything bad', emphasises her stance with 'bloody hell' and then adds a seemingly insincere marker of intimacy ('luv'). Luke responds by shifting his facial expression from a serious one to a wide smile. However, rather than being a display of genuine emotion, this alludes to Luke's opinion that Becky is 'very fake' (mentioned by Luke earlier).

In this section, we have seen how mixed messages can give rise to different evaluations of (im)politeness on the part of participants. These different evaluations appear to be systematically related both to the participation framework in which they arise (e.g. targets are more likely than the instigator of a tease to perceive something as offensive), and whether they occur frontstage (i.e. in situ responses to a tease) or backstage (i.e. post facto responses in interactions subsequent to the interaction in which the teasing occurred).

5 Summary and Future Directions

In this chapter we have summarised research to date on an emerging focus of research in studies of (im)politeness, namely, cases where there are mismatching interpersonal messages in interaction, or what we have here termed mixed messages. Given instances of mixed messages can involve a complex interplay of polite and impolite attitudes, and are very often designed to be ambivalent as to the producer's 'genuine' intentions, they often give rise to a range of different evaluations on the part of participants. A key question for the analyst is thus for *whom* is this particular action or meaning polite, impolite, non-impolite, over-polite and so on (Haugh 2013). It is also an area of research towards which pragmatics is well positioned to make a contribution given mixed messages invariably involve the participants understanding what is being implied or left unsaid by the speaker (Culpeper 2011), as well as metapragmatic awareness of the interpersonal and cultural implications of instances of mixed messages (Sinkeviciute 2013, 2014).

While much of the research to date has been on interactions amongst speakers of different varieties of English, there is a small but growing number of studies that have investigated the pragmatics of mixed messaging in other languages, including Chinese (Haugh and Chang 2015), Russian (Furman 2013) and Spanish (Maíz-Arévalo 2015). However, there clearly remains considerable work to be done on mixed messaging across (varieties) of language and different cultural groups, and its relationship to evaluations of (im)politeness and offence. Notably, while work on mixed messages in varieties of English has generally proceeded with awareness on the part of analysts that any such work needs to be grounded in an understanding of the metalanguage employed by participants themselves, there has been little research to date that has investigated the metapragmatics of mixed messages in different languages and cultures, with the notable exception of Taylor's (2015a, b) work on 'sarcasm' and 'irony' in English and Italian. What the latter study clearly demonstrates, however, is that it would be prudent for any study of mixed messages to be grounded in the metapragmatics of those practices in the language in question. Indeed, through such work we will likely uncover other actions and practices by which mixed messages may arise in interaction. In this way, we can move the field of (im)politeness research forward from the analysis of what is commonly known to an exploration of not simply what we do not know but what we are not yet aware we do not know.

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14

(Im)politeness: Prosody and Gesture

Lucien Brown and Pilar Prieto

1 Introduction

The negotiation of (im)politeness that accompanies communicative events is mediated through various modalities, including the use of words conventionally associated with (im)politeness, the sound of the speaker's voice, and the use of polite bodily and facial gestures. For a speaker to be interpreted as polite, it may not be enough to simply use appropriate verbal expressions, or throw in a 'polite word' such as please or thank you. The speaker will also need to deliver the utterance in an appropriate tone of voice, and pay attention to body position and facial expression. In short, (im)politeness resides not just in *what* you say, but also *how* you say it.

The fact that (im)politeness is fundamentally multimodal has long been recognised within politeness research. Indeed, Brown and Levinson (1987) mention both prosody and gesture (or 'kinesics') at several junctures in their seminal work on politeness universals, and the iconic orange book cover features the well-known photograph of South Indian villagers using the *namaste* gesture (pressing palms together with fingers pointed upwards, whilst bowing

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_14

and smiling) to bid farewell to a departing government official. Brown and Levinson (1987) note, for example that Tzeltal speakers employ high pitch for negative politeness and creaky voice for positive politeness.

Despite this, detailed analysis of prosody and gesture has rarely featured in the (im)politeness literature, which has instead been dominated by the analysis of verbal politeness. Indeed, Culpeper (2011) observes that 'remarkably, the bulk of research on politeness or impoliteness pays woefully little attention to the role of prosody' (p. 146), and also notes that 'non-verbal cues … [receive] relatively little attention in communication and pragmatic studies' (p. 151). The reasons for the lack of research on prosody and gesture are not altogether clear, although Mapson (2014, p. 163) points out that it may be due to practical difficulties involved in examining speech in its holistic entirety, which seemingly poses more challenges than the analysis of verbal linguistic elements on their own. This trend is now being reversed, however. Recent years have seen the emergence of a vibrant interest in the prosodic and gestural components of politeness, evinced by a number of important research papers that will be reviewed in this chapter.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Prosody

Language researchers agree that prosody conveys various communicative functions that range from semantico-pragmatic functions such as speech act marking (assertion, question, etc.), epistemic positioning, information status (focus, given vs. new information), as well as politeness and affective and emotional states (see Prieto 2015 for a review of the meanings encoded by prosody). Prosody refers to suprasegmental features of speech; in other words, vocal effects that accompany the sounds of individual segments of speech, and that extend over words, phrases or utterances. Prosody allows for the same word, phrase or utterance to be delivered in different ways, such as louder/quieter, faster/slower, with higher or lower pitch or with different intonation contours. Four important acoustic dimensions (and perceptual correlates) have been included in the study of the prosodic correlates of politeness:

(1) **Fundamental frequency (or F0) parameters**. Fundamental frequency is the acoustic feature that measures the rate of vibration of the vocal cords and is the reflection of perceived pitch. It is typically measured in Hertz,

or cycles per second. The most common pitch and pitch variability measures that have been used to characterise prosody in polite utterances are pitch height (or highest F0 value in the utterance, also called topline), pitch register or average pitch (a measure of contour pitch raising or lowering in the F0 space, which is calculated by the mean pitch value of the pitch contour) and pitch span or pitch range (a measure of pitch excursion, typically calculated by taking the difference between the lowest and the highest F0 measures in the utterance). Variations in pitch range can be measured globally (at the level of the utterance) or locally (measuring the difference between the lowest and the highest point in a given pitch accent).

(2) **Duration (perceived length)**. Duration and duration variability, as well as speech rate, correspond to the perception of length and rhythm of the utterance. Duration is commonly measured in milliseconds and milliseconds per unit. Some of the measures that have been used to characterise polite prosody are mean syllable length, speech rate and mean length of pauses.

(3) **Intensity (loudness)**. Intensity is the acoustic correlate of perceived loudness, and is typically reported in decibels (dB). The most frequent measure reported in several studies is mean utterance intensity.

(4) **Voice quality**. Voice quality has been defined as the as the 'characteristic auditory colouring' of a speaker's voice, and it is derived from a variety of laryngeal and supralaryngeal configurations. Supralaryngeal changes can induce a nasalised, dentalised and velarised voice, while different vocal fold configurations lead to different phonation types, such as breathy, whispery, creaky and harsh voices. In order to characterise such phonation types, researchers have used acoustic parameters like jitter (which analyses the percentage of change in the duration of pitch periods) and shimmer (which analyses the percentage of change in speech amplitude between pitch periods). Creaky voice, for example, exhibits high indexes of jitter and shimmer, that is, a strong departure from a strictly naturally sounding voice with regular pitch periods. Another voice quality measure that has been used is HNR (or harmonic-to-noise ratio), which is an average ratio of energy of the non-harmonic components and represents an evaluation of the presence of noise and hoarseness in the voice. Finally, measures of spectral tilt and specifically H1–H2 (or the difference in amplitude between first and second harmonics) has been claimed to be one of the best indicators of voice quality, and specifically breathy phonation.

Regarding the analysis of **intonation contours**, there is ample consensus among intonation researchers on the basic tenets of the Autosegmental-Metrical (or AM) model of intonation and its application to the ToBI annotation conventions developed for a number of typologically diverse languages (see Gussenhoven 2004 for a review of the AM model of intonation). The ToBI conventions establish four layers of labelling (words, tones, break indices and miscellaneous information) which are aligned with the speech signal. In the tones tier, and following the AM model, a set of phonologically contrastive pitch events—pitch accents and boundary tones—may be defined for each system. For example, the intonation contours of English are described as a sequence of phonologically distinctive tonal units (represented with High and Low targets and their combinations) that are associated with metrically prominent units and with phrasal boundaries. This phonological representation of tones is mapped onto the phonetic representation through language-particular implementation rules. The break index tier represents the prosodic structure of the language through numerical indices that indicate degrees of disjuncture between any two adjacent words. Readers who are interested in knowing more about the application of the ToBI conventions to different languages can refer to Jun (2005, 2014).

2.2 The Frequency Code

One powerful theory regarding the relationship between prosody and politeness is Ohala's (1984, 1994) Frequency Code Hypothesis, which concerns the assumed relationship between high pitch and politeness. Ohala (1994, p. 327) claims that high or rising pitch is universally associated with a range of social messages, including deference, politeness, submission and lack of confidence. Low or falling pitch, on the other hand, is associated with opposing social messages such as assertiveness, authority, aggression, confidence and threat. The rationale for these connections rests on the observation that high pitch is biologically associated with smaller size, since smaller animals will have smaller larynxes that will produce higher pitched sounds. By using higher pitch when speaking politely, the speaker makes him/herself appear small and subdominant, and gives the impression that he/she is not in a position to coerce the hearer. Following Ohala's proposal, Gussenhoven (2002, 2004) outlined a broad account of universal intonational paralinguistic meaning expanding on the idea of the frequency code and two other biologically determined codes. The affective interpretations of the frequency code include 'feminine', 'submissive', 'friendly', 'polite' and 'vulnerable' for higher pitch and 'masculine', 'dominant', 'confident', 'protective' and 'aggressive' for lower pitch.

2.3 Gesture

Gesture refers to visible bodily action that is used as an utterance, or as part of an utterance (Kendon 2004, p. 7). Gestures allow people to engage in the exchange of meaningful information when communication by talk is impossible (e.g. waving farewell to someone behind a closed window). But gestures more commonly occur in accompaniment to talk, such as the hand beats and head nods that speakers produce as they engage in face-to-face interaction. Research on gesture is particularly concerned with explicating how gesture and speech are so intimately connected in human interaction.

Gestures can be analysed both according to their form, and according to their function. Regarding form, one coding system that is commonly used in politeness research is that of McNeill (1992, pp. 78–89, 377–80). This system is based on: (a) the identification of the actual articulator being used (hand, finger, arm); (b) its shape (e.g. open hand, index finger extended); and (c) its orientation (e.g. palm/finger toward up, palm/finger away from body, etc.). From a functional point of view, McNeill (1992) proposes the following four types of gestures: iconics (also called representational gestures, e.g. gestures which represent features of the referent in a transparent way, such as framing the shape of a person while speaking about him/her), metaphorics (which refer to more abstract notions, such as touching your heart while speaking about love), beats (or hand movements which have an emphatic function in discourse) and deictics (e.g. hand and index finger gestures referring to locations). Although gestures are most commonly produced by the arms, they are quite often produced by other means. For instance, some cultures have been shown to use lip or mouth points instead of finger points, such as the Arrernte people in Australia (Wilkins 2003).

The term 'gesture' is reserved for this particular form of bodily action, that works as utterance and over which the speaker is deemed to have some level of voluntary control. The term is not typically used to refer to habitual or involuntary bodily actions (e.g. touching one's own nose or hair while speaking). Also, 'gesture' is not usually employed to describe factors such as the orientation of the body (e.g. facing the interlocutor, or looking away from the interlocutor) and the distance between the interlocutors. Although such orientations take on obvious affective and social meanings, the movements that are used to establish them do not seem to constitute recognisable bodily gestures as such (Kendon 2004, p. 8). However, these kinds of bodily orientations can be studied under the wider rubric of non-verbal behaviour.

3 Critical Overview of Research

This section is structured around three important research questions that, broadly speaking, previous studies on the relationship between prosody/gesture and (im)politeness have attempted to answer.

3.1 What Role Does Prosody Play in the Communication of (Im)politeness?

Research has shown that prosody plays a crucial role in the negotiation of (im)politeness (see Hidalgo and Nebot 2014 for a review). By adopting certain prosodic patterns, speakers can change what may on the surface appear to be a polite utterance into an impolite one, and vice versa. For example, a polite farewell such as 'goodbye' can be turned into a rude farewell by virtue of its being accompanied by means of 'faster tempo, tense articulation and […] much higher pitch average' (Culpeper 2005, p. 53). Similarly, utterances that include profanities and other potentially face-threatening language can be interpreted as mock impoliteness (rather than genuine impoliteness) when accompanied by certain prosodic features (see Sect. 4.2). Prosody also interacts with politeness in terms of social indexicality. In other words, speakers use specific prosodic cues when addressing status superiors, as opposed to status equals or subordinates. Winter and Grawunder (2011, 2012) found that Korean speakers would speak to status superiors using lower pitch, slower speech rate and breathier voicing.

Research in this area has worked towards establishing which acoustic features tend to correlate with politeness and impoliteness-related meanings. One of the acoustic parameters of prosody that has received most attention in phonetic studies of politeness has been the study of pitch. A relatively consistent finding points to an increase in **pitch range** and **pitch height**, which generally leads to a higher perception of politeness (Chen et al. 2004 for Dutch and English; Ohara 2001 for Japanese, among others), although there are exceptions such as the lower pitch used to mark indexical politeness in Korean noted above (see Sect. 3.2 for further discussion). Research has also shown that politeness may be communicated through a decrease in **speech rate** (Ofuka et al. 2000 for Japanese; Lin et al. 2006 for Taiwanese; Winter and Grawunder 2011, 2012 for Korean; Ruiz Santabalbina 2013 for Spanish; Hübscher et al. 2017, under review, for Catalan). In addition, dimensions of voice quality appear to be manipulated for politeness-related meanings, including breathiness (Campbell 2004 for English; Winter and Grawunder

2011, 2012 for Korean; Ito 2004). For example, Ito (2004) noted that aspiration noise (which could be a reflection of breathiness) is perceptually associated with polite speech in Japanese.

Phonological studies of politeness and intonation have shown that pitch contour choice encodes politeness across languages, with a tendency for a more frequent use of high and sustained boundary tones or upstepped (rather than downstepped) pitch accents in polite utterances. Orozco (2008, 2010) investigated the realisation of polite utterances in Mexican Spanish. She presented 12 participants with eight unpunctuated written requests and asked them to produce them in neutral and polite styles. While there were no outstanding differences in the choice of the nuclear pitch accent between conditions, the polite style favoured the use of a high boundary tone more than the neutral style did (72% vs. 64.4% of high boundary tones in each condition respectively). Another difference found between neutral and polite utterances was the more frequent use of a high initial boundary tone in the latter (64%) than in the former (36%). Devís and Cantero (2014) showed that both from a production and perception point of view, some of the most successful melodic characteristics of politeness attenuators for Catalan were the use of high and suspended final and internal pitch inflections. Astruc et al. (2016) examined how politeness is encoded by intonation in Catalan offers and requests, and found that choice of intonation pattern is controlled by factors like social distance and the cost of the requested action. Catalan speakers more frequently used rising pitch patterns with high cost offers and high cost requests. By contrast, falling patterns were used more frequently with low cost offers. Similarly, Borràs-Comes et al. (2015) showed that both situational and social politeness factors govern the choice of vocative intonation in Catalan. On the other hand, pitch contour choices have also been linked to the expression of genuine impoliteness. For example, Wichmann (2000) pointed out that the polite fall in British English is a high fall, while the impolite fall is a low fall. She mentioned that the difference in perceived politeness between the two contours could be related to the fact that a high fall has been found to signal 'more to come', while the use of a low fall conveys a sense of extreme closure or finality (see Wichmann 2000; Culpeper 2011).

In addition to adopting a distinct 'polite tone of voice', research has shown that the perception of politeness can also be achieved through **prosodic accommodation** to the interlocutor's pitch range (Lin et al. 2006) or to the interlocutor's speech rate (Ofuka et al. 2000). On the other hand, impoliteness is triggered by **prosodic dissociation** (the opposite strategy to prosodic accommodation) with the interlocutor. Culpeper et al. (2003) attempted to explore this area by explaining how different types of impoliteness within

their proposed negative and positive impoliteness strategies could be manifested through prosody. For example, the positive impoliteness strategy of denying common ground or dissociating from the interlocutor is typically achieved through the mimicry of the interlocutor's voice or through not accommodating to the loudness of the conversation. Hidalgo (2009) echoes Culpeper et al. (2003) by stating that elevating one's tone of voice can be seen as a violation of the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975), thereby achieving genuine impoliteness.

It is important to point out that the prosodic features of politeness reviewed in this section are not 'inherently polite' and do not apply systematically across contexts. Laplante and Ambady (2003) experimentally showed that the perception effects of what they called a 'polite tone of voice' (which included many of the characteristics mentioned above) depend on the content of the message. Although the polite tone of voice significantly increased politeness ratings when it accompanied positive messages (e.g., *Would you like to go get ice cream?*), this was not the case when it was associated with negative messages (e.g., *Would you leave me alone?*). In other words, no matter how hard speakers try to 'soften' the impact of a negative statement on the hearer, prosodic cues may not be able to compensate enough and might even result in the perception of sarcasm.

There may also be important differences as to how the prosodic correlates of politeness are produced and perceived between male and female speakers. Regarding production, Winter and Grawunder (2011) found that Korean women used a relatively more breathy-sounding voice when addressing status superiors in a polite speech register, than when addressing status equals in a casual register. However, men did not exhibit consistent differences between the two politeness registers with respect to this feature. This is similar in some respects to the results on Japanese reported by Loveday (1981) or Ohara (2001), who found that female Japanese speakers tend to express politeness by raising average F0. Moreover, Ohara (2001) reported that proficient second language learners of Japanese are well aware of the fact that raising one's pitch projects femininity in this language. Regarding perception, Idemaru et al. (2015) found that there was an important difference between the way men and women perceived the role of pitch in Korean utterances. Male speakers perceived utterances with lower pitch as more polite, which is consistent with the findings of production studies which show that Korean speakers of both genders lower their pitch in polite registers. However, female speakers perceived utterances with higher pitch as being more polite, which constitutes a mismatch between how they produce politeness and how they perceive it.

3.2 Can the Frequency Code Work Across Different Cultures, and Different Modes of (Im)politeness?

The claim from Ohala's (1984, 1994) Frequency Code Hypothesis (see Sect. 2.2) that high pitch is universally associated with politeness has found support across several languages. In Dutch and English, an increase in peak height can lead to higher levels of perceived friendliness (Chen et al. 2004). In Japanese, female speakers raise their pitch when speaking deferentially towards a professor (Ohara 2001) and when performing politeness formulae (Loveday 1981). In addition, raising pitch at the end of the utterance has been shown to exhibit politeness functions in this language (Ofuka et al. 2000). Research on Mexican Spanish has also shown that speakers favoured the use of a high initial and a high final boundary tone in the production of polite requests (Orozco 2008; Orozco 2010). Similarly, Devís and Cantero (2014) acoustically analysed a corpus of Catalan spontaneous speech and perceptually validated it. They found that one of the most successful melodic characteristics of politeness attenuators for this language (capable of converting commands into requests or confrontation into co-operation) was the use of high or suspended utterance-final and utterance-medial melodic inflections.

However, some recent research has shown that the frequency code may not be universal to all languages, or to all modes of politeness. Winter and Grawunder (2011, 2012) and Brown et al. (2014) showed that low pitch (rather than high pitch) correlated with the usage of a polite speech register in Korean, which is prototypically used to index that the hearer is of superior age or social status. In a follow-up study, Brown et al. (2015) collected comparative data from German, Austrian German, Russian and Japanese speakers. None of these additional languages showed a significant effect of hearer identity (status superior versus status equal) on F0, although pitch was slightly lower for addressing a status superior in all languages, except for Japanese. It appears that in some languages, such as Korean, the indexing of superior social status requires that the speaker sounds calm, subdued and unanimated (rather than necessarily submissive). Similar results are also reported for Mursi (Irvine 1979) and for Catalan (Hübscher et al. 2017, under review).

In addition, other studies show that high pitch may be used to signal meanings related to impoliteness (rather than politeness). Stadler (2007) showed that in German and New Zealand English high pitch was used to express aggression. Similarly, Goodwin et al. (2002) demonstrated that Latin-American and African-American girls of elementary school age used pitch

leaps from their normal range of 250–350 Hz to around 600 Hz when producing disagreement turns in games of hopscotch. In addition, Nadeu and Prieto (2011) showed that in Catalan an increase in the final pitch height of yes–no questions leads to more *impoliteness* ratings, unless utterances were accompanied by a smiling face.

The studies discussed in this section suggest that pitch is employed in various ways across languages to achieve (im)politeness-related meanings. However, since the forms of (im)politeness are multiple, and the meaning of politeness is complex and in some ways culture specific, the relationship between pitch and politeness is far more complex than originally suggested by the Frequency Code.

3.3 What Role Does Gesture Play in the Communication of (Im)politeness, and How Do Gesture and Prosody Interact?

A range of different gestures and other forms of non-verbal behaviour are involved in the negotiation of (im)politeness. Tree and Manusov (1998, p. 573), for example, identified a number of 'aggravating' and 'mitigating' non-verbal behaviours in American English, including no touching, more distance, indirect body orientation, unpleasant facial expression, lowered eyebrows, a loud voice and wide gestures (all 'aggravating'), and pleasant facial expressions, raised eyebrows, direct body orientation, a tense, closed position with small gestures, softer voice, touch and close proximity (all 'mitigating').

However, research has also shown that many politeness-related gestures are culture specific (see Kita 2009). In a classic study on arm gestures, Efron (1941/1972) demonstrated that Italian immigrants in New York used spatially more expansive gestures, moving the entire arm from the shoulder across the lateral plane, which meant that the gestures were highly visible. The perception that 'Italians gesture a lot' was produced not by increased frequency of gestures, but instead by increased saliency. Similarly, Müller (1998) showed that Spaniards produced more gestures above shoulder height. Maynard (1993) and Kita and Ide (2007) reported that Japanese speakers produced head nods not only more frequently than speakers of other languages, but also in different positions in the conversation. In addition, Kita and Essegby (2001) showed that some gestures may be impolite due to culture-specific taboos, such as taboos in Ghana related to giving, receiving, eating and drinking, as well as pointing, with the left hand. Pointing with the index finger may be restricted or avoided in certain cultures due to it being considered impolite or taboo

(see Wilkins 2003, pp. 174–5). In Yoruba, index finger pointing towards a referent who is older may be impolite, although open-hand pointing is acceptable (Ola 2009). This also applies to many parts of East Asia, such as Taiwan.

Experimental research has shown that gesture interacts closely with prosody in the communication of (im)politeness. Nadeu and Prieto (2011) conducted two perception experiments related to the role of pitch range and its interaction with facial information on the perception of politeness. The first experiment assessed the contribution of varying degrees of pitch range expansion to the perception of politeness in Catalan questions. Contrary to expectation, the results showed that increasing the pitch range of the final portion of the utterance resulted in a progressive *decrease* in the degree of perceived politeness. The second experiment assessed the interaction between pitch range and facial information (e.g., smiling face vs. neutral face). In this case, the results revealed a completely different pattern than the one found in Experiment 1. Crucially, the tendency was for increased pitch height to be perceived as more polite only in the smiling face condition. This experiment provides empirical evidence that prosodic correlates are not directly linked to specific pragmatic meanings (e.g., higher F0 = politeness), and that prosodic information crucially interacts with gestural information. In sum, the work reviewed in this section points to a view of politeness that is inherently multimodal.

4 Case Studies

Research on the role of prosody and gesture in the communication of (im)politeness can generally be divided into production studies and perception studies. Production studies collect naturally occurring or elicited speech, which is then analysed in an exploratory fashion to uncover the prosodic and/or gestural patterns that occur in the (im)politeness-related situation under analysis. Perception studies, on the other hand, use experimental techniques to assess the role of prosody and/or gestures in the way that hearers reach politeness-related judgments. In this section, we look at example analyses from these two research traditions.

4.1 Production Data: Korean

In order to compare the phonetic profile of Korean *contaymal* (polite speech addressed towards a status superior) and *panmal* (informal speech addressed towards a status equal), Winter and Grawunder (2011, 2012), collected

production data from native speakers of Korean using an oral Discourse Completion Task or DCT (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989). The task involved performing certain common speech acts, with half of these speech acts addressed to a status superior, such as a professor, and the other half being addressed to a friend. The following is a sample item from the DCT, with an example of a response given by one participant:[1]

Item: You visit your professor's office and ask him if he has finished writing a letter of recommendation for you. You tell him that it is very urgent, and ask him if he can write it quickly.

Example response: *Yay, annyenhaseyyo, kyoswunim. Cey-ka, um, chwuchense ttaymwuney wa-s-snuntey-yo. Ce, ku ccok-eyse com ppalukey yenlak-i wa-kacikoy-senyo. Kulayse enu cengto toy-si-ess-nunci com yeccwup-ko siph-ese wa-ss-upnita.*
'Yes, hello, professor. I, uhm, came because of the letter of recommendation. They contacted me and said that they need it quickly. So I came here because I wanted to ask how far along you are with it.'

Brown et al. (2014) used a similar task, only this time the utterances were scripted in order to produce *contaymal* and *panmal* utterance strings that were morphologically and lexically identical:

Item addressed to professor (in *contaymal*):
kyoswu-nim, cinan pen-ey malssumha-si-n khemphyuthe phulokulaym-ul kwuha-yss-supnita. ***kulentey sayongpep-i elyew-ese kule-nuntey*** *pappu-si-kyess-ciman camkkan-man kaluchy-e cwu-si-l swu iss-na-yo?*
'Professor, I've bought that computer program that you mentioned last time. **But the instructions are difficult**, so I know you must be busy, but can you teach me how to use it.'

Item addressed to friend (in *panmal*):
Chinkwu-ya, cinan pen-ey malha-n khemphyuthe phulokulaym-ul kwuha-yss-e. ***kulentey sayongpep-i elyew-ese kule-nuntey*** *pappu-kyess-ciman camkkan-man kaluchy-e cwu-l swu iss-e?*
'Hey buddy, I've bought that computer program that you mentioned last time. **But the instructions are difficult**, so I know you must be busy, but can you teach me how to use it.'

[1] We would like to thank Bodo Winter and Sven Grawunder for allowing us to use this example.

As shown in the examples above, the underlined parts of the utterances addressed to the professor and to the friend were identical in terms of morphology and lexical content and therefore differed only in their phonetic production.

This data collection technique was subsequently repeated for further languages. Brown et al. (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of the Korean data (16 participants from Winter and Grawunder 2011, 2012; eight from Brown et al. 2014), alongside newly collected data for Japanese (eight speakers), German (13 speakers), Austrian German (18 speakers) and Russian (six speakers).

The recordings were phonetically analysed using Praat[2] (Boesma and Weenink 2016) for F0 (pitch), intensity (loudness) and a number of measures of voice quality: jitter, shimmer, harmonics-to-noise ratio and the difference between the first and second harmonics. Speech rate was also calculated by counting syllables as they appeared in the transcript, and then dividing these counts by the duration of each response. The data was statistically analysed with R[3] (R Core Team 2013), using mixed logistic regression.

In this case study, we focus on two measurements—pitch and intensity—and how they appeared in the cross-linguistic comparison in Brown et al. (2015). Figure 14.1 shows the difference in the average F0 values (measured in Hz) between the polite condition (i.e. when addressing a status superior, such as a professor) and the informal condition (i.e. when addressing a status equal, such as a close friend). As can be seen, in both of the Korean datasets (Korean 1 = Winter and Grawunder 2011, 2012; Korean 2 = Brown et al. 2014), polite speech was notably lower in pitch than informal speech, and these differences were statistically significant. However, in the other languages the differences between polite and informal speech were much smaller, and indeed were not above chance. Turning to Fig. 14.2, this graph shows the difference in intensity values (measured in dB) between the 'polite' and 'informal' conditions. We see that 'polite' speech was less intense (i.e. quieter) than 'informal' speech for all languages, except for Russian, where the pattern was reversed (these differences were statistically significant for all languages). These results suggest that the use of low pitch for signalling this particular mode of politeness in Korean may be specific to this language, whereas the use of intensity is more universal.

[2] Praat can be downloaded free of charge from www.praat.org. This website also includes a useful beginner's manual and tutorials.

[3] R can be downloaded free of charge from www.r-project.org. For an easily accessible tutorial on the linguistic applications of R, see Winter (2013).




Fig. 14.1 F0 for individual language datasets




Fig. 14.2 Intensity for individual language datasets

In a subsequent study, Brown and Winter (forthcoming) carried out exploratory research of the gestures and other non-verbal behaviours that accompany polite *contaymal* speech and informal *panmal* speech in Korean television dramas. The authors coded and analysed the gestures used in four types of interactions: (1) male lead characters interacting with male intimates, (2) male lead characters interacting with male status superiors, (3) female lead characters interacting with female intimates; and (4) female lead characters interacting with female status superiors. The gestures and non-verbal behaviours were coded under the following categories: arm gestures, facial gestures, physical contact, self-touching, head nods and bows. The authors also coded the orientation of the speakers (i.e. whether their body was oriented towards or away from the interlocutor). It was found that casual speech contained more arm gestures, facial gestures, physical contact and self-touching. As shown in Fig. 14.3, the hand gestures often occupied a relatively large gesture space, and the facial gestures were highly animated in character. In contrast, these behaviours were almost totally absent from the polite speech register. However, the polite speech register contained more head nods and bows.

Regarding bodily orientation, a notable finding was that in interactions between status superiors and status subordinates, the subordinate would almost always orient their body towards the status superior and maintain eye contact on them, whereas the status superior would often orient their body slightly away from the subordinate and withhold eye contact, as shown




Fig. 14.3 Open palm hand gestures and facial gestures that accompany informal *panmal*



Fig. 14.4 The status subordinate (*right*) orients his body towards the status superior, while the status superior (*left*) is oriented to the side and looks down

in Fig. 14.4. Status superiors were particularly likely to move their physical orientation away from the status subordinate when they were uncomfortable or embarrassed. This finding is in line with previous claims that direct body orientation is associated with politeness and indirect orientation with impoliteness (Tree and Manusov 1998). However, it challenges the commonly held assumption that *subordinates* need to avoid eye contact to maintain politeness in East Asian cultures.

4.2 Perception Data: Catalan

The phenomenon of mock impoliteness (as opposed to genuine impoliteness) has been analysed by pragmaticists as the use of impoliteness markers (e.g. the use of 'go to hell') with a social bonding intention rather than as a true expression of impoliteness (see Culpeper 2011; see also Culpeper et al. (Chap. 13), this volume). The two perception studies reported in McKinnon and Prieto (2014) were designed to assess the effects of prosodic and gestural cues in the interpretation of mock impoliteness. Two main factors were controlled in the two experiments, namely situational/discourse context (e.g. genuine impoliteness vs. mock impoliteness context), and types of prosodic and gestural signals (e.g. genuine impoliteness vs. mock impoliteness prosodic and gestural features). In order to prepare the materials, it was necessary to investigate which gestural and prosodic patterns are representative of genuine vs. mock impoliteness in Catalan. To do this, an oral Discourse Completion Task was employed which included situational prompts to elicit genuine vs. mock impoliteness responses (the reader can access the DCT used in the Appendix



Fig. 14.5 Still video images of an example of genuine impoliteness. Target sentence: 'Goddammit, look at the fucking road when you're driving'

of that paper). A total of six native Catalan speakers were videotaped while participating in the oral DCT, and a total of 60 utterances were submitted to prosodic and gestural analysis with Praat and ELAN[4] respectively. The results of the prosodic analysis showed that genuine impoliteness sentences were associated with prosodic features related to the expression of anger, while mock impoliteness sentences were associated with prosodic features related to the expression of joy (this is consistent with Culpeper et al. 2003). The results of the gestural analysis showed the most common feature amongst the genuine impoliteness data was the furrowing of eyebrows and a palm towards the centre gesture that moves straight up vertically, level with the participant's head, before possibly moving straight forward (see Fig. 14.5). By contrast, for mock impoliteness, the most consistent gestural features among all the participants were a smile, shaking of the head, as well a slightly raised arm up to the participant's mid-torso (see Fig. 14.6).

From these audio-visual materials, a set of 20 target utterances were chosen as stimuli for the perception experiments. A total of 97 native speakers of Catalan were asked to participate in two rating experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with audio-only and audio-visual files of the same target sentences that were produced with mock impoliteness vs. genuine impoliteness prosodic and gestural cues. For each trial, they were asked to rate to what extent the speaker (a) was insulting (genuine impoliteness) and (b) was joking (mock impoliteness), on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. A total of 1,880 responses were obtained, which were submitted to statistical analysis (Linear Mixed Model) with the statistics program SPSS. The results indicated a clear asymmetry between the evaluation of intended genuine vs. mock

[4] ELAN is a professional tool for the creation of annotations on video and audio resources. The program can be downloaded free of charge from http://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/.




Fig. 14.6 Still video images of an example of mock impoliteness. Target sentence: 'Why don't you shut the fuck up?'

impoliteness. While genuine impolite utterances are easily detected through prosody alone, mock impoliteness utterances generally need the addition of gestural cues to the prosodic cues to be successfully assessed.

In Experiment 2, participants were asked to rate the same utterances in two conditions (impolite vs mock impolite) preceded with a set of matched and mismatched situational/discourse contexts that favoured either a genuine or a mock impoliteness interpretation. For example, the mock politeness rendition of the sentence 'go to hell' was heard with a previous context favouring either a mock impolite interpretation (matched discourse context) and also with a previous context favouring a genuine impolite interpretation (mismatched context). In the mismatched condition, genuinely impolite discourse contexts were associated with mock impolite utterances, and mock impolite discourse contexts were paired with genuinely impolite utterances. For each trial, participants were asked to rate on a five point Likert scale the extent to which the speaker (a) was insulting (genuine impoliteness) and (b) was joking (mock impoliteness), as well as the degree of adequacy between the situational prompt and the target utterance. A total of 1,000 responses were obtained for this experiment, which were submitted to statistical analysis. First, as expected, the results of Experiment 2 revealed that mismatches between the discourse context and the utterance caused more uncertainty among listeners, which led them to rate the utterance as more 'neutral', i.e. neither genuine nor mock impoliteness. Second, Experiment 2 also revealed a distinction between the evaluations of genuine vs. mock impoliteness utterances. As in Experiment 1, when participants were presented with only the sound file (e.g., without gestures) of the intended mock impoliteness utterances, they displayed a higher level of uncertainty than when they were presented with gestures. Overall, the two experiments show that the evaluation of mock impoliteness is a sensitive pragmatic phenomenon, and that mock impoliteness is always prone to be misunderstood as impolite behaviour.

As such, it needs to be continuously modulated and evaluated by participants in a conversation, who need to take into account and interactively assess socio-pragmatic and discourse contextual features, as well as lexical, prosodic and gestural signals.

5 Summary and Future Directions

The expression and perception of (im)politeness is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that is influenced by multiple sets of social and communicative factors. As demonstrated in this chapter, research has shown that prosody and gesture play crucial roles in the way that politeness is negotiated in context.

To date, research has tended to focus on fairly prototypical areas of (im)politeness, such as the prosody and gestures that accompany (im)politeness formulae, or speech addressed to a social superior. Going forward, researchers will need to integrate more complex and nuanced pragmatic factors into research designs, and look more closely at the way that the use of prosody and gestures varies across different contexts, or according to speaker identity. On this last point, the influence of gender on the multimodal expression of (im)politeness is expected to be a crucial research question, although it has attracted only very little research to date.

One strength of existent research into prosodic and gestural dimensions of (im)politeness is that it has featured languages that are relatively under-researched in the (im)politeness literature, such as Catalan and Korean. However, there is still a need for research into a wider range of languages, and for more direct cross-linguistic comparisons to be made. To facilitate cross-linguistic comparisons, researchers will need to establish standardised ways to not only measure prosodic parameters, but also to code gestural parameters and pragmatic information in a database, as well as comparable eliciting methods.

Finally, future research will need to address more directly the relative perceptual relevance of prosodic and gestural (im)politeness cues. Although previous studies have shown that these cues are important to perception, it is still not clear whether these non-verbal cues are of equal (or possibly superior) importance to the more widely researched verbal cues. In addition, research has not yet established in which situations (or positions within the utterance or interaction) non-verbal cues carry most meaning.

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Experimental Approaches to Linguistic (Im)politeness

Thomas Holtgraves and Jean-François Bonnefon

1 Introduction

Experimental approaches to (im)politeness have a relatively long history but have tended to remain somewhat out of the mainstream of politeness research. This is unfortunate because experimental approaches are particularly useful for theory testing; as such they provide an important complement to more naturalistic research methodologies (see Jucker and Staley, Chap. 16 this volume). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a relatively broad overview of experimental research on linguistic politeness, describing both methodological techniques as well as some of the major findings and their theoretical implications. We begin by providing a brief description of the key concepts and logic underlying experimental approaches. The largest section of the chapter follows and consists of a review of experimental research on politeness. In that section we first describe the early research testing certain propositions from Brown and Levinson's politeness theory. This is followed by a consideration of research across a range of topics examining some of

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_15

the social and cognitive consequences of politeness, including an extended analysis of one case study. Our overall goal with this chapter is to articulate the manner in which experimental approaches can work hand-in-glove with other approaches to further our understanding of politeness.

2 Key Concepts and Methods

Two of the hallmarks of experimental approaches are manipulation and control. That is, researchers will manipulate the variable(s) of interest, such as the presence or absence of politeness, or different types of politeness, and then examine their impact on the variable(s) of interest such as politeness judgments, utterance interpretation, perceptions of a speaker and so on. Control of other variables is typically achieved via random assignment of participants to conditions. For example, a researcher interested in the role of politeness in persuasion could randomly assign participants to read a persuasive message that contains multiple politeness markers, or an identical message that does not contain those markers. After reading one of the two messages all participants might then be asked to indicate their attitude toward the message proposal. If politeness enhances persuasiveness, then those reading the polite version should have more favourable attitudes toward the message topic than those reading the control version. Any potential differences between participants, such as pre-existing differences in attitudes, intelligence, personality and so on, are controlled via random assignment of participants to conditions.

The issue then arises as to how much more favourable those attitudes need to be in order to conclude that politeness influences persuasiveness. This is answered by evaluating the results using some type of inferential statistical procedure. This is typically accomplished by estimating the probability of obtaining the observed difference in the sample of individuals participating in the study, if in fact there was no difference in the general population from which these individuals are sampled (i.e. the null hypothesis). If the probability of observing such a difference is low (typically less than .05), then the researcher will conclude that the effect is real (i.e. significant and unlikely to simply reflect chance variation). There are other statistical procedures that can accompany or replace null hypothesis testing (e.g. confidence intervals, effect sizes).[1] If the data suggest that only some politeness markers play a role in persuasion, then researchers may modify their theoretical approach and

[1] There continues to be some controversy surrounding the logic of null hypothesis testing (e.g. Levine et al. 2008).

collect additional data as a means of evaluating this alteration. The back and forth between theory and data is also one of the hallmarks of experimental approaches. Section 4 will use case studies to provide additional details in the specific case of politeness.

One potential problem with experimental approaches to politeness, as with all experimental approaches to language, is the issue of generalisability. Testing the effects of a language variable by manipulating certain words raises the issue of whether any observed effects are simply unique to those words, or whether they generalise to other words in that class. For example, if a persuasive message containing politeness markers was more persuasive than the control message, is that effect unique to the politeness markers used in the message, or does it generalise to all politeness markers? This is why experimental language researchers will often treat both participants and language as random variables, testing for the generalisability of results over both participants and verbal stimuli.

3 Critical Review of Relevant Empirical Research

3.1 Initial Tests of Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory

The re-issue of Penelope Brown and Steven Levinson's politeness theory in 1987, followed by Roger Brown's (1988) endorsement of their theory, resulted in a brief flurry of experimental studies of politeness, research that was conducted primarily by social psychologists and communication scholars. In the main, this research was designed to test various propositions derived from Brown and Levinson's theory that focused primarily on (1) the ordering of politeness superstrategies and (2) the effects of imposition, power and distance on levels of politeness. We consider each of these two issues in turn.

Ordering of Superstrategies

Brown and Levinson proposed the existence of four linguistic superstrategies that constituted a universal continuum of politeness; bald-on-record was the least polite, followed in ascending order by positive politeness, negative politeness and off-record politeness. This was viewed as a testable proposition and several researchers did just that, with most of these studies examining

requests. To do this, researchers generated tokens of the four superstrategies which were then rated by participants in terms of politeness and related constructs (e.g. liking of the speaker). Partial support for the theory's ordering was obtained (Bauman 1988; Blum-Kulka 1987; Holtgraves and Yang 1990), and there was some evidence for its cross-cultural generality (Fraser and Nolan 1981; Hill et al. 1986; Holtgraves and Yang 1990).

At the same time, however, some of this research demonstrated problems with the superstrategy ordering. First, at least for requests, one major exception to the predicted ordering was that negatively polite forms were often ranked higher in politeness than off-record forms. Several possibilities were suggested to account for this. Some researchers argued that off-record forms carry a cost because the recipient must make an effort in order to infer the speaker's meaning (Blum-Kulka 1987; Leech 1983). Others suggested that off-record forms give the impression of manipulativeness on the part of the speaker (Lakoff 1973). On the other hand, off-record forms may not function as truly ambiguous messages in an experimental context: given the fact that participants are asked to rate a set of requests, they are likely to catch up on the fact that all the utterances are requests, thereby eliminating their ambiguity. The broader issue here is whether politeness should be equated with indirectness; the failure of experimental research to provide total support for the Brown and Levinson's politeness ordering suggests that they are related but far from identical. As many have demonstrated, indirectness can occur for reasons other than politeness (e.g. Pinker et al. 2008), and of course politeness may be conveyed by means other than indirectness. The relationship between politeness and indirectness remains an important, unresolved issue that could benefit from additional experimental research.

A second and related issue arose regarding the proposed ordering of negative and positive politeness strategies. Some researchers argued that these forms are qualitatively different and hence cannot be ordered on a unidimensional continuum (Baxter 1984; Lim and Bowers 1991; Scollon and Scollon 1981; Tracy 1990). For directives (threats to the hearer's negative face) the proposed ordering makes sense theoretically (negative politeness grants the hearer greater autonomy than positive politeness) and is supported by empirical research (Holtgraves and Yang 1990). On the other hand, for acts that threaten primarily the hearer's positive face, research suggests that positive politeness may be perceived as more polite than negative politeness (Lim and Bowers 1991). In fact, for acts that threaten the recipient's positive face, it is difficult to imagine what negative politeness would look like. In experimental research on disagreements, instances of negative politeness were virtually nonexistent (Holtgraves 1997). One possibility in this regard is that politeness

strategies can be ordered on the basis of a specificity principle; a strategy that orients to the specific type of face threatened will be regarded as the most polite strategy. Thus, negatively polite strategies would be more polite for acts threatening the hearer's negative face, and positively polite strategies would be more polite for acts threatening the hearer's positive face. This also is an issue that could benefit from additional experimental research.

Imposition, Power and Distance

One of the attractions of Brown and Levinson's politeness theory for social psychologists was the specification of clear links between language and the major social dimensions of power and distance. As a result, multiple experiments were conducted, both in the lab and in the field, examining the impact of these variables on the production and perception of politeness.

Brown and Levinson's theory assumes that as hearer power, relationship distance and act imposition increase, so too does the overall weightiness of the act. Increased politeness is assumed to reflect increased weightiness. Researchers used relatively straightforward role-playing scenario techniques to manipulate power, distance, and imposition in order to examine their impact on the perceptions and production of politeness. Consistent support was found for the imposition variable, with increasing imposition associated with increasing levels of politeness. This effect was found for requests (Brown and Gilman 1989; Holtgraves and Yang 1992; Leichty and Applegate 1991), expressions of gratitude (Okamoto and Robinson 1997), recommendations vs. reports (Lambert 1996), accounts (Gonzales et al. 1990; McLaughlin et al. 1983), as well as other speech acts (Brown and Gilman 1989; Leitchy and Applegate 1991). Some null findings were reported (Baxter 1984) but they were rare.

Experimental research was also generally supportive of the power variable. Increasing politeness as a function of increasing hearer power was found with requests (Holtgraves and Yang 1990, 1992; Leichty and Applegate 1991; Lim and Bowers 1991), including observational studies of actual requests (Blum-Kulka et al. 1985). As well, power was found to have the predicted effects on the politeness of messages conveying bad news (Ambady et al. 1996), teasing (Keltner et al. 1998), remindings and complaints (Leitchy and Applegate 1991), criticisms (Lim and Bowers 1991), accounts (Gonzales et al. 1990) and questions (Holtgraves 1986). Some of these effects were replicated cross-culturally (Holtgraves and Yang 1992; Ambady et al. 1996).

Finally, the results for the effects of relationship distance on politeness were mixed. Consistent with the theory, some researchers reported greater politeness as a function of increasing distance between interlocutors (Holtgraves and Yang 1992; Wood and Kroger 1991); others reported the exact opposite (Baxter 1984; Brown and Gilman 1989). And some (e.g. Lambert 1996) have reported no relationship between distance and politeness. Distance, of course, is a multi-faceted variable and it has been measured and manipulated in a variety of ways. Slugoski and Turnbull (1988) (see also Brown and Gilman 1989) argued that researchers sometimes confounded distance (i.e. familiarity) and affect (i.e. liking). Higher levels of politeness have been found to be associated with greater interpersonal distance (i.e. interactants are more polite with people with whom they are less familiar) but also with greater liking (people are more polite with those whom they like). Recent research suggests, however, that relationship affect can be overridden by interactants' momentary emotional changes, an effect that undermines its usefulness in this regard (Vergis and Terkourafi 2015).

One issue that has been raised regarding the Brown and Levinson model is the manner in which power, distance and imposition interact. The model (implicitly) assumes that their effects are additive. Empirical research suggests otherwise. Many researchers who have examined the simultaneous impact of these variables on politeness have reported interactions between them, including Power by Distance interactions (Blum-Kulka et al. 1985; Holtgraves and Yang 1990; Lim and Bowers 1991), Imposition by Distance interactions (Holtgraves and Yang 1992; Leitchy and Applegate 1991) and Imposition by Power interactions (Holtgraves and Yang 1992; Gonzales et al. 1990). The existence of these interactions simply means that as the effects of one of the interpersonal variables become very large, the effects of the other two variables become much smaller. For example, a person making an extremely large request will tend to be polite regardless of power and distance.

A second issue is whether politeness is influenced by variables other than power, distance and imposition. Obviously it is. It is important to note, however, that power, distance and imposition are high-level, abstract variables that should subsume more specific variables. For example, gender, ethnicity, occupational differences and so on are variables that feed into power and distance, and, ultimately, politeness. Even mood states may be incorporated in the model in this way. For example, Forgas (1999a, b) demonstrated that people in sad moods prefer greater politeness than people in happy moods. But why does mood affect politeness in the first place? One possibility is that a person's mood influences their perceptions of the interpersonal context (power, distance and imposition). So, people in a sad mood may perceive themselves

as being relatively low in power, or perceive an act as being relatively more imposing, and it is these perceptions that affect their level of politeness.

On the other hand, Terkourafi (2001, 2005; Vergis and Terkourafi 2015) has argued for a frame-based approach to politeness in which different situational contexts, over time, come to be associated with expected politeness forms (i.e. they become conventionalised). Although these expectancies can be overridden by the context, the default meaning of these terms become part of the lexical meaning and do not intentionally convey (im)politeness. This alternative offers a more granular approach, one in which power, distance and imposition can play a role in politeness, but not the overarching role theorised by Brown and Levinson (1987).

Whether mood and other intrapersonal variables can be handled within the Brown and Levinson (1987) framework remains to be seen. The empirical examination of other variables theorised to impact politeness should simultaneously assess power, distance and imposition as potential mediating variables.

3.2 Experimental Extensions of Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory

In addition to research designed to test propositions derived from politeness theory, other researchers have used politeness theory as a framework for examining a variety of social and cognitive processes related to language use. In this section, we review research on the role of politeness in person perception, memory and comprehension, reasoning (including a case study) and Parkinson's Disease.

Person Perception

Person perception has a long history of research and theorising in social psychology dating back to some of the field's founding scholars (e.g. Asch 1946). One of the fundamental issues in this research is the manner in which people translate raw sensory data into dimensions that can be used for perceiving people. Politeness provides one such avenue and the logic is straightforward. If the use of a particular linguistic form is affected by power and distance, it follows that the use of a particular linguistic form will be informative for observers (including the hearer) regarding the speaker's perceived power and distance. For example, if high-status speakers use less polite forms than lower-status interactants for performing the same act, then the use of less polite forms should result in perceptions of higher speaker status, other things being equal.

In a cross-cultural study using participants from the United States and Korea, Holtgraves and Yang (1990) found that less polite request forms were associated with perceptions of greater speaker power. This effect was similar for Koreans and Americans and occurred with relatively minor wording changes. For example, 'Would you get the mail?' resulted in perceptions of greater speaker power than 'Could you get the mail?' There are, of course, obvious limits to such an effect. In fact, when a high-status speaker is extremely polite to a subordinate it will often result in perceived sarcasm (Slugoski and Turnbull 1988). Other research has demonstrated that levels of politeness/facework can influence perceptions of participants on other dimensions such as assertiveness, credibility, attractiveness and so on (Holtgraves 1992).

Note that these findings should not be construed as indicating that language-based person perception is static. The existence of multiple determinants allows people to strategically vary their politeness as a means of negotiating and/or altering the interpersonal context; it is, in effect, an important component of impression management (Goffman 1959). So, a higher power person (e.g. a boss) who moves from negative politeness to positive politeness may be attempting to negotiate a closer relationship. Or, a person in an established relationship may begin to use less politeness as a means of negotiating higher power in the relationship. And so on. At the same time, the existence of multiple politeness determinants can also result in interpersonal misperceptions or misunderstandings. A speaker may assume his politeness level reflects one dimension (e.g. closeness), but his interlocutor may assume it reflects a different dimension (e.g. status). This negotiated nature of politeness-based person perception awaits further empirical investigation.

Powerful vs. Powerless Language

One particularly important subarea within this domain is research on what has been termed powerful vs. powerless language. The concept of powerless language originated in Robin Lakoff's (1975) writings regarding the 'female' register. Subsequent research, however, demonstrated that this register was not unique to women but instead reflected lower power (Crosby and Nyquist 1977; Erickson et al. 1978). In general, a powerless linguistic style refers to the presence of linguistic features such as tag questions, hesitations, disclaimers, hedges, indirectness and so on; powerful language refers to the absence of these features. At a very general level, then, powerless language is roughly equivalent to polite language. Researchers have examined the impact of a powerless linguistic style in a variety of contexts and found that the use of a powerless style

(relative to a powerful style) results in perceptions of less speaker credibility (Burrell and Koper 1998; Erickson et al. 1978), as well as lower scores on other dimensions associated with overall competence (Bradac and Mulac 1984; Gibbons et al. 1991; Hosman and Wright 1987). These effects occurred regardless of the speaker's gender and are consistent with previously discussed research demonstrating a link between politeness and power. In addition, other researchers have found that, depending on the context, messages phrased in a powerless style will be less persuasive than the same message phrased in a powerful style (Holtgraves and Lasky 1999; Blankenship and Holtgraves 2005). However, Carli's (1999) research suggests that this effect depends on the gender of the speaker and the recipient.

Processing Politeness: Memory and Comprehension

As this review suggests, variations in politeness have effects on a range of social and cognitive processes. But how, exactly, is politeness processed? One line of research has examined memory for politeness wording. A long-standing finding in the memory literature is that people typically forget how something was said (i.e. the wording of an utterance) but retain the gist of what was said (Sachs 1967). An important exception to this, however, is that wording will be remembered well when it has interpersonal implications. For example, people remember the wording of jokes (Keenan et al. 1977; MacWhinney et al. 1982). Politeness, of course, is a dimension of language with clear interpersonal implications. And research suggests that this wording is spontaneously encoded and retained. In several experiments, Holtgraves (1997) examined incidental memory for wording that varied in politeness. In general, people remembered politeness wording at levels exceeding chance, and did so particularly for politeness wording that was inconsistent with the social context. For example, participants in a psychology experiment were more likely to remember impolite forms if the speaker was low in status (a graduate student) and polite forms if the speaker was high in status (a faculty member). Such forms violate expectations and hence are remembered well. Interestingly, even if the specific wording is not remembered, people appear to encode the overall level of politeness and recall wordings consistent with that level of politeness even if they cannot recall the exact wording. In others words, if participants heard an impolite request, when asked to recall that request they tended to recall an impolite (rather than polite) form, even if they could not remember the exact wording. Further, Slugoski (1995) demonstrated that politeness wording can influence the perceived imposition of a request.

Tests of Politeness and Reasoning

Reasoning operates through tool words which broadly fall under connectives (e.g. and, or, not, if ... then) and quantifiers (e.g. some, most, probable, possible). Politeness is important in this field because it can affect the interpretation of connectives and quantifiers, and therefore the conclusions that reasoners reach when manipulating connectives and quantifiers (Bonnefon 2014; Bonnefon et al. 2011b).

Consider for example the quantifier 'some' in 'Some Peruvian generals are male.' From this single piece of information, most reasoners conclude that not all Peruvian generals are male, or, equivalently, that there are female Peruvian generals (Schmidt and Thompson 2008). This interpretation of 'some' as implying 'not all' is based on a principle of pragmatic efficiency: if the speaker had known that all Peruvian generals were male, they would have just said so. The fact that they used the weaker term 'some' means that they were not in a position to use 'all', hence the inference that some Peruvian generals are female (Geurts 2010).

Politeness, however, can complicate the picture by introducing another reason why a speaker might want to use a weaker term. Compare 'some people loved your talk' and 'some people hated your talk'. In the latter case, a polite speaker may very well want to tactfully use the term 'some', even though they are aware that everyone hated the talk. And indeed, experimental findings confirmed that reasoners had trouble interpreting 'some' in threatening statements such as 'some people hated your talk': about half of them no longer concluded that some people did not hate the talk (Bonnefon et al. 2009). In a similar vein, other reasoning experiments showed that politeness could change the interpretation of the disjunction 'or' from exclusive (either one but not both) to inclusive (either one and possibly both), or change the way reasoners combined several 'if … then' conditional statements (Demeure et al. 2009; Feeney and Bonnefon 2013; Pighin and Bonnefon 2011). These experiments always combined a theoretical analysis based on politeness (in order to predict the contextual elements which may shift the interpretation of a connective or a quantifier) and the typical experimental approach used in reasoning research, in which pieces of information are presented to reasoners, who then rate or generate the various conclusions which can be drawn from these pieces of information.

Politeness theory was also instrumental in experimental research on the 'severity effect' (Bonnefon and Villejoubert 2006; Harris et al. 2009). A severity effect occurs when people overestimate the probability of an event as a function of the badness of this event. That is, when events A and B are both qualified as

'likely' (or probable, possible, etc.), and A is a worse event than B, then A will be estimated as having a higher probability than B. Consider for example:

(A) The offender will possibly kill again;
(B) The offender will possibly return to the crime scene.

When presented with these two statements, and asked about the probability of each event, people typically assign a greater probability to the offender killing again, than to the offender returning to the crime scene (Harris and Corner 2011;Pighin et al. 2011;Villejoubert et al. 2009).

Politeness was called upon to explain this robust experimental finding. The broad idea here is that the worse the news that a speaker must communicate, the more plausible it is that the speaker will politely attenuate the impact of the bad news by sugar coating it with a certainty quantifier such as 'possibly' (e.g. 'Your test results possibly suggest that you may have diabetes'). This is a testable prediction: the experimental strategy is simply to assess people's perception of the extent to which the speaker is being polite, to assess the numerical probability they assign to the event and to compute the correlation between these two measures. Such experimental tests have largely confirmed the politeness account of the severity effect (Bonnefon and Villejoubert 2006; Juanchich et al. 2012; Sirota and Juanchich 2012; Juanchich and Sirota 2013).

In sum, the use of experimental techniques has confirmed the important role of politeness in reasoning and risk communication, opening promising avenues for research integrating pragmatics, reasoning and decision making.

4 Case Studies

4.1 Experiments on Discourse Markers

In this section, we offer a more detailed description of a series of experiments on discourse markers and politeness (Bonnefon et al. 2015) in order to emphasise the process of experimental testing. This project started with a robust experimental finding already described in section "Tests of Politeness and Reasoning" of this chapter. When reasoners interpret a statement such as 'some people did *x*', they interpret 'some' as meaning 'not all' when *x* has positive valence for the listener (e.g. 'some people loved your talk' implies 'not everyone loved your talk'), but they hesitate between 'not all' and 'possibly all' when *x* has negative valence for the listener (e.g. 'some people hated your talk' is ambiguous between 'not everyone hated your talk' and 'possibly everyone hated your talk').

We hypothesised that reasoners might be able to use contextual cues in order to determine whether the speaker was straightforward (i.e. 'some' means 'not all') or polite (i.e. 'some' means 'possibly all'). We decided to study the impact of two such cues: prefacing the statement with 'well', and prefacing it with a silent pause. Because such discourse markers have been shown to signal an incoming polite statement (Holtgraves 2000), we predicted that they could help people detect the polite intention of the speaker. To test this prediction, we presented reasoners with statements such as 'some people loved your talk' or 'some people hated your talk', which could either be prefaced by the word 'well', by a silent pause or by neither. We expected that both markers would amplify the valence effect, making it easier to interpret 'some hated' as 'possibly all hated' and 'some loved' as 'not all loved'.

In three experiments, we obtained mixed evidence for our prediction. We found out that only pauses had the expected effect, whereas 'wells' only encouraged the 'not all' interpretation for 'some loved' statements, and did nothing for the interpretation of 'some hated' statements.

To make sense of these results, we engaged in a more subtle theoretical analysis of the two markers. From our literature review, we concluded that 'wells' and pauses had different cognitive effects: 'wells' signalled the need for further cognitive elaboration of the incoming statement (Blakemore 2002; Bronwen 2010), whereas pauses prepared listeners for a low-probability, unexpected statement (Corley et al. 2007; MacGregor et al. 2010). Based on this interpretation of our current results, we were able to generate a new series of testable predictions, which formed the impetus for a second series of experiments.

Consider again three possible types of scalar statements: *positive* statements like 'some people loved your idea', *negative* statements such as 'some people hated your idea', and *neutral* statements such as 'some people bought tickets'. Scalar inferences from positive and neutral statements are linked to greater cognitive effort (e.g. De Neys and Schaeken 2007), but the relation is not straightforward for negative statements (Bonnefon et al. 2011a). Accordingly, given the assumption that 'wells' signal the need for greater cognitive effort, 'wells' should increase the rate of scalar inferences for positive and neutral statements, but not necessarily for negative statements.

Predictions are different for pauses, given the assumption that pauses orient the listener to the least favourable interpretation of the statement. The least favourable interpretation of a positive statement is that not everybody 'loved', the least favourable interpretation of a negative statement is that possibly everybody 'hated' and neutral statements do not have a least favourable interpretation one way or the other. Accordingly, pauses should increase the rate of scalar inferences from positive statements, decrease the rate of scalar inferences from negative statements and have no effect on neutral statements.

Finally, if pauses prepare listeners for unfavourable utterances, they should prompt them to fill in statements like 'some people … your idea' with a negative verb such as 'hated', rather than with a positive verb such as 'loved'. No such effect, though, should be expected from Wells.

All these predictions were tested and confirmed in a series of five experiments. Overall, this example provides a good illustration of the strength of the experimental method in the politeness domain. In particular, it illustrates the back and forth dynamics of theory to data, and data to theory. An initial hypothesis on the role of discourse markers in politeness detection proved unsatisfying after a first stage of data collection; these data were explained by refining our initial theoretical model; and this refined theoretical model allowed new testable predictions which were confirmed in a second stage of data collection. We believe this back-and-forth dynamic can open very promising avenues of future research on (im)politeness.

4.2 Politeness and Parkinson's Disease

Politeness theory provides a coherent and relatively comprehensive framework for examining a variety of communication difficulties. Hence, it has proven to be useful in terms of understanding language deficits associated with certain disorders. Consider, for example, recent research on language deficits in Parkinson's Disease (PD). Although PD is primarily associated with debilitating extrapyramidal motor dysfunction, it also affects thinking, reasoning, planning and language functions, and in terms of the latter there is some evidence of pragmatic impairment in PD (e.g. Lewis et al. 1998; McNamara and Durso 2003), including politeness. To investigate the latter, Holtgraves and McNamara (2010) used a role-playing task and asked participants (those with Parkinson's disease and matched controls) to imagine being in situations in which they were to make a request of another person and to write out exactly what they would say in order to make each request. Two variables were manipulated: degree of imposition and relative status. Overall, the PD participants were less polite than the control participants. More importantly, the politeness of the PD participants (relative to the control participants) was less influenced by the size of the request. That is, for control participants, increasing imposition was associated with increasing politeness; this did not occur for PD participants. In terms of the effects of speaker status, the difference between PD and control participants was not reliable. However, sensitivity to status did vary significantly as a function of medication dosage. PD participants who were taking a lower dosage varied their politeness as a function of status in the predicted manner; PD participants in the high dosage group did not.

What are the potential sources of the politeness impairment in PD? One possibility is that it reflects an overall decline in cognitive capabilities, especially executive cognitive functions (ECFs) (Owen et al. 1992; Lange et al. 1992; Taylor and Saint-Cyr 1995; Troster and Woods 2003; McNamara et al. 2008). Reduced cognitive resources in PD could result in an attentional deficit such that variations in request size are not noticed; because they are not noticed there is no corresponding change in politeness. Consistent with this possibility, researchers have demonstrated a clear connection between executive function deficits in PD and the ability to contribute meaningfully (i.e. appropriately informative) to conversations (Holtgraves et al. 2013). Another possibility is that even when variations in the context are noticed, the cognitive capacities required to produce more polite (and cognitively complex) strategies is hindered in people with PD. In the Holtgraves and McNamara (2010) research, participants on higher doses of dopaminergic medication did notice variations in recipient status (based on manipulation check items) but they failed to produce more polite strategies for a higher power recipient.

Previous research has documented problematic social behaviors in patients with PD including inappropriate and ineffective attempts at communication, social withdrawal, sexual improprieties, ignoring doctor's orders/suggestions, irresponsible use of money (e.g. gambling away the family's savings) and a strange insensitivity to the social, moral and personal consequences of inappropriate social behaviours (Menza et al. 1993; Crucian et al. 2001). Some of these social deficits may be due to the inability of people with PD to accurately assess the weightiness of their remarks in varying social contexts, and thus to phrase their utterances most effectively and appropriately. Whatever the underlying mechanism(s), the diminished politeness capabilities of people with PD contributes to the communication and interactional difficulties associated with this disorder

5 Summary and Future Directions

In this chapter we have provided a summary and overview of the methods and findings of some of the major experimental approaches to politeness. This is a thriving subarea of research that has contributed both to the politeness literature and to a range of other areas. In this section we present and discuss some of the recent developments in this area along with suggestions for issues deserving of empirical investigation.

We believe the Brown and Levinson model continues to be useful as an overarching framework for examining the relationship between language and

basic psychological processes. Its usefulness derives in part from its hierarchical structure whereby high level variables such as power and distance can subsume other more concrete variables, such as gender, occupation and so on. It may also be possible to use the model to explore individual differences in politeness, an area that has seen relatively little research. That people differ from one another in their levels of politeness is obvious. But why? One possibility is that they differ in their perceptions of interpersonal situations. Introverts, for example, may perceive relatively greater distance between themselves and others, and hence produce higher levels of politeness. Extraverts, on the other hand, may perceive relatively less distance and hence favour the use of relatively less polite but more approach-based strategies (i.e. positive politeness). The possibility that high-level variables, such as (perceived) power and distance, can explain politeness variability (as a function of mood, personality traits, culture, gender and so on) should continue to be pursued.

We also believe that experimental approaches to politeness can provide important information regarding the *processing* of politeness and hence address theoretically important issues such as the relationship between politeness and indirectness. To do this requires the adaptation and use of on-line techniques and this represents something of a new avenue in politeness research. One such technique is an eye-tracking methodology. For example, Raizen et al. (2015) used an eye-tracking procedure to examine the processing of taboo words (i.e. potential violations of positive face). Their results demonstrate the early and important role played by identity-based expectations in the comprehension of taboo words.

Another important development in this regard is the use of electrophysiological techniques to examine politeness processing in real time. Although electrophysiological techniques have been used in psycholinguistic research for several decades (e.g. Kutas and Hillyard 1980), the use of these techniques to study pragmatic phenomena, including politeness, is relatively recent (van Berkum 2012; Hoeks and Bouwer 2014). A good example is the work of Jiang and colleagues (Jiang et al. 2013; Jiang and Zhou 2015). These researchers recorded evoked related potentials (ERPs) as participants read conversations in which speaker status and pronoun type (respectful vs. disrespectful) were manipulated. Status inconsistent pronouns (e.g., disrespectful pronoun from a lower status speaker) resulted in an enhanced N400—an indicator of semantic integration effort—than status inconsistent pronouns, thereby suggesting that brain activity varies as a function of the pragmatic implications. Also noteworthy in this research was the investigation of individual differences; participants who were more tolerant of disrespectful usage tended not to display these effects. Clearly, the study of politeness using electrophysiological techniques

is only beginning, but it is a technique with the potential to provide unambiguous information regarding the processes involved in the comprehension of politeness. Moreover, the use of these techniques can be expanded to other areas as well. For example, the specific role played by politeness in processing scalar expressions—as described earlier in this chapter—could be usefully explored with electrophysiological techniques.

Experimental approaches to politeness allow for precise control over extraneous variables. There is a downside, of course, in that experimental stimuli may be sometimes artificial and divorced from the context in which they might actually occur. Trade-offs are obviously involved; gains in experimental control may be paid for with a decline in realism. Researchers, however, can strive to make their stimuli as realistic as possible, for example, by collecting actual discourse samples to be used in experimental research. And in fact, it may be possible to use electrophysiological techniques as individuals engage in (constrained) natural language use (e.g. Hoeks and Bouwer 2014). The gain in precise experimental control, coupled with the back and forth between theory and data, can allow for advances in our understanding of certain facets of politeness, an understanding that can contribute to and compliment advances made with non-experimental techniques.

Acknowledgements The writing of this chapter was partially supported by a grant (BCS-1224553) from the National Science Foundation awarded to the first author.

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16

(Im)politeness and Developments in Methodology

Andreas H. Jucker and Larssyn Staley

1 Introduction

Since the 1970s, a wide range of approaches has been brought to the study of (im)politeness. Initially researchers heavily relied on their native-speaker intuitions to theorise about issues of politeness (e.g. Lakoff 1973, 1975), but soon they began to base their studies on the investigation of empirical data. The many conceptualisations of what politeness (and later impoliteness) is, the various types of data drawn on and the different research questions under investigation have inevitably led to a broad array of approaches to (im)politeness research. Researchers often argue for the superiority of their own procedure of data collection and analysis. In this overview of research methods, however, we take a more neutral stance. Research methods must always be assessed on the basis of their suitability to specific research questions and in connection with the specific conceptualisation of politeness or impoliteness used for a particular investigation. Corpus-based studies, for instance, are not inherently better than studies based on data gathered through questionnaire-based or intuition-based research, but they might be more suited to certain types of research questions. For this reason, we do not restrict our considerations to one particular conceptualisation of politeness. We try to survey a large range of research that uses the term 'politeness'

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_16

or 'impoliteness' to designate its object of investigation, and we also include research that focuses more directly on specific speech acts that are considered to be polite or impolite. The boundaries of (im)politeness research are fuzzy, and we will be more concerned with the chosen methods of data collection and analysis rather than with the boundary disputes in the field.

2 Key Concepts: Methods and Methodologies

In this contribution, we use the term 'method' to refer to a particular way of carrying out research, specific ways of collecting data or specific ways of analysing such data. The term 'methodology', on the other hand, refers more globally to a research design that combines a set of research questions with appropriate theoretical foundations and specific methods of data collection and analysis. This means that data collection methods and methods of data analysis can only be assessed and evaluated in the context of their research methodologies and on the basis of the following questions: Are the methods suitable to support specific research hypotheses or to answer specific research questions? And what are the theoretical foundations? Does the investigation focus on a first order definition of the term politeness or impoliteness (in the sense of Eelen 2001, pp. 30–43; Watts et al. 1992, pp. xx, xxii, 3; or Watts 2003, pp. 4, 8–12), i.e. does it focus on how a specific speech community uses these terms? Or does it focus on a second order definition? Does it focus on a specific and well-defined notion of (im)politeness? For ease of presentation, we shall take the methods of data collection as a starting point in our outline of the interdependence of data collection, research questions and data analysis in Sect. 3 below.

Many linguists rely—at least to some extent—on intuited data, that is to say, on their own intuition about possible and impossible elements and constructions in their native language. In some cases researchers do not rely on their own intuition but elicit the intuition of native speakers with the help of interviews and rating questionnaires. The use of such data has often been criticised and it is sometimes subsumed under the slightly disparaging label of 'armchair linguistics' (Clark and Bangerter 2004; Jucker 2009). It stands in opposition to empirical approaches that rely on observation. Two types of empirical approaches can be distinguished: the laboratory approach, which uses experimental techniques to elicit linguistic data, and the field approach, which relies exclusively on naturally occurring, real-life linguistic data. Laboratory approaches encompass a wide range of elicitation techniques, such as discourse completion tasks, dialogue construction tasks, role-plays

and other interactional tasks. Field approaches subsume both small-scale data analyses of short extracts of naturally occurring conversations and large-scale investigations of multi-million or even multi-billion word corpora. In general, field data is considered to be more natural than elicited data while elicited data can be more easily controlled for specific variables than field data (Leech 2014, pp. 248, 252).

There are clearly overlaps between these categories, as for instance in a discourse completion task, in which it is difficult to draw the line between the elicitation of spontaneous utterances (laboratory approach) and the elicitation of opinions or intuitions of what would be appropriate utterances in the given situation (armchair approach). And participant observation provides an overlap between a field approach that relies on data that should be as free from researcher interference as possible and a lab approach with its elicitation techniques.

Kasper and Dahl (1991, p. 217) provided a useful way of categorising data collection methods in their meta-study of 39 studies of interlanguage pragmatics. They place the various methods used on two parallel scales. On the one hand, there are methods that focus on perception and comprehension, as for instance in various types of rating or multiple-choice tasks, and on the other hand there are methods that focus on the production of language. These include discourse completion tasks, role-plays and the observation of authentic discourse. On the second scale the methods are arranged in the same sequence from elicited data at one end to observational data at the other. Leech (2014, p. 249) adds another two scales to characterise the same continuum. The first of them distinguishes between maximally controlled settings such as multiple-choice tasks, where respondents are given a small number of options to choose from, and maximally uncontrolled data, such as large natural-language corpora, where speakers are in no way constrained by the researcher in their contributions. The second additional scale distinguishes between contrived and artificial data on the one hand and authentic data on the other. Leech discusses these scales in terms of authenticity versus investigative precision. High authenticity comes with the price of a poor rating of investigative precision and vice versa. In a research project on how different people react to specific compliments, a more controlled setting allows for more precision at the cost of authenticity. Figure 16.1 illustrates three of these dimensions with a range of data collection methods, including more experimental methods, such as eye tracking (see chapter on experimental methods, Holtgraves and Bonnefon (Chap. 15), this volume). The order of the methods is only approximate, arranged along the scale from maximally controlled to maximally uncontrolled data. The difference between contrived and authentic




Fig. 16.1 Data collection methods (partly based on Kasper and Dahl 1991, p. 217 and Leech 2014, p. 249)

data is conceived less as a scale, but rather a dichotomic contrast. In general, the methods on the left side of the figure allow for a higher degree of investigative precision than the methods on the right side.

The method of choice in (im)politeness research also crucially depends on the conceptualisation of what politeness actually is and how it differs from impoliteness. It has become standard in politeness theory to distinguish between everyday folk-notions or perceptions of what polite behaviour is (so-called first-order politeness or politeness$_1$) and scholarly conceptualisations of politeness with precise definitions formulated for research purposes (so-called second-order politeness or politeness$_2$). This distinction was first introduced by Watts et al. (1992) and further developed by Eelen (2001), Watts (2003), Locher and Watts (2005) and others. According to Locher and Watts (2005, p. 16) it makes little sense to maintain a universal theoretical notion of politeness that does not correspond to what speech communities consider to be 'polite', 'politic', 'appropriate' or 'normal'. They also propose that it is necessary to focus on the entire range of relational work between interlocutors. Polite and impolite behaviour constitute only segments of this range and can only be properly understood in the larger context. However, (im)politeness researchers continue to investigate specific and narrowly defined forms of behaviour, albeit with an increased awareness that such investigations are more focused and specialised. They do not provide a comprehensive picture but they may still provide enlightening insights into specific aspects of verbal behaviour.

An additional important issue is the question of whether linguistic expressions (utterances or speech acts) have a more or less fixed, intrinsic politeness or impoliteness value. 'Postmodern' or 'discursive' approaches to (im)politeness

focus on the 'micro, that is, on participants' situated and dynamic evaluations of politeness, not shared conventionalised politeness forms or strategies' (Culpeper 2010, p. 3235), and, therefore, they regularly stress that linguistic forms do not have intrinsic politeness or impoliteness values, as for instance Locher and Watts (2005, p. 29):

> Depending upon the kind of verbal social behavior in which individuals engage, they will adapt their relational work to what is considered appropriate. Given that this is the case, it is not valid to refer to conflictual and aggressive behavior as inherently 'impolite', 'rude', or 'discourteous'. But neither is it valid to classify excessively formal or indirect behavior as automatically 'polite', 'polished', or 'distinguished'. Hence no utterance is inherently polite.

This is sometimes seen as a contrast to the earlier position which argued that politeness or impoliteness values are intrinsic. However, it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to find research that proposes an unmitigated version of such a view. Even Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 65–8), who discuss 'intrinsic FTAs', allow for situational variation. They talk about the fact that some speech acts 'primarily' or 'mainly' perform certain face-threatening acts, e.g. when they argue that orders and requests 'primarily threaten the addressee's (H's) negative face want' (1987, p. 65). This still allows for requests such as 'Come in' or 'Do sit down' (1987, p. 69), which are clearly in the interest of the addressee. Brown and Levinson talk about the intrinsic face-threatening value of speech acts, or more precisely of illocutions, while Locher and Watts (2005, p. 29) talk about the specific linguistic realisation of utterances. In both cases it seems clear that the actual situational context of a speech act or an utterance may override its typical or default value. Leech (2014, p. 251) uses the term 'pragmalinguistic politeness' or 'context-invariant politeness' to refer to such typical or default values of linguistic expressions which can easily be obtained from native speakers in elicitation experiments even if the same expressions may occur with entirely different values in actual contexts.

3 Critical Overview of Data Collection Methods

In this section we provide an overview of the most common data collection methods that have been used in politeness and impoliteness research since the 1970s and how they have developed. We aim to provide a diachronic picture of how methods have developed over the years as well as examples of how certain methods may be particularly advantageous for particular research

questions. For other overviews and critiques of data collection methods in pragmatics and in politeness research see de Paiva (2010), Dollinger (2012), Ewald (2012), Kasper (2008), Golato (2003), Félix-Brasdefer (2008, Chap. 3) and Leech (2014, Chap. 9). The following outline starts with the earliest studies on politeness and impoliteness, but as more recent methods developed parallel to each other, the chronological order is not strictly maintained.

3.1 Armchair Approaches

Philosophical approaches to pragmatics are best exemplified by the early natural language philosophers, such as Austin and Searle. Their work was entirely based on their own intuition and critical thinking. Searle (1969), in particular, developed rigorous analytical methods to distinguish between different individual speech acts and between different classes of speech acts. In the area of politeness research such pure forms of philosophical approaches are very rare but one early example is Robin Lakoff (1973, 1975), whose work on politeness relied almost exclusively on her own intuition. She argued that men and women use language differently and that women are much more than men constrained by social expectations of polite behaviour. Women use 'empty' adjectives like *divine*, *charming* or *cute*, they use various types of hedges, hypercorrect grammar and superpolite forms and they are particularly careful to say 'please' and 'thank you', or at any rate they use them more often and more consistently then men (Lakoff 1975, pp. 53–5). Lakoff was later criticised for her non-empirical approach. But she developed her ideas at a time when linguistics was mostly seen as a philosophical discipline based on rational thinking rather than a strictly empirical one (Jucker 2012).

Leech (1983), too, relied largely on his own intuition as a native speaker when he developed his politeness principles, which he set up as an important addition and complementation of Grice's (1975) co-operative principle, and like Grice he used a philosophical approach. He argued that politeness was not just 'a superficial matter of "being civil"' (1983, p. 104) but it was a missing link between Grice's co-operative principle and how people interpret utterances. People are not always co-operative in the way Grice predicted. They may violate the co-operative principle, for instance, in order to be polite. The politeness principle, with its six submaxims (tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement and sympathy), outweighs the co-operative principle. The interactions of these principles provide explanations that coincide with

his own intuition about the relative politeness of individual utterances. Thus, an utterance such as 'I wouldn't mind a cup of coffee' is marginally more polite as a request than 'Could you spare me a cup of coffee?' Both of them compete with the generosity maxim but only the latter also competes with the tact maxim, that is to say both violate the instigation to minimise benefit to self but only the latter also violates the instigation to minimise cost to other. The entire model, therefore, depends on such fine-tuned native speaker assessments of the politeness values of utterances whose contexts are imaginatively created by the researcher.

Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), who developed their approach to politeness in the 1970s, used a mixed-methods approach drawing on an intuition-based linguistic approach and a more empirical anthropological one. They developed their categories of positive and negative politeness strategies based on their conception of a rational 'Model Person' (1987, p. 58) and illustrative examples drawn from their tape-recorded data of three unrelated languages and cultures: Tzeltal, a Mayan language in Chiapas, Mexico; South Indian Tamil; and American and British English. Although their theory is based on observed examples, the examples are, in a sense, decontextualised because they are extracted from the discursive context and coded without taking into account the prior interaction or the hearer's reaction. They also specify that this type of data is 'supplemented by examples drawn from our native-speaker intuitions for English, and by elicited data for Tzeltal and Tamil' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 59).

Soon after these pioneering studies of politeness in the 1970s and 1980s, researchers increasingly adopted more empirical methods of data collection but they were faced with the choice of either eliciting data in controlled (laboratory) experiments or of relying on data out in the field, i.e. language that was produced for communicative purposes independent of the research project.

3.2 Laboratory Approaches

Early politeness work that adopted a more empirical perspective relied mostly on elicitation techniques, such as discourse completion tasks and role-plays. Such experimental approaches offered a higher level of control over the variables, and made it possible to compare polite behaviour in different social groups or different social contexts. Some of the relevant research was primarily interested in different speech acts but issues of politeness loomed

large over these projects because of the assumed connection between indirectness and modification with politeness that was illustrated in many of Brown and Levinson's strategies (1987, pp. 130–78).

Blum-Kulka and her research associates, for instance, chose requests and apologies for their investigations because these two speech acts constitute prototypical face-threats to the negative face of the addressee and the positive face of the speaker respectively. A request is always an imposition on the addressee's freedom of action and an apology is an acknowledgement that the speaker has done something that might demean his/her standing in the eyes of the addressee. The experimental design of a discourse completion task allowed Blum-Kulka et al. (1989, p. 16) to gather data from large groups of respondents and to compare different language groups, i.e. Australian, American and British English, Canadian French, Danish, German and Hebrew, plus various groups of non-native speakers. These respondents were given printed-out short interactions in which one utterance was missing that the respondents were asked to fill in. The context made it clear what kind of situation was intended, what the role relationship between the speaker and the addressee was supposed to be and what kind of utterance, either a request or an apology, was needed to complete the interaction. Blum-Kulka et al. (1989, p. 13) concede that such data is not 'natural' but they argue that the stereotyped nature of the responses would reveal the cross-cultural differences in sharper contrast. This method has often been discussed and criticised in subsequent research (e.g. Trosborg 1995, pp. 142–3; Beebe and Cummings 1996; Yuan 2001, p. 283; Golato 2003, p. 92, 2005, p. 13; Leech 2014, p. 252). Informants are likely to provide shorter and more formal utterances because of the written nature of the task and because of the limited space provided for the missing utterance. The informants already know how the (fictional) interlocutor is going to react because that is already given as a continuation of the interaction, and the roles depicted in these interactions may be more or less familiar for individual informants (boss, police officer, librarian, professor and so on).

Despite their unquestionable limitations, discourse completion tasks have been shown to be able to approximate natural data at least to some extent and thus to be a useful research tool if treated with the necessary caution (e.g. Economidou-Kogetsidis 2013). A number of modifications have been tested in order to overcome their limitations. Yuan (2001), for instance, used an oral discourse completion task to collect compliments and compliment responses from a large number of speakers of Mandarin. In this case the scenarios were provided in a tape-recorded format rather than as written texts, and the informants were asked to produce the missing utterance in oral form. This allowed the informants to take as much time for their answers as they

wished (Yuan 2001, p. 274). It turned out that the oral discourse completion tasks did indeed produce more features of oral language, such as exclamation particles, repetitions, inversions and omissions, and the utterances were significantly longer than in the corresponding written discourse completion tasks but they still lacked any negotiations between the interlocutors which are typical for real-life interactions (Yuan 2001, p. 284). Barron (2003, 2005, pp. 147–8), on the other hand, used a free discourse completion task (FDCT) (see also 'dialogue construction' in Bardovi-Harlig et al. 2008; Bergman and Kasper 1993) in which informants write both sides of the dialogue and are 'instructed to write as much as they feel is necessary for each situation' (Barron 2005, p. 148). Because the informants create both sides of the conversation and because they are not restricted to one utterance, the role of sequencing can be investigated (2005, p. 148).

Role-plays and role-enactments have also been suggested as solutions to the shortcomings of discourse completion tasks. For her study of requests, complaints and apologies, Trosborg (1995) used this method to collect relevant utterances from native speakers of English, native speakers of Danish and Danish learners of English. The choice of speech acts was again linked to their face-threatening potential. The participants were asked to perform everyday situations in which the speech acts under investigation were bound to occur. A student was asked, for instance, to complain to his or her next-door neighbour about the noise of a party or to apologise to a fellow student for being late for a meeting. The interactions were played out by two participants and therefore provided an opportunity for spontaneous reactions, counter-reactions and negotiations. The method, thus, provides quasi spontaneous data, but the quality will obviously vary depending on the participants' individual willingness and ability to perform such scenes.

3.3 Field Approaches

Field studies depend on the empirical observation of naturally occurring data. The researcher tries to abstain as much as possible from interfering with the production of the data. There are many different ways in which naturally occurring data can be collected ranging from the casual observation of everyday conversations, systematic tape recordings and transcriptions of interactions, to the use of pre-existing databases, such as written materials of various sorts and large-scale language corpora. Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages.

Diary Studies

Some of the early work on politeness relied on the notebook or diary method. This involves a researcher or—more typically—a group of researchers who collect specific instances of verbal behaviour as they encounter them in their daily lives. Manes and Wolfson (1981), for instance, sent out their students to collect compliments and compliment responses by noting them down as accurately and as soon as possible after the encounter. Manes and Wolfson (1981, p. 115) call this an 'ethnographic approach', and they maintain that this 'is the only reliable method for collecting data about the way compliments, or indeed, any other speech act functions'. Holmes (1988, 1995, Chap. 4) also used this approach in her investigation of sex-preferential politeness strategies in the complimenting behaviour of male and female New Zealanders. This method has several advantages. With the help of some student assistants the researcher can gather a large number of naturally occurring compliments and their responses together with contextual information about the interlocutors, the situation, the object of the compliment and so on. It is a form of participant observation, and, therefore, the researcher has first-hand knowledge from one of the participants (the complimenter, the complimentee or a bystander) of what happened in this situation. On the other hand, the method clearly has disadvantages. The participant observer might inadvertently influence the situation in one way or another. He or she might be more likely to pick up stereotypical compliments and miss the more unusual ones. His or her gender might influence the gender pattern of the collected compliment exchanges. And he or she—in spite of best efforts—might write down inaccurate or incomplete versions of the exchange (see Yuan 2001, pp. 286–8; Jucker 2009, p. 1626 for more extensive critiques of this data collection method).

Interactional Approaches

Interactional methods aim to account for the emergent nature of politeness values by analysing the function of utterances in both their discourse and social context. In interactional approaches, politeness values are seen as discursively constructed by the interactants in the given context. Researchers who use interactional methods have expressed a departure from research that analyses single utterances in isolation, in which (im)politeness values were seen as inherent features of the linguistic form, towards a discursive approach that uses naturally occurring and contextualised discourse. Bargiela and Harris (2006, p. 17) state that '[t]he preference for isolated speech acts should

be replaced by (or at least be embedded in) the analysis of exchanges clearly located in the arena of social interaction (Meier 1995) where goals, interests, ends, motivations are played out'. In this chapter, we categorise all politeness research that analyses naturally occurring data within their context, both written and spoken, as interactional. This, however, groups together studies that are based on different methodologies, such as interactional sociolinguistics (cf. Kong 1998), conversation analysis (cf. Piirainen-Marsh 2005) and discourse analysis (cf. Placencia 2008). Although these methodologies have different origins and vary in focus, approach and aims, the boundaries between them are not always straightforward and they all investigate politeness in interaction.

Interactional research is often based on datasets, or what researchers sometimes refer to as small corpora, compiled by the researcher or research group. The spoken discourse compiled for such research is audio or video recorded and tends to be restricted to a specific genre, such as workplace discourse (cf. Holmes 1993), service encounters (cf. Placencia 2008; Upadhyay 2003; Traverso 2006; Kerbrat-Orecchiono 2005, 2006; Kong 1998) or hospitality encounters (cf. Grainger et al. 2015). Placencia explains that delimiting the context to a specific genre 'allows communicative activities, such as requests, to be studied in the sequences in which they are embedded' (2008, p. 4). By collecting their own small corpora, researchers often have access to more information about the interactants and the social context of the interaction than what is generally available for larger corpora. The focus on naturally occurring goal-oriented discourse, in preselected contexts, allows researchers to see how specific types of interaction are negotiated and how they unfold. Having the surrounding social context and, according to Placencia (2008, p. 4), the co-text is essential 'for the interpretation of the rapport value of each utterance in relation to the preceding or following utterances'.

Kong (1998), one of the early interactional studies, highlights the weakness of approaches such as Brown and Levinson (1987) in their inability to fully account for the effect of context, both co-text and social context, on the interpretation of politeness. Kong's study (1998) is based on a dataset of 22 audio-recorded service encounters, all of which involve buying and selling in Hong Kong. In his analysis Kong considers each exchange in its entirety: interpreting each utterance in relation to the surrounding utterances and taking account of the cultural requirements of the interactive goals and the interactants' social relationship. Kong states that his findings cannot be generalised across Hong Kong culture (1998, p. 562) and 'that the two factors proposed by Brown and Levinson, social distance and power, are insensitive to the strong contextual variations found in real-life encounters' (1998, p. 561).

Placencia (2008) takes an interactional approach in her analysis of requests in a corner shop in two varieties of Ecuadorian Spanish, Quinto and Manta, and states that 'Quiteños were found to use more politeness formulas and diminutives, for example, than Madrileños' (2008, p. 7) as well as more internal modification and preambles (2008, p. 23), whereas the Madrileños were found to use less formality (2008, p. 23). Placencia's study shows that the forms that are considered 'polite' in a single interaction type—'corner store encounters'—are in fact not stable, but vary even among national varieties of a language.

Although every approach includes some element of the researcher's intuition/interpretation, such an approach provides the researcher with the context necessary to base their analysis of politeness on how the discourse unfolds and is negotiated, including the interactants' reactions to a particular utterance.

Philological Approaches

Philological approaches—as we understand them—differ from interactional approaches mainly by being based on fictional texts rather than transcriptions of video- or tape-recorded naturally occurring interactions. Such studies are based on the manual analysis of, usually relatively short, fictional texts, e.g. (extracts of) movie scripts, plays or novels. The use of fictional discourse in politeness research stems on the one hand from studies in historical pragmatics, for which recordings of naturally occurring discourse are not available, and on the other from early work in literary stylistics (e.g. Simpson's 1989 article on politeness in Ionesco's play *The Lesson*). Despite not being based on naturally occurring discourse, the philological approach has provided interesting results. As Jucker and Kopaczyk (2017) argue, fictional texts are written by and for specific people with a real communicative purpose. Moreover, both fictional and non-fictional texts may contain elements of the other. One must, as with all data, think critically about the type of data, the communicative context and the generalisations that can be made.

The communicative value of fictional texts is not restricted to historical politeness, but can also provide insights for theories on contemporary impoliteness. In her 2012 paper, Dynel provides a close reading of various scenes from the television series *House* to demonstrate the added value of a multi-party model of impoliteness—which accounts for the different interpretations of and reactions to impolite utterances by ratified participants (addressees) and unratified participants (overhearers, such as bystanders and eavesdroppers). In considering a wider scope of participation, Dynel is able to investigate the different reactions of multiple types of receivers, both intended

and unintended. Dynel points out that some of the inherent characteristics of scripted data can be what make them insightful: (1) utterances are constructed by 'the collective sender in such a way as to facilitate the viewer's, and thus researcher's, interpretation'; (2) generally 'the viewer is granted access to all relevant information' such as a character's interpretation of something as impolite; and (3) viewers 'are normally invited to recognize the speaker's intentions' (2012, p. 176). In Dynel's proposed framework a further level of communication is also considered. Rather than just focusing on the interaction between the characters in the show, she also recognises the second level of communication between the collective sender, those working on the show behind the scenes and the viewers of the show, and considers that what might be considered impolite by various characters in the show, may be what brings about humour or interest for the audience.

From studies like Dynel (2012), we can see that through the use of a philological approach we may gain access to the collective sender's intention; however, in analysing fictional texts we must also account for multiple levels of communication and what exactly is being communicated on what level.

Corpus-based Studies

Corpus-based studies take a quantitative approach to (im)politeness phenomena using electronic searches in large corpora. Such approaches lend themselves more easily to certain politeness features than to others because search strings are needed to perform automated searches. Thus, corpus-based approaches inherit some of the weaknesses of the early philosophical approaches when used for the analysis of speech acts because they generally work with default politeness or impoliteness values. Additionally, in large corpus searches it is more difficult—and in many cases perhaps impossible—to predetermine and distinguish between the different politeness values that a given expression might adopt in different social and linguistic contexts. Despite these weaknesses, corpus approaches make it possible to quantitatively study specific forms in various contexts and text types.

Deutschmann's (2003) corpus-based approach makes use of a variety of text types and many naturally occurring examples accessible through corpora. Using the British National Corpus, he 'investigate[d] the form and function […] as well as the sociolinguistic factors that affect the frequency and types of apologies produced in different text types' (2003, p. 13). This research, however, rests on two assumptions: (1) that politeness is somehow linguistically encoded in this speech act (Deutschmann 2003, p. 35); and (2) that 'apologizing tends to be accompanied by a limited set of easily identifiable routine

formulae' (2003, p. 36). It is the second assumption which is necessary for a corpus-based approach. Deutschmann recognises that unconventional forms can be used to apologise (2003, p. 36), and that although his search strings are based on conventional formulae, not all of the retrieved tokens are examples of politeness (2003, p. 35). His corpus search yielded 3,070 apologies, with which he was able to investigate the influence of social factors like the social relationship of the speaker and addressee and the conversational situation on the type of apology used. Although the forms studied were predetermined, the use of conventional formulae and the size of the corpus allowed Deutschmann to find patterns across text types and situations, which is not generally possible with the smaller datasets inherent in other methods.

Corpus-based approaches have also been used for investigations of the politeness values of discourse-pragmatic features. Using the London-Lund Corpus, Aijmer (2002, 2013) investigates the function of various discourse-pragmatic markers or particles, such as *oh*, *ah* (2002), *well, in fact, actually* and general extenders (2013). In both studies, Aijmer finds that these features can take on many functions, including politeness functions, such as intensifying, mitigating, downtoning, softening, hedging and expressing shared knowledge. A corpus-based approach to multi-functional forms provides the researcher with a variety of linguistic and social contexts which can be used for quantitative comparisons of specific functions in specific contexts. For example, Aijmer finds that *actually* is used to 'establish familiarity and solidarity' in conversation, while in classroom discourse and business transactions it takes on 'specialized functions (including "strategic uses" and indexical stance meanings)' (2013, p. 123). The variety of text types and contexts in large corpora makes it possible to quantitatively investigate when particular discourse-pragmatic markers take on certain (im)politeness values.

In general, corpus-based methods are very powerful because they can efficiently search very large sets of data, but they are also very limited because they rely on pre-defined search strings and because in the first instance they decontextualise all the instances that are retrieved from the data. A thorough analysis often depends on a suitable recontextualisation of (some subset of) what has been retrieved.

The Semantics and Meta-discourse of (Im)politenes

Since the discursive turn and Watts et al. (1992), much research has advocated a first order approach to politeness research (cf. Eelen 2001; Watts 2003; Locher and Watts 2005). One such method is to investigate the way

people comment on and discuss (im)politeness, in other words the study of (im)politeness meta-discourse. In its short history, research on (im)politeness meta-discourse has relied on many sources of data: corpora (Culpeper 2009; Jucker et al. 2012; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2014), interviews (Spencer-Oatey 2011), online fora comments (Kleinke and Bös 2015), etiquette manuals (Young 2010; Terkourafi 2011) and other spoken data resources such as exploitative TV shows, tapped phone calls and documentaries (Culpeper 2010). The defining feature of research on (im)politeness meta-discourse is not the method of data collection but rather the feature of analysis being speakers' discourse on discourse. In Kleinke and Bös's (2015, p. 58) words, (im)politeness meta-discourse utterances are 'those elements that provide an assessment regarding the appropriateness of participants' communicative behaviour and/or feedback on the ongoing discussions'.

Such research is found under the headings of '(Im)politeness metadiscourse' (Culpeper 2010), 'metalanguage of politeness' (Culpeper 2009), 'metapragmatic (im)politeness comments' (Spencer-Oatey 2011), 'metacommunicative expressions' (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2014; Jucker et al. 2012) and 'metapragmatic comments/utterances' (Kleinke and Bös 2015). Despite the slight variations in terminology, all this research takes a first-order perspective (at times in combination with a second-order perspective) and investigates language users' reference to the use of (im)polite language.

According to Hübler and Busse (2012, p. 3) meta-communicative expressions can 'range from full utterances (or even utterance sequences), with some lexeme(s) at their center that denote(s) a communicative concept […] to simply adverbials […] or conjuncts'. In (im)politeness meta-discourse research this has translated to the analysis of the use of terms synonymous for or related to (im)politeness as well as to the analysis of the use of speech act verbs in a discursive rather than performative sense. Studies focusing on the use of semantically similar terms to comment on or question (im)politeness tend to start with a thesaurus or terms discussed in previous research.

In an early study, Ide et al. (1992) tested native speaker assessments of a range of labels related to American English 'polite' and Japanese *teineina* by eliciting appropriateness ratings of these labels in a range of different situations. Rather than eliciting appropriateness ratings, Culpeper (2009) first compiled a list of terms, 'such as: impolite, rude, opprobrious, scurrilous, aggressive, threatening, abusive, offensive, insulting, discourteous, ill-mannered' (2009, p. 64), obtained from various thesauri before investigating the use of these terms in the Oxford English Corpus (OEC), a two billion word corpus of written English. His aim was to provide a 'contrast between what is happening in academia and what the "lay person" is doing' (2009, p. 71).

Jucker et al. (2012) also begin with a thesaurus, the *Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary*, to investigate how people talked about politeness in particular periods and what they considered polite and impolite. After investigating the semantic field of *courtesy* and *politeness,* Jucker et al. (2012) searched for the related terms in the *Helsinki Corpus* and investigated differences in the use of politeness meta-discourse in various periods, genres and prototypical text categories. Once texts with high frequencies of politeness meta-discourse were found, a closer reading was performed to see what could be gleaned from usage in specific texts about how politeness was perceived. In taking terms from thesauri as a starting point for larger corpus based searches, the authors gain access into (im)politeness meta-discourse; however, with automated searches there is always the possibility that other terms—unknown to the researchers—are used and therefore not retrieved in the search. Nonetheless, this method provides valuable insight into how people comment on (im)politeness.

Spencer-Oatey (2011), who is interested in investigating interpersonal relationships, states that 'one fruitful way is to examine the metapragmatic emotion and (im)politeness comments that people make' (2011, p. 3566), as this provides us with the insights of participating speakers, rather than those of the analyst. Her data consist of 52 interviews lasting 60–90 minutes each. Although she and one other interviewer did not question the interviewees on politeness related issues, the interviews contained '14 metapragmatic comments that entailed an evaluation from an (im)politeness perspective of another person or what they had done. Seven comments were "polite" evaluations and seven were "impolite"' (2011, p. 3573). These comments were located by an initial search for terms associated with politeness and impoliteness. Then the transcripts were manually checked to confirm that each occurrence, such as *kind* and *nice,* referred to the positive quality of a person rather than something else. Finally, each individual text was manually checked for additional meta-comments not found in the initial automatic search. The more manual approach taken by Spencer-Oatey on the smaller dataset was carried out to 'gain preliminary insights into the relational issues that pragmatic theories need to be able to explain' (2011, p. 3571). Spencer-Oatey (2011, p. 3576) concludes that the small number of metapragmatic politeness comments may be a reflection of the data collection method and the lack of a focus on relational matters in the interviews. Culpeper (2009, p. 65) also highlights the necessity of a very large corpus in order to gather sufficient metapragmatic comments for study; however, once they are found, the scope then has to be narrowed to see how the metapragmatic comments are used by specific people in specific contexts.

The above-mentioned studies on the meta-discourse of (im)politeness all start with terms related to or used to describe (im)politeness. Another approach is, however, to start with a speech act verb to search for and investigate how people comment on and evaluate the said speech act. This approach is applied by Jucker and Taavitsainen (2014) in their diachronic investigation of compliments in American English using the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). They highlight that speech act verbs can be used both performatively and discursively (see also Kohnen 2012) and that discursive uses (i.e. metapragmatic expression usage) often point back to the actual compliment (2014, p. 261), which may or may not have used the performative verb. The distinction between performative and discursive uses is, however, not made in all meta-discursive studies. Kleinke and Bös (2015), due to their combination of first-order and second-order approaches to politeness, do not make such a clear-cut distinction and posit that when combining politeness$_1$ and politeness$_2$ approaches it becomes clear that 'the majority of metapragmatic comments are rude themselves' (2015, p. 64). Pizziconi (2007), to give another example, investigates Japanese apologies by focusing on apologetic formulae in a corpus of computer mediated communication. These apologetic metapragmatic comments include both meta-linguistic and evaluative comments which are 'interventions which hedge, amend or constrain past or future inferences involving dispreferred typifications of conduct' (Pizziconi 2007, p. 69).

First-order approaches to the meta-discourse of politeness and impoliteness give researchers a different and insightful perspective on how participants in an interaction perceive relational aspects and politeness. These first-hand insights provide invaluable information to researchers who embark on cross-cultural politeness research or make diachronic comparisons.

4 Case Study: 30 Years of Politeness Research

Lakoff's seminal study with the title 'Language and Woman's Place', first published in 1973, may be seen as the starting point of politeness studies in a pragmatic framework. Since then a huge amount of research has been published on this topic. The previous sections have provided a sampling of the different methods that have been employed in the endeavour to understand issues of politeness and impoliteness in language. In line with our overview, Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris (2006, p. 8) have observed that '[m]ethodologically, research on linguistic politeness in the past has often

relied on elicited or simulated data but during the past decade or so, a number of scholars have turned their attention to "naturally-occurring" data'. It is this change—from elicited or simulated data to naturally occurring data—that we would like to investigate here through a brief analysis of the methods used in articles published in two journals that have—in their own ways—been central to the development of linguistic politeness studies, the *Journal of Pragmatics* and the *Journal of Politeness Research*.

The *Journal of Pragmatics* started publication in 1977 and initially published some 20–25 papers per year. After a peak of 267 papers in 2011 it now publishes roughly 150 papers per year. Until 1983 not a single paper used the word 'politeness' in the title, the abstract or the keywords. The word 'politeness' made its first appearance in these elements in two papers published in 1984 and 1985. Kasher (1984) discusses the psychological reality of pragmatics and uses Leech's (1983) politeness principles as one of several testing grounds for his argumentation, and Wierzbicka (1985) discusses cultural differences between English and Polish and considers the respective politeness values of swear words or imperatives in these two cultures. Since 1986, every year has seen at least two papers with 'politeness' in their title, abstract or in the keywords. Although not all of these papers focus equally on issues of politeness. The criterion is simply taken as a rough and easy diagnostic.

Until now, the *Journal of Pragmatics* has published 2,884 papers (26 April 2015, including articles in press), 209 of which use the word 'politeness' in their title, abstract or keywords. It is interesting that the frequency of these papers among all the papers has remained more or less constant at a little less than 10 per cent since the late 1980s. There are some deviations up or down in specific years but there is no general trend of a clear increase or decrease over the years.

The term 'impoliteness' enters the scene much later. Before 2006 it occurs in three papers only. It makes its first appearance in an abstract of a paper published in 1991 (Hickey 1991), a paper that argues on the basis of a few intuited examples for the face-threatening potential of surprises. Five years later it appears in the title of Culpeper's (1996) seminal paper on the anatomy of impoliteness, in which he uses a philological approach in his analysis of short extracts of a Shakespeare drama and of a fly-on-the-wall documentary.

In order to gain an overview of the developments in the methods used in (im)politeness research since 1984 we have investigated the methods used in the *Journal of Pragmatics* and the *Journal of Politeness Research.* Between 1985 and 26 April 2015, 209 articles containing 'politeness' in the title, abstract or keywords were published in the *Journal of Pragmatics*. To see the development

of the methods used, we have divided the articles on politeness in the *Journal of Pragmatics* into three groups chronologically. There were 32 articles on politeness in 1985–1994, 66 in 1995–2004 and 111 in 2005–2014. We then classified all 209 articles on politeness according to the methods that were used. Of these articles 13 received two codes and two received three codes because the studies relied on two or three main methods. An inter-rater reliability test on a sample of articles produced an agreement rate of 81 per cent.

What can be seen from our analysis of these 209 articles in the *Journal of Pragmatics* is that both the philosophical method and the diary method have decreased in usage over the past three decades (see Fig. 16.2). In the first decade, the philosophical method was used in 29 per cent of the articles, and it was the second most frequently used method. This drastically changed between 1995 and 2004, as only 3 per cent of the articles in this period were based on intuited data. And, between 2005 and 2014 the use of philosophical methods further decreased to 2 per cent. Use of the diary study method also decreased from 1984 to 2014. Between 1985 and 1994 it is the fourth most frequently used method, at 6 per cent, whereas between 2005 and 2014 it is only used in 2 per cent of the articles. In sum, philosophical and diary methods go from being the second and fourth most frequent methods, respectively, to being least frequent in the most recent decade.




Fig. 16.2 Approaches in 209 politeness related articles published in *Journal of Pragmatics* (1985–2014)

Both the interactional and the experimental method have remained fairly stable in frequency over the past three decades. The interactional method is used more often than any other method in all three decades, at 31 per cent in 1985–1994 and 41 per cent in both 1995–2004 and 2005–2014. Experimental methods were used in 20 per cent of the articles in 1985–1994, 17 per cent in 1995–2004 and in 16 per cent of the articles in 2005–2014. With the exception of the first decade, in which the philosophical method had a strong presence, the percentage of articles based on experimental methods has had a strong presence and is only used less frequently than interactional-based methods.

Three methods that appear to be on the rise in the *Journal of Pragmatics* are philological, corpus based and semantic field and meta-discourse. Philological methods increased from 3 per cent of the articles in 1985–1994 to 6 per cent in 1995–2004 and 7 per cent in 2005–2014, making them the third most frequent empirical approach in the most recent decade, just behind interactional and experimental approaches. The increase of philological methods reflects the relatively new acknowledgement of the benefits that such studies can have in their own right. Corpus-based methods are increasing but still marginal in politeness research. In 1985–1994 they are not used at all, but then slightly increase to 1 per cent in 1995–2004 and 2 per cent in 2005–2014. Finally, although the percentage of studies based on the semantics and meta-discourse of (im)politeness dropped from 3 per cent in the first decade to zero occurrences in 1995–2004, it has increased again to 6 per cent in 2005–2014, perhaps reflecting an interest in first order approaches.

In order to account for all of the types of articles published on politeness in these two journals, it was necessary to include the following additional categories: historical, argumentative, state of the art and other. For research on historical we did not distinguish between fictional data (e.g. drama) and authentic data (e.g. court records) and categorised them simply as historical. These papers include both qualitative discursive and quantitative corpus-based methods. Figure 16.2 shows that the historical approach increased in the *Journal of Pragmatics* in 1995–2004, but has since declined. This may be due to the start of new journals such as the *Journal of Historical Pragmatics.* Argumentative papers, which put forward a new approach or promote the advantages of a certain approach, increased from 3 per cent to 13 per cent from 1985–1994 to 1995–2004 and levelled off to 12 per cent in 2005–2014. The increase in these argumentative papers coincides fairly well with the onset of the discursive approach to politeness (Watts et al. 1992), the re-evaluation of methods to account for (im)politeness (Culpeper 1996) and the departure from early studies which considered politeness values to be inherent. Our classification of politeness articles in the *Journal of Pragmatics*

also shows that state of the art articles, which focus on presenting a broad overview of approaches with little evaluation of them, have been fairly stable over the past two decades after a slight initial decline. The final category, other, contains mostly book reviews, editorials and a limited number of studies that were not easily classified according to our categories.

In addition to investigating the methods used in politeness research in the *Journal of Pragmatics*, we have also categorised all of the articles in the *Journal of Politeness Research* according to the same criteria. The *Journal of Politeness Research*, a publication explicitly devoted to politeness and impoliteness research, only started publication in 2005 and, therefore, does not provide such a diachronic picture, but has since then published 135 articles (26 April 2015). The methods used in the *Journal of Politeness Research* over the past ten years are similar to those in the same time period in the *Journal of Pragmatics.* The interactional approach is by far the most frequently used method (see Fig. 16.3). More than a third (43 per cent) of the articles use an interactional approach; which is comparable to our findings for the *Journal of Pragmatics* (41 per cent). Moreover, as in the *Journal of Pragmatics,* experimental methods are used second most frequently at 18 per cent, which is only two percentage points more than in the *Journal of Pragmatics.* Other methods, such as corpus,




Fig. 16.3 Approaches in 104 articles published in *Journal of Politeness Research* (2004–2014)

diary studies, meta-discourse, philosophical and philological are all used in less than 10 per cent of the articles. The distributions of the methods used in these two journals in the past decade are strikingly similar and clearly show the need for both interactional studies based on naturally occurring data and experimental studies focusing on more controlled situations. A difference in the distribution of argumentative and state of the art papers can, however, be seen in the two journals. State of the art articles have a stronger presence in the *Journal of Politeness Research,* whereas argumentative articles are more frequent in the *Journal of Pragmatics*. Although the figures for argumentative and state of the art articles vary slightly between these two journals, both types of articles clearly play an important role in the development of the field.

5 Summary and Future Directions

Our case study in Sect. 4 has revealed a relatively clear picture of the methods used in politeness and impoliteness research over the last 30 years. The number of empirical papers has noticeably increased and the number of philosophical papers has correspondingly decreased. Among the empirical papers, corpus-based studies, with their focus on quantification, have increased in number but they are still of limited importance. Interactional and philological papers, with their qualitative focus, still prevail. In general, however, there are still a broad range of methods used for politeness and impoliteness research. There is no one single method that everybody uses.

We find this diversity of methods encouraging. There is no single method that is most appropriate and suitable for the research of politeness and impoliteness in language, as each method provides an insightful perspective. The suitability of methods is specific to individual research questions. For a large range of questions, we need a large range of methods and a critical attitude about the suitability of individual methods. They all have their strengths and their weaknesses and these need to be assessed critically for each individual research project.

On the basis of the current situation it is not easy to predict the further development of politeness and impoliteness research in the near future, but it is plausible to assume that politeness and impoliteness scholars will continue to use a range of methods in order to explore new avenues in this exciting field of research. The nature of the topic under investigation does not lend itself easily to large-scale quantifications. Qualitative methods will, therefore, very likely continue to play a significant role. However, further developments in corpus methodology and the general trend towards quantitative methods

that is observable in a range of related disciplines (see Taavitsainen and Jucker 2015) may provide further inroads of corpus-based quantitative methods into the (im)politeness scholar's spectrum of research tools.

Acknowledgements Our thanks for a lot of help with the coding of the data for our case study go to Andreas Gerster, and for a careful reading and critique of a draft version of this paper to Magdalena Leitner and the editors. The usual disclaimers apply.

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Part III

(Im)politeness and Variation

17

Historical (Im)politeness

Andreas H. Jucker and Joanna Kopaczyk

1 Introduction

In this contribution we focus on the diachrony of linguistic politeness and impoliteness, that is to say, on the variation of politeness and impoliteness across time. In recent years a considerable amount of research has accumulated on issues of politeness and impoliteness in various historical contexts, but to date an overall account of the development of politeness or impoliteness across several centuries is still lacking. For many languages we have comprehensive descriptions of the development of their language structure (phonology, morphology, lexical inventory, syntax) and we have a reasonable understanding of the processes that lead from one stage to the next, but we do not have anything even remotely similar in detail and extensiveness on how politeness and impoliteness developed across time and of how one stage leads to the next. The present chapter provides an overview of how scholars have set out to identify and interpret instances and understandings of politeness and impoliteness for

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_17

particular historical periods. This overview highlights that the coverage of such research is still scarce, and much more needs to be done to explore continuities between these phenomena across time.

In the following we give a brief outline of the key notions in the field that are important for the study of (im)politeness in a historical context. In the main part of this contribution we provide a survey of relevant scholarship. We start with some of the earliest work, which extended Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach to historical data. In this context, politeness is seen as a strategy to save the speaker's and the addressee's individual face wants. Other politeness-related work takes specific speech acts or terms of address as a starting point and explores the relevant effects for politeness or impoliteness. We then pay attention to expletives and interjections which have also been analysed in respect to their politeness values. Finally, we survey some recent work that tries to apply a discursive approach to historical data. This approach explores textual evidence of explicit interactions between interlocutors of what constitutes polite and impolite behaviour. In Sect. 4 we add two case studies. In the first we showcase the meta-communicative expression approach and trace diachronic developments of (im)politeness through a study of relevant lexical items in the history of the English language, and in the second we provide a discursive analysis of impoliteness in a poem written in Scots at the beginning of the sixteenth century, to suggest pathways of investigation beyond core English texts.

2 Key Concepts: Comparability, Historicity and Data

One of the fundamental problems of historical (im)politeness research is tracing these notions across time and finding a *tertium comparationis* for instances and understandings of politeness and impoliteness from different historical periods. Similarly, today's notions of politeness and impoliteness in one particular culture differ from similar notions in other cultures and they differ from these notions at earlier stages of the same culture (see Jucker 2012a; Kádár and Haugh 2013, pp. 159–61). This makes comparative studies both across time and place difficult. In this context it is helpful to adopt the distinction between first-order politeness and second-order politeness introduced by Watts et al. (1992), where first-order politeness (or politeness$_1$ according to Eelen 2001, p. 30) refers to the every-day notion of the term 'politeness' or semantically related terms while second-order politeness (or politeness$_2$ according to Eelen) refers to theoretical constructs defined by researchers for analytical purposes. A study of politeness$_1$ across time, therefore, constitutes a search in historical

data for behaviour that was considered to be 'polite' by specific historical speech communities. A study of first-order politeness, therefore, is paramount to a lexical field study (see our case study in Sect. 4.1 below). For English, the *Historical Thesaurus of English* uses the term 'courtesy' as a cover term for all types of polite behaviour past and present. But any historical comparison will have to tackle the problem of reconstructing precise shades of meanings of the words in this specific lexical field in historically distant cultures.

A diachronic study of second-order politeness is faced with somewhat different problems. It takes a well-defined type of behaviour as its starting point and searches for instances of such behaviour in data of earlier periods. It may turn out that historical speech communities did not engage in such behaviour at all, and it may be very difficult to interpret the historical evidence to even decide whether it manifests instances of such behaviour. Kohnen (2008a, b), for instance, argues that in Old English there is very little evidence for politeness defined as face-threat mitigation (in the sense of Brown and Levinson 1987), i.e. a specific type of second-order politeness. This does not preclude the existence of other types of politeness$_2$ in Old English, and it certainly does not preclude the existence of relevant lexical items (metalanguage) of politeness$_1$. The *Historical Thesaurus* lists, among others, *manþwærnes* 'gentleness, courtesy, weakness', *wynsumnes* 'loveliness, pleasantness, rejoicing' and *þeawfæstnes* 'adherence to the rules of right conduct or method, discipline, obedience to rule'. Jucker (2012a) used the evidence of such metalanguage to argue for a type of discernment politeness in Old English, i.e. a form of behaviour that was more concerned with a recognition of one's place in a strictly hierarchical society rather than face-threat mitigation or face enhancement.

These problems of comparability and historicity of the notion of 'politeness' (and by analogy for the notion of 'impoliteness') are exacerbated by the scarcity of the nature of historical data. The communicative needs and practices of earlier generations were very different from ours, literacy levels were much lower than those of today, much less written language was produced and presumably a very large part of written material did not survive. As a result, the historical pragmaticist, like any historical linguist, is faced with a limited number of preserved texts and a narrow range of genres and text types, especially for the early periods of a language. Our knowledge of Old English, for instance, is largely based on the textual evidence from religious writings, glosses and translations of Latin texts, as well as some official documents, such as royal grants of land and privileges, and a small amount of heroic poetry.

In the early days of historical pragmatics the legitimacy and validity of such data for pragmatic analyses was often questioned because it clearly does not tell us very much about oral language use at the time. Researchers spent

a considerable amount time and effort in justifying their use of plays as data for pragmatic analyses (see, for instance, Culpeper and Kytö 2000; and Jucker 2000a for extensive discussions of data problems in historical pragmatics). More recently, however, many historical pragmaticists have significantly modified their attitude towards historical data (see in particular Culpeper and Kytö 2010). Written records of the past are no longer seen as less than perfect approximations to natural, oral communication but they are seen as testimonies of communicative acts in their own right. This attitude towards (historical) pragmatic data is based on the understanding that all pragmatic analyses must be contextualized and that there are no easy generalizations. There is no default use of language, such as for instance natural spoken communication, from which all other uses can be seen as deviations (see Kytö 2010).

Written records understood as communicative acts in their own right are always complex and multilayered. Very often they include reports of other communicative acts. A court record, for instance, typically contains an account of what was said in a courtroom including reports of conversations that took place outside of the courtroom (see Koch 1999; Archer 2005). For the analyst it is always important to take the communicative context of such accounts seriously and to abstain from any simple generalizations beyond the actual data under analysis.

3 Critical Overview of Research

Early research in the history of linguistic politeness focused on discourse strategies in the sense of Brown and Levinson (1987). In the meantime approaches have diversified, and aspects of politeness and impoliteness are often discussed in connection with terms of address, specific speech acts, interjections or expletives. More recently the focus of some studies has moved to the investigation of explicit negotiations of issues of politeness and impoliteness. The following overview of research of politeness and impoliteness in historical contexts will outline these approaches.

3.1 Discourse Strategies

The first scholars who applied Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach to politeness to historical data were Brown and Gilman (1989). They used four of William Shakespeare's tragedies, *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth* and *Othello* to test Brown and Levinson's theory, particularly focusing on their formula for calculating the weightiness of a face-threatening act. The formula relies on the

dimensions power (P), social distance (D) and the intrinsic extremity of the imposition (R). The validity of the formula was tested by systematically searching for minimal pairs of speeches in which only one of the three dimensions differed while the other two were constant. The two speeches were then assessed for their politeness on the basis of the number of Brown and Levinson's positively and negatively polite substrategies that were identified in these speeches, and finally this assessment was compared to the predictions of the theory with a very simple mathematical model. Brown and Gilman found that the results for P and for R were those that were predicted by the theory, while the results for D were not. Affect was more important than social distance. Characters that like each other are more polite than characters who do not like each other. Brown and Gilman were cautious with their conclusions and they pointed out the limitations of a quantitative approach because of what they saw as a lack of control of data that was not based on experimental methods.

Roman Kopytko (1993, 1995) was another researcher who set out to test Brown and Levinson's politeness theory on plays by William Shakespeare. He extended Brown and Gilman's database of four tragedies by adding four comedies: *The Taming of the Shrew*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, *The Merchant of Venice* and *Twelfth Night*. He isolated a total of 637 occurrences of negative and positive politeness strategies in the eight plays, 418 in the tragedies and 219 in the comedies (Kopytko 1995, p. 529). He, too, is cautious about making far-reaching conclusions, but he identifies a tendency for bald-on-record strategies within the lower classes represented in Shakespeare's plays and for positive politeness strategies to be used as in-group solidarity markers in general. This last observation stands in contrast to what Kopytko sees as a preference for negative politeness strategies in present-day English (1995, p. 531).

Culpeper (1996) adapted Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies to an impoliteness framework, which he applied to a contemporary and a historical source. The contemporary source consisted of a documentary film of an American army recruit training camp, and the historical source consisted of William Shakespeare's drama *Macbeth*. He is, however, not interested in a quantitative analysis. On the contrary, he presents a single key extract from *Macbeth* to show in detail how impoliteness can play an important role in the development of character and plot. In the scene of the appearance of the ghost during the dinner with the Lords, Macbeth is about to lose his nerve and at this point Lady Macbeth strategically uses impoliteness to goad his manliness and 'thereby get him to pull himself together' (Culpeper 1996, p. 365).

Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach to politeness equates specific linguistic forms with specific politeness strategies. This aspect of their theory has long been criticized as being too static and as unable to account for differing

situational values of specific expressions, but it provided an attractive basis for early politeness researchers interested in historical materials to quantify these strategies. Culpeper's approach, however, already points in a different direction. Even though Culpeper's approach is also based on Brown and Levinson, he is more interested in the minutiae of a specific situation, and in this sense, it is perhaps an early attempt at a discursive approach (see Sect. 3.5).

3.2 Terms of Address

In many European languages, speakers use nominal or pronominal expressions to address each other, and there are generally many options to choose from. Among nominal terms of address there are proper names, relational nouns, titles and honorifics, terms of endearment, terms of abuse and many others. Among pronominal terms of address many languages also offer different options to address an interlocutor. Both nominal and pronominal terms of address, as well as accompanying verb forms, can be loaded with interpersonal and social information offering speakers a wide spectrum of respecting or breaking social conventions. Terms of address, therefore, provide a fertile ground for studying issues of politeness and impoliteness. Historically, languages often start with one pronoun that can be used to address one interlocutor and then develop a second form that expresses formality, distance or deference, functions that are sometimes subsumed under the more general heading of politeness (e.g. by Helmbrecht 2003, 2005).

In the context of historical investigations into the politeness distinctions in address-term systems, three strands of research can be distinguished. The majority of this research is devoted to the details of specific situations at a particular time in the development of a specific language. This strand of research is well represented. For example, the volume edited by Taavitsainen and Jucker (2003) contains detailed analyses of the use of *thou* and *ye* in later Middle English literature (Burnley 2003), the use of *tu* and *vus* in the Anglo-Norman *Seinte Resureccion*, a very early example of French vernacular theatre composed probably as early as about 1200 (Hunt 2003), and the use of Spanish forms of address in the sixteenth century (Bentivoglio 2003). Such work usually tries to uncover the intricacies of the rules of who uses which pronoun to address whom and in what situations. The systems differ diachronically and they differ from one language to the next, but they also share similarities, and, therefore, they are regularly described in terms of politeness, deference and respect. There is also work that looks at both pronominal and nominal terms of address. Busse (2002a), for instance, devotes an entire chapter in his book

on linguistic variation in the Shakespeare corpus to the co-occurrence patterns of second-person pronouns and nominal forms of address. He computes the likelihood of individual nominal terms of address co-occurring either with *you* or with *thou*, and on this basis he can place the nominal terms along a scale of politeness that ranges from negative politeness or deference, where the terms tend to co-occur with *you*, to positive politeness, where they tend to co-occur with *thou*. At the negative end, he finds titles of honour and courtesy and occupational titles while at the positive end, he finds generic terms of address and terms of endearment as well as terms of abuse.

The second strand of research is concerned with the diachronic development of such systems and the etymology of the forms that are used for the so-called 'polite' forms. The forms tend to originate from second-person plural pronouns (e.g. French *vous*), from third-person singular or plural forms (e.g. Italian *Lei*, German *Sie*) or from nominal terms of respect and deference (e.g. Polish *pan*, *pani*) (see Mazzon 2010, pp. 354–5; for more details Helmbrecht 2003, p. 196). It is the pronouns derived from nouns in particular that provide interesting case studies for processes of grammaticalization, e.g. the development of Dutch *U* from *Uwe Edelheid* 'your grace' (Braun 1988, pp. 60–61). Brown and Gilman (1960) provide an early study in which they analyse pronouns of address in a range of European languages, and they interpret the choice of one or the other to address a single interlocutor on the dimensions of power and solidarity. They are interested in the development of entire systems and how the systems developed from a so-called power system with asymmetric pronoun usage (the dominant interlocutor uses T and receives V from the subordinate interlocutor), to a symmetric system of solidarity (mutual V for socially distant interlocutors and mutual T for socially close ones).

Finally there is the third strand of work that adopts the larger perspective of areal and typological considerations. Helmbrecht (2003, 2005) investigates politeness distinctions in second-person pronouns on a more global scale by trying to find patterns of languages in the world. He describes Europe as a 'hotbed' of languages with politeness distinctions in the pronominal system (Helmbrecht 2005, p. 426). Apart from Europe such distinctions exist in South-east Asia, India and perhaps Central America but they are not attested in North and South America, North Asia, Australia or Papua New Guinea (see the *World Atlas of Language Structures* maps, Helmbrecht 2013). On the basis of his data, he concludes that politeness distinctions in pronouns are areal phenomena for which two explanations can be offered, either on the basis of their function or on the basis of borrowing both the linguistic

practices of polite address and the linguistic forms used for these practices (Helmbrecht 2003, p. 199).

3.3 Speech Acts

Issues of (im)politeness are often investigated in relation to specific speech acts. Some speech acts are seen as typically face-threatening or face-enhancing either for the speaker's or the addressee's face. Searle's class of directives comprises speech acts that, with varying levels of insistence, try to get the addressee to carry out an act that he or she might otherwise not have carried out. This ranges from suggestions and advice to strict orders and commands. In a technical sense, all of them constitute an imposition on the addressee, but their severity as face-threatening acts depends very much on the possible benefit that the addressee might gain from carrying out the proposed course of action and on situational factors, such as the role-relationship between speaker and addressee.

Blum-Kulka et al. (1989) in their seminal work on present-day data, for instance, focused on requests and apologies. Requests threaten the negative face of the addressee and apologies threaten the positive face of the speaker respectively. Trosborg (1995) added complaints as a third face-threatening act which threatens the addressee's positive face. Speech acts with a clear face-threatening potential were seen as ideal for these studies because they allowed the experimental investigation of the choice of politeness strategies in correlation with the sociodemographic features of the speakers, situational factors and the like. In the meantime the connection between specific speech acts and specific face effects has been called into question. O'Driscoll (2007, p. 469), for instance, argues that 'effects on face are radically situational; they cannot be properties of illocutions in the abstract' (see also Terkourafi 2005, pp. 251–2). In historical contexts, however, politeness research regularly focuses on specific speech acts and their face-threatening or face-enhancing potential irrespective of whether this potential is seen as intrinsic or as a mere default property.

In recent years several researchers have started to extend the study of speech acts and their face-threatening potential to a historical context. Kohnen (2008a), for instance, focuses on directives in Anglo-Saxon England. He argues that indirect formulations so typical of present-day English were not used because facework did not have the role that it has today. He describes Anglo-Saxon England as a society 'beyond politeness' because—as he argues—in a 'monastic world of humility and obedience there are (or there should be) only limited face wants since Christians are not allowed to assume a rank above

their fellow Christians' (Kohnen 2008a, p. 40). In a later paper (Kohnen 2011), he looks at Old English directive constructions with *ic wille* 'I want (you) to' and *ic wolde* 'I would like (you) to', which superficially resemble present-day negative politeness requests. Kohnen argues that these constructions are either translations of Latin originals and therefore based on a different textual culture or that they can be interpreted in terms of the Christian values of humility and the Anglo-Saxon values of mutual obligation.

Busse (2002b) describes the politeness effects that the diachronic shift from requests with *pray* to requests with *please* had in English. On the basis of data that are mostly drawn from the *Oxford English Dictionary*, he interprets this development as a pragmatic shift from requests that assert the sincerity of the speaker (*I pray you*, *I beseech you*) to requests that focus on the addressee's willingness to perform the requested action (*if it pleases you*) (Busse 2002b, p. 31). Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008) looks at the politeness of requests in a nineteenth-century corpus of 151 English model letters for merchants. She finds that correspondents in business domains use positive politeness strategies in the opening and closing sections of their letters in order to build a friendly and cooperative atmosphere but in the central section of the letter, requests opt for clarity and brevity and use negative politeness strategies only sparingly (Del Lungo Camiciotti 2008, p. 122). All these studies take the face-threatening potential of directives as a starting point. The speaker's desire for the addressee to do something that he or she might not have done otherwise constitutes an imposition on their freedom of action. This research, therefore, assesses the extent to which redressive action and mitigating facework seem to be necessary.

Denizot (2012) chooses a different approach in her study of orders in Ancient Greek. She does not start with the inherent face threat of a specific speech act but with a specific linguistic form in order to assess its politeness value. She draws on plays by Aristophanes and Euripides in order to analyse the (im)politeness of orders. Negative interrogatives in the future tense can be used to issue orders (οὐκ ἐρεῖς, 'Won't you talk?'), and her analysis of 106 utterances of this form in her corpus reveals that they are never used with a polite intention.

Other researchers focus on speech acts that threaten the addressee's positive face. This work tends to focus on the impolite effects that specific speech acts have on the audience rather than on any mitigating strategies that are used to reduce the face-threatening potential of a speech act. The prototypical example in this respect is the insult which is designed to hurt and demean the addressee and, thus, to threaten his or her positive face. Some studies focus on insults of specific historical sources. Jucker (2000b) looks at insults in Geoffrey Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* while Pakis (2011) investigates insults

in the Anglo-Saxon poem *Battle of Maldon*. Very few researchers so far have attempted a more diachronic perspective, but Arnovick (1995, 1999, Chap. 2), for instance, compares the heroic flyting of the Anglo-Saxon warrior to the competitive 'sounding' of African-American youth, and she analyses both of them in the larger context of their oral traditions as agonistic insults (see also Sect. 4.2). They share the subject matter of calling the honour of the contestant and his family into question. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) pursue a more theoretical aim in their attempt to develop a framework for the diachronic analysis of insults throughout the history of the English language. Insults are located in a multidimensional grid that allows the detailed description of specific forms of insults as ritual versus creative (formal level), conventional versus particular (context dependence), ludic (i.e. playful) or aggressive, or intentional versus unintentional (speaker attitude) and so on. But as in the case of Arnovick they rely on a fairly haphazard coverage of data. They draw on more or less isolated instances of agonistic behaviour in the history of the English language. A truly comprehensive diachrony of insults with a more systematic and comprehensive coverage does not yet seem possible.

3.4 Interjections and Expletives

In the context of appreciation on the one hand and disparagement on the other, various means of enhancing the message make frequent appearance. Interjections constitute a word class which is usually associated with expressing attitudes and emotional states (Ameka 1992a; Gehweiler 2010, p. 316). The fact that they overlap with other categories (e.g. discourse markers, onomatopoeia, formulae) and their non-obligatory status have for a long time relegated interjections to marginal notes in grammar books; in pragmatic and historical pragmatic studies, however, their importance was appreciated early on (e.g. the whole of volume 18, issue 2–3, of the *Journal of Pragmatics* (1992); Brinton 1996; Arnovick 1999). The core features of interjections include short form, prosodic separation from other utterances, lack of semantic transparency, a social deictic function and other functions related to emotional and mental states of the speaker (for a thorough literature review, see Gehweiler 2010). In fact, it has been claimed that 'those seemingly irrational devices […] constitute the essence of communication' (Ameka 1992a, p. 101).

Interjections are typical of spoken encounters; therefore, for a historical study speech-related genres are often in focus (Culpeper and Kytö 2010,

pp. 199–305).[1] In fact, historical corpus-based studies of interjections have revealed correlations between specific types of interjections and genres (e.g. Taavitsainen 1995, 1997, 1998). It is interesting to note that, as a word class, interjections retain their primary functions diachronically but their inventory and particular forms change. This is why some studies dealing with interjections concentrate on form-to-function mapping trying to establish the pragmaticalisation routes of a particular form towards an interjection (e.g. Gehweiler 2008 on *Jesus!* becoming *gee!*), while others explore the function of expressing mental and emotional states through various linguistic forms which can be classified as interjections (e.g. Arnovick 1999, pp. 73–94 on curses).

In their discourse effects, interjections can range from enhancing positive emotions to potential offence. In Biber et al.'s (1999, pp. 93–4, 1083–95) typology, the category of *inserts* contains interjections as well as greetings and farewells (e.g. *hello* or *goodbye*) and speech act formulae (e.g. *thank you* or *please*) which are related to enhancing positive face wants. Many of these items have been studied diachronically and their pragmaticalisation pathways have been traced in various genres; for instance Taavitsainen (1995) looks at the inventory and functions of interjections in sermons, saints' lives, romances and fabliaux, while Arnovick (1999, pp. 95–118) considers the development of *goodbye* in dramatic texts from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century and in present-day English. Speakers show sensitivity to the positive and negative connotations of interjections and may choose to alter their face-threatening value if the situation calls for polite linguistic behaviour. This is why some semantically transparent interjections can be replaced with similarly sounding euphemisms (e.g. *bloody* > *blooming*) or evolve into semantically obscure euphemistic variants (e.g. *God's wounds* > *zounds*; for a chronological list of examples, see Hughes 1991, pp. 13–15). Thus, speakers have a way of mitigating the force of a potentially face-threatening interjection and establishing rapport in a non-threatening way with the audience, which shows a conscious choice of politeness over impoliteness.

Interjections, as stressed by Ameka (1992b, pp. 260–61), may carry impoliteness values when they violate contextual expectations or conditions, even though at face value they do not necessarily possess any politeness or impoliteness features. Expletives, a subgroup of interjections found in swearing, cursing and taboo contexts, are characteristic of impoliteness-related situations, or even triggered by 'Offending Events' associated with anger (Jay 1992, pp. 98–100; Culpeper 2011, pp. 221–3; Bousfield 2008,

[1] Culpeper and Kytö subsume interjections under *pragmatic noise*, together with laughter and pause fillers (2010, pp. 199–207).

pp. 79–81, 183–7). Expletives emerge most often in semantic fields such as religion, sexuality, reference to human body and social stigma (for general ethnographic studies see Montagu 1967; Hughes 1991; Wajnryb 2004). Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) give an overview of insults in the history of English, where curses and swearing play an important role. The religious domain was typically exploited for this purpose—for instance, it is a frequent resource for Chaucer in his construction of verbal aggression (Jucker 2000, pp. 383–5). Culpeper and Kytö (2010, pp. 209–13) give a fascinating account of early modern commentaries on contemporary interjections and expletives. For instance, writing in 1586, William Bullokar associated disdain with *waw*, cursing with *wo, wo*, and threats with *well well*. Interestingly enough, interjections devoid of semantic content, but with a specific phonological structure (initial fricatives or stops) such as *fie*, *tush* or *pshaw*, have become obsolete in pragmatic functions related to impoliteness contexts (disdain or disgust), while the phonological preference has switched to word-final velar stops, as in *ugh* or *yuck* (Culpeper and Kytö 2010, p. 282).

It is apparent that the function of interjections and expletives and their (im)politeness effects are not stable diachronically. They also depend on discursive negotiation of meaning and on shared understandings among interlocutors. For instance, Jucker and Taavitsainen point out that '[o]aths and swearing are not in themselves insults … but they may be perceived as insults if the addressee perceives them as disrespectful' (2000, p. 75). Along the same lines, the Language in the Workplace Project at Wellington University has shown that even such a prototypical expletive as *fuck* can 'serve to express positive politeness or solidarity' or mitigate FTAs, especially when used in a jocular way by a given community of practice (Daly et al. 2004, pp. 949, 959–61). This perspective should also be useful to uncover potential (im)politeness effects brought about by interjections in historical texts.

3.5 Negotiation of Politeness and (Im)politeness

Discursive approaches to politeness are concerned with explicit negotiations of what is deemed to be polite or impolite by the interactants themselves.

> We consider it important to take native speaker assessments of politeness seriously and to make them the basis of a discursive, data-driven, bottom-up approach to politeness. The discursive dispute over such terms in instances of social practice should represent the locus of attention for politeness research. By discursive dispute we do not mean real instances of disagreement amongst members

> of a community of practice over the terms 'polite', 'impolite', etc. but rather the discursive structuring and reproduction of forms of behavior and their potential assessments (…) by individual participants. (Locher and Watts 2005, p. 16)

In a historical context, consulting native speakers is not possible, but several scholars have explored relevant historical texts—usually fictional texts—and uncovered passages in which negotiations of politeness and impoliteness issues are depicted. Such passages provide something of an ethnographic view of politeness attitudes of earlier generations even if the fictional or non-fictional context of such passages must be taken into account. Bax and Kádár (2011) in their introduction to a recent special issue of the *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* argue for 'thick' descriptions (Geertz 1973), i.e. interpretative descriptions of social practices and underlying sociocultural norms of communities, i.e. the 'meaning of interactional practices as construed by the participants themselves' (2011, p. 5). They continue:

> As for extracting higher-order sociocultural patterns, not to say overall cultural coherences from a collection (or selection) of concrete historical linguistic practices, it is material to stress that first-order understandings are of necessity historical understandings. Such 'indigenous' interpretations, which are, of course, products of their time as much as they are restricted to particular geographical areas, are not always easy to assess in retrospect (Bax and Kádár 2011, p. 5)

In a recent paper, Jucker (2014) has shown how two of the characters in the Middle English romance *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* extensively negotiate the etiquette of courtly behaviour. On three consecutive days, the lady of the house tries to seduce Sir Gawain, while her husband, Sir Bertilak de Hautdesert, is out hunting. This puts Gawain in a serious dilemma. If he gives in to the lady's wooing, he betrays his host, the lady's husband, and if he refuses her requests, he violates his obligations to courtesy towards the lady of the house, who skilfully reminds him of his own reputation as a knight and his duty to behave graciously and courteously. The lady presents courtesy as a character trait that a person can be renowned for. The concept of courtesy provides a very strict code of conduct for the courtly characters. Wishes become commands, and the fact that the lady has to articulate her wishes is already seen as somewhat of a flaw in the knight's courtesy.

Ben Jonson's *Volpone, or The Fox*, provided the data for a similar discursive politeness analysis (Jucker 2012b). *Volpone*, written at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is a play full of greed and deceit. The eponymous character, a rich Venetian gentleman, pretends to be on his deathbed in order to dupe three

aspirers to his inheritance. Early in the play the characters use what appears to be exceedingly polite language in order to conceal their darker motives, while in later scenes some of the characters use exceedingly impolite language towards the more honest characters in order to ingratiate themselves with Volpone. The audience of the play derives pleasure from recognizing the incongruence between the default politeness values of the language used by the characters and their real motives, and on some occasions the characters actually comment explicitly on the politeness or impoliteness of what other characters say.

In this way, a discursive analysis can provide a better understanding of isolated, historically situated instances of how polite and impolite language was used, how it was embedded within polite and impolite behaviour and how such behaviour was evaluated. So far, such analyses are no more than sporadic and mostly restricted to individual fictional texts. At present, it does not seem realistic to hope for a more comprehensive picture or an understanding of the diachronic developments that link these sporadic and diachronically dispersed points of investigation.

4 Case Studies

In the following two case studies we seek to demonstrate how a diachronic study of the semantic field of terms of (im)politeness, that is, a study of (im)politeness$_1$ can lead to a better understanding of different types of (im)politeness$_2$. In the second case study, we carry out a discursive analysis of an Older Scots poem, 'The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedy' and show how the two poets discursively construct impoliteness and create elaborate insults to meet genre requirements.

4.1 Semantics and Types of (Im)politeness in the History of English

Politeness$_1$ and impoliteness$_1$ refer to people's perception of what they consider—in a wide sense of the words—polite or impolite (for initial ideas on so-called first and second order politeness, see Watts et al. 1992). If we are interested in a lay understanding and labelling of a particular type of linguistic behaviour, we should develop a method for recovering the ways people talk about the instances of such behaviour. Retrospection or intuition is not a satisfactory tool because, if performed by a linguist, it will be tainted with an interpretative set of understandings which belong to the layer of politeness$_2$,

and if performed by a single lay informant it will represent the understanding of this person only. Therefore, in order to investigate notions related to politeness$_1$, it is advisable to turn to corpus methodologies and engage with large repositories of real language production.

A study of relevant terms in the semantic field of (im)politeness might provide an interesting starting point for such an investigation. Corpus linguistic methodologies have recently been applied to capture the semantic networks of key politeness-related terms by Jucker et al. (2012) and impoliteness-related ones by Culpeper (2009, 2011). In the short historical overview presented below, we concentrate on key (im)politeness-related terms associated with specific periods in the history of English, as reviewed in literature and revealed by means of corpus linguistic trawling in the *Oxford English Dictionary Historical Thesaurus* (OED HT) and Google Books N-gram Viewer.

In the most recent period in the history of English, a single term reflecting favourable linguistic behaviour is probably difficult to pinpoint. Still, one associates such behaviour with the use of hedging, modality and conventional indirectness, as in the question *Could you possibly …?* (e.g. Stewart 2005; Wierzbicka 2006; Jucker 2012a). For impoliteness, it is useful to start from an overview of how unfavourable social behaviour is realised verbally. Culpeper (2010, pp. 3242–3) offers a corpus-based selection of conventionalized impoliteness formulae divided into several categories: insults (e.g. *you fucking moron*),[2] pointed criticisms (e.g. *that was absolutely rubbish*), challenging or unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions (e.g. *why do you make my life impossible?*), condescension (e.g. *that's childish*), message enforcers (e.g. *you got it?*), dismissals (e.g. *get lost*), silencers (e.g. *shut your fucking mouth*), threats (e.g. *X before I hit you*), and negative expressives (e.g. *damn you*). It is clear that a single impoliteness$_1$ term for all these types of verbal abuse would be difficult to find, but with the help of the OED HT we can discover a range of related terms. The general category of 'bad behaviour' splits into several related subcategories with 'discourtesy' being the closest concept to the idea of unfavourable social behaviour realised linguistically. Here, the terms of interest for present-day English are *rude/rudeness* and *impolite/impoliteness*, although language users may talk about instances of such behaviour in various ways, also indirectly and using metaphors. The Mapping Metaphor project (2015), based on the OED HT and recently completed at the University of Glasgow, is a perfect aid in constructing semantic networks and conceptual maps for these notions with a diachronic angle.

[2] Every conventional formula allows for some lexical variation, see Culpeper (2010: 3242–3243). For a diachronic take on insults see Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000).

The Google Books project has recently furnished scholars with the possibility of accessing more than five million digitized printed books from 1500 to today for lexical searches (see Michel et al. 2010; Aiden and Michel 2013). This tool provides detailed diachronic graphs of the development of individual words, but the results always have to be interpreted with care. The corpus is unstructured, the individual hits are entirely decontextualized and the OCR quality of some of the early manuscripts is still questionable. In spite of these shortcomings, Jucker et al. (2012) used the Google Books corpus to show that the adjective *polite* emerged in the late modern period as a key linguistic term. It was the time when society became sensitive to appropriate and correct ways of presenting oneself, as much in terms of appearance, education and manners as in terms of linguistic choices. However, the lay term to describe the opposite type of behaviour was not *impolite* but rather *rude* or *uncivil* (and related nouns). Figure 17.1 shows the development of the terms *rude*, *rudeness*, *uncivil* and *incivility* from 1650 to 2000. Figure 17.2 leaves out the most frequent term *rude* and thus zooms in on the use of the less frequent terms—*uncivil* and *incivility*—and contrasts them with *impolite* and *impoliteness*, which are, at least initially, even less frequent.

The notion of *civility*, cultured, civilized, socially expected and accepted behaviour, goes back to the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries (as related to 'courtesy' and 'seemly behaviour' respectively by the OED HT). The early modern period brought about more emphasis on the individual. People had to engage then in subtle struggles, also linguistic, to assert their place in society. When it comes to ways of referring to socially unacceptable or aggravating behaviour, the adjective *rude*, with its palette of polysemous meanings,




Fig. 17.1 Words of negative behaviour in Google Books Ngram Viewer (*rude*, *rudeness*, *uncivil*, *incivility*), 1650–2000




Fig. 17.2 Words of negative behaviour in Google Books Ngram Viewer (*uncivil*, *incivility*, *impolite*, *impoliteness*), 1650–2000

comes across as a favoured label during that time (see Fig. 17.1). As pointed out by Culpeper (2011, p. 79), '[*r*]*ude* is outstandingly the impoliteness-metalinguistic expression of general currency' even today, but the 1770–1870 peak in the Google Books material may indicate a period of increased sensitivity to inappropriate behaviour and an interest in discussing it in writing.

One can look for the origins of the perceptions of civility and rudeness in the later middle ages. By then, the social structure had evolved towards a feudal hierarchy, with a central figure of an overlord and his vassals. Life at court followed the rules of *curteisie* 'courtesy', which implied 'courteous behaviour; courtly elegance and politeness of manners' (OED *courtesy*, Jucker 2012a) and was thus most relevant to higher social ranks (Jucker 2010). When it comes to unfavourable social behaviour, *rude* (c.1400), followed by *rudish* c.1450, is one of the earliest terms which emerge in this semantic area in the OED HT. Chaucer's Host in the *Canterbury Tales* launches into 'rude speche and boold' when encouraging the Nun's Priest to tell a story but at the same time making fun of his poor horse (for slanders and insults in the *Canterbury Tales*, see Jucker 2000b).

In the Old English period, the society was organized following the principles of mutual obligation and kin loyalty (Kohnen 2008b, pp. 142–3). Thus, the key term which captured favourable social behaviour, and potentially, language use, was *þeawfæstnes* 'adherence to rules of conduct, obedience'. Could Old English flyting rituals, involving insults (Hughes 1991, pp. 47–50; Arnovick 1995, p. 610; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000, pp. 77–9; Pakis 2011), be perceived as the other end of the spectrum from favourable to unfavourable types of social behaviour? These insults were sanctioned by convention, both in real life and in poetic encounters (see also the discussion

of flyting in 4.2 below), and, in fact, they could enhance the favourable perception of the interacting parties. The unfavourable image could probably be carried through the concept of being *ceorlisc* 'churlish, vulgar, rustic' (OED *churlish* adj.) but the Historical Thesaurus identifies *churlish* as related to 'bad behaviour' and 'discourtesy' only from around 1405. It would require further studies of Anglo-Saxon culture to be able to pinpoint a lay understanding of what constituted instances of verbal abuse, aggression and unfavourable social behaviour, and how they were labelled.

4.2 Impoliteness in Verbal Duels: A Discursive Approach to 'The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedy'

In this case study, we turn our attention to verbal duels to show how impoliteness can be constructed discursively, in view of the communicative context and the opponent's intentions. Previous qualitative studies have shown that superficial politeness can be discursively interpreted to conceal harmful or subversive intentions (Jucker 2012b, 2014), so this time we take an inherently impolite exchange to investigate its layers of discourse. The poetic genre of flyting, where protagonists throw elaborate insults at each other, is situated in 'the pragmatic space of antagonistic behaviour' (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000, p. 92; on challenging rituals see also Bax 1999, 2010). While the Germanic heroic flyting (e.g. the Unferth episode in Beowulf) has a ritualistic background and was not intended as ludic—the boasts and insults are to be taken seriously (Arnovick 1995, p. 608; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000, pp. 77–9; Bax 2010, pp. 507–8)—the late medieval and early modern flyting tradition in Scots is more elusive in this respect. On the one hand, it 'illustrates an unpleasant aspect of language, the power to cause shame and humiliation' (Bawcutt 1983, p. 5). It is a serious contest of poetic skill, filled with metaphors of war and physical combat (Bawcutt 1998, p. 428), and an answer to impudent provocation (see below). On the other hand, this genre can also be considered to be part of courtly entertainment, and thus not to be taken seriously, bearing resemblance perhaps to twenty-first century exploitative talk-shows (Culpeper 2005).

William Dunbar (1459–1529) is counted among the most creative and versatile writers of late medieval and/or early Renaissance poetry (Bawcutt 1998), which makes him the exemplary Scottish *makar*. Walter Kennedy's (c. 1455–c.1508) oeuvre does not survive in large quantities and is therefore less known, but he was highly regarded by his contemporaries (Meier 2008). Their verbal duel, referred to usually as *The Flyting between Dunbar*

and Kennedy, is 'an exercise in *vituperatio* … a full-scale competitive exchange of insults' (Burrow 2006, p. 142; for authoritative editions, see Bawcutt 1998 and Meier 2008). As suggested by Bawcutt (1998, p. 429), it is a product of local street quarrels (see also Bawcutt 1983, pp. 7–9; Ewan 2002), coupled with the learned tradition of dispute and the poetic rendering of cultural differences and rivalries. Written between 1490s and 1501 (Bawcutt 1998, p. 429), this exercise in elaborate insult may have been performed at James IV's court (Kinsley 1979, p. 284), and survives in several copies, notably in a Chepman and Myllar print from 1508, as one of the first printed texts in Scotland (van Buuren 2001, p. 27).

Speaking in the poem, Dunbar considers flyting to be a despicable Gaelic tradition, in which he is ashamed to take part but forced to do so because of his opponent's, Kennedy's, 'bakbytting' which 'rais the feynd with flytting' ('rose the devil with flyting'; ll. 22–23; all quotations from Bawcutt 1998). Both poets show awareness of the genre and offer meta-linguistic comments on their verbal behaviour. In an introductory exchange of statements to intimidate the other party, Dunbar says:

(1)

The erd sould trymbill, the firmanent sould schaik….
To heir quhat I suld wryt with pen and ynk;
For and I flyt, sum sege for schame sould sink […].

'The earth should tremble, the firmanent should shake….
To hear what I should write with pen and ink;
For when I flyte, some men for shame will sink […]' (ll. 9–13)

Then he continues to paint a vivid picture of what happens to the unfortunate addressee of his flyting. Kennedy responds by launching a direct attack on Dunbar's poetry writing:

(2)

Dirtin Dumbar, quhome on blawis thow thy boist,
Pretendand the to wryte sic skaldit skrowis,
Ramowd rebald, thow fall doun att the roist.
My laureat lettres at the and I lowis.
…
Say '*Deo* mercy' or I cry the doun,
And leif thy ryming, rebald, and thy rowis.'

'Filthy Dunbar, who are you bragging for,
Pretending to write such scabby scrolls,
Foul-mouthed rogue, thou'd fall down at the feast.
If I loose my excellent writings at thee.
…
Say '*Deo* mercy' or I denounce thee,
And give up thy rhyming, rascal, and thy rolls.' (ll. 25–32)

He repeats the same threat at the end of his part of the introduction, adding that 'Kennedy to the this cedull sendis' ('Kennedy sends you this document', l.48), which implies that the poem was written in parts which both authors sent to each other. In the elaborate narratives, especially by Kennedy, whose part comes second, one can see responses to particular challenges that Dunbar threw his way. From a discursive point of view it becomes clear that this performance of verbal aggression will be meticulously worked out to meet a specific cultural context. The authors inform each other what they are about to do, so that everybody, including the audience, knows what is going to ensue. In these circumstances the offensive force of impoliteness seems to be mitigated. What is acted out as impolite and rude, simply belongs to the genre convention. In fact, evidence from other poems indicates that Dunbar held Kennedy in high regard.

Still, a careful reader of the poem will find that '[a]part from stock taunts of being poor and ugly there is remarkably little over-lapping abuse' (Bawcutt 1983, p. 18). In fact, highly specific references to lineage, ethnicity (Lowlander vs Highlander) and personal histories constitute the backbone of the respective parts. So the invectives are tailored and, therefore, more personal and potentially harmful, as recognized by the addressee through the apparent need to defend himself. This recognition is a necessary condition of insult (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000, pp. 73–4). Literary critics notice that even the physical descriptions may contain some true-to-fact information. Dunbar picks on Kennedy's 'lean, gaunt, half-starved appearance' while Kennedy calls Dunbar 'a *mymmerkin* (ll. 29, 514), a pygmy or dwarfish creature; and several times a *dearch* 'dwarf' (ll. 33, 395, 408)' (Bawcutt 1983, p. 18). Meier (2008, p. ciii) agrees that 'the reader of the *Flyting* is never sure how serious Dunbar's and Kennedy's insults are meant to be'. The perlocutionary effect may not be straightforward to recover, and could in fact have been ambiguous at the time of delivery (see also Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000 on illocutionary and perlocutionary force in insults). So is this a poetic contest or a genuine street brawl, captured in a poetic form? In verbal duels '[t]he insults that the contestants hurl at each other must be perceived to be blatantly untrue' (Jucker

and Taavitsainen 2000, p. 75), otherwise things can turn serious. Scottish courts at that time would treat *flyting* on a par with defamation and slander (Ewan 2002, p. 164). The culprit could be 'sentenced to a period in the stocks, the pillory or even a whipping' (Tasioulas 1999, p. 752, n.11). Dunbar and Kennedy did not suffer such consequences but the epithets they hurled at each other may have caused harm on a personal level, if the delicate line of the convention was crossed. This shows that Jucker and Taavitsainen's distinction between truth-conditional and performative insults (2000, p. 75) is not always easy to implement, even though we would like to see verbal duelling as playful rather than full of legal consequence.

5 Summary and Future Directions

The diachronic dimension of politeness and impoliteness is still a very much underexplored area of research. Our knowledge of the various forms of politeness and impoliteness at earlier stages of individual languages is patchy and sporadic. Much of the relevant research that does exist in this area is devoted to individual periods and often to one particular source, e.g. the work of famous authors, or to particular genres, e.g. correspondence or trial proceedings. There are very few studies that adopt a truly diachronic perspective and investigate the developments over time. And even those studies that cover a longer time period tend to be sporadic and compare two or more historically dispersed situations rather than the diachronic processes themselves.

For the future it is to be hoped that we can get a better understanding of the diachronic processes that are involved in the development of politeness and impoliteness cultures. The last forty years or so of politeness research (if we take Lakoff's 1975 seminal work as a convenient starting point) have brought about very considerable advances in methodology and understanding of the issues that are involved. Many of these advances have also been applied to historical contexts but much still remains to be done. First of all, we need to fill in as many of the gaps as possible in the unchartered periods of specific languages. We need to extend our research from the famous authors to less famous ones and we need to cover a broader range of sources. Historical sources are limited in scope and in quantity but so far only a very small fraction of this has been investigated from the perspective of the politeness or impoliteness of the interactions. Second, we need to uncover the larger patterns of development in this area and—ultimately—the underlying process of change. These processes are very likely connected to changes in the social fabric of individual speech communities and the historical processes that affect

them. Communicative behaviour develops in response to the everyday needs of the speakers within the constraints of the social relations between them. It is plausible to assume that these processes are ultimately responsible for the diachronic developments of linguistic politeness and impoliteness. And third, we need to develop and refine our analytical tools to investigate issues of politeness and impoliteness (see also Culpeper and Kádár (2010)).

Historical politeness and impoliteness research would be difficult to imagine without the advances of research methodology for present-day languages, but in the end, present-day descriptions will also profit from a better understanding of the historical processes. It is the historical processes that lead to the situations we encounter today and the more we understand about these processes, the better we understand today's polite and impolite linguistic behaviour.

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18

(Im)politeness: Language Socialization

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1 Introduction

This chapter discusses (im)politeness from the perspective of language socialization. While politeness has been conceptualised in a number of ways (e.g., Brown and Levinson 1987; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983), language socialization views politeness as an 'affective stance', defined as 'mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern' (Ochs 1996, p. 41). A polite affective stance may be a display of respect, modesty, kindness, good manners, appropriateness, empathy, courtesy, consideration, and the like, depending on the participants, setting, and culture (e.g., Pizziconi 2007). Thus, language socialization considers politeness not as a static category, but as a dynamic concept that is socio-culturally variable and reflects and constructs 'context' (Duranti and Goodwin 1992). In societies across the globe, more competent members socialize novices to social and communicative norms that constitute politeness in ways understood and recognised by other members. In this way, the process of language socialization is related to 'politeness practices', or communicative norms

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_18

that are understood and used by members of a social group and subject to reflexive evaluation (Eelen 2001; Watts et al. 1992). Research on politeness and research on language socialization have tended to investigate different areas of concern (but see, Lo and Howard 2009). Language socialization research focuses on the process of novices' linguistic and sociocultural development, whereas politeness research tends to focus on theoretical issues (cf. Culpeper and Terkourafi (Chap. 2, this volume); Mills (Chap. 3, this volume)). Moreover, language socialization research rarely links up its findings to a theory of politeness, and politeness research seldom examines the process of how novices learn to speak politely—or impolitely—in culturally specific ways. This chapter demonstrates ways in which language socialization and (im)politeness are intertwined. More specifically, it argues that language socialization entails learning (im)politeness, and learning (im)politeness is embedded in the process of language socialization. In these ways, it attempts to provide an alternative perspective on (im)politeness theory and research.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses language socialization and key concepts. Section 3 provides a critical overview of the research. Section 4 presents two case studies of L1 (first language) child and adult socialization to politeness. Section 5 summarises the discussion and provides directions for future research.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

Language socialization theory considers language as embedded in cultural practice and acquired together with sociocultural knowledge (e.g., Duranti et al. 2011; Garrett and Baquedano López 2002; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986a, b). Language socialization occurs in unequal relationships (expert and novice) with respect to sociocultural knowledge. In becoming a competent member of a social group, children and other relative novices are socialized into a range of communicative and social norms, including (im)politeness. As in some other frameworks concerned with (im)politeness in human interaction (e.g., Culpeper 2011; Watts 2003), language socialization regards politeness as a dimension of 'face', or the orientation of social actors in interpersonal relations to what others think of them (Goffman 1967). Goffman proposes that this orientation is the underpinning of 'facework', or the use of communicative strategies in managing face in interaction. As politeness is not the only type of facework social actors perform (Haugh 2013), it can be argued that politeness is also deployed for a range of other interactional functions.

The process of language socialization thus involves learning communicative norms of politeness to engage in facework and other ends. Novices are not passive recipients of this socialization, but active agents who align or do not align with acts of socialization, use language in prescribed and novel ways, and socialize others in various ways (e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin 2008).

Central to the process of language socialization is the notion of 'indexicality', which refers to the capacity of language to point to and evoke aspects of the social context (see Pizziconi and Christie (Chap. 7), this volume). According to Silverstein (1976), two types of indexes are: (1) 'referential index' that contributes to the propositional content of an utterance (e.g., deictic words such as 'here', and pronouns such as 'I'); and (2) 'non-referential index' that does not contribute to the propositional content but points to or evokes social, cultural, and/or affective meaning (e.g., honorifics, sentence final particles, see Cook 1992). In relation to non-referential indexes, language features, including phonology, morphology, lexicon, speech acts, and register, index various socioculturally meaningful realities, such as identities, social actions, stances, and activities. Ochs (1992, 1996) argues that there are few cases of a one-to-one mapping between a particular linguistic form and a social category. She asserts that language features directly index affective stance, and affective stance indirectly indexes other social categories such as identity, social acts, and activities. For example, the Japanese sentence-final particle *wa* may directly index a delicate affective intensity and indirectly index female gender, which is mediated by the language ideology that women have a delicate disposition (Ochs 1992). From this perspective, politeness is directly indexed through various linguistic features (e.g., prosody, grammatical markers, address terms, formulaic expressions, honorifics), and politeness indirectly indexes a range of other sociocultural meanings. Thus, the process of language socialization involves learning to understand and use language as an index of politeness in relation to identities, actions, and activities, among others.

Kulick (2003) proposes that language is endowed with a 'dual indexicality' in which features of language 'manifest both their surface propositional content and the simultaneous inverse of that content' (Kulick and Schieffelin 2004, p. 358). For example, when caregivers explicitly instruct children how to speak politely (e.g., saying the word 'please' when making a request) they implicitly convey to them what counts as being impolite (e.g., not saying the word 'please' when making a request). This suggests that in learning to associate language features with politeness (e.g., being respectful, well-mannered, appropriate), novices also come to associate the non-occurrence of such features with impoliteness (e.g., being rude, disrespectful, inappropriate).

A central concern of language socialization is on 'how cultures organize children of different ages as speakers, particularly as authors of utterances' (Ochs and Schieffelin 1995, p. 176). This includes how they position novices as speakers of social and communicative norms. Previous research draws upon Goffman's (1981) more refined notion of speaker in his essay on 'footing', in which he describes a 'participation framework' consisting of various kinds of speakers and hearers (e.g., de León 2011). In relation to the speaker, Goffman proposes a 'production format' of an utterance consisting of four roles: (a) 'animator' (i.e., one who physically produces the sounds of language); (b) 'author' (i.e., one who originally selects the words or ideas); (c) 'principal' (i.e., one who is responsible for the words); and (d) 'figure' (i.e., character in a described scene). While a speaker can occupy all of these roles at once, in many cases the production format is split into two or more roles. For example, in explicitly instructing children in norms of linguistic politeness (e.g., Say, 'thank you'), the caregiver is the author, and the child is positioned as the animator. Participation frameworks vary widely among communities and settings. Among Tzotzil Mayans, Kaluli of Papua New Guinea, and Samoans, children are positioned in multiparty interaction from infancy, as addressed recipient, unaddressed recipient, or overhearer (see Ochs et al. 2005). The ways children are organised in participation frameworks contributes to cross-cultural differences with respect to socializing (im)politeness.

Although language socialization typically occurs when there is an asymmetry in knowledge between participants, this process is not unidirectional, as the roles of expert and novice can shift in interaction. For example, when the topic of conversation turns to technology, older children may take on the role of expert (e.g., Heath 2011). Also, in heritage language settings, children may display expertise in the mainstream language (e.g., English for Mexican children living in the United States) by serving as translators in assisting parents in matters outside the home (e.g., García Sánchez et al. 2011). All aspects of language socialization, including actions, activities, identities, and stances are co-constructed between parties, and thus the process of socialization depends on various factors, including the agency of the novice.

Although early research primarily focused on L1 caregiver–child interaction, language socialization is not limited to childhood but is a lifelong process (Ochs and Schieffelin 2008). Recent research explores a variety of settings and novices learning a L1, L2 (second language), and heritage language. Several studies have examined workplaces, in which L1 or L2 adults are socialized into social and communicative norms of a business and professional community (Duff et al. 2000; Dunn 2011, 2013; Jacobs-Huey 2003, 2007; Li 2000; Roberts 2010; Sarangi and Roberts 2002). Members of a social group may be

socialized into politeness (and impoliteness) when learning to take on new roles and participate in new activities across the lifespan.

3 Critical Overview of Research

This section provides an overview of three major areas of language socialization research that directly relate socialization to (im)politeness, namely interactional routines, requests and directives, and honorifics.

3.1 Interactional Routines

Language socialization research in a variety of settings and cultures has focused on 'interactional routines' (e.g., Kanagy 1999; Ohta 1999; Peters and Boggs 1986; Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo 1986), or conventional and formulaic expressions for performing social actions (cf. Kádár and Terkourafi (Chap. 8), this volume). Such routines are typically composed of adjacency pairs, or social actions produced by separate actors in succession, such as request–compliance, apology–acknowledgement or greeting–greeting exchanges (e.g., Schegloff and Sacks 1973). Interactional routines are an important means for managing facework among parties, and thus are often modelled and explicitly instructed by more expert members (e.g., Gleason et al. 1984). For instance, among the Basotho of South Africa, Demuth (1986) shows how mothers and older siblings instruct children to convey, 'thank you's, greetings, respect to elders, and proper terms of address' (pp. 62–3). Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo (1986) examine how Kwara'ae caregivers instruct children to ask and answer questions, make requests, say greetings and leave-takings, and respond when food is offered. As in some other Caribbean communities (Paugh 2011), Tessonneau (2005) observes that Guadelope caregivers directly instruct children in greetings as a display of respect and deference towards elders. Similarly, Japanese caregivers socialize children to perform greetings and leave-takings, expressions of appreciation, apologies and requests by speaking for pre-verbal children and prompting children what to say to third parties (Burdelski 2011, 2013a). In these ways, adults in various societies and communities instruct children in interactional routines in encouraging them to display other-orientation, including attentiveness to their social surroundings beyond their immediate desires and concerns. Also, in the Japanese case, caregivers instruct children to say certain formulaic expressions not only to other human interlocutors, but also to animals, and religious, natural and inanimate objects. For

instance, Burdelski (2009) shows that when a mother directed a two-year-old child to take a stone out of his mouth and the child responded by throwing the stone onto the ground, the mother instructed the child to apologise to the stone (e.g., *ishi ni gomennasai tte dekiru?* 'Can you say, "I'm sorry" to the stone?'). In Japanese, such explicit instruction in interactional routines is linked to 'empathy training' (Clancy 1986).

Studies of children's interactions among siblings and peers show that children socialize other children into interactional routines, such as expressions of apology (Kampf and Blum-Kulka 2007; Burdelski 2013a). Moreover, children may use certain formulaic expressions that are normatively associated with politeness in novel ways. For example, Reynolds (2007) shows how children in an Antonero Mayan community used the Spanish formulaic expression *Buenos días* 'Good day', with a military salute, among peers and siblings for performing ritual insults.

Research on language socialization into interactional routines is not limited to children. For instance, in a study of L2 Japanese language socialization, Cook (2011) shows how in Japanese families serving as hosts to college-aged students from the United States host mothers encouraged students at mealtime to make and align with assessments (e.g., *oishii* 'delicious') of the food the mothers had made by using *desho*, an epistemic stance marker similar to the English tag question 'isn't it?' (This is delicious, *desho*?). Similarly to Clancy's observations of Japanese caregiver–child interaction, Cook's analysis suggests that in encouraging students to make assessments of the food, adults socialize them to enact a role of a 'polite diner' (Clancy 1986, p. 236).

3.2 Requests and Directives

Language socialization research and related approaches such as discourse analysis of family interaction (Blum-Kulka 1997; Tannen 2004) have examined requests and 'directives', or communicative behaviours 'designed to get someone else to do something' (Goodwin 1990, p. 67). In Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of politeness, requests are 'face-threatening acts', or ones that violate another's 'negative face wants' (i.e., desire to be free from imposition). Thus, such social actions are often mitigated with 'negative politeness strategies' in order to lessen their illocutionary force so as to maintain face and interpersonal harmony. For instance, in North American White middle-class households, parents address children using polite formulas, such as 'please' and 'thank you', and instruct children to say such formulas to family members and others, such as when making a request (e.g., Gleason 1980). Moreover,

when making requests to children, US parents use endearments, impersonal pronouns, passive voice, and inclusive constructions (e.g., 'Let's sit down' = 'You sit down') (Blum-Kulka 1997, p. 147). Similarly, Japanese caregivers address children using polite requests (using X-*te kudasai* 'please do X'), and also prompt them to say such requests to adults and children (e.g., to adult guest: *doozo, suwatte kudasai tte* 'Say, "Please sit down"') (Burdelski 2006, 2010). In these ways, many caregivers instruct and provide a model to children on how to make requests as an index of politeness.

A central focus of analysis in studies on requests and directives is indirectness (Searle 1975), in which a speaker does not go on record as issuing an imposition. The use of indirectness with children varies across cultures. In a study of an Athabaskan community, Scollon (1982) observes that adults pose questions to children as a directive (e.g., 'Where's your pencil?'), which provides a model to them on preferred indirectness in this community. Scollon also observes that children pose questions to adults in attempting to obtain permission or in requesting things (e.g., 'You got a what you call? Ruler'), which suggests they acquire linguistic means of indirectness from a young age. Clancy (1986) points out that indirectness is a central feature of Japanese communicative style, and shows how children are socialized to indirectness from a young age. She finds that in issuing directives to two-year-old children, mothers often use hints, questions, appeals to feelings, and reported speech. Moreover, Clancy observes that the mothers often paired an indirect form (such as a hint) with a direct form (such as an imperative) in order to convey to children the communicative intent of the indirect form. Similarly, Takada (2013) shows that Japanese caregivers use various kinds of indirectness with children, for instance by reporting the imagined speech of third parties who cannot ostensibly speak, such as infants (including those soon to be born). In some languages such as Korean and Japanese, adults attempt to control children's actions by encouraging them to consider the adult's or another's feelings. For instance, Lo (2009), shows how a teacher in a Korean as a heritage language classroom in the United States urged the children to work harder in their schoolwork by referring to the teacher's *maum* 'seat of emotion' (Teacher: '…because you never keep up with class, when I leave here after class, I feel bad (lit. my *maum* hurts)'). In research in Japanese preschools, Hayashi et al. (2009) observe that in encouraging children to eat all the food on their plate, teachers evoked the feelings of the non-eaten food ('Poor Mister Carrot!… Don't you think he feels lonely?'). In these ways, adults around the globe often use various means for controlling children in non-imposing and indirect ways.

Several studies have also shown how adults socialize children to indirectness by speaking (or encouraging children to speak) *through* others, including

children and animals. For instance, in a Navajo community, Field (2001) shows that teachers and parents engage children in triadic directive-giving exchanges with others, which socializes them into the communicative practice of making requests through third parties. Also, in a discourse analytic study of four middle-class families in the United States, Tannen (2004) shows how a mother ventriloquised the speech of the pet dogs in indirectly encouraging a child to pick up and put away his toys (e.g., Mother speaking in an extra high pitch to the dogs: 'We're naughty, but we're not a naughty as Jason, he's naughtiest'). In a language socialization study of seven two-year-old Japanese children, Burdelski (2011) observes that when a family was visiting the home of the paternal grandparents, the mother prompted the two-year-old child what to say to the grandmother (her mother-in-law) (Mother to child: *Baaba, mukoo de mite kudasai tte* 'Say to granny, please look at (your newspaper) over there), which functioned as an indirect request from the mother to the grandmother, as the child was not expected to (and did not subsequently) repeat the prompted expression. In these ways, caregivers in diverse societies employ a range of strategies in modelling to children and instructing them in preferred ways of issuing requests and directives in indirect ways. Such strategies convey norms of politeness in relation to managing face concerns among parties and constructing relationships.

3.3 Honorifics

Language socialization research has also examined honorifics in various societies. Although in Brown and Levinson's politeness theory honorifics are considered a negative politeness strategy (i.e., to avoid offence by showing deference), honorifics do more than index negative politeness. As Agha (1998, p. 153) observes, '[h]onorific speech is not used only for paying respect of conferring honor; it serves many other interactional agendas, such as control and domination, irony, innuendo, and masked aggression, as well as other types of socially meaningful behaviors…' This suggests that honorifics are used not only in relation to politeness, but also for acts that may be interpreted as impolite. As described in this section, language socialization research suggests that children are socialized to and acquire various meanings of honorifics, both polite and impolite.

In comparison to the T–V (informal *tu* and formal *vous*) distinction in many Indo-European languages, some Asian languages have an elaborately developed system of honorifics, and children are attuned to them from an early age. In languages such as Korean (Song 2009), Thai (Howard 2009) and Japanese

(Morita 2003), in which cultural meanings related to politeness are encoded in person reference and address terms, children are socialized to use appropriate terms in referring to and addressing persons, such as those of higher rank and social status (e.g., grandparents, teachers, older siblings). In a study of Korean as a heritage language in the United States, Song (2009) shows how mothers socialize children to refer to and address older peers using honorific kinship terms (e.g., *nuna* 'elder sister', *hyeng* 'elder brother'). For instance, when a child (Joonho, five years old) was recalling to his mother an event of the school day involving an older male friend (Sicheol, six years old) using the friend's first name (as is the norm in English), the mother corrected his utterance to include the Korean honorific kinship term *hyeng* 'older brother' (Mother: *Sicheol hyenga maliya? Sicheol hyengaka way wulessnuntey*? 'You mean Sicheol *hyeng*? Why did Sicheol *hyeng* cry?'). Similarly, Japanese caregivers socialize children to use appropriate reference and address terms that index social hierarchy. For instance, when speaking to children, teachers and caregivers refer to themselves and other adults using the honorific term the child is expected to use (e.g., *okaasan* 'mother', *sensei* 'teacher') (Morita 2003).

Socialization to honorifics also occurs among children themselves. For instance, in a study in a Northern Thai community, Howard (2007) observes that when older siblings seek compliance from younger siblings, or when younger siblings seek benefits from older siblings, they employ the hierarchical terms of person reference 'elder sibling' and 'younger sibling' in invoking relationships and 'mutual feelings of dependence, love, and respect' (p. 205). Thus, in some Asian societies and communities children are socialized to a view that person reference terms 'do more than just refer', rather they 'instantiate and stabilize culture-specific views of the person' (Enfield 2007, p. 97).

Honorifics are also encoded in a range of other language features such as grammar and pragmatic particles. In Japanese and Korean, there is typically a choice between a honorific or non honorific predicate and honorific or non-honorific formulaic expression (e.g., Japanese: *ohayoo-gozaimasu/ohayoo* 'Good morning +/– HONORIFIC). Children are sensitised to these choices in relation to the addressee and setting. Park (2006), who examined Korean-American children's language socialization, shows how caregivers instruct children to use honorifics in uttering requests and greetings to grandparents, which socializes them to display respect and deference to elders. For instance, when a grandmother was leaving the family house, the mother instructed the child what to say to her using the honorific marker *-yo* from the child's perspective (*Danyeo ose-yo geureoneun geoya* '(You) should say, "Go and return"'). In another study, Shohet (2013) observes that Vietnamese caregivers instruct children to use an honorific particle when addressing elders such as when

leaving the home. Also, in research in a Northern Thai elementary classroom, Howard (2009) shows how children are socialized to speak politely and show respect to teachers. For instance, when a teacher asked the class if they wanted to study and the children responded that they did without using the honorific marker *kha*, the teacher instructed the children to repeat the answer using this honorific marker ('ah (we) want to study *kha*. Do it again. Answer again'). In these ways, Korean, Thai, and Vietnamese caregivers socialize children to use honorifics to display respect and deference to others within a social hierarchy.

Research also shows that children use honorifics in their peer groups in both prescribed and novel ways. For instance, in terms of novel use, Burdelski (2013b) observes that when two female children (three years old) were riding in a rowboat in the classroom and an older boy (five years old) asked them if he could ride in it with them, the girls used addressee honorifics (verbal-*masu* form or copula *desu*) in refusing his request (*aitemasen* 'This seat isn't open'; *noremasen* 'You can't ride') and in providing a reason for the refusal (*omoi desu* 'You're heavy'). As these children typically spoke to each other in the plain form (non-honorifics), this episode suggests that Japanese children may use addressee honorifics to index social distance in excluding peers from play (cf. García-Sánchez 2011), as a form of impoliteness.

Although socialization of honorifics begins in childhood, in some societies such as Japan and Korea this socialization continues beyond the home and formal schooling when learning to take on new roles and activities. As L. Brown (2011) observes in relation to Korean, socialization to honorifics extends into adulthood because, 'what constitutes appropriate use (of honorifics) continues to change as the speaker advances in age and status and operates in different social environments' (p. 93). In Japanese, which has two types of predicate honorifics (addressee and referent), while addressee honorifics are used and acquired early through role-plays and other activities in the home and school (Burdelski 2013b; Cook 1996a, b, 1997; Fukuda 2005; Nakamura 1996), referent honorifics are acquired later as they are challenging not only for children (see sub-section "Honorifics" with Section 4.1) but also for adults (see sub-section "Honorifics" with in Section 4.2). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising to find that adults are socialized into honorifics when entering the business world, in which appropriate language use becomes linked to being a representative of an institution. For instance, in a linguistic anthropological study of interaction in a business manners training course, Dunn (2011, 2013) observes that instructors explicitly teach referent honorifics and formulaic expressions to adult trainees by having them fill out worksheets and perform model dialogs, as part of socialization to etiquette and presentation of a public self. In these ways, in some languages such as Japanese, socialization

of honorifics and other forms of politeness takes place across the lifespan as adults enter new communities of practice.

As the above studies suggest, more competent members use a variety of strategies in socializing novices to understand and use linguistic resources that index politeness, including deference, respect, consideration, kindness, appropriateness, empathy and manners. Such use of language is important for socializing novices in how to maintain face and do facework in interaction, and is tied to socializing a range of other socioculturally meaningful realities, including identities, social actions, stances and activities.

4 Case Studies: Indirectness, Attentiveness, and Honorifics in Japanese Language Socialization as an L1

This section draws upon two case studies of Japanese language socialization in order to illustrate how researchers may go about examining (im)politeness from a language socialization perspective. The first study focuses on L1 children (Burdelski), and the second on L1 adults (Cook). Each analysis first briefly introduces the data and methods.

4.1 Children in and around the Home

The first case study is based on a longitudinal and ethnographic study of seven Japanese families with a two-year-old child (four boys and three girls) residing in urban areas in the Kansai (western) region of Japan. Children were audiovisually recorded over six months (from the age of one year and ten or eleven months until the age of two years and four or five months) as they interacted with family members and other adults and children in and around the household.

Indirect Requests and Directives

As mentioned earlier, an important focus of children's language socialization in Japanese is empathy training (Clancy 1986). Children are encouraged to interpret others' needs, wants and desires often based on their minimal and non-verbal cues and silence as forms of indirectness. Japanese caregivers socialize children to indirectness from a young age in various ways. They not only speak to children in ways that urge them what to do/say in subtle and non-imposing ways (e.g., providing hints), but also encourage them how to

interpret *others'* indirect utterances as a request for the child's action (Burdelski 2015). Both of these strategies are illustrated in (1). Here, a male focal child (Ken) is holding the ball of a female child (Ami) on a playground in front of their home.[1]

(1) [Ken—male, 2;2, Dad—Ken's father, Ami—female, 5;5]

1 →	Dad:	*Ken chan* (0.6) *Ami chan no daro*?
		'Ken-*chan* (0.6), it's Ami's (ball), right?'
		(0.4)
2	Dad:	*na*. (.)
		'Right.'
		(0.2)
3 →	Dad:	[*Ami chan no na n decho*?]
		'It's Ami-*chan*'s (ball), right?'
4	Ami:	[AMI CHAN KAE]RU WA::.
		'Ami-*chan* is (=I am) going home.'
5		(0.2)
6 →	Dad:	*moo kaeru tte*. [*hora*. ((guides Ken's body towards Ami))
		'She says, "(I)'m going home already." Look.'
7	Ken:	[((walking away))
8	Dad:	((clears throat, 0.8))
9	Dad:	[*hai Ken chan*.] ((puts hand on the ball in Ken's hand))
		'Okay, Ken-*chan*.'
10	Ken:	[( )]
11 →	Dad:	[[*hai*. (>*oide. kaeshite*.<) =]]
		'Okay, >come, return it<.'
12	Ami?:	[[( )]]
13 →	Dad:	=*doozo shite*.
		'Do, "Here you are."'
14	Ken:	((walking out of park, 0.8))
15 →	Dad:	*doozo shite, Ken chan*.
		'Do, "Here you are, Ken-*chan*."'

At the beginning of this excerpt, Ken's father points out to Ken (using the diminutive *-chan* to address him as Ken-*chan*) the ownership of the ball (lines 1 and 3), which functions as a hint to return the ball to its owner (Ami). Then, when Ami announces that she is going home (line 4), Ken's father repeats a

[1] Transcription conventions for transcripts (1)–(4) are listed in the Appendix at the end of the text of this chapter, before the reference list.

version of this utterance as reported speech (line 6: 'She says, "(I)'m going home already"'). While Ami's original utterance is an announcement of her impending action, by repeating a version of it as reported speech the father directs Ken to interpret it as a request to return to the ball to Ami. Similar to Clancy's (1986) analysis of directives in caregiver speech, here Dad's directive does not explicitly indicate to Ken what to do next. Rather, he uses touch to orient Ken's attention by physically guiding his body towards the quoted speaker (Ami). Previous studies on caregiver–child interaction have also discussed the importance of both verbal and non-verbal means in orienting children's attention towards other people and relevant entities in the social world so as to direct their actions (e.g., P. Brown 2011; Cekaite 2015). Here, in using both talk and touch, Dad encourages Ken to interpret Ami's utterance not simply as an announcement ("I'm going home already"), but also as a request to have her ball returned to her (an indirect speech act). This interpretation is not necessarily based on the reported speaker's (Ami's) actual intentions, and in this way can be considered a 'cultural gloss' (Ochs and Schieffelin 1995), as originally described by Scollon (1982) in relation to Athabaskan child-rearing. According to Scollon (1982), in glossing a child's utterance, a caregiver provides 'interpretations based on her own sense of the situation' (p. 91). Here, when Ken does not orient to the next expected social action (returning the ball to Ami), Dad reformulates the reported speech in a more direct way, by telling Ken what to do (line 11: *kaeshite* 'return it') and then by prompting him what to say (lines 13 and 15: 'Do, "Here you are."'). In comparison to the pairing of direct and indirect forms observed in dyadic mother–child interaction (Clancy 1986), this excerpt suggests that Japanese caregivers also socialize children to indirectness in triadic interaction by encouraging them how to interpret *others*' verbal behaviour as indirect requests (Burdelski, 2015). Such practices socialize children to politeness in relation to respecting others' desires and interactional needs, such as having their possessions returned to them in a timely way.

Honorifics

In addition to indirectness, an important aspect of politeness in Japanese is honorifics. Japanese has a rich system of honorifics, which consists of a range of lexical and grammaticalised forms. Two main categories of honorifics are: (1) referent honorifics (REF HON), which include: (a) respectful language, (b) humble/deferential language, and (c) beautification language (see Pizziconi 2011); and (2) addressee honorifics (ADD HON), which are considered by Japanese lay speakers as a *teinei* 'polite' form (Pizziconi 2007). Japanese

caregivers attune young children to honorifics (Clancy 1986; Nakamura 2002), particularly addressee honorifics and on occasion reference honorifics in relation to social roles and setting. In these data, a frequent setting for this attunement is role-play interaction (e.g., store, telephone, doctor). For instance, in excerpt (2) a mother and father (who does not talk in this excerpt) are playing telephone with the child (Taka) in which they enact various roles (e.g., child's friend, a caller from a company). Here, the mother enacts a caller from a company using both addressee and referent honorifics.

(2)[2] [Taka—male, 2;5, Mom—Taka's mother]

1	Taka:	*MOSHIMO:SH*.
		'Hello.'
2 →	Mom:	*a, Arakawa Taka kun desu ka*[:?
		'Ah is-ADD HON this Taka Arakawa-*kun*?'
3	Taka:	[*n::*
		'Mm.'
4		(0.3)
5 →	Mom:	*anoo kochira kaisha na n desu keredomo::,*
		'Um, this is-ADD HON the company calling but,'
6 →		*otoosan ka okaasan wa irasshaimasu ka::::?*
		'is-REF HON+ADD HON your father-REF HON or mother-REF HON there?'
7		(1.0)
8	Taka:	*irasshaimasu yo*.
		'(They) are-REF HON+ADD HON.'
9		(0.3)
10 →	Mom:	*n ja chotto otoosan ka okaasan ni kawatte moraemasu ka?*
		'Well then, could (I) have-ADD HON (you) put (your) father-REF HON or mother-REF HON on a bit?'
11	Taka:	*n::*
		'Mm.'
12		(4.1)
13	Taka:	*ii desu*.
		'It's good-ADD HON.'
14	Mom:	*hai*.
		'Yes.'

[2] This excerpt (a longer version) is also examined in Burdelski (2013b).

In this telephone call, the mother uses addressee honorifics (lines 2, 5, 6, and 10) to index her social role and relationship to the child as an unknown recipient. At the opening of the call, in addition to addressee honorifics, the mother addresses the child using his full name and the diminutive *-kun* for boys (and male subordinates, as in excerpt 4 below). The child also uses addressee honorifics throughout the role-play, which suggests that by the age of two and a half, Japanese children are able to use addressee honorifics in response to others' use of them in indexing fictive social roles and relationships. The mother (in her role as caller) also uses referent honorifics, but to a lesser degree. She uses the person reference terms *otoosan* 'father' and *okaasan* 'mother' (lines 6 and 10) and the other-elevating verb *irassharu* 'to be' (line 6) when referring to the child's parents, as an index of respect and out-group relationships. In response to the mother's use of the other-elevating referent honorific verb *irassharu* in referring to the child's parents, the child repeats the verb *irassharu* also in referring to his parents (line 8: '(They) are-REF HON+ADD HON'), and thus misuses referent honorifics. In Japanese, other-elevating verbs are not typically used to refer to in-group members (such as family members). A fully competent speaker would be expected to choose either the neural verb *iru* 'to be' or the self- and in-group-lowering referent honorific verb *oru* 'to be'. Although the mother does not correct the child's mistake, this excerpt suggests that role-play interaction is an important context for children's socialization to addressee and referent honorifics in indexing politeness.

As illustrated in the above excerpts, Japanese children are socialized from an early age to understand and use various language features to index polite affective stances, which in turn index identities, social actions and activities. In the next section, we illustrate how politeness in Japanese is socialized much later in life, as L1 Japanese-speaking adults enter full-time employment upon completing their formal education.

4.2 Adults in the Business World

The second case study is based on audiovisual recordings of new employee orientation sessions (25 in total) at a small-scale IT company (18 employees) in Tokyo. The sessions took place almost daily for 30 minutes to an hour over four months. The participants are two male superiors (Iino, in his 30s, who holds a managerial position, and Hata, in his 20s, who has worked for two years as a programmer) and four new employees, who are recent college graduates (Kato: male, Nishi: male, Sato: female, Waki: male). The goals of

the orientation are to improve new employees' communication skills and to ensure that they act politely as company representatives at the place where they will be sent to work as IT specialists. Here, we examine the process of socializing these new college graduates into being competent members of a business community, by focusing on two areas: (a) attentiveness to others' needs; and (b) honorifics.

Attentiveness to Others' Needs: *kikubari*

Displaying *kikubari* 'attentiveness to others' needs' is considered to be a polite act and important in developing and maintaining good interpersonal relationships in Japanese society (Fukushima 2004, 2011; Fukushima and Haugh 2014; Lebra 1976, 2004). Fukushima (2011, p. 550) describes *kikubari* as 'a demonstrator's pre-emptive response to a beneficiary's verbal or nonverbal cues or situations surrounding a beneficiary and a demonstrator, which takes the form of offering.' *Kikubari* is interlinked with *omoiyari* 'empathy' and *sasshi* 'anticipatory inference' (Fukushima and Haugh 2014, p. 166). As discussed earlier (section "Indirect Requests and Directives"), Japanese children learn to interpret what others are feeling and empathise with them from a very early age (e.g., Clancy 1986; Burdelski 2009, 2013a). They are socialized to pay attention to the feelings and needs of the addressee and/or a third party even when these others are not making an explicit request or verbally expressing their needs. Although college-aged students understand the importance of displaying attentiveness (Fukushima 2011; Fukushima and Haugh 2014), attention to others' needs is an important topic in the new employee orientation in Japanese companies. In general, attentiveness to others' needs is ideologically a moral issue, but in the business context, it is reframed as an issue of business productivity. It is this new 'frame' (Goffman 1981) that makes the lesson of attentiveness to others' needs an important component of the new employee orientation. In (3a), the superior, Iino, explains how *kikubari* can be applied to the business context. Just prior to this excerpt, Hata told the new employees to always ask themselves what others are intending in order to pick up on their unspoken needs.

(3a) [Iino—superior, Kato—new employee]

1 → Iino: *eeto koo iu koto o yatte hoshii to iwareta toki ni*
'Well, when (you) are told (by a customer), "(I) want (you) to do this",'

2 → *sore de owari na no ka na tte iu no o kangaete hoshii to iu koto na n desu yo*

'it is that (we) want (you) to think, "Is that all (I need to do)?".'

3 *ano kiita koto aru to omou n desu kedo*
'Uh (I) think (you)'ve heard this before, but'

4 *iwareta koto dake yatte ireba ii ka doo ka tte iu hanashi kiita koto nai?*
'Haven't (you) heard whether or not it is okay to do just what you are told to do?'

5 Kato: *sonna arimasu ne* [*h h h h*
'(I) have heard such a thing h h h h.'

6 Iino: [*h h h h*

7 *tte koto o koko wa iitai n desu yo*
'In this part (of the orientation session) (we) want to say this (act proactively).'

8 Kato: *hai*
'Yes.'

9 → Iino: *ano: tabun shigoto o yaru ue de iwareta koto o yatte ireba ii baai mo mochiron arimasu.*
'Well, perhaps there are certainly times when it is okay to just do what (you) are told to do in (your) work.'

10 Kato: *un*
'Uh huh'

11 → Iino: *arimasu kedo sore o bakka zutto yatteru to soko de oshi- oshimai ni natte shimau.*
'There are such times, but if you keep only doing so, you will come to a dead end.

12 Kato: *hai*
'Yes.'

13 → Iino: *hai sono saki o kangaete kudasai to*
'Well, please think ahead of that (=Do more than what you are told).'

In creating a context in which a new employee has received a request from a customer to do something (line 1: '"(I) want (you) to do to this"'), Iino tells the new employees that he wants them to ask themselves whether just responding to the request is all they have to do (line 2). That is, he encourages them to interpret the request beyond what is verbally stated and to proactively attend to what the customer might also need (before he or she asks for it). Following Iino's question (line 4), Kato responds positively and laughs (line 5). His laugh suggests his critical stance toward Iino's question (i.e., 'Of course

we know we have to act proactively, so why are you asking this question?'). In response to Kato, Iino first asserts that although there are times when it is appropriate to do just what one is told to do (line 9), continuing to do so will lead to a 'dead end' (line 11), and then he emphasises the importance to 'think ahead' (line 13). In this way, Iino conveys to the new employees the importance of discerning when to display *kikubari* in their work. In the workplace setting, socialization to politeness is a power-related practice. In (3b), Iino summarises how attentiveness helps one's job productivity.

(3b) [Iino and Hata—superiors]

1 → Iino: *umaku okyakusan no yooboo o kumitotte ageru koto ga dekiru yoo ni naru to dondon shigoto ni tsunagatte iku n desu ne*
'Once (you) become skilful in picking up what clients want, (you) will get a lot of work.'

2 Hata: *soo desu ne*
'That's right.'

Ideologically *kikubari* is not directly linked to business profits. It is perhaps only in the business context in which *kikuburi* is discussed in terms of job productivity and profits. Iino's reframing of attentiveness to others' needs in terms of business productivity and profits in (3b) socializes the new employees to the new reality of the business community.

Honorifics

In addition to attentiveness, business etiquette training in Japan typically provides lessons on referent honorifics, as the appropriate use of referent honorifics is considered to be a critical skill in the business community (Dunn 2011, 2013). These lessons include worksheets and drills on the correct honorific verb forms, conversation practice (Dunn 2011), and known-answer questions. In this IT company, the superiors pose known-answer questions. As discussed earlier (see sub-section "Honorifics" within Section 4.1), in Japanese other-elevating verbs are used to refer to out-group members. Because the categories *uchi* 'in-group'/*soto* 'out-group' are indexical (Wetzel 1994), who constitutes the speaker's in- or out-group changes from context to context. Thus, the appropriate use of referent honorifics entails an ability to determine whether the person being referred is within the speaker's in-group or out-group in relation to others. For instance, when a client calls the section head of a company who is out of the office, the section head's subordinate

is expected to treat the section head as an in-group member and not use an other-elevating verb to refer to him. Conversely, when a family member of the section head calls the section head while he is out of the office, his subordinate is expected to treat him as an out-group member and use an other-elevating verb to refer to him. As illustrated in (4), determining whether the person being referred to is an in-group or out-group member in a given context is challenging for young adults. By providing a hypothetical situation in which the section head's family member has called the section head, Mr. Yamada, who is currently out of the office, the superiors (Hata and Iino) ask the new employees (Kato and Nishi) what they would say in this situation if they were Mr. Yamada's subordinate.

(4) [superiors—Hata and Iino; new employees—Kato and Nishi]

1 Hata: *ano miuchi no kata kara denwa dattara doo shimau?*
'Um, what would you say if (Mr Yamada's) family member calls?'

2 → Kato: *Yamada buchoo wa ima gaishutsu shite imasu.*
'Section Head Yamada is-ADD HON out of the office now.'

3 Hata: *e:: Nishi kun*
'Uh:: Nishi-*kun*.'

4 → Nishi: *Yamada san wa ima gaishutsu chuu desu.*
'Mr. Yamada is-ADD HON out of the office now.'

5 → Hata: *ee* (0.2) *chigaimasu*
'Uh (those answers) are wrong.'

6 (0.2)

7 → Hata: *kochira wa* (.) *ee keigo o tsukawanai to ikenai.*
'This one (=situation) uh (you) have to use (referent) honorifics.'

8 Iino: *shasen de wa*
'(when you talk) on the company phone.'

9 Hata: *Yamada buchoo wa*
'Section Head Yamada'

10 → Nishi: °*gaishutsu nasatte* [*imasu.*]°
'is-REF HON+ADD HON out of the office'.

11 Hata: [*nasatte*] *imasu ga tadashii desu ne.*
'"*nasatte imasu*-REF HON+ADD HON" is correct, isn't it?'

12 Nishi: *aa*
'Ah.'

13 Hata: *aite gata ga* (.) ((outward hand gesture)) *uchi de wa naku soto*
'the calling party (.) is not (your) in-group but out-group.'

14		*Yamada buchoo wa ai–* (.) *miuchi no kata kara to Yamada bucho–*
		'Section Head Yamada (.) from his family Section Head Yamada'
15		*miuchi- Yamada bucho ga soto de jibun ga uchi na n de*
		'family-Section Head Yamada is out-group and you are in-group so'
16	Nishi:	*hai*
		'Yes.'
17	Hata:	*soto ni taishite keii harawanakya ikenai*.
		'(You) have to show respect to an out-group member.'
18	Nishi:	*aa*
		'Ah.'

In response to Hata's question (line 1), Kato and Nishi answer by employing only addressee honorifics (lines 2 and 4), when the use of referent honorifics is also expected. Hata states that their answers are wrong and instructs them to use referent honorifics (line 5). Hata and Iino co-construct this instruction, as Iino conveys that referent honorifics must be used when talking on the company's phone (line 7). Hata starts to provide a correct expression by saying *Yamada buchoo wa* 'Section Head Yamada' (line 9). Nishi then breaks in and starts to complete the sentence using the other-elevating verb *nasatte* ('do') in a whispering voice (line 10). When Nishi utters this other-elevating verb, Hata completes his sentence by repeating *nasatte* (line 11), which confirms that Nishi's use of honorifics is correct. Apparently, the new employees are struggling with identifying who is the in-group member and who is the out-group member in this context, and hence initially fail to produce referent honorifics. Hata explains that an other-elevating verb is needed here because Mr. Yamada and his family are out-group members from the speaker's point of view (lines 13–15), and so they must display *keii* 'respect' to Mr. Yamada (line 17).

Similar to the young child's use of honorifics in the role-play activity examined earlier (excerpt 2), referent honorifics posed a challenge to the new employees during the orientation sessions. In the case of the child, he used an other-elevating verb (*irassharu*) to refer to members of his in-group (parents), whereas in the case of the new employees, they initially failed to come up with an other-elevating verb (nasaru) to refer to their boss as an out-group member. The exchange in this excerpt, and similar examples in these data, indicate that during the orientation sessions the superiors provided the new employees with metapragmatic comments on honorific usage and offered them opportunities to correct their misuse of honorifics. In this way, explicit socialization of

referent honorifics is emphasised later in life in different ways, as young people enter the business world. This is perhaps due to the fact that the appropriate use of honorifics is consequential not just for the individual but also for the social group, especially the company's image and profits. The socialization of honorifics as linguistic politeness is likely to be a lifelong endeavour in societies such as Japan with a rich system of honorifics.

5 Summary and Future Directions

This chapter has discussed language socialization in relation to (im)politeness. It has reviewed prior research related to language socialization and (im)politeness, and has drawn upon case studies among L1 children in and around the household and L1 adults in the business world in order to illustrate to researchers how to go about examining (im)politeness from a language socialization perspective. It has discussed and analysed politeness as a kind of affective stance in displaying respect, deference, manners, kindness, consideration, empathy and the like, that is indexed by various linguistic features, which in turn index a range of socioculturally meaningful realties, including social actions, activities and identities. The analysis has demonstrated how language socialization entails learning (im)politeness, and how learning (im)politeness is embedded in the process of language socialization. It has thus provided an alternative perspective on (im)politeness theory and research.

Finally, the discussion and analysis suggest directions for future research. While many of the studies related to language socialization and (im)politeness focus on adult–child interactions, and this area should continue to develop in a range of societies and settings, more research is needed especially on: (a) children's interactions among peers and siblings; (b) adult socialization across the life span; and (c) technology as a tool of socialization. The findings that children use language features that are normatively associated with politeness (e.g., formulaic greetings, honorifics) in both prescribed and novel ways (e.g., for insults, exclusion) suggests a need for more research on language socialization to (im)politeness within children's peers groups. Also, it would be helpful to have more research on language socialization of (im)politeness across the lifespan, especially on young and older adults' interactions with family members in households and co-workers and superiors in workplaces. Finally, in an increasingly globalising world, it would be beneficial to know how language socialization into (im)politeness occurs through internet and web cameras (Sunakawa 2011) in which speakers such as extended family members who are located in different countries, regions, or towns use technology for communication across generations of speakers.

Appendix

The following transcription conventions are used:

[Wo] rd	Brackets indicate overlapping talk.
Wo:: rd	Colon marks phonological lengthening (each colon is approx. 0.1 sec.).
Wo-	Hyphen indicates sound cutoff.
((bows))	Nonverbal actions and comments are shown in double parentheses.
h	Ah h indicates laughter.
(1.2)	Number in parenthesis indicates silence in seconds/tenths of a second.
(.)	Full stop inside parenthesis indicates a micro-pause (less than 0.2 second).
>word<	Greater-than signs mark fast-paced speech.
=	An equals sign indicates latching between turns.
.	Full stop marks falling intonation.
,	Comma marks a continuing intonation.
?	Question mark indicates a rising intonation.
(Word)	Word in parenthesis indicates transcriber uncertainty of hearing and a tentative reconstruction.
( )	Empty parenthesis indicates an inaudible word or words.
°Word°	Circles around an utterance mark reduced volume.

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(Im)politeness: Learning and Teaching

J. César Félix-Brasdefer and Gerrard Mugford

1 Introduction

Research in interlanguage pragmatics (ILP) has demonstrated that various aspects of pragmatics can be taught in the classroom from beginning levels of language instruction. For instance, the learning and teaching of polite behaviour has been widely investigated through the use of speech acts such as requests, complaints, compliments and compliment responses, and refusals (e.g., Alcón 2013; Bardovi-Harlig 2001; Félix-Brasdefer and Cohen 2012; Hasler-Barker 2013; Rose 2005). Ishihara and Cohen (2010) make a strong case for teaching principles of pragmatics in both L2 and FL language contexts; Tatsuki and Houck (2010) and Houck and Tatsuki (2010) present innovative pedagogical proposals for the teaching of speech acts at the discourse level; Bardovi-Harlig and Mahan-Taylor (2003) edited a series of pedagogical lessons for teaching speech acts; Félix-Brasdefer (2006) proposed pedagogical model to teach polite refusals at the discourse level. And more recently, Pizziconi and Locher (2015), edited a collection of articles which combine research from the field of (im)politeness

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_19

with research on language pedagogy and language learning. These studies focus on the teaching and learning of L2 politeness as processes of socialisation.

The ability to produce and perceive (im)polite behaviour in a second (L2) or foreign language (FL) context[1] is part of the learner's pragmatic knowledge, and can be studied within the field of ILP. Although initial definitions of ILP referred to the non-native speaker's (NNS) ability to *use* and comprehend speech acts and other conversational practices (Bardovi-Harlig 1999; Kasper and Dahl 1991), L2 pragmatics is concerned with the *learning* component to emphasise the development of the L2 pragmatic system (Bardovi-Harlig 2013). Learning the pragmatic system of a SL or FL has implications for effective ways to teach pragmatics in the classroom. Pragmatic knowledge, according to Leech (1983) and Thomas (1983), comprises two components: *pragmalinguistic competence* refers to knowledge and performance of the conventions of language use or the linguistic resources available in a given language that convey 'particular illocutions' in contextually appropriate situations (Leech 1983, p. 11); s*ociopragmatic competence* is knowledge about and performance consistent with the social norms in specific situations in a given society, as well as familiarity with variables of social power and social distance. The goal of teaching pragmatics in the classroom should be to develop learners' pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic abilities in FL and L2 host environments. Instructors of second languages should be familiar with these concepts when developing materials for teaching pragmatics in the classroom.

This chapter is organised as follows. First, we review the main concepts, as well as theoretical and methodological approaches used in examining (im)polite behaviour. Then, we review existing research into L2 (im)politeness with regard to the effects of instruction of pragmatics and current views that examine the use and learning of L2 (im)politeness features from a discourse perspective. We then propose a pedagogical model for the teaching of (im)politeness in the classroom, followed by the conclusions, i.e., the summary and future directions for research.

2 Key Concepts in and Approaches to L2 (Im)politeness

Research on the learning and teaching of L2 (im)polite behaviour in the FL classroom or in the host environment has addressed three fundamental issues: (1) the effectiveness of instruction to maximise learning; (2) the

[1] In this chapter, L2–FL distinction will refer to the following: an L2 is presumably being learned in a context where that language is used by the dominant language group (e.g., Australians learning Spanish in Mexico) and an FL is being learned in a context where the language may have far more limited use (e.g., US Americans or British students studying Spanish at Indiana University).

role of exposure of pragmatic input in the FL classroom; and (3) raising sociopragmatic awareness. With regard to the learning and effectiveness of instruction, Rose and Kasper's (2001) edited volume provides solid empirical evidence that proves that without instruction (implicit or explicit) various aspects of pragmatics are learned slowly, and some, perhaps may never be learned. Researchers that examine ways to maximise the learning of L2 pragmatics in the classroom, such as (im)polite discourse practices, often use cross-sectional (e.g., samples of two or more learner groups at different times) or longitudinal designs (e.g., samples of L2 behaviour used by the same learner over time). When we analyse learner data we need to consider the amount, frequency, length of exposure, and modality of how learners are exposed to L2 limited input in the FL classroom (e.g., textbooks, metapragmatic instruction), or in the host environment such as in study-abroad settings with learners exposed to natural input. For instance, in intercultural interactions learners socialise in everyday situations: they agree or disagree, respond to rudeness, develop the ability to use genuine or mock impoliteness (Mugford 2013) or develop the ability to use transactional and relational talk in service encounter settings (Shively 2013). Finally, beginning with Schmidt's (1983) consciousness-raising approach to teaching pragmatics, research in ILP shows that raising awareness of sociopragmatics in the target language enhances the learner's pragmatic competence.

Studies that adopt an awareness-raising approach often use metapragmatic instruction, relational sequences as input, cross-cultural examples of the learners' L1 and L2 cultures, and joint discussion of sociopragmatic differences with regard to (im)politeness norms, directness or indirectness, the notion of insistence, and perceptions of degrees of social power, distance, and degree of imposition (e.g., Félix-Brasdefer 2006; Félix-Brasdefer and Cohen 2012; Hasler-Barker 2013; Haugh and Chang 2015; Rose 2005).

The analysis of L2 (im)polite behaviour should consider more effective ways to examine social interaction using data from different discourse settings in institutional and non-institutional contexts. Some of these include the negotiation of service in intercultural contexts (e.g., US learners of Spanish buying food or clothes in Mexico City or asking a stranger for directions in Madrid), rejecting an instructor's advice to take a course, learning how to write appropriate emails in formal and non-formal settings, engaging in relational talk with the host family, or complaining about poor service at a restaurant in the target culture. Further, grounded in Vygotskian (1978) cultural-historical psychology, van Compernolle (2014) proposed a model for the teaching of L2 pragmatics (mainly speech acts) using sociocultural theory that underscores the importance of social relationships for developing pragmatic competence through social practices, specifically since social action is mediated

and internalised through culturally organised activity. And Kecskes (2013) proposed the sociocognitive approach that can be used to examine (im)polite behaviour in intercultural interactions, including English as a lingua franca. His approach 'emphasizes that language production and comprehension involve both prior experience and knowledge, and emergent, actual situation experience and knowledge co-constructed by interlocutors' (p. 7). Kecskes argues that FL/L2 users are influenced by two or more different sets of linguistic and non-linguistic conventions. Therefore, establishing common ground, identifying context, and recognising salience become important issues in the teaching and learning of (im)politeness.

3 Overview of Previous Research in L2 (Im)politeness

Research into the teaching and learning of (im)politeness in a FL and in the host environment has focused on three key areas: conformity to target-language norms; discursive contextually managed expression of politeness; and face-work (Goffman 1967) that allows one to be (im)polite in one's own way. Conformity reflects integration and acculturation and examines how language learners can be instructed to adhere to NS patterns and practices of the target language; especially, in terms of *politic* behaviour (Watts 2003) and conventionalised speech acts (Bardovi-Harlig and Bastos 2011). Discursive approaches examine how interactants engage in relational work when negotiating interpersonal relations, as in intercultural interactions between learners and NSs of the target language. Face management can be achieved by FL users trying to establish their own ways of expressing politeness and impoliteness which may involve balancing L1 and FL (im)politeness practices. One example of development of (im)politeness practices that showcases acculturation and development of interactional competence over time is Schmidt's (1983) case study. The author showed that after a three-year observation period, his adult language learner, Wes, made little progress in his grammatical competence, while his pragmatic and discourse ability improved. He showed various examples of sophisticated interactional competence, despite sufficient pragmalinguistic knowledge of linguistic (polite) expressions to soften direct requests. In the FL classroom context, Félix-Brasdefer (2007) showed that beginners and intermediate learners of Spanish appeared to be impolite due to the lack of pragmalinguistic resources to mitigate a request in learner–NS role-play interactions. In these studies, insufficient pragmalinguistic information to mitigate the request may have been perceived as impolite or abrupt by the interlocutor.

The three aforementioned research areas reflect current approaches towards examining politeness and impoliteness: the classic face-saving mode (Brown and Levinson 1987, Leech 1983; Lakoff 1973) which reflects conformity to existing practices; the discursive approach (Eelen 2001; Locher and Watts 2008; Mills 2003; Watts 2003) which examines how participants construct and maintain relationships; and face management which can be described in terms of interactional co-construction (Arundale 1999, 2006; Haugh 2007) and rapport management (Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2007). Furthermore, the three investigative approaches demonstrate how (im)politeness research developed from focusing on the hearer and adhering target-language norms to recognising that FL users have choices regarding how they wish to participate in the target language (TL) in both terms of impoliteness and rudeness. Consequently, research no longer considers impoliteness and rudeness to be mere opposites of politeness, but rather they represent interactional choices. For instance, Mugford (2011) discussed the choices EFL users faced in the ELT classroom regarding *politic* and *polite* norms (Watts 2003) and face enhancement (Spencer-Oatey 2007). Mugford (2012) examines target-language impoliteness in terms of Spencer-Oatey's 'behavioural expectations, face sensitivities, and interactional wants' (2005, p. 95). Thus, theories of (im)politeness have influenced the teaching/learning of (im)politeness.

To provide a critical overview of research into (im)politeness teaching and learning, we have, therefore, structured this section in the following way. First of all, we examine major research concerns in the learning and teaching of (im)politeness, especially in terms of whether (im)politeness can be taught. Secondly, we propose a pedagogical model for teaching and learning (im)politeness in terms of conformity to target-language norms, discursive expression of politeness and face management. Finally, we critically examine whether research has had an effect on learning in the foreign-language classroom.

3.1 Can (Im)polite Behaviour Be Learned and Taught?

Socially acceptable and appropriate language functions and conventions involve the expression and interpretation of linguistic (im)politeness, especially since pragmatic competence reflects 'the ability to communicate your intended message with all its nuances in any socio-cultural context and to interpret the message of your interlocutor as it was intended' (Fraser 2010, p. 15). Since (im)politeness is a fundamental part of pragmatic competence researchers have examined whether it can be taught in the classroom context. A preliminary question asks whether students should be taught impolite / rude language. If so, a follow-up question examines whether exposure to

(im)polite behaviour in the FL classroom is sufficient in order to express and react to (im)polite behaviour. Teachers have to decide whether explicit instruction—delivered through metapragmatic information of (im)politeness practices—is more effective than implicit instruction in the FL classroom. Overall, research in L2 pragmatics has shown that instruction in pragmatics is more effective than exposure for developing pragmatic competence (Bardovi-Harlig 2001; Kasper and Rose 2002, Chap. 7; Rose 2005; Rose and Kasper 2001). Evidence of the teaching of (im)politeness is generally conducted through the analysis of polite or impolite speech acts, such as refusals, requests, threats, and complaints.

Research in interlanguage pragmatics has shown that the pragmatic system of uninstructed L2 learners is different from that of NSs and that acquisition of pragmatic competence progresses slowly and is sometimes incomplete (Bardovi-Harlig 2001). Although learners receive instruction in the classroom, they are not exposed to instruction of (im)polite discourse practices. For instance, Ellis (1992) examined the opportunities that a classroom setting afforded two ESL boys (ages 10 and 11) for performing appropriate requests over a period of two years. The classroom data included speech act sequences in teacher–student interactions. He found that while the range of the learners' request types was extended slightly over time, direct requests predominated throughout, mostly by means of mood-derivable verbs (i.e., imperative verbs), and, more importantly, the majority of these directives contained little use of internal or external modification, which shows a lack of pragmalinguistic ability to express linguistic politeness. The possibility of these learners needing more time in the classroom environment to better develop their performance of requests was discarded; instead, it was observed that '[i]t may be necessary to create such a need artificially and perhaps, also, to draw learners' conscious attention to the way in which language is used to encode social meaning' (Ellis, p. 21). Furthermore, due to the narrow range and low frequency of mitigators that have been observed in the speech of uninstructed advanced learners in L2 (Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford 1991; Mugford 2008) and FL contexts (Félix-Brasdefer 2004), it seems that mitigators need to be explicitly taught so that learners may make the appropriate form–function connections between these frequent elements from the early stages of acquisition. In fact, using a pre-post test design, Félix-Brasdefer (2007) showed that FL learners of Spanish who received metapragmatic instruction improved the frequency and variety of lexical ('please') and syntactic mitigators ('conditional', 'imperfect') in refusals over the course of one semester. In contrast, learners in the control group—who did not receive instruction in pragmatics—did not show significant gains over time. With regard to the learning of implicature,

Bouton (1994) observed that even after 17 months of residing in the United States, ESL learners still had difficulty in comprehending certain types of implicatures, leading the author to suggest the need for explicit instruction of pragmatics in the classroom.

Rather than teaching students how to be rude in the target language, studies of TL impoliteness have examined how learners can be prepared to negotiate uncomfortable situations. For instance, Mugford (2012) examines how teachers can help students negotiate, respond to and contend with face-threatening acts. While not advocating that EFL users should be taught to be rude, Mugford argues that 'L2 users need to be given choices when confronted with rudeness so that they decide how they want to react' (2008, p. 375). Such choices inevitably involve the right to be impolite if they wish to do so.

Bardovi-Harlig and Salsbury (2004) analysed the sequence and structure of turns in disagreements among uninstructed ESL learners during a one-year longitudinal study. While change was observed in an increase of the amount of talk, delayed postponements, and evidence of a multiple turn structure over time, the authors recommended 'the addition of a conversational component to enhance classroom instruction' to assist learners in developing oral expression in pragmatics (2004, p. 223). Similarly, in Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford's (1993) one-year longitudinal observation of suggestions and mitigators among advanced ESL learners, the authors pointed out that '[w]ithout explicit teaching and without necessary input, it is little wonder that NNSs learn to make suggestions before they learn the appropriate linguistic form for those suggestions' (p. 301). While there seems to be some evidence of improvement among uninstructed learners over time, the consensus among researchers is that an instructional component in pragmatics and relevant pragmatic input is necessary to foster pragmatic competence in both the L2 and FL classrooms. And Koike and Pearson (2005) and Hasler-Barker (2013) showed that certain pragmalinguistic features of suggestions and compliments and compliment responses, respectively, can be learned via both implicit and explicit instruction. In particular, using a pre-test/ post-test/ delayed design, Hasler-Barker showed the effects of explicit metapragmatic instruction over the course of one semester.

Unlike the aforementioned research on the learning of polite practices, research on the learning of impolite behaviour is scarce. For example, in her analysis of honorifics in Korean, Brown (2013) introduced learners to features of impolite behaviour in the classroom. Learners were introduced to input from a Korean TV drama; pragmalinguistic features of the interaction were discussed in class, followed by communicative practice. The metapragmatic comments revealed that learners were willing to learn

about impolite practices in the classroom. Schepers (2014) also used a TV drama show to teach polite and impolite practices in the classroom. And Mugford (2008) showed that FL teachers of English are willing to teach impolite practices in the classroom. Finally, using a production questionnaire, Beebe and Waring (2005) conducted a cross-sectional study with two groups of learners (lower proficiency and higher proficiency) who responded to rude situations. Results showed proficiency effects, with the higher-proficiency group using more aggressing strategies (e.g., insult, threat, criticise) and persisting strategies (e.g., argue) than the lower-proficiency group who showed a preference for acquiescing strategies (e.g., apologise, thank). This study shows evidence of pragmatic development in the learners' ability to react to rude behaviour, with the higher-proficiency group sounding more aggressive and more assertive in their ability to react to rude behaviour.

These previous studies point to the need to teach impoliteness in the classroom from beginner levels. While examining politeness helps EFL learners focus on normative behaviour, the reality is that at the beginner stage, students may pay more attention to perceived acts of impoliteness and this may be a much more productive route towards dealing with (im)politeness in the EFL classroom. Features of impolite behaviour are teachable, and learners need to be given the opportunity to react to rude behaviour according to the sociocultural norms of the target culture.

In order to examine how researchers have attempted to answer these questions, in the next section we examine the insights obtained through: pragmatic approaches to politeness and conformity to target-language norms; discursive expression of politeness; and face management. Whilst analysing (im)politeness through these three categories, we do not argue that the division is absolute but rather one of emphasis.

3.2 Pragmatic Approach: Teaching Conformity

Teaching politeness as conformity may be attempted by adhering to TL models of politeness (e.g., Brown and Levinson 1987; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983), by imitating native speakers' interactional norms and practices, or by following conventional speech act patterns in terms of pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic resources. Given that most research has focused on the work of Brown and Levinson, the central focus of this section will be on their influence, research studies using Brown and Levinson's model and possible criticisms of adherence to their model with regard to ESL teaching.

In teaching and learning (im)politeness, Brown and Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983) offer principles that are relatively easy to recognise and seemingly reflect everyday behaviour. Concepts of positive and negative politeness provide understandable means of explaining and illustrating closeness, solidarity, distance and mitigation when comparing the TL culture(s) with that of the learners' first language. Strategies such as 'seek agreement' and 'be conventionally indirect' provide tangible ways of expressing politeness. Furthermore Brown and Levinson offer FL users a way of avoiding offence since they focus on face threatening acts, which may help EFL users to unintentionally to avoid saying or doing the wrong thing.

Given the strong influence of Brown and Levinson (1987) on developing politeness theory, it is not surprising that they have had a significant impact on research into teaching and learning of (im)politeness. For instance, adopting a pragmatic competence approach, Bou-Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2003) developed an interaction-based interpretation of Brown and Levinson's model of politeness and examined its suitability for teaching and learning second-language politeness by raising learner awareness of pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic resources. Félix-Brasdefer and Hasler-Barker (2012) proposed a pedagogical model for the teaching of compliments and responses to compliments. This model highlights the extent to which learners are exposed to input in the class and through textbooks. It underscores explicit metapragmatic instruction during the course of a semester through awareness-raising activities, cross-cultural comparisons, and communicative practice. Their methodological proposals for the teaching and learning of politeness involve increasing awareness and sensitising learners to different genres and linguistic resources. This is then followed through by comparing, examining and discussing similarities and differences in successful and unsuccessful dialogues so that students can develop as autonomous ethnographic learners.

Criticising the lack of attention given by ELT textbook writers to the teaching and learning of politeness, Ficzere (2014) argues that her research has found that it is possible and useful to teach politeness strategies to higher-level adult language learners. Reflecting a conformity approach to politeness, Ficzere sees teaching and learning as useful in helping 'L2 speakers to better understand and use such cultural norms regarding politeness' (p. 30). Through the use of interviews, classroom teaching and questionnaires, Ficzere investigated learners' cross-cultural attitudes toward politeness, analysed situations potentially involving politeness and investigated possible pragmatic strategies for negotiating appropriate situations.

Focusing on the use of Hebrew, Olshtain and Weinbach (1985) investigated 'the main semantic formulas used in the act of complaining' (p. 195)

and compared such use by native and non-native speakers of Hebrew. Examining the speech act of complaining in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1987) face threatening act (FTA), Olshtain and Weinbach identified differences between native and non-native speakers and the sociopragmatic choices that influenced their decisions. Using a written discourse completion task (DCT), they asked 35 native and 35 non-native participants to react to 20 situations which reflected such variables as social status, social distance, contract (pre-existing understandings between interactants in the DCTs) and levels of expectation. The results indicate that whilst both groups used the full range of complaint strategies, the native speakers were, for instance, more severe in their complaints. Whilst the native speakers were not held up to be the model, interpretation of research results runs the risk of seeing non-native speakers, whose first language was not identified in the study, as not following TL norms rather than trying to understand them as fully fledged interactants with their own ways of complaining. However, such research is useful in studying adherence or deviance from TL norms of (im)politeness.

Despite arguing for its importance, pragmatic approaches to (im)politeness (e.g., Brown and Levinson 1987; Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983) tend to lack a discursive context. Therefore, research on teaching and learning impoliteness from a classic conformist viewpoint tends to be limited because one normally needs a discursive context. One exception can be found in Ahmadi and Heydari (2011) who, working in an Iranian English language teaching context, administered a Likert-format questionnaire to four groups of participants: 110 EFL learners, 70 EFL teachers, five Iranian language experts and eight non-Iranian language experts. This research examined how language learners can be helped 'to cope with impolite situations happening in the real language use' (Ahmadi and Heydari 2011, p. 1276). The questionnaire asked participants to comment on various aspects of teaching impoliteness such as the need to teach it, whether it should be taught directly or indirectly and at what level it should be taught. The results highlighted differences between the groups regarding (im)politeness instruction in the classroom, whether it should only be taught at higher levels and whether it should be taught explicitly. Results indicated that students' awareness and consciousness of polite and impolite practices 'was vital to successful communication' and, in the Iranian context, this may be best achieved through implicit learning and self-instruction (Ahmadi and Heydari 2011, p. 1281).

Whilst the importance of Brown and Levinson's contribution to the development of politeness theory is hardly open to question, criticism of using their model for teaching and learning has been voiced, among others, by Meier (1997) who argues that the achievement of appropriateness would

be a better pedagogical target. At the same time, Haugh has cautioned about the indiscriminate use of Brown and Levinson's (1987) notions of positive and negative face when teaching politeness, 'without acknowledging that these notions may be quite unsuitable for highlighting differences in the conceptualisation of "politeness" across cultures (Haugh 2006)' (Haugh 2007, p. 676).

Given that classic approaches focus on conformity and politeness norms and practices which FL/L2 users may not be aware of or may not want to follow, discursive approaches may offer more valuable insights as to how (im)politeness is enacted at an interactional level.

3.3 Discursive Approaches: Interactional Achievement

Discursive approaches to research on teaching and learning (im)politeness start with the premise that (im)politeness is enacted and achieved interactionally between participants. Therefore research on teaching and learning needs to be context-based and sensitive to the participants' age, distance and power along with other sociolinguistic and sociopragmatic factors.

Adopting a cross-cultural perspective, Félix-Brasdefer (2008) examines the teachability of mitigation through the invitation–refusal sequence (e.g. downgrading, softening and hedging), the benefits of direct instruction as opposed to exposure, and the effectiveness of different teaching approaches. By examining the use of mitigation in six role-play situations by intermediate-level experimental and control groups, each comprising 16 learners of Spanish, Félix-Brasdefer was able to examine the effect of metapragmatic instruction which had as an objective 'to promote explicit learning of certain mitigators when refusing a person of equal or higher status' (2008, p. 483). The findings showed that explicit instruction allowed learners to move from a lexical stage to the productive use of mitigators across multiple turns, and also resulted in higher retention levels. The results also indicated that a combination of pedagogical approaches such as noticing, input enhancement and metapragmatic discussion was more effective in teaching mitigators than following one single teaching technique.

Haugh (2007) noted that instruction needs to take into consideration the knowledge of pragmatic aspects of the target language and 'the identities the learner wishes to enact through interaction with others in that language' (2007, p. 658). Emphasising both learner choice and situatedness, Haugh argues that 'much work in applied pragmatics has tended to use pragmatic theories without sufficient consideration of their potential suitability for explicating culture-specific aspects of particular pragmatic phenomena' (2007, p. 676).

Haugh's research is important because he offers a way for FL users to decide how to engage in (im)politeness practices and negotiate their identities rather than blindly following TL norms of use.

Meanwhile, Félix-Brasdefer and Cohen (2012) argue for an integrated approach to teaching pragmatics in the Spanish as a Foreign Language classroom at beginner levels which aims to 'maximize learners' ability to negotiate speech acts in interaction' (p. 651). By examining different models for the teaching of pragmatics in the classroom, especially with regard to requests, advice/suggestions, refusals/disagreements, compliments and asking for/giving information, Félix-Brasdefer and Cohen offer a four-step approach with involves raising learner awareness, providing pragmatic input, teaching grammar as a communicative resource and offering opportunities for students to engage in pragmatic production by practising role-play situations of polite and impolite speech acts. This pedagogical approach provides the Spanish-language learner with a range of pragmalinguistic resources which is key to FL users choosing to be polite in their own ways.

With the growing interest in researching the teaching and learning of impoliteness, discursive approaches offer insights into the choices available to language learners. An early study carried out by Fraser examines insulting behaviour and the techniques available for both verbal and non-verbal insulting since '[i]t is a significant area which, if better understood, will permit teachers to both develop effective materials and recognize where communication disasters can occur'(1981, p. 435). By conducting a cross-cultural comparison of insulting expressions, Fraser argues that a knowledge of rude/impolite terms and techniques enables the learner to recognise insulting behaviour, shun ineffective techniques and, most importantly, avoid being an inadvertent insulter.

Meanwhile, Beebe and Waring (2005) go beyond the teaching of conventional speech acts such as requests, apologies and complaints and examine how EFL users can be given choices when responding to rudeness. By surveying the responses of 20 lower- and 20 higher-proficiency students in DCTs consisting of six situations, Beebe and Waring examined 'their use of pragmatic strategies in responding to rudeness as well as their subtle ways of expressing pragmatic force off-record' (p. 69). The results indicate that interactants used a wide range of pragmatics, which Beebe and Waring put into the following clusters: aggressing, persisting and acquiescing. Examples of aggressing strategies included insults, threats and challenges and criticism. Persisting strategies reflected arguing, justifying and requesting clarification. Acquiescing strategies comprise apologising, thanking, acquiescing and opting out. Beebe and Waring argue that their research allows teachers to 'understand the

natural progression of the increasing assertiveness in ESL students' pragmatic development' (2005, p. 74), as well as providing opportunities to enhance students' pragmatic competence.

Arguing for the need to teach impoliteness in the EFL classroom, Mugford (2008, 2013, 2014) argues that target-language politeness practices need to be studied and investigated given that English-language teaching tends to ignore everyday discourse practices such as rudeness, disrespect and impoliteness. Analysing the experiences of 84 EFL users in Mexico, he examined target-language impolite incidents and investigated how EFL students can be prepared to negotiate impoliteness and rudeness. With an emphasis on choice, Mugford argues that 'L2 users have the right to be impolite if they want to: they should be able to express themselves in the way they want to while understanding the consequences of their actions' (2008, p. 382). And more recently, based on a revised framework for raising sociopragmatic awareness (Huth and Talgehani-Nikazm 2006), Haugh and Chang (2015) proposed a four-step approach to teaching L2 impoliteness from an interactional perspective: 1) analysis of a relational sequence (e.g., teasing banter); 2) exposure to authentic data; 3) cross-cultural L1–L2 data comparison; and, 4). raising sociopragmatic awareness of impoliteness practices. This pedagogical proposal provides learners with general knowledge of understandings of relevant sociopragmatic dimensions of (im)politeness at the discourse level.

Research into the teaching and learning of (im)politeness in discursive terms faces the challenge of trying to prepare FL users for context-based use which may be spontaneous and difficult to predict. Teachers need to develop a pedagogical framework that helps students engage in relational (im)politeness. Furthermore, the teaching and learning of declarative knowledge regarding (im)politeness represents another pedagogical challenge for teachers, as it may be difficult to transform it into procedural knowledge when students have to participate and react in spur-of-the moment social interaction.

Whilst discursive approaches focus on the communicative context and interactional practices and behaviour, (im)politeness may develop in an emerging interaction as FL/L2 users attempt to come across in their own ways and achieve their own interpersonal goals.

3.4 Identity Management

Face approaches to researching the teaching and learning of (im)politeness have emphasised such issues as how FL interactants wish to come across and interact with other participants. Building on Spencer-Oatey's rapport

management (2005, 2007), researchers envisage (im)politeness strategies in terms of what interactants are trying to achieve individually, collectively, culturally and socially with other interactants.

Outlining a rapport approach, Liddicoat (2014) argues that by reflecting on differences in language use, learners can be helped to develop intercultural competence which can ultimately heighten their awareness of (im)politeness differences. Therefore, Liddicoat makes an important contribution to the teaching and learning of (im)politeness in promoting awareness and refection on pragmatic differences.

Examining the co-construction in terms of politeness, Iwasaki (2011) studied perceptions among four male L2 learners of Japanese regarding the use of the Japanese 'politeness' markers *desu/masu* which are employed to reflect social distance. Using an emic approach, she analysed how participants attempted to project a 'politeness' identity. Through the use of retrospective interviews conducted in the United States, the participants reflected on their use of *desu/masu* when they had lived in Japan in terms of: language socialisation; male foreigner status; accounts of explicit socialisation; making friends; and speech styles. The results indicated that there was 'a major disconnect between what they had been taught in the classroom and the social encounters they experienced' (2011, p. 98). Whilst textbooks emphasised *desu/masu* style, the interviewees were often bewildered at the use of these politeness markers in the target-language context and the expectations that L1 users had regarding how L2 users should employ them. Research findings demonstrated that the participants' use (or lack of use) went a considerable way in establishing their FL identity in the target language.

Research into impoliteness in terms of face management has examined how interactants project themselves and how they are perceived (Chang and Haugh 2011; Hinkel 1996; House 2010). Impoliteness invariably reflects the FL user's evaluations which may be strongly influenced by generalisations or by ethnocentric perceptions regarding politeness and impoliteness. Mills (2009), for instance, argues that cultural perceptions of impoliteness come from stereotypical and ideological knowledge. Therefore, she argues it is important to separate individual and social perceptions of impoliteness and identify and discuss preconceptions and ideological beliefs about linguistic behaviour of certain groups objectively. Mills' conclusions are important for research into teaching and learning FL (im)politeness since learners often assume that individual instances of impoliteness reflect TL societal norms and practices.

Dewaele argues that the concept of appropriateness is fundamental in the learning and the teaching of foreign languages and in trying to understand

TL (im)politeness practices. His initial introductory question asks '[s]hould foreign language teachers teach learners to violate the rules of 'appropriate' behaviour?' (2008, p. 245). After examining a potentially deliberately impolite situation, Dewaele adopts 'an emic perspective, i.e. a description of the participants' behaviour in terms meaningful (consciously or unconsciously) to them and where their voices and opinions are heard, in order to investigate the complex judgements of appropriateness in multilinguals' different languages' (2005, pp. 246–7). Examining the results from Dewaele and Pavlenko's (2001–2003) web-based Bilingualism and Emotion Questionnaire (BEQ) involving 1,800 multilinguals, Dewaele concludes that appropriateness is 'crucial part of sociopragmatic, sociocultural and sociolinguistic competence' which enables students to become 'authentic L2 users, capable of navigating through sociolinguistic and sociopragmatic minefield in TL' (2005, p. 262). Appropriateness plays a key role in helping learners develop (im)politeness strategies since learners cannot be expected to know or understand the whole gamut of target-language patterns and behaviours. Rather they need to be sensitive to context and interact in ways that are suitable for a given situation but which also allow them to express their own voice.

Whilst the face management approaches to researching (im)politeness treats FL users as fully fledged individual interactants in their own right, teachers face the daunting task of helping students express their individuality whilst emphasising the need to conform to TL language norms.

4 Pedagogical Model for Teaching (Im)polite Behaviour in the FL Classroom

Based on previous models for teaching speech acts (e.g., Félix-Brasdefer 2006; Félix-Brasdeer and Cohen 2012; Félix-Brasdefer and Bardovi-Harlig 2010; Rose 1994, 2005; Tatsuki and Houck 2010), we propose here a model for the teaching of (im)polite behaviour in the FL classroom. Previous models focus on the teaching of linguistic politeness mainly through linguistic expressions to soften speech acts, such as requests, refusals, advice giving, and softening indirect complaints. Instruction of politeness includes internal modification through lexical and syntactic resources to soften a face-threatening speech act. Lexical resources include 'please', adverbs (e.g., probably, maybe, possibly), and tag questions (e.g., open the door, will you?). Syntactic modification of speech acts includes use of the imperfect or the conditional to express politeness (e.g., I *wanted* to ask if you *would have time* to write a

recommendation for my graduate school application), aspect and past tense (e.g., I *was thinking* I might…). For example, Yates and Springall (2010) proposed a range of introductions for softening requests, ranging from most to least softened: 'I'm wondering if I could…', 'Would it be possible to..', I was thinking I might…', Maybe I could…', 'Can I …', 'I'd like to…', 'I want to…'. Online pedagogical activities for the teaching of refusals or compliments through online delivery can be accessed directly into the classroom from the Indiana University pragmatics website (Félix-Brasdefer 2015, http://www.indiana.edu/~discprag/spch_refusals.html). The website shows an overview of the speech act of refusals, strategies commonly used to express a refusal, role play dialogues, and online activities to be practiced directly in the classroom (see below). In general, the aim of most of pedagogical proposals to date focus on the teaching of linguistic (polite) expressions used to internally modify a speech act to make it sound more polite.

The proposed model aims at providing teachers and learners with a four-step approach to the teaching of (im)politeness in the classroom. We focus on raising awareness of pragmatic features of impoliteness events, the role of pragmatic input that students are exposed to in the classroom, teaching grammar as a communicative resource, and communicative practice.

4.1 Raising Awareness

Instructors start by explaining that in everyday social interaction we accomplish communicative actions, including polite or impolite practices. Instructors begin by explaining that (im)politeness refers to positive or negative evaluative attitudes towards behaviours that occur in specific contexts; these behaviours may be intentional or not. Impoliteness may also refer to behaviour that can be interpreted as offensive (Culpeper 2011). Instructors ask students to brainstorm words that are associated with polite and impolite behaviour. For example, students can provide a list of synonyms that they associate with politeness in their first language (e.g., kind, courteous, deferential, gracious, respectful, cordial) or impoliteness (e.g., rude, discourteous, disrespectful, mean, nasty). Then, students are asked to provide word associations of politeness and impoliteness in the target language. The instructor should encourage discussion of previous experiences where students participated or witnessed polite or impolite situations, paying attention to social variables such as the social power and distance between the interlocutors, as well as the gender and age of the participants. The aim of this activity is to raise awareness of the contextual features of (im)polite practices that students encounter in the target language.

4.2 Pragmatic Input: Identification and Reflection of (Im)polite Behaviour

The goal of this activity is to provide the learner with appropriate input necessary to identify contextual (e.g., situation, social distance, power) and co-textual features (e.g., polite and impolite words used). The students should focus on the pragmalinguistic resources used to express or perceive (im)polite practices.

Identification of Polite Features We give and respond to compliments, we ask a professor for a letter of recommendation, or we apologise to our classmate for arriving late at the study session. The selection of the expressions used to perform these communicative actions may depend on various factors such as the setting, the gender and age of the interlocutors, and the degree of social distance or social power between the interlocutors. The email message in example (1) (taken from Félix-Brasdefer and Cohen 2012), sent from a student to her professor, shows different communicative actions such as greeting, requesting, and expressing gratitude in email discourse:

(1) Email message sent from a female student to her male professor

1 Professor,
2 I am planning on studying abroad next spring in Barcelona
3 to complete my minor in Spanish and experience the culture.
4 I was wondering if you would be willing to write me a
5 letter of recommendation to add to my abroad application?
6 If you're able to do so, feel free to email me any questions you
7 have and I can send you the necessary form.
8 Thank you very much for your consideration,
9 [Student's name]

In addition to the title that was used to open the message (line 1), the student chose various communicative actions, such as a request for a letter of recommendation (lines 4–5) and an expression of gratitude to close her message (line 8), followed by the student's signature (line 9). Since the request is addressed to a professor, the student used a conventionally indirect request with various forms of internal modification that soften the imposition of the request, such as the past progressive and the conditional. Here, these expressions are employed to express politeness and formality (e.g., line 4: 'I *was wondering* if you *would be willing*…').

Identification of Impolite Features Using examples of impoliteness events (Culpeper et al. 2010), instructors can further develop reflection and identification of impolite practices and linguistic features used in impoliteness events. Following Culpeper (2011), impoliteness events refer to

> …constellations of behaviours and co-textual/contextual features that co-occur in time and space, have particular functions and outcomes and are/can be discussed and remembered by participants after the event (p. 195).

In particular, impoliteness events are relevant because it's information that is salient, that is, asking learners to remember an event that they perceived to be impolite when they interacted with native speakers of the target language. Example (2) shows an impoliteness event from a student who visited Barcelona:

(2) Impoliteness event between a second language learner and a NS of Spanish

When I was visiting a friend in Barcelona, we went out to eat one night. It was both of our second to last week in Spain, so we felt very confident in our ability to speak Spanish with our waiter. When he came to the table for the first time, he addressed us in Spanish. We responded, and from then on he would only speak to us in English. We were both very frustrated as we were trying to get in as much speaking practice as possible before we came home. Knowing we would never see him again, at the end of our meal we asked him why he would not converse with us in Spanish, and his response was that he doesn't like speaking broken Spanish with Americans.
His tone of voice throughout the meal, but especially in his response to our question, was very condescending. This event occurred in a busy restaurant in downtown Barcelona. It was said by a waiter that we did not know nor did we ever see again. I don't know if others in the restaurant heard it, but there was a very solid mix of English and Spanish speakers around us and we were seated relatively close together so it is very possible they did.
We tried to be nice throughout the entire meal, even after his rude response, so we thanked him for serving us and left immediately after.
We didn't do anything out of the ordinary other than ask him directly why he would not speak Spanish with us.

Based on the impoliteness event in (2), the instructor should direct the students' attention to the identification of contextual and co-textual features of the situation. For example, students should discuss the characteristics of the situation (a restaurant), power dimension, and closeness/

distance, the difference between the students' and the waiter's ages, and gender of the participants. With regard to the co-textual features, students can identify the linguistic expressions that the learners used to perceive this situation as polite or impolite (lines 16–17), the words used to perceive impoliteness (lines 7–9), and the outcome of the situation. Instructors and students can also discuss the type of offence of impolite behaviour, such as an offence to the students' identity face (lines 8–9). Students can also be encouraged to examine the incident from the waiter's point of view: a busy restaurant where he needs to employ the most efficient means of communication in order to attend to his clients rather than providing an opportunity for students to practise a foreign language.

Finally, students can be encouraged to discuss other impoliteness events that they have encountered with NSs of the target culture, or impoliteness events or impolite speech acts included in their textbooks. They should focus on the identification of contextual and co-textual features in polite and impolite practices. After asking the students to reflect on and discuss potentially rude situations, we need to provide pedagogical framework for helping learners negotiate (im)politeness.

4.3 Teaching Grammar as a Communicative Resource

In this section we follow Widdowson's (1992) concept of teaching grammar as a communicative resource, specifically, since grammar 'can be said to have a regulative function in use' (1992, p. 334). The focus here is on raising pragmalinguistic awareness of linguistic features of (im)polite practices. The aim of this section is to provide instructors with pedagogical principles to teach the pragmatic functions of the grammatical elements used to perform a refusal. The teacher explains the pragmatic functions of the following elements present in refusal responses: the conditional, the imperfect, the imperfect subjunctive, impersonal expressions, tag questions, diminutives, and pragmatic functions of insults to express solidarity or mock impoliteness. For example, the conditional and the imperfect are often used to express politeness and distance with the interlocutor, especially, in situations where one person is of higher status (e.g., *I wanted to ask if you would be* willing to write a recommendation). The example in (3) shows a refusal to a friend's invitation to his birthday party. Mitigated refusals, marked in bold, typically include the pragmalinguistic forms (3):

(3) Refusal responses to an invitation by US male college students (−P, −D)
a. **I can't, man.** I got somethin' else going on.
b. Ah, **dude**, I'm goin' outta town this weekend.
c. **no, darn it**. I can't, **I'm sorry**, I wish I could.
d. **Oh, I'd love to**, but I have plans on Friday evening
e. Thanks for the invite, **but I don't think** I'll be able to make it.
f. oh, well, **maybe** after work, but it doesn't look good since I do work at night
g. **Unfortunately, I won't be able to make it**. Let's try to get together for lunch or something.

Instructors should address the learners' attention to the pragmalinguistic resources used to soften a refusal to an invitation include solidarity markers (e.g., man, dude), adverbs (e.g., maybe), expressions of willingness (e.g., I'd love to), epistemic expressions (e.g. I don't think), or expressions of apology (e.g., I'm sorry). The instructor should focus on the pragmatic functions of these expressions to express degrees of solidarity or deference politeness (Scollon and Scollon 2001). It is also important to highlight the need to analyse the sequential placement of these expressions at the discourse level (see examples of role play refusals to invitations in Félix-Brasdefer 2006). Presence or absence of overlap and turn-taking further contribute to degrees of politeness or impoliteness to express involvement or independence with the interlocutor.

Example (4) shows an example that instructors can use to raise awareness to pragmalinguistic impolite resources:

(4) A Mexican woman who is eight months pregnant is approached by several American and Mexican acquaintances in Mexico who are speaking English:

Speaker 1:	How are you feeling today?
Pregnant woman:	[attempts to answer]
Speaker 2:	Fat!!!!
Everyone:	[laughter]

Example (4) can be seen as potentially rude on several levels. First of all, the pregnant woman is not given time to give a preferred response to the first-pair part of the adjacency pair *How are you feeling?* Secondly, by hijacking her response, speaker 2 makes fun of her inability to answer and, at the same time, insults her physical appearance, showing no consideration for her condition. Pedagogical intervention can help learners response/react to such incidents in the way the feel is most appropriate e.g. by using one of Beebe and Waring's (2005) aggressing, persisting and acquiescing strategies. Discussion can centre on whether this is genuine rudeness or just banter.

The goal of this activity is to have learners use grammar for communicative purposes by understanding the pragmatic functions associated with the expressions used in a refusal response. By increasing their ability with the communicative functions of grammar, learners will not only increase their grammatical competence, but will also improve their functional knowledge of how to negotiate communicative actions in an FL context where pragmatic input is limited. The next step provides learners with information to practise and/or identify (im)polite features.

4.4 Practicing Polite and Impolite Language in the Classroom

The aim of this step is to practise the information presented in steps 1–3 using online simulated activities that promote speaking at the discourse level.[2] Students can practise the following role-play situations to practice to develop their speaking skills to communicate politeness (situations 1 & 2) or reacting to rudeness (situations 3 & 4).

Situation 1: Refusing a friend's invitation to a birthday party (−P, −D)
Situation 2: Refusing a professor's advice to take a class (+P, +D)
Situation 3: Reacting to rude behaviour (+P, +D)
Situation 4: Reacting to rude behaviour (−P, +D)

For situations 1 and 2, the role play situations can be accessed directly from Indiana University's website (see link in Félix-Brasdefer 2015, http://www.indiana.edu/~discprag/spch_refusals.html). On the 'Refusals' page, click 'Refusing in English or Spanish' found at the bottom of the pull-down window.

The teacher should instruct the students to review the information discussed in steps 1–3 above and practise these activities in front of the class. The instructor selects one or more students to interact the online role plays in class, followed by a discussion of the responses provided. Then, the class is divided into small groups to discuss the responses provided in the role-play situations. Then, the students present their discussion to the class. Alternatively, the teacher can ask the students to record the role-play situations at home and bring the audios to the following class. This alternative is suitable for online

[2] The format used to design the structure of the role play was adopted from models used to measure speaking in the Advanced Placement (AP) Spanish exam (http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/members/courses/teachers_corner/50015.html).

learners who can record their interactions on their smart phones, or on the internet. Then the teacher plays some of those situations in class, followed by a discussion of the students' responses.

Situations 3 and 4 are revised versions of Beebe and Waring's (2005) situations of responses to rudeness.

Situation 3: You go to your university's bookstore where books are kept behind a counter. You ask to see a book. The lady behind the counter says, 'If you want to browse, go to the library.'

What do you say?

What would you like to say?

Sample responses

What would you say?

I just wanna make sure it's the right book before I buy it, so I just wanted to look at it.

What would you like to say?

I would like to say—that was very rude, and you should be nice to the customers because the customer is always right.

Situation 4: You are a student calling the Intensive English Program to make an appointment to see your professor. You ask when the professor is free. The secretary says, 'YOU'RE an adult. YOU pick a time.'

What do you say?

What would you like to say?

Sample responses

What do you say?

Well, is Friday at this time good? I was just hoping to know when he was free cause then it would be more easily for the professor also.

What would like to say?

I would like to say that—thanks for being mean, maybe you should get a different job.

After practising these situations in class, students and the instructor discuss the various pragmalinguistic resources to respond to rudeness in the first and second language. Then, students can discuss the sample responses to reflect on additional ways to respond to rude behaviour. At the end of this activity,

students discuss other scenarios where they have responded to rudeness in their first or second language.

This pedagogical approach aims to build on learners' first- and second-language experiences and discuss the choices available for target-language interaction. Moreover, it reflects an ethnographic, self- and group-discovery approach where learners and teachers discuss the effectiveness and use of pragmalinguistic resources. Although these examples are aimed at learners of Spanish or English, the teacher can adapt similar examples to teach L2 (im)politeness to learners of different languages.

5 Summary and Future Directions

The three different approaches to researching the teaching and learning of (im)politeness reflect a shift towards understanding and valuing the layperson's concepts (politeness1) and moving away from a single and narrow focus on theory-driven models (politeness2) (Eelen 2001). However, it remains to be seen whether such a shift from an etic to an emic perspective will be reflected in classroom teaching methodology and materials where politic behaviour (Watts 2003) is the dominant pedagogical mode. For instance, (im)politeness is often seen in terms of the need to employ such discourse markers as 'please' and 'thank you' and adhere to conventionalised speech acts patterns. The challenge in the FL classroom will be to allow L2 learners to be polite in their own ways by giving them the necessary range of pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic resources.

Classic approaches to understanding and teaching (im)politeness provide a safe way of teaching because they provide norms of use and appear to reflect everyday behaviour. By contrast, discursive and face management approaches are much more tentative, open to multiple interpretations and much more time consuming to teach. Furthermore, there is no authoritative explanation of (im)politeness practices as each event and interaction has to be analysed in its own terms. The challenge for teachers is to help learners understand (im)politeness practices from different points of view (both L1 and FL/FL) and help them understand that (im)politeness is not always interpreted in the same way in different cultures and by interactants in a given situation. In the final analysis, learners have to develop an ethnographic awareness in each situation and context and have the pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic resources to act/react appropriately and in the way that they want to come across. Raising sociopragmatic awareness of polite and impolite relational practices should be the priority of language teachers in the classroom, and must be incorporated as part of the language curriculum.

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20

(Im)politeness and Gender

Malgorzata Chalupnik, Christine Christie, and Louise Mullany

1 Introduction

The complex interrelationship between gender and (im)politeness has been explored from a number of different research angles over the past 40 years, particularly within the linguistic subdisciplines of pragmatics and sociolinguistics. A considerable body of scholarly work exists. In order to account for the key developments which have helped to shape the field, this chapter focuses on crucial concepts and theories presented by researchers contributing to the subject area. It catalogues seminal publications chronologically, starting with the ground-breaking work of Lakoff (1975). Preceding the now classic accounts of politeness from researchers including Brown and Levinson ([1978] 1987) and Leech (1983), the pioneering study of language and gender presented by Lakoff was arguably the first to emphasise the overarching usefulness of exploring linguistic politeness.

The theoretical and methodological developments in the study of gender and language continue to advance the scholarship of politeness to this

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_20

day. In order to shed light on how these developments can be traced back to significant shifts in the discipline of gender and language studies, this chapter discusses the key advancements in theoretical approaches and methodological frameworks. With the greater level of sophistication of tools and frameworks utilised when examining how gender and (im)politeness intersect, we see the emergence of more in-depth insights into the interrelationship between the two concepts and also the arrival of productive new avenues for future research. With the overarching aim of facilitating the production of contemporary research in the field, this chapter presents specific examples of recent studies which shed light on how the interdependencies between gender and (im)politeness can be productively explored. The presentation of these analytical examples is also vital for mapping out empirical gaps which still need to be addressed when contributing to the subject area. The chapter concludes with the presentation of productive avenues for future research, highlighting underinvestigated areas in gender and (im)politeness scholarship.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

Early work on gender and politeness tended to have the search for gender differences in politeness use at its core (see Coates 2004), often using Brown and Levinson's (1978) approach. In more recent years, gender has been more widely conceptualised as something which is discursively negotiated and performatively constituted rather than something that individuals inherently possess within themselves which can simply be mapped from their sex categorisation (Butler 1990). This shift in how gender has been theorised significantly marks the separation of the social from the biological in an attempt to move away from the deadlock of binaries and sweeping statements about how men and women talk. The greater sophistication afforded by the development of theoretical and also, in result, methodological frameworks has enabled researchers to gain a more accurate insight into the nuanced and complex interrelationship between gender and (im)politeness.

The most influential work in the field is undoubtedly Butler's (1990) theorisation of gender performativity, which builds on Austin's (1962) theory on the ability of language to not only describe the world around us but also to shape it. From Butler's perspective, gender is described as a verb, as something that people do rather than something that they inherently possess. Butler (2011) importantly claims that the linguistic resources interactants draw upon in the process of enacting gender have profound effects on their production

of social reality. This argument is also encapsulated in Eckert and McConnell-Ginet's influential definition of gender:

> [G]ender is not part of one's essence, what one is, but an achievement, what one does. Gender is a set of practices through which people construct and claim identities, not simply a system for categorizing people. And gender practices are not only about establishing identities but also about managing social relations. (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003, p. 305)

The emphasis placed upon the relational nature of the enactment of gender has crucial significance for research carried out in the field, as it highlights the vital points of intersection between gender and (im)politeness. Assessments of whether specific types of linguistic behaviour are deemed to be polite or impolite are identified to be both interactionally achieved and socially embedded.

In Butler's (1990) original performativity theory, the argument that specific reiterative discursive practices have the power to shape social reality provides a powerful tool for explaining why specific types of linguistic practices are afforded a prototypical status and why other linguistic practices transgress the boundaries of normative expectations. Women and men may be, thus, 'represented and/or expected to behave in particular gendered ways' (Sunderland 2004, p. 21) and this maps directly onto expectations, evaluations and judgements about 'polite' and 'impolite' behaviour. Sunderland's work is useful here as she brings in the concept of 'gendered discourses' and describes these as practices which are closely aligned with specific gender expectations and, therefore, deemed more appropriate in specific contexts. This provides an important point of reference for politeness, particularly in terms of describing how particular types of linguistic performances become gender-coded and more or less acceptable for speakers based on gender category. At the intersection of gendered performances and beliefs constructed in relation to these performances emerge productive avenues for the exploration of how gender ideologies permeate discourse and also constrain linguistic practices. The transgression of what Butler (2004, p. 55) describes as a 'rigid regulatory frame', the requirement for 'the embodiment of certain ideals of femininity and masculinity', is integral to the identification of the specific types of discursive behaviours which are deemed to be polite and impolite.

Central to this juxtaposition of micro- and macro-level representations and enactments of gender is the role played by discourse in the negotiation of gendered identities. What many researchers drawing upon this social constructionist framework do is adopt a dichotomised understanding of the concept where discourse is defined both as 'language beyond the sentence'

(Tannen 1989, p. 6) and also 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 1972, p. 49). This increased attentiveness to the productive tensions between the local, pluralised performances of gender (Cameron 2005) and the wider, overarching ideologies which regulate them is what brings theorising conducted by Third Wave feminist linguists together (see Mills and Mullany 2011 for a detailed definition of Third Wave Feminism). Christie (2000) defines the preoccupation of this approach as being concerned with the ways in which function is acquired by discourse in order to achieve specific purposes in specific contexts.

3 Critical Overview of Research

We organise this research overview by linking the study of gender and the study of (im)politeness in four key works. They have been carefully selected because they usefully illustrate significant points when developments in the theorisation of gender have directly interacted with developments in (im)politeness as a field of research and because they signal new directions in the study of (im)politeness and gender. The critical overview focuses on Lakoff (1975); Brown (1980); Holmes (1993) and Mills (2003).

Lakoff (1975) is an important contributor to the study of gender and (im)politeness, not just because she is the primary instigator of this field of research, but also because, as this overview demonstrates, the issues she raises have remained pertinent throughout the four decades since her original publication.[1] Current work continues to build on questions that Lakoff raised about the ontological relationship between social identity and language, the relative power of men and women as distinct social groups and how this relates to the language used by men and women and language used to represent men and women, as well questions about how we come to understand the social meanings generated by utterances. The following account of Lakoff's work therefore highlights continuities in the scholarship on gender and (im)politeness since the early 1970s. However, it is important to recognise that Lakoff's (1975) analysis of gender is an application of her (1973) theorisation of politeness, and that although her account, like Brown and Levinson's, builds on Grice's Cooperative Principle, her theorisation of politeness and its relationship to social identity is quite distinct and has quite different implications for gender and (im)politeness research, and these differences are evident in the literature discussed below.

[1] At the time of writing, there have been over 1000 citations of this work.

Lakoff's early (1973, 1975) works are often critiqued as a product of their time: the notion of gender is inadequately theorised in the 1975 work; they both follow the models of scholarship in transformational grammar in that they are premised on introspective evidence, including appeals to native speaker intuition; and the theorisation of politeness is formulated as a set of rules. For these reasons and others, Lakoff's politeness framework has rarely been adopted wholesale by (im)politeness scholars. However, elements of the framework are set out below because, although it does not match the systematicity of Brown and Levinson's ([1978] 1987) model, it accounts for the claims about politeness and gender that Lakoff makes and it also articulates insights into language and gender that remain relevant. Moreover, although there are some inconsistencies in the links between gender and linguistic behaviour that Lakoff proposes, her main claims about politeness are not premised on a straightforwardly essentialist model of gender and at times they are not incompatible with recent, performative, accounts of gender. Although Lakoff argues, for example, that women are required to avoid 'the coarseness of ruffianly men's language: no slang, no swear words, no off colour remarks' (1975, p. 52) and instead are expected to 'talk like a lady', she goes on to state that these behavioural patterns are tendencies and are not inevitable (1975, p. 57).

Briefly, Lakoff's (1975) analysis of gender and politeness has an overtly egalitarian agenda. It is premised on her observation that, at the time and in the society that she is writing, men and women are not social equals. Having established patterns of linguistic behaviour that she categorises as 'politeness' in her 1973 work, and which she formulates as a set of rules, her 1975 work is designed to show how these rules tend to function differently for men and women and how they can explain gendered differences in linguistic behaviour. This is worthy of research, she argues, because the differences are both a symptom and a cause of social inequalities: if women are aware of the way they speak, and the damaging effects that their linguistic choices can have, on themselves and on how others perceive them, they can change that behaviour and this in turn will lead to a more equal society. Lakoff does not suggest that there is a simple relationship between patterns of language use and the inequalities that exist in society at the time she is writing, arguing that where differences between men's and women's language are evident, this is 'a symptom of a problem in our culture, not the problem itself' (1975, p. 62).

Lakoff (1975) sets out a case for the existence of a 'woman's language', referred to as 'talking like a lady', and proposes that typical differences in men's and women's speech are due to the different linguistic choices available to them: women are expected to take up different social roles to men and these roles are seen to constrain women's language use in particular. For example,

she proposes that women are expected to be 'the preservers of morality and civility' in a society, and that women's speech is therefore required to be more polite. Lakoff identifies characteristics of women's speech in order to make the point that women are, as a result of these expectations, judged according to the stereotype of the 'ideal woman' who acts as the 'arbiter of morality, judge of manners'. Articulating the egalitarian agenda of her work, she goes on to state:

> My hope is that women will recognize that such a role is insufficient for a human being and will then realize that using this language, having it used of them, and thus being placed implicitly in this role, is degrading in that it is constraining. (Lakoff 1975, p. 52)

Her argument is, therefore, that by bring women's attention to the roles that are imposed on them, they will have the choice of rejecting those roles, and as a result the requirement to speak like a lady will no longer obtain.

Lakoff's (1975) argument that men and women's talk is different and is typically done for different purposes is set out in detail here because later studies of gender and (im)politeness (such as Brown (1980) and Holmes (1993) discussed below) are predicated on similar claims. It also makes it possible to tease out the distinct influence of Lakoff (1973, 1975) and Brown and Levinson ([1978] 1987) on the study of gender and (im)politeness. For example, in her (1973) theorisation of politeness, Lakoff formulates the following 'Rules of Pragmatic Competence': (1) Be Clear (2) Be Polite (1973, p. 296) which draws on Grice's (1967) work. She suggests that if a speaker produces an utterance that does not observe the maxims and is less clear as a result, the addressee is likely to assume that the speaker is being polite.[2] Lakoff proposes that the choice of which of the above rules should be followed depends on the context of the utterance, and in particular on the goals of the speaker. If, for example, the primary goal of the speaker is to maintain or promote a particular relationship, she will be more concerned with politeness than with clarity (1973, p. 296). As we show below, this proposition is developed in the work of Janet Holmes, even though the model of politeness that she adopts is that of Brown and Levinson ([1978] 1987)

Lakoff formulates three predictive Rules of Politeness: (1) Formality: keep aloof (2) Deference: give options (3) Camaraderie: show sympathy. She argues that, when applied correctly, the Rules of Politeness should be able to predict

[2] It is worth noting Lakoff's view that politeness is the result of an evaluation, as this is also assumed in later works on gender and (im)politeness.

'why, in a particular culture, a particular act in a particular circumstance is polite, or not polite' (1975, p. 64). American men, it is argued, typically orient towards Rule 1: the aim being to communicate as efficiently as possible, while American women's behaviour is generally oriented towards Rules 1 and 2. As Lakoff points out, this seems to be a contradiction since Formality, according to Rule 1, requires the speaker to 'keep aloof' (implying superiority) while Deference, Rule 2, implies inferiority. However, for Lakoff that is the crux of the problem that women face in society. Her argument is that women are required to do contradictory things: they are the arbiters of morality but have no power.

The complexity of the relationship between gendered social identities and (im)politeness is only hinted at in this brief summary, but it is worth drawing out here, as it differs radically from work on gender (im)politeness that follows Brown and Levinson's model. For example, on the one hand, Lakoff presents women's use of politeness as a strategic (and therefore a rational) set of choices, and to that extent it can be argued that she is not assuming that a speaker's social identity is a simple determinant of linguistic choices.

> If [a woman] doesn't learn to speak women's language, in traditional society she's dead: she is ostracized as unfeminine by both men and women. … But what happens if she opts to do as she ought – learn to talk like a lady? She has some rewards: she is accepted as a suitable female. (1975, p. 61)

In assuming that speakers have the autonomy to make choices, Lakoff's position here resembles that of Brown and Levinson. However, Lakoff also argues that there are disadvantages that result if a woman talks like a lady:

> But she also finds she is treated – purely because of the way she speaks, and, therefore, supposedly thinks – as someone not to be taken seriously, of dim intelligence, frivolous, and incapable of understanding anything important (1975, p. 61)

The contradiction here, that women's linguistic performance *can* be explained as strategic but that this behaviour disadvantages them, raises questions about the extent to which this behaviour is actually chosen. Moreover, if it is the case that women are not aware that certain linguistic behaviours are damaging to the speaker, it would indicate that their use is not a strategic choice. This would imply a lack of autonomy and conscious choice that distinguishes Lakoff's theorisation of politeness from Brown and Levinson's (1978) model. The following account of Penelope Brown's (1980) study of Tenejapan men and women's use of politeness resources illustrates the distinction.

In contrast to Lakoff's account, Brown and Levinson's (1978) theorisation of politeness has very little to say about gender, but it is briefly mentioned in a section that focuses on sociological applications and which draws on Brown's research in Tenejapa in the 1970s (later published as Brown 1980). Brown's work offers a useful indication of the developments in the study of gender and politeness that follow from Brown and Levinson's model. For example, as indicated above, both Lakoff's (1973) theorisation of politeness and her (1975) application make generalisations about behaviour across cultures that are based largely on introspection and on her observation of middle-class white American men and women. Moreover, these observations are not the result of a systematic elicitation of data and her claims are not supported with evidence. Brown's work, on the other hand, is based on a systematic study of context-specific interactions within a particular culture, and is designed to make claims only about the behaviour of men and women in that specific culture within a selected set of contexts. Her study therefore engages with the growing recognition, evident in the developments in gender and language scholarship at the time, that the behaviour of white middle-class women should not, as had previously been the case, be seen as representative of all women's behaviour. Brown's study also instantiates a move towards more evidence-based, empirical studies of gender and language.

Brown's (1980) study does build on Lakoff's work, but she observes that so far the work has led to a preoccupation with identifying characteristics of female speech on the basis that 'women feel unsure of themselves because they have been taught to express themselves in 'women's language,' which abounds in markers of uncertainty'. In opposition to this concern with psychological states, Brown develops her own stance by arguing that her aim is to develop a methodology that allows language use to be analysed according to the specific features that distinguish the speech of men and women in order to show how this is related 'in a precisely specifiable way to the social-structural pressures and constraints on their behaviour' (1980, p. 112). She proposes that men's and women's speech needs to be compared within specific contexts of use if gendered differences in language are to be identified and accounted for. Starting from Lakoff's claim that women are more polite and applying the politeness framework she had developed with Levinson, Brown looks for evidence of face-saving acts in different contexts of use, asking the following questions of her Tenejapan data:

> Under what conditions and in what situations do women actually use more polite expressions than men do in comparable situations? And why? (1980, p. 117)

She also articulates the way in which her analysis is informed by the (Brown and Levinson 1978) politeness framework she is working with:

> If women are more polite than men, our theory suggests that women are either 1) generally speaking to superiors 2) generally speaking to socially distant persons, or 3) involved in more face-threatening acts, or have a higher assessment than men have of what counts as an imposition. (1980, p. 117)

Brown's analysis shows that the Tenejapan women in her study do use polite expressions differently to the men across the culture-specific interactional contexts in which she elicits her data. Charting the number of face-saving strategies used by her cohort, she argues that the women are 'more sensitive from moment to moment to the potential face-threateningness of what they are saying and modify their speech accordingly' (1980, p. 131). She concludes that this is related to the specific power differential between men and women in that society citing, amongst other causes, women's vulnerability to men in a society where 'wives, sisters, and daughters are likely to be beaten if there are threats to their reputation' (p. 131). She argues that these women's use of politeness strategies are functional in that they enable the women to avoid the very real consequences of carrying out an unmitigated face-threatening act. Brown concludes that her work addresses a need in studies that relate language and gender at the time she is writing to show 'how the ways in which women choose to express themselves reveal truths about their social relationships and their social status in society' (p. 133).

In her early work Janet Holmes's (1988, 1993, 1995) charting of differences in men's and women's speech, adopts many of Brown's methods: she adopts systematic methods of data elicitation, focusing on naturally occurring conversation, addressing the impact of different contexts of use and focusing on the specific behaviour of a single cultural cohort: in this case men and women in New Zealand. Holmes adopts Brown and Levinson's ([1978] 1987) framework, and assumes that politeness behaviour is strategic. However, Holmes moves on debates within (im)politeness research by engaging with contemporary developments in research on gender and language in which 'women's language' was redefined in a positive light. In particular, however, it is Holmes' rejection of Lakoff's assumption that women's language is 'deficient' in some way (cf. Spender 1985; Uchida 1992) that echoes developments in the study of language and gender. Indeed her alternative premise is indicated in the title of her (1993) paper: 'New Zealand women are good to talk to'.

In developing the thesis articulated in the title, Holmes (1993) accepts Lakoff's claim that women are more polite than men and she also builds on

her argument that women and men have different interactional goals and that this accounts for differences in their speech patterns. However, she refines this set of premises by arguing that women typically orient towards 'social-affective functions' of talk while men orient towards its 'referential function'. In doing so Holmes takes issue with Lakoff's depiction of 'women's language' as responsible for women becoming 'hesitant, unconfident, spineless creatures' (1993, p. 96). Instead, she proposes that her analysis of women's language identifies a speaker who is 'female, sociolinguistically and pragmatically sensitive, and a cultural rather than a linguistic conceptualization' (1993, p. 91). Holmes supports this claim through an investigation of gendered differences in interactional style, the use of pragmatic particles and the realisation of speech functions. Her analysis identifies sex-specific correlations with a number of quantifiable features including: amount of talk; number of interruptions; number and type of hedges including different types of tag questions; number of apologies and number and type of response to apologies; number and type of compliments and response. Holmes interprets her findings as offering evidence that 'women respond sensitively to the demands of context' in a number of ways, arguing that the patterns in her findings are not evidence of powerlessness 'but should rather be seen as positive features of women's speech'. She supports this claim by proposing that the many 'facilitative patterns which characterize women's speech in general also characterize the speech of those in leadership roles or positions where they are responsible for ensuring the success of an interaction' (1993, p. 111).

The search for binary distinctions in the linguistic behaviour of men and women, which Holmes's early work illustrates, became less of a preoccupation for gender and language research as the complexities of gender as a social category began to be recognised in the light of work by theorists such as Butler (1990) and Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992). As we indicate in Sect. 2, from the 1990s on, scholarship on gender and language increasingly engaged with gender as an unstable construct that speakers achieve through their use of linguistic resources rather than as an essential quality that is reflected in patterns of speech. Mill's (2003) work usefully illustrates how this change in direction has informed the study of gender and (im)politeness. In her book *Gender and Politeness* Mills develops the social constructionist notion of gender by synthesising it with developments in (im)politeness research by theorists such as Eelen (2001), who had argued that (im)politeness is not an inherent quality of an utterance, but is a quality attributed to an utterance within a specific context of use. Mills adds to this development in (im)politeness scholarship by locating that evaluative behaviour within an established set of social theories that relate discourse and community to gender identity.

Premised on a constructivist model of social identity (see Cameron 2005), Mills' (2003) work is located within the Foucauldian paradigm (Foucault 1972), which holds that social identity is realised through the subject positions that we take up when engaging in available discourses. Mills (2003, p. 25) argues that, although as individuals we have the illusion that we are able to choose the linguistic resources we use in everyday life, these choices do not take place in a social vacuum. Rather, Mills proposes that available discursive structures constrain what can be said in a particular social context, how it can be said, and who can say it, arguing that 'discourses themselves set out the parameters within which those limited choices can be made' (2003, p. 25). The way in which this informs Mills' development of (im)politeness theory can be seen in her argument that judgements about politeness are inevitably linked to judgements about social identity and are also context-dependent (where context is theorised within the Communities of Practice paradigm developed by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992):

> hypothesised stereotypes of feminine and masculine behaviour obviously play a role in the production of what participants see as appropriate or inappropriate speech. However decisions about what is appropriate or not are decided upon strategically within the parameters of the community of practice and within the course of the interaction rather than being decided upon by each individual once and for all. (Mills 2003, p. 235)

In her own analysis of interactional data, Mills's approach can be contrasted to Holmes's early work in that, rather than focusing on differences in the way that males and females use and respond to politeness resources, her concern is to analyse what politeness (or more specifically, what is evaluated locally as politeness) is used to achieve within a particular community of practice (Mills 2003, p. 231).

The four works discussed in this critical overview have been chosen because they illustrate four key points when developments in the theorisation of gender and language studies have intersected with developments in the study (im)politeness. We conclude this section by indicating just three of the ways in which other examples of (im)politeness research that addresses gender have engaged with some of the issues raised in these key works.

The first issue revolves around whether the use of politeness resources is always a strategic choice. Brown (1980), following Brown and Levinson's (1978) model assumes that speakers have an autonomy that is not evident in Lakoff's (1975) model. From Lakoff's perspective, because men and women have been socialised to behave in different ways, women can't

simply choose, for example, to use Rule 3 politeness (camaraderie) with men because it would not generate the same social meanings as when men are using camaraderie with other men. Lakoff's original study generated a range of scholarship that focuses on (primarily) women's linguistic choices in order to show that they are different to, and more polite than, men's. One example is Ide's (1982) work, which takes up this issue in relation to honorifics, arguing that Japanese women's speech is more polite than men's (p. 378) and attributing this to differences in social power. Ide goes on to develop her work on gender and honorifics in a later study (Ide 1989) in which she argues against the notion of politeness as strategic, and instead develops the notion of discernment politeness (*wakimae*) which corresponds more closely to Lakoff's theorisation of gendered social constraints on politeness behaviour (Ide 2005, p. 60).

The second issue relates to the question of whether there actually is, as Lakoff proposed, a distinct 'women's language' that is typically more polite than men's. Although Holmes' early work discussed above suggests that in New Zealand English this is the case, and although Ide's (1982) study suggests that it is also the case in Japanese, following developments in the theorisation of gender in recent years, scholarship in the field has tended to see 'women's language' as an ideology that, as Mills' (2003) proposes, is discursively produced. Okamoto and Shibamoto Smith (2004, p. 4) argue in relation to Japanese, for example, that the qualities of polite speech attributed to women should be seen as evidence of normative expectations rather than actual usage. Moreover, the extent to which these expectations are realisations of a discourse that constrains Japanese women's speech is identified by Inoue (2006, p. 1) who argues that this discourse allows Japanese women to be rendered as a 'knowable and unified subject both to herself and to others'.

The third and final issue that this overview has identified is the extent to which aspects of social identity (such as gender) and the social meanings attributed to linguistic resources (such as (im)politeness) are both the end-products of a socially situated evaluative process of the sort identified by Mills (2003). The complexities of addressing two unstable entities have been addressed in recent approaches to sociolinguistics which draw on Silverstein's (2003) notion of indexical orders and Agha's (2003) notion of enregisterment as a context for understanding metapragmatic evaluations (see also the Chap. 7 on Indexicality and (Im)politeness in this volume). This approach has, in turn, led to the development of new methodologies for exploring the relationship between gender and (im)politeness. A useful example is Cook's (2011) work on the indexical scope of honorifics in a Japanese committee meeting, which brings to light the way in which gender is just one aspect of social

identity that is implicated in the participants' use of honorifics to construct an institutional identity. Further examples of this approach are discussed in the case studies (Sect. 4) which follow.

4 Case Studies

In this section, we provide illustrations of empirical investigations which explore how local performances of indexicalised gendered identities are inevitably constructed against a backdrop of more global expectations relating to these performances. In keeping with the predominant adoption of approaches associated with Third Wave Feminism, the studies presented here draw upon Butler's (1990) theoretical notions of gender. They also articulate productive avenues for future research and aid the advancement of the field of gender and (im)politeness. Apart from highlighting important empirical gaps, we also wish to foreground specific challenges which still need to be addressed by researchers contributing to this particular field of enquiry.

By selecting empirical studies conducted by Planchenault (2010) and Mullany (2011), we aim to highlight the heterogeneity of theoretical frameworks, texts and contexts studied in the contemporary analysis of gender and (im)politeness. The construction of a rich and multi-vocal perspective on the interrelationship between (im)politeness, gender and other types of indexicalised identities is crucial for mobilising scholarship on how these concepts intersect. This broad perspective, however, can be only achieved by studying the various contexts in which interaction takes place.

Accessing various global settings and analysing data pertaining to contexts which have traditionally received less scholarly attention is one of the key methods of bridging empirical gaps which currently exist in the study of gender and (im)politeness. This issue is addressed by both Planchenault (2010) and Mullany (2011). Planchenault (2010), for instance, moves away from the predominantly adopted approach of studying the language used by speakers of English. In her analysis of communicative practices of a virtual community of transvestites on a French-speaking website, Planchenault (2010) explores how various linguistic devices are used to enact gendered identities. This departure from the hegemony of researching anglophone communities proves very productive as it allows the researcher to highlight language-specific features which have a profound effect on gendered performances and their interpretations. This is also observed in the case of the analysis of a text of introduction (Planchenault 2010, p. 99) presented in Extract 1:

Extract 1

Bonjour à vous toutes, je suis très émue à la pensée de me trouver parmi vous et d'être la copine de la semaine je ne l'aurais jamais imaginé. […] Merci de vos témoignages à toutes qui me donnent aussi la force d'être et un merci tout particulier à Isabelle pour son site.

'Hello to all[f] of you[f], I am very moved[f] to be among you and to be the girlfriend of the week. I would never have expected it. […] Thanks to all[f] of you for your life stories; they give me the strength to be myself and a special thanks to Isabelle for her website.'

In Extract 1, we observe both direct and indirect indexing of gender (Ochs 1992). The former is visible in the employment of a female term of address, 'girlfriend', and also feminine forms of pronouns and verbs such as 'all' and 'move'. The overt gender indexing that is observed in the posting is shown to not only be afforded but also necessitated by the prevalence of grammatical gender in French. The majority of comments analysed by Planchenault (2010) follow a similar pattern to Extract 1 and include further female terms of address and feminine forms of lexical choices used by the authors of the online messages. Despite claims of computer-mediated communication (CMC) being able to afford any of its participants a greater level of anonymity with regards to direct indexicality of gender (Graddol and Swann 1989), evidence from the data collected by Planchenault (2010) indicates that this is not likely to be the case in languages characterised by the widespread use of grammatical gender. This plays a crucial role in highlighting how language-specific features can have influence on the construction of gender identities, politeness and also the 'textual cross-dressing' (Danet 1998) which is performed by users of the website.

Apart from being indexed directly and overtly through the use of markers of feminine identities, gender is also constructed by means of drawing upon the wider ideology relating to the concept. In Extract 1, this is visible in the adoption of collaborative talk stereotypically associated with femininity. The author of the post uses expressions of gratitude and phrases associated with formulaic politeness to rely upon normative beliefs about how men and women talk to construct gender identities of self and others. The usefulness of Butler's (1990) performativity approach is highlighted, particularly with regard to unpicking the intricacies of gendered performances and the interdependencies between more local practices and specific global beliefs about the interrelationship between gender and (im)politeness.

An in-depth insight into how the netiquette of the website is shaped by beliefs about gendered performances is also revealed in the analysis of how evaluations about (im)politeness of specific gendered performances are constructed against the backdrop of normative representations of gender—in particular, hegemonic masculinity. This is observed in the analysis of a comment posted by one of the moderators of the website (Planchenault 2010, p. 92):

Extract 2

Et si vous êtes un homme … quelques conseils indispensables: Je pense qu'il est inutile de vous recommander de marcher sur des œufs, et notamment d'abandonner cette 'mâle assurance' qui se confond souvent avec la muflerie.

'If you are a man … some vital advice: I think that it is not necessary to remind you to be extremely careful, and most of all to leave this "male confidence" behind because it is too often mixed with boorishness.'

The noun 'boorishness' is used in Extract 2 in reference to the negative evaluation of some of the practices concerned with enacting hegemonic masculinity. The dissociation from these practices and the performance of hegemonic masculinity plays a crucial role in galvanising a shared sense of identity of the members of the virtual community and also in the representation of the self versus other users of the website.

The choice of this particular research context thus makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of how evaluations about what is deemed to be polite or impolite are affected by the enactment of pluralised gendered identities, which themselves are a result of gender indices intersecting with other types of identities, including non-heteronormative identities. Planchenault's (2010) study highlights the value of accessing underresearched settings and exploring these interdependencies of identity construction from a politeness perspective.

The value of studying localised evaluations of gendered performances in underresearched contexts is also addressed in Mullany's (2011) analysis of language used by ice-road truckers in Canada. With the study of white collar environments still largely dominating the scholarship of workplace discourse and the analysis of gender and (im)politeness, relatively little attention has been paid to various types of working-class settings. The choice of this particular context is shown to be productive as Mullany (2011) explores the interrelationship between gender, social class and (im)politeness.

The interplay between these concepts is visible in the interaction presented in Extract 3 (Mullany 2011, pp. 76–7), where two members of a community of practice, Rick and Hugh, talk about Rick's working conditions:

Extract 3
Rick's cab. He is talking to Hugh [his boss] on his mobile phone.

01	Hugh:	What's wrong with truck now Rick every time I phone
02		you you've got a complaint
03	Rick:	Well because I'm fucking tired of freezing in this
04		fucking thing (-) it's fucking cold in here
05	Hugh:	If it's freezing I told you to get the fucking thing fixed take it
06		to the mechanic (-) you got a mechanic
07	Rick:	So you get me running so I'm running with no heat
08	Hugh:	Nobody's fault but your own go take it get it fixed
09		[you've got a mechanic]
10	Rick:	[No I'm fucking freezing] all of the time man fucking getting
11		pretty pretty tough to fucking want to go for a load when you're
12		freezing all other time (-) I'm kind of abandoned
13		he[re]
14	Hugh:	[Aband]oned? What are you talking ab[out?]
15	Rick:	[I'm just] left fucking
16		hanging here like is costing me a fortune just to feed myself
17	Hugh:	What have you gotta eat I mean you went through like two
18		grand in a fucking week (-) so what are you what are y- what
19		are you spending it on going to the bar every night?
20	Rick:	S- see that's what I mean Hugh you got a totally different
21		fucking attitude when you're up here you come up here and
22		just don't give a fuck as long as you're hauling loads and I
23		don't think that's fucking right
24	Hugh:	You've got a mechanic Rick take it over there quit your fucking
25		whining about it

Rick and Hugh employ the expletive 'fucking' twelve times in Extract 3 to strengthen the propositional meaning of their utterances. The enactment of hegemonic masculinity which is observed in this case is not only highlighted by this high frequency of swear words used by Hugh and Rick during the course of their interaction but also by their employment of a range of stereotypical competitive interactional styles, all working to indirectly indexicalise masculinity. When issuing directives, Hugh does not minimise asymmetries stemming from the hierarchical make-up of the team. His employment of

directives is characterised by drawing upon direct and unmitigated speech act forms. These can be observed in lines 5–6, 8 and 25–26. Towards the end of the extract, in lines 21–24, Hugh's behaviour is assessed negatively by Rick who accuses him of not being concerned with Rick's wellbeing. Hugh responds by also attacking Rick's positive self-image, describing his voicing of opinion as 'whining' (line 26).

Despite being stereotypically associated with working-class environments, the enactment of hegemonic masculinity observed in Extract 3 and many other interactions analysed by Mullany (2011) is responsible for the erosion of workplace relationships, which eventually results in two members of the team leaving their jobs.

Linguistic devices used by the truckers and their boss when enacting gendered identities are shown to have nuanced and multi-faceted functions. Expletives and humour, in particular, are illustrated to enact solidarity and collegiality on some occasions but then underpin and run counter to the expression of collegiality on other occasions, which has a detrimental effect on the truckers' workplace relationship over time. The analysis of evaluations made by truckers in relation to their gendered performances allows Mullany (2011) to deconstruct the normative and essentialist representations of what is assessed to be impolite or polite in this working-class setting. Through the analysis of a blue-collar environment, this study also demonstrates the value of gaining new insights into the relationship between stereotypical assumptions about how gendered identities are indexicalised and clearly correlated with local assessments of (im)politeness.

Importantly, the study of language used in different contexts has enabled researchers to shed light on the relational nature of identity and the fact that assessments about what is considered to be polite or impolite are, as illustrated in the studies presented above, frequently informed not only by assumptions about gender but also other types of identity construction. An important avenue for further research is, then, exploring what is often referred to as intersectionality (Block and Corona 2016) so how identities such as ethnicity, social class, age and sexuality relate to (im)politeness in tandem with gender.

Planchenault (2010) and Mullany (2011) also demonstrate the usefulness of juxtaposing local, context-specific performances of gender within global representations of what these performances entail, particularly regarding deconstructing gendered stereotypes. The analysis of localised gendered performances plays a crucial role in challenging monolithic and essentialist assumptions about gender. Both studies thus provide a valuable contribution to the discussion of how dominant representations of gendered concepts are reproduced and resisted in interaction. By doing so,

they also give empirical substance to theoretical claims about pluralised gendered identities (Cameron 2005).

5 Summary and Future Directions

Here, we have highlighted the significant role that gender has played in politeness research since its inception. The two concepts of gender and (im)politeness are inextricably linked, and the fields of gender and language studies and the pragmatics and sociolinguistics of politeness owe much to the theoretical and methodological explorations that have taken place at the interface of gender and politeness. As we have illustrated here, some of the most seminal work on gender and language has advanced thinking in the field of politeness studies as a whole. The chapter has tracked the chronological development of the field of gender and politeness research, from Lakoff's early work, through to the culture/difference approach, where more quantitative research emerged (Holmes 1993, 1995), to the focus to look locally, adopting more qualitative, ethnographic approaches, from Eckert and McConnell-Ginet's (1992, 1999) hugely influential work, through to the more recent adaption of 'discursive' approaches, which also tend to favour qualitative, micro-textual approaches.

While not all research into gender and (im)politeness can be described as feminist, the issue of redressing gender inequalities necessitates the subject area to have a clear political agenda. Articulating it by critically engaging with normative representations of gender is arguably one of the key premises of research conducted in this field and it also constitutes one of the crucial elements that set this area of politeness research apart from others. The continuous effort to redress the negative influence of gendered ideologies on everyday discourse is, however, associated with its own set of challenges.

While the current research on gender and (im)politeness to a large extent critically engages with the dichotomised and essentialist paradigm of gender difference, as illustrated in the case of studies presented above, there is still relatively little evidence of the cross-pollination between the findings of research conducted in this academic research field and the beliefs expressed in mainstream populist discussions of the topic. While we can observe a promising growth of discussions drawing upon the current theorising of gender, the mass media are still frequently culpable for reverting to normative and dichotomised conceptualisations of gender and (im)politeness. We would suggest that one of the challenges facing researchers contributing to this field is addressing this problem by persistently reasserting findings of the

latest research into gender and (im)politeness, and placing more emphasis on external engagement.

The field of gender and politeness has come a very long way in the last 40 years, though there is still a great deal of scope for future development. One of the areas that need to be redressed is to examine the interplay between gender and politeness in non-white, non-Western groups. With the exception of a cluster of work on Japanese which we have referred to above in Sect. 3, more empirical research needs to be gathered from non-white, non-Western groups. There is also a need to examine the complex interplay between gender, politeness and intersectional identities, including sexuality. Research on gender and sexuality has started to emerge, as we have seen with Planchenault's (2010) work, but there is a need for research to take place across different cultures to ensure that that the field of gender and politeness research becomes more culturally and empirically diverse.

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21

(Im)politeness and Regional Variation

Klaus P. Schneider and María Elena Placencia

1 Introduction

(Im)politeness varies across regions. It has been found that notions of what is considered polite or impolite differ between communities distributed in space in which the same language is spoken. This type of variation is illustrated in the following post: 'I phoned Netflix customer support which is US-based, they were so overly polite I thought they were being sarcastic and hung up.' This post was submitted to the website 'British Problems' (http://www.reddit.com/r/britishproblems) in 2014 by a speaker of English in the United Kingdom. It shows that ideas about appropriate verbal behaviour in a given social situation diverge across different parts of the natively English-speaking world. The caller had obviously expected to be dealt with in a different manner. In the situation, the caller was taken by surprise by the interlocutor's behaviour, which was perceived as inappropriate, and terminated the phone call without accomplishing his or her original goal. In retrospect, however, the caller acknowledges the existence of diverging norms and expectations in explicitly mentioning that the customer support is based in the United States

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_21

and that the caller only *thought* they were being sarcastic, which, in fact, they were not, it is implied, by their own standards, thus, assuming that in the United States a higher investment of politeness is required, which is considered excessive by British standards.

The present chapter examines how notions of (im)politeness and appropriate behaviour may vary across countries sharing the same language, but may also differ within a country. Conceptualisations of region and regional variation in general are discussed in Sect. 2, while Sect. 3 provides an overview of research on (im)politeness and regional variation in a range of languages. In Sect. 4, two case studies of regional pragmatic variation are presented, one on English and one on Spanish as the two most frequently investigated languages in this context. Finally, Sect. 5 includes a summary and outlines future research.

2 Key Concepts and Theories: Region and Regional Variation

The study of regional variation in language has a long history. Observations of geographical diversity and dialect differences date back to the thirteenth century; even earlier comments were made by the Greeks. In the Romantic period, rural dialects were believed to preserve a language in its purest form. Dialectology as a linguistic discipline, as it emerged in the course of the nineteenth century, has been focused on describing how dialects differ from each other by identifying distinctive features. Dialect geography in particular has been aimed at determining dialect areas and the boundaries between them. The distribution of variants in geographical space and dialect areas with their boundaries have been plotted on maps and presented in linguistic atlases (cf. Schneider 2005a).

Traditional dialectology has predominantly concentrated on regional variation within one country. Yet, since dialect areas do not necessarily coincide with political units and since dialects are not discrete subdivisions but, as a rule, form continua of mutually comprehensible varieties which may transgress nation-state boundaries, regions in neighbouring countries are occasionally also considered (Chambers and Trudgill 1998: 3–12).

For some pluricentric languages, there is an additional, but more recent tradition of investigating regional variation at the national level. Pluricentric languages are languages spoken natively in more than one nation-state (cf. Clyne 1992). Examples include French (spoken in France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada), German (spoken in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and also Belgium), and especially Spanish, with more than twenty national varieties in Latin America alone, and English with national varieties on all continents.

Sociolinguists have furthermore examined regional variation at the local level, analysing the variety of a given language spoken in a particular city or town. Examples include Trudgill's famous study of Norwich in England (Trudgill 1974) and more recent studies of Pittsburghese, i.e. the variety of American English spoken in Pittsburgh (Johnstone 2013). Work in sociolinguistics has also been carried out on sublocal variation, as for instance in the classical study by Milroy and Milroy of Belfast, contrasting the varieties spoken in three inner-city working class districts (Milroy 1980, 1981). Moreover, it has been suggested that supranational regions exist, differing in their cultural values and their pragmatic norms. In her review of empirical work on compliments, Kasper (1990) notes that British English compliments differ from compliments paid in American English and other national overseas varieties of the English language, where the force of compliments is maximised, while British English compliments are more similar to compliments paid in Germany or Scandinavia, where the force of compliments is minimised. Kasper (1990: 199) therefore postulates a supranational area of shared cultural values in north-western Europe. This claim, which has yet to be substantiated in systematic empirical study, is reminiscent of Galtung's (1981) concept of macro-cultures and subcivilisations. Both approaches, Kasper's and Galtung's, remind us that sharing a culture does not necessarily mean sharing a language, and, vice versa, that sharing a language does not automatically mean sharing a culture (cf. also Culpeper 2012: 1128), including sharing perceptions of (im)politeness and appropriate behaviour.

Against this background, five types of regional variation can be distinguished, namely supranational, national, subnational, local and sublocal. So far, the focus of relevant research has been on national variation (but cf. Sect. 3 below for further detail).

Studies at all levels of regional variation have predominantly dealt with differences in pronunciation, lexis and grammar. Pragmatic differences, on the other hand, have largely been neglected, and this applies in particular to differences concerning (im)politeness. Differences of this kind are in the focus of variational pragmatics (Schneider and Barron 2008; Barron and Schneider 2009; Schneider 2010; Barron 2014). This discipline is conceptualised as the interface of pragmatics with dialectology. In this context, dialectology is not limited to the study of regional variation as in traditional dialect geography, but defined in broader terms as it is understood e.g. in the United States today (Wolfram and Schilling 2016). In this view, modern dialectology corresponds to that branch of sociolinguistics dealing with linguistic variation in general and, thus, including the study not only of regional variation, but also the study of social variation.

In the framework of variational pragmatics, region is one of currently five so-called macro-social factors whose impact on language use in interaction is investigated (cf. Schneider and Barron 2008: 16–19). The other four factors are gender, age, ethnicity and social class, but no claim is made that this list is exhaustive. Macro-social factors effect variation in language use, specifically regional, gender, age, ethnic and socioeconomic variation, resulting in the respective dialects or, more neutrally, varieties (on gender variation and (im)politeness, cf. Christie and Mullany (Chap. 20), of this volume).

While it is perfectly legitimate, if not necessary, to analytically distinguish the macro-social factors in empirical work and study each of them individually and separately in order to determine their respective impact on language use in interaction, it is, of course, clear that in real life there is an interplay among these different factors. Conceivably, each possible configuration is characterised by specific ways of using language. Needless to say, apart from variety-specific ways of speaking there are language-specific conventions, i.e. preferred ways of speaking generally considered as a norm, and also a common core of communicative behaviours, of which some may be universal.[1]

Variational pragmatics has been accused of variationist essentialism of the Labovian type. It is, however, no coincidence that the name chosen is 'variational pragmatics' and not 'variationist pragmatics' (Schneider 2010: 251). Ultimately variational pragmatics is not interested in crude facts, but in identities. In more concrete terms, variational pragmatics is not interested in sex, but in gender, and not in race, but in ethnicity, and so on. In this context, researchers often speak of 'regional and social variation' as if gender, age, ethnicity and social class were all social factors, whereas region would be something different. In variational pragmatics, however, a distinction is made between geographical space on the one hand and regional affiliation and identity on the other hand. The relationship between the two is the same as that between biological sex and socially constructed gender, or between chronological age and psychological age. This means that speakers in their language use do not necessarily identify with the region they live in, nor necessarily with the region, if different, they were born in or grew up in. It is assumed that regional identity can also be chosen, constructed and displayed at will.

Rejecting variationist essentialism does not automatically mean subscribing to a constructionist position. An alternative is the 'emic first-order approach

[1] Cf. House (2005: 17–18), who, in her multilayered model of politeness, distinguishes between universal, cultural-specific and language-specific aspects.

to macro-social factors' advocated by Haugh and Schneider (2012), who write: 'we would like to treat all macro-social factors as identities as they are displayed and perceived by participants (in the emic sense) in an interaction' (Haugh and Schneider 2012: 1017). This approach is based, among other evidence, on the observation that in everyday contexts ordinary language users as lay persons categorise individuals they encounter in terms of looks (e.g. dress, hairdo) and behaviours (both verbal and non-verbal) as members of a particular social group or community, as also demonstrated in communication accommodation theory (cf. Gallois and Giles 2015).

Macro-social factors not only interact with each other in any one person, they also interact with micro-social factors in each interaction. Unlike macro-social factors, micro-social factors are relational, pertaining to the constellation and the relationship between the interlocutors. The most frequently discussed micro-social factors are social distance/familiarity, i.e. how well the interlocutors know each other, and power/relative social status, i.e. whether the relationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical. These two factors play a crucial role in Brown and Levinson's (1987[1978]) politeness theory, but also in empirical speech act analysis (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Trosborg 1995). According to the Bulge theory (Wolfson 1988), social distance is not a dichotomous category but forms a continuum, with a maximum investment of politeness in the middle (which can be visualised as a bulge in a graph), representing relationships between acquaintances, e.g. workmates or neighbours who are not friends, and a minimum investment of politeness at the end points, i.e. between strangers (with no social consequences after one-shot encounters) or, on the other hand, in close or intimate relationships (where redressive action is considered unnecessary). These and similar findings point to the fact that verbal behaviour and its appropriateness varies not only across varieties, but also across situations. Moreover, recent research has found that in the same situation speakers of the same regional variety differ in their (perception of the) use of language and interactional practices (see, for example, Clyne et al. 2006, in the next section). In the same type of context, Haugh and Carbaugh (2015) observe regional variation at the national level as well as both intravarietal and intra-individual variation.

This section has dealt with general notions of region and regional variation in dialectology, sociolinguistics and pragmatics to provide the conceptual background for the following section, which includes a review of the research literature specifically focused on regional variability in (im)politeness in a range of languages.

3 Critical Overview of Research on (Im)politeness and Regional Variation

In this section we provide an illustrative overview of studies on (im)politeness and regional pragmatic variation.[2] We adopt a broad view of (im)politeness as (in)appropriate behaviour (Meier 1995; Schneider 2012a) (see Introduction). Therefore, we include studies that explicitly or implicitly aim to identify similarities and differences regarding what participants in an interaction or informants responding to a questionnaire, for example, consider (in)appropriate behaviour in a given context. This also covers the study of what some authors refer to as communicative styles, associated with a cultural group's notions about 'the appropriate … ways of jointly accomplishing social interaction' (Blum-Kulka 1997: 14).

Among those studies with an explicit (im)politeness focus, some draw on Brown and Levinson's face theory (1987[1978]) (Hardin 2001),[3] and variations of this theory such as Scollon and Scollon's (2001[1995]) deference, solidarity and hierarchy face systems (Félix-Brasdefer 2008), while others choose to employ the basic notions of autonomy and affiliation behind Brown and Levinson's framework to discuss affiliation and distance creating/maintaining strategies, for example, without necessarily adopting the full framework (Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2004). Others draw on Leech's (1983) Politeness Principle and maxims (Schneider 1999) or Spencer-Oatey's (2000, 2008) rapport management framework (García 2009). Many studies involve discussions of variation in cultural preferences or values with reference to a number of dimensions that have been proposed in cross-cultural pragmatics research (cf. House 2000) such as directness–indirectness, verbosity–restraint, formality–informality and person vs. task orientation (Placencia 2005) as well as frameworks from other fields such as Hofstede's (1991) with his notions of individualism and collectivism, for example (Muhr 2008).

Contrastivity and comparability are two essential principles in the study of regional pragmatic variation and variational pragmatics more widely (cf. Schneider 2010). However, no particular theoretical approach is advocated. Indeed, different theoretical perspectives have been employed including, among others: ethnography of speaking (Herbert 1989), sociopragmatics

[2] For overviews on regional pragmatic variation in general, see Schneider and Barron (2008) and Placencia (2011). Language-specific overviews can be found, for example, in García and Placencia (2011) for Spanish, and Schneider (2012b) for English.

[3] The examples of empirical works provided throughout Sect. 3, like Hardin (2001), are illustrative of studies available.

(Breuer and Geluykens 2007), ethnopragmatics (Goddard 2012), interactional pragmatics (Merrison et al. 2012), and corpus linguistics (McCarthy 2002). Reflecting different theoretical perspectives, different data sources and data-collection methods are used, including field notes from (non)participant observation (Herbert 1989), transcriptions of recordings of naturally occurring spoken interaction, be it institutional or non-institutional (Jautz 2008), existing corpora such as the International Corpus of English (ICE) (Kallen 2005), production questionnaires, including the more recent *free* Discourse-Completion Tasks (DCTs) (cf. Barron 2005) or dialogue production tasks (Schneider 2008) as well as e-DCTs (Mack and Sykes 2009), role-plays (Félix-Brasdefer 2010), film scripts (Formentelli 2014), magazine ads (Hernández Toribio 2011), and so on. The focus of a given study may thus be on perceptions of (in)appropriate behaviour (Schneider 2012a, c)[4] when production questionnaires and other data elicitation methods are employed, or actual language usage when naturally occurring data are utilised. A combination of methods and data sources can be found in some studies such as Norrby and Kretzenbacher's (2014) that focuses on address practices in varieties of Swedish and German. In addition to data obtained through participant observation, these authors use data from focus group discussions, social network interviews, questionnaires, and online forums. Needless to say, different methods have their own limitations. Production questionnaires, for example, have been extensively criticised in that they do not give access to actual language use; however, they can be a valuable tool for the study of perceptions of language use and permit systematic control of relevant social variables, thus warranting comparability, which is crucial for any type of contrastive or variational study. Ultimately, the choice of methodology for any study needs to be guided by clearly defined research questions as well as practical considerations. Triangulation, as in Norrby and Kretzenbacher's (2014) work, is useful as it sheds light on different aspects of the same phenomenon, therefore adding robustness to a study and facilitating a deeper understanding of what is (in)appropriate behaviour in a given context.

(Im)politeness can be studied at different discourse levels. Schneider and Barron (2008) propose the following: the 'actional' or speech act level that involves function-to-form mapping (Warga 2008); the 'formal' domain, which focuses on the communicative functions of linguistic forms and, therefore, deals with form-to-function mapping (Barron 2011); the 'interactional', which involves the analysis of sequential patterns to realise specific speech acts

[4] Perceptional studies in the narrow sense of the term are rare, but cf. e.g. Curcó and De Fina (2002) and Schneider (2013).

or phases of an interaction such as openings and closings (Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2004); the discourse 'topic' level, which includes, for example, topic selection and topic development (Wolfram and Schilling 2016: 155–65), and the 'organisational' level, which covers the analysis of aspects of turn-taking such as simultaneous talk and interruptions (Fant 1996). The non-verbal level that deals with phenomena such as the use of laughter, gaze and gesture can be added to this list (Bravo 1998). A good number of studies available fall under the actional level, but other levels are gaining attention, especially the formal level in corpus-based studies (Aijmer 2013); an increasing number of studies, on the other hand, cover more than one level (Placencia 2008).

English and Spanish are the languages that have received the most attention in the study of regional pragmatic variation, followed by German. Other pluricentric languages such as Chinese, Dutch, French and Portuguese are still underexplored in this area. The majority of studies focus on appropriate rather than inappropriate behaviour. Also, most studies deal with the *national* level of analysis (see Sect. 2), offering contrastive studies of national varieties of a given language (e.g. German vs. Austrian German) although in practice many focus on a subnational variety since the data employed often corresponds to a specific location (e.g. Mannheim in Germany and Vienna in Austria). When it comes to British English, the choice of nomenclature reflects the corpus employed. For example, studies based on the International Corpus of English—Great Britain normally discuss features of 'British English' whereas 'English English' is the nomenclature that tends to be employed in studies based on data corresponding to England alone.[5]

In order to give a flavour of the area, below we consider a sample of studies that deal with regional variation in English and Spanish, as the most extensively studied pluricentric languages, as well as a sample of other less investigated languages. We include a few early studies and some recent works too. In terms of results, a caveat in this illustrative overview is that while numerous studies show the existence of regional pragmatic variation, as highlighted in Sect. 2, it needs to be borne in mind that regional affiliation normally interacts with other macro-social factors such as age, gender and socioeconomic background as well as with micro-social factors such as power and distance. Given the complexity of the interplay between these different factors, most researchers choose to be selective. In this brief overview, we are also selective when reporting on findings given space constraints, and, therefore, focus mainly on aspects relating to regional variation.

[5] However, authors like Schweinberger (2015) employ the term British English, but specify the subvarieties of British English examined—'south-eastern varieties' in Schweinberger's study.

3.1 Studies on Varieties of English

The varieties examined mainly correspond to Anglo Englishes (Haugh and Schneider 2012), with early studies focusing on American, British and South African English (Herbert 1989; Tottie 1991). Within the past decade, a greater number of national varieties, including Australian (Goddard 2012), Irish (Schneider 2005b) and New Zealand English (Jautz 2008), have started to be examined.

The focus of study is varied, ranging from speech act realisation (the 'actional' level) as in Barron (2005), to listener responses (the 'organisational' level) as in O'Keefe and Adolphs (2008), sequences of jocular exchanges (Haugh and Bousfield 2012) and sequences of small talk (Schneider 2008)[6] (the interactional level in both cases), as well as the use of pragmatic markers (the formal level), as in Schweinberger (2015).

Regarding similarities and differences in what is considered appropriate behaviour across the different regional varieties of English examined, taking the topic of complimenting behaviour as an example, Herbert (1989), for instance, looked at variation in compliments (and compliment responses) in American and South African English from an ethnographic perspective, using field notes from participant observation. He observed that compliments were more frequent in American English. He regards complimenting as a 'conversational and cultural' strategy 'for establishing solidarity' which he associates with notions of 'equality and democratic idealism' (p. 29) and suggests that such notions are more typically encountered in American society. This would explain the higher frequency of compliments in American English compared with South African English.

Schneider (1999), on the other hand, adopting a sociopragmatic perspective examined compliment responses in Irish English (Dublin) vis-à-vis Chen's (1993) results for American English and Chinese. This was on the basis of DCT data and with reference to Leech's (1983) politeness theory. Schneider found some differences at the level of both super- and substrategies. Concerning the first, he found, for example, that the Irish had, overall, a larger repertoire of strategies, employing one more strategy than Americans and three more than the Chinese. Grouping the superstrategies according to whether they essentially conveyed acceptance or rejection, Schneider found that while Americans appear predominantly to follow Leech's (1983) agreement maxim, and the Chinese, Leech's (1983) modesty maxim, the Irish give relatively equal weight to agreement and modesty. With respect to

[6] See Case Study 1 (in Sect. 4.1) for results corresponding to this study.

substrategies, Schneider again found that the Irish employed a wide ranger than the Americans or the Chinese in Chen's (1993) study.

To provide a more recent example on a different topic, Goddard (2012) examined the kind of talk that happens in an initial encounter (cf. Schneider 2008), or what he refers to as 'early interaction' (the interactional level), in Australian, American and English English. More specifically, from an ethnopragmatics perspective and using a variety of sources, Goddard proposes certain cultural scripts that would account for similarities and differences in expected behaviour in early interactions across the three varieties. In terms of differences, he identifies different cultural notions in operation in the three contexts: projecting solidarity and equality stands out for Australians whereas projecting reserve stands out for the English. On the other hand, a key cultural notion for Americans, who appear to emphasise individual differences, is projecting liking or approval. More recently, and also comparing initial interactions in Australian and American English, Haugh and Carbaugh (2015) focused on self-disclosure practices. In their analysis of elicited dyadic conversation data, they adopted an approach combining corpus-assisted interactional pragmatics with cultural discourse analysis. Both Australians and Americans were found to volunteer self-disclosures, but intervarietal differences were also observed. For instance, the American participants employed positive assessments in response to self-disclosures more frequently and with a higher degree of intensification than the Australian participants. There was, however, also a noticeable amount of intravarietal as well as intrapersonal variation.

3.2 Studies on Varieties of Spanish

Studies on varieties of Spanish can be grouped into three broad categories: those contrasting a national variety of Spanish spoken in the Americas with Peninsular Spanish; those contrasting two/three Spanish American national varieties, and those examining varieties of Spanish at the subnational level. A number of studies in the first category such as Puga Larraín (1997), in which Chilean Spanish is contrasted with Peninsular Spanish, were prompted by reported stereotypes among Latin Americans regarding Spaniards' interactional style, suggesting conflicting politeness norms. For example, for some Latin Americans, Spaniards appeared to be too direct or brusque, verging on the impolite. However, empirical studies have shown that directness in speech act realisation is not necessarily a point of divergence across Spanish American varieties and Peninsular Spanish. Instead, one key feature of difference that would partly explain existing stereotypes is Spaniards' lesser use

of mitigating devices when compared to Chileans (Santiago) (Puga Larraín 1997) or Uruguayans (Montevideo) (Márquez Reiter 2002), for example. Nonetheless, studies such as Placencia (2008) and Bataller (2015) (see below) highlight that variation at the *subnational* level in the use of mitigating and other devices should not be overlooked.

Another instance of this first group of studies is Fant (1996) where business negotiations among Mexicans in contrast with Spaniards were analysed on the basis of simulations recorded for training purposes in Mexico and Spain. Focusing on features of turn delivery and the exchange of turns (the organisational level), Fant found that Spanish negotiators talk more and produce more turns than Mexican negotiators in the same amount of time. This partly involved Spanish negotiators speaking faster than Mexican negotiators except during stressful situations where they slowed down. Mexicans, on the other hand, were found to do the opposite. Overlaps in turn-exchange occurred in both groups but were found to be higher among Spaniards. Also, there was a higher proportion of interruptive overlaps in the Spanish corpus. The author interprets some of these findings as reflecting a higher tolerance among Spaniards of direct confrontation in negotiation.

More recently, Lower and Placencia (2015) look at nominal address usage on Facebook among Ecuadorian and Spanish females, aged between 18 and 24. They examine the categories of address forms employed such as first names and family (*hija* 'daughter') terms, mechanisms of address term modification, including shortening (*Ale* for *Alejandra*) or extending (*Cristinaaa*) the name, the use of diminutives (*Martita*), enhanced personalisation (*mi preciosa Tañita* 'my lovely *Tañita*'), the function of address forms as well as other features. The study showed some common features across groups as well as some features of variation that point to local practices. Concerning types of address forms, for example, all main categories were found in the two groups, but employed with different frequencies in some cases. For instance, first names were the most frequent among the Spanish women while first names, together with family terms were the most frequent among Ecuadorian women. Also, Ecuadorian women were found to use mechanisms of address term modification considerably more frequently than their Spanish counterparts. While both groups employed shortened and extended forms, enhanced personalisation was only found in the Quito corpus. On the whole, Lower and Placencia's results suggest that address forms play a stronger rapport enhancement function among Quiteño women.

Concerning pragmatic variation across varieties of Spanish in the Americas, García (2008), for example, examined invitations (actional and interactional levels) in Venezuelan (Caracas) and Argentinean (Buenos Aires) Spanish by

means of role plays, with reference to Blum-Kulka et al.'s (1989) work and Brown and Levinson's (1987[1978]) politeness framework. She finds that, predominantly, both groups make use of solidarity strategies; however, she notes some differences too. For example, in making the invitation, Argentineans show a preference for mood-derivable strategies, using imperative formulations, whereas Venezuelans appear to prefer want statements. As such, the author suggests that the former are firmer in their formulation of the invitation, and, thus, as opposed to the latter, do not give their interlocutors much room for negotiation.

The last group of studies, as indicated, corresponds to the examination of regional variation at the subnational level. This is an area of growing interest. Placencia (2008) and Bataller (2015), for example, focus on similarities and differences in service encounter interactions across regional subvarieties of Spanish. Placencia examines corner shop interactions in two locations in Ecuador: Quito and Manta, and Bataller, interactions in cafeterias in two locations in Spain: Huétor Santillán, near Granada, and Valencia. In both studies, various discourse levels of the service encounter interactions are examined. In terms of results at the actional or speech act level, for example, in Placencia (2008), direct requests were found to be preferred in both locations although there was some variation at the level of substrategies. Bataller reports similar findings for the two Spanish locations where she conducted her study. Another point of difference in Placencia's study is that she found more mitigation in the Quito rather than the Manta data set. Likewise, Bataller found that Huétor Santillán customers employed mitigators more frequently than Valencia customers. Placencia suggests that, all in all, Quiteños appear to 'display more interpersonal concerns than Manteños in their corner shop transactions, creating a more personalised style of interaction' (p. 325). Manteños instead would be more task-oriented. Bataller (2015), in turn, interprets her findings as an indication of a stronger expression of solidarity in Huétor Santillán, compared with Valencia.

3.3 Studies on Varieties of Other Languages

As remarked above, German is a pluricentric language that has received some attention too. Studies available have mainly focused on pragmatic variation across Austrian and German German as in Muhr's (1993) and Warga's (2008) works on request realisation. More recently, however, Swiss German also appears in some studies (cf. Schüpbach 2014). Additionally, there are a few early studies contrasting the communicative style of Germans from the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

For instance, Birkner and Kern (2000) look at the management of self-presentation in job interviews across the two locations.

Leaving German aside, as also pointed out above, studies on varieties of other pluricentric languages, are scarce. They include, among others, the examination of refusals in Mainland and Taiwan Chinese (Spencer-Oatey et al. 2008), address forms in Netherlandic and Belgian Dutch (Plevoets et al. 2008); apologies in Canadian and French French (Schölmberger 2008); refusals to invitations in Cameroon and French French (Mulo Farenkia 2015); diminution in Cypriot and Mainland Modern Standard Greek (Terkourafi 1999); pronominal address in Brazilian and Angolan Portuguese (Silva-Brummel 1984) and address practices more broadly in Finnish Swedish and Swedish Swedish (Clyne et al. 2006; Norrby and Kretzenbacher 2014). Concerning methodological aspects, while literary works may have been the data source in the early years as in Silva-Brummel's (1984) study, contemporary studies make use of a range of data and data sources, such as observation (Terkourafi 1999), questionnaires, focus group discussions (Clyne et al. 2006), and existing corpora (cf. Plevoets et al. 2008).

Taking Swedish as an example, Clyne et al. (2006), for instance, report on a study on perceptions of variation and change of address systems in two varieties of Swedish—Finnish Swedish and Swedish Swedish—(and German). Their study is based on focus group discussions and participant observation in Vaasa and Gothenburg (and a German city). For example, they find that informal *du* (T) is regarded as the unmarked form in both varieties, but the more formal form *ni* (V) appears to be used more widely in Finnish Swedish compared to Swedish Swedish. However, Clyne et al. also report on some subnational variation concerning the perception of *ni*. With respect to Swedish Swedish, they find that while the young perceive it as a marker of politeness and respect, for people in the oldest group (60+) *ni* is associated with condescension (p. 303). On the other hand, in Finnish Swedish, *ni* does not appear to have negative connotations of this type.

In short, this brief overview aimed to provide a window into the wealth of research in regional pragmatic variation, although space constraints have prevented us from delving deeper into methodological issues, for example, or looking at trends in politeness orientations concerning the languages most widely examined. This last task, however, may be a premature endeavour in that there is still a long way to go in terms of understanding subnational variation in particular, given the greater focus so far on national varieties. Also there are multiple contexts in which pragmatic variation can be examined. Media settings, including social media, for instance, are still greatly underrepresented in the politeness and regional pragmatic variation literature.

4 Case Studies

In this section, two case studies are presented which are illustrative of research carried out on regional pragmatic variation and diverging perceptions of politeness and appropriateness. These studies deal with differences between national varieties of English and Spanish, respectively, as the two pluricentric languages which have received the most attention. The first case study compares manifestations of appropriateness across American, Canadian, English and Irish small talk, with a focus on opening moves and speech act realisations. The second case study contrasts rapport management in service encounters in Ecuador and Spain, with a special focus on (pro)nominal address. Both studies demonstrate how geographically distributed patterns of language use reflect diverging views of polite and appropriate verbal behaviour.

4.1 Case Study 1: Regional Variation in Appropriate Behaviour in American, Canadian, Irish and English Small Talk

This case study is focused on regional variation in English small talk and diverging notions of its appropriateness. Small talk, or, more technically, phatic discourse, is chosen as the focus here because in general it is notably susceptible to variation. As Nord (2007: 171) puts it: 'the phatic function relies more on culture-specific conventions than any other function in communication.' While this may be an exaggerated statement overstating the case, there is no doubt that, in a global perspective, small talk differs across languages and cultures in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and concerning practices, expectations and attitudes (Schneider 2008: 99–105).

Against this background, regional variation can be expected to occur across varieties of English. The question of what is considered appropriate and which differences can be observed across regions was addressed in a series of studies on small talk in four national inner-circle, i.e. first language, varieties of English: British English (specifically English English/EngE), Irish English (as spoken in the Republic of Ireland/IrE), American English (as spoken in the USA/AmE) (Schneider 2008, 2011, 2012a), and, though to a more limited extent, Canadian English (CanE) (Schneider and Sickinger 2014). The method employed in these studies was a dialogue production task (DPT). In DPTs, informants are required to write an entire dialogue (cf. Sects. 3 and 4.2). In the instructions of this particular DPT, the informants were asked to produce a dialogue between strangers at a party. The dialogues elicited with this

experimental format, warranting a high degree of variable control and thus comparability, were coded for speech acts (i.e. illocutions), content (i.e. propositions), interactional status (i.e. conditional relevance) and discourse position (in terms of turn-at-talk in the dialogue sequence).

The findings included both similarities and differences concerning pragmalinguistic as well as sociopragmatic parameters. Among the sociopragmatic similarities was the choice of speech acts used in this specific social situation. The speech acts occurring in all varieties under study included, first and foremost, the following (coding labels in all capitals name the illocutions, labels with capital initials name the propositions):

GREETING (e.g. *Hi!*)
REMARK Party (e.g. *Great party, isn't it?*)
QUESTION After You (e.g. *How are you doing?*)
QUESTION Identity (e.g. *What's your name?*)
DISCLOSE Identity (e.g. *I'm Ashley.*)
REMARK Identity (e.g. *I don't believe we have met.*)
COMPLIMENT Appearance (e.g. *I really like your top.*)
QUESTION Host (e.g. *How do you know the hostess?*)

In the realisation of the speech acts employed, both pragmalinguistic similarities and pragmalinguistic differences were observed. Remarks about the party, for example, were overwhelmingly realised by using an elliptical construction consisting of a positively evaluative adjective and the noun *party* to which a question tag was attached, e.g. *Great party, isn't it?* While the type of construction was essentially the same, i.e. an ellipsis including an evaluative adjective and the noun *party* followed by a question tag, two variables occurred, namely the choice of adjective and the choice of question tag. Whereas *great* was clearly preferred by the informants from Ireland, a greater variety of adjectives was chosen by the informants from the other English speaking countries, including *great*, *nice*, *good*, *cool*, *rockin'* and adjectival *fun*. The question tag consistently selected by the informants from England and Ireland was *isn't it?*, whereas the American informants, without exception, used *huh?*; the Canadians used both *isn't it?* and *huh?*, but also *eh?* (Schneider 2015).

Considerable sociopragmatic differences were also found. Although the same speech acts were used in all national varieties, some were used with different frequencies and distribution. While no significant differences were observed concerning e.g. greetings or the host question, clear differences emerged in the frequencies and distribution of other speech acts, first and foremost those coded as DISCLOSE Identity and QUESTION Identity, i.e. introducing

yourself and asking the interlocutor's name, and also QUESTION After You and REMARK Party, i.e. wellbeing inquiries and agreement-seeking assessments. The latter two speech acts were clearly favoured in the Irish dialogues. The former two, by contrast, were favoured by the Americans, but played only a minor role in the other dialogues. If DISCLOSE Identity and QUESTION Identity appeared in the English and Irish dialogues at all, they appeared at a later stage and were sometimes prefaced by an apology, especially in the English dialogues; cf., e.g. turn 5: *Sorry, I don't mean to be rude, but what's your name?* (cf. Schneider 2011). Evidently, asking a stranger's name, even at a later stage in a conversation, is considered a face threat in Ireland and particularly in England, i.e. an intrusion into the private sphere of one's interlocutor. In informal interviews, informants from England agreed that you can spend an enjoyable evening with a stranger without ever knowing this person's name.

Even more distinctive regional patterns were found in the opening turns of the dialogues. Over half of all English dialogues (56.7%) opened with a bare greeting, e.g. *Hi* (often responded to by a bare greeting in the second turn). The dominant pattern found in the Irish dialogues (73.3%) consisted of a greeting followed by a remark about the party, e.g. *Hi! Great party, isn't it?* The American dialogues, on the other hand, started with a greeting followed by a self-introduction (60%), e.g. *Hi, my name is Jill*. These findings suggest that the communicative task first to be solved in the given situation is interpreted in different ways in different parts of the English speaking world. Speakers from England seem to be focused on opening a conversation, since they open their dialogues non-specifically as they might open any conversation, i.e. by an exchange of greetings. Speakers from Ireland, by contrast, refer to the specific circumstances, i.e. the party. Finally, what seems to be salient for speakers from the United States is the fact that they are talking to a person they do not know and, thus, introductions have the highest priority. These salient opening patterns—focusing on position (English English), on the occasion (Irish English) or on the relationship (American English)—display a distinct regional distribution. In terms of politeness and appropriateness, the distinction between 'personal' and 'impersonal' (see also Sect. 4.2 below) seems to be immediately relevant in the present context. Speakers from England prefer an impersonal style in their openings, distinctly keeping a distance, whereas speakers from the United States clearly favour a personalised style when they introduce themselves straight away and sometimes explicitly ask their interlocutor's name. Typical Irish opening moves can be situated in between. While speakers from England seem to follow Lakoff's (Lakoff 1973) politeness rule 'Don't impose', speakers from Ireland seem to follow the rule 'Be friendly', without being too personal, however.

Three issues are important in this regard. First, the vast majority of all regional patterns identified are variety-preferential rather than variety-exclusive. Second, while a distinct regional distribution of the patterns can be observed, it must be emphasised that these are only dominant and not absolute patterns. In each case, the respective pattern was chosen by a significant majority, but not by all informants. This finding shows that variation exists not only between national varieties, but also within these varieties (cf. also Haugh and Carbaugh 2015), thus contradicting essentialist assumptions that language use might be *determined* by macro-social factors. The third and most important point is that the dialogues elicited by a discourse production task (DPT) and similar (written) experimental formats do not necessarily reveal what individual speakers would actually say in any real-world situation (see Sect. 3). Such dialogues do, however, reveal what speakers would say or, more likely, think they should say. Experimental data of the type reported reveal, in other words, what is generally considered appropriate in a given type of social situation, i.e. they reflect collective expectations and culture-specific social norms. This does not mean that the informants involved in the experiments always (or ever) observe these norms. The data merely show that speakers are aware of such expectations, which could be called conventions or, using a term introduced by Laver (1975), the 'polite norm' (cf. also Kádár and Terkourafi (Chap. 8), of this volume, on convention, ritual and (im)politeness). Divergence from this norm may be interpreted as rude behaviour. Consider again the example quoted above, *Sorry, I don't mean to be rude, but what's your name?*, in which an anticipatory apology is employed, bearing witness to the fact that introductions and requesting the interlocutor's name do not have a high priority in English English small talk.

While collecting data by employing a written production questionnaire may be considered artificial and the validity of the data challenged, there is corpus support for at least some of the results reported above. Analysing the use of question tags attached to elliptical evaluations consisting of adjective + noun (e.g. *Beautiful dish, huh?*) in the spoken parts of the British and the Irish component of the International Corpus of English and the Corpus of Contemporary American English yielded a clear picture: There was no occurrence of *huh?* in the British and the Irish data and only 13 occurrences of *isn't it?* vis-à-vis 1761 occurrences of *huh?* in the American data. This illustrates how corpus evidence can be employed to increase the validity of experimental findings.

Finally, it is a question of methodological concern to what extent the results reported above are representative of the national varieties of English under inspection and the countries these varieties are spoken in. As is usually the

case in studies of regional pragmatic variation at the national level (cf. Sect. 3 above), the data were collected not only in the same subnational region, but also in the same town or city, to homogenise the four data sets in order to preclude the interference of subnational variation, as the elicitation of truly representative samples was not feasible. So, arguably, the reported findings are representative only of the respective subnational region or even just the respective places, or even only of particular groups of younger-generation speakers in those places in the communities of practice of school and college students. On the other hand, there is evidence that these findings are typical not only of the region the data were gathered in. For instance, the British anthropologist Kate Fox, in her popular book *Watching the English: The Hidden Rules of English Behaviour* (2004) identifies a 'rule of behaviour' she calls 'The No-name Rule', which describes the opening pattern found in the American dialogues reported on above (i.e. immediately introducing yourself by name) and shows that people in England consider such American behaviour as inappropriate or downright rude (Fox 2004: 38–9). Fox's observations seem to point to the fact that regional differences in language-use conventions occur at a national level, or are at least perceived at a national level. Her observations nicely illustrate that norms and perceptions of (im)politeness and (in)appropriateness vary across regions in which the same language is spoken, yet not the same culture shared. Small talk, as has been demonstrated, is a case in point. As Clyne (1994: 84) notes: '... small-talk requires common expectations among participants about its appropriateness and a common willingness to take part.' Diverging expectations may lead to misperceptions and miscommunication. This applies more generally to all cases of diverging language use conventions, as also the case study presented in Sect. 4.2 will show.

4.2 Case Study 2: Regional Variation in Rapport Management in Service Encounters in Ecuadorian (Quito) and Peninsular (Madrid) Spanish

Elisa, an Ecuadorian returnee migrant who spent close to 20 years in Madrid, set up a corner shop in a residential neighbourhood in Quito, Ecuador on her return in 2013. In her initial interactions with Quiteño customers, she found that they were reacting negatively to her. She reports that the main problem, as she found out, was that she was employing *tuteo* (address with *tú* 'informal you') with them as had been the norm for her in Spain in similar service encounters, whereas Quiteños seemed to expect *ustedeo* (address with *usted* 'you formal') (personal communication, April 2014). Likewise,

in other service encounter interactions in Quito, where she was a customer, she found that some service providers challenged her *tuteo* and demanded to be addressed with *usted*. She was told that her use of *tuteo* showed *falta de educación* 'lack of good manners' as well as *falta de respeto* 'disrespect'. These experiences soon forced Elisa to revise her 'Spanish' communicative style and (re)adapt to the local conventions by using the formal, distance-marking *usted*.

This anecdote illustrates a certain conflict in what is regarded as appropriate behaviour in the same context by speakers of two different regional varieties of Spanish in this case. Indeed, *usted* in face-to-face service encounters in Quito has been found to be associated with the expression of respect (Placencia 2004); therefore, a person not using *usted* can be labelled as disrespectful as in Elisa's case above. In the same setting, *usted* is also a way of maintaining a certain distance with people who are strangers (Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2004) or who are seen as not belonging to the same social class. A person using *tú* where *usted* is expected may thus be accused of being *confianzudo*, that is, of acting 'as though more *confianza* exists than is actually the case' (Fitch 1998: 48). *Confianza* is a cultural notion applied to relationships characterised by 'closeness and a sense of deep familiarity' (Thurén 1988: 222). This label—*confianzudo*—also extends in certain contexts in Quito to the use of first names where honorifics (Leech 1999) such as *señorita* 'miss' are expected. By contrast, in a similar setting in Spain, egalitarianism appears to prevail and *tú* (together with first-name address) is of widespread use; *usted* may be equated with unfriendliness rather than being regarded as an important marker of respect.

Formality–informality is one of the cultural dimensions of variation that has been identified as important in some sociocultural contexts in the study of rapport management (Spencer-Oatey 2000, 2008) across cultural groups (cf. Jautz 2008). This dimension interacts with another dimension that Márquez Reiter and Placencia (2004), for example, refer to as closeness-seeking vs. distance-maintenance, and can be linked to Spencer-Oatey's (2000) notion of association rights, which she uses to refer to people's 'fundamental belief' that they are 'entitled to an association with others that is in keeping with the type of relationship' they have with them (p. 14). Spencer-Oatey suggests that association rights can be enhanced or threatened in the same way people's face can be enhanced or threatened. Elisa's initial use of *tú* address with customers or service providers in Quito appeared to have threatened their association rights in that they possibly perceived her way of speaking as too close or personal for their liking. In other words, the same communicative practice—*tuteo* in this case—in the same setting can be rapport-threatening in one sociocultural context and rapport-maintaining (if not rapport-enhancing) in another.

In order to explore perceptions of appropriate rapport management behaviour in service encounters in Quito and Madrid in the same context, an exploratory experimental study was carried out in 2015, with a focus on young females as customers. The study is based on a corpus generated by means of a dialogue construction task (cf. Schneider 2008) with six situations. The situation relevant for this study, modelled on naturally occurring service encounter interactions (cf. Placencia 2004), was formulated as follows:

> You go to a corner shop in your neighbourhood to purchase some bread and milk. You know the shopkeeper (Guillermo) well since you have been going to that shop ever since you were a kid. Write a dialogue depicting the conversation as it would typically develop from the moment you enter the shop.

A dialogue construction task—a type of production questionnaire—was chosen as it facilitates variable control. Also, unlike DCTs, it generates whole interactions, allowing the researcher to analyse particular speech actions (the transaction in this case) embedded within openings and closings. The use of production questionnaires (Kasper 2008) is not problem free, but it has been found effective in bringing to the fore what members of a given socio-cultural group regard as appropriate behaviour (cf. Schneider 2012c). Additionally, studies employing naturally occurring data, while giving access to actual instances of language use, have their own limitations. For example, when it comes to service encounters, it is difficult to reliably note down customers' age just from observation alone or to gain access into their educational or socioeconomic background without asking them directly and thus interfering with their business at hand.

In order to keep the background of the participants relatively uniform, university students were approached to act as informants: 25 female university students, age 20 on average in Quito, and 21 in Madrid, completed the questionnaire. In both contexts, the universities selected are attended by students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.

In terms of results, since the situation describes a high degree of familiarity between the participants ('you have been going to that shop ever since you were a kid'), a friendly interaction is expected. It is thus interesting to see how positive rapport is constructed across the two varieties, and how speakers of the two varieties go about the transaction. For space restrictions, however, we consider here only a few features of the interactions, with a focus on openings.

Opening actions that contribute to the construction of the interaction as friendly include greetings and/or wellbeing inquiries which can

be accompanied by nominal address forms. Pronominal address usage is displayed in most cases, also marking how the participants perceive the relationship. Starting with greetings and/or wellbeing inquiries, these were produced by most 'customers' (22/25) in the two corpora, normally in the first turn of the interaction, as illustrated in examples 1 and 2 below.

(1) (Q, F19) [7]
01 Customer: *Hola Guillermo, ¿cómo está vecino?* (Q, F19)
'Hello Guillermo, how are you^{V} neighbour?'
02 Guillermo: *Bien gracias mija.*
'Fine thanks my daughter'
03 Customer: *Será que me puede dar un pancito y una leche?*
'Do you think you^{V} can give me bread^{D} and milk?'

(2) (M, F21)
01 Customer: *Buenos días Guillermo, ¿qué tal?*
'Good morning Guillermo, how are things?
02 Guillermo: *Todo como siempre, guapetona. ¿Quieres lo de siempre?*
'Everything as usual, goodlooking^{A}. Would you^{T} like the usual?

The shopkeeper (Guillermo) produced fewer greetings or wellbeing inquiries in both contexts. Responding to customers' requests as in (3) (*deme pancito y leche* 'give me bread and milk') appears to take precedence over the production of response greetings.

(3) (Q, F20)
01 Customer: *Buenas Sr Guille, deme pancito y leche!*
'Morning/Afternoon/Evening Mr Guille^{S}, give^{V} me bread^{D} and milk'
02 Guillermo: *Claro mijita, coja no más.*
'Of course my daughter^{D}, go^{V} ahead and take^{V} it'

Informal greetings as in (1) and semi-formal as in (3) above predominate over formal forms in both data sets: there is only one case of a formal greeting (e.g. *buenos días* 'good morning') in the Quito corpus, and seven in the Madrid corpus (see example 2 above). However, when it comes to pronominal address which surfaces through wellbeing inquiries (Example 1), offers of

[7] 'Guillermo' is the shopkeeper in both contexts. Q stands for Quito, and M, for Madrid; F stands for female. Symbols employed include: V for formal pronominal address; T for informal pronominal address; A for augmentative, D for diminutive, and S for shortened forms (e.g. *Guille* for *Guillermo*). The examples are presented as they appeared in the questionnaires. In some cases, they do not conform with standard orthographic rules.

service (Example 2) and requests for a product (Example 3), the situation is somewhat different. In Quito, as can be seen in Figures 21.1 and 21.2 below, there is a clear preference for formal *usted* among both customers and shopkeepers; conversely, there is a clear preference for *tú* in the Madrid corpus. This is in line with results in Placencia (2005), for example, based on naturally occurring data.

Concerning wellbeing inquiries, both customers and shopkeepers produce them in both settings, although Quiteño customers produce them more often than shopkeepers (13 vs. 8/25); on the other hand, Madrileño customers and shopkeepers produce a similar number of these inquiries (9 vs. 10/25). In terms of conventions of form, a feature of difference that stands out is that Madrid inquiries correspond to somewhat impersonal forms such as: *¿qué tal?* 'how are things?' as in (2) above or *¿cómo va todo/la jornada/la mañana?* 'how are things/how is everything/the day/morning going?', whereas Quiteño inquiries are always personal: *¿cómo está?* 'how are you^{V}?' as in (1) above, or *¿cómo le va?* 'how are things going for you^{V}?'. A greater orientation to personalisation in service encounters among Quiteños, compared to Madrileños was observed in Placencia (2005).

Another feature of variation across data sets lies in the use of nominal address. As can be seen in Table 21.1, first name (in full), as in (2) above, is the most frequent form employed by customers in the Madrid corpus.




Fig. 21.1 Pronominal address employed by customers (*N* = 25 for each location)




Fig. 21.2 Pronominal address employed by shopkeepers (*N* = 25 for each location)

Table 21.1 Nominal address

Form		Quito (*N* = 25)		Madrid (*N* = 25)	
		Cust.	Shopk.	Cust.	Shopk.
First names	full forms *Guillermo*	5		19	1
	shortened/familiarised forms *Guille*[S]*/Guillo*[S]*/Guillermito*[D]	5		–	–
Honorifics (Leech 1999)	*don/señor* 'Mr' + first name (full form) *don/señor Guillermo*	4		–	–
	don/señor 'Mr' + first name (shortened/familiarised form) *don /Señor Guille*[S]*/Guillo*[S]*/Guillermito*[D]	6		–	–
	niña (literally, 'young girl')		7	–	–
Kinship terms	*mija* (short form for *mi hija* 'my daughter') *mijita* '*mija*[D]'	–	9	–	–
	hija 'daughter'	–	–	–	2
Endearments	*Veci(no)* 'neighbour'	3		–	–
	mi niña (literally, 'my girl')	–	2	–	–
	bonita/guapa/guapetona/princesa 'pretty/goodlooking/ goodlooking[A]/ princess'	–	–	–	5
Total		23	20	19	8
Ø nominal address		2	5	6	17

Quiteño customers, on the other hand, appear to have a wider repertoire of nominal forms that includes first names (both full and shortened/familiarised forms), honorifics in combination with first names, as well as the endearment term *vecino* 'neighbour'. As such, while keeping a certain distance, Quiteño customers are able to convey familiarity and affection at the same time when using diminutivised and playful, shortened first names on their own, or in combination with honorifics. These results appear to be in line with Placencia et al.'s (2015) study of address forms in Quito, Seville and Santiago de Chile, in a different context, where a wider range of forms was found to be in use among Quiteños, compared to Sevillanos. Shopkeepers in both Quito and Madrid use kinship terms, although the Quiteño *mija* 'my daughter' is, again, more personalised than the Madrid *hija* 'daughter', and appears to be used more frequently among Quiteños (9 vs. 2/25). Madrileño shopkeepers, however, appear to use a wider range of endearments.

All in all, the findings from this study show both shared as well as contrasting perceptions among Quiteño and Madrileño informants about appropriate rapport management behaviour in openings in the everyday service encounter scenario that was presented to them. In both cases, the opening of the encounter is rapport-enhancing as it is marked by friendliness through mostly informal greetings and/or wellbeing inquiries. However, there is divergence in perception when it comes to choice of pronominal address: *usted*, 'you formal', is favoured by the Quiteño informants in this study, and *tú*, 'you informal', by the Madrileño ones. This finding, in line with results from previous studies involving men and women of different ages (Placencia 2005), would corroborate Elisa's—the returnee migrant referred to in the introduction of this section—observations regarding expected behaviour in face-to-face service encounters in Quito.

As we also saw, what is considered appropriate differs with respect to nominal address too: Madrileño customers seem to prefer (unmodified) first-name address, consistent with familiar pronominal address. By contrast, Quiteño customers make use of a wider range of address forms, both formal and informal. Using these forms allows them to modulate their relationship with the shopkeeper, walking a tightrope between seeking closeness through displays of affection and maintaining the distance that appears to be expected in a commercial service encounter.

It has to be borne in mind though that the results from this exploratory study correspond to one context of face-to-face service encounters only, and that there are multiple other contexts that could potentially yield different results. Additionally, as we saw in Sect. 3.2, there can be subnational variation in the way service encounters are conducted, and rapport between service providers and customers, managed.

5 Summary and Future Directions

Perceptions of (im)politeness and (in)appropriateness have been found to be subject to regional variation. This type of variation has been examined so far mostly at the national level of pluricentric languages, first and foremost of English and of Spanish and also of only a handful of further mostly Indo-European languages. Hence, more research is needed on other languages as well as at other levels of regional variation, especially the subnational and local levels. Also, with respect to English, most studies have focused on Anglo-Englishes, but other varieties of English should be examined too. Overwhelmingly, regionally distributed recurrent patterns of language use have been identified and interpreted as reflections of diverging norms and expectations. In this endeavour, the focus has predominantly been on the actional and also the interactional level as distinguished in variational pragmatics; but with the increasing adoption of corpus linguistic methods the formal level receives more and more attention, specifically the study of discourse markers. Since comparability is a key concern in any study of variation, experimental methods, warranting a sufficient degree of systematic variable control, have largely been preferred. Typically, written production questionnaires including traditional discourse completion tasks (DCTs) have been employed, with their well-known drawbacks, as well as role plays to a lesser extent. Some methodological innovations have, however, been introduced such as the development of e-DCTs, spoken DCTs and dialogue production tasks (also known as free DCTs) to counter some of the problems inherent in the use of traditional DCTs, namely the elicitation of 'spoken' data in written form and the focus on isolated speech acts. Corpus linguistics offers many further possibilities, but is not free from limitations either. As generally corpora can be searched only for forms but not for communicative functions, corpus-based studies of pragmatic variation have concentrated on the formal level, notably on the comparative study of discourse markers. However, once regional patterns of language use have been established in experimental work, corpus data, where available, can be employed in triangulation to increase the validity and robustness of experimental findings. Experimental studies on the other hand can also be useful as a follow-up to studies based on naturally occurring data as they can allow for the examination of specific features of language use under controlled conditions and have the potential of being carried out on a large scale.

Some genres within media discourse, such as advertising, seem to constitute fruitful research areas which are underrepresented in studies of (im)politeness and regional pragmatic variation. Also, the internet, with its own methodological challenges (cf. Hine 2009), offers numerous contexts for the analysis of intralingual variation, which are underexplored (e.g. e-commerce and social media).

Concerning social media, given that interaction on social networking sites is not restricted by geographical boundaries, the study of regional variation would at first sight appear to be irrelevant; however, many Facebook users, for instance, continue to take part in local Facebook communities (Lower and Placencia 2015). A fruitful line of research would thus be to examine whether the greater interconnectedness brought about by social networking sites like Facebook and globalisation processes more widely is resulting in homogeneous perceptions and expressions of (in)appropriate or (im)polite behaviour online (cf. Sifianou 2013).

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22

(Im)politeness and Cultural Variation

Maria Sifianou and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich

1 Introduction

The theme of this chapter is intriguing not least because its focal points involve three highly debated concepts: 'politeness', 'impoliteness' and 'culture' whose complexity and ambiguity along with their equally intricate relationship have been attracting scholars' attention for years. The multifaceted and contested nature of the concept of '(im)politeness' has been well-attested in the relevant literature (see among others, Kopytko 1995; Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Watts 2003; Haugh 2007). Held (1992, p. 131) calls politeness a 'definitionally fuzzy and empirically difficult area' of research and Watts (2003, pp. 11, 12) talks of the 'elusive' nature and 'bewildering ambiguity' of the term and elsewhere (Watts 2005, p. xiii) of 'a slippery, ultimately indefinable quality of interaction'. The same is true of impoliteness whose definition is 'a real challenge' (Culpeper 2011a, p. 22).

The case with the term 'culture' is not very different as it 'often brings up more problems than it solves' (Scollon and Scollon 2001, p. 138). Culpeper (2012, p. 1128) calls it a 'tricky notion' and one that is 'notoriously difficult

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_22

to define' (Culpeper 2011a, p. 12; Spencer-Oatey 2008, p. 3). Lempert (2012, p. 194, drawing on Blommaert 1991) remarks that the concept of culture plays down culture-internal variation and 'is complicit with nationalisms'. This is the result of 'the Humboldtian idealization of one language: one society: one culture [which] had its origins in the romanticism of the period which coincided with the consolidation of the European nation states' (Gumperz 1996, p. 362). Any glance at the relevant literature does indeed indicate that the term 'culture' has been variously used and as such it has been variously defined. A clear illustration of this is Bargiela-Chiappini's (2010, p. 310) observation that the 157 definitions of the term that were provided in earlier compilations have doubled in number recently. As she notes 'the proliferation of definitions is a sign of an elusiveness that has baffled disciplines and scholars for a long time'. Watts (2005, p. xxv) sees 'the lack of a solid and workable definition of the term "culture"' as a problem not only in politeness research but also in anthropology in general and, therefore, as long as we can recognise cultural differences and pinpoint what constitutes them we do not need a full definition of the term.

There is no doubt then that this ambiguity and complexity of the terms along with their ideological underpinnings highlight an equally complex relationship between the two. Thus even though the relationship between 'politeness' and 'culture' is undoubtedly significant, their relationship is anything but straightforward and constitutes one of the major theoretical and methodological issues of the field (Kádár and Mills 2011, p. 2).

The most influential early politeness theories (Lakoff 1973; Brown and Levinson 1978/1987; Leech 1983) were basically universalistic assuming that the rules, strategies and maxims presented therein were of universal applicability. Early subsequent research (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989) tried to verify if this was indeed the case and noted that even though regularities were found in the seven languages investigated they could not make claims of universality. Similarly, in an earlier study, House and Kasper (1981, p. 157) had stated that 'we don't know whether politeness is a universal phenomenon'.

Soon after, substantial criticism of the assumed universal applicability of these early politeness models came initially from non-Western scholars (see among others, Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988, 1989; Gu 1990; Nwoye 1992). Central to such criticisms is the alleged ethnocentric bias of Brown and Levinson's model (see among others, Wierzbicka 1985, 2014; Ehlich 1992; Held 1992) and, consequently, its inapplicability as a universal model of politeness. In some cases, however, attempts to refute earlier pan-human universalistic claims did not entirely escape universalising assumptions of their own but of a different scale, where one language/culture is equated with

a specific conceptualisation of politeness. More recently, the advent of the so-called 'discursive' turn in (im)politeness research brought with it a host of challenging issues. In this new context, politeness is seen as a situated evaluation of behaviour and viewed as such can hardly serve as a basis for universal models, either.

This chapter starts with a brief overview of the beginnings and the development of arguments relating to the universality and inter- and intracultural variation (Sect. 2) and proceeds with a discussion of the issue of cultural variation as it emerges in current approaches (Sect. 3). Section 4 discusses research on compliments as a case study.

2 Early Approaches to Politeness and Culture

2.1 Universalistic Perspectives on Politeness

Understandably, all three early approaches to politeness (Lakoff 1973; Brown and Levinson 1978/1987; Leech 1983) were influenced by the rationalist and universalist paradigm that was dominant at the time (Janney and Arndt 1993); namely, Grice's (1975) theory of conversation, and Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) speech act theory. Against this backdrop, all three theories assume or make claims to universality, though leaving some leeway for culture-specificity. In particular, one of Brown and Levinson's stated concerns was the search of universals in language use which is unequivocal even in the title of their book. Thus their theory explicitly advocates a universalistic perspective, although it still allows for a certain degree of cross-cultural variation, which they call 'ethos' and define it as 'the affective quality of interaction characteristic of members of a society' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 243). Central to the accounts for cross-cultural variation that Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 248) offer is the varying importance attached to the three social variables (P = power, D = social distance and R = degree of imposition) and their cumulative effect on the weight of imposition. The latter leads them to the distinction between positive and negative politeness strategies and accordingly between positive and negative politeness cultures. As they (1987, p. 245) state, they offer this distinction as a crass overgeneralisation and acknowledge subcultural differences. In brief, their justification for their assumption that universal principles motivate politeness phenomena is that 'despite the rich cultural elaborations, the core ideas have a striking familiarity' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 13) in the three unrelated languages and cultures they investigated (i.e., English, Tamil and Tzeltal). These parallels are purportedly of two kinds: (a) the linguistic

construction of polite utterances; and (b) their modification in relation to social characteristics of the interlocutors and the situation (Brown 2001, p. 16621). It is worth noting here that their focus on the similarities detected does not preclude differences, which were not detailed in their study since they were not interested in them (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 241).

In a similar vein, Lakoff (1973, p. 303) explicitly subscribes to a universalistic perspective when she claims that 'these [her politeness] rules are universal' and explains differences in different cultures as the result of 'different orders of precedence for these rules'. One can easily assume that Leech (1983) adopts a rather universalistic stance since he extends Grice's and Searle's universalistic models in the direction of an interpersonal rhetoric which includes the politeness principle and the attendant maxims of tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement and sympathy. However, Leech (2007, pp. 169–170; 2014) himself claims that he has never made any claims to universality of his theory, which, in fact, can be used (and has been used) as a framework for contrastive studies (see also Culpeper 2011b). More recently, Leech (2007, 2014) reformulates his maxims as a general super-constraint, which he calls Grand Strategy of Politeness (GSP) in an attempt to explain politeness phenomena. He concludes that even though it is 'premature to talk of universals of politeness' and 'despite differences, there is no East—West divide in politeness' (Leech 2007, pp. 200, 202).

In brief, it seems that either implicitly or explicitly all three theories subscribe to a largely universalistic perspective, even though their authors would probably agree with Leech's (2007, p. 170; see also Wierzbicka 2014, p. 95) recent statement that both absolute universalist and relativist positions are untenable (cf. Brown 2001, p. 11622). However, their commitment to the universal applicability of their models has led early researchers to make rather strong related universalistic claims. For instance, Fraser et al. (1980, pp. 78–79) contend that '[e]very language makes available the same set of strategies—semantic formulas—for performing a given speech act' and further illustrate this by arguing that 'if one can request, for example, in one language by asking the hearer about his ability to do the act ("Can you do that?"), by expressing one's desire for the hearer to do the act ("I'd really appreciate if you'd do that") … then these same semantic formulas—strategies—are available to the speaker of every other language'. Not many researchers would espouse such claims today and even in the past there were sceptics like Thomas (1983, p. 101) who argues specifically that ability questions are highly conventionalised politeness forms in British English where they are more likely to be understood as requests rather than ability questions but in other languages, such as French and Russian, the reverse is the case

(see also Ogiermann 2009a).[1] It is worth noting that even in British English such conventionalised request constructions, concerning ability, only emerged in the second quarter of the nineteenth-century (Culpeper and Archer 2008) and more generally such negatively polite strategies have surfaced relatively recently in English, a society which used to be more oriented towards positive politeness (Taavitsainen and Jucker 2008; see also Brown and Gilman 1989, p. 181; Kohnen 2015, p. 61).

2.2 Positive and Negative Politeness Cultures

Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) have proposed a contested, yet highly influential distinction between positive and negative politeness strategies and, subsequently, 'between positive-politeness cultures and negative-politeness cultures' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 245). Both these distinctions, especially the latter, have received a lot of criticism on the grounds that it is impossible to categorise whole social groups according to the politeness strategies they prefer. What has been argued instead is that this emphasis on negative politeness is a fundamentally English understanding of politeness (Wierzbicka 1985) and, more specifically, that of dominant groups in English society (see, among others, Mills 2009; Mills and Kádár 2011). A number of issues arise in relation to this distinction and subsequent criticisms, which are discussed below.

First, while it may be convenient to talk about large groups, such as the English, the Spanish or the Greeks and what they have in common, on the other hand, it is also clear that communication involves individuals who interact and not societies (Scollon and Scollon 2001, p. 138). This shorthand has led to statements which, if taken out of their linguistic context, may give the impression that their authors espouse generalisations about the politeness orientation of whole language groups. Thus, even though some form of generalisation is found in earlier politeness studies, following the dominant trend of the time, these generalisations do not embrace all individuals of a particular language group or culture as later critics of this trend tend to assume. What appears to be overlooked in such critiques, however, is that in most cases such statements have been offered with qualifications and caveats and have been produced in response to the dominant pan-human universalistic claims of the time, which downplayed the role of culture (see Hymes 1986, p. 47; cf. Lempert 2012, p. 195) in understanding politeness phenomena. In other words, most authors who have been frequently quoted as overgeneralising

[1] More generally, Watts (2003, p. 12) maintains that the linguistic means through which politeness is realised differ quite radically across a range of different languages.

would agree that no society is completely uniform in its politeness orientation (see, e.g., Sifianou 1992, pp. 39–40, 47–8, 81 and elsewhere). Even Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 245) themselves allow for a certain degree of cross-cultural variation ('ethos') and they also clearly state that complex stratified societies will exhibit both kinds of politeness, with perhaps upper classes having a negative politeness ethos and lower classes a positive politeness ethos. The authors (1987, p. 246) further add that the emphasis on the one or the other not only marks different social classes but also marks different kinds of social roles. Even at the level of interaction, Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 230–31) acknowledge the possibility of a mixture of positive and negative politeness strategies and view it as either a kind of hybrid strategy or as a sometimes 'painful' movement for interlocutors between approach and distance.

Second, an interesting common denominator in various early studies considering politeness phenomena in diverse societies (see, e.g., Wierzbicka 1985; Hickey 1991; Blum-Kulka 1992; Sifianou 1992; Hassall 1999) is that these societies have been identified as bearing a primarily positive politeness orientation, a finding which to our knowledge, far from being contested, has been further corroborated by subsequent research (see among others, Tzanne 2001; Bella 2009; Ogiermann 2009b; Barros García and Terkourafi 2014).[2] Thus, relevant research so far concerning cultural orientation directs attention to the inadequacy of predictions relating mostly to the negative politeness orientation. Not many modern societies, other than the English (and perhaps the Japanese and the Korean), have been felicitously identified to date as exhibiting a negative politeness orientation. However, Brown and Levinson seem to favour negative politeness, even though they (1987, pp. 129–30) acknowledge its Western bias, acknowledgment which further weakens the universal applicability of their model.

Other related distinctions include rapprochement v. distancing (Barros García and Terkourafi 2014), and collectivist v. individualist cultures (Hofstede 1980). Ide (1989) argues that such distinctions are inadequate for Japanese and suggests one between discernment and volition (but see Pizziconi 2007, 2011). Whilst these distinctions are useful for bringing variation into attention, we should not be led into assuming that they can adequately describe the complexities of variation. In a recent paper, Kádár and Mills (2013) argue for the need of reconceptualising the notions of volition, and discernment,

[2] This should not be taken as an overarching generalisation that spans whole populations because, as Fernandez-Amaya et al. (2014) argue convincingly, conclusions regarding in/appropriateness should be made for individual genres, and, as Bella and Sifianou (2012) show, the single constant feature in e-mail requests sent to faculty members by Greek students is the use of formality.

in particular, so as to become usable in cross-cultural research. In relation to the positive / negative politeness distinction, some scholars (see, e.g., Blum-Kulka 1992; Harris 2001; Bella 2009) have suggested that positive and negative politeness strategies are not as distinct as presented by the theory, since they can be mixed in interaction. This view is shared by Brown and Gilman (1989, p. 165) who, in fact, propose that positive and negative politeness strategies be merged into one super-strategy of redress (see also Bousfield 2008). Strecker (1988, p. 155) goes further and suggests that even off-record strategies are not independent of positive and negative politeness ones. Despite differing views as to the usefulness of such dichotomies, as Hymes (1986, p. 49) points out, they are attractive because 'they offer order in a complex sphere, yet it is the hard truth that what goes on in given situations escapes such categorisations'. They could, however, be used with caution as broad approximations and in the knowledge that no society is completely uniform in its politeness orientation. Not all societies or societies as a whole can neatly fit in such binary oppositions. Furthermore, even if two societies could be classified as bearing the same politeness orientation or as belonging to the collectivist or individualist dimension they will not exhibit identical preferences of linguistic or non-linguistic behaviour, since societies develop under different socio-historical circumstances. More importantly perhaps, such generalising comparisons should not be understood as always valid. For instance, Barros García and Terkourafi (2014) view American culture as a distancing one when compared to Spanish whereas Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 245) view western USA cultures as positive-politeness oriented when compared to the British.

Ultimately, then, such distinctions should not be understood as absolute dichotomies but as useful abstractions which can help explain specific orientations or tendencies, stereotypical or otherwise, in both intra- and intercultural mundane interactions of specific social units. However, in order to account for whole cultural groups, they may need to be reconceptualised as scalar rather than dichotomous distinctions (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2010a). The fact that there are individual differences within social groups does not preclude discernible tendencies, especially if subsequent research corroborates initial findings.

3 The Discursive Turn

Despite its alleged shortcomings, Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987) work and the proliferation of research it inspired provided a most important impetus for new ways of looking at politeness phenomena and their relationship to

'culture'. These were initiated with Eelen's (2001) provocative book challenging all previous accounts of politeness on a number of grounds. This initiative was soon followed by a host of publications which coincided with the broader discursive or postmodern turn in the social sciences and the humanities. Thus the so-called 'discursive' approach to politeness emerged as prominent and highly influential. Even though it does not constitute a unified category (see, e.g., Haugh 2007; Kádár 2011; Mills 2011), among its common denominators is the conviction that politeness is a situated evaluation, rather than behaviour *per se* and is to be located at the discoursal level. Its full understanding necessitates longer chunks of discourse rather than single utterances or even adjacency pairs since 'politeness cannot in principle reside in single utterances but is negotiated in longer discourses, or, one might add, over several encounters' (Terkourafi 2005, p. 241; see also Sifianou 2012). Such a perspective casts doubts on a number of aspects of Brown and Levinson's theory, one such being the issue of the universality of politeness. In general, discursive approaches challenge essentialist understandings of culture since they presuppose extant fixed and stable norms which guide the behaviour of particular groups of individuals which are seen as homogeneous (Eelen 2001, p. 166; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2013, p. 3; see also Mills 2003, 2013; Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 2006). On the contrary, discursive approaches view culture and politeness as dynamic constructs emerging in actual interactions rather than as static phenomena which can be defined in advance. In such a framework, claims to universality and even generalisation, to a great extent, become unsustainable.

To come to grips with the social level, various smaller units of analysis have been suggested as a more viable way to proceed, including communities of practice, genre practices, gender, ethnic and generational groups or what Holliday (1999) calls 'small cultures' referring to any cohesive social grouping. No doubt, considering such smaller groups can be a first step in attempts at tracing more general patterns, regularities that give cohesion to groups (Holliday 1999, p. 248; Spencer-Oatey 2005, p. 339). However, in discussing the limitations of such units, Kádár and Haugh (2013, p. 47) argue that 'no unit can capture every interactional relationship' and even though the individual is regarded as one of the most important units of analysis, other such units continue to be used by post-2000 politeness researchers.

3.1 Situatedness and Generalisations of Politeness

The emphasis placed by discursive researchers on the need to explore lay understandings of politeness and, in fact, hearers' subjective evaluations of what they have shown to have interpreted as (im)polite have had a number

of significant consequences including the restriction of the possibility of establishing global norms, and thus implicitly intra- and cross-cultural comparisons as an option. Thus, the centre of attention of comparing different cultures of earlier approaches has shifted to investigating the practices of different individuals, and, by extension to 'a focus on the co-constructive aspect of communication' (Scollon and Scollon 2003, p. 543). In this framework, the concept of culture is relevant only if it can be shown that interlocutors treat it as relevant in their interactions (Scollon and Scollon 2003, p. 544; Higgins 2007) and conversation analysis has been viewed as offering a useful aid to this end.

Conversation analysts see culture as an interactionally demonstrable and observable phenomenon in the sequential development of interaction (Geyer 2008, pp. 64–5; McHoul et al. 2008). So 'rather than trying to trace the effect of a rather abstracted culture on the interaction', which was the focus of earlier approaches 'it is possible to find evidence of the effect of culture within the utterances of interactants' (Mills 2011, p. 34). However, despite its usefulness, exclusive concentration on the meticulous analysis of the sequential organisation of interactions deprives analysts of significant information, which may not be made relevant in the current interaction but may, nevertheless, be highly significant for the interlocutors involved (see, e.g., McHoul et al. 2008; Sidnel 2008). Interesting illustrations of this are offered by what Bucholtz (1999, p. 10) refers to as 'self-protective linguistic practices' and also what Strauss (2004, p. 174) calls 'self-censoring' to refer to cases in which the speaker refrains from voicing a controversial or highly debatable opinion (see also Schegloff 2003; Davies et al. 2013; Locher 2013).[3] As Strauss (2004, p. 174) further notes, that there are such censored views can be adduced from what the speaker has claimed in other related contexts. Thus some scholars have turned to the broader ethnomethodological paradigm which draws information not only from the sequential development of the specific interaction but also from ethnographic information which may be independently available but empirically verifiable (see, e.g., McHoul et al. 2008). Others espouse a broader pragmatic framework informed by research and methods of conversation analysis but also including, among others, features of the situational context and the relational history of the participants (Haugh 2011, p. 258).

[3] In mass communication studies, similar issues are discussed extensively under the rubric of 'the spiral of silence' (Noelle-Newmann 1974) to refer to cases in which people who believe they are in the minority tend to abstain from publicly expressing their opinion and vice versa.

Another important consequence is that concentrating on single interactions makes it difficult to draw any generalisations which may reach beyond the specific encounter (see, e.g., Terkourafi 2011, p. 245). However, generalisation is needed in all studies of social interaction in order to be able to draw useful conclusions from empirical studies (Christie 2005, p. 5; Holmes and Schnurr 2005, pp. 122–3; Mills 2013, pp. 74, 77), and pin down culture as the large-scale result of people interacting over time (Eelen 2001, p. 246). Needless to say, any generalisation needs careful and cautious steps but, as Mills (2013, p. 77) argues, the lack of generalisation in much politeness research is 'slightly disappointing' in that we need to have a sense in which the specific analysis is not only valid for just these people in that specific encounter.

There has been a proliferation of studies which focus on specific dyadic and polylogic interactions in diverse traditional and mediated contexts in various cultures, even though studies with English data predominate (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2010a; Kádár and Bargiela-Chiappini 2011, p. 5). Despite this proliferation, there have been repeated pleas for the study of (im)politeness in a wide range of settings across different varieties (Culpeper 2012; Haugh and Schneider 2012) and subvarieties of English (Mills 2009). If English is in need of further study, then one can easily imagine the need for the study of other languages and language varieties which have been underrepresented in research.

3.2 Intracultural Variation

Among the constraints that early cross-cultural research has created is 'the relative neglect of *intra*cultural variation' (Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 243) and its reliance on speech act theory. Mills (2011, p. 21), for instance, is right in arguing that speech acts can be manifested through a variety of linguistic forms since 'many utterances which have the form of compliments do not function as a compliment to the hearer, and may actually not be intended by the speaker to be taken as compliments' (see also Maíz-Arévalo and García-Gómez 2013, p. 4) and 'individuals may pay compliments without using the conventional linguistic realisations'.[4] A number of such situation-specific examples of compliments can be found in Sifianou (2001), as for instance, in an exchange between two interlocutors arranging their exact meeting point at a busy London train station: the phrase 'how appropriate' in response to 'I'll be waiting for you by the flower stand' is meant as a compliment, but such a phrase could not be understood as a compliment outside the specific context in which it occurred.

[4] See Jaworski (1994) for related issues on apologies.

However, given the recent theoretical and data-collection advances such instances can be spotted as unusual and highly situation-specific and could be excluded from the quiver of conventionalised means of complimenting. Besides, a speech act approach can be implemented with techniques and tenets from other research areas (see, e.g., Merrison et al. 2012), and the data set can be expanded through the use of electronic corpora (see Barron 2011 on offers). More recently and in some cases under the influence of the discursive turn in linguistics, researchers have turned their attention to natural rather than elicited data from specific traditional and mediated contexts (e.g. students' e-mails sent to teachers or specific service encounters). In such cases, whole events rather than single decontextualised acts are considered as it has become clear that a speech act does not reside in single utterances since the preceding and/or following linguistic material and the sociocultural context may soften or strengthen or even reveal and possibly contradict their force. Even Brown and Levinson themselves (1987, pp. 10, 233) acknowledge their neglect of longer linguistic units (a shortcoming they attribute to speech act theory) and propose, even though they do not expand on it, the concept of 'face-threatening intention' (instead of FTA), 'since FTAs do not necessarily inhere in single acts'. Attention to natural data has also revealed that speech acts in institutional contexts may be manifested differently from those in other contexts (see, e.g., Grainger and Harris 2007; Davies 2011 on political apologies).

Thus, the intracultural level of variation has started receiving scholars' attention concerning primarily subvarieties of English, such as social variation within British (Mills 2009) and New Zealand English (Holmes et al. 2008; Holmes et al. 2012), and across varieties of English such as British and American English (Breuer and Geluykens 2007), Irish and British English (Barron 2005), Irish, British and American English (Schneider 2005), British and Australian English (Merrison et al. 2012) and British, American and Australian English (Goddard 2012).

It has been argued lately that to understand and analyse politeness at the level of culture, we need to develop new models rather than transferring the ones that have been developed and used for the analysis of individual interactions (Mills 2009; Kádár and Bargiela-Chiappini 2011; Mills and Kádár 2011).[5] More specifically, Mills and Kádár (2011) argue that at the individual level, norms of politeness vary within cultures, across different communities of practice, different social classes and regions, different gender and age groups

[5] Moreover, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2010b) raises the question as to whether such models developed for dyadic interaction can be applied to studies of polylogic interactions as well as mediated (rather than face-to face) interactions, such as those found in the social media.

and so on. They further contend that the analyst's job is to explore such situated variations and, one might add, bring such findings together. If there is no overarching project which would bring all these undoubtedly very interesting findings together, then such endeavours will remain an 'incoherent text', unable to account for broader patterns of variation in any consistent way because even though conventions are situation-specific, there may be some pan-situational values and assumptions (Spencer-Oatey 2005, p. 340). At the cultural level, Mills and Kádár (2011) argue that statements about politeness are generally conservative, ideological constructs based on stereotypes and produced by those who are socially and/or economically powerful (see also Eelen 2001, p. 208). But stereotypes inform individual choice and are either reaffirmed or challenged (Mills 2003, p. 190). Thus, as Mills and Kádár (2011) argue, (im)politeness at the cultural level should be studied with caution. Instead of making overgeneralisations about cultural linguistics norms of a language community as a whole, we should see politeness and impoliteness as resources available to interlocutors within specific subcultures and genre practices and which different groups will view in different ways (Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 42; Mills 2013).[6] This is consonant with the related point (Sifianou 1992, p. 48), namely that individuals draw from their culturally available repository the (im)politeness strategies which better express their ideology, age and gender and even the mood of the moment.

A frequently quoted example of regional variation in England which 'seems to transcend some of the class boundaries within the region' is that of 'blunt Yorkshiremen', who take pride in the use of forms that 'might be considered impolite or overly direct' in other regions since it gives them a sense 'of a strong regional identity'. Negative politeness devices 'are often characterised as negative and effete' (Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 30; Kádár and Haugh 2013, p. 46). This interesting example brings to mind what sociolinguists have called the 'covert prestige' of vernacular varieties, that is, the hidden values associated with non-standard, informal speech as opposed to the overt prestige associated with middle classes and formality (Trudgill 1972, p. 183). An example of regional variation, more limited in scope, is the use of expressions meaning 'excuse me' in some rural areas of Greece before or after the mention of animals (particularly donkeys) and vegetables like courgettes and cucumbers (Sifianou 1992, p. 81).

Haugh (2011, p. 259) raises three issues in relation to the study of politeness at the social level: what kinds of data are needed, how these should be

[6] We should also bear in mind that not all individuals share exactly the same set of resources (Johnstone 2008, p. 160).

analysed and, whether the study of the individual and the social could be reconciled or should remain distinct. His response to the first two issues is that the gamut of the data analysed should be expanded to include not just extracts of longer interactions, but also metapragmatic analyses of the use of various related terms in corpora, surveys of lay evaluations of specific interactions, and interactions that have become the focus of broader societal debates (Haugh 2011, p. 260). As he observes, such data have been analysed but the interconnections between the individual and the social levels remain rather ambiguous. Drawing on Arundale (2009), Haugh (2011, p. 260) contends that the social and the individual in nature are fully interdependent and yet social and individual phenomena are distinct and function differently. Haugh (2010) discusses the inherent difficulties to reconciling micro and macro perspectives on language and culture and argues for the need of integrating them. This integration is offered by Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013 and elsewhere), who argues that genre provides the link between social structure and individual action, that is, it constitutes the meso level of analysis. She suggests that a reformulated version of Fairclough's (2003) tripartite model (discourse/genre/style) is a way of relating everyday interaction with society.

Moreover, Haugh (2011, p. 260) sees the moral dimension of (im)politeness as a significant element in a theory of politeness at the social level, and an aid in exploring its interconnections between the individual and the social levels of politeness (see also Bargiela-Chiappini 2003; Terkourafi 2011; Haugh 2013; Kádár and Márquez Reiter 2015). It seems that this is indeed a neglected aspect of politeness as is also its non-verbal / behavioural aspect (Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 2006).[7] It is understandable that as linguists we should be interested in forms of social behaviour which involve language (Holmes 2012, p. 207; Watts 2003, p. xi). However, if a common-sense definition of politeness is 'proper behaviour', which clearly testifies that it is not confined to language (Eelen 2001, p. iv), then we may be missing an important aspect of it by confining ourselves to the study of verbal behaviour. Furthermore, we may unwittingly even discriminate against social groups where non-verbal, non-linguistic behaviour may be equally or even more valued.[8]

[7] As Bucholtz (1999, p. 9) states 'language is only one social activity among many and ... takes much of its meaning (both social and referential) from the other practices that surround it'. Janney and Arndt (1993, p. 34) also contend that in order to fully understand how politeness phenomena are perceived and interpreted by different groups of people it is necessary to extend investigation beyond the linguistic level.

[8] See for example, Fukushima's (2013, p. 279 and elsewhere) notion of 'attentiveness' which clearly incorporates a non-verbal component as equally significant in its expression. See also Sifianou and Tzanne (2010).

3.3 Cross-Cultural Variation

Despite the attested problems with dichotomies such as positive and negative politeness strategies and relatedly between positive and negative politeness cultures, many researchers, especially in early cross-cultural and interlanguage pragmatics, have found both these distinctions useful and have used them in numerous empirical studies, in many cases suggesting modifications (see, e.g., Ogiermann 2009b).[9] Blum-Kulka et al.'s (1989) pioneering work drawing data primarily through discourse completion tests has been a highly influential starting point for the comparison of various speech acts across different languages. Researchers following this line of investigation have used, in addition to discourse completion tests, role-plays, verbal reports and various types of questionnaires (see Golato 2003; Kasper 2008; Jucker 2009; Bella 2012, 2014a, b; Leech 2014, among many others). The plethora of research studies that emerged has undoubtedly contributed to furthering our understanding of the structure and function of various speech acts and of politeness practices in different communities. In addition, it has facilitated cross-cultural comparisons and has also served as a springboard for modifications, refinements and further research (see, e.g., Trosborg 1995; Haugh and Schneider 2012).

There is no way one can do justice to the tremendous growth of research that emanated from focusing on various speech acts, with requests, apologies and compliments (and their responses) probably receiving the lion's share. One can only look for publications by Blum-Kulka, House, Kasper, Trosborg, Olshtain, Cohen, Manes, Wolfson and Holmes to get a sense of the variety of the issues discussed and the communities involved. In addition to these, a host of other speech acts, such as greetings, invitations, refusals, complaints and offers have attracted scholarly attention. Not all such research is cross-cultural but has served as the basis for cross-cultural comparisons. For instance, Manes and Wolfson explored compliments in American English but their research design and findings have served as a source of inspiration for various comparative studies, both cross-cultural and intracultural (see Sect. 4).

A much-discussed issue which was probably enforced by this legacy is that of the relationship between politeness and indirectness. In early politeness research, directives are categorised as direct, conventionally and non-conventionally indirect or in Brown and Levinson's (see, e.g., pp. 68–69) terms 'on-record' and 'off-record indirect', describing them as universal and attributing a higher degree of politeness to the latter (p. 20). This equation

[9] van der Bom and Mills (2015, p. 180) have recently noted a 'return to Brown and Levinson' albeit with modifications.

of indirectness with politeness reflects its ethnocentric bias and inevitably implies that some societies are more polite than others. However, as has been repeatedly shown, the relationship between politeness and indirectness is far more complex and context-dependent and thus differs across cultures (see, e.g., Blum-Kulka 1987; Sifianou 1997; Ogiermann 2009a, 2015). Early cross-cultural research has shown that some cultures value the clarity of directness which they associate with honesty, whereas the ambiguity of indirectness not only places heavy inferential demands on the addressee (Blum-Kulka 1987, p. 133) but can also depict the speaker as 'devious and manipulative' (Pinker 2007, p. 442). More recently, Terkourafi (2014) has argued for the need of broadening the set of uses of indirect speech explored (e.g., politeness and deniability) and to this end, she suggests a new nomenclature. Terkourafi (2014, p. 67) concludes by arguing that we should move away from culturally constructed understandings and should view the relationship between direct and indirect speech 'in its full complexity as interlocking resources that can serve multiple and diverse ends'.

Given the recent developments in theoretical approaches to politeness and data-collection methodologies as well as the availability of a great variety and large amounts of data, researchers are not bound to the restrictions of the past. Corpus linguistics and more specifically corpus pragmatics (see, e.g., Aijmer and Rühlemann 2015) offer various tools for coding and annotating masses of corpus data that also enable the inclusion of linguistic and contextual information (see, e.g., Culpeper 2015). In addition, the media are becoming increasingly popular offering a rich source of naturally occurring digital data (Androutsopoulos 2006; Locher 2010; Maíz-Arévalo and García-Gómez 2013). Such developments provide comparable data and wider possibilities for the triangulation of data-collection methods, the merits of which are advocated by many researchers (see, e.g., Haugh 2010; Culpeper 2012; Kádár and Haugh 2013). So, necessary generalisations of a smaller scale can be more safely drawn and offered with the necessary provisos. As Pizziconi (2007, p. 208) contends '"situated" meanings can only be mobilized (recognized, strategically utilized, modified) in relation to some broad, culturally shared … meanings'. Without denying regularities and generalisation, constructivist approaches are suspicious of them (Mills 2011, p. 48) and tend to focus on variability. However, such a focus may be restrictive if one is interested in comparing the practices within or across different social or regional groups. As Spencer-Oatey (2005, p. 339) argues 'regularity and variability go hand in hand' and the focus of one's research directs attention to regularity or variability. The assumption was and still is (see, e.g., Mills and Kádár 2011, p. 43) that by analysing a wide range of data from various genres we may

be able not only to draw generalisations but also spot differences, one may add. The difference is that in the past, these would be typically interpreted as revealing general patterns of use while in current research they are viewed as revealing the resources available to a certain group and their tendencies to use particular forms to express politeness or impoliteness in specific contexts.

Therefore, it seems that the easier access to various types of data facilitates the exploration of data from specific genres and validates generalisations, which could then be compared to related findings from other genres within the same community or to findings from similar genres in other communities. To this end, compliments are discussed in the following section as a case study.

4 Case Study: Compliments

As mentioned earlier, compliments are among the speech acts that have received considerable attention in cross-cultural research. With their various studies on compliment behaviour in American English, Manes and Wolfson (e.g., Wolfson and Manes 1980; Manes and Wolfson 1981; Wolfson 1981, 1983; Manes 1983) set the ground for the overwhelming expansion of research on compliments and compliment responses in diverse communities both within and across cultures, such as Italian, Spanish, Polish, German, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Greek (see Golato 2002; Chen 2010 for overviews). Being sociolinguists, rather than pragmaticians, Manes and Wolfson strongly espouse the ethnographic approach for collecting data (see, e.g., Wolfson 1976) and their research design and findings have since been used as benchmarks for the study of compliments in other communities. Among their well-known findings, one can note the formulaic nature of compliments, their solidarity function and the various foci, such as appearance, ability and possessions which seem to attract compliments in American English. The formulaic nature of compliments has been confirmed in various studies for diverse communities (e.g., Holmes 1988, on New Zealand English; Herbert 1991, on Polish and Yuan 2002, on Chinese) even though the preferred structures differ. Cultural variation has been observed in the topics that attract compliments. For instance, Manes (1983) and Holmes (1988) found that American English and New Zealand English speakers tend to compliment people on personal appearance. Yuan (2002) found that in Chinese it is ability that attracts most compliments followed by appearance. On the other hand, Herbert (1991) and Jaworski (1995) attested that in Polish new possessions attract the most compliments. Such differences have been attributed to differing cultural values.

One problem with the ethnographic approach that has been repeatedly noted (see, e.g., Golato 2003; Jucker 2009) is that some compliments may escape the researcher's attention. More significantly perhaps, researchers may focus on more conventionalised compliments and miss what is more original and unexpected. However, this is not necessarily the case, because research applying the ethnographic approach has found various types of very creative, poetic and playful compliments, especially among young, closely related Greek individuals (Sifianou 2001). For instance, original cases include compliments which involve comparisons with well-known individuals with excellent characteristics or skills. The following example occurred between close friends:

Πω πω ομορφιές! τύφλα νάχει η Σκλίβα.
Wow beauty! Skliva (1996, Greek Miss World) pales next to you.

It is true that the ethnographic method relies heavily on the researcher's memory to record the compliment accurately at a later stage and thus significant information for the analysis (such as supportive moves or additional turns) may be forgotten (Jucker 2009; Golato 2003). However, if one is interested in the content of compliments, for instance, this methodology is of value as large amounts of data can be collected and findings can be used in comparative studies.

In a recent study, Keisanen and Kärkkäinen (2014) employ a conversation analytic approach. Using a corpus of eight hours of video-recorded casual interactions in American English, they extracted 21 instances of compliments and attempted a multimodal analysis of complimenting sequences. Their aim was to explore not only the frequent structures but also the prosody and embodied actions interlocutors use to co-construct these sequences. Among their interesting findings, such as the significance of prosody and, in particular, eye gaze during such sequences, they also consider the position of the compliment in the sequence. They rightly argue that relevant research has mostly concentrated on first-turn compliments whereas reactive compliments were more frequent in their data (Keisanen and Kärkkäinen 2014, p. 655). One of their examples is '*you will %make the &perfect manager' which comes after a question–answer sequence between friends that could be seen as leading to the compliment. A similar point is raised by Placencia and Lower (2013) who consider compliments on Facebook as 'a kind of second-pair part of photo-initiated communication online'. Sifianou (2001) also discusses the positional flexibility of compliments in an interaction and their possible reactive nature of previous actions, providing examples (such as that discussed in Sect. 3.2).

A new source of data has been recently used by Placencia and Lower (2013) who turned to the internet. They explored compliments which appear as reactions to photographs posted on a Facebook network of family and friends in the United States. The authors found that overall the structure and the topics of compliments in their corpus are very similar to those listed by Manes and Wolfson (1981) for American English, whereas the few differences encountered could be attributed to the affordances of the medium. A similar source of data, supplemented by semi-structured interviews, is used by Maíz-Arévalo (2013) to explore compliment responses in Spanish. She argues that features of the medium (such as disembodiment, asynchronicity and relative lack of privacy) contribute to a simplification of some face-to-face response strategies and to the amplification of others. Maíz-Arévalo and García-Gómez (2013) are perhaps the first to engage in a comparative study between English and Spanish using two balanced corpora from online social networks. They argue that despite superficial similarities, their results show that compliments in the two languages 'follow remarkably different frequencies of use which reflect deep cultural differences' (p. 1). They conclude, with the necessary caution, that their results seem to support the positive politeness orientation of the Spanish and the more negative politeness orientation of the British.

Given the plethora of publications on compliments and compliment responses, it is obvious that various theoretical frameworks and methods of data collection have been used to gather relevant data, including various forms of discourse completion tests, role plays with field observation being the most popular, as Golato (2002, p. 548) states. She (2003) further discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these methods and argues that conversation analysis with audio- and video-recorded data is the most preferable means of collecting and analysing compliments (see also Wieland 1995) as their position in the sequential organisation of the interaction may be important for their interpretation and their face-threatening force. However, she explains that she considers conversation analysis the most appropriate approach for the study of actual language use but not the most suitable for all research questions.

What transpires from the above brief discussion is that conversation analysis is the most suitable method for detailed analyses of few naturally occurring instances in one language (Jucker 2009) and that replication of exact situations is difficult. Conversation analysts see their findings neither as a claim to universality nor as a basis for cross-cultural comparisons, as Schegloff (2002, p. 250) argues as regards telephone conversation openings. Ethnographically collected data offer possibilities for large collections of data and are more

amenable to comparative studies. DCTs, despite their shortcomings, appear to have advantages such as the control of variables and contexts and seem to have been preferred for 'pure' comparative studies, whether cross-cultural or intracultural, before the advent of electronic means of communication. Finally, the social media have started attracting researchers' interest as a new source of naturally occurring, digital data.

5 Concluding Remarks

Early politeness research has been criticised for concentrating on single utterances and focusing on the individual who uses language strategically according to politeness norms. Unfairly to some extent, it has also been criticised for seeing these norms as applicable to societies as wholes. The discursive turn discontent with such views reaches the other extreme initially where only the individual still remains dominant, only the individual is different this time. Instead of being the producer of (im)polite discourse, it is the recipient who is assumed to determine what is polite or impolite through his/her evaluation and in some cases even the producer's evaluation is relegated to a secondary position or is ignored. It then became clear that such a view cannot take us very far, and so the focus included both interlocutors and their local working out of their relationship through (im)politeness practices, which relegated politeness itself to a secondary position. Communities of practice and genres were used among other smaller social units in attempts to discover social norms pertaining to such groupings. Nowadays more and more researchers would agree that concentrating on the local, but without attempts at generalisations and consideration of broader social forces influencing the local cannot take us very far in our research endeavours.

Scholars agree that cultures are not homogeneous since in every single culture there is variation as to what is understood as (im)polite by specific individuals in specific situations. To complicate things further, a fact that seems to have been ignored in most relevant politeness research is that cultures and even subcultures are not only heterogeneous but also unbounded entities since they 'diffuse and flow into each other' (Coupland 2010, p. 6), especially nowadays that globalisation entails mobility for various reasons and increasing numbers of various kinds of interactions both traditional and novel, particularly given the development of technologically mediated means of communication. However, despite such centrifugal and centripetal forces, there are bounds to variation, as sociolinguists have shown us for years. Despite social and

regional variation, there is mutual intelligibility to a greater or lesser extent and pragmatic / sociocultural variation may follow similar principles. Thus we need to reconcile extreme constructivist views which imply that social reality is continuously (re)invented and likewise that (im)politeness is co-constructed anew in every interaction[10] with older views which posit broader motivations and strategies of politeness which inform interactions. Societies are neither populated by uniform individuals who merely conform to social practices of a unified culture but neither are they by individuals who behave in endlessly different ways and constantly change social reality because if the latter were the case, communication would be impossible. Single individuals are not so powerful as to change social reality and politeness norms just because they may resist or deviate from them once or even more regularly. Many individuals and concerted efforts over time are needed for social reality to change. Politeness is co-constituted in interaction but it is also constitutive of it because of what interlocutors bring with them (see O'Driscoll 2011, p. 156, for a related view of face) which even though not static and perhaps different from one context to another, there is a certain stability which is not as immediately visible as it does not participate in any discursive struggle.

Mills and Kádár (2011, p. 42) argue that (im)politeness norms could be seen as resources available within particular cultures which different groups will view in different ways. From this repository, individuals will select the ones they see as more appropriate for the specific situation. Hedged general statements can be made at the level of the resources available after having analysed a wide range of data from various social groups (ibid., p. 43). As Culpeper (2012, p. 1131) lucidly illustrates '[l]ike a stack of Russian dolls, interactional norms sit within community of practice norms, which sit within organisational (institutional) norms, and in turn societal norms (beyond which minority group norms spill)'. However, analysts tend to concentrate on interesting but rather exceptional cases and this may obscure extant similarities and uncontested cases. Therefore, there should be a balance between older views of a pan-human universality and extreme individualistic constructivist positions, where politeness is a hearer-based evaluation to the detriment of the previously powerful speaker. We believe that politeness research today is attempting to achieve that balance.

[10] See Kádár (2013) for an in-depth discussion of the 'middle way' between extreme co-constructionism and cultural norms.

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23

Intercultural (Im)politeness

Michael Haugh and Dániel Z. Kádár

1 Introduction

This chapter explores the relatively understudied area of intercultural (im)politeness. The fact that intercultural (im)politeness has not been a primary focus of (im)politeness researchers may be surprising in light of the fact that culture itself has played an extremely important role in the field since its foundation, albeit one that has been increasingly contested. However, the bulk of such explorations of (im)politeness have been *cross-cultural* rather than *intercultural* by nature. That is, the vast majority of studies have analysed (im)politeness in intracultural settings, and compared such cases across cultural groups, rather than in encounters between interactants with different cultural backgrounds.

There are a number of possible explanations as to why (im)politeness in intercultural settings has been relatively neglected by researchers. One reason is the assumption that communication with others of more or less the same cultural background is the unmarked norm, and that intercultural encounters are somehow less ubiquitous. It is for that reason, perhaps, that a specific

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_23

theory of intercultural (im)politeness has yet to be developed (Haugh 2010; Kecskes 2014), in spite of the fact that theories of intercultural communication abound. However, such an assumption seems out of step with the lived reality of migrants, increasing recognition of the fundamentally multicultural nature of societies, the possibilities afforded by the Internet, and the ever increasing forces of globalisation.

A second, somewhat related reason is that what counts as an intercultural encounter has become increasingly difficult to isolate. Sifianou (2013), for instance, has argued that politeness behaviour in institutional encounters is increasingly following 'international' norms due to the pressures of globalisation. In such cases, the encounters in question may not display any *inter*culturally salient phenomenon, at least not of the sort studied by (im)politeness researchers to date. Consequently, if one places such interactions under the lens of putative cultural differences one risks forcing one's own analytic agenda onto the data studied (Kádár and Haugh 2013).

Third, a highly reductive notion of culture that is associated primarily with nation states has left (im)politeness researchers with an analytical tool that does not do justice to the inevitable complexity of social interaction. The traditional notion of culture and its seemingly natural relationship with nation states, has come under considerable fire in the past few decades. It is broadly accepted in the humanities that culture has many layers (see Clifford's (1988) seminal study). Indeed, people frequently engage in intercultural interaction in their daily lives, often without noticing it: in a sense, asking an administrative colleague to help with an academic matter in a university may be construed as an 'intercultural' request, as different identifiable communities of practice within workplaces tend to have different interactional cultures (however small such differences might seem). Yet if we take such a stance to its natural conclusion, for instance, in the guise of Holliday's (1999) arguments regarding 'small cultures', it leads us to fracturing our analyses to the point that almost any interaction can be regarded, at least in some respects, as intercultural. This might seem, at first glance at least, to provide a theoretical way out of using 'culture' as a generalising concept, as it overturns the traditional assumption that what underpins communication is common ground and that intercultural encounters inevitably give rise to misunderstandings and troubles (Sarangi 1994). However, it ignores the very real ideological power of culture at all levels of groups from small communal groups or communities of practice through to large and diffuse national groupings as a resource for participants (Carbaugh 2012), as well as the manner in which the practices, beliefs, values and so on can vary in systematic ways between

persons that simply cannot all be accounted for at the level of 'small cultures' or 'communities of practice' (Mills 2011).

A fourth, related, reason, is that there still remains considerable theoretical debate amongst scholars about the relationship between culture and the behaviour of members of that culture (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin 2009). In other words, what is the link between the values and beliefs espoused by members of a culture, and the practices through which they constitute their daily lives? In many approaches to date it has been assumed that cultural values translate into cultural norms or schema of behaviour (e.g. Hofstede 1991). However, such an assumption is problematic as abstract cultural values evidently do not readily translate into observable behaviours (McSweeney 2002), and it also ignores the inevitable variability in the actual behaviours of members (Eelen 2001). In our view, an approach to culture, such as that espoused by Hofstede (1991), confounds two potentially distinct objects of analysis. On the one hand, there are regularities in how members *do* and *mean* things in interaction, that is, the ways in which we accomplish and make sense of the social actions, meanings, activities and so on that constitute our daily interactions. On the other hand, there are regularities in the ways in which members *evaluate* those social actions, activities, meanings and so on. We need to be studying such regularities at multiple levels, and examining the extent to which they correlate with the values, beliefs and so on that are both explicitly and implicitly conceptualised by members.

Thus, while overly simplistic generalisations about (im)politeness amongst the Japanese or British speakers of English might be difficult to defend in the face of the fact that there is invariably some degree of variation in how '(im)politeness' is conceptualised and practised amongst members of these respective speech communities, it would be equally naïve to assume that it does not matter for the analysis of (im)politeness what language(s) a person speaks or where they have grown up. (Im)politeness in intercultural encounters is a very real and potentially omnipresent concern for those participants. What is required, then, is not a full-scale abandonment of intercultural (im)politeness as a locus of research, but rather *engagement* with the inevitable complexity of analysing and theorising (im)politeness in such settings. In this chapter, we attempt to do just that.

We begin, in Sect. 2, by discussing some of the key concepts that are relevant to intercultural (im)politeness research, before offering, in Sect. 3, an overview of some the key findings in research to date. We then present, in Sect. 4, two small case studies that highlight key issues in the study of intercultural (im)politeness, before concluding with a brief summary and reflections on possible future directions in the field.

2 Key Concepts

The study of intercultural (im)politeness lies at the intersection of two complex, fundamentally interdisciplinary fields, namely, sociopragmatics and intercultural communication. Given that sociopragmatics is discussed at length in a number of chapters in this volume (see, e.g., Culpeper and Terkourafi (Chap. 2), this volume; Mills (Chap. 3), this volume), we will focus our discussion on the latter. Intercultural communication as a field involves multiple disciplinary strands and a diverse range of theories and approaches, as frequently noted in various handbooks of intercultural communication (e.g. Jackson 2012; Paulston et al. 2012). Thus, rather than attempting to summarise all of these approaches and theories,[1] our discussion here is focused on key concepts in the field of intercultural communication that we consider to be of particular relevance to the study of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters, namely: (1) culture and communication, (2) perspectives, footings and the emic/etic distinction, (3) identities and identification, and (4) adaptation and interculturality.

2.1 Culture and Communication

Intercultural communication as a field lies at the intersection of two concepts that have attracted considerable debate in a wide range of other fields across the humanities and social sciences, namely, 'culture' and 'communication'. The primary site of research is communicative interactions across or between participants who are identified by researchers, and/or identify themselves, as belonging to different cultural groups. The question of what constitutes a cultural group in the context of such encounters was traditionally linked to the nationality and first language of those participants. However, in recent decades a more finely-grained notion of cultural group has emerged. Culture is commonly used to refer to any set of persons who can be classed or categorised as having some kind of association through shared beliefs, values and practices, that is, shared ways of doing things as well as shared ways of interpreting or thinking about things in the world (Scollon and Scollon 1995; Spencer-Oatey 2000). Culture is thus both multilayered, involving various social groupings ranging from family or other communal living groups to communities of practices through to diffuse relational networks, and multifaceted, involving recurrent ways of doing, perceiving and evaluating and so on at all levels of

[1] See Martin et al. (2-012) for a judiciously balanced and very useful overview of the field.

social life. It is through the way in which members are held morally responsible with respect to these recurrent ways of doing, perceiving, evaluating and so on that such social groupings are infused with an ideological ethos.

On this view of culture, nationality and first language (L1) are just some of the grounds for categorising groups of persons, albeit ones that are invested with considerable ideological power. Persons can, of course, be divided into various types of social groupings by both lay and professional analysts. However, it is only in cases where members of a particular social grouping are held normatively accountable to recurrent ways of doing, perceiving, evaluating and so on, thereby infusing this social grouping with an ideological ethos, that it can be analysed as a 'culture', and not merely a social group, both by members themselves and the professional analyst.

From the perspective of (im)politeness research what is critical about the notion of culture is that it offers the *moral* grounds for making such evaluations in the first place (Culpeper 2011; Kádár and Haugh 2013). In other words, without recourse to recurrent, 'seen but unnoticed' ways of going about our everyday lives (Garfinkel 1967), there are no grounds upon which participants may evaluate the talk and conduct of others (and ourselves) as 'good', 'bad', 'appropriate', 'inappropriate', 'polite', 'impolite' and so on (Haugh 2013). The complication in the case of *inter*cultural encounters is that the moral grounds for such evaluations cannot be readily presumed by participants, but must inevitably be negotiated across multiple perspectives. To negotiate such understandings does not mean, however, that participants invariably reach the same understandings. Wolf (2015), for instance, argues that

> the realisation of some anomaly, i.e., of some cultural difference will start the hermeneutic circle of interpretation and reinterpretation, until the partners engaged in an intercultural dialogue will, asymptotically,[2] achieve a degree of mutual understanding, or to use Gadamer's term, a 'fusion of horizons' (Gadamer 1989: 306) […] This process cannot be achieved in singular encounters, but requires continuous intercultural exposure. (p. 448)

In other words, negotiating understandings in intercultural encounters benefits from ongoing exposure to cultural others along with some degree of 'mindfulness' on the part of those participants (Žegarac et al. 2014). This explains seemingly contradictory findings that while in some cases diverging

[2] Asymptotically means, more or less, to approach a value or line but never quite reach it. In other words, in intercultural interaction we might approach very closely some kind of mutual understanding, but such understandings are unlikely to ever be fully aligned between participants. This phenomenon may not be limited, of course, to so-called intercultural interactions.

understandings and practices can lead to interactional discomfort or offence (e.g. Chang and Haugh 2011; Clyne 1994; Holmes et al. 2008; Lee-Wong 2002; Nakane 2006), in other cases participants may attempt to accommodate themselves to the cultural other, thereby accomplishing positive impressions of the other and smoothing over any potential offence (Bubel 2006; House 2008, 2010; Kecskes 2013; Kidwell 2000; Miller 1995; Ryoo 2005).

Such studies also invariably build on various different theoretical approaches to the question of what constitutes culture. In the field of intercultural communication these approaches can be broadly grouped into three interrelated streams: cognitive, interactional and critical. The first stream sees culture as a form of knowledge, and takes what is sometimes termed the 'functionalist' approach to analysing intercultural encounters (Martin et al. 2012). Researchers aim to systematically describe cultural knowledge and how it underpins the degree to which intercultural encounters are perceived to be 'successful' or 'unsuccessful' (Busch 2009). Early work along these lines tended to use methods and approaches from social psychology, in which 'politeness systems' and 'face' are conceptualised and operationalised as possible impediments to successful communication (e.g. Imahori and Cupach 2005; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998). More recent work in pragmatics, particularly that undertaken under the banner of rapport management theory (e.g. Spencer-Oatey 2000; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2003) or intercultural pragmatics (Kecskes 2014), has regarded such knowledge as much more dynamic and individuated. The notion of 'distributed cognition' in cultural linguistics (Sharifian 2011) arguably offers a potentially useful theoretical basis for developing a much more dynamic, cognitively oriented account of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters.

The second stream treats culture as involving practices, that is, recurrent or preferred ways of doing, thinking and categorising people, and takes what is sometimes termed an 'interpretive' approach to analysing intercultural encounters (Scollon et al. 2012). Much of this work has come under the banner of interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1982), although the focus has shifted away from culture as a 'macro-level' category, where it is assumed that membership in a defined cultural group can be readily attributed to participants in intercultural encounters, to one in which the focus is on the ways in which participant signal cultural membership in such encounters. The notion of 'community of practice' (CofP) has taken a central place in accounts of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters (Holmes et al. 2008; Holmes et al. 2012), although, as Marra (2015: 381) points out, there are only a few studies that have actually tracked the development of the practices and putative normative constraints immanent to communities of practice in

analysing (im)politeness. In any case, given intercultural encounters often arise outside of what could legitimately be deemed a community of practice, there remains further theoretical work to be done to anchor the practices that are assumed to underpin evaluations of (im)politeness within a broader account of culture that goes beyond communities of practice (Mills 2011).

The third stream treats culture as an inherently ideological resource for perpetuating power imbalances or inequalities, and takes what is sometimes termed a 'critical' approach to analysing intercultural encounters (Halualani et al. 2009, Holliday 1999; Martin and Nakayama 1999). The primary focus in such approaches is on analysing intercultural encounters as 'site[s] of struggle where various communication meanings are contested within social hierarchies' (Martin et al. 2012: 28). While ideology and power has become an important focus of analysis in broadly discursive accounts of (im)politeness (Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Watts 2003), there has been limited application of such ideas to the analysis of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters to date. Instead, they have been taken up in approaches that explicitly combine interpretive and critical approaches, such as cultural discourse analysis (CuDA) (Carbaugh 2005, 2012), or discursive pragmatics (e.g. Grainger and Mills 2015).

The notion of culture is foundational to the analysis of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters, yet it is a concept that has been the subject of considerable debate. However, whether one elects to treat culture as a form of distributed knowledge, recurrent practices, or hegemonic ideology, one issue that has largely been neglected in such accounts is an account of the *mechanisms* by which such knowledge, practices or ideologies are developed and shared. The theoretical distinction between 'prior context' (rooted in the prior experiences of individuals) and 'actual situational context' (Kecskes 2014) offers one way forward in better understanding such mechanisms at the level of individual intercultural encounters, although it remains to be tested through systematic analysis of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters.

2.2 Warranting Analyses of Encounters as Intercultural

It has sometimes been assumed by researchers in intercultural communication that because participants are from different national or ethnic backgrounds that what ensues is an intercultural interaction. Van der Bom and Mills (2015), for instance, have recently argued that cultural norms in intercultural interactions are 'discursively negotiated' (p. 191). Their argument is based on their finding that in an interaction where three participants in the interaction identify themselves as Dutch and another as Italian, evaluations of

(im)politeness are evidently negotiated by them rather than being dictated by their different cultural backgrounds. While it is made abundantly clear that these evaluations of (im)politeness are indeed discursively accomplished, it is not so clear what makes those sequences in question intercultural as opposed to simply interpersonal. Indeed, nowhere in their analysis is the notion of culture (or cultural resources, practices and so on) actually discussed. Yet without doing so, the analyst runs the risk of treating an encounter as an intercultural one when there is little evidence to support the assumption that culture is in fact being manifested in that particular interaction. It is thus important, in our view, for the analyst to provide a warrant for their analysis of the interaction in question as one which is *intercultural*, as opposed to constituting an interpersonal one, that is, between two or more persons. The study of intercultural (im)politeness involves analysing how different cultural resources and practices are invoked or brought to bear by participants in the accomplishment of evaluations of (im)politeness. To examine intercultural (im)politeness, then, requires an additional layer of analysis where the researcher offers a clear warrant for his or her assumption that we are in fact dealing with an intercultural encounter.

One approach to warranting our analyses of (im)politeness as intercultural in nature is to draw from the orientations of the participants themselves to issues of culture or cultural group membership in the course of that interaction (Miller 1995), or in subsequent interactions. In the latter case, these may be naturally occurring or elicited by the researcher through post-facto interviews (Günthner 2000; House 2008; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2003). A second approach is to attempt to triangulate the findings from interactional analyses with findings from ethnographic work, including such methods as participant observation, interviews or questionnaires, document analysis and so on, carried out at the site where the data were collected (Bailey 1997; Lee-Wong 2002; Miller 1995). A third approach is to elicit evaluations of interactions from lay observers who identify themselves with different cultural groups about the encounter in question (Chang and Haugh 2011). While there are likely to be yet other approaches, what is critical for (im)politeness researchers is not simply to assume that because participants evidently identify with different cultural groups that the interaction that ensues is, by definition, intercultural.

Yet no matter which approach is taken to warranting one's analysis of an encounter as one that is (potentially) intercultural, it is important for the researcher to always bear in mind the observer's paradox (Labov 1972). While this is generally understood to refer to the way in which the systematic collection of data by researchers can influence the actions or behaviours of those being observed, there is another additional layer that needs to be borne

in mind in the case of studying intercultural (im)politeness: the way in which the cultural background of the observing researcher can influence his or her interpretations of what is being accomplished by those participants. Ramírez-Cruz (2017), for instance, found that in course of ongoing ethnographic observations of a taco stand in Pittsburgh, USA, the Hispanic researcher perceived significantly more friendly stances on the part of customers (both Hispanic and White Americans) than the Anglo-American researcher (31.4% as opposed to 12.7%). What we are dealing with here, then, is the potential for observer bias, something which is particularly acute in the case of studies of (im)politeness, in which the object of study is inherently subjective, that is, rooted in the perspectives of persons rather than being objectively verifiable independent of those persons.

2.3 Perspectives, Footings and the Emic/Etic Distinction

The emic/etic distinction revolves around issues of claimed, assumed or perceived membership in cultural groups, and the different perspectives on talk and conduct vis-à-vis (im)politeness that can arise therein. An *emic* perspective represents how cultural insiders or members understand things, while an *etic* perspective stands for the understandings of a cultural outsider (Pike 1967). In linguistic anthropology, an etic perspective is typically taken to be that of the researcher (Harris 1976), but in intercultural encounters it also represents the perspective of the cultural 'other'.[3] Thus, while these notions have been popularised in (im)politeness research more broadly in Eelen's (2001) seminal work, they arguably have particular importance when researching (im)politeness in intercultural encounters at both the interactional and metapragmatic levels of analysis (Kádár and Haugh 2013).

In the course of an intercultural encounter, while one's evaluations of one's own talk is grounded in an emic perspective (whether one is talking about Mead's [1934] individuated perspective on self, the 'I', or the perspective of the 'generalised other' on self, the 'me'), one's evaluations of the others' talk or conduct is grounded in an etic perspective from the perspective of that other

[3] While the term 'emic' is consistently used in the literature to refer to an 'insider/member's' perspective, there is some variation in how the term 'etic' is deployed. In many studies it is considered to be synonymous with a 'scientific' perspective, given that in anthropology an outsider's perspective was traditionally synonymous with that of the researcher. For reasons we outline below, however, we use the term 'etic' in Pike's broader sense to refer simply to an outsider/non-member's perspective.

participant, and vice-versa. To illustrate what we mean by that, let us consider the following intercultural apology discussed by Chang and Haugh (2011).[4]

(1) (Joyce has called Wayne after he did not turn up to a pre-arranged dinner)[5]

```
13 W:  it's just, a:h, I really apologise for not getting back
14     to you the other day but we couldn't make it?
                                          [move 1: apology]
15 J:  oh, that's okay. yeah, yeah, yeah. I- I just
16     thought oh probably you are busy with something
17     so you ah probably were easy to- to (0.2)
18     for(hhh)get it.                    [move 2: absolution]
19 W:  yeah we were pretty busy actually?
                                          [move 3: response to absolution]
```

While the apology emerged as part of a longer interaction, for the sake of simplicity we focus here on only the apology sequence proper. In the excerpt above, there are three basic sequential moves: (1) the apology itself, (2) the response of the apology-recipient to the apology, and (3) the response of the apology-producer to the apology-recipient's response to the apology. The participants can thus be analysed as taking up distinct footings (Goffman 1981) in that sequence, that is, their interactional alignments with respect to the social actions within that sequence (Haugh and Chang 2015), such as apology-producer, apology-recipient, and so on.

Given these distinct footings, each of these three sequential moves arguably has the potential to occasion two distinct evaluative perspectives.[6]

a. Wayne's evaluation of his apology (emic) **[move 1]**
b. Joyce's evaluation of Wayne's apology (etic)
c. Joyce's evaluation of her absolution (emic) **[move 2]**
d. Wayne's evaluation of Joyce's absolution (etic)
e. Wayne's evaluation of his response to Joyce's absolution (emic) **[move 3]**
f. Joyce's evaluation of Wayne's response to her absolution (etic)

If we take into account each participant's likely inferences about the other's evaluations of their conduct the situation becomes even more complex:

[4] In the previous section, we discussed the various ways in which the analyst can warrant their treatment of an encounter as an *intercultural* one (in which emic/etic perspectives are salient) as opposed to simply an *interpersonal* one. In Chang and Haugh's (2011) study, this warrant was grounded in evaluations of the apology elicited from Australian and Taiwanese informants.

[5] This example has been transcribed using standard CA transcription conventions (Jefferson 2004).

[6] We say potential because it is not necessarily the case that any interaction involving participants from different cultural backgrounds involves an interplay of emic/etic perspectives, but only those where it is demonstrably an intercultural—as opposed to simply an interpersonal—encounter.

a'. Joyce's inference about Wayne's evaluation of his apology (etc) **[move 1]**
b'. Wayne's inference about Joyce's evaluation of his apology (etc)
(and so on…)

What we see, then, is that there is an entwining of emic and etic perspectives on the talk and conduct of both self and other, which is here constitutive of the interaction as one that is *inter*cultural.[7] The point for the analyst, then, is not simply *whose* perspective we are dealing with (i.e. Wayne or Joyce), but *whose* perspective on *whose* talk or conduct (i.e. Wayne on Wayne, Wayne on Joyce, Joyce on Joyce, Joyce on Wayne), and also the *moral grounds* of the evaluation in question (i.e. emic or etic). For that reason it is of particular importance in analysing (im)politeness in intercultural encounters to distinguish between the footings of those participants themselves (e.g. apology-producer versus apology-recipient), and the emic–etic perspectives they bring to bear on their evaluations of their respective social actions. It is for that reason that the notions of perspective and 'perspectivising' (ten Thije 2006) are critical to analysing and theorising intercultural (im)politeness.

Stance taking and evaluating in intercultural communication are also strongly interconnected with issues of morality and immorality at the metapragmatic level. Observing others from an etic perspective entails framing the behaviour of others from one's own moral perspective, through the lenses of moral values, that is, one's own perception of how things 'should be'.[8] However, while emic understandings of the moral order are immanent to social practice, they generally remain tacit for the very reason that the 'familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others' that underpin it are, by right of being 'perceivedly normal courses of action', and so 'taken for granted' (Garfinkel 1967: 35). An important exception to this is the case of ritual (see Terkourafi and Kádár (Chap. 8), in the present volume), which maintains the moral order in a way that is highly salient from an insider perspective. Tacit understandings of the moral order tend to be reflected by references to moral values, in particular, in cases when such understandings are breached (Garfinkel 1967) or challenged, and people's moral values surface in the form of metapragmatic comments (Haugh and Kádár forthcoming; Kádár and Haugh 2013).[9]

[7] The inferences we make as analysts about the likely evaluations of each participant are licensed through examining both the design of the turn that implements the action in question as well as the subsequent response to that prior action (Haugh 2015a; Mitchell and Haugh, 2015).

[8] It is pertinent to note that morality in Whutnow's (1989) sense is where interactants associate what they perceive as violations of moral order with moves to restore the moral order, and so the concept of punitive action is an important part of this theory (see Kádár and Márquez Reiter [2015] for further discussion).

[9] While this sort of 'surfacing' of moral values is not limited to instances of intercultural communication, the potential for an interplay of emic and etic perspectives in intercultural encounters does perhaps increase the possibility that there will be observable breaches of the moral order.

Notably, in the case of intercultural or intergroup encounters such comments often involve what might be for the producer an evaluation rooted in his or her own emic perspective, but for the target or recipient is one rooted in a fundamentally etic perspective. Consider the following excerpts from a YouTube discussion board on a short film dedicated to the question of whether Chinese tourists are rude or not.[10] Not surprisingly, this discussion generated considerable intergroup debate, with many of these comments involving some form of moralising. While the majority of Westerner commenters claimed that Chinese tourists are indeed rude, a number of Chinese and Western commenters argued that this very evaluative attitude is itself immoral. For example, a Western commenter Julius Machinebacon noted that the way in which one perceives Chinese behaviour depends on how one 'treats them'.

(2)
Nothing to do with the country. It is a question of education (no, I don't necessarily mean school or university, but how the parents have nurtured their children). […] Apart from the rising patriotism (without actually looking at the facts in history) I have found living with Chinese people quite pleasant. And this mostly depends on how I see and treat them: not looking down upon them. (Julius Machinebacon)

Making reference to 'properly treating others' itself involves a moral appeal, and so this statement also implies that those who make negative and overgeneralising comments about the Chinese are themselves committing an immoral act. In a similar manner, Austin Wu, a Chinese commenter, makes an appeal to morality in evaluating those evaluating Chinese tourists as rude as themselves rude.

(3) Why you gotta be so rude, don't you know we are human too, I'm from China :) (Austin Wu)

It is thus apparent that evaluations of the talk and conduct of others, in particular, those accomplished through metapragmatic comments, are themselves a form of social action (Haugh 2013; Kádár and Haugh 2013). It is for this reason that evaluations of (im)politeness, especially in intercultural or intergroup encounters, can be challenged on moral grounds.

[10] The recordings and subsequent discussion board were accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LPPTCS1QXc.

2.4 Identities and Identification

It is now firmly established that the perceived, claimed or attributed identities of participants are central to evaluations of (im)politeness (Blitvich 2013; Kádár and Haugh 2013; Locher 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2005). It is by indicating what I think of you (i.e. your *person*) through my talk or conduct that evaluations of that talk or conduct as '(im)polite' may arise (Haugh and Hinze 2003). There is, however, an additional layer involved in the case of encounters that are recognisably intercultural ones, as understandings of the cultural identities of participants may also enter into evaluations of (im)politeness in a number of ways:

1. interactants can construct culturally situated identities vis-à-vis a choice of (im)polite language use that indexes such identities;
2. they can discuss such choices in the form of post-event metadiscourses;
3. and also they can make metapragmatic comments about (claimed or perceived) (im)politeness.

Similar to the notion of culture, however, the notion of identity has been theorised in a number of different ways (see Blitvich and Sifianou (Chap. 10), this volume, for a useful overview).

While early work treated cultural identities as something that could be straightforwardly ascribed by the analyst, recent work has moved away from treating identities as relatively stable constructs towards a more dynamic account of *identification*, that is, the processes by which multiple situated identities are projected, negotiated and contested in interaction by participants (Bucholtz 1999; Benwell and Stokoe 2006). In the case of intercultural encounters, then, the question is not 'what is a person's cultural identity', but rather, 'how do people construct/re-present their cultural identity' (Dervin 2012: 186), and, in particular, what are the roles of stereotyping and 'othering' (that is, 'objectification of another person or group' in such a way that 'puts aside and ignores the complexity and subjectivity of the individual' [Dervin 2012: 187]). In intercultural encounters, interactants may use understandings of 'cultural identities' as a discursive resource (Thornborrow 2002), that is, as a means to influence or even manipulate their interlocutor's stances. In arguments between intercultural couples (Goncalves 2013), for instance, one party's impolite attitude may be construed as culturally normative, and the spouse thereby positioned as an 'outsider' who does not have sufficient command of the language/culture to properly evaluate the given attitude.

In the case of intercultural encounters, two identification processes of particular importance are those of 'association' and 'disassociation' (Bucholtz 1999). Association emphasises similarity, while disassociation emphasises difference. They often become most salient when a non-member, that is, someone positioned as a cultural 'outsider' relative to a particular relational network, attempts to associate him or herself with members or 'insiders' of that network. The question of what counts as dissociation or association is thus unavoidably relative, as it depends on the nature of a given relational network, and how individuals position themselves, or are positioned, as members or non-members.

Consider the following excerpt from an encounter between DK (who is of Hungarian nationality but recently arrived to a permanent position at a university in the north of England) and SL (a local from Yorkshire).

(4)
DK: Well *dun*, as *we* Yorkshire people say!
SL: ((smiles and amiably hits DK's shoulder))

The focus of association here is a regional group (i.e. Yorkshire) within a nation, rather than the nation per se (i.e. Britain). This interaction took place between one of the authors Dániel Kádár and his acquaintance SL in Yorkshire. Upon congratulating his acquaintance on an achievement, Kádár switched to a Yorkshire accent by pronouncing *done* as *dun*, and also markedly emphasised his association with a Yorkshire identity through metapragmatically positioning himself as a member—albeit temporarily in this locally, situated interaction—through using an inclusive 'we' pronoun. The reaction of SL seems to us to indicate that SL, who is a native of Yorkshire, receives DK's attempt at associating, that is, as identifying with SL's cultural group as a (new) co-member, albeit temporally, positively (although SL may well have been humouring DK). What is important to note here, in particular, is that DK's attempt at associating, that is, as identifying with SL's cultural group as a new member, is open to evaluation as 'friendly' and thus 'polite', on the one hand, but 'overly presumptuous' and thus potentially 'impolite' on the other. Identities, and processes of identification, are thus central to evaluations of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters. While in the excerpt above, DK's use of 'in-group' language was received positively, the very same attempt may give rise to offence on other occasions, a point we shall explore in more detail in the first case study in Sect. 4.

2.5 Accommodation and Interculturality

One further set of theoretical notions relevant to the analysis of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters was briefly alluded to in the previous section, namely, that of cultural accommodation and interculturality. Accommodation, or what Kim (2012) refers to as 'adaptability' in the context of (ongoing) intercultural contact, refers to the ways in which 'individuals who, upon relocating to an unfamiliar cultural environment, strive to establish and maintain a relatively stable, reciprocal and functional relationship with the[ir] environment' (Kim 2012: 233), both in the short term (e.g. sojourners) and in the long term (e.g. immigrants). In example (4), which we discussed in the previous section, DK is not only at that moment explicitly adopting the local accent and claiming co-membership, thereby demonstrating a willingness to adapt himself in order to establish relationships in the community, the two participants are co-constructing a hybrid intercultural or 'third' space (Kramsch 1993) where what DK is doing in identifying himself in this way at this moment in time is 'open to translation, negotiation, resignification' (Kramsch and Uryu 2012: 218). That is to say, over time such moves by DK may be accepted, resisted or even challenged by those self-identifying (and identified by DK) as locals. The cultural identities of immigrants are invariably complex and continuously shaped in a dynamic intercultural space, and issues of (im)politeness and offence are one of the focal loci of processes of intercultural adaptation (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin 2009). It is worth noting, however, that such hybrid third spaces may also constitute a site of 'difference and contestation' (Kramsch and Uryu 2012: 213) in intergroup or intercultural encounters, although this is a point that has yet to be explored in empirical studies of intercultural (im)politeness.

Yet even as one can talk of adaptation to perceived local norms there are also contradictory movements towards increased globalisation or internationalisation of what can be perceived as '(im)polite' (Sifianou 2013). Indeed, the issue of what counts as '(im)polite' in a lingua franca encounter, that is, where none of the participants identifies or is identified as an L1 speaker of the language in question, poses considerable challenges for current theories of (im)politeness. As Kecskes (2014) has argued, what counts as '(im)polite' in English lingua franca (ELF) interactions is negotiated by those participants. The question such a position raises, however, is on what basis are such understandings negotiated? An evaluation of (im)politeness necessarily involves invoking some sort of moral grounds for that evaluation. In the case of interactions in which English is the lingua franca (ELF), questions arise as to what those

moral grounds are and how they are co-constituted. Are the participants' perceived understandings of (im)politeness grounded in what they might expect L1 speakers of particular varieties of English to do, or are they grounded in an hybrid space where a variety of (sometimes contradictory) norms are mixed or conflated? Drawing on a distinction between participants' understandings and the various emic/etic footings in which these understandings may be situated, arguably offers some way forward to addressing the complex nature of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters.

3 Approaches in Intercultural (Im)politeness Research

The study of (im)politeness in intercultural encounters has followed a trajectory that has been more or less the inverse of that of studies of (im)politeness in cross-cultural settings. While (im)politeness research as a field initially focused primarily on politeness, and only in the past decade has moved to consider impoliteness (see Culpeper and Hardaker (Chap. 9), this volume), and even more recently the realm of 'mixed messages', including mock impoliteness, mock politeness and so on (see Culpeper, Haugh and Sinkeviciute (Chap. 13), this volume), the study of intercultural (im)politeness has witnessed the opposite trend. In the latter case, while most researchers initially focused on analysing instances of 'unintended impoliteness' or 'failed politeness', in recent years there has been a shift towards examining instances of 'politeness' in intercultural encounters. This broadening of the focus of studies of intercultural (im)politeness reflects the more general shift in the field of intercultural communication away from conceptualising intercultural interaction as inevitably a site of misunderstanding or misapprehension (Sarangi 1994; Bührig and ten Thije 2006). Making note of such paradigm shifts should not, however, be taken as implying that more recent studies are somehow superior to earlier ones. Our view is that whether one focuses on 'unintended impoliteness', 'politeness' or 'genuine impoliteness' in intercultural encounters, or whether one's focus is intercultural encounters in which there are both first language and additional language speakers, or alternatively lingua franca settings, there remains significant unfinished business. Our aim in this section is to briefly outline some of the key studies of intercultural (im)politeness to date, with a view to highlighting both what progress has been made in the field, and what significant gaps nevertheless remain.

Much of the effort of researchers has been directed towards the ways in which differences in speech practices and situation-specific expectations can give rise to (unintended) offence or interactional troubles (Haugh 2010: 143–150). Such cases have generally been analysed as forms of 'unintended impoliteness' or 'failed politeness' (e.g. Bailey 1997; Clyne 1994; Grainger 2011; Günthner 2000; Holmes et al. 2008; Lee-Wong 2002; Miller 1995; Nakane 2006; Ting-Toomey 2009; Tyler 2009). Divergences in the speech practices and expectations of participants in intercultural encounters is traditionally assumed to be a function of pragmatic transfer, that is, where lexical items, syntactic structures or pragmatic routines that are preferred in one language are used (or not used) in another.

Yet as Inagaki (2011) notes, issues of understanding in intercultural encounters are sometimes much more complex than might be illuminated through a singular focus on pragmatic failure. What may also be involved is the participants' own history of experiences and concomitant values and presumptions, which underlies both how they interpret and how they evaluate the talk and conduct of others and themselves. In other words, what gives rise to offence in the intercultural encounter in question may not be divergences in the practices of those participants per se, but instead a deeper form of misunderstanding (Haugh 2008: 219–24), in which what is involved is not a 'wrong' understanding or 'lack of understanding' (*malentendu* or *méconnaissance*), but rather an inability to understand the other's perspective (*mésentente*) (Rancière 1999). A number of studies have focused on the ways in which participants take offence at the conduct of cultural others, and yet remain unaware of the deeper misunderstandings that underpin these perceptions of impoliteness (e.g. Chang and Haugh 2011; Haugh 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2002; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2000; Wang and Spencer-Oatey 2015).

More recently, a number of studies have focused on the ways in which participants in intercultural encounters may also accomplish perceptions of each other as 'polite' and 'friendly' (e.g. Bubel 2006; House 2008, 2010; Miller 1995, 2000; Ryoo 2005). House (2008, 2010), for instance, has argued that what might be evaluated as 'impolite' by first-language speakers of English is not treated as such by speakers of English as an additional language in situations where English is being used as a lingua franca. These studies indicate that in examining (im)politeness in intercultural encounters it is important to remember that what is evaluated as (im)polite is ultimately locally negotiated by those participants, rather than simply being a function of putative or presumed cultural norms.

In examining the literature on intercultural (im)politeness it is striking to note that most of the studies to date have focused on institutional encounters

(see also Holmes and Schnurr (Chap. 24), this volume), that is, (im)politeness in the workplace or in service encounters, rather than in everyday intercultural interactions amongst acquaintances, friends or family. Moreover, most studies have focused on intercultural (im)politeness in interactions where English is the primary language. Unlike cross-cultural (im)politeness research, where a wide range of languages (and language varieties) have been studied, the focus in intercultural (im)politeness research has been primarily on English. This reflects, in part, the extent to which English dominates intercultural encounters worldwide, yet it is not by any means the only language in the world through which intercultural encounters may be negotiated. A third notable gap is that the focus of intercultural (im)politeness research has primarily been on face-to-face encounters. There has been little research that has focused on intercultural (im)politeness in digitally-mediated forms of communication (see Graham and Hardaker (Chap. 30), this volume), with the exception of studies of intercultural (im)politeness in email (e.g. Bjørge 2007; Stroińska and Cecchetto 2013). This is perhaps surprising given the extent to which the internet affords intergroup encounters to a degree and scope that were simply unimaginable even a few decades ago. Part of the problem for the researchers is, of course, establishing the extent to which digitally mediated interactions can be analysed as interpersonal, intergroup or intercultural in nature, as in many such interactions the background of participants is not readily accessible (either to the other participants or the researcher). Yet intergroup conflicts mediated through various forms of digital communication are clearly on the rise (Kádár et al. 2013; Lorenzo-Dus et al. 2011; Perelmutter 2013). It thus appears to be an area ripe for further analysis and theorisation that will enrich our understanding of intercultural (im)politeness more generally.

4 Case Studies

4.1 Taking Offence in Intergroup Encounters

As we have pointed out, much of the focus in intercultural (im)politeness research has been on the ways in which what or how something is said or done may give rise to (unintended) offence or perceptions of impoliteness in intercultural encounters. It has been increasingly acknowledged, however, that what is of paramount importance in intercultural interactions is not the cultural identities that might be ascribed to the participants by the researcher, but rather the cultural identities the participants themselves co-construct. A key focus of attention should thus arguably be not simply on what or how

something was said or done, but on *who* said or did it, and the ways in which evaluations of (im)politeness can arise through participants construing the interaction, at least at that point in time, as an *inter*group one.

To illustrate what we mean by this claim, we focus on a conversation from the UK version of *Big Brother* that generated considerable controversy when it was broadcast in June 2007. The interaction in question involved three housemates, Emily Parr, Charley Uchea and Nicky Maxwell. We focus here first on what occasioned the controversy leading to Emily being removed from the house, namely, Emily calling Charley a 'nigger' after Charley has been relating her worries about being pregnant.[11]

(5a) Big Brother Season 8, 6 June 2007

```
1   C:  I ↑hope I'm not pregnant I feel (like)
2       (0.8)
3  ():  ohh:.
4       (.)
5   E:  you're ↑pushing it a:ren't you nig↓ger.
6       [°hh oh I just called you a nigger° ((breathy))
7   C:  [hh hh hh oh
8   N:  .hh oh
9   E:  £I'm so-£ [hh    hh    hh    hh         ]
10  C:            [>you're in trouble for tha:t<]
11  N:            [oh Emily I can't             ] believe=
12  E:  =[hh hh hh hh [ hh hh]
13  N:  =[you ↑said   [tha:t ]
14  C:                [you're] in ↑trouble
15  N:  ((sniffs))
16  E:  ↑do:n't >↓don't make a big thing out of it then<.
17  C:  you:'re in [°trouble° ]
18  E:             [I was ↑jo:]k↓ing
19  C:  I know you were but you (are [in some] shivy) shit
20  E:                               [°oh: ° ]
```

What becomes immediately apparent in the subsequent turns is that this is treated by all three participants as a moral transgression. The transgression in question is not simply the use of a racial slur (Croom 2011), but that it has been directed by a white participant (Emily) towards a black participant (Charley). However, the transgression is construed in different ways by the three participants. Emily immediately construes it as a 'slip' (line 6), and then launches what is possibly an aborted apology that dissolves into laughter (line 9), and then claims to have been 'joking' (line 18). The latter represents

[11] A recording of the incident in question was accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7qZqXDbPS8 [now blocked on copyright grounds]. It has been transcribed using standard CA transcription conventions (Jefferson 2004).

an attempt to divert moral culpability for using the slur in question as a slur (Allan 2015) by claiming non-serious intent (Haugh 2016b). While Charley acknowledges this latter claim to non-serious intent (line 19), she repeatedly asserts that Emily is 'in trouble' for saying it (lines 10, 14, 17, 19). Nicky also expresses disbelief (lines 11, 13), thereby construing it as a serious transgression given it defies what is expectable (and thus appropriate) conduct.

Charley subsequently makes it clear that in her view the problem is not with the use of the term per se, but its use by Emily, as can be observed in the following excerpt.

(5b)

```
46 C: .hh: °(fancy )you saying ↑tha:t
47    go:rm[less°            ]
48 N:       [°°I can't believe] you said th(hh)at hh°°=
49 E: =↑SOmeone's already used that word in this
50    ↓house?=
51 C: =>no: wa:y yea:h ↑me< (0.3) I'm a nigger
52    (0.3)
53 N: pf[f hh hh]
54 C:    [I am   ] one (.) .hh (.) ↑fancy you:
55    saying ↓it
```

In claiming the slur is something that she is able to use in reference to herself (line 51), but not something she expects Emily to say (lines 46, 54–55), Charley is not only ascribing the slur a property of sayability (i.e. it is something that can be used by some persons but not others), she is construing the exchange itself as an *intergroup* one. That is, Emily is cast here as a cultural 'other', a non-member of the group in which using the slur is acceptable, a categorisation which had not been oriented to as relevant by those participants up until that point in their conversation.

There is, of course, another layer to this particular episode in that the participants orient to the fact that their conversation is being broadcast and thus likely 'overhead' by a (ratified) viewing audience (Dynel 2011; Haugh 2013). When Charley explicitly claims Emily is 'in trouble' this constitutes an allusion to that participation framework, as the persons with whom she is 'in trouble' are, of course, the viewing audience and the producers of the show. In other words, the use of the slur by Emily will be offensive to them.

Notably, Charley herself treats the taking of offence herself as a sensitive social action (Haugh 2015b). In the following excerpt, Charley first explicitly construes Emily's use of the term as indexing a 'racist' attitude (lines 83–84).

(5c)

```
83 C: ↑what ↑made you sa:y that though
84    that is a bit racist ↓Em innit?=
85 N: =↑what ↑made you just pop ↑out with ↓it
86 E: [oh: I:  ]
87 C: [you nig-] (.) sorry I'm in ↑shock (.)
88    I rec[kon        ]
89 E:      [are you not] of↑fen↓ded.
90    (0.4)
91 C: well ↑no: not rea:l[↓ly ] but=
92 E:                    [no:.]
93 C: =bli:[me:y      ]
94 N:      [she ↑might]'ve been? (0.8) but she's ↓no:↑t
95    (0.4)
96 C: yea:h.
```

Nicky goes on to construe this as inviting an account from Emily as to why she used the term (lines 85). However, rather than completing any such account (line 86), Emily asks whether Charley is 'offended' (line 89), thereby implicitly acknowledging that Charley may well be. Notably, Charley's denial is non-straightforward (line 91), and ends with an expression of surprise (line 93), while Nicky offers that Charley could legitimately have felt offended but didn't in this case (line 94). In that way, they jointly resist Emily's construal of her possible feelings of offence as something that is straightforwardly deniable (cf. line 92). Overall, then, the participants orient to the taking of offence as a sensitive social action. This may well be partly because straightforwardly doing so might undermine the relational connection (Arundale 2006) they have established in the house thus far. There are also possible self-presentation issues at play here, especially given Charley is aware that her response is likely being—or to be—observed by the viewing audience.

While in this brief analysis we have focused on a somewhat complex case in which construing an interaction as an intergroup encounter proffers, in part at least, the grounds for taking offence, the opposite may, of course, hold true. That is to say, participants may construe some talk or conduct that is open to evaluation as 'impolite' as not actually 'impolite' because it involves an 'unintended slip' by a cultural other, following what Firth (1996) refers to as the 'let it pass' principle. On that basis, is also possible that in some instances construing oneself as the cultural 'other' licenses talk or conduct that would otherwise attract social sanction. Our point, then, is that construing an interaction as an intercultural or intergroup one may itself licence evaluations of (im)politeness.

4.2 Metalexemes in Intercultural Contact

Given the focus on intercultural encounters in English and evaluations of 'politeness' or 'impoliteness' in most studies to date, we have elected to focus here in our second case study on examining the ways in which metalexemes that represent phenomena with (im)polite implications—such as 'booing', 'jousting' or 'heckling'—are translated into other languages.[12] The term 'metalexeme' refers to words that are used about (im)politeness-related phenomena, and as such can be distinguished from other words and expressions. An examination of such metalexemes has not only revealed that many of the English technical terms that are used in the realm of (im)politeness research have very different pragmatic implications in other languages,[13] but also that many of these metalexical 'synonyms' across languages have come into existence through intercultural contact and subsequent appropriation. This case study is thus somewhat different from the previous one, in that it represents intercultural contact at a macro-level. Essentially, it shows the ways in which a certain (im)politeness-related phenomenon is appropriated in a new cultural context. We believe that this is an important dimension of intercultural (im)politeness, which should be discussed in order to demonstrate that: (a) intercultural research is useful in order to understand differences between the culture-specific meanings of seemingly 'technical' metalexemes such as 'heckling'; and (b) to illustrate that an intercultural perspective is useful for capturing particular elements of macro-level cultural contact.

In order to illustrate this point, let us focus on 'heckling'. Heckling describes a situation in which an unratified person decides to interrupt a public talk, and as such it is a pragmatic phenomenon with clear potential for evaluation as 'impolite'. In Chinese, there is no single equivalent for the metalexeme 'heckling': it is referred to by two metalexemes *zhiwen* 质问 (interrogate) and *qihong* 起哄 (make loud noises), which are used in a seemingly interchangeable way when it comes to heckling incidents. Examples (6) and (7) illustrate this point:

(6)
奥巴马演讲韩籍学生激烈质问
Oubama yanjiang zao Han-ji xuesheng jilie zhiwen
Obama's talk was violently heckled by a Korean national student
(Retrieved from: http://news.qq.com/a/20131126/011972.htm)

[12] This case study forms part of a larger project presented in Kádár (2017) and Kádár and Ran (2015).

[13] See also Haugh (2016a) for discussion of the challenges of the use of English as a scientific metalanguage in '(Im)politeness' research.

(7)
奥巴马演讲遭起哄
Oubama yanjiang zao qihong
Obama's talk has been heckled
(Retrieved from: http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzA4MjkyNDI4.html)

Yet, while seemingly referring to the same thing, it is well established that (meta)lexical 'synonyms' are unlikely to have exactly the same meaning, as context, style and other factors influence why a given lexeme is chosen (Schreyer 1976). Kádár (2017) has thus examined the relationship between *zhiwen*/*qihong* and the act of heckling, as well as the way in which these metalexemes are used to frame foreign heckling incidents.

Historical research, which we only describe briefly here, has shown that variants of *zhiwen* and *qihong* were not used in the sense of 'heckling' before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Kádár 2017). More precisely, the Chinese used *qihong* to describe the interruption of public performances of art and entertainment, that is, they had a 'native' lexeme for heckling, with a relatively limited interpretation compared to the meaning of the English metalexeme. This changed as the Chinese adopted the British parliamentary system in the 1910s. Suddenly parliamentary debates emerged, and they adopted 'heckling' in the sense used in the UK at that time: asking challenging questions from a ratified position. Thus, in the 1910s the Chinese directly borrowed an English term, to coin heckling metalexemes for two different contexts: *zhiwen* for politics, and *qihong* for arts. This gradually changed in the 1940s to 1950s when *zhiwen* appeared first in the sense of interruption, and subsequently in the 1950s to 1960s when *zhiwen* and *qihong* were both used to describe heckling in politics. At the same time *qihong* remains the only lexeme for sports and arts heckling.

The historical background of *zhiwen* and *qihong* points towards a key difference between their modern meanings as forms of heckling: data shows that *zhiwen* refers to serious, rightful and potentially 'moral' acts of heckling, primarily in the context of politics, whilst *qihong* refers to 'non-serious' and/or 'immoral' heckling acts in both politics and other areas such as sports and arts. Thus, in Chinese, due to the moral implications associated with heckling, the choice of *zhiwen* vs. *qihong* involves taking an explicit attitudinal stance with respect to the perceived 'morality' of the 'heckling' in question (Bednarek 2008; Haddington 2012). This means that a foreign heckling incident, for example, cannot be reported without the translator taking an explicitly positive or negative attitudinal stance towards it. This also implies that in academic and popular discourse we are potentially talking about different

phenomena when we discuss 'heckling' in English and Chinese. This challenges the common assumption that academic studies of (im)politeness phenomena use technical terms that capture the same phenomena across different language and cultures (Haugh 2016a; Kádár and Paternoster 2015). This does not mean that we cannot or should not use technical terms in the field, but that we should be aware of the fact that these technical terms may have very different implications across languages and cultures. In other words, if we use English as an academic language, it is important to attempt to broaden the meanings of technical terms (aka metalexemes), in order for them to include various culture-specific implications (Haugh and Kádár forthcoming; Kádár 2017).

In order to illustrate what we mean, let us provide two examples which represent the way in which foreign heckling events are reported in Chinese media, which reveal that *zhiwen* and *qihong* convey the authors' stances on the event being reported:

(8)
奥巴马发表讲话遭打断 男子气势汹汹对其质问 当地时间2014年7月24日,美国洛杉矶,奥巴马在洛杉矶贸易技术学院中就经济问题表讲话。一些民众拉横幅或手持标牌抗议奥巴马遣返非法移民[…]其间,一名男子气势汹汹的打断奥巴马的讲话对其提出质问,随后该名男子被安保人员带离现场。
'Obama's speech is being interrupted: A young man truculently heckles him
24.07.2014, Los Angeles: Obama held a presentation on economics at the Los Angeles School of Business and Economics. A few persons held up a banner that expressed opposition against Obama's [plan of] deporting of illegal immigrants […] A young man truculently interrupted Obama's speech and heckled him, and following this he was removed by the security personnel.' (Retrieved from *Zhongguo ribao* 中国日报 *China Daily*)

(9)
奥巴马演讲耶鲁学生起哄 总统发飙怒指干扰者
Obama's speech is heckled by a student from Yale University—The president angrily points his finger at the intruder
(Retrieved from *Zhongqing wanbao* 重庆晚报 *Chongqing Evening News*)

A comparison of examples (8) and (9) reveals that *zhiwen* in the first and *qihong* in the second represent different attitudinal stances. The author of example (8) appears to be on the side of the protesters: they use the idiomatic expression *qishi-xiongxiong* (气势汹汹) truculently in reference to the young heckler's behaviour; this idiom has positive overtones in Chinese as it has connotations of the protester's braveness. Also, the author does not use any

honorific title for Obama and, on the non-linguistic level the article shows a photo of the protesters. Example (9), on the other hand, describes the heckler as an 'intruder' (*ganraozhe* 干扰者), refers to Obama with the deferential 'President' *zongtong* (总统); on the non-linguistic level it shows an appealing photo of Obama who points to the heckler with a determined face. Note that while the word 'angrily' may imply for Western readers that Obama lost his temper, in the Chinese context, when it comes to discussion about politicians, the expression of anger tends to appear as morally justifiable action, i.e. it adds to the positive image of Obama in this particular context. To sum up, this section has illustrated that foreign heckling incidents cannot be 'objectively' reported in Chinese (although one wonders whether there is such a thing as objective translation), simply because in Chinese the two major heckling metalexemes imply different attitudinal stances. This imposes restraints on the appropriation of foreign heckling notions in Chinese metadiscourses. Even more importantly, this case study has demonstrated that issues of interculturality and hybridity permeate even the very metalexicon that we use in (im)politeness research.

5 Summary

In this chapter we have suggested that despite ongoing critiques of the notion of culture, to ignore encounters which participants themselves construe as *intercultural* would amount to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Indeed, as ongoing debates about how to define culture indicate, we would suggest that it is a highly productive analytical construct, albeit one that is difficult to pin down (see also Sifianou and Blitvich (Chap. 22), this volume). In undertaking studies of intercultural (im)politeness, then, what is needed is a considered analytical approach that draws not only from a particular theoretical stance on culture itself, but also an appreciation of the importance of grounding one's analysis in the understandings of the participants themselves. The latter requires, in turn, a firm grasp of the relevance of the emic/etic distinction, processes of identification, and accommodation to studies of intercultural (im)politeness. We have also suggested that intercultural encounters can be studied at both a local, situated level, as well as at a broader, macro level.

Looking forward, we would argue that intercultural (im)politeness research has much to offer the field of (im)politeness more generally. In our view, morally-imbued evaluations lie at the heart of (im)politeness (Haugh 2015a; Haugh and Kádár forthcoming; Kádár and Haugh 2013). However, moral systems do not develop within individuals but across fields, that is, a dynamic

relational network, which is not only imbued with historicity, but also with ongoing interactions and emerging relationships (Kádár and Haugh 2013: 78). Yet while this means that evaluations of (im)politeness are almost inevitably conservative in the moment, they are nevertheless also always open to change over time within relational fields. Intercultural encounters constitute a potent enabler of social change as they represent an arena where the moral underpinnings of (im)politeness may be readily challenged or contested by participants, thereby accelerating changes in moral systems. Given rapid changes in the range of persons with whom we may interact afforded by developments in digital communications and an increasingly globalised world, it seems fair to say that the twenty-first century is rapidly becoming a century of intercultural and intergroup communication. It thus follows that we can no longer afford for the study of (im)politeness in intercultural and intergroup encounters to remain a mere side avenue or digression for (im)politeness researchers. While this will invariably lead to more complex theories of (im)politeness, such intricacy must arguably be embraced as an inevitable part of explaining social life in a rapidly changing world.

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Part IV

(Im)politeness in Specific Contexts

24

(Im)politeness in the Workplace

Janet Holmes and Stephanie Schnurr

1 Introduction[1]

This chapter focuses on (im)politeness in workplace interaction. When is it considered appropriate or even friendly, rather than rude and insulting, to swear at your workmates? Why would the foreman on a building site use hedged and indirect forms to give instructions? How could it be considered polite to talk while someone is giving a presentation at a formal meeting? These are some of the issues raised in this chapter. We begin, however, by discussing our approach to studying (im)polite discourse at work; then we briefly review some of the previous research in this area and identify methods of collecting relevant data, before proceeding to illustrate how we analyse (im)politeness in workplace discourse.

[1] We would like to express our appreciation to the Language in the Workplace team who supported the research described in this paper, and especially Bernadette Vine and Meredith Marra for helpful comments on our final draft.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_24

2 Definitions, Key Concepts and Theoretical Approaches

2.1 Defining (Im)politeness

As will be clear from the different contributions to this book, the terms 'politeness' and 'impoliteness' have generated much discussion and controversy.[2] In general, however, if they accept the terms as useful at all (and some, such as Spencer-Oatey (2000: 2–3); O'Driscoll (2007: 464), do not) researchers tend to agree that (im)politeness is concerned with affective aspects of interaction (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987; Kasper 1990; Mills 2003; Watts 2003), and with aspects of facework (Geyer 2008). Affect is communicated multimodally, through facial expression, gesture and body stance, as well as language. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we focus on *linguistic* (im)politeness.

We define linguistic *politeness* as discursively strategic interaction intended and perceived as having been used to maintain harmonious relations and avoid conflict with others (cf. Kasper 1990; Holmes 1995; Thomas 1995; Watts 2003; Schnurr et al. 2008). Linguistic *impoliteness* is here defined as discursive behaviour which causes unintended (rather than deliberate) offence. Deliberate offence or face attack is considered *rudeness*, designed 'to cause social conflict and disharmony' (Culpeper et al. 2003: 1545), and is excluded from consideration in this chapter. (See Culpeper 2011, and this volume Chap. 9, for further discussion of rudeness or intentional impoliteness.)

Evaluation lies at the heart of the analysis of politeness, and it is now widely accepted in current (im)politeness research that judgements are context-dependent: 'no sentence is inherently polite or impolite' (Fraser and Nolan 1981: 96; see also Spencer-Oatey 2008; Geyer 2008: 7) and that they are made in relation to societal norms (Watts 2003; Leech 2014). Moreover, what is evaluated as '(im)polite' often '*emerges* contextually from instances of socio-communicative verbal interaction' (Watts 2003: 141). Furthermore, even within one language there is a good deal of variation in what is considered (im)polite behaviour, and this diversity obviously increases when we consider intercultural communication, as we illustrate below.[3]

[2] This section draws on Holmes (2012).

[3] We do not make use in this chapter of the distinction between politeness1 and politeness2 (Eelen 2001; Watts 2003). While the distinction seems plausible, it is very difficult to maintain analytically (cf Mills 2003: 8).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Our approach to analysing (im)politeness in workplace discourse, as outlined in Holmes et al. (2011), is located within a social realist framework, utilising a social constructionist perspective to analyse the relationship between structure and agency (see Carter and Sealey 2000; Coupland 2001; Ehrlich 2008; Cameron 2009). In very general terms, 'real world material conditions and social relations … constrain and shape the discursive construction of organisational reality in any particular socio-historical situation' (Reed 2005: 1629). Or in Porter's (1993: 593) words:

> the basic theoretical assumption of critical realism is that human action is enabled and constrained by social structures, but this action, in turn, reproduces or transforms those structures. …The purpose of ethnographic investigation here is not to ideographically illuminate small scale social events, but to use examination of human agency to shed light on the relationship between agency and structure.

Thus, as noted in Holmes et al. (2011: 13), '[w]e construct our social reality within the constraints of particular social and historical conditions; in other words, our behaviour, which includes our talk, is constrained by the parameters of broad societal norms and "inherited structures" of belief, power, opportunity, and so on (Cameron 2009: 15).' Our theoretical model identifies these social constraints on interactional behaviour at different levels of generality, from the broadest and most encompassing societal or institutional level through the organisational level to the more specific level of a community of practice (henceforth CofP) or workplace team (cf. Hecht et al. 2005; Wodak 2008: 208). (im)politeness norms clearly qualify as instances of such social constraints, and, while not all researchers make this framework explicit, it appears to underlie the analysis of politeness in much of the research on workplace discourse.[4]

At the societal level, these constraints involve institutional norms which all members of society are aware of whether they conform to them or contest them. As Coupland notes, participants 'orient variably and creatively' to normative institutional constraints, providing evidence that 'people do in fact work with a pre-discursive concept of social order as well as being active agents in their reproduction (or modification) of it' (2001: 16–17). These include societal ideologies such as 'the gender order' (Connell 1987), which influences what is regarded as polite and appropriate behaviour for women and men, and the 'tall poppy syndrome' (Lipson 1948/2011; Jackson and Parry 2001), which condemns

[4] Coupland and Jaworski (2009: 17) make the same point about much sociolinguistic research.

boasting and self-promotion in many Australasian social contexts. At the organisational level, particular companies may have politeness norms regarding the formality of meetings (e.g. with or without a formal opening and closing) and in relation to the language(s) considered appropriate in meetings (e.g. English only or multilingual). At the CofP level, particular social and sociolinguistic constraints develop as components of the workplace culture of particular teams, influencing what is regarded as (im)polite discursive behaviour (e.g. in relation to social talk or swearing) as will be illustrated below. (See also Eelen's (2001) ground-breaking critique of pre-discursive concepts which made an immense contribution to the theoretical understanding of (im)politeness.)

Many, perhaps most, researchers working in the area of workplace discourse adopt an Interactional Sociolinguistics approach (Gumperz 1999, 2008), analysing discourse in its wider sociocultural context, and drawing on the analyst's knowledge of the community and its norms in interpreting what is going on in an interaction. This involves sociopragmatic analysis with a focus on interpersonal politeness. The goal is to explore how social meaning, including (im)politeness, is discursively conveyed and inferred in particular interactions. This approach is perfectly compatible with a CofP framework as first proposed by Lave and Wenger (1991) to account for the quintessentially social character of learning. They argue that learning involves gradually increasing participation in a CofP, and that the learner moves from initially peripheral status to more complex and fully engaged participation. We suggest that (im)politeness norms comprise one important component of this learning, and it is useful to focus on *transitions* of various kinds to illustrate the contribution of such norms to successful integration in various workplace contexts. These transitions may take place on different levels and, as we illustrate in the analysis section below, may involve people moving from country to country (e.g. expatriates), from institution to institution (e.g. apprentices and newcomers moving into their first job after school), and from company to company (e.g. people who change jobs or employers). However, before analysing some of these transitions in more detail, we provide a brief overview of research on (im)politeness in the workplace.

3 (Im)politeness in the Workplace: A Brief Overview

(Im)politeness is clearly an important and highly relevant topic in the workplace context—especially since the closely related notions of power and politeness are ubiquitous dimensions of workplace interaction (see, for example,

Holmes and Stubbe 2003b; Vine 2004; Schnurr 2009). It is thus not surprising that issues of (im)politeness have been of considerable interest to researchers over the past two decades.

While much early research on politeness in the workplace focused on the analysis of written texts, mostly in the form of business correspondence, in corporate settings (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 1996; Nickerson 1999), more recently, the research focus has shifted to spoken interaction. Researchers have analysed (im)politeness in business meetings (e.g. Mullany 2004, 2006; Wasson 2000; Chan 2007), service-encounters (e.g. Kong 2006; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006; see also Márquez Reiter and Bou Franch (Chap. 25), this volume), medical contexts (e.g. Graham 2009; see also Locher and Schnurr (Chap. 26), this volume), telephone conversations (e.g. Brown and Crawford 2009; Halbe 2012), including call-centres (e.g. Hui 2014; Archer and Jagodzinski 2015), and one-to-one interactions (e.g. Schnurr et al. 2008; Koltunova 2005; Marsden and Holmes 2014). Interestingly, however, despite the interest in other forms of workplace interaction, business meetings remain the site for most research on (im)politeness in workplace contexts. One of the seminal works on politeness in workplace settings is Holmes and Stubbe's (2003b) book on *Power and Politeness in the Workplace*[5] which provides a comprehensive analysis of politeness issues in the workplace context, and which draws on a large corpus of authentic workplace interactions recorded in formal and informal meetings, as well as other kinds of face-to-face interactions in a wide variety of different workplaces. Another important text is Bargiela-Chiappini and Gotti's (2005) *Asian Business Discourse(s)* which discusses a range of (im)politeness issues in a variety of business contexts in Asia, including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Korea. The contributions to this volume explore (im)politeness practices in both written and spoken data.

Extending the research focus beyond corporate white-collar environments, a number of researchers have begun to explore blue-collar, institutional, as well as legal, military and medical workplaces (e.g. Tracy 2012; Halbe 2011; Graham 2009; Daly et al. 2004; Bousfield 2007; Fillietaz 2010a; Barata 2014). Perhaps the most interesting finding of these studies is that the *type* of workplace has a considerable impact on the specific (im)politeness norms and practices that characterise the interactions of members of that workplace. For example, Daly et al. (2004) observed that the regular swearing, use of taboo expressions and jocular abuse which characterised the interactions of one particular team in the New Zealand factory they studied, functioned mainly as expressions of solidarity and in-group membership, rather than as utterances

[5] Reissued in 2015 as a classic edition by Routledge.

threatening or attacking the interlocutors' face (see Barata 2014 for similar observations in the military context). In these workplace contexts, this kind of behaviour, could be considered normative and appropriate, and hence, in line with our definition above, as polite behaviour.

Moreover, while most of the early research on (im)politeness was firmly located within Western, mostly English-speaking, contexts, much current research explores (im)politeness phenomena in a wider range of different sociocultural contexts, including, for example, workplaces in Spain, Belgium, France, Venezuela, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Syria and Peru (e.g. Arnaiz 2006; Munoz 2005; Murphy and Levy 2006; Dunn 2011; Kong 2006; Kleifgen and Huynh Le 2007; Garcia 2012; van den Eynden Morpeth 2012; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006; Traverso 2006). For example, Dunn (2011) studied politeness in business etiquette training offered by five Japanese companies. The training courses that she observed combined verbal and nonverbal forms of politeness, and covered a range of topics, including personal appearance ('personal etiquette'), vocal and facial expressions and proper movement. Regarding verbal politeness, course participants were taught several discursive strategies 'for making the "undesirable" utterances more polite', such as using a more formal style, phrasing requests as questions, avoiding negatives and using apologies to mitigate face threatening acts (FTAs) (Dunn 2011: 3647). Interestingly, while many of these strategies are reminiscent of Brown and Levinson (1987), they were not conveyed 'as matters of individual choice or volition. Rather, both honorific forms and other verbal strategies were presented primarily as a matter of learning and conforming to the social conventions of the business world' (Dunn 2011: 3653).

Another interesting study which looked at the use of politeness in workplace emails was conducted by van den Eynden Morpeth (2012). In her analysis of emails written by the staff in two Belgian (i.e. Flemish) workplaces, van den Eynden Morpeth (2012: 47) found that although 'politeness is a salient feature of workplace email', it was not possible to make generalisations about gender specific use of politeness. While she identified statistically significant gender differences in the use of greetings, thanks and signatures (which were more often used by the women in her sample than by the men), she also observed that in other respects men were more polite (e.g. when using compliments). See also Yeoh (2014) for a similar analysis with different findings examining email communication in two New Zealand companies and one Malaysian organisation.

This growing body of research typically provides in-depth analyses of how specific, often potentially face threatening, speech acts are performed by members of specific workplaces in a chosen sociocultural context. Among the more frequently scrutinised speech acts in workplace contexts are requests

(e.g. Bremner 2006; Santos and Silva 2008; Wigglesworth and Yates 2007), directives (e.g. Harris 2006), disagreements (e.g. Schnurr and Chan 2011; Choi and Schnurr 2014), complaints (e.g. Vasquez 2009) and refusals (e.g. Cho 2007; Schnurr and Zayts 2013). In addition to these specific speech acts, another discursive strategy that has received a good deal of attention from (im)politeness researchers is humour (e.g. Holmes 2000a; Mullany 2004; Schnurr and Chan 2009; Richards 2010). Humour is an effective means to achieve a range of workplace objectives while doing (im)politeness in ways that are consistent with the norms that characterise a particular workplace or CofP (e.g. Holmes and Marra 2002) as well as enacting (and sometimes challenging) the norms that are often associated with a particular sociocultural context (e.g. Schnurr and Chan 2009).

However, the growing interest among researchers in (im)politeness phenomena in different sociocultural contexts has resulted not only in a substantial number of studies which describe how (im)politeness is enacted in different workplaces around the world, but, more interestingly perhaps, has also led to an increasing number of studies of cross-cultural comparisons of (im)politeness behaviours (e.g. Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2004; Murphy and Levy 2006; Schnurr and Chan 2009), as well as a growing number of projects focusing on politeness in intercultural (e.g. Schnurr and Zayts 2013, 2017; Murphy and Levy 2006) and sometimes intracultural encounters (e.g. Schnurr et al. 2007). In line with general developments in intercultural research, most of these studies move considerably beyond a focus on perceived miscommunication where, arguably, participants' culture-specific norms of (im)politeness clash with each other, resulting in face damage and face loss. Rather than relying on cultural stereotypes in their analysis, more recent research studies challenge over-generalisations and stereotypical claims underlying such descriptions and reductions of culture to sets of static norms and assumptions, and reconceptualise culture and (im)politeness more dynamically by acknowledging that both are processes which are enacted and negotiated throughout an interaction (e.g. Holmes et al. 2011, 2012; Marra et al. 2014; Schnurr and Zayts 2013, 2017).

A possible way forward to avoid essentialist assumptions, which is particularly useful for research on (im)politeness in the workplace, is provided by the concept of the CofP, as noted above. Within this framework rather than trying to identify the norms of (im)politeness that allegedly characterise an entire culture, more recent research has started to explore the ways in which (im)politeness is interpreted, enacted, as well as reinforced and sometimes challenged, in the more concrete context of the specific CofP in which an interaction takes place. These CofPs may be ethnicised (Schnurr et al. 2007) or gendered (Holmes and Stubbe 2003a; Holmes 2006) in different ways and

thus provide useful guidelines for an analysis and interpretation of observed behaviour as (im)polite or otherwise. Judgments about (im)polite behaviour, it is argued, can only be made with reference to the specific context in which an exchange takes place, and the CofP is a crucial aspect of this context. For example, whether an instance of swearing is considered to be impolite and perhaps even sexist can only be interpreted in the context of what constitutes normative behaviour amongst members of the particular (possibly ethnicised and/or gendered) CofP in which this instance occurred.

Among the topics that have received considerable attention from researchers on (im)politeness in the workplace are not only ethnicity and gender but also power (e.g. Grainger 2004; Mullany 2004; Holmes and Schnurr 2005; Schnurr et al. 2007; Holmes et al. 2008; Shin 2003; Harris 2006; Takano 2005). The focus on power is perhaps not surprising given our earlier comment about the close relationship between (im)politeness and power. However, rather than treating power as a static variable and investigating how interlocutors, who hold powerful positions, do (im)politeness when they exercise their power, more recent constructivist research explores the discursive strategies which interlocutors use when doing power, gender and ethnicity. The focus of this research has thus shifted towards an analysis of the processes through which power, gender and ethnicity are constructed, enacted and negotiated in an interaction in the context of the norms that emerge in specific CofPs.

In addition to these largely academic endeavours, there are also a small number of studies that explore practical implications of (im)politeness research in the workplace context, mostly with regards to language teaching (e.g. Newton 2004; Wigglesworth and Yates 2007; Holmes and Riddiford 2011) but also in broader applied linguistics contexts (Holmes et al. 2011). Drawing on our own research, we turn now to some illustrations of the complexities of collecting and analysing instances of linguistic (im)politeness at work.

4 Methods of Collecting Data

Some studies of (im)politeness in workplace interaction have included consideration of written material, such as emails (e.g. Fletcher 2014), and researchers have often used questionnaires and interviews (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini et al. 2007: 181; Mullany 2007; Baxter 2010), to collect participants' reports of appropriate language use and attitudes. However, most researchers studying (im)politeness in the workplace over the last two decades have focused on recording spoken workplace interaction, though this material is frequently supplemented by ethnographic observation and interviews (Holmes and

Stubbe 2003b; Schnurr and Chan 2009; Mullany 2006). Audio-recording is currently the most widespread technique for capturing workplace talk, but video-recording is increasing, providing opportunities to analyse nonverbal behaviour using multimodal approaches (e.g. Kerekes 2006; Kuzmierszyk 2014; Roberts et al. 2008).

Our own methods of data collection combine ethnographic observations aimed at 'thick description' (Geertz 1973), as well as 'thick participation' (Sarangi 2006: 204), recordings of talk at work and interviews, supplemented by questionnaire data and relevant written materials from the worksite such as website information, mission statements, posters and reports (see Gunnarsson 2009). Our methods have been widely adopted by others working in this area over the last 15 years, so it is useful to outline them here.

Following consultation to identify issues of interest to both parties in the research, i.e. the workplace partners and ourselves as researchers, we generally begin with a period of observation by a research assistant (RA) to identify workplace routines, typical patterns of interaction (e.g. do meetings have a formal agenda? do people have morning tea together? do they eat together at lunchtime?) and potential key participants. To reduce the effect of the observer's paradox (Labov 1972) in white-collar workplaces, the RA often takes on small administrative tasks such as photocopying, while in blue-collar workplaces, the RA offers help where possible and joins workers for work breaks. To record authentic interaction in such workplaces, we first used audio tapes, then mini-disks and most recently digital recorders, supplemented by video-recording whenever possible (Holmes and Stubbe 2003b; Marra 2008). This approach, which is now widely used in workplace research internationally, entails asking volunteers to record a range of their everyday work interactions over a period of two to three weeks. Thus, we are not present during the recordings in order to minimise the observer effect, though of course there is some initial self-consciousness due to the unavoidable presence of the recording equipment. However, this typically disappears remarkably quickly. Similarly, we set up video cameras in meeting rooms before anyone arrives, and then disappear until after the meeting is over. We undertake debriefing interviews after recording is completed, and, where they are willing, we engage in further discussion with individuals or small groups to assist in interpreting material. Workshopping excerpts from the recorded material with participants has proved invaluable in 'warranting' or validating interpretations, especially in intercultural contexts where different norms and values are potential sources of miscommunication (see Marra 2008; Holmes and Vine 2015 for more detail). In the next section we provide some examples illustrating the analysis of (im)politeness in workplace discourse.

5 Analysing (Im)politeness in Talk at Work

The analysis of (im)politeness in workplace discourse entails consideration of the compatibility of the sociocultural norms of participants. Where norms differ for whatever reason, there is potential for offence as unfamiliar behaviour is often perceived as evidence of impoliteness. In this section we analyse (im)politeness by considering sociocultural norms at different levels, ranging from the societal through the organisational to the CofP level. The analyses of the examples below explore ways in which taken-for-granted politeness norms become evident in workplace interaction when people are involved in transitions from one community to another.

5.1 From Country to Country

When people reflect upon the effects of moving countries in the course of their work, they often comment on how they feel they had to change their behaviours in order to adapt to the norms and expectations of colleagues in their new environment. Example 1, which is taken from an interview with Susan,[6] an expatriate who works and lives in Hong Kong, is a good illustration of this. Susan is originally from the UK and prior to moving to Hong Kong she worked and lived in Australia for several years.

(1)[7]
Prior to Susan's response below she explained how she had to change her leadership style when coming to Hong Kong.

1. Susan: say for example this morning it happens every day
2. just pick one this morning
3. so we have to prepare some detailed reports for the global firm
4. and in-in Australia it's pretty obvious if you think about this
5. that the global firm wants its reports because they are doing a review of
6. learning and development in China
7. and the automatic thing in over say in Australia would be
8. the administration is pretty same-same
9. they are doing their review
10. I might lose my job

[6] All names are pseudonyms.

[7] This example is also discussed in Schnurr and Zayts (fc).

11. so what you- the way you manage it in Australia is
12. you explain why they are doing this and
13. you-you allow that question–answer to happen
14. in China if you try to do that it just worries people
15. they don't actually want to know

This example illustrates how Susan considers that she had to change her leadership style to accommodate the expectations and practices of her Chinese subordinates. She describes what to her are normal and expected ways of managing potentially bad news with her team. The bad news in this case relates to having to prepare some reports as part of the company's review, which may ultimately lead to some job losses. According to Susan, in Australia, the appropriate way of managing this would be to 'explain why they are doing this' (line 12), and then to give people the opportunity to ask questions to facilitate their understanding of what is going on (line 13). However, as Susan makes very clear, she is convinced that these ways of communicating and dealing with potentially bad news would not work 'in China' (line 14). Thus, while sharing information may be perceived as important and effective leadership in Australia, in China, according to Susan, such practice only 'worries people' (line 14) and 'they don't actually want to know' (line 15).

There is ample evidence in the interviews that we conducted with expatriates in Hong Kong of such perceived differences in relation to normative expectations and practices that are associated with different cultural groups (see also Schnurr & Zayts 2017). Participants frequently commented, for example, on the fact that Chinese and Westerners had very different expectations relating to work–life balance and that Chinese members of a team typically expect everyone to stay at work until the last person has finished their job, which is reported as being very different to the expectations and practices of Australians and other Westerners who tend to leave the office when their work is finished. Similar differences were reported regarding decision-making practices. Several expatriates complained to us in interviews about the apparent lack of participation and involvement of their Chinese colleagues and team members in decision making.

However, it is important to emphasise that these claims about different expectations and practices of members of different cultural groups are based on people's perceptions, and may not necessarily reflect their actual everyday practice. In fact, as we have argued elsewhere in more detail (e.g. Schnurr and Zayts 2012, 2013, 2017), people often tend to over emphasise differences in practices that they associate with a particular cultural group or sociocultural context. Often, these claims are much more difficult to sustain when we examine people's everyday workplace interactions. For example, in the video- and

audio-recordings of actual workplace interactions, contrary to the claims of the expatriates, we found considerable evidence of collaborative decision making (Schnurr and Zayts 2012).

5.2 From Institution to Institution

Another important transition which brings potentially disparate politeness norms into focus is the transition between different institutions. While people regularly move between legal, religious, recreational and home domains, the most relevant transition between institutional domains from our analytical perspective is the move from school to work. Researchers in Switzerland have focused on this transition in particular, describing the challenges facing apprentices and new workers as they join the workforce, and indicating the potential for misunderstanding and unintentional offence, or even for attracting derision, when newcomers unwittingly breach established interactional norms (e.g. Fillietaz 2010a, b).

We have examined this particular transition in the context of the construction industry, with a case study of the relational and transactional demands on a work experience student, pseudonymed Rick, as he negotiated the interactional norms of an established CofP on a New Zealand building site (Holmes and Woodhams 2013). The site fulfilled the three criterial features identified by Wenger (1998: 73): mutual engagement, since the builders worked together; a joint negotiated enterprise, namely to construct a house; and a shared repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over time, including 'local lore, shared stories, inside jokes', and 'jargon and shortcuts to communication' (1998: 125).

Most of these features of communication on the building site presented challenges to Rick, but it was the 'shared repertoire' that most obviously entailed the risk of (in)appropriate or (im)polite discursive behaviour. Rick was unfamiliar not only with much of the builders' technical jargon, but also with their standard topics of small talk and their style of humour (Holmes and Woodhams 2013). One particular area of difficulty for Rick was the conventional indirectness with which directives were issued by the foreman Tom, together with Tom's assumption that it was obvious what was needed to comply with them: e.g. 'we just need that done …'; 'I just want that corner done …'; 'perhaps you could …'. Our analysis demonstrated that Rick repeatedly failed to understand just what was needed until Tom adopted much more explicit and direct forms: e.g. 'jump out the front there please Rick'; 'you can go around the top'. Members of the CofP could interpret very implicit and indirect instructions without difficulty because of their familiarity with the jargon and their extensive experience on the job. Clearly Rick's previous experience

was insufficient to enable him to understand Tom's indirect directives, though Tom describes what he asks Rick to do as 'just common sense' when he discusses Rick's bewildering incompetence with another builder after Rick has left for the day. Different industries develop different interactional norms and newcomers need to learn to interpret and use them if they are to succeed in integrating into the relevant CofPs.

Similarly, different institutions develop different ways of establishing good relationships, rapport and solidarity between co-workers. In many workplaces, social talk and humour are primary strategies used for this purpose (Holmes 2000b; Ragan 2000; Murata 2015). But the norms for *when*, *where, on what topics* and *how much* vary greatly from one workplace to another, and it is easy to cause offence or be perceived as rude or aloof if someone does not participate appropriately in such workplace exchanges (see, for example, Holmes and Riddiford 2010). On the construction site described above, the challenge facing a newcomer was not only to contribute appropriately to the specific topics of small talk and humour (e.g. sport, sexual exploits) which other workers engaged in, but also to weave this relational talk smoothly into the ongoing dominant transactional talk which was the main focus of most interactions. Example 2 illustrates this process between the foreman Tom and his apprentice Max.

(2)[8]
Context: Tom and Max are installing the cladding. Max's comment in line 2 is a response to a news item on the radio which is playing in the background.

1.	Tom:	oh right yeah ++ um (10)
2.	Max:	someone broke their leg + hey you got a bottom corrugation
3.	Tom:	bottom second down bottom of the corrugation
4.		yeah like bottom of that board
5.	Max:	thirty nine
6.	Tom:	yeah thirty nine + what's someone broke their leg where
7.	Max:	oh they were doing like a half time display
8.		of people like parachuting in //+\ or like hang-gliding in
9.	Tom:	/[laughs]\\
10.		at the super fourteen game
11.	Max:	nah what he was saying ( ) //+\
12.		and then some dude like broke his leg (9)
13.	Tom:	/[laughs]: oh yeah:\\
14.	Max:	do you want to go cut another one
15.		I can keep doing this

[8] This example is taken from Holmes and Woodhams (2013).

The men are working closely together at this point and they drop and pick up the social topic of what happened at the Super 14 rugby game as their work allows. The positively polite or relational talk and the transactional/on the job talk are closely interwoven: [rel.] 'someone broke their leg +' [trans.] 'hey you got a bottom corrugation' (line 2), and [trans.] 'yeah thirty nine +' [rel.] 'what's someone broke their leg where' (line 6). This kind of talk is how these workers construct rapport. It seems so easy for those who are core members of the CofP, but it is much more challenging for newcomers, and yet it is important to master it in order to integrate into the CofP. Politeness in this context entails learning to contribute appropriately to such interactions—an important aspect of making the successful transition from school to work.

5.3 From Company to Company

Our third example illustrates the challenge of moving between companies which have different sociocultural interactional norms, and serves to illustrate the potential for breaches of politeness norms in intercultural communication contexts. In the New Zealand context, Maori people are typically bicultural and thus do not experience major challenges as they move between Maori and Pakeha cultural contexts, whether at work or in other domains. Pakeha who move from majority group work contexts to ethnicised Maori workplaces (Schnurr et al. 2008; Holmes et al. 2012), on the other hand, are often taken aback to find that the interactional norms that they take for granted do not necessarily pertain in their new workplaces.

We have discussed in some detail the very different norms for meeting openings and closings in New Zealand Maori workplaces (Holmes and Marra 2011; Holmes et al. 2011). Where brief opening phrases, such as 'OK let's start', or even the one word initial discourse marker, 'right', serve as perfectly appropriate openings for Pakeha workplace meetings, even those of a senior team (cf Lewis 2006 on different European norms), a meeting in a Maori workplace rarely opens without a formal *karakia* (prayer or traditional chant) involving a number of ritual and routine components which derive their structure from traditional Maori greeting protocols (Salmond 1974, 1975; Metge 1995).[9] Ignorance or lack of understanding of the underlying values reflected in the structure and form of such openings can lead to potential friction between Pakeha and Maori colleagues since new members of workplace

[9] See Holmes et al. (2011) Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the structure of these openings in the Maori workplaces in which we recorded data and Chapter 8 for a discussion of their significance in intercultural communication.

teams in Maori workplaces may cause offence by behaving disrespectfully or betraying impatience during these formal openings.

Another area of potential intercultural friction is what is considered polite behaviour during meetings. Maori participants often provide more explicit feedback to speakers, compared to the silence which is the norm during contributions to Pakeha formal meetings (Kell et al. 2007; Holmes et al. 2011; Metge and Kinloch 1978). A nice example of the potential this offers for misunderstanding is illustrated in example 3.[10]

(3)
Context: Kiwi Consultations: Meeting of all staff. Steve has joined this company only recently and has not yet learned their interactional norms. He is introducing an agenda item. Frank is the Finance Manager and Daniel is the company CEO.

1	Steve:	we have capability development um
2		the G M oversight here //is from Frank with Caleb\
3	Frank:	/[quietly to Daniel]: and what's *maraetai* mean?:\\
4	Steve:	the manager in charge budget of a hundred
5		and //eighty\ seven k
6	Daniel:	/[quietly]: mm?:\\
7	Frank:	[quietly]: what's *maraetai* mean?:
8	Steve:	obviously key area
9		//we want to ensure that um\
10	Daniel:	/[quietly]: it's by your left\\ eye:
11	Frank:	[quietly]: mm?:
12	Daniel:	[quietly]: it's by your left eye:
13	Frank:	[quietly]: by your left eye:
14	Daniel:	//[quietly]: mm my right eye:\
15	Steve:	/one of the important\\ things in communication is
16		not to talk when others are talking
17		[laughter]
18	Steve:	I hope that the cameras picked up (that)
19		[laughter]
20	Frank:	Steve this indicates a need for you to be out in *hui*
21		[laughter]
22	Frank:	one of the things that you learn very quickly
23		is that a sign of respect is that other people
24		are talking about what //you're saying

[10] This example and the relevant discussion is based on the longer discussion in Holmes et al. (2011).

25 while you're saying it\
26 /[laughter]\\ [laughter]
27 Steve: I see I see
28 Caleb: //good recovery Frank good recovery\

During Steve's extended contribution to the meeting, many participants make quiet remarks to each other, as is typical in Maori meetings, but when Frank, a senior manager, asks Daniel, the CEO, for clarification of the word *maraetai* Steve reacts by humorously reprimanding them for their impolite behaviour: 'one of the important things in communication is not to talk when others are talking' (lines 15–16). This remark causes general amusement since, as Frank points out (lines 20–25), Steve is here inappropriately asserting the communicative norms of the Pakeha company to which he formerly belonged. But in his new company Maori ways of speaking prevail, as is evident from the fact that others have been talking quietly during Steve's contribution. Since our recorders picked up Frank and Daniel's conversation, we know that Frank's comment was in fact 'on-topic' and ironically, as a result of drawing attention to the quiet side-conversation, Steve causes an even bigger interruption to his presentation and attracts (good-humoured) critical attention to his own cultural ignorance and insensitivity.

This example thus illustrates a typical pattern observable in the Maori meetings in our data; polite behaviour involves a more active style of attending to a speaker, more overlapping talk, explicit verbal feedback and collaborative all-together-now (ATN) interaction (Coates 1989) than Pakeha meetings, where silence is the polite norm when someone speaks in a formal context (cf. Spencer-Oatey 2008; Jaworski 1993). The potential for discomfort and misunderstanding when a Pakeha joins a Maori workforce where Maori interactional norms obtain is quite obvious.[11]

While this example involves a cultural contrast, thus making clear that Steve needs to acquire new interactional norms if he is to be perceived as behaving appropriately in his new place of work, we have many similar, though less explicit, examples of the traps presented by contrasting organisational norms in culturally similar workplaces. Colleagues in some New Zealand organisations, for example, engage in a great deal of small talk on very personal topics at the beginning of meetings, while others use the pre-meeting time to talk about work-related talk on topics not anticipated in the agenda (Holmes 2000b, 2006). Meeting chairs in some companies wait until all those expected at the meeting have arrived, while in other companies the norm is to open the meeting as close

[11] See Holmes et al. (2011) Chapter 8 for further examples and discussion.

as possible to the official meeting start time. Acceptable ways of giving directives and formulating greetings in email communication also differ between organisations (Waldvogel 2005; van den Eynden Morpeth 2012; Yeoh 2014). Thus there are many different ways in which a person may unwittingly cause offence as they make the transition from one organisation to another.

Finally, another type of transition that deserves brief mention is the transition involved when people move between jobs in the same company, or as their roles and responsibilities change—sometimes even within the same team. For example, one of the people whose workplace interactions were recorded in our Hong Kong data, Cheryl, was promoted to leader of the team of which she had been a member for some time. This new position not only came with a new title but also meant that she had to learn how to 'do being the leader' of her team—an important component of which included learning appropriate ways of chairing meetings, making decisions, getting things done and making sure the other team members were happy. Although Cheryl had been a member of the team before her promotion and was thus acquainted with normative and polite ways of interacting with other members of this CofP, there is some evidence in our data to suggest that at times she struggled with her new role, and that she was challenged by other members of her team who sometimes questioned her decisions and propositions, thus affecting her leadership performance (see also Schnurr and Zayts 2011).

Overall then the analysis of these selected examples has illustrated the importance of paying attention to the range of discursive clues that people use to enact and interpret workplace interaction appropriately within specific sociocultural, institutional and organisational contexts. Clearly, (im)politeness norms comprise one important component of the learning required to integrate into a new workplace context and a specific role and to contribute appropriately to workplace discourse.

6 Future Directions for Research

In outlining some avenues for future research we take as a starting point the list of recommendations drawn up by Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris (2006) at the end of their state-of-the-art article in a special issue of the *Journal of Politeness Research*. More than a decade after the publication of their article, it seems that their first point, namely addressing the question of what constitutes (im)polite behaviour at work, has been enthusiastically taken on board by researchers, as demonstrated by the increasing number of case studies on (im)politeness in different workplace settings in different sociocultural context.

As indicated in our analyses above, the CofP plays a crucial role in this context and provides a promising way forward—especially for research on (im)politeness. In relation to Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris' second point, namely the need to collect and analyse a much wider range of authentic data in both intercultural and intracultural encounters in the workplace, we believe that although some progress has been made in recent studies, there remains a challenge for research to critically explore the role of culture in these contexts. In particular, we need more studies that distance themselves from cultural stereotyping and avoid making overgeneralising assumptions. And lastly, we agree with Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris' third recommendation and reiterate their demand to pay more attention to exploring and exploiting the implications of (im)politeness research for real-life applications—not only for teaching but also for training and coaching of those who do business interculturally.

In addition to these points, we identify three further avenues for future research. Firstly, one large, but to date relatively neglected, area of research on (im)politeness in the workplace context is computer mediated communication in its various forms. Although there are a few studies of email communication (e.g. Murphy and Levy 2006; Yeoh 2014), interaction between members of a virtual team (Darics 2010) and facebook interaction (Mak and Chui 2014), more research in this area is clearly needed to reflect the dramatic and rapid changes that most workplaces (worldwide) have been undergoing in the past few decades. One aspect of this is the multimodal nature of many of the new genres of workplace interaction.

Multimodal analysis of workplace discourse is another potential growth area for (im)politeness research. Multimodal discourse analysis offers interesting new ways of enriching our understanding of (im)politeness behaviour in workplace talk (see Norris and Jones 2005; Norris 2011), such as, for instance, the mimicry of gesture for creating shared understanding and rapport in job interviews (e.g. Kusmierczyk 2013)

Thirdly, although research on (im)politeness at work has established itself as a strong and constantly growing field of inquiry, most research focuses on politeness phenomena and rapport; relatively few studies analyse *im*politeness in workplace contexts (e.g. Schnurr et al. 2008; Mullany 2008). And while it could be argued that one might expect to find relatively few instances of impoliteness in workplace contexts (see also Schnurr et al. 2008), when impoliteness does occur, it is usually very salient, multifunctional and interactionally significant. Indeed, impolite linguistic behaviour often involves issues of power, and may be used (sometimes very strategically) to either reinforce or challenge existing power relations. Thus, future research in this area seems likely to be relevant to the area of (im)politeness more generally.

7 Transcription Conventions

// \	simultaneous or overlapping utterance of 'first' speaker
/ \\	simultaneous of overlapping utterance of 'second' speaker
[laughs]	paralinguistic information
: :	text between colons is modified by the tag immediately preceding it
un-	cut off word, both self and other interruption
( )	untranscribable or incomprehensible speech
(well)	transcriber's best guess at unclear speech
+	pause of up to one second
++	one to two second pause
(3)	pause over two seconds

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25

(Im)politeness in Service Encounters

Rosina Márquez Reiter and Patricia Bou-Franch

1 Service Encounters in Late Modernity

Merritt's (1976) influential conversation analytic examination of requests for service vs. requests for information in everyday service encounters (SEs) and Ventola's (1987) systemic linguistics analysis of the constitutive structures of this speech genre, have been a source of reference for much of the literature on (im)politeness in service encounters. They constitute the first studies of the social activities that interactional participants in their roles as service providers and customers (Merritt 1976) engage in to exchange different types of commodities, such as information or goods (e.g. summons-answer, greeting exchange, service request-provision, etc.). They also show the order in which the activities (may) occur contingent on one another (e.g. a service request may be idle if an answer to a summons indicating recipiency is absent) within a specific time frame and physical setting (Shostack 1985). Importantly, these studies brought to light the repetition and predictabilities that such mundane social interactions entail as well as the communicative subtleties that are embedded within the genre. One such subtlety is the way in

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_25

which sociability and efficiency are managed in these primarily transactional exchanges as evidenced in the performance of repeated non-essential activities for the transaction to be effected, such as the presence of greetings as 'access rituals' (Goffman 1971, p. 79)[1] in the openings, farewells to coordinate interactional cessation in closings, and the conventionalised realisation of essential ones (e.g. request for service).

Indeed, it is the formalised nature of such exchanges with rule-bound structures that has attracted (im)politeness scholars to examine interactions in this type of institutional setting as they provide a window into (im)politeness manifestations (Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2005). Service encounters represent a methodological vehicle from which to conduct (im)politeness research in that the presence or absence of certain activities (e.g. greetings, 'how are you's, farewells), the way in which they are constructed and the interactional stage where they occur can be mapped against their (non)essentiality in terms of the interactional goal (i.e. strictly speaking, greetings are not essential for a service request to take place) and their typical interactional placement. This, in turn, can offer the (im)politeness analyst a lens from which to explore the normative expectations that participants usually orient to in such contexts. Thus, the recurrent presence of strictly non-essential activities for the transaction to be effected could then be interpreted as indicative of standing cultural practices and these, in turn, attributable to the politeness orientations of a lingua-culture in a given institutional context (e.g. the presence of greetings in service requests across varieties of Spanish, Márquez Reiter 2011). Similarly, the absence of standing cultural practices or the presence of activities which are typically absent in these type of interactions is likely to be interpreted as marked and potentially indicative of (im)politeness orientations or face considerations tailored to the occasion (see, for example, Tracy 1997 on the presence of 'how are you's in emergency service calls). As a result, such practices are likely to become accountable in the interactional behaviour of the participants (first-order politeness—Eelen 2001) and used as empirical armour to further the analyst's understanding of (im)politeness (second-order politeness).

A wealth of literature abounds around different forms of SEs. These have been the object of interest of different language and non-language based disciplines like marketing, business, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, applied

[1] Goffman (1971, p. 139) observed that 'Among adults in our society almost every kind of transaction, including every coming together into a moment of talk, is opened and closed by ritual.' He explained that changes in the level of access individuals have to each other are marked by greetings and goodbyes. And, that these have forms specific to different occasions, are highly conventionalised and automatically performed.

linguistics and anthropology (see Fernández-Amaya and Hernández-López 2015 for a recent review). This is hardly surprising given the informationalisation era (Castells 2000) in which we now live, where language and communication play an increasingly important role in service provision (Martín Rojo and Márquez Reiter 2010). This, coupled with the general availability of broadband, at least in some parts of the world, is slowly changing our understanding of the nature of service encounters. New forms of service delivery such as those mediated by technology have transformed some of the practices consumers and service providers engage in in pursuit and delivery of service as well as making it possible to create new services (e.g. contactless payment, see Graham and Hardaker (Chap. 30), in this volume).

Consumers now typically expect efficiently prompt service delivery at their fingertips. Companies, for their part, expect service providers to satisfactorily manage customer relations in the shortest possible period of time maximising efficiency and maintaining sociability, with a view to building loyalty among their customer base and enhancing their brand. In the case of SEs mediated by the telephone, service providers are expected to do so in faceless interactions where paralinguistic features such as body language, gestures or facial expressions are absent. A likely result of this is the unusual individualisation of the link between consumers and service providers over the phone (Liccope 2001). Telephone agents have become mediators or gatekeepers of a kind whose job is to ensure and guarantee access to the service requested by the consumers in an expediently personalised manner.

However, the communicative uncertainty that lack of paralinguistic features may bring in telephone mediated SEs, often coupled with the delivery of services by an agent who is lingua-culturally different from the consumer and who delivers the service from a different corner of the world, have led many companies to require agents to style the delivery of services according to a script. Such scripts typically prescribe, among others, the way in which routinised activities should be performed, especially those involving rituals of interactional access and cessation i.e. the openings and closings, where communicative practices such as synthetic personalisation (Fairclough 1989) are deployed to display a more individualised customer experience, (Márquez Reiter 2006). In most cases, such individualisation is reminiscent of the politeness patterns identified in English female talk (i.e. involvement; Tannen 1984) featuring an orientation to positive politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987) resulting in what is known as the feminisation of the workforce (Cameron 2000). Examples of such practices include offers of assistance ('How can I help you today?') thus potentially implying that the agent wants to help (cf. Márquez Reiter 2011), the provision of self-identification by the

telephone agent typically in the form of his or her first name, thus potentially triggering the consumer to proffer his or her first name in return (Sacks 1992).

The presence of such, strictly speaking, non-essential activities displays friendliness and involvement. Arguably, they are deployed to display a conversational footing (Goffman 1979) in what are essentially goal-oriented exchanges. Their interpretation as perfunctory performance is evidenced, among others, by the fact that consumers quickly move on to the reason for the call typically without engaging in other forms of talk and, when needed, navigate the institutional environment in such a way so as to out-manoeuvre the agent and get best value for money (Márquez Reiter 2009, 2013a). Arguably, this is the result of the multiple points of (telephone) contact between service providers and consumers, interactions with other consumers demanding services from the same or similar companies as far as contemporary service operationalisation is concerned.

Another factor that has been shown to affect the way SEs unfold, and which expands the meaning and possibilities of these social practices is related to the individual who starts the conversation. Especially significant in this respect are those interactions in which it is the service providers who seek to sell and promote particular services and get in touch with the customer, particularly through phone calls, thus initiating the interaction. This is an important social change in which the provider calls the home of the customer, intruding upon his or her private domain. Such intrusion, therefore, would call for special management techniques (Cameron 2001; Márquez Reiter 2009) given the generally unsolicited nature of the call and the imposition on the consumer (Brown and Levinson 1987).

As consumers, we have witnessed how conventionally conceived-of dyadic face-to-face interactions in a given physical setting and time frame between a consumer and a service provider whom, unlike the former, enjoys unique access to relevant product information and has been equipped with the tools to utilise that information (Jadad 1998) are slowly being phased out by technology-mediated forms of service provision. In these relatively new mediated communicative environments, the service encounter may encompass a multiplicity of interactions and experiences with other parties alongside the interaction with the service provider (Bou-Franch 2015; consider for example, the potentialities of social network platforms such as Facebook, Márquez Reiter et al. 2015).

New communicative arenas, resulting from advances in technology, have thus endowed consumers with the possibility of participating in concurrent service encounters with other consumers and service providers alongside their interaction with the primary service provider. As part of this process,

consumers can gain (some of) the knowledge and product expertise that they would not normally have access to in conventionally conceived-of dyadic face-to-face encounters. This, in turn, has the potential to impact on the roles that consumers and service providers embrace within the encounter and provide fertile ground for the emergence of activities in which the authority, knowledge or credibility of service provider or the consumer may be challenged. Such potential challenges would provide the (im)politeness scholar with rich data to examine face manifestations and behavioural normative expectations in SEs.

Indeed, the impact of internet innovations on the development of online services, the crucial change from the largely static websites of early internet (Herring 2008) to the more dynamic, convergent websites and social media platforms of the web 2.0 age (Herring 2013; Page et al. 2014; Walther and Jang 2012) deserve special attention, as this shift partly explains the evolution of online services. Early e-marketing scholarship, for instance, underlines the advantages of internet technologies in cutting costs, addressing different groups of customers and providing a 'service independent of direct service employee involvement' (Meuter et al. 2000, p. 50) through their websites. Research in the web 2.0 era, however, has paid greater attention to the role of social media. Incidentally, the term web 2.0 emerged as a strategic attempt to precisely reframe e-commerce at the turn of the twenty-first century (Marwick 2010), in connection with the more participatory and dynamic possibilities of the social media (Page et al. 2014). After all, *sociability*—'in the sense of supporting social interaction and reconfiguring on-line communities' (Bou-Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2014a, p. 1; boyd and Ellison 2008) is the most distinctive feature of social media. Indeed, within e-commerce, social media has revolutionised interaction by providing multidirectional communication, between the company and the consumer as well as among consumers (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; Mangold and Faulds 2009).

Research into SEs includes an overwhelming diversity of commercial and non-commercial institutional settings from academic settings to asylum seeking interviews, from face-to-face to technology mediated encounters. As the field of research is broad, it would be impossible to address the many studies that have contributed to its advancement within the space of this chapter. Our work, therefore, will restrict the field of enquiry to the commercial sector, with special attention to those studies which address SEs alongside (im)politeness. Our efforts are thus directed to providing a review, albeit not necessarily an exhaustive one, of research conducted in the area of commercial SEs and (im)politeness, discuss the merits of examining (im)politeness through SEs, and demonstrate that future studies in this area need to account

for the affordability (Gibson 1979), potentiality and multiplicity of channels of communication through which SEs are presently delivered.

2 Towards a Definition of Service Encounters

Commercial SEs have been characterised as an *institutional* genre, involving an institutional representative and an ordinary participant (Drew and Heritage 1992; Economidou-Kogetsidis 2005; Márquez Reiter 2005).[2] Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2006, p. 80) argues that they constitute 'ordinary' interactions *half-way* between informal conversations and those of a more marked institutional sort. The participant roles, and the rights and obligations that come with them, are well-defined and are particularly stable over time, with the institutional representative enacting the role of service provider, e.g. seller or service representative, and the ordinary participant acting as service seeker, e.g. customer or buyer (Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu 2001). The interaction between these participants is task-oriented. It is precisely this transactional objective which constitutes the genre's main communicative purpose.

However, not all SEs are equally centred on transactions; some encounters are socially minimal, i.e. more restricted to the transaction, while others are socially expanded and will contain interpersonally oriented exchanges and small talk (Bailey 1997, p. 331). We contend that in any of these, though, an interpersonal orientation is to be expected as the transactional and interpersonal functions are not mutually exclusive. This is in line with the view of various scholars working on SEs who have pointed out the centrality of interpersonality and rapport in these commercial activities (e.g. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Bou-Franch 2008; Márquez Reiter 2006).

Similarly, marketing and social psychology scholars have underlined the importance of establishing rapport during commercial encounters, since rapport fosters customer perceptions of the interaction as agreeable and pleasurable, and helps to develop a personal connection between the parties (Gremler and Gwinner 2000). Rapport management is, therefore, related not just to the interpersonal but also to the transactional goal of the SE. It is a means of developing customer satisfaction and, thus serves to a) reinforce the customer's intention to buy; b) create loyalty of the customer towards the brand or store; and c) foster publicity for the virtues of the service or goods and therefore attract more clients. (Gremler and Gwinner 2000; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Bou-Franch 2008).

[2] For a critical review of the institutional–ordinary distinction see, for example, Cameron (2001).

The study of how interpersonal relations leading to customer satisfaction are constructed, (re)negotiated and maintained has taken centre stage in the language-based service encounters literature. This is because SEs are characterised by socially shared regular patternings (Ventola 1987, 2005). They are ubiquitous and routinised. They thus 'provide us with a "uniform" starting point for intercultural comparisons' (Márquez Reiter 2011, p. 3). This, in turn, allows the analyst to explore similarities and differences in the politeness orientations of different lingua-cultures or contexts. The methodological advantages of such sites of interpersonal engagement has attracted many (im)politeness researchers given their potentiality to offer an implicit or explicit stance on the universality vs. relativity agenda that has permeated research into politeness since its conception (Brown and Levinson 1987). In addition, they have formed the basis of closely aligned areas of research such as variational pragmatics (see, for example, Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2005; Schneider and Placencia (Chap. 21), this volume).

The following sections review prior work on (im)politeness in commercial SEs. This has variously focused on specific linguistic aspects of particular encounters, their interactional unfolding and/or customers' perceptions of the services provided, and has involved different data-collection methodologies, including questionnaires, observations and note-taking, ethnographic interviews, audio/video-recording and transcribing, as well as screen-shots and video recording of digital encounters. Our review has been arranged considering the interaction/ language-shaping dimensions of face-to-face versus technology-mediated encounters.

3 Research on (Im)politeness in Service Encounters

3.1 Face-To-Face Service Encounters

The bulk of research into (im)politeness in SEs revolves around dyadic, face-to-face interactions in a multitude of settings and adopts, mainly, second-order politeness perspectives, that is, they make use of theoretical, expert notions and taxonomies of (im)politeness which are applied to the data under scrutiny (Eelen 2001).

Traditional, socially minimal, SEs have been characterised by features like brevity, explicitness, limited range of speech acts, with predominance of requests, and stability in participants' roles, rights and obligations (Bayyurt

and Bayraktaroğlu 2001; Economidou-Kogetsidis 2005). In our review of the relevant literature, it becomes evident that studies of SEs and (im)politeness have mostly moved from contextual and sociolinguistic factors that affect interpersonal expressions in SEs, including the study of the distribution of specific linguistic and interactional features, to an interest in the interactional construction of whole encounters in (non)mediated settings and customers' normative expectations of the services. These changes have crucially involved a move away from the analyses at the level of the utterance and the speech-act, towards the problematisation of social categories like gender and power, and the adoption of increasingly complex methodologies that allow for the compilation of naturally occurring encounters. Equally important have been the reconceptualisations of central notions like (im)politeness, the increasing interest of scholars in the role of impoliteness, the relationship between face and identity, the adoption of broader notions like rapport management, face constitution or relational work, and the wealth of studies brought about by the 'discursive turn'[3] in (im)politeness (e.g. Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Watts 2003, see Mills (Chap. 3), in this volume)

An early aim of studies of face-to-face SEs was to identify the contextual factors that have a linguistic impact on the encounter, for instance, the frequency of the SE, the gender of participants, open or closed settings and the nature of the product or service. Studies that deal with the frequency of the encounter are a case in point. In addition to SEs that constitute a one-time interaction between individuals who have never been in contact before and who will probably never be in contact again (see, for example, Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu 2001; Economidou-Kogetsidis 2005), SEs also include interactions between regular customers and providers, especially in smaller shops and bars, or markets in small towns. The role of repeated interactions has merited scholarly attention for the interpersonal histories (Mills 2003) that will develop between the parties involved and how they affect the type of interactional engagement as well as choice of rapport management techniques.[4]

Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu (2001) examined familiarity vis-à-vis prestige of the store and participant gender using questionnaire data in Turkish, and found that despite strong expectations of politic behaviour in the sense of Watts (1992), customer-service provider familiarity affected interpersonal choices regarding the use of pronouns, terms of address and degree of indirection in the service request. Studies using authentic interactions have also

[3] For a review see, among others, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2010) and Sifianou and Tzanne (2010).

[4] See Fitch 1998 on the importance of *vínculos* ('interpersonal ties') and Márquez Reiter 2011 on first, second and third follow-up service calls between the same conversational participants.

found frequency of contact has an impact on discourse practices. In particular, Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2006) found that interactions with frequent customers in small shops in France had an impact on the emergence of small talk, jokes and fostered greater use of elliptical forms (cf. Placencia 2004; Mancera Rueda and Placencia 2011 for similar findings for SEs in Spanish bars). According to Kerbrat-Orecchioni, frequency of contact led to closeness between the service provider and the customers, and this made the conversation more convivial and oriented towards '*mutual contentment*' (p. 100, italics in the original). These empirical studies show in what ways degree of familiarity and frequency of contact are important factors in the examination of situational and cultural practices. They have also (implicitly) highlighted the need to expand politeness frameworks to account for face-supporting or face-flattering and 'neutral' or politic behaviours (Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu 2001; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006). In this sense, these studies form part of a relatively recent trend in (im)politeness research that has moved away from Brown and Levinson's focus in their adoption of broader conceptualisations of facework, rapport management or relational work (Spencer-Oatey 2000; Locher and Watts 2005; Felix-Brasdefer 2015).

Other contextual factors that influence (im)politeness in the unfolding of SEs include the gender of the participants, the affluence of the store, the nature and availability of the product or service and the time factor understood as queueing time before being served (Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu 2001; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2006). For example, in Bayyurt and Bayraktaroğlu's (2001) study, women's inclination for distance and formality was interpreted as 'reputation-protective female behaviour' (234), a societal constraint that was balanced by greater volubility and more frequent use of attention-getters and positive politeness devices. Also worth mentioning is Antonopoulou's (2001) study of socially minimal SEs in a corpus of SEs in a Greek newsagent's shop collected through observation and note-taking. In line with previous research, in this study men were transaction-oriented, reducing or doing away with initial and final (non-essential) talk. Women, on the other hand, constructed the event more interpersonally, as observed by the use of more expressions during the opening and closing stages of the interaction. However, the analysis of the medial phase of the SEs revealed a more complex picture in which male and female customers were accommodating and addressee-oriented (cf. Félix-Brasdefer 2012). This, however, should not come as a surprise when considering that negotiation typically takes place in the middle of the encounter. The study showed that the addressee's gender, rather than the speaker's, had a greater influence on the interactional patterns of the service requests under study.

An important step forward in research into SE was marked by a change of perspective which moved from considering the effect of different contextual and sociolinguistic factors on SEs and a focus on the speech-act level, to the analysis of whole service interactions from broader perspectives. Márquez Reiter and Placencia (2004), for instance, set out to examine cross-culturally the overall organisation of SEs and the construction of interpersonal relationships during the (re)negotiation of 56 audio-recorded SEs in Montevidean and Quiteño Spanish. Their examination included some of the activities in which the participants, especially the service provider, engaged in the different phases or stages of the encounter as consultants were deployed as potential consumers to trigger the encounters in an effort to move away from fully elicited exchanges (see also Traverso 2001). The analysis of the opening and closing sections, as well as that of the selling strategies, primarily in the middles, suggests that Montevidean providers seek closeness and involvement through the use of informal greetings and pronouns, shorter opening sequences and longer closings during which selling topics were reintroduced by the seller (see also Márquez Reiter and Stewart 2008). On the other hand, service providers in Quito were reported to seek respectful distance through use of formal greetings and pronouns, relatively longer opening sequences and brief closings. Today, studies of this kind, centred on different varieties of the same language are often addressed within the field of variational pragmatics (see Schneider and Placencia (Chap. 21), in this volume). Bataller's (2015) study of regional variation in Spanish *cafeterías* in Granada and Valencia, with a focus on the illocutionary, discourse and stylistic domains, and Binchy's (2005) study of the effect of participant familiarity on customers' requests for service and servers' requests for payment in Irish English, are examples of variational pragmatic studies of interest to researchers of (im)politeness in SEs.

Cross-cultural perspectives have a prominent place in research into SEs within (im)politeness frameworks. Traverso's (2006) study of audio-recorded SEs in France and Syria, which focuses on routines and interactional rituals, illustrates this point. Traverso's work showed the ways in which politeness choices in SEs were culture-specific: interpersonal devices like lexico-grammatical minimisers were more frequent in the French than in the Arabic SEs, while Syrian interactions resorted more frequently and systematically to ritual acts which transform the encounter into 'a little ceremony of everyday life' (p. 120).

Research into service encounters has increasingly drawn from recent views and contributions within the field of (im)politeness studies, brought about by the 'discursive turn' (see above, see Mills (Chap. 3), in this volume). In this sense, a slowly growing body of studies of lay expectations of, or first-order,

(im)politeness in different service settings is gaining importance. Fernández-Amaya et al. (2014), for instance, develop a first-order politeness study of the genre of reception-desk interactions. Through an electronic questionnaire, this study examined Spanish guests' expectations and assessments of appropriate receptionist interactional behaviour in hotels in Spain and abroad (three English-speaking countries), using a genre approach to (im)politeness (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2010). The analysis revealed that Spanish guests generally expect efficiency, professionalism, formality, deference and task-oriented strategies independently of the country where they are staying, therefore making the behavioural normative expectations typical of this genre the determining factor in language preferences. However, when assessing specific linguistic strategies, Spanish guests showed a preference for receptionists to orientate to deference and formality when in Spain, but placed greater value on off-task talk and solidarity when abroad. This was explained in terms of respondents' construction of a non-native identity during the intercultural encounter. The authors caution that general and linguistic expectations should be taken into consideration by hotel managers to accomplish customer satisfaction and prompt successful SEs. Carmona-Lavado and Hernández-López (2015) also investigate the relationship between politeness and customer satisfaction in Spanish restaurants from a bottom-up perspective. Through self-completed questionnaires their study revealed that employees' politeness had a great impact on customers' positive evaluations of the encounter, and that the type of politeness most highly valued by questionnaire respondents included a combination of respectful distance and friendliness. These results are incongruent with generalist claims that associate Spanish communicative preferences with positive politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987). They implicitly alert the (im)politeness analyst to the importance of considering the role that context plays in (im)politeness and covertly caution against using fixed taxonomies or categorisations without an ethnographic understanding of the context chosen to examine (im)politeness.

3.2 Telephone-Mediated Service Encounters

The general availability and low cost of telephone communication, at least in some parts of the globe, have transformed the way in which many (multi) national and international companies interface with consumers. The pervasiveness of a medium that allows participants to exchange information and carry out transactions synchronically and at a distance is evident in the creation and proliferation of call centres around the globe. These, in turn, have

brought about changes in the customer-service provider relationship in as much as many everyday services are now provided over the phone in real time twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. This form of mediated supply and demand brings with it changes in the way in which efficiency and sociability are calibrated and, hence, (im)politeness managed (see Sect. 1).

Telephone SEs thus unfold within 'the parameters of the medium' (Márquez Reiter 2011, p. 3), institutional, synchronous, real-time encounters involving a certain degree of planning both on the part of the client and on the part of the provider. Two aspects are specially innovative and relevant in telephone SEs: a focus on the participant who acts as interaction-initiator, and a move away from requests and into other linguistic actions also performed during the encounter, as is the case of complaints (Márquez Reiter 2013b).

Telephone-mediated SEs have also received considerable attention from (im)politeness scholars, albeit to a lesser extent than dyadic face-to-face encounters, given the difficulty in accessing naturally occurring recordings of service calls. Márquez Reiter (2005, 2006) examined the openings of calls to a Montevideo-based carer-provider company and to a service repair company. Although offers of assistance were absent in both studies, greeting exchanges were reported as recurrent. The author reported that the occurrence of greetings in service calls between strangers who are unlikely to be in touch with each other again displays an orientation to interpersonal connectedness (Fitch 1991) and is seen as a sign of politeness in the context examined.

In a cross-cultural study of politeness strategies of Greek and British English callers to an airline's call service Economidou-Kogetsidis (2005) examined the callers' degree of directness in proffering the reason for the call, i.e. the opening request, and the differences in the use of the marker 'please' in both languages. She found that Greek speakers compared to British English speakers, employed a higher degree of directness. The author affirmed that directness was motivated by clarity, goal-orientedness and formality. She concluded that the interpretation of the meaning and function of requestive directness is context-dependent (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 130).

Focusing on the sequential organisation of the request-response adjacency pair Varcasia (2013) carried out a cross-cultural study of British English, Italian and German service calls, primarily from a conversation-analytic perspective. Contrary to previous studies of opening requests (Economidou-Kogetsidis 2005) which were found to be oriented towards brevity, her analysis shows that the participants prefer more complex response types. They offer the customer more information than has actually been requested. This is because a yes/ no response without any attenuation devices would in fact be a 'non-conforming type of response', that is, an answer which is not fitted to the type made relevant by the question (Schegloff 2007, p. 78). This, in turn, may suggest

a disregard for the maintenance of good customer relations and be open to evaluations of impoliteness (e.g. Orthaber and Márquez Reiter (2016)).

Other studies of facework and politeness in mediated calls for information include Márquez Reiter (2008) examination of calls to a service repair company where she observed that the agents shifted responsibility to a third party so as to distance themselves from the cause of problem, thus not fully assuming their roles as institutional representatives. Márquez Reiter (2011) further conducted an extensive study of various activities in openings, middles and closings of inbound and outbound telephone calls to and from a Latin American call centre of a multinational timeshare company and identified various practices that the telephone agents and customers, speakers of different standard varieties of Spanish in the Americas, go about getting things done. She found that the openings and closings, in particular, are structurally similar to those identified in similar institutional settings in other languages (e.g. Zimmerman 1992) despite an orientation to interpersonal connectedness as evidenced, among others, by the presence of greetings and 'how are you' sequences (cf. Tracy 1997 and Sect. 1). More recently, Archer and Jagodziński (2015) examined impoliteness and verbal aggression at a Polish-speaking call centre. The authors maintain that the institution's tacit acceptance of this communicative behaviour leads to the sanctioning of face-attacks.

3.3 Online Service Encounters: A Changing World

Just as language-based disciplines were relatively slow to embark on the investigation of online discourses (Androutsopoulos and Beibwenger 2009; Bou-Franch et al. 2012), so too have (im)politeness scholars been relatively slow to examine new forms of SEs in the digital world, despite the enormous growth of electronic commerce over the last decade. Let us briefly consider a news report that caught our attention while writing this chapter. The report discussed the promotional efforts of a local public transport company to target youth, which included providing a mobile phone number to which users can text their queries through *WhatsApp*. The reason behind this move lies in the fact that this technology is used by 95% of people aged 18–30 in the region, and thus its use is expected to attract the desired population segment.[5] This briefly shows how companies are seeking to optimise their sales by employing resources provided by developments in information and communication technologies. In addition to traditional companies' use of digital technologies and migration to online environments, new electronic stores with no bricks and mortar counterpart are also continuously emerging. The world of service

[5] http://cadenaser.com/emisora/2015/02/19/radio_valencia/1424364035_449813.html.

encounters is changing, and so is the way in which we communicate therein. Companies now have greater visibility and reach much wider audiences, while users have a variety of purchasing and interacting possibilities, including different digital modes which may be employed in combination with more traditional shopping encounters.

Recent publications, however, suggest that this area is slowly but steadily gaining the attention it deserves. The study of (im)politeness in digital SEs should address two important issues: (1) the employment of appropriate methodologies to fully capture practices on line; and (2) the ways in which digitisation is reshaping discursive practices (cf Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2015). Regarding the first issue, it becomes essential to combine *digitised methods*, i.e. those designed for non-mediated communication that may be adapted to the new media, with *natively digital* frameworks (Rogers 2009). Research suggests that we can gain more insights into digital practices by employing traditional linguistic frameworks alongside a range of media theories dealing with technology-based interactions (Bou-Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2014b; Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2015). Interestingly, Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) develop a classification scheme of social media types with a view to advising companies on best practices. It draws on two social processes of interest to (im)politeness scholarship i.e. self-presentation and self-disclosure (Goffman 1971, p. 79), and two media theories, namely, Social Presence (Short et al. 1976) and Media Richness (Daft and Lengel 1986). This suggests ways in which digitised methods could be integrated with natively digital theories to examine (im)politeness in electronic SEs.

Studies of SEs through websites focus mainly on communication from the company to the consumer; such encounters represent the section of e-commerce closest to pre-social media era, thus reflecting the 'points of continuity' (Page et al. 2014, p. 9) between early and recent internet practices. Consequently, these studies elaborate on the absence of negotiation and personal interaction between provider and consumer, which were central in studies of face-to-face and telephone-mediated encounters, opening thus a potentially interesting avenue for the examination of the role of (im)politeness in such contexts.

In their study of commercial websites in Peninsular and US Spanish, for example, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Bou-Franch (2008) argue that even though the personal interaction between the company and the consumer loses centrality, the company still performs a number of persuasive acts that involve politeness choices. What is new, however, is that politeness options are not open to negotiation but need to be anticipated by the company. The authors analysed the linguistic realisation of marketing

strategies in a corpus of commercial websites and found that politeness patterns such as showing interest in the customer, offering the customer goods and claiming common ground were frequently used by companies to provide entertainment and dialogue and to offer customers a service beyond their expectations, i.e. they addressed customers' saliently positive face needs (Brown and Levinson 1987) and were oriented towards involvement and rapport. The marketing strategies of providing customers with greater control was realised through the politeness pattern of giving them options, which addressed saliently negative face needs and showed concern for customers' independence (Brown and Levinson 1987). Further cross-cultural comparisons unveiled the predominance of genre conventions over possible culture-specific constraints, a finding explained in terms of the greater prevalence of globalisation in the web.

Indeed, recent research has elaborated on the idea of lack of personal contact in commercial websites and found that this is often seen as an advantage rather than a problem, a fact that makes the transactional goal and the information-orientation of electronic shopping even more salient, and suggests that *informed choice* is the 'driving force behind e-shopping practices, indeed what e-service encounters are all about' (Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2015, p. 26). The centrality of information-giving in commercial websites calls for research into the 'what and how' of the information provided. Corporate websites, for instance, have been found to offer multiple transactions within the same platform. In particular, Bou-Franch (2015) found a connection between information presentation, the social identity of consumers, and politeness, and suggested that convergent platforms allow the company to address different consumer groups and tailor informational content and politeness preferences in providing such information, in accordance to their anticipated needs. Additionally, specific cultural dimensions vis-à-vis rapport management have also been found to play an important role in information presentation (Ivorra Pérez 2015). In fact, given the internationalisation of e-commerce, cross-cultural variation is of utmost importance when considering interface design, not only in terms of information presentation but also including semiotic modes other than language (Callahan 2006). This calls for discourse analysts to adopt multimodal perspectives, an area in need of further research (Thurlow and Mroczek 2011) in the arena of (im)politeness studies.

On the other hand, newer forms of communication between the company and the consumers, and among consumers, have also begun to receive scholarly attention. Studies like Placencia (2015) and Márquez Reiter et al. (2015) are a case in point. In an examination of a dynamic website which

accommodates different retailers and products and offers customers the possibility of engaging in interactions with the sellers, Placencia (2015) examined interactions between Ecuadorian consumers and retailers and found ordinary offline practices like bargaining and bartering were not infrequent. She investigated the creation and negotiation of interpersonal relationships through the use of address forms and greetings. Her study revealed a tendency towards informality. This is in marked contrast with the respectful distance characteristic of the face-to-face service encounters in Ecuador previously studied (see, for example, Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2004). The anonymity of the electronic medium was argued to be behind the greater reliance on informal devices, which were considered to be too close to overfriendliness, and even to impoliteness. This study, therefore, supports previous research that shows the prominence of informality across digital modes of communication (cf. Lorenzo-Dus and Bou-Franch 2013; Yus 2012).

In a study of social media interaction within the framework of SEs, Márquez Reiter et al. (2015) adopt a ritual relational perspective (Kádár 2013) to investigate communication between a Slovenian public transport company and consumers through a company-supported Facebook page. The study examined customers' reactions to the company's status updates, and subsequent responses by the page administrator, and revealed that although the administrator seeks to align with customers and present a positive image of the company, she interactionally disattends (Maynard and Hudak 2008) to the Facebook users' misgivings regarding the company's products and services. This, in turn, they argued, prevented the customers' moans from becoming complaints (Edwards 2000). As a result of this, moans escalated as observed in the way customers formed coalitions with other customers against the company (see also Creelman 2015).This study offers a new facet of service provider–consumer digital interaction, namely, ways in which communication among consumers in social media may fall outside the control of the company (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; Mangold and Faulds 2009).

The centrality of information in general, and more specifically, that of informed choice, in commercial websites and its relation to community-building in social media service encounters, has begun to unveil the ways in which service providers and consumers interactionally manage task efficiency and sociability in the digital world. Furthermore, the variety of discursive practices involved in these interactions suggests that the genre of SEs is transforming. It is characterised by change and hybridity, in its adaptation to internet technologies (Fairclough 2003).

4 Disattending Customers' Positive Comments: A Case Study

This section presents a case study of (im)politeness in digital service encounters. It focuses on the company *El Corte Inglés* (ECI), the largest department store in Spain. ECI boasts a multiplatform website for e-shopping, connected to numerous blogs. ECI also connects with customers through a range of social media, namely, Facebook, Twitter, Tuenti, Google+, YouTube and Pinterest. Such extensive presence and participation in the social media is hardly surprising for, as Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) argue for the corporate world, '[t]oday, everything is about Social Media' (p. 67).

Our case study specifically focuses on the promotional campaign of the summer line of clothing for men (called *Hominem*) recently launched across different digital technologies. Central to this campaign is fashion model Juan Betancourt, who acts as ECI's main strategy to appeal to customers. This case study particularly examines Facebook interactions in relation to the said campaign. Example 1 shows ECI's status update of May 6, 2015.

(1) El Corte Inglés[6]
Disfruta de la nueva colección de #HominemconJuan Betancourthttp://bit.ly/1JkZW2M
Enjoy #Hominem new collection with Juan Betancourthttp://bit.ly/1JkZW2M

The post included a promotional video-clip of the model in different outfits. It must be noted that this line of male clothing is promoted through the use of the verb 'enjoy', in relation to the brand *Hominem* and the model *Betancourt*, suggesting that some form of enjoyment could be derived from watching the video-clip in relation to the two hypertext words: the name of the brand and of the model. Indeed, consumers not only 'went along' with it, but also 'elaborated on', this company-fostered entertainment, in the sense of Haugh's (2014, p. 95) interactional dynamics of jocular mockery. Within 17 hours of its publication, the video-clip had over 23.000 views, while the post was shared by 48 users, received over 600 likes, and, more importantly for

[6] Although the case study selected and, in particular, some of the comments made by the prospective female consumers represent a case of modern reverted sexism, it is beyond the scope of our chapter to discuss it. The example was merely chosen as representative of social participation in across social media SEs.

our analysis of textual participation, received 39 responses, which interactionally built up the 'enjoyment' into what could be termed 'escalating entertainment'. A selection of such posts follows:

(2) 1 (F) Uno de estos me recomendó el medico (emoticono)
the doctor prescribed one of these to me (grinning emoticon)
2 (F) Hilarious lol
3 (F) Madre de dios hermoso, ¡¡¡
Oh my god !!!
4 (M) El Corte inglés? O El Modelo? Ay!!! Hija Y Prima, Que Sois señoras Casadas.
El corte inglés? Or the model? Oops!!! Daughter and cousin, but you're married ladies.
5 (F) Está incluido el modelo??
Is the model included???
6 (F) En lo que menos me he fijado ha sido en la ropa!!! Donde esta, en El Corte Inglés?????? Voy de caminooooooooo
I paid the least attention to the clothes!!!! Where is he, in El Corte Inglés?????? On my wayyyyyyyy
7 (F) Dónde se esconde?
Where's he hiding?
8 (M) SUPERBETANCOURT
9 (F) Pero estos hombres existen de verdad?? Donde están porque yo en el Corte Inglés no los veo
But do these men actually exist?? Where are they because I can't see them in El Corte Inglés

In signalling the non-serious, playful frame, Facebook respondents resorted to a variety of discursive means typical of conversational joking and mockery,[7] like transparent untruths (2.1), exaggerations (2.8) or incongruous allusions (2.4) and presuppositions (2.7) (Dynel 2008; Haugh 2014; Norrick 2004). The laughter, phonetic features and facial/bodily cues which characterise face-to-face, conversational humour (Haugh 2014) were replaced in this context by a range of micro-linguistic features typical of digital discourse, which included use of emoticons (2.1), acronyms (2.2), multiple punctuation marks and vowels (2. 6), and capitalisation (2. 8) (Bieswanger 2013). In going along with the invitation to enjoy the promotion, and elaborating on it in what participants signal as playful and entertaining, the humorous exchange makes

[7] See Haugh (2014) for a review.

salient a positive politeness orientation in that the exchange builds rapport and strengthens solidarity between the company and the consumers. This type of conversational humour is 'group inclusive' (Dynel 2008, p. 251) in that it contributes to create cohesion and reinforce bonding ties among members of this online community.[8] In this way, ECI offers entertainment—which is precisely one of the five key marketing strategies identified in the literature (cf. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Bou-Franch 2008)—thus contributing to customer satisfaction. The positive, unquestioning response to this status update is probably behind the lack of further contributions by the company. The company disattention to customers' positive comments contrasts with that of company disattention in the case of the negative comments of Márquez Reiter et al.'s (2015) study. Despite differences in the customers' assessments, both forms of social media afforded (Gibson 1979) (prospective) consumers a multiparty participatory framework in which consumers can create allegiances in favour or against the services or brand offered by given companies. In so doing, they offer (im)politeness scholars an opportunity to explore relational practices in (non) ephemeral virtual service encounter communities.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the evolution of shopping practices and the concomitant changes in studies of (im)politeness and service encounters. Interpersonal interaction has been at the heart of face-to-face and telephone-mediated encounters and often used as a starting point to examine (im)politeness in newer forms of service encounters with varying degrees of success. However, the advent of the digital revolution has transformed the world of service encounters in as much as the analytic frameworks traditionally used to examine (im)politeness and the methods used to collect the data on which these studies are based do not always capture the multitude of (concurrent) exchanges that service providers and consumers can potentially engage in across time or the changing roles that this affordance brings about. Technological advances have enabled consumers to gain access to product information prior to engaging with a service provider as well as the possibility of sharing their experience with other consumers. This, in turn, can potentially allow consumers to challenge the knowledge and authority on which the traditional role of service providers are conceived, providing thus

[8] This brief example also offers a glimpse into the gender culture that the store promotes, a point we cannot address here for lack of space, but which calls for further research from critical perspectives.

(im)politeness scholars with rich data to examine face manifestations and behavioural normative expectations in SEs.

We have noted the centrality of information and informed choice in SEs through commercial websites in which there is a general lack of personal interaction between provider and consumer, and shopping becomes a form of impersonal self-service. We have also underlined how companies are resorting to social media to re-establish contact with customers and even host interactions among customers, thus creating online communities. These communities, as noted above, constitute ideal sites for the investigation of face work and the negotiation of behavioural norms. Indeed, future studies of the merits of (im)politeness through SEs should take into account the affordability (Gibson 1979), potentiality and multiplicity of channels of communication through which SEs are presently delivered.

Further research into SEs should also consider, at least, two overlooked issues: the presence of third parties during the encounters and the role of non-verbal communication. In this respect, Merritt (2015) argues that SEs involving adults with accompanying children unfold against situated communicative practices acquired early in life through socialisation processes. Socialisation is at the heart of the SE in which an adult customer brings along a child or youth, and forms the object of her enquiry—the service encounter with children (or SEWC). Through a small ethnographic study which included observation, note-taking and informal interviews she observed how SEWC bring about changes in the maintenance of ritual equilibrium (or (im)politeness), tied to situated context in terms of the territorial areas of the providers and the expanded territory of the adult with an accompanying child. Changes in the dynamics of territorial authority, she argues, lead to the use of creative and subtle moves on the part of the adults, including eye contact and use of inclusive and exclusive pronouns, thus reframing the participant structure of the encounter. This study opens a new area of research into naturally occurring encounters in as much as it sheds light on how cultural practices, including (im)politeness devices, are learnt and perpetuated within different communities as well as the importance of taking full account of the communicative context under examination.

As we have seen so far, there is ample evidence that service providers' affective and verbal behaviour during a SE affects customer satisfaction with the encounter; however, little is known of how non-verbal cues contribute to enhance service providers' affective and verbal behaviour and impact on customer satisfaction. This motivated Dorai and Webster (2015) to develop a conceptual model of non-verbal communication in SEs capable of capturing how paralanguage, kinetics, proxemics and physical

appearance, may influence affective reactions. And, how these, in turn, are likely to determine customer evaluations of friendliness, courtesy, empathy, competence, and credibility. Thus, research into non-mediated SEs should also consider the utilisation of video-recording to ascertain the role played by non-verbal communication.

It should by now be clear that research into (im)politeness in SEs will thus need to reconsider how the imperatives of sociability and efficiency are managed in as much as interpersonal relations are (re)constructed in multimedia SEs across time. This allows customers and service providers alike to anticipate expectations on the basis of multiple prior exchanges with other customers and service providers. This complex picture calls for an interdisciplinary approach encompassing concepts and portraits from (im)politeness research, media theories and the latest developments in Information and Communication Technologies. Undoubtedly, this represents an exciting challenge; one that as (im)politeness scholars we should rise up to in a rapidly changing world.

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26

(Im)politeness in Health Settings

Miriam A. Locher and Stephanie Schnurr

1 Introduction

As Mullany (2009) points out in her introduction to the special issue on health and (im)politeness in the *Journal of Politeness Research*, 'applying politeness research to health care communication' is a fairly recent but rewarding area of research within applied linguistics. Even when we include the studies she points to (Robins and Wolf 1988; Lambert 1995, 1996; Speirs 1998; Grainger 2002, 2004; Jameson 2003; Norris and Rowsell 2003; Delbene 2004; Woolhead et al. 2006), add the six contributions in her 2009 special issue (Backhaus; Brown and Crawford; Graham; Harrison and Barlow; Mullany; Zayts and Kang), and take further sources into account, we can still concur with Mullany that 'overall there is a real necessity for empirical investigations to be produced in a wide variety of health care contexts' (p. 1). In this chapter, we review some of the issues that transpire in the current research field and add observations of our own.

Before going into a literature review on the intersection of the study of (im)politeness and health communication which entails an introduction to

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_26

key concepts and theories (Sect. 2), some comments on the scope of the terms are in order. In a narrow sense, '(im)politeness' in its emic understanding refers to what people in a particular social practice understand by the terms 'politeness', 'impoliteness', 'rudeness', etc. While there are larger societal norms that display ideologies about social behaviour, there can also be considerable local differences in the practices of individual groups (see Leech 2014; Locher and Watts 2005). However, the term (im)politeness can also be used as a shorthand for referring to facework/ relational work/ rapport management in general. With this larger lens in mind, scholars are interested in situated pragmatic rules that show how social interactants negotiate relationships and get 'things done' by means of language without jeopardising the social balance or how people exploit linguistic means in more conflictual situations to get their points of view across and to save, maintain or challenge each other's face (for a thorough introduction to the notion of face, see O'Driscoll (Chap. 5), in this volume). Studies with such a larger (im)politeness lens often look at particular interpersonal strategies, such as the use of humour, mitigation strategies and address terms, in order to report on patters in relational work (see Locher and Graham 2010, on the scope of interpersonal pragmatics).

Linking these observations to our health context, it is important to first point out that the combination of health and communication is a vibrant research field with a long tradition (for overviews, see, e.g., Hamilton and Chou 2014; Harvey and Koteyko 2013; Collins et al. 2011; journals such as *Communication and Medicine*). Many different research disciplines contribute to this field from social psychology, communication studies, health literacy, medical sociology, medical anthropology, education, pragmatics and applied linguistics. The object of study is equally diverse including different interactions between different combinations of interactants (healthcare provider–healthcare provider, healthcare provider–patient, patient–patient, carers–patients, etc.), ideologies and discourses around health and different modes and interaction and their combinations (face-to-face, telephone, leaflets, case reports, e-health contexts, etc.). Hamilton and Chou (2014, p. 1) report on clusters of research on 'patient–provider communication,' 'mental health and counseling,' 'narrative as related to cognition and illness experience,' and the 'discourse of public health.' They go on to organise the 40 chapters in their handbook (which is compiled with applied linguists in mind) around the themes 'individuals' everyday health communication,' 'health professionals' communicative practices,' and 'patient–provider communication in interaction.' Davis (2010, p. 382) argues that there are four distinct groups of researchers with different training who study language use in particular in medical contexts: linguists who study health discourse; clinical linguists who work on language

disorders; health communications studies specialists; and clinicians who are persons trained in clinical practice and who aim at improving communication. They all have in common that they look at language, observe linguistic patterns and offer interpretations from their different points of view. Health practitioners have long been interested in studying their communication and in discovering best practices and problems in an attempt to improve healthcare services and 'to enact more effective care and achieve more favourable patient outcomes as a result of better communication' (Davis 2010, p. 382).

As a result, the following selection of health buzz issues touches on concerns central to both health communication and interpersonal pragmatics (as defined by Locher and Graham 2010): patient empowerment, the creation of rapport between doctor and patient, the use of persuasive strategies to encourage patients to adhere to treatment (e.g. by means of humour, mitigation, the use of lay vocabulary and the avoidance of jargon, etc.), the creation of trust and expertise or how to deal with face-threatening situations of having to break bad news or imparting information without giving advice. This is because the situated practices that evoke expectations about actions and roles, the dynamic negotiation of face and norms, and the resulting identity construction and relationship negotiation are often at the heart of these studies. In many cases, however, the literature on health and communication does not use theories of (im)politeness as a starting point for their analyses despite studying the same or similar surface phenomena. As a consequence, scholars interested in relational work and (im)politeness in health communication may find many more studies relevant for them when expanding their searches beyond the keywords (im)politeness. Having said this, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to give an overview on language and health communication in general. In what follows, we will thus first elaborate on a number of key studies that combine an interest in interpersonal language use and (im)politeness studies in health contexts (Sect. 2), before elaborating on a set of interlinked key themes that we will illustrate with data (Sect. 3). We will conclude the chapter by offering an outlook to further research (Sect. 4).

2 Key Concepts and Theories: (Im)politeness in Healthcare Contexts

Research on (im)politeness in healthcare is as diverse and varied as the general scope of language and health communication briefly described above. This diversity is reflected in the different healthcare contexts that studies have looked at, the different types and forms of communication and participants

involved in the interactions that characterise these contexts, as well as the different theoretical frameworks on which this research draws. While it would go beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of all these different aspects, we aim to provide only a brief summary here and illustrate some of the overall trends and tendencies that characterise recent research on (im)politeness in healthcare settings. We will concentrate first on the scope of research and will then zoom into the emerging topics of e-health, culture, and theory and method in order to illustrate key issues and theories.

2.1 Scope of Research

In addition to focusing on relatively traditional institutionalised contexts (such as hospitals or general practices) where many studies are located (e.g. Agledahl et al. 2011; Ojwang et al. 2010; Zayts and Schnurr 2013), (im)politeness research is increasingly conducted in other, perhaps slightly less mainstream, medical environments. For example, Woolhead et al. (2006) and Backhaus (2009) analyse the use of (im)politeness in social care settings, Davis and Kelly (2012) focus on counselling services, and Bromme et al. (2012), Graham (2009) and Locher (2017) look at different educational environments. In addition, research on internet-related healthcare environments is on the rise (e.g. Gallardo and Ferrari 2010; Harrison and Barlow 2009; Harvey and Koteyko 2013; Locher 2006, 2010). Researchers have also started to expand on the literature on professional–lay interactions, such as those between nurses and patients (Zayts and Schnurr 2013; Ojwang et al. 2010), care home staff and clients (e.g. Woolhead et al. 2006; Temple et al. 1999), stroke patients and health professionals (Grainger et al. 2005), and between tutors and medical students (Bromme et al. 2012)—just to name a few. Moreover, intra-professional encounters, for example among doctors (Gallardo and Ferrari 2010) and among healthcare professionals with different specialisations, such as pharmacists, physicians, and nurses (Lambert 1995; Graham 2009) receive more and more attention. A relatively underresearched area seems to be that of (im)politeness in interactions among patients, which only a handful of studies have investigated to date. One of these studies is Harrison and Barlow (2009) who analyse the occurrence of specific politeness strategies in relation to advice giving in the online feedback that patients with arthritis give each other as part of an online self-management programme. They observed that in performing the potentially face-threatening acts of giving advice and criticising each others' weekly action plans via emails and postings on an online discussion board, the patients frequently used relatively

short personal narratives to express empathy while giving advice relatively indirectly. This technique is particularly effective in this specific healthcare context as it enables 'advice givers to avoid being prescriptive while at the same time demonstrating empathy and shared concerns with the recipient' (Harrison and Barlow 2009, p. 108; Thurnherr et al. 2016).

2.2 e-health

Harrison and Barlow's (2009) study also shows that there is a growing interest among researchers on (im)politeness to analyse other forms of communication rather than the traditional face-to-face interactions. In addition to the emails and postings on online discussion boards that they looked at, other studies have conducted research on telephone interactions (e.g. Brown and Crawford 2009), and a range of other computer mediated forms of communication, such as an online discussion forum for doctors (Gallardo and Ferrari 2010), and a range of different healthcare-related websites (e.g. Locher 2006, 2010; Oh et al. 2012). For example, in a study on websites that promote safe-sex behaviours Steehouder (2005) investigates the use of facework to effectively communicate potentially face-threatening information on this taboo topic. He shows that by creating specific sets of roles for authors and readers, these websites skilfully manage to do the FTAs of criticising current opinions and behaviours of the readers as well as imposing specific behaviours on them. Constructing and strategically drawing on specific sets of roles (expert–unknowing; consultant–advice seeker; instructor–follower; and peer-to-peer) enables the website users to communicate the various FTAs in relatively direct, on-record and yet non-face-threatening ways. For example, by taking on the role of expert it becomes acceptable for an author to answer questions (e.g. posted by other users in the Frequently Asked Questions Section) and to deliver information often in a rather schoolbook like fashion. Similarly, taking on the roles of peers may facilitate talking about topics that might be considered taboo for an interaction among strangers (e.g. sex).

The notion of role has received some attention in the literature on medical communication (e.g. Sarangi 2000, 2010; Zayts and Schnurr 2014) and is as important for e-health practices as it is for face-to-face interaction. It is generally understood as a discursive accomplishment which is always to some extent co-constructed, subject to change, and dependent on the context (e.g. Roberts and Sarangi 1999). In the medical context, interlocutors (often strategically) draw on different roles which are to some extent co-constructed between those participating in the interaction taking into consideration

the institutional context in which the interaction takes place. Interlocutors thereby skilfully negotiate the various (and sometimes opposing) demands of the medical context and profession, on the one hand, and the clients' expectations, on the other (Zayts and Schnurr 2014). They thus engage in intricate emergent negotiations of identity construction and relationships. Locher and Hoffman's (2006) work on the fictional agony aunt Lucy in an online advice column demonstrates how carefully the health team responsible for the column uses language to create an approachable yet informed persona through entirely linguistic means, who is appealing to the target audience of college students. For an in-depth discussion of the interface of (im)politeness and identity construction, see Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Sifianou (Chap. 10), in this volume.

2.3 Culture

Another topical strand that runs through the research on (im)politeness in healthcare settings is that of culture. Since the relationship between (im)politeness and culture has long captured the interest of researchers, it is perhaps not surprising that this is also the topic of several research studies in the healthcare context. More specifically, (im)politeness phenomena have been researched in a wide range of different sociocultural contexts, as, for example, Australia (e.g. Davis and Kelly 2012; Iedema 2005), Hong Kong (e.g. Zayts and Kang 2009; Zayts and Schnurr 2013), Kenya (Ojwang et al. 2010), Latin America (e.g. Gallardo and Ferrari 2010), Norway (e.g. Agledahl et al. 2011), the United Kingdom (e.g. Harrison and Barlow 2009), and the United States (e.g. Graham 2009; Locher 2006). These studies have identified and described some of the discursive strategies and pragmatic processes through which participants in these sociocultural contexts do (im)politeness in a wide range of healthcare settings. One of the few studies which specifically focuses on the phenomenon of *im*politeness is Ojwang et al. (2010). Their study of nurses in a Kenyan hospital discusses the frequent use of impoliteness and abuse uttered by the nurses towards their patients. They show some of the strategies through which the nurses regularly attack the patients' face and the responses this generates. Although in most cases the nurses did not employ any mitigating strategies when issuing their impolite comments, such as criticisms, blame, sarcastic remarks, and reprimands, which often violated the patients' dignity, the patients were generally more concerned with preserving both their own and the nurses' face. In order to reclaim their dignity they typically responded with either silence, retaliatory face damage or face repair.

The remarkably high frequency of impolite behaviour by the nurses which was observed in this particular hospital is explained with reference to the social power differential that exists between the nurses and their patients, and the perceived vulnerability and powerlessness of the latter in this context. What is particularly interesting about this study is the authors' comment at the end that this situation 'is not in accord with what is considered Western best practice in hospital settings' (Ojwang et al. 2010, p. 521).

However, in spite of this interest in (im)politeness in healthcare in a range of different sociocultural contexts, there is only a relatively small number of studies which focus on (im)politeness in intracultural and intercultural encounters (e.g. Graham 2009; Mason 2004; Zayts and Kang 2009). But several comparative studies exist which explore the use of (im)politeness in medical settings in different sociocultural contexts, such as Backhaus' (2009) analysis of politeness in elderly care facilities in Japan, in which he compares his observations with the findings of previous studies in a similar context in countries as diverse as South Africa, Germany and the United Kingdom. He observed remarkable similarities regarding the use of positive politeness strategies in instances of praise, and inclusive as well as exclusive joking displayed by interlocutors in care homes across these countries. These similarities are interpreted as pointing to 'some universal communicative properties in this special type of health care setting' (Backhaus 2009, p. 67). Due to the relatively similar institutional characteristics and practices of these settings, e.g. in terms of power difference and social distance between interactants, as well as the seriousness of the FTAs involved, it is perhaps not surprising to find a high degree of similarity in the use of verbal strategies to do politeness (but see Ojwang et al. 2010, above). Thus, rather than referring to potential cultural differences, this study shows that the everyday practices that characterise the care home context may be more relevant in accounting for the use of (im)politeness.

This critical stance towards using culture as an explanation for observed differences in (im)politeness is also reflected in other studies in the healthcare context. In line with recent developments in research on intercultural communication, there is an increasing acknowledgement among politeness researchers that treating culture as an a priori explanatory variable to account for observed differences in (im)polite behaviour is not a very fruitful exercise as it dramatically oversimplifies a rather complex situation and runs the danger of reinforcing stereotypes (e.g. Eelen 2001; Mills 2003, 2004; Watts 2003). For example, in a study on prenatal screening in Hong Kong, Zayts and Schnurr (2013, p. 188) argue that researchers should 'focus on how meaning is created and negotiated at the micro-level of an interaction, and to move away from 'grand generalisations' about the impact of culture specific

behaviours and expectations' on the way in which people use (im)politeness. They propose that using the framework of relational work (Watts 2003; Locher and Watts 2005) is one way forward as it 'encourages analyses that view both politeness and culture as discursive constructs' (Zayts and Schnurr 2013, p. 190). According to this theoretical framework, notions of what is considered to be polite, impolite, or politic behaviour are dynamically negotiated among participants in a specific encounter. Thus, rather than assuming that culture per se influences participants' behaviour in terms of (im)politeness, employing the framework of relational work shifts the focus onto analysing how specific cultural aspects (such as sociocultural norms) are actually oriented to and negotiated as an interaction unfolds.

2.4 Theory and Method

The immense diversity of research on (im)politeness in healthcare contexts in terms of interactional setting, participants, and form of communication is further reflected in the different methodological and theoretical approaches that researchers have taken when exploring issues of (im)politeness in healthcare contexts. Zayts and Schnurr's (2013) study is also a good illustration of the tendency of recent research on (im)politeness in healthcare settings to move beyond an uncritical use of Brown and Levinson's (1987) seminal Politeness Theory and to draw on other theoretical frameworks, such as relational work (see also Graham 2009). Although Politeness Theory remains one of the most popular frameworks, in more recent research, it is often used a starting point or general frame of reference which is then further supplemented and extended by other theoretical approaches (e.g. Harrison and Barlow 2009; Rhys and Schmidt-Renfree 2000). One of these 'other' concepts often used in combination with Politeness Theory in research in the healthcare context is the notion of Community of Practice (Wenger 1998). In line with the community of practice approach, the frequent face attacks by the nurses in the Kenyan hospital that Ojwang et al. (2010) observed, for example, can at least partly be understood as a reflection and enactment of some of the licensed and normative practices that have emerged among the nurses in this hospital setting. The authors argue that, while this kind of confrontational face-attacking behaviour may be perceived as impolite and inappropriate by the patients (who are outsiders to this particular community of practice), it may be interpreted as completely normal, appropriate behaviour by the nurses (who are integral members of this particular community of practice).

The theoretical and methodological differences in research orientations also surface in the use of different data. Research conducted within communication studies and medical anthropology tends to gather data via experimental designs around hypothetical scenarios (often with students as participants) (e.g. Bromme et al. 2012; Dillard and Shen 2005; Jenkins and Dragojevic 2013; Pitts et al. 2014) or survey questionnaires (e.g. Bartlett and Coulson 2011), and often uses a five-point Likert scale or other kinds of descriptive statistics to analyse frequencies and correlations of particular behaviours. However, within applied linguistics and pragmatics, most research studies on (im)politeness in healthcare contexts are data-driven and draw on qualitative sociolinguistic methodologies, such as discourse analysis (e.g. Grainger 2004; Grainger et al. 2005; Zayts and Schnurr 2013; Graham 2009). This includes both written documents (such as the critical incident reports in Iedema (2005)), spoken interactions (such as the face-to-face conversations recorded by, for example, Zayts and Kang (2009) and Grainger (2004)), as well as a range of online material (e.g. Gallardo and Ferrari 2010; Oh et al. 2012; Locher 2006; Thurnherr et al. 2016). Other popular methods of gathering data employed by researchers across different disciplines include participant observation (e.g. Mason 2004; Ojwang et al. 2010), conducting interviews (e.g. Pliskin 1997; Brashers et al. 2006), and organising focus groups (Woolhead et al. 2006).

While dealing with naturally occurring interactional data may be relatively challenging, not least due to a range of ethical issues that may arise as part of obtaining patients' informed consent for participating in the research, the studies briefly reviewed here clearly indicate several major advantages of such an approach. In particular, analysing authentic data is central to the endeavour of gaining a better understanding of how notions of (im)politeness are actually enacted and negotiated among participants in specific encounters in the healthcare context.

3 Critical Overview of Research: Illustrating Emergent Themes of Relational Work in Health Contexts

The previous section presented a succinct overview of the scope of past and current (im)politeness research and briefly touched on the topics of e-health, culture, and theory and method. In this section, we will revisit these concerns with the help of some data. Our discussions of examples from several different health contexts, including an American health advice column for university students, reflective writing texts form medical students in the UK, and

telephone counselling calls between genetic nurses and mothers of newborns in a Hong Kong hospital, are guided by the attention to a number of themes that re-emerge in the health literature discussed above and that are of special interest to interpersonal pragmatics:

- the face-threatening potential of many interactions in a health context;
- the negotiation of roles pertaining to health interaction in dynamic encounters;
- the creation and maintenance of trust and expertise;
- the importance of counselling, providing advice, providing information, etc.

These themes areas are fundamentally linked to face concerns and to each other. A number of examples of naturally occurring data serve to illustrate these claims.

The face-threatening character of many health encounters has been documented in many studies. The face-threat can be due to taboo issues, such as reported in Silverman et al.'s (1992) work on AIDS/HIV counselling, or may be due to concerns of social control and perceived differences in expertise, such as in Heritage and Sefi's (1992) studies on health nurses who visit first time mothers. Both studies report on patterns of counselling and advice-giving that pay tribute to the delicate nature of the issues at hand, i.e. the sexual taboo topic and the potential implication that the mothers are not doing their job well. In Grainger et al.'s (2005, p. 35) study on delivering bad news, they show how patient and therapist 'collaboratively manage the emergent "bad news" situation.' Sarangi and Clark's (2002) work on genetic counselling also reveals to what extent the parents expect advice while the counsellors are not allowed by their institutions to take a personal, advisory stance. As a result, the roles of experts and clients are contested and negotiated, which entails the risk of face-loss.

In the case of health encounters, notions of trust and expertise are particularly relevant (cf. Sillence 2013; Armstrong et al. 2011). In Locher's (2006, 2010) study of an American health advice column for university students, the team of health professionals create a fictional, female advisor persona and develop a voice for her that is supposed to be both attractive (e.g., displaying a sense of humour) and informed (e.g., referring the readers to expert sources and using a moderate amount of medical jargon, which is then explained for a lay readership; see also Locher and Hoffmann 2006). The success of this professional health advice column 'Lucy Answers' lies in attracting a readership that returns to the columns regularly and dares to ask (sensitive) questions.

The study of how advice is rendered reveals that there is a complex interplay of relational work strategies on different levels. The team hardly ever starts a

response to a question with an advisory move; instead, the advisory passages are embedded within discursive moves such as assessing the questioner's situation, giving general information on health concerns or explaining raised issues in more detail. In this, the composition of the response letters resembles a stepwise entry to advice, similar to the face-to-face context of health nurses advising first time mothers mentioned above (Heritage and Sefi 1992). Furthermore, the advisory passages show sensitivity to face concerns by formulating advice in the form of declarative sentences and questions as in (1) and (2); however, next to this general orientation to mitigation and face-saving, we also find advice in the form of imperatives as in (3) (all examples are taken from Locher 2006).

(1) You might try the 'Stop–Start' method. (a declarative sentence realizing a suggestion)
(2) Why not crank 'Under The Table And Dreaming' the next time your boyfriend is over? (an interrogative inviting a future action)
(3) Discuss this with your health care provider […]. (an imperative as directive)

However, in 'Lucy Answers' imperatives on their own or in the form of lists are embedded within the entire response letter and can thus be argued to be already mitigated to a certain extent. They often function as suggestions for several possible courses of action or for action sequences (Locher 2006, pp. 98–101).

Furthermore, the advisor 'Lucy' uses face-enhancing involvement strategies by praising the questioners about their behaviour and commending actions that they described, as well as bonding and empathising with the questioner (examples 4 to 6).

(4) Kudos to you for seeking help.
(5) Good luck with your investigation
(6) It's not at all uncommon to experience some degree of anxiety when you move, change jobs, graduate, get married, etc.—even if these big life events are positive ones.

In contrast, we also found face-aggravating strategies in the data in the form of criticism of the questioner or boosting the advisor's expertise.

(7) It isn't good to smoke no matter what else you do.
(8) It is essential to talk with your health care provider and/or pharmacist about your prescription […].

All of these strategies together make up the relational work in this particular health practice, so that, while mitigation is clearly dominant, face-enhancing and face-threatening behaviours also have their place.

Concerns about expertise and trust also surface in reflective writing texts written by medical students in the UK (Locher 2015b, 2017). The students, who were asked to write about a memorable encounter with a patient during their attachment/internship, rarely wrote about politeness explicitly; however, they did comment on identity management and in particular on their fears to appear unintentionally rude or impolite in the eyes of their patients. In example (9), a student reports on such a situation as follows:

(9) The first thing that struck me was that the patient sort of mumbled when speaking due to his illness. This made the encounter tricky, but also rather *awkward* for me as I *wasn't sure* whether to keep asking him to repeat things or just nod in a clueless manner. *After all, the last thing I wanted to be was rude*, and unfortunately this played on my mind throughout the interview. (italics added)

In this excerpt, the student describes his emotional involvement and thus highlights the interpersonal consequences of his action or inaction (on the link between emotions and relational work see Culpeper 2011; Locher and Langlotz 2008; Langlotz and Locher 2012, 2013, in press; Locher and Koenig 2014; Spencer-Oatey 2007, 2011). In addition to emotions, other themes that appear in the corpus (N = 189) are the importance/value of the creation of rapport between the provider and patient, the important role of empathy, the presentation of self when claiming the status of a medical student and future health provider, the challenge of finding the right level of relational work, and the interpersonal consequences of communication styles/choices on relationships. Concerns like these, raised by medical students, can provide useful additions to the medical communication skills curriculum, need to be addressed in courses on communication skills, and may also help sharpen our analytical tools for interpersonal pragmatics.

Some of these concerns are also reflected in spoken medical interactions. We have chosen one example here from a larger corpus of genetic counselling sessions (for more details see Zayts and Schnurr 2014) to illustrate how some of the overarching themes identified above pan out in spoken encounters between healthcare professionals and clients. The example that we analyse below is taken from a corpus of audio-recorded telephone consultations between genetic nurses in a neonatal screening unit at a specialist genetic clinic in Hong Kong and mothers of newborns who have been diagnosed with G6PD deficiency, which is a mild hereditary condition that can be managed

by taking certain preventative measures (see Zayts and Schnurr 2017). These telephone conversations, which typically take place while the mother is still on the maternity ward, are aimed at informing the mothers about their baby's diagnosis and advising them on preventative measures to be taken after their release from hospital.

The activities of telling a mother how to manage her newborn's condition and advice giving are potentially face-threatening as they could be perceived by the mothers as an intrusion into their area of expertise (i.e., how to look after and take care of their baby; compare Heritage and Sefi 1992). Due to the potentially face-threatening nature of these interactional activities, these telephone consultations are thus interesting sites for an analysis of several issues pertaining to (im)politeness in medical contexts. This is particularly true for those interactions that involve mothers who have some prior knowledge of the condition, as illustrated in (10), taken from Zayts and Schnurr (2014). This example, which we have chosen for closer scrutiny here, involves such a 'knowledgeable' mother, i.e. a mother who has some prior knowledge of the condition (in this case, because she has it herself). As a consequence of the mother's knowledge, she interrupts and to a certain extent rejects the nurse's attempts at delivering information and giving advice, thereby challenging the nurse's face, as well as the authority and expertise associated with the nurse's professional role.

(10) *Telephone conversation between a nurse (N) and a mother (M) whose newborn has recently been diagnosed with G6PD. Since M also suffers from the deficiency herself, she has some prior knowledge of the condition which she informed the nurse about earlier in the conversation. The exchange took place in Cantonese, the native language of both interlocutors.*

1. N: 所以, 要預防嘅話, 噉呀:, *(.)* 媽咪,
   頭先你講過啦有大部份嘅中藥喺唔可以食.
   噉呀,(.)其實呢主要就喺五種[中藥要避免].
   Therefore, in order to prevent, so:, (.) mommy,[1] you have mentioned earlier that most Chinese medicine cannot be taken by him. So, (.) actually there are mainly five types [of Chinese medicine to avoid].
2. M: 喺.
   Yes.

[1] The terms 'mommy' and 'daddy' are frequently used in the Hong Kong data by the medical providers when addressing their clients. It thus seems to be normal and acceptable practice (and hence politic behaviour), which could perhaps be interpreted as a way of building rapport and doing relational work.

3. N: 喺啦. 噉呀, 你記唔記得喺邊五種呀?
   Right. So, can you recall what are these five types?
4. M: 唔記得.
   I don't remember.
5. N: 唔記得? 嗱, 噉, 我, (.)
   You don't? Mm, so, I, (.)
6. M: 單張嗰嗰到有無㗎?
   Does the leaflet contain this information?
7. N: 單張呢有嘅, 不過, 不過如果問媽咪, 你, 你自己點樣做呀?
   The leaflet contains the information, but, but if I ask mommy, you, how would you yourself act?
8. M: 誒:.
   Eh:.
9. N: 即係你, 自己本人呀, 因為你知你有呢個病, 㗎嘛?
   As in you, you yourself, because you are aware that you have this deficiency, right?
10. M: 我, 我, 我知道邊啲唔食得或者唔好接觸. (.)
    I, I, I know what cannot be eaten or touched. (.)
11. N: 噉呀, 誒: 譬如, 嗱, 因為你頭先話你又唔記得咗邊啲中藥唔食得啦, 噉樣如
    你=
    So, eh: for example, nah, because you said earlier that you have again forgotten the types of Chinese medicine which cannot be taken, so what if you=
12. M: =所以我咩中藥都唔食囉.
    =So I do not take any Chinese medicine lo.

The nurse's questions in turns 1 and 3 which aim to assess the mother's knowledge of G6PD are relatively directive and almost condescending, and hence potentially face-threatening—especially since the mother has previously informed the nurse that she has the condition herself and knows how to manage it (not shown here). Against this background, the nurse's information delivery seems strictly speaking unnecessary (as the mother presumably knows what kinds of medicines she and her baby are allowed to take), and the nurse's question in turn 3 could be understood as implying that the mother may not actually have this knowledge and could thus be face-threatening. The mother seems to interpret the nurse's behaviour in that light, as is reflected in her responses. Although she admits that she does not remember the information (turn 4), she subsequently resists the nurse's attempts at information delivery, for example by interrupting her and asking whether this information is also included in the leaflet that all affected mothers receive prior to the telephone

consultation (turn 6). The relative directness of the mother's question indicates her resistance to the nurse's attempts at information delivery and at the same time also challenges the nurse's face and delegitimises her institutionally assigned role as information provider (see also Zayts and Schnurr 2017). This continues throughout the interaction, for example when the mother categorically states her knowledge about which substances to avoid instead of answering the nurse's request for information (turn 10).

Thus, in order to continue with the information delivery, which constitutes a crucial aspect of these counselling interactions (Zayts and Schnurr 2014), the nurse employs several strategies to negotiate the roles of interlocutors while at the same attending to her own face and that of the mother. For example, she continues to try and provide information in spite of the mother's resistance by asking questions to encourage the mother to cooperate (turns 7 and 9) and by providing explanations for her own behaviour (e.g. turn 11). But in spite of the nurse's efforts, her attempts are in vain and she does not manage to deliver the information in this exchange—rather, at the end, the mother interrupts her again with yet another categorical statement (turn 12). With this face-threatening behaviour she once more challenges the nurse's role and authority. This behaviour is quite typical for encounters with 'knowledgeable' mothers in which the mothers frequently question the traditional dichotomous role allocation according to which the healthcare professional is set up as the expert and the mother/ client is constructed as the (less knowledgeable) lay person (see also Zayts and Schnurr 2017).

Coming back to the re-emerging themes described above, our analysis of this example of spoken interaction has shown that because advice giving, information delivery and other potentially face-threatening activities are crucial aspects of many medical encounters, interlocutors are constantly engaged in doing relational work and, closely related, negotiating their own and each other's roles and responsibilities. These processes take place throughout an interaction, and provide further support for claims that there is no one single or best way of giving advice, delivering information, doing counselling etc.; rather, what are considered to be appropriate and politic ways of performing these activities is dynamically negotiated among interlocutors as their interaction unfolds.

4 Conclusions and Future Directions for Research

Looking at the studies that elaborate on issues that are of interest to (im)politeness scholars who work on health contexts, we need to first reiterate that many relational concerns crucial to health contexts are not necessarily

discussed with an (im)politeness approach. However, if we take a broader perspective, adopting an interpersonal pragmatic lens (see Locher and Graham 2010, p. 2; Haugh et al. 2013, p. 9), we can fruitfully explore concerns that have been discussed under the terms facework, rapport management, or relational work by different authors in the health context. It is not surprising that this context yields such challenging and rich data since interactions between the parties in question (health professionals, caretakers, patients) involve intricate negotiations of differences in power, dependency, expertise, and trust, often in contexts where delicate and in some cases life-threatening concerns are deliberated. There are thus clearly several avenues for future research, and we would like to suggest the following list as possible first steps towards exploring the incredibly complex and diverse topic of (im)politeness in healthcare settings:

– As in so many research areas in applied linguistics, it seems to us that there is a dominance of studies on health practices in English. More research from an interpersonal pragmatics perspective on other languages is thus called for to shed further light on how people in other, often marginalised and overlooked sociocultural contexts deal with the various challenges of health communication (e.g. Hernández López 2011; Vickers et al. 2015). There is also clearly a need for more intercultural and intracultural studies—especially those that embrace recent critical conceptualisations of culture and move beyond cultural stereotyping and instead focus on actual practice.
– In a similar vein, further research is needed to explore health contexts in which the providers and patients do not share the same language(s). Linguistic problems occur both when the providers do not speak the local language of the patients (this is the case in many countries where the doctors and nurses are foreigners due to a dearth of professionals), and in settings where immigrants do not speak the dominant local language, as well as in multilingual contexts where both parties are not proficient in each other's language or a lingua franca (e.g., Mason 2004; Zayts and Kang 2009; Vickers et al. 2015). These situations are challenging on the transactional, informational level as well as on the interpersonal level (e.g. do the patients dare to insist that they have not understood an explanation or an instruction? How do the providers make sure that instructions are understood?). Due to globalisation and continuing migration trends world-wide, these issues become increasingly more relevant and thus demand more (applied) research—especially, since local (im)politeness practices may not be known by those 'new' to the context, and neither may their in-context values.

- More studies on health practices in computer-mediated contexts will help to reflect the changing landscape of healthcare which increasingly taps into this medium/ channel to communicate with potential and actual patients and clients, their families, professionals and the wider public (Prestin and Choud 2014). It seems to us that a combination of approaches from rhetoric, argumentation theory, identity construction and (im)politeness frameworks might be particularly fruitful for the study of public health sites that deal with persuasion and risk management (e.g. Rudolf von Rohr 2015). Moreover, the potential of lay sites for health support and advice-giving deserves further attention (e.g. Sillence 2013), and the potential of CMC for emotional and psychological counselling is clearly booming so that we can expect to see more studies in this field.
- From a methodological point of view, we see that many applied linguistic and pragmatic studies in the area of (im)politeness in healthcare employ purely qualitative methodologies. While clearly recognising the value of this research, we would also like to call for more quantification and an increased use of mixed methodologies (cf. Locher 2015a), which, we believe, can help in establishing patterns that illustrate the norms of (im)politeness practices.
- Finally, on a more abstract level, we believe that the medical/health humanities, with their concerns ranging from teaching communication skills to medical students to narrative medicine in general, provide a challenging and worthwhile interface with our interests that is worth exploring. For example, the creation of rapport and empathy, learning how to 'listen', and how to interpret patients' narratives etc. coincide with the interest of (im)politeness scholars concerned with interpersonal pragmatic issues, such as norms of conduct, identity construction and the negotiation of face (e.g. Gygax et al. 2012; Gygax and Locher 2015; Locher et al. 2015; Locher 2015b, 2017; Silverman et al. 2013).

For these various areas of research that we have briefly outlined here, we believe that combining the study of identity construction and role negotiation together with face concerns (Hall and Bucholtz 2013, p. 130; Locher 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2007; Schnurr and Chan 2011; Zayts and Schnurr 2014) is a promising way forward as it allows us to identify and better understand the strategies through which face is negotiated while at the same time linking these insights to the ways in which interlocutors dynamically maintain and reinforce, as well as challenge and change interactional as well as (im)politeness norms.

Acknowledgements Part of the research reported in this chapter was supported by a grant from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (project no. HKU 758211 H). We are grateful to the participants of this project who allowed us to record their interactions, and the other members of the research team Dr Olga Zayts, Dr. Lam Tak Sum Stephen, Dr Lo Fai Man Ivan, and Ms. Fung Shun Mei May, as well as the research assistants Yau Hoi Ying Alice and Cheuk Kwok Wing Natalie for assistance with transcribing the data. Furthermore, we thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for supporting the work on the project *'Life (beyond) writing': Illness narratives* (CR13I1_126959; CR13I1_144541) and *Language and Health Online* (100016_143286/1).

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27

(Im)politeness in Legal Settings

Dawn Archer

1 Introduction

In a footnote in their now-seminal work, Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 52, n. 2) highlighted the courtroom as a useful site of politeness research, given the use of formal protocols to regulate (and sometimes proactively defuse) conflict between opposing parties. Lakoff (1989, p. 103) provided the first such study shortly thereafter, and argued that the informational orientation of courtroom discourse tended to result in 'clarity' taking precedence over politeness. She also made her own rallying cry: that more researchers seek to 'understand the true function of politeness *and its absence*' (ibid., p. 102, my italics) in the courtroom and similar contexts. In this chapter, I review Lakoff (1989) and thirteen additional investigations which have responded to the call to study politeness and/or its absence in legal settings. These investigations focus on:

- Courtroom interaction today (Lakoff 1989; Penman 1990; Harris 2011; Johnson and Clifford 2011);
- Courtroom interaction of times past (Kryk-Kastovsky 2006; Archer 2008, 2011a, b, 2014; Cecconi 2011);
- Appellate court opinions (Kurzon 2001; Tracy 2011);

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_27

- Judicial hearings (Taylor 2009); and
- Police interactions (Limberg 2008).

Like the bulk of (im)politeness research more generally, all but Limberg's study focus on English or American contexts, with Limberg drawing upon German data. Limberg's study of police interaction is included here as a legal setting, in line with the inclusion of police interaction with lay participants within forensic studies more generally (see, e.g., Coulthard and Johnson 2010). I summarise the fourteen studies in Sects. 3–3.4, following a discussion of some of the key ideas, concepts and theories in respect to (im)politeness to arise, be developed and/or debated thanks to this body of work (see Sects. 2–2.3). What will become clear is that researchers interested in legal settings have tended:

1. To focus on the absence of *politeness* or presence of minimal politeness more so than face enhancement;
2. To discuss the use of superficial politeness to varnish otherwise face threatening acts (FTAs); and
3. To debate whether conflictive facework[1] is better considered to be verbal aggression or reasonable hostility in such settings, because of a lack of malicious intent on the part of most participants (cf. Goffman 1967, p. 14).

These foci are not unduly surprising, given that conflict is widely believed to characterise (and hence be seen as a norm in) some parts of the judicial process. However, they have sometimes served to background the fact that the courtroom process is also made up of activity types which are not inherently conflictive (direct examination, summing up, etc.). The judicial process more generally, moreover, includes activities such as appellate opinions (Kurzon 2001; Tracy 2011) and judicial hearings (Taylor 2009), and these, too, display facework strategies designed to procure agreement (in addition to facework strategies signalling disagreement). This is beginning to prompt a reassessment of some legal settings, such that cooperation as well as conflict are considered by researchers. In Sect. 4, I provide a more in-depth account of one such study: Tracy (2011). Section 5 then considers ways of taking future research forward.

[1] *Facework*, here, refers to 'the actions taken by a person to make what [s]he is doing consistent with face' (Goffman 1967, p. 5). *Face*, in turn, equates to the 'image of self' that 'a person effectively claims' (ibid.), based upon what others seem to be assuming about him/her (Goffman called this their *line*). In essence, then, face is akin to a type of behavioural mask (Watts 2003, p. 107), which is partly shaped by 'the rules of the group' (Goffman ibid., pp. 5–6), participants' definition(s) of the activity, and their associated feelings in respect to the line being taken.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

Studies such as those listed above have helped to highlight a number of issues that merit some consideration:

- the relevance of (im)politeness in legal (and similar institutional) settings;
- how to delineate politeness and impoliteness from politic behaviour (i.e. contextually appropriate behaviour) in these settings;
- whether (im)politeness is better viewed on a continuum in legal as well as other settings (rather than as a dichotomy); and
- the intentionality debate, in light of *mens rea* (i.e., criminal intent).

2.1 The Relevance of (Im)politeness in Legal Settings

It is now widely accepted, within the general (im)politeness literature, that what constitutes (im)politeness will depend upon context-of-use, intention(s) of S and H/others' perception(s) of S's intention(s). Some researchers point out, nonetheless, that there are linguistic forms or relational formulae which 'are conventionalised to such a degree' (in the English language at least) that they seem to have a meaning and hence function 'that is (largely) stable… across different types of activity' (Bousfield 2010, p. 125). In consequence, their accompanying semantic prosody tends to be systematically positive or negative in most settings. Such forms/formulae include the use of honorifics and politeness markers. Importantly, Bousfield (ibid.) goes on to qualify his observation by asserting that the politeness function of honorifics, politeness markers and similar phenomena is 'by no means' stable across all activity types. As will become clear, this qualification certainly applies to legal settings. Address terms are used to achieve face enhancement and politic facework, for example. They are also used to achieve face aggravation: as when courtroom lawyers nail a target via honorifics during their cross-examinations (see section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets" and Sect. 3.3 for relevant examples). In contrast to criminal lawyers, attorneys in appellate courts tend to prioritise politic facework characterised by impersonalisation and professionalisation throughout (Tracy 2011). This might equate to building 'a separation between a speaker and what he or she is saying' rather than tying 'disagreement much more tightly to the person' via a combination of, for example, honorifics and pronouns. Tracy provides the contrasting examples of 'that's dangerous and troubling' and 'your arguments are dangerous

and troubling' (ibid., p. 132). Tracy does discuss one exception to this (appellate) norm of 'minimal' politeness: Kenneth Starr. This attorney 'talked in ways that gave significant attention to the positive [and negative] face of self and others' (ibid., p. 133). He used face-attentive compliments (*you know your jurisprudence well in this area*) and respectful disagreements (*I respectfully disagree*), constructed shared moments of humour through, for example, self-deprecatory laughter-eliciting comments (*I—I see that my argument has been very persuasive in this particular point*) and apologised for interrupting (see Sects. 3.2 and 5 for more detailed discussions of Tracy's study).

2.2 Delineating Politeness and Impoliteness in Legal Settings: Via a Continuum

As Sect. 2.1 reveals, and Sects. 3–3.4 will confirm, the range of possible facework strategies within legal settings traverses everything from face enhancement to face aggravation. I have used the terms face enhancement and face aggravation deliberately, as several researchers argue against assigning the evaluation *impoliteness* to institutionally sanctioned aggressive facework, when it is contextually 'legitimate and desirable' without being 'centrally intended as face attack' (Tracy 2008: 175). They include Tracy (2008), who describes such facework as *reasonable hostility* (see section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets"), and Archer (2008), who prefers the term *verbal aggression* (see section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets"). Tracy and Archer are amongst a number of researchers (interested in legal settings) to also argue for the creation of a facework continuum (see, in addition, Lakoff 1989; Watts 1992, 2003; Keinpointer 1997; Locher 2004; Mills 2003; Johnson and Clifford 2011). This notion is immediately evident in Taylor's (2009, p. 213) delineation of politeness and impoliteness 'at opposite ends of a continuum' according to whether they perform 'marked cooperative facework' or 'marked aggressive facework', for example (see Sect. 3.3). It is also evident in Tracy's (2011, p. 124) definition of a facework system as 'the set of face-enhancing, face-neutral, and face-attacking practices that are an expected part of doing particular activities' (see Sects. 3.2 and 5). Archer (2015) has gone a stage further, by developing a Goffman-inspired model that attempts to capture both face enhancement and face aggravation and everything in-between (see Fig. 27.1).

The facework scale is based on the assumption that face enhancement represents the positive end of a pragmatic space relating to S's evaluation of the addressee, and face aggravation, the negative end (cf. Taylor ibid.). A precursor




Fig. 27.1 Facework scale, including accidental FTA zone (adapted from Archer 2015)

to the 2015 Facework Scale—which focuses upon face aggravation only (Archer 2011a)—is explained in more detail in section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets".

2.3 Dealing with the 'Problem' of Intentionality

A hotly debated topic within (im)politeness research is that of intentionality. Most (im)politeness researchers accept the notion that people do communicate intentionally. What is questioned, by many, is 'the Gricean notion that intentions exist *a priori* in the minds of speakers and that it is the recovery of a speaker's [facework] intention(s) by hearers that leads to the understanding of politeness' (Culpeper 2011, p. 48), impoliteness, or something in-between. Researchers like Haugh (2008) believe this to be unhelpful for several reasons. One reason is that intentions will often vary in their object: communicative intention is directed at an utterance, for example, but a higher-order intention can be directed at a sequence of utterances. A second reason is that a focus on S intention only (whether communicative intention or higher-order intention) tends to ignore 'we-intentions', that is, the notion that meaning is not only speaker-oriented.[2] Rather, it is co-created by all participants within an interaction, regardless of whether they are adopting a speaker role, hearer role or overhearer role (see also Arundale 1999). Grimshaw proffered a possible solution to (im)politeness researchers some 25 years ago. He conceded that 'what is in people's heads is accessible neither to analysts nor to interlocutors (nor even, ultimately, fully accessible to those whose behaviour is under investigation)' (1990, p. 281). Nonetheless, it is possible for us *to reconstruct*

[2] As Haugh notes (personal correspondence), researchers also use the term, *intention*, in different ways.

the plausible intentions of speakers (i.e., make inferences and attributions which are 'for-the-most practical purposes … no less plausible than those of actual participants': ibid.), given adequate evidence.

A similar process is evident within legal settings such as police interviewing and courtroom examination. Police officers need to establish whether a suspect's actions were intended and premeditated or something else (e.g., recklessness on their part). Edwards (2008) provides the example of a 16-year-old male accused of damaging a car, who initially admitted to *smashing* the car's back window, but changed his account to having *punched* the window. The process of establishing intent, which police officers undertake, shares similarities with Haugh's (ibid., p. 101) notion of intention as a '*post-facto* construct': that is to say, they make use of a suspect's 'violations of norms or other interactional troubles', where they occur. A police interviewer might probe the difference between *smashed* and *punched*, for example. Similar to Haugh (ibid.), Edwards (2008) recognises intentionality to be a social practice, in the sense of being managed and negotiated over the course of an interaction. In the case of the 16-year-old, for example, the interviewer had to try to ascertain the suspect's purpose when he *punched* the window and, in particular, whether he intended to cause any damage to the window, before determining what the suspect meant in replying *No, not really*. A jury member's role is similar to this, in that s/he must determine a defendant's state of mind, in order to reach a consensus in respect to the crucial question of legal intent. They do so by weighing the plausibility of the crime narrative (offered by the prosecution team) and counter narrative (offered by the defence team). Sometimes, message interpretation is as much of a 'dirty business' (Hewes et al. 1985, p. 299) for jury members as it can be for (im)politeness researchers and police interviewers. This is because lawyers will sometimes express their 'intent … indirectly' through the presuppositions inherent within their questions (and the answers those questions procure). They might also seek to ensure that their intent is 'indeterminate' (Penman 1990, p. 22). This is especially the case when lawyers make use of ambiguous and/or intentionally misleading strategies (Penman 1990, p. 21) so that their messages, and the facework strategies underpinning them, 'serve more than one goal at the same time' (see section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets"). This explains Archer's (2015) inclusion of a strategically ambivalent zone within her Facework Scale (see Sect. 2.2). I describe an historical example of a lawyer making use of strategic ambiguity to negatively frame another in section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets".

3 Outline of the Fourteen Studies

3.1 Face-Threatening Acts and the Courtroom

Currently, more (im)politeness studies relate to the courtroom than any other legal setting. The bulk of these studies make use of similar amounts of historical and modern datasets.

Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets

In her original study of the modern courtroom, Lakoff (1989, p. 120) highlighted how courtroom discourse can be made up of 'a textured web of politeness, non-politeness and rudeness', depending upon the particular activity being undertaken at the time, where:

(1) *politeness* involves general adherence to politeness norms (i.e., the use of overt politeness signals) in contexts where they are expected;
(2) *non-politeness* involves an absence of overt politeness signals in contexts where they are unnecessary; and
(3) *rudeness* involves non-adherence to politeness norms/ rules in contexts where adherence is expected.

Lakoff believed that the transactional nature of the courtroom would ensure it is primarily characterised by non-politeness. As Fraser (2005, p. 69) notes, (1) and (2) are often discussed today, using the *politic* label (Watts 1989, 1992, 2003), whereas (3) may bring to mind several ongoing debates within the (im)politeness literature. In fact, Lakoff (1989, p. 123) allowed for two types of rudeness:

- *systematic/rule-governed rudeness*, that is, the strategic/motivated/goal-specific use of face attack on S's part, and
- *non-systematic rudeness,* that is, FTAs resulting from S's 'lack or loss of control'.

There is thus overlap here with recent impoliteness publications that have debated: the best way of distinguishing intentional FTAs from emotional venting (Culpeper 2011); the most appropriate labels for such behaviour (compare Culpeper 2008 and Terkourafi 2008); and the contentious issue

of being able to assign intentionality to individual discourse acts (see Sects. 2.1–2.3). Lakoff's three-way labelling of politeness phenomena points, in turn, to an understanding of (im)politeness as a continuum rather than as a simple polite-impolite dichotomy (cf. Culpeper 1996) (see, in particular, Sect. 2.2). Lakoff further anticipated that different kinds of politeness, non-politeness and/or rudeness would characterise different activity or discourse types. This aspect of her work is more tangible in the wider (im)politeness literature, thanks to studies which have focussed upon the *shaping* effects of institutional and/or professional norms (Harris 2001, 2003; Holmes and Stubbe 2003; Locher and Watts 2008; Tracy 2008) and the link between (im)politeness and power (Bousfield and Locher 2008; Harris 2011).

There are obvious differences between the work of Penman (1990) and the work of Lakoff (1989): most notably, that Lakoff was building on her own model of politeness, whereas Penman's approach constitutes a deliberate attempt to extend the approach of Brown and Levinson ([1978] 1987), but with court hearings specifically in mind. Penman's and Lakoff's work also shared a crucial starting point. They both believed in the possibility of engaging in facework which was neither polite nor impolite; and hence that facework and (im)politeness are not necessarily synonymous in the courtroom. Penman (ibid., pp. 16–17) was nonetheless critical of:

- A view of courtroom discourse which oversimplified its interactional goals to transactional or informational only (cf. Lakoff, ibid., p. 103);
- The neglect of self-directed facework in favour of other-directed facework (cf. Brown and Levinson); and
- The neglect of face aggravation by overly promoting politeness strategies based on mitigation or protection (cf. Brown and Levinson).

Her own solution to such criticisms was 'a 2 × 2 choice matrix for actors', that is, 'two types of 'face' × two types of actors ('speaker' and 'hearer' in Brown & Levinson's theory)' revolving 'around a respect–contempt dimension' (Penman 1990, p. 19). This results in four general facework strategies: 'Self-Directed Positive and Negative Facework and Other-Directed Positive and Negative Facework'. Penman also argued strenuously that, in a courtroom context especially, an actor's utterance can serve 'multiple facework goals… simultaneously and/or sequentially' (ibid.). She provides the example utterance, *Did you deliberately lie to that person or not?* where the questioner simultaneously attacks the recipient's positive and negative face through: (a) generating an implicature that damages his/her self-image, and (b) constraining his/her freedom of action through 'forcing' a reply (ibid.).

In their paper, Johnson and Clifford (2011) sought to invalidate Kurzon's (2001, p. 43) claim that courtroom talk 'is inherently polite, due to the formal, high stakes context' (see Sect. 3.2). To do so, they analysed cross-examination extracts from the 2000 'libel action brought by Irving against Lipstadt and Penguin Books Limited' (ibid., p. 45), using a combination of close reading and more quantitative analysis, via *Wordsmith Tools* (Scott 2007). The authors paid particular attention to how 'politeness [was used] as a strategic act' (Christie 2007, p. 263) by two participants in particular: Irving, as claimant, and Richard Rampton QC, as cross-examiner. Johnson and Clifford conclude that face-aggravating strategies are inevitable within the courtroom context and that many of these can be legally and contextually-sanctioned (Culpeper 1998, p. 86; Archer 2008, p. 189; Tracy 2008, p. 169). Johnson and Clifford note, further, that cross-examiners like Rampton are able to achieve impoliteness even when doing politeness (ibid., p. 45). By this they mean that cross-examiners can 'varnish' their indirect utterances with surface-level politeness features, such that their 'impoliteness remains below the surface of the discourse' (ibid., p. 68). In consequence, institutionally inferior participants like Irving struggle 'to perform a [successful] challenge' (ibid.). Such findings lead Johnson and Clifford (a) to argue, following Penman, that multiple facework goals 'need to be accounted for within institutional interaction in general and in the trial genre and its variety of activities, in particular' (2011, p. 44), and (b) to suggest, following Lakoff, that an (im)politeness continuum would be useful in a courtroom context (see Sect. 2.2). According to Johnson and Clifford (ibid., pp. 46–7), (b) could capture over-polite, non-polite, impolite and rude behaviours via, for example, Brown and Levinson's (1978, pp. 70–72) list of acts that threaten negative and positive face, Culpeper et al.'s (2003, p. 1563) 'offensive' and 'defence' strategies', and 'Culpeper's (2005, pp. 41–2) 'five impolite super-strategies'.

Harris (2011) is also keen to determine whether, or the extent to which models of (im)politeness are applicable to courtroom discourse. She does so by exploring how particular linguistic features commonly associated with (im)politeness (the lexemes *please* and *thank you*, address tokens, repetitive/conducive questions, sarcasm, insinuations, threats…) are actually used in a now infamous trial: that of serial killer Dr Harold Shipman. Harris concludes that (im)politeness and facework are not synonymous, following Penman (1990) and Archer (2008). But she further argues that 'face-based definitions' need to account for a variety of 'intercultural, institutional or interpersonal' contexts (ibid., p. 103). She finds Tracy's (2008) concept of *reasonable hostility* particularly 'relevant to courtroom discourse' (ibid., p. 87) in this regard, because of its consideration of facework in all its guises (see also Sect. 2.2 and

section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets"). Although developed with school governance board meetings in mind, Tracy's (ibid., p. 187) approach allows FTAs within legal settings to 'not only [be] anticipated, but [also to] play a positive and necessary role … subject to certain conventions' (Harris, ibid., p. 87). Researchers are thus in a better position to allow for the complexity of the courtroom, comprising as it does 'a variety of different types of interaction, power relationships, goals, and pragmatic functions' (ibid.). This includes paying attention to:

> [...] how cultural and social 'politeness norms' interact with the power oriented, hierarchical and prescriptive interactional roles of the major participants in a criminal trial and in accord with the legal and discourse conventions of the courtroom, some of [which are] imposed by the courtroom procedures themselves and others by the strategic considerations of the participants. (Harris, ibid., p. 87)

In some cases, this may include speech acts being 'adorned with at least a piece or two of politeness jewellery', to use Tracy's (ibid., p. 187) phraseology (cf. Johnson and Clifford 2011).

Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets

Kryk-Kastovsky (2006) was the first researcher to investigate the extent to which (im)politeness approaches that were developed with modern data in mind—in this case, Culpeper (1996, 2005)—might also be applicable to the historical courtroom. Her analyses of two treason trials—*Titus Oates* (1685) and *Lady Alice Lisle* (1685)—led Kryk-Kastovsky (ibid., p. 216) to simplify Culpeper's bald-on-record impoliteness category to 'syntactic impoliteness', and to distinguish the latter from 'semantic/pragmatic impoliteness'. Focusing on terms of address, questioning strategies, and discourse markers, she then went on to argue that the two treason trials demonstrate multiple instances of such syntactic and semantic/pragmatic impoliteness.

Kryk-Kastovsky's adoption of a structural/syntactic impoliteness category has since been criticised by Archer (2008, p. 190), who argues that it risks giving the impression that (im)politeness 'exists at the word or grammatical level *out of context*'. Archer draws on five treason trials from a similar period as Kryk-Kastovsky—*Charles 1* (1649), *Coleman* (1678), *Oates* (1685), *Francia* (1716) and *Layer* (1722)—to demonstrate two interrelated points:

- Prototypical impoliteness was relatively uncommon in the Early Modern English courtroom.
- A level of verbal aggression was legally and/or contextually-sanctioned then as it is today, i.e., some participants had 'licence' to aggravate the face of others (Culpeper 1998, p. 86).

Archer (ibid., p. 204) thus calls for (im)politeness researchers to differentiate verbal aggression strategies from impoliteness strategies proper, in a courtroom context (historical and modern). To help researchers in this regard, she proposes a facework intentionality scale (F.I.S.) inspired by Goffman (1967) and Penman (1990). Simply put, F.I.S. allows for impolite face threats motivated by some personal sense of spite (Goffman's ibid., p. 14 *intentional* level of face threat) to be differentiated from other verbally aggressive acts whose primary goal is not to cause offence (Goffman's ibid., p. 14 *incidental* and *accidental* levels of face threat). For example, the following extract from the trial of Titus Oates (1685) has previously been described by Kryk-Kastovsky as an instance of impoliteness:

Judge	And you are sure he went out of Town the Saturday after?
Mrs. A. Ireland	Yes, I am sure he went out of Town then; for I asked him, why he would go on a Saturday? And he told me, he would go but to Standen that Night.

But Archer draws on F.I.S. to highlight how the judge was actually exercising 'his right to seek clarification as to the correctness of the information the witness had given' (ibid., p. 193). As such, any perceived face damage would have constituted an unplanned by-product of the interaction as opposed to a malicious and spiteful act, and hence would have fallen within the incidental (rather than the intentional) zone of F.I.S.

Cecconi (2011) has analysed additional seventeenth-century trials in order to test, first, Archer's argument that impoliteness is rare in courtroom discourse, and, second, her differentiation between strategic verbal aggression and impoliteness proper. Cecconi confirms that prototypical impoliteness is rare in the courtroom context, based on her dataset of four *State Trials* and numerous trial records from the *Old Bailey Proceedings*. She also confirms the usefulness of capturing 'the speaker's multiple goals in interaction … along an intentionality scale ranging from strong to weak intent to harm' (Cecconi ibid., p. 104), but adds that oscillations between primary and subsidiary goals often make it difficult to label a given FTA as incidental, intentional

or accidental. In so doing, Cecconi implicitly confirms the usefulness of Archer's (2011a, 2015) facework zone of *strategic ambivalence*. The *strategic ambivalence* zone was initially added to Archer's scale in 2011 as a means of capturing how cross-examining lawyers past and present have been able to use 'linguistically aggressive behaviour' (ibid., pp. 3220–21) to undermine the (counter-)crime narrative of the opposition, as part of their role. When doing so, however, they tend(ed) to use facework strategies which are/were neither intentional nor incidental but, rather, somewhere in between. The *strategic ambivalence* zone thus sits—so as to allow for movement—between the intentional and incidental zones of the newly named Face Aggravation Scale (F.A.S.). Utterances or utterance sequences are said to fall into the strategic ambivalence zone when a lawyer's strategy may be anticipated to cause offence, but does not have *causing offence* as a primary goal (ibid., p. 3217). For example, in their opening exchange, Edward Carson QC seeks to clarify something as seemingly innocuous as Oscar Wilde's age:

CARSON: You stated at the commencement of your examination that you were thirty-nine years of age. I think you are over forty, isn't that so?
WILDE: I don't think so. I think I am either thirty-nine or forty—forty my next birthday. If you have my certificate there that settles the matter.
CARSON: You were born, I believe, upon the 16th of October 1854?
WILDE: Yes, I have no intention of posing for a younger man at all. I try to be correct in the date.
CARSON: It makes you somewhat over forty.
WILDE: Very well.
(Cross-examination of Wilde, Wednesday pm 3rd April 1895 [Holland 2003, p. 64])

As Archer (2011b, p. 79) explains, however:

> Carson's purpose … was not merely to clarify Wilde's age and thus the correctness of the information Wilde had volunteered to Clarke during examination-in-chief, but to insinuate that Wilde was prepared to lie in a court of law over something which was relatively trivial: 'and if Oscar was prepared to lie about small things', then he would likely 'lie about bigger things' (McKenna 2003, p. 487)—i.e., posing as a sodomite [as he was accused]. Hence, Carson's somewhat convoluted strategy of asking Oscar to confirm first his age and then his birth-date, followed by a Quantity-flouting but technically correct statement regarding Oscar having passed his fortieth birthday (by six months!).

Archer (ibid., pp. 75, 86) goes on to suggest that face-threatening strategies in a courtroom context can point to interlocutors' (often conflicting) understanding of reality, that is, the 'truth filters' they 'use to make sense of their world' (i.e., their *reality paradigms*). She further suggests that reality paradigms can be/are often strategically manipulated by lawyers to attribute to interlocutors face-damaging qualities such as dishonesty, moral deviance, etc. For example, Carson questioned Wilde over letters 'expressive of love' that he had written to Lord Alfred Douglas, and even had him read one aloud so that he might get him to confirm that they were, in fact, love letters. When Wilde insisted that they were merely letters *expressive of love*, Carson queried whether it was *the kind of letter that one man writes towards another man?* In reply Wilde asserted that *What other men write to other men* he knew *nothing about, nor* did he *care* (Holland 2003, p. 110). The comment proved to be costly. It allowed Carson to continue constructing Wilde as, first, 'a resistant witness, who used evading strategies because he did not want to have to confirm and/or to provide information which might ultimately prove to be self-damaging', and, second, as being deviant compared to other 'normal' Victorian men (Archer ibid., p. 83).

Archer's (2014) most recent study of verbal aggression in a courtroom context is one of three that make use of computationally-assisted methods as part of their analyses (see Sects. 2.1 and 2.3). Archer used Wmatrix (Rayson 2008) to automatically annotate 200 Old Bailey trials covering 1783–93, and targeted those utterances or utterance sequences captured by one or more of six semantic tags: Q2.2 (speech acts), A5.1+/− ('good/ bad' evaluation), A5.2+/− ('true/ false' evaluation), E3- ('angry/ violent'), S1.2.4+/− ('(im)politeness'), and S7.2+/− ('respect/ lack of respect'). Archer argues that this approach is able to provide multiple potential indicators of verbal aggression in the late eighteenth-century English courtroom. However, it is important that the words and phrases captured by such semantic tags are first viewed in their context-of-use (that is, recontextualised using an *expand context* facility within Wmatrix) so that false positives can be differentiated from genuine examples of verbal aggression. More recently, a new semantic annotation tool based on themes derived from the *Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary* has been developed as part of an ESCR/AHRC project.[3] The new tool should minimise the mis-assignment of metalinguistic terms that are associated with facework today but which have been subject to significant semantic change over time (see discussions of, e.g., *politeness* and *politely* by Jucker 2010; Kádár and Culpeper 2010; Archer 2014).

[3] The Semantic Annotation and Mark Up for Enhancing Lexical Searches (SAMUELS) project (grant reference AH/L010062/1) was a cross-university collaboration involving the universities of Central Lancashire, Glasgow, Huddersfield and Lancaster. See http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/critical/research/fundedresearchprojects/samuels/.

3.2 FTAs and Appellate Court Opinions

Kurzon's (2001) study of politeness relates to American and English appellate court opinions, that is, the opinions offered by judges in an appeals setting. These opinions are usually written down, and thus tend to 'have a wider audience' than court transcripts for example; not least because 'appellate decisions… often set up precedents on the basis of which future decisions [within the Anglo-American or common law system] are to be reached' (ibid., p. 65). This wider audience includes 'appellate judges sitting in lower appellate courts and higher appellate courts' as well as the wider professional community, academics, journalists, etc. (ibid., pp. 65, 67).

Like Lakoff (1989), Kurzon assumes that this type of formal language is typically characterised by the automatic presence of non-politeness (see Johnson and Clifford 2011, pp. 43–4 for an instance of this assumption). This said, Kurzon does note differential levels of impoliteness among English and American judges, with the latter being regarded as more impolite than the former. For Kurzon (ibid., p. 83), this points to 'a cultural distinction between the two jurisdictions'. Yet, this cultural distinction seems to relate to ways of doing disagreement only, for '[t]here does not seem to be any substantial difference in the way English and American judges express agreement with various others' (colleagues, judges in lower courts, lawyers, etc.) (ibid., p. 80). With respect to the former:

> The tendency among English judges is to tone down disagreement. They express regret in disagreeing with colleagues or with other judges, they do not often attack the judge him/herself but attack his opinions, or they impersonalize the whole matter by criticizing the decision of the 'court', not of those individuals sitting on the bench. A frequent method is to criticize one's colleagues, lower court judges or the court, but at the same time to mitigate the criticism by stating that the judge is expressing his or her view only, e.g., 'in my view', or by suggesting that the addresser's position, which opposes the opinions of the other judges, is limited 'to the present case' only.

In contrast, the American judges tended to adopt what Kurzon describes as a 'no holds barred approach', such that 'opposing judges, lower judges and counsel' were deemed to be 'simply incorrect', to 'grossly distort' matters, and to 'say things which 'make no sense'' (ibid., p. 81).

More recently, Tracy (2011, p. 128) has analysed two interrelated appellate cases popularly referred to as *In re Marriage* and the *Proposition 8* appeal. Both cases were heard by the same seven judges (as representatives of the California Supreme Court). An important difference between Kurzon and Tracy is that

Tracy specifically focuses on oral argument. Nonetheless, her investigations lead her to make similar conclusions to Kurzon: namely, that Lakoff's non-politeness—or more appropriately minimal politeness (Tracy ibid., p. 141)—constitutes the norm in such conflictive contexts. This is largely because:

> Oral argument is an asymmetrical situation in which judges are the more powerful party. Justices ask questions or advance arguments, and attorneys respond. The purpose of exchanges is to explore the complexities of two opposing views about a small set of sharply demarcated issues. Judges do so by posing tough questions and being sceptical of attorneys' assertions. Answers are rarely good enough: attorneys will be pushed and responses probed. Whilst an ordinary observer might regard such behaviour as highly face-threatening, and hence expect to see some evidence of positive and negative politeness tokens, there is little sense that the interactants are framing the situation this way (ibid., p. 129).

Simply put, '[f]ace is undoubtedly important to participants' in this setting, but the 'positive value' that is wanted is neither personal nor more than minimally status-recognising' (ibid.). As such, social and relational concerns are deemed to be irrelevant: with the result that '[a]ttorneys rarely preface disagreements with hedges …. or modal forms that indicate less certainty'. Nor do they 'praise judges for past actions or good questions'/'attack them for asking unreasonable questions', etc. Judges, in turn, 'refrain from complimenting [their] answers or implying that attorneys are morally questionable because of positions they advocate' (Tracy ibid., p. 129). So strong is such speech behaviour, in fact, that Tracy describes breaking this pattern as 'deviant' (ibid., p. 142).

3.3 FTAs and Judicial Hearings

Like Tracy, Taylor (2009) draws on the notion of competence face in her investigation of data from the Hutton Inquiry.[4] However, whereas Tracy (ibid., p. 125) understands 'attending to competence and liking wants (positive face)' to be an important part of relational work (Locher and Watts 2005), Taylor draws on Partington's (2006, p. 97) distinction between affective and competence face. This means that affective face is primarily concerned with relational needs and competence face is primarily concerned with issues of authority, capability and control. Taylor argues, for example, that judicial

[4] For those unfamiliar with the Hutton Inquiry, this judicial hearing spanned the period August–October 2003, and investigated claims that a dossier which 'formed part of the [UK] government's case for the military invasion of Iraq' had been 'sexed up' (Taylor 2009, p. 208).

hearings set up a need for both the QC and witness to find ways of enhancing their competence face. They might do so 'by proving that they are able to successfully participate in the interaction' or by demonstrating they can handle themselves better than their adversary (ibid., p. 212: see also Goffman ibid., p. 25). The latter, in turn, may involve a participant seeking to threaten their adversary's competence face in some way. In one interaction, for example, a witness (Davies) implied that they had superior knowledge to the QC:

> DAVIES: I agree with that, Mr Sumption; and if *you* knew my colleagues you would not think they were acting as amplifiers to anybody.
> (24 September 2003).

In a different interaction, a witness sought to accomplish both Self face-enhancement and Other face-threat by simultaneously presenting him/herself as consistent and implying that 'the QC [w]as repetitive, inattentive, slow':

> I have already explained to you … As I have explained to you before … I think I have just explained to you … the answer that I have just given to you … As I have said to you before
> (Taylor ibid., p. 225).

Taylor (ibid., p. 223, 232) believes that it is possible to differentiate 'between acceptable, or institutionally sanctioned, aggressive facework and impoliteness' proper, as well as politeness, in this particular setting, by monitoring shifts away from information concerns (where participants *feel* they are 'doing institutional business') towards the 'more interactional mode' of interaction: be it to achieve face enhancement or face aggression (cf. Lakoff's argument that courtroom talk will tend to be transactional primarily, but has the potential to involve (im)politeness). Taylor provides the example of a witness who mimicked the attribution strategy of the QC, using *you*:

> QC: I think I asked her whether she could say whether you did see it.
> HOON: No, no, I am quoting *you* directly, Mr Gumperz

As Taylor (ibid., p. 223) explains, the 'use of *you* is ... [also] noted as a negative impoliteness strategy by Culpeper, in correspondence to Brown and Levinson's negative politeness strategy of 'impersonalize S and H: Avoid the pronouns "I" and "you"' (Brown and Levinson 1987, p. 131).' Taylor suggests, further, that the use of title and surname in this example constitutes an instance of Brown and Levinson's (ibid., p. 184) *nailing of X*, rather than being a polite address form (Sect. 3.1).

3.4 FTAs and Police Interactions

As previously explained, Limberg (2008) is the only study (of the fourteen outlined in this chapter) which draws on a legal context beyond the Anglo-American one. It is also the only study to focus specifically on police officers' interaction with the lay public, as they go about their patrol duties (including responding to emergency calls). Data for the study is drawn from a German documentary series, *Ärger im Revier* ('Trouble in the Precinct'), broadcast in 2005. The bulk of Limberg's discussion focuses on the police officers' interactions with 'citizens in several German cities' who are somehow involved in 'minor offences' (ibid., p. 160) and, in particular, on the officers' use of 'manipulation' strategies when faced with resistance. This includes the use of conditional threats. Limberg (ibid., p. 157) is at pains to point out that this focus should not be taken to mean that threat utterances are a major part of police work. On the contrary, he found that they did 'not … occur as systematically' in this context as, for example, Harris (1984) has found in respect to other institutional contexts (ibid.).

Despite the restrictive impact of threats on the hearer, Limberg argues that their classification as impolite is 'highly context-dependent and, to some extent, institutionally bound' (ibid., p. 166). He suggests, further, that threats can even be 'appropriate to the prevailing circumstances from a police perspective' (ibid., p. 176), when an addressee persistently resists their authority. As such, there are immediate overlaps with many of the aforementioned studies, where aggression is seen as a norm for at least a fragment of participants' discursive practices. Like several (im)politeness researchers, Limberg is nonetheless careful to argue that *sanctioned* and *neutralised* linguistic behaviour are not the same thing. Limberg argues, further, that it is the extent to which a threat is institutionally sanctioned and the net impact of the threat on the recipient (viz. face damage) which will help to determine whether or not a threat should be classified as impolite (see also Harris 1984 on the form and functions of threats in court). What is particularly interesting about Limberg's study is that, although (German) police officers have a 'right to exercise institutionalized power' as a means of making an 'offending party comply with their demands' (ibid., p. 156), the latter do not always comply. This means that we need to pay as much attention to how offending parties 'in these encounters bend the interactionally negotiated and institutionally purported norms' (ibid.) they face as much as the officers' compliance-seeking strategies (cf. Tracy 2011, outlined in Sect. 3.2).

4 Case Study

This penultimate section takes a more in-depth look at Tracy's (2011) face-work study of oral argument in US state supreme courts (see Sect. 3.2), focusing, in particular, upon how the attorneys' and justices' 'communicative work' (ibid., p. 124) signalled their management of potential conflict via cooperation (cf. 1.). As this first transcript (from *In re Marriage*) reveals, this was generally achieved using minimal politeness—with participants apparently working hard 'to define relational concerns' as irrelevant to their situation (ibid.):

A-K represents an attorney, J-K a justice, and CJ-G a chief justice

J-K … So, what happens to your *argument* that we should really wait until the legislature steps in for the third time?

A-A *Well* what we're saying here is that the legislature is actively engaged in responding to these issues […] just in- with regards to the, you know, clinical powerlessness prong of the suspect classification theory, you know, the *US Supreme Court in City of Cleburne* said it isn't clinical powerlessness, uh 'cause you can't control the legislature […] if you look at it from—even from the other side's perspective, I mean, the nineteen-fift- uh civil rights laws do evolve. The *1957 civil rights—US civil rights law* was ultimately followed by the *1964 Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act.* I mean- [doesn't mean that it's—

J-K [This difference—Is deference to uh the uh l—legislative process, or the will of the voters, a legitimate governmental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis?

A-K *Yes, your honor,* we—we submit that it is a legitimate interest, because it's not just deference to a legislative line the legislature drew. This is a definition of marriage which has proven, you know, durable through the test of time that pre-dates our state and our nation. It was only—it—it was in our common law, it's been adopted into our law, it's—it's nut just—ih—it's not just any line that was drawn here, and there is continuing effort to address it, um t—to address the interests that are being represented by [petitioners.

J-K [Given your—

CJ-G [*Well*, the interests that you just mentioned, couldn't one use that same language with regard to racial discrimination, the exact word that [you said.

A-K [*Well*—that's—what distinguishes this case from *Perez and Loving,* where there was—there was marriage and that had been put on marriage for no reason other than white supremacy. Here, plaintiffs talk about domestic partnership as if it were- as if it were, you know, the—the segregated [schoolhouse and …

CJ-G [*But—but* here it ...

The above is a small extract of the (larger) exchange discussed by Tracy (see ibid., pp. 130–33). Even this shortened extract reveals the creation of 'an impersonal face for both parties' (ibid., p. 132), however. This is achieved 'through the recurring use of … address terms' indicative of institutional roles (e.g., *your honor*), through the regular use of argument metalanguage (see the discussion in Sect. 2.1), and 'through their references to prior court cases and state laws' (ibid.). Tracy (ibid., p. 132) goes on to note that, '[a]lthough interruptions are typically regarded as impolite' or face-attacking in legal settings, 'there was little sense that attorneys were defining them in that way' within the US appellate court. There was no labelling of the justice's intrusion as 'not letting them finish', for example (ibid.). Similarly, although judges posed tough questions and seemed to query responses throughout (ibid., p. 129), disagreements tended to be straightforward. Notice the prevalence of the disagreement tokens *well* and *but* in the above extract. *Well* and *but* constituted the starting word for '30 percent of justices' turns', according to Tracy (ibid., p. 132). 'Other kinds of conversational activities' that mark an 'action as sensitive or dispreferred were rarely present in either judges or attorneys' utterances', however (ibid., p. 133). There was also a marked absence 'of positive and negative politeness tokens' (ibid., p. 129), leading Tracy to conclude that relational concerns were not relevant to them. That is to say, there was no need to 'preface disagreements with hedges... or modal forms that indicate less certainty', to praise one another 'for past actions or good questions'/'attack them for asking unreasonable questions', etc. (ibid., p. 129).

As previously discussed (in Sect. 2.1), Tracy's investigation of two appellate cases heard by the same judges did uncover one exception to the apparent norm of minimal politeness: the attorney Kenneth Starr. The following extract captures Starr's reply to a justice, who had asked him what *inalienable* meant in the California constitution.

> A-S It cannot be taken away except with the appropriate process. And one of the inalienable rights that this court has articulated decade after decade—*This body of jurisprudence is so stable. It's so beautifully developed. It's one of the reasons, as the court noted, that courts around the country look to this court. And rightly so with respect to this among other bodies of jurisprudence …* (Tracy ibid., p. 134).

This compliment served to enhance the face of the court (by emphasising its stability and advanced development) as well as enhancing Starr's own face (by positioning him as an expert, capable of judging the quality of different court systems). When Starr engaged in disagreement, he would often personally

name his opposing counsel, rather than identifying them via their more impersonal, institutional role. For example, his comment 'Well, I respectfully disagree with my brother Christopher' related to the then Assistant Attorney General of California (ibid., p. 134). As well as the phrase *respectfully disagree*, Starr prefaced his opposing (and hence potentially conflictive) remarks with *if I may respectfully disagree* and *if I may I'm going to be indirect.* As Tracy (ibid., p. 135) notes, these prefaces enabled Starr to 'make visible that there are persons involved in the disagreement, and that hurt feelings were a possibility'. This appears to have been true of his interruptions also, for they coincided with apologies. Tracy (ibid., p. 136) suggests that:

> In apologizing where other attorneys did not do so, Starr called attention to his actions as being interruptive of the justices. It foregrounded them as persons with face needs that deserved to be acknowledged rather than reinforcing the scene as an impersonal one.

Tracy suggests further that, through such facework, Starr was also able to frame himself as acting graciously in ways that suggested he was at least equal to his interlocutors (rather than inferior to them). His approach seemed to influence the judges too: in the *Proposition 8* case, for example, the judges regularly apologised for interrupting Starr (which tended to prompt a reciprocal apology from Starr).

In the conclusion to her paper, Tracy (ibid., p. 142) posits that studies such as hers offer a means of 'engag[ing] in empirical analyses that do not privilege individual speaker intention' only, but, rather, focus upon 'how different participants' orient 'to each other'. This allows researchers to identify both when attorneys and judges 'fit into the taken-for-granted relational definition[s] assumed to be the frame for this kind of communication practice', and also when individuals like Starr do not: and how this, in turn, influences the behaviours of others (ibid.). The study also palpably highlights that, in legal settings such as this, facework is not achieved using politeness or impoliteness only. The facework strategies are much more complex.

5 Future Directions

This chapter has outlined fourteen studies relating to legal settings (Sect. 3–3.4), and the key ideas, concepts and theories in respect to (im)politeness which have arisen and/or have been developed thanks to this body of work (Sect. 2–2.3). It also includes a case study, based on Tracy's (2011) study of oral argument in US

state supreme courts (Sect. 4). (Im)politeness and facework research in a legal setting has been shown to offer much to (im)politeness and facework research more generally. This includes feeding into—and, in some cases, leading—the current debates in respect to: the relevance of politeness in institutional settings (Sect. 2.1); whether (im)politeness is better viewed on a continuum (Sect. 2.2); and dealing with the 'problem' of intentionality (Sect. 2.3).

The studies also highlight a number of data and methodological issues; some of which have been addressed already, and some of which can be easily addressed in future research. Lakoff's (1989) study has been criticised for 'containing only one rather bizarre anecdotal example of actual courtroom discourse', for example, and, hence, for its lack of 'analytical detail' (Harris 2011, p. 148). This particular methodological issue has been amply rectified as the studies which have followed Lakoff (1989) have mainly drawn on real-life datasets (see section "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets" and Sect. 3.4). Real-life datasets can also be problematic, of course. This is especially true of studies that are reliant on official courtroom records: for such transcribed records are never as *verbatim* as they claim. They lack the prosodic information, which might aid researchers' interpretation of, for example, a participant's illocutionary force. A possible reason that the American judicial system has been studied more than any other is the ready availability of such courtroom data. For example, Tracy (2011, p. 128) was able to download 'videotapes of oral argument … from the state websites where they are made available to the public'. This allowed her to create transcripts 'for each hearing' she focused upon, 'giving [special] attention to words, repetitions, repairs, and vocalized sounds (uh huh); as well as which justice was speaking and moments of overlap'. Tracy did not solely rely on these transcripts once created, however. Rather, she used the transcripts in conjunction with the tape recordings. By making use of televised material, Limberg (2008) was also able to compare his transcripts with the original recordings and thus see and hear how the facework strategies were undertaken: this includes important prosodic aspects (Culpeper et al. 2003). However, although the 'value of [such televised] documentary data and their authenticity' (Limberg 2008, p. 158) is largely accepted (Bousfield 2007), it is important to remember that such datasets are heavily framed (by others) to ensure their entertainment value/appeal to a mass audience.

Potential analytical issues raised by some of the studies outlined in Sects. 3–3.4 include concluding prematurely. This might be because (im)politeness decisions have sometimes been based upon a single adjacency pair or upon the presence of syntactic/grammatical features out of context (Kryk-Kastovsky 2006). One way of ensuring that our assessments of (im)politeness are based

on adequate amounts of data is to make use of corpus linguistic (CL) methods in future studies, similar to Taylor (2009), Johnson and Clifford (2011) and Archer (2014) (see sections "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Based on Modern Datasets" and "Courtroom-Based (Im)politeness Studies Making Use of Historical Datasets"). Taylor and Archer advocate, in turn, that researchers interested in facework can make use of CL techniques to identify the metalinguistic representations of such phenomena. Investigations of lay terms relating to (im)politeness provide an important means of discerning how metalinguistic representations are potentially influencing and/or reflecting thought within a given activity type, CofP and/or institutional practice. In the case of Archer (2014), this includes determining the ways in which such metalanguage representations were connected to the ideologies of times past: that is, to contemporaneous evaluations of im/polite, incidental and ambiguous facework based on perceived social norms, 'correct' or 'in/appropriate' behaviour, the notion of 'a larger moral order', etc. (Cameron 2004, p. 313; Culpeper 2011, pp. 73–4). Possible future directions, beyond the use of CL techniques, include researchers continuing to delineate the facework strategies used in various legal settings *in all their guises*. This means remaining open to the possibility that the choice is not between politeness and impoliteness necessarily, but between impersonal facework, incidental facework, facework strategies characterised by reasonable hostility, etc. It also means allowing for studies in legal settings that pay as much attention to cooperative exchanges as they do conflictive exchanges.

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28

Facework and (Im)politeness in Political Exchanges

Karen Tracy

1 Introduction

In her book, *Rude Democracy: Civility and Incivility in American Politics,* political scientist Susan Herbst (2010) argues that it is best to think of civility and incivility as strategic tools rather than assuming incivility violates a social norm. People act with civility, act without it, or use some complex package of polite and impolite moves because of goals and concerns the selected communication acts are likely to address. To be sure, assertions about the importance of civility, as well as taken-for-granted ways to convey it, are staples of political life, but so, too, are actions that seriously disrespect addressed parties or those being spoken about. In this chapter my aim is to provide a sense of the kinds and complexities of facework in political life.

What the terms, 'political' and 'facework' refer to depend on a scholar's analytic purpose and disciplinary background. In psychology face and facework are preferred over the term politeness (Holtgraves 2005); in communication (Arundale 2006; Ting-Toomey 1994; Tracy 1990), face/ facework are also the more frequently used terms. 'Facework' refers to the language and interaction practices that accomplish or endanger relational and presentational aims in specific situations. It is what communicators do to uphold or challenge their own or others' face wants (Tracy and Robles 2013). Friends chatting

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_28

about national policies over coffee (Walsh 2004), parents explaining to their children which presidential candidate their family favours (Gordon 2004), or even family members constructing stories around the dinner table (Ochs and Taylor 1992) have all been identified as political. For this chapter's purpose I draw the boundary of the political more narrowly, defining political discourse as restricted to talk, and also writing, which involves at least one government official, or aspiring official, in communication with others about matters of public concern (Ädel 2010).

Although not entirely possible, my goal is to sidestep the conceptual debates regarding (im)politeness theorising. These include:

(1) whether it is reasonable to define politeness theoretically apart from the lay notion (i.e., politeness1 vs. politeness2, etic vs. emic) (Eelen 2001);
(2) whether face, (im)politeness, rapport management, or relational work/practice is the better umbrella term to describe the focal scholarly terrain (see e.g., Culpeper 2008; Locher and Watts 2008; Spencer-Oatey 2005);
(3) whether face only applies to face-to-face situations (O'Driscoll 2011) and how it links to identity (Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2009, 2013);
(4) whether verbal aggression, impoliteness, hostility, rudeness, or some other term is the best one is to identify negative, hurtful communication acts (Archer 2008; Culpeper 2011); and
(5) the role of implicatures and indirectness in judgements of (im)politeness (Haugh 2015).

In reflecting about what made academic concepts useful Erving Goffman remarked that concepts should be grounded in the sites to which they were to be applied. As he noted, 'Better, perhaps, different coats to clothe the children well than a single splendid tent in which they all shiver' (Goffman 1961, p. xiv). Goffman, as multiple scholars have noted (Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2013; Winkin and Leeds-Hurwitz 2013), created many concepts useful for understanding social life, 'face' and 'facework' being two of them. At the same time he left unelaborated how these concepts could be applied to different situations or how they might relate to the other terms he coined. In contrast, Brown and Levinson's (1978) theory of politeness sought to build the single splendid tent. Their politeness theory offered an understanding of social interaction that was theoretically coherent, elegant, and broad in scope, albeit limited in how well it served individual users. Both of these approaches to understanding social life have value but they pull in opposite directions. This chapter about (im)politeness in political settings leans toward the Goffman, different-coat approach.

The chapter is organised into three parts. In the first section I identify key concepts about facework in political settings. Then, I do a critical review of the literature on politeness and political genres. I conclude the chapter with a case study of a relatively underanalysed political genre—legislative hearings.

2 Facework in Political Settings: Key Concepts

Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness is grounded in everyday interpersonal life, taking as central the kinds of talk that occur among family and friends. Their theory largely ignores institutional sites in which people are bound together in ways that impose rights and obligations on the parties related to their roles (Craig et al. 1986; Harris 2006). A patient, for instance, may be relatively low power relative to a physician and also distant, but she has rights to straightforwardly request certain highly time- and labour-intensive actions. On the reverse side, a physician making a small request—such as asking a patient to go and get coffee from a nearby vending machine—could be highly face-threatening.

Since the appearance of Brown and Levinson's theory, but especially in the last decade, researchers have been studying the specific face demands, challenges, and (im)politeness moves in a range of institutional encounters, including healthcare (Locher and Schnurr (Chap. 26), this volume; Mullany 2009), service (Márquez Reiter and Franch (Chap. 25)), workplace (Holmes and Schnurr (Chap. 24), this volume; Schnurr and Chan 2009), legal (Archer 2011; Archer and Harris, this volume) and political exchanges. These institutional sites have similarities with each other, as well as possessing distinctive facework challenges. Six features of *political* exchanges stand out as especially different from everyday ones.

(a) *In political exchanges one or more parties have concerns about their social group's face as well as their own personal face.*

Political issues concern contested matters regarding who should get resources, the reasonable or goodness of particular actions/people, and a large swath of emotion-filled symbolic decisions. These contested matters involve individuals speaking to each other, but typically they do so with a spokesperson role related to a particular group foregrounded. Speakers express themselves as the prime minister or a member of the opposition party, a Republican or a Democrat, a labour or management leader, a citizen connected to a cause-promoting group or an elected official. In speaking and

being spoken to, persons will be concerned about how their group is being perceived and treated and know that others have similar concerns. In contrast, however, to ordinary interaction in which it is often in each party's best interest to support the face of interacting others, that is not necessarily the case in political exchanges. Politics involves groups in adversarial relationships, and to advantage one group often by definition will disadvantage the other group.

In a comparison of how Israeli children and politicians did disputes Kampf and Blum-Kulka (2011) found that children did a much better job of recognising yet holding on to differences in a friendly way. Children cared about maintaining their relationships. In contrast Israeli politicians not only valued a direct *dugri* form of expression (Katriel 1986), but they regarded threatening the face of the other party as an important way to enhance their own face. The face of different groups is not necessarily directly opposed. In an analysis of booklets for non-specialists designed by the European Union to explain particulars of a constitutional treaty, Magistro (2011) found that the document-writers used many of Brown and Levinson's positive politeness strategies to acknowledge readers likely concerns about their national face, which by many was seen as in competition with their European face, to persuade them to see the treaty in a positive light.

(b) *Much political talk is designed for overhearing listeners even more than the actual party addressed.*

It has long been recognised that attorneys questioning witnesses in the courtroom design their questions—the content, form, and sequence—for overhearing jury members (Heffer 2005). In political contexts the audience for messages is even more complicated. Bell (1984) distinguished among four audience or listener roles: there is the party a speaker is directly addressing, such as an interviewer in a political talk show; there are ratified others, those who are not part of an exchange but are being addressed, such as media viewers or the citizens attending a live debate; there are those who may be listening who are not targets, technicians helping with a sound system, for example; and finally, there are non-ratified persons of whom the speaker may be unaware, such as a person who has secretly gained access, perhaps electronically, to an occasion. To state it simply, it is almost always the case that there are multiple audiences when a person speaks in a political context. The audience complexity is undoubtedly greatest for politicians who have relationships with many other politicians and constituencies but it is also there when an ordinary citizen connected to an issue or interest group speaks out at a public meeting.

There are studies (e.g., Bull 2000, 2008; Clayman 2007) that analyse how politicians seek to evade questions that could alienate some segment of their audience and which ways of doing so are least likely to engender negative assessments of the politician's honesty and character. That there are multiple listeners in political exchanges makes it important that (im)politeness analysts do not stop their analysis with the most obvious addressees.

(c) *Rudeness and insults are expected, even valued, parts of political talk.*

In one of the early theorisations of rudeness, Kienpointner (1997) treated rudeness as something that was to be expected in situations that were non-cooperative or competitive. He identified debate in parliament as an obvious place where strategic rudeness could be expected. Garces-Conejos Blitvich (2009) goes further and argues that impoliteness as a style may constitute a community's life. Studying American news shows such as Bill O'Reilly and Glenn Beck, she identifies the purpose of these shows as to 'reaffirm a given view of the world, usually conservative' (p. 272). Political news shows such as these use impoliteness to address those with whom the host disagrees. This rudeness creates community with the like-minded viewing audience, showing them that the host is willing to 'say it like it is'. Rude, hostile expression toward those expressing opposing viewpoints establishes the host as a truthful, assertive person, not someone who buckles to the conventions of niceness.

Impolite expression and attack are involving and entertaining (Culpeper 2005, 2011). The journal, *Research on Language and Social Interaction,* had a special issue analysing an interview that the American TV news anchor, Dan Rather, did in 1998 with the then Vice President George Bush (Pomerantz 1989). Bush was running for President against Michael Dukakis. Prior to this interview, as Clayman and Whalen (1989) showed, Bush was battling a public perception that he was 'wimpy' and not sufficiently tough to be president. The interview became a much replayed media event because it violated conventions of a news interview. Soon after its start, it turned into a shouting match between the two men. Both of them contributed to the escalating rudeness, but because Rather had a reputation for being a bully, Bush's resistance to the interview and attack on Rather ended up presenting Bush in a positive light and put to rest concerns about his wimpiness.

(d) *Marked face-attack is often accompanied by politeness moves.*

In a study of the Prime Minister's question time in the British House of Commons, Harris (2001) found intentional, explicit face-threat to be a

defining feature of exchanges. Both through the content of questions and responses and the presuppositions built into these actions, challenges to the competence and reasonableness of opposing parties were regularly enacted. The House of Commons, as does most political bodies, prohibits members from accusing each other of wrongdoing during debate. However as long as the challenges to another's positive face are expressed somewhat indirectly—e.g., describing a 'cowardly decision' rather than accusing the person of being a coward—and accompanied by the expected negative politeness features of a deferential address form with disagreement-marking politeness tokens (e.g., 'with all due respect'), the exchanges tend to move forward without breakdown. Reflecting about interaction in the courts, an institutional context that has features in common with political exchanges, Harris (2011, p. 92) comments, 'the lexemes "please" and "thank you" consistently occur in most types of courtroom discourse in order to insure that the face-aggravation of witnesses/defendants is not to be taken as *deliberately* insulting or personal to those being interrogated.'

In political settings, similar moves are common. Tracy (2008, 2010) coined the term 'reasonable hostility' to describe the communicative moves common among citizen speaking to elected official in a community's education governance meetings. Reasonable hostility involved challenging other participants, whether they be elected officials, school staff, or disagreeing others, in ways those parties would regard as rude and insulting. However these hostile sentiments were routinely accompanied by small tokens of politeness. These tokens functioned to convey to non-affiliated others that the negative sentiment was because of the person's position on the issue rather than being designed to embarrass or hurt the person.

(e) *Traditional politeness moves can be used to insult or challenge a political person.*

One of the ways of showing positive politeness is to compliment a person (Brown and Levinson 1987). In a large-scale analysis of who compliments whom about what, Knapp et al. (1984) found that women were more often the recipients of this type of positive speech act and men were often the givers. Compliments, though, can function as put-downs. In an analysis of the second 2007 debate between candidates for the French presidency—Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy—Fracchiolla (2011) showed how Sarkozy gave compliments and insisted how much he respected Royal. The effect of this kind of politeness was to imply Royal's unsuitability for the office of president. Because expectations about politeness and niceness are gender-connected in several ways (Lakoff 2005), which is turn are connected to social expectations

about who can fulfil what roles, moves that are linguistically 'polite' can indirectly challenge that a person has certain other needed character traits.

It is also the case that traditional politeness moves, such as thanking people for their efforts, can be used to attack co-present third parties. For instance, in one American community that had experienced a major financial crisis in its school district due to mismanagement, citizen testifiers at a pubic meeting thanked one category of person to implicate the incompetent conduct of others (Tracy 2007). In another conflict-rich local meeting, an elected board member resigned because of the group's 'lack of democracy' and thanked two of the six other members of the existing Board (Tracy 2010). In the context where a person thanks people who have assisted self during time in an elected role, the absence of thanks for others in the same category as the thanked becomes hearable as criticism of un-thanked persons.

Politeness moves can also be done is a fashion that are attacking. In a study of exchange in the British House of Lords, Robles (2011) argued that the distinctive style that has evolved in this setting is a product of the high level of formality that has been passed down across the centuries combined with the strong oppositional character of the activities. This has resulted

> in a number of practices that defy the usual distinction between directness and indirectness, or make use of extralinguistic properties to do disagreement work: mitigation markers may be used as upgraders; gratitude may be displayed with sarcasm; questions may be populated with scathing criticisms; nonverbals may be exaggerated; and there are many other such practices besides, practices in which ordinary markers of 'politeness' come across as markedly impolite. (p. 151)

(f) *'Backstage' is an elusive place for political communicators.*

Goffman (1959) introduced the distinction between backstage and front stage to capture different ways people talk to others with whom they interact in their institutional roles. For instance, when with a customer, a waiter is front stage but in the kitchen chatting with the chef and co-workers, he is backstage. Similarly, a politician answering questions from constituents at a local meeting is front stage, but when she is in the car talking with her staff, she is backstage. In backstage areas people talk in ways that could be described as venting and releasing tension but these ways of talking are likely to be construed as impolite or rude if addressed directly to the person.

Mullany (2011) analyzed a flap that occurred when Gordon Brown, who was then British Prime Minster and running for election, engaged in a long conversation with a woman at a local meeting. In their exchange, Brown had

answered questions about immigration policy and when he got in his car to leave, he remarked to staff about the 'bigoted woman' he had just spoken with. Unbeknownst to Brown his lapel mike was still on; a reporter heard the comment and decided to publicise it. This led to a series of apologies by Brown to the woman and the larger public, as well as discussions in blogs evaluating his handling of the event.

In political life, at least for highly visible players, it has become increasingly likely that no arena of social life can be 100 per cent guaranteed to remain backstage. Given that personal actions are seen as an index of character and suitability for an elected office, and because alliances among parties are ever-changing and adversarial, backstage becomes an elusive place for political figures.

3 Critical Overview of Political Genres Studied

Parliamentary discourse has been a primary site for thinking through politeness issues in political life, with the questioning of the Prime Minister or government staff that happens in the British House of Commons an especially analysed practice. Harris (2001) showed how rather than power being a given, as Brown and Levinson's model assumes, it is accomplished through the ways questions are posed and responded to. In these exchanges much of the discourse is either intentionally face-threatening, when directed to the opposing party, or face-enhancing when addressed to one's own side. Extending this work, Murphy (2014) found that the degree and frequency of face-threatening acts depend on a member's place in parliament. Those members of parliament who are 'backbenchers' are threatened more gently than the leader of the opposition who is often compared directly to the prime minster.

In a comparison of insulting moves in British and Swedish parliaments Ilie (2004) found distinctive national differences in frequency and types of insults. At the same time, in both parliaments she found that insults were 'regarded as attention-getters meant to shake up a political adversary into reacting emotionally and thus revealing unflattering aspects of his/her personality, political responsibly and/or moral profile' (p. 52). Other scholars have drawn comparisons between Russian and British parliaments (Sivenkova 2008) and between the British House of Lords and the House of Commons (Robles 2011). A study (Wilson and Stapleton 2012) of the Northern Irish Assembly, where either Irish or English may be spoken, shows that the selection of the language chosen is a strategy of advancing one party's interest at the expense of the other.

Radio-broadcast or televised interviews with political figures (e.g., Hernandez-Flores 2008; Hutchby 2011) as well as debates between politicians, are events that have also been given significant attention. In an analysis of Turkish debates Yemenci (2001) shows that interruptions, which are generally assumed to be rude, have different functions based on whether the interviewer or one of the candidates interrupts and the specific interactional purpose for that speaker's interruption (e.g., by hosts: to project an ensuing follow-up question versus challenging the interviewee for being misleading). Drawing on analysis of 16 US election debates at different levels, Garcia-Pastor (2008) described face-aggravating strategies used by candidates. For instance to aggravate positive face of the opponent, speakers worked to disassociate and distance themselves from the other as well as belittle or ignore him/her.

In addition to these two main genres, a variety of other issues and texts have been analysed for facework moves, including: (a) issues in translating politeness in multilingual documents in the European Union (Magistro 2013); (b) a presidential speech by Obama, a heckler, and YouTube responses (Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2012); (c) local hearings about an environmental issue (Buttny 2009; Buttny and Cohen 2007); (d) school board meetings (Tracy 2010); and citizen talk in a public meeting about genetically modified organisms (Hausendorf and Bora 2006).

The single act that has received the most attention is the apology. Murphy's (2015) study of the British House of Commons, for instance, found the acts that most often led members of parliament to apologise included: (1) insulting or criticising another member; (2) giving misleading or incorrect information; (3) breaching the conventions of parliament; and (4) financial irregularities. There has also been considerable attention given to political apologies that do not exactly apologise (Kampf 2008, 2009), expressing regret perhaps but not taking responsibility, such as seen in Tony Blair's apology for Britain's participation in the slave trade (Davies 2011), Bill Clinton's for the US role (Harris et al. 2006), and Ancarno's (2015) broader comparison of British and French apologies in the press.

4 A Case Study: Legislative Hearings

One political genre that is important in the United States, albeit somewhat less common in other countries, is the hearing that is held by a legislative body. In the United States when a governance group faces a technically difficult or socially contentious issue, a hearing is likely to be held. Who may participate in a hearing will depend on the issue and the level of the governance group.

Hearings held by Senate or House committees at the federal level usually restrict participation considerably, whereas hearings at state or local levels often allow any citizen who wishes to speak to do so.

A survey by Conover et al. (2002) compared British and American citizens' frequency of participation in public meetings—a broader genre category than the hearing but one that includes them—and found that Americans were more than twice as likely to have verbally participated in a public meeting. The United States, they argued, has a populist conception of democracy in which ordinary citizens see themselves as having a right to express their views in public meetings. Britain, in contrast, subscribes to an elite view of democracy in which deliberation about issues is largely restricted to elected or appointed officials, therefore limiting public meeting occasions and citizen participation.

Over the last decade I have been studying hearings held by judicial committees of state and federal legislative bodies (Senates or Houses of Representatives) as they consider one or another issue related to laws that would extend marriage to same-sex couples (Tracy 2016). I have analysed two federal hearings and six state hearings. In the federal hearings committee members often made statements about their position before taking testimony and the number of testifiers was limited (under 20). In the state hearings, committee members did not usually announce their position, and the number of testifiers was large, ranging from 40 to 176. For the federal hearings, the first one was sponsored by the House Judiciary Committee in 1996 to assess the reasonableness of passing DOMA, i.e., the Defense of Marriage Act. The second hearing, the 2011 hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee, addressed whether DOMA should be repealed. The six state hearings, occurring between 2006 and 2011, focused on whether that particular state should make either civil unions or marriage legal for same-sex couples.

The larger research project analyses how participants' talk did identity-work for themselves, the parties they addressed, and the gay and lesbian parties about which they spoke. As Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2013) has commented, in the last decade the understanding of identity and face in politeness studies has converged. Identity, similar to face, is constructed through interaction; at the same time, face has been extended from Goffman's focus on unacquainted dyads to institutional and personal relationships. Identities of interest in this study of public hearings have included interactional ones such as legislator and citizen testifier, and, especially of interest, personal/relational identities related to moral qualities: whether a person was espousing a (un)reasonable view, committed to equality (or not), appropriately honouring God (or not), prejudiced (or not), and so on. Supporting or challenging these kinds of

identities were the specific face stakes in these hearings. These moral matters are central to (im)politeness theorising (Haugh 2013).

To propose that politeness/impoliteness (being face-attacking or face-supportive) are best conceived as judgements that are context-sensitive is widely accepted (e.g., Locher and Watts 2008; Mills 2003). What study of these marriage law hearings makes visible is the importance of conceptualising context to go beyond genre (e.g., parliamentary questioning, apology) so that context attends to time and to institutional level (e.g., local, state, federal in the United States). The debate about marriage equality in the United States was a particularly fast-moving social change. In 2003, laws criminalising homosexual sex were finally declared unconstitutional, a violation of citizens' privacy rights. In the decade or so after *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), the US Supreme Court case overturning sodomy laws, public attitudes toward same-sex marriage changed from highly negative to generally positive.

In the 1996 House Committee hearing that led to the establishment of DOMA, negative sentiment toward homosexuals was straightforwardly expressed. Consider an exchange that occurred between two committee members (Tracy 2016), Pat Schroeder, a Democratic member against the passage of DOMA and Bob Inglis a Republican favouring its passage.

Excerpt 1 (U.S. House Judicial Committee, Schroder and Inglis, 1996)

(a) Schroeder

You know, every day in the House we say 'The Pledge of Allegiance,' and we talk about liberty and justice for all. And today I'm asking what part of 'all' don't you guys understand? I see absolutely no reason for this bill except to create a divisive issue in America, one more thing to stir people up, to get hate radio going, to get everybody moving around.

(b) Inglis

I'd simply respond to the gentlelady from Colorado by noting that this Republic was founded on some basic statements of truth, and it's really interesting that in the Declaration of Independence it made some rather bold assertions: 'These are truths that are self-evident.' In other words, there was no debate about those things and there was no sort of uneasiness about asserting that there are some things that are true and right and some things that are wrong. And that, I would submit, Mrs. Schroeder, is what's been one of the strengths of this Nation—is the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and that's what it's about here.

In Schroeder's comment, we see her describing the motives of those who oppose her in highly unflattering, face-attacking ways. Tying her comment

to an American god term—the pledge of allegiance—she questions opposing others' commitment to what she frames as a basic socially-shared beliefs. She then uses an extreme case formulation, 'absolutely no reason' (Pomerantz 1986) to imply that opponents of her position had bad motives (a desire to be divisive and stir people up). Schroeder's remark is countered by Inglis with an equally face-attacking statement. Accompanied by a presumably polite reference term similar to those used in parliament (i.e., 'the gentlelady from Colorado') Inglis also draws on an iconic American text, the Declaration of Independence, as he works to discredit Schroder's remark. Given the content of the hearing is about marriage rights, what Inglis asserts are 'the self-evident truths,' 'distinguish[ing] between right and wrong,' and 'what it's about here' is what the DOMA Report stated: 'defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage' and 'defending traditional notions of morality' (see Tracy 2016). Both parties, as is commonplace in political talk, spoke in ways likely to be seen as rude and face-attacking by those opposing their view but as warranted and reasonable by those who agreed with their view.

If we compare this 1996 hearing to pass DOMA to the 2011 Senate hearing to repeal it, we continue to see both sides engaging in face-attack, but change in what was sayable occurred. Certain strategies of face-attack that were done without mitigation by committee members and testifiers in the 1996 hearing were no longer acceptable in 2011. Absent by 2011 was straightforward expression of disapproval of gays and lesbians and their 'lifestyle.' By 2011, expression of support for continuing DOMA was regularly accompanied by expressions of positive sentiment toward gay persons or at least denial of ill-will. Consider the words of the committee member who was the lead supporter for continuing DOMA in 2011.

Excerpt 2 (Senator Grassley, 2011)
One of the witnesses before us today says that DOMA was passed for only one reason: 'to express disapproval of gay and lesbian people.' I know this to be false. Senators at the time, such as [names liberal senators who had voted for DOMA's 1996 passage] did not support DOMA to express disapproval of gay and lesbian people, and neither did I.

Thus, time can shift what will be seen as description of the world versus reasonable, politically warranted face-attack versus unwarranted face-attack that reveals a speaker's own moral culpability.

In legislative hearings a common way to attack an opponent is to accuse them of being 'political'. Although perhaps a less scathing face-attack than others, describing an individual or group as 'political' suggests that the party's

motives are self-serving and without merit. This, in fact, was a central strategy opponents of DOMA used in 1996.

Excerpt 3

Rep. Barney Frank: The legislation is because the 'Republican national campaign is not doing very well and there is a significant effort to change the subject…. *This is largely political in motivation*.'

Nebraska State Senator, Ernest Chambers: I don't think it takes courage to bring a bill such as this. This is the kind that is—and I'm not referring, please understand, to the gentlemen and ladies who bring this legislation; I assume that, and presume, it was done in good faith, but I'm looking at the nature of the legislation. *I think it's cynical, political, and hypocritical.*

Besides the historical time being an important part of context, that shapes interpretation of facework in political exchanges, another factor is the level of the institution. To state an obvious fact, state and local institutions are closer to ordinary people than is the same body/genre at the national level. The upshot of this different relationship to citizens is a difference in what are permissible ways to threaten testifiers' face. Perhaps the most common linguistic tool used in hearings to problematise a speaker's stance is the question (Sidnell 2010).

Although questions could serve primarily an informational function, in the marriage law hearings they rarely did. By and large questions were used to problematise the face of the addressee, especially the reasonableness of his/her opinion. Engaging in this kind of discrediting action with ordinary citizens at the state level was a more delicate activity than questioning at the federal level. Framing ordinary citizens' expressions in ways that might humiliate them seems inappropriate whereas doing so with expert testifiers at the national level seemed fair political play. Evidence that legislators understood the hearing context this way is seen in the number of questions posed to testifiers. In the two federal hearings, 75–100 per cent of testifiers were questioned; in the state hearings, three of them had no questions and the other three ranged from 5–16 per cent of testifiers.

In the state level hearings a common occurrence, albeit an activity that chairs frequently reproached, was applause. In these hearings that had a large number of people in attendance, the audience would break into loud clapping when a speaker said something that part of the audience especially liked. Often these moments of applause followed a statement that attacked the view of the opposing group. Applause in essence functioned as double-sided face move carried out by legitimate overhearers. It supported the speaker's claim to be reasonable and right and it implied that the opposing other was unreasonable and wrong.

A final facework insight that study of these hearings about same-sex marriage reveals is to identify another use of apologies. In the Hawaii state hearing, which had 176 citizens testifying, nine apologies were offered for the content or style of speakers' comments. Eight of these apologies were offered by speakers opposing marriage rights for gays and lesbians, Excerpt 4 illustrates two of them.

Excerpt 4 Hawaii Hearing
Speaker 31: Excuse me, I would like to *apologize* for some. To reiterate what someone else had said earlier, *apologize* for those who've acted in a hateful manner out of fear and ignorance. That is never acceptable, ever. I would like to stress that this opposition has nothing to do with hate or prejudice. But everything to do with protecting the value and the sanctity of traditional marriage.
Speaker 131: I personally want to *apologize* for the sins of my generation, and I vow to teach my children compassion, and understanding toward all people. That being said, I want it to be known that I fiercely oppose this bill.

Toward the end of the evening after the eight apologisers for the con-side spoke, two con-speakers expressed their dismay that only those speaking on their side were apologising. One speaker said:

Excerpt 5
Speaker 155: And oh, I would add one thing to that. Um a lotta – um – several Christians have stood up here and uh been very accommodating uh to the other side, *apologizing* and uh, try – giving ground. Um and I think, uh I – I – I have not heard that from the other side as much.

In making this comment, speaker 155 makes visible another interactional meaning of apologies. In a conflictual situation, apologies are polite ways to recognise that everyone is speaking a little inappropriately. The way to mend the situation is for all parties to acknowledge their contribution to the tension by apologising. Thus, speaker 155 can be seen to be threatening the face of pro-speakers by suggesting they are not living up to the expectations of public, civil discourse. A pro-speaker who followed the two con-speakers, though, did not accept that the need to apologise applied equally to both sides. She said:

Excerpt 6
Speaker 167: You're asking us to *apologize* to you guys. But you have the rights in this room. You have the rights, we don't have the rights. So I can't *apologize*

to you for all of the insults that you've levered at us today – that you've levelled at us today. For all of the incredible ignorance that I have heard.

In essence we see speakers 155 and 167 discursively struggling over the kind of 'apologising' that should be happening in the hearing and the meanings of the expressions of sorrow that had been voiced. Speaker 167 frames apology as warranted only when a party has wronged the other, a wronging she argues that has only gone one way. Speaker 155, in contrast, treats apologies as a reasonable, expected way for both parties to be polite in tense situations, thereby implicitly not accepting that her side has done anything seriously wrong.

5 Summary and Future Directions

Facework in political exchanges is particularly complicated because the typical exchange involves multiple parties bound to each other in webs of competing and cooperative relationships. This complexity of binding results in facework packages that do not readily fit any simple description. That is, facework in political exchanges regularly involves positive and negative linguistic politeness forms mixed with self-face enhancing formulations and other face-attacking moves. To complicate matters even more, the packages speakers will employ may change in short amounts of time as what is morally defensible or reprehensible in the larger society may change rapidly. Too, people's evaluations about rudeness and reasonableness are not consistent but tie to the political groups with which they affiliate and the positions they hold on issues of dispute. This means that analyses of (im)politeness need to take seriously people's positioning to understand their judgements.

Given this complexity, the need for additional research in multiple fronts is compelling. Directions that future research could beneficially take are many. I would note but two. First, understanding of local political scenes is needed. If we want to understand political life and communicative expression we need to be giving attention to city councils, mayors, local newspapers and grass roots action groups. We have a well-established saying that 'the personal is political'; we need to equally recognise that local politics is political. Interviews with presidents and parliamentary debates deserve attention, but these genres should be studied alongside the local, not instead of it. Local politics makes up much of people's lives and political expression in local scenes is done differently than it is at national levels. The local deserves sustained attention.

Second, more than most arenas of social life, politics is being reshaped by evolving technologies. Examining how facework is carried out in blogging,

tweeting, and YouTube posts, as well all the yet-to-be-developed new technological forms, is needed and is likely to make visible novel facework strategies to enhance self's persona and to support and challenge those who are addressed.

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29

(Im)politeness in Fictional Texts

Dan McIntyre and Derek Bousfield

1 Introduction

(Im)politeness has been of interest to stylisticians of fiction for almost as long as it has been a concern in pragmatics (see, for example, early work such as that by Brown and Gilman 1989; Simpson 1989; Sell 1992; Leech 1992). This chapter explains what (im)politeness has to offer to the stylistic analysis of fictional texts as well as what the analysis of (im)politeness in fiction can contribute to pragmatics.

To begin with the first of these points, the value of theories and models of (im)politeness for stylistic analysis is that they can help stylisticians to explain interactions between characters, which in turn allows us to understand how fictional texts are likely to be understood by readers. At the same time, such analyses can be of value to pragmatics since, as Clark (2007: 196) points out, 'the texts considered by stylisticians can be seen as data with which to test particular approaches to pragmatics.' The reason for this is that the stylistic effects that we encounter in fiction (e.g. conflict, dramatic tension, plot development, humour, etc.) are often created by narrators and characters violating

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_29

aspects of interaction. Such violations can be revealing of how processes of interaction work, and these insights can be useful to pragmaticians in reassessing and revising pragmatic concepts and frameworks for analysis. These are academic reasons for studying fiction. There is, of course, an additional practical reason and this is the economic advantage that is to be gained by studying data that is much cheaper and (possibly) easier to collect than speech. In an ideal world, research questions would drive data collection, but in situations where practical restrictions apply (for instance, where research funding is limited and difficult to obtain) the use of fiction as data can allow researchers to circumvent such problems, at least to an extent.

We begin this chapter by discussing the nature and value of fiction as linguistic data before going on to provide a critical overview of key work which has utilised and developed models of (im)politeness in the analysis of fiction. We then present a short case study demonstrating the value of analysing (im)politeness in fiction before ending with some suggestions for how work in this area might be taken forwards.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

2.1 Fiction as Linguistic Data

Traditionally, linguistics has been primarily concerned with the analysis of naturally occurring language, usually speech in favour of writing. Linguists who have not used naturally occurring data have been subject to criticism. Stubbs (1993), for instance, while acknowledging the importance of Halliday's work in text linguistics, takes issue with his use of non-naturally occurring examples, complaining that 'his arguments often rely nevertheless on invented sentences about aunts, dukes and teapots, or about Christopher Wren and a gazebo' (Stubbs 1993: 9). The reason for this opposition to the use of invented examples stems from a concern that they fail to acknowledge the complexity of naturally occurring language. Corpus linguists, for instance, have shown how naturally occurring spoken language operates according to grammatical rules that differ from those developed to describe written language, and that such rules would not have been discoverable via the analysis of invented examples (see, for instance, Biber et al. 1999). It is easy to understand, then, why some linguists have been dismissive of the value of inauthentic language data and, by extension, the use of fiction to test linguistic models. Generally, then, fiction has been the concern only of those linguists (i.e. stylisticians) aiming to account for the nature and function of literary language specifically, or of those

for whom there is no other option (e.g. historical pragmaticians). Sinclair (2004), however, is clear on the importance of fiction to linguistics, saying:

> Literature is a prime example of language in use; no systematic apparatus can claim to describe a language if it does not embrace the literature also; and not as a freakish development, but as a natural specialization of categories which are required in other parts of the descriptive system.
>
> (Sinclair 2004: 51)

Following this line of reasoning, fiction has a role to play in the development of linguistic models and analytical frameworks, including, of course, theories of (im)politeness.

A second reason for using fiction as linguistic data is that advances in corpus analytical techniques have begun to show that some fictional data is perhaps not as different from naturally occurring language as we might first have assumed. Quaglio's (2009) study of the US sitcom *Friends* uses Biber's (1988) method of multidimensional analysis to compare transcripts of the show against the conversation section of the Longman Grammar Corpus. Multidimensional analysis assumes that the co-occurrence of particular linguistic items will differ according to register. So, for instance, conversation will display co-occurrences that are different from those found in academic prose or fiction. Biber (1988) argues that such differences in the co-occurrence of linguistic items can be explained with reference to the function of particular registers. Multidimensional analysis requires first of all determining particular functions that have been associated with particular linguistic items. So, for example, past tense verbs and third-person pronouns are typically associated with narrative discourse. The target corpus is then tagged for these predetermined linguistic features. Next, a statistical analysis is carried out to determine whether the co-occurrence of these features in the target corpus is the same as or differs from their co-occurrence in a reference corpus. As a result of this analysis, it is then possible to determine what Biber (1988) calls dimensions of variation between registers. For instance, Biber (2004) points out that present-tense verbs, contractions and first-person pronouns are characteristic of interactive discourse as opposed to informational discourse, and that 'interactive–informational' constitutes a dimension of variation. Using Biber's (1988) technique, Quaglio (2009) determines that there is a significant degree of similarity between his *Friends* corpus and the conversation dataset that constitutes his reference corpus. For example, the interactive features of dimension 1 (the interactive–informational dimension) are present to a similar level in both corpora. Although there are also some differences

between the two data sets, and although Quaglio is careful not to overclaim the importance of his results, what his work points towards is the possibility of using fiction (or, at least, fictional dialogue) at least as a support for naturally occurring data (this is one of the reasons for our choice of data in the case study section of this chapter). This may be of particular value in cases where naturally occurring data is difficult to obtain, as is often the case when collecting samples of spoken language. In such instances, fiction might well be used to supplement whatever naturally occurring data is to hand.

2.2 Advantages of Fiction as Data

The previous section argued that fiction has a role to play as linguistic data. What we argue in this section is that fiction also has characteristics that make it special and that can, in some cases, offer insights that cannot be obtained through the analysis of naturally occurring linguistic data.

The first point to make is that fiction constitutes a limited data set. That is, a novel or a play is prototypically complete in and of itself, thereby constituting a complete set of data for linguistic analysis. This contrasts with, say, boardroom conversations that might extend over several meetings, not all of which may be available as data. That said, whether it is possible for the analyst to take account of a complete novel or play is largely dependent on the analytical methodology employed (which should, of course, be driven by the research questions to be answered). However, the increasing use of corpus linguistic techniques in stylistics have broadened the scope of how many data we are able to deal with in an analysis.

A second noteworthy feature of fiction (and also of some non-literary narrative) is that it has discourse structures that are more complex than those found in naturally occurring conversation. This notion is explained extensively by Short (1996), who identifies three levels of discourse in prototypical prose fiction and two in prototypical plays. To begin with prose fiction, the first level of discourse constitutes discursive communication between the author of the text and the reader. Embedded within this is a level of communication between the narrator of the text in question and the narratee. In some third-person stories the illusion may be created that the narrator of the story is in fact the author. In such cases, according to Short (1996), the primary discourse roles (author and narrator) of the first and second levels of the discourse architecture may be said to collapse together. Similarly, in such cases we might experience the illusion that we the reader are the addressee of the narrator, in which case the secondary discourse roles (reader and narratee) of the first and second levels of the discourse architecture may also be said to

collapse together. Finally, embedded within this second tier of discourse structure is a third level in which characters interact with each other. The difference in this third level is that communication is bidirectional between characters (unlike, say, between narratee and narrator).

Plays have a similar discourse structure to prose fiction but, prototypically, are not said to have a narrator level. Nonetheless, it can be noted that stage directions in plays function very much like narration in prose fiction, meaning that the discourse structure of plays is not necessarily as different from that of prose fiction as Short (1996) claims (see McIntyre 2006 for more on this point).

The upshot of these discourse structures for the analysis of interaction is that we can use theories, models and analytical frameworks from pragmatics to analyse communication between fictional characters (i.e. at the third tier of the discourse architecture of a text) and, indeed, between all participants within the discourse structure of the text. Such communication can be direct (as in plays) or indirect, as is found in prose fiction (along with many other presentations of speech and thought forms; see Semino and Short 2004). This is another point where the analysis of fiction can be useful in the testing of pragmatic approaches. Classic pragmatic theories have tended to be developed with prototypical direct speech and writing in mind and are not, therefore, fully worked out for application to the kind of indirect forms found in fiction. In prose fiction, for instance, different options for speech presentation can mean that it is not always possible to reconstruct the supposed original speech that a character or characters uttered. However, importantly, what fiction does often give us is access to a character's thoughts, either directly or filtered through a narrator. This can then have a bearing on how we interpret that character's utterances. In real life, access to the motivations and intentions behind a particular utterance, or to the understandings of addressees and other participants is usually not possible. But in fiction it can be, as in this example from the opening paragraph of William Boyd's novel *A Good Man In Africa*:

> [Context: Morgan Leafy is First Secretary to the British Deputy High Commission in Kinjanja, a fictional African country.]
>
> 'Good man,' said Dalmire, gratefully accepting the gin Morgan Leafy offered him, 'Oh good man.' He presents his eager male friendship like a gift, thought Morgan; he's like a dog who wants me to throw a stick for him to chase. If he had a tail he'd be wagging it.
>
> Morgan smiled and raised his own glass. I hate you, you smug bastard! he screamed inwardly. You shit, you little turd, you've ruined my life! But all he said was, 'Congratulations. She's a fabulous girl. Lovely. Lucky chap.'
>
> (Boyd 1981: 11)

The narration in the above extract allows us to be confident that Dalmire's utterance is meant sincerely since we know he accepts his drink gratefully. Similarly, the presentation of Morgan's direct thought allows us to be confident that his congratulatory utterance is not meant sincerely. This is what Jucker (2016: 112) alludes to when, through his analysis of politeness in eighteenth-century English drama, he notes that 'In fictional texts it is often possible to contrast the outward behaviour of individual characters with their true intentions.' This insight into intention is not usually available to analysts working with naturally occurring speech. The importance of this in relation to (im)politeness in fiction we explain in Sect. 3.1 below.

3 Critical Overview of Research

3.1 Countering Criticisms of Brown and Levinson's Model Through Reference to Fiction

The approach to politeness that has tended to be favoured in the analysis of fiction draws on a face-based model. Stylistic analyses that have focused on (im)politeness have tended either to directly apply Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory (e.g. Simpson 1989) or to develop this (e.g. Culpeper 1998; Bousfield 2007) to account for new phenomena (e.g. impoliteness). Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach, of course, has not been without its detractors or criticisms. However, many of the elements of Brown and Levinson's work that have been criticised are particularly important in the analysis of fiction. For example, one particular criticism of Brown and Levinson (1987) concerns their reliance on the concept of a 'Model Person', which might be seen as a convenient construct for the sake of an elegant theory. However, Brown and Levinson (1987) state that they use the concept of a Model Person in a 'tongue in cheek' (p. 58) fashion to demonstrate the ideal of a fluent speaker of a language endowed with rationality and face. ('Rationality', Brown and Levinson argue, simply means understanding the likely linguistic means to a polite end.) Furthermore, the concept of a model person, or 'cardboard cut out' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 58–9), is a concept which is helpful in the analysis of fiction. All readers draw on schematic expectations of character types (arising from societal experience, including reading literature) which we rely on when building a mental image of fictional characters (see Culpeper 2001, section 2.3). Brown and Levinson's (1987) theoretical notion of a 'model person' can act as a benchmark to help us assess fictional characters with regard to the types of linguistic behaviour that they might be expected

to use schematically[1] (such behaviour might include topics discussed, contribution to conversational control, speech/communicative acts performed and levels of commitment to (im)politeness). The specific character impression for the benchmarked type of expected Model Person would then be open to development by readers in response to characterisation triggers in character-to-character interactions, or other textual cues. This insight from characterisation studies reinforces the value of the model person concept from Brown and Levinson's approach to politeness. The Model Person is a presumed ideal which very few people meet; but assessing an individual's behaviour in relation to that linguistic ideal offers a mechanism for understanding the possible function of polite and impolite linguistic behaviour, especially where such behaviour deviates from the expected.

Discursive and post-discursive approaches to (im)politeness arose partly out of criticisms of aspects of Brown and Levinson (1987), such as that described above concerning the concept of the Model Person. Two particular aspects of discursive approaches need discussion, as they have a bearing on the analysis of (im)politeness in fiction. The first, as we will show in the case study in Sect. 4, is particularly useful to analysts of fiction and fictional dialogue. This is the concept that a receiver's uptake and response to a producer's utterance is crucial in the analysis and interpretation of (im)politeness: That, in effect, we are looking for the *judgements* of a receiver to a producer's prior turn, and evidence of whether that utterance was construed or interpreted as polite or impolite. This notion that this is an important aspect of (im)politeness analysis arose from the view of discursive and post-discursive scholars that (im)politeness is not inherent in language but rather is co-constructed in and through the discursive interaction of two or more participants in any given speech event, within a community of practice. One interesting conundrum for analysts working with real-life spoken interaction is that receivers of such linguistic behaviour don't always respond by clearly stating that they have taken a preceding utterance to be polite or impolite and, as Holmes and Schnurr (2005: 122, citing O'Keefe 1989) argue, 'many people may not have the meta-linguistic skills required to articulate the levels of politeness they intended or interpreted.' However,

[1] A schema (pl. schemas/schemata) is a bundled or organised package of knowledge an individual holds and which would be expected to be gained and refreshed or updated through social interaction or exposure to other socialising phenomena (e.g. reading literature, consuming the news, and so on). Cook (1994: 11) defines a schema as being a 'mental representation of typical instances'. Simpson (2004: 89) explains that such 'typical instances' are divisible into 'frames' (a term, borrowed from Minsky 1975, for the physical, but non-temporal characteristics of a situation, place, or type of person) and 'scripts' (a term borrowed from Schank and Abelson 1977 for the logical, or expected temporal flow of events relating to or caused by the situation, place or type of person). Essentially, schemas are cognitively stored, socially acquired 'shortcuts' to understanding the physical or social world in which individuals find themselves.

fictional prose includes communicative narratological devices which real-life spoken interaction does not. For example, as we have already mentioned, narrators in fictional prose can present not only the speech of characters but also their thoughts, and in a number of forms (see Semino and Short 2004). This means that an analyst has access to responses and judgements that would not necessarily be recoverable from naturally occurring data.

The second aspect arising from some approaches to discursive theorising is more problematic. Mullany (2008: 236) summarises the stance taken by discursivists such as Mills (2002, 2003, 2005) as follows:

> […] it is only those members who belong to the specific CofPs [communities of practice] that are being investigated who are able to judge whether particular acts are polite or impolite.
>
> (Mullany 2008: 236, critiquing Mills 2002, 2003, 2005).

Mullany is, in our view, right to question this claim. This is because accepting Mills's position causes a particular problem for the analysis of (im)politeness in fiction. The problem with Mills's stance on discursive approaches to (im)politeness is that for fiction to be interpreted, readers (and theatre/film audiences) must assume the position of members of the communities of practice portrayed in the fiction, even if the community of practice is radically different from that which the reader is part of in real life. For example, Peter Ackroyd's novel *Hawksmoor* tells the story of the eighteenth century architect Nicholas Dyer. The chapters are narrated in the first-person by Dyer, and Ackroyd utilises a number of archaisms to create the impression of an earlier form of English (something akin to the later stages of Early Modern English). Here is the opening paragraph of the novel:

> And so let us beginne; and, as the Fabrick takes its Shape in front of you, alwaies keep the Structure intirely in Mind as you inscribe it. First, you must measure out or cast the Area in as exact a Manner as can be, and then you must draw the Plot and make the Scale. I have imparted to you the Principles of Terrour and Magnificence, for these you must represent in the due placing of parts and Ornaments as well as in the Proportion of the several Orders: you see, Walter, how I take my pen?
>
> (Ackroyd 1985: 5)

To the contemporary reader, the above extract is likely to present certain challenges of interpretation. First, the narrator is not known to the reader at this stage in the novel. It is only later that it becomes evident that the narrator is Nicholas Dyer and that he is attempting to instruct his apprentice, Walter Pyne, in the art and craft of architecture. Next, there is the use of

what Short (1996) terms schema-oriented language, such as 'Fabrick', 'draw the Plot', 'Principles of Terrour and Magnificence' and 'the Proportion of the several Orders'. What is important here is that this language draws on a mental schema for eighteenth century architectural practices that most readers are unlikely to possess. This, combined with (by contemporary norms) non-standard spelling and orthographic practices, serves to alienate the reader from the fictional world. Nonetheless, to make sense of the novel, the reader needs to engage in the inferencing necessary to decode the narrator's story. This essentially involves accruing the necessary knowledge (via textual cues) to build a picture of the norms and standards of the community of practice to which the narrator belongs. For example, Dyer's position as Walter's master is reflected in the linguistic choices he makes, such as the imperative towards Walter ('alwaies keep the Structure intirely in Mind as you inscribe it'). The modern reader will almost certainly have schematic knowledge of the power relations that obtain between master and apprentice but may not fully appreciate the nature of indentured service (where indentured servants were often little better off than slaves). As the story progresses, the nature of the master–servant relationship becomes clearer and readers will update their relevant schema. This has potential to cause them to reinterpret some of Dyer's utterances. For example, the question that Dyer asks of his apprentice ('you see, Walter, how I take my pen?') is more likely to function as an instruction to pay attention than a genuine request for information. We might then assume that Walter, given his position and relative lack of power, is obliged to take full note of this request. The problem is that this analytical and interpretative activity necessitates making the kinds of assumptions that are essentially prohibited by those discursive approaches to (im)politeness which require us to be members of a given Community of Practice. Ultimately, if observers of real or fictional (im)politeness ought not to make interpretative judgements from their own perspective, then this calls into question the overall point of fiction. We might, of course, decide that fiction is a special case and that these issues should not determine the approach we take to the analysis of (im)politeness in naturally occurring data. However, given Sinclair's (2004) statement about the importance of fiction in the development of theories of language, this would seem a reductive move. For this reason, we follow Mullany's (2008) view that:

> Provided that analysts are careful about the claims they make, using all verbal, non-verbal material and observations that are open to them to come up with what they consider to be the most justifiable reading of what has taken place within an interaction, then it is perfectly acceptable for analysts to play a role in judging whether or not (im)politeness has taken place.
>
> (Mullany 2008: 237)

This view is also important for what it suggests about the importance of multimodality in the analysis of (im)politeness, an issue we return to in Sect. 3.4.

3.2 Testing and Developing Brown and Levinson's Model Through the Analysis of Fiction

Early work that applied Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach in the analysis of fiction in English was as much concerned with testing Brown and Levinson's theory as it was in accounting for literary stylistic effects. Brown and Gilman (1989) use Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory to examine four Shakespearean tragedies, *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth* and *Othello*, with the aim of investigating whether power, distance and what they term the ranked 'extremity' (1989: 159) of face-threatening acts affect politeness in their dataset in the same way that Brown and Levinson (1987) claim with regard to their own data (note that many researchers would nowadays prefer the term 'imposition' to 'extremity'). Brown and Gilman's (1989) choice of texts is interesting, given our discussion of the suitability of fiction as data for pragmatic analysis. They make the point that the Early Modern English of Shakespeare's work constitutes another 'language' against which to compare Brown and Levinson's findings, and that this additional data ought to lend further support to the exercise of trying to discover 'universals' in politeness use (Brown and Gilman 1989: 170). Additionally, they make the point that drama constitutes our primary means of determining what conversation is likely to have been like in the Early Modern period, a fact which explains the inclusion of drama in more recent work on historical pragmatics (see, for example, Culpeper and Kytö 2010). They also point to the importance of having access to interactants' thoughts, which is made possible in their data through the inclusion of soliloquies.

Brown and Gilman (1989) proceed by identifying pairs of character interactions that are distinguished from one another by just one of the following three variables: power (P), distance (D) and ranked extremity of FTA (R). Their assumption is that since politeness theory makes predictions about the level of politeness to be expected relative to the weightiness of each variable, isolating variables makes it possible to determine the effect of individual variables on politeness. For example, Brown and Gilman (1989: 173) note that in in the following extract from *King Lear*, the addressee (the Duke of Albany) is of a higher status than the speaker (Edgar):

Edgar: If e'er your Grace had speech with man so poor,
Hear me one word.

(*King Lear*, Act V, scene i, lines 38–9)

Consequently, they code the power variable as 'hearer higher than speaker'. They then code distance, perhaps counter-intuitively, as 'low',[2] since the speaker and addressee do not know each other well. They also code the ranked extremity of the FTA as 'low', since a request to be heard is a minor imposition. They then score the speech for politeness, first by identifying the superstrategy employed and then by assigning points for each substrategy used to mitigate the FTA. In the case of the above example, the superstrategy is on record with redressive action and the mitigating substrategies are indirectness, deference, self-abasement and minimising of the imposition, giving a score of +4.

They then identify a second interaction between these two characters, where two of the three variables are the same and one differs:

> *Albany*: Speak.
>
> (*King Lear*, Act V, scene i, line 39)

In the above example, D and R remain the same but P is different. As Brown and Gilman (1989) then explain:

> Politeness theory predicts that, for two FTAs matched with respect to D and R but not P, the speech from the lower to the higher will be the more polite. Edgar is much more polite than Albany and so this example counts as one confirming case for politeness theory.
>
> (Brown and Gilman 1989: 175)

Generally, Brown and Gilman (1989) find that P and R as variables that influence politeness operate in the same way in their data as predicted in Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory. This is something that has also been observed by other Shakespearean scholars who have taken a historical pragmatic approach. Kizelbach (2014), for instance, notes that that character Hal in *Henry V* uses the bald-on-record strategy only when his power is affirmed through his coronation. Distance, though, operates differently in Brown and Gilman's data. While Brown and Levinson predict that politeness will increase as distance between

[2] Not knowing someone well would intuitively correlate with a high degree of social distance; however, in this case, Brown and Gilman appear to be coding distance as 'low' to signal the impact of the social distance. In this example, the impact is on the determination of the overall weightiness of the FTA as one component in the calculation (also including 'relative power' and 'ranking of the imposition') of Brown and Levinson's (1987) formula: W_x = D(S,H) + P (H,S) and R_x (where W_x = overall weightiness of the FTA which is equal to D(S,H) (Distance obtaining between the speaker and the hearer) plus P(S,H) (Power of the hearer over the speaker) and R_x (the Ranking of the imposition made). Consider challenging or threatening the face of a close, personal friend whom one has known and liked for years. The fact that the social distance is so close would have a 'high' impact on the determination of the weightiness of the FTA.

interactants widens, Brown and Gilman find the opposite to be true in their Shakespearean data and suggest that the explanation for this is that the examples they examine are of characters who have rapidly and suddenly changed their minds about the degree of affect they feel for their interlocutor (see also Spencer-Oatey and Zegeraca (Chap. 6), this volume, for a more detailed discussion and treatment of the interrelationship between 'power' and 'distance').

The importance of Brown and Gilman's findings is acknowledged by Kopytko (1995), who further develops their work by extending the range of Shakespearean data studied to include four comedies, in addition to the four tragedies that Brown and Gilman (1989) originally examined. Kopytko (1995) makes the same observation that the variables that influence linguistic politeness operate differently in Shakespeare's plays. Moreover, Kopytko (1995) argues that more variables need to be posited in order to fully account for politeness in his data set. He suggests positive and negative affect, intimacy, cunning and importance.

Brown and Gilman (1989) and Kopytko (1995) not only provide an insight into the nature of characterisation in Shakespearean drama but also demonstrate that Brown and Levinson's (1987) conceptualisation of how distance and other variables can affect politeness needs to be specified according to the type of relationship that interactants have. While this is something that is acknowledged by Brown and Levinson (1987), the work of Brown and Gilman (1989) and Kopytko (1995) suggests what some of the additional variables for specifying relationships might be. Nonetheless, Brown and Gilman (1989) are careful to note that in their analysis they only score instances of FTAs where politeness is deployed; that is, they do not consider instances where a bald-on-record strategy is used by the speaker. They identify at least two contexts in which characters use this strategy. These are when a character is enraged or in the grips of madness. However, Brown and Gilman's (1989) lack of concern with these situations highlights one of the limiting factors of Brown and Levinson's (1987) original study, and this is its inability to fully describe and explain instances where interactants may be concerned with purposefully damaging an interlocutor's face. In fiction, as in real-life, this is often foregrounded behaviour.

3.3 (Im)politeness and Foregrounding

The analysis of (im)politeness in fiction has largely been carried out by stylisticians. Unsurprisingly, given its importance in stylistics, foregrounding theory (see Mukařovský 1983 for an outline and van Peer 1980 for experimental proof) has featured prominently in discussions about the function of (im)politeness in literary texts. Leech (1992), for instance, analyses George

Bernard Shaw's 1898 play *You Never Can Tell* in order to demonstrate that deviation from perceived norms is as important a concept in the analysis of interaction as it is in the analysis of formal features of language. In this respect, Leech uses his analysis of (im)politeness in fiction to develop further the stylistic theory of foregrounding. This is a case of a pragmatic approach to (im)politeness impacting not just on our ability to account for interpretations of literary texts, but on the actual theories and analytical methods that we use to do stylistic analysis. The 'norms' (Leech 1992: 260) that Leech adopts in his analysis are those assumed by Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle and Leech's own Politeness Principle (for an elaboration of which, see Leech 1983). What Leech uncovers is that the characters' linguistic behaviour reflects macro-level thematic elements in the play of repulsion and attraction. For example, Leech (1992) observes that the linguistic behaviour of the twins, Dolly and Philip, can be analysed as showing a tendency to overrate the Co-operative Principle while simultaneously underrating the Politeness Principle. Conversely, the linguistic behaviour of Mr. Crampton, the twins' father, overrates the Politeness Principle at the expense of the Co-operative Principle. The analysis of (im)politeness allows Leech not only to account for characters' interactive behaviour and social relations with each other, but also the communicative functions observable at the first tier of the play's discourse architecture, between writer and reader/viewer.

Foregrounding theory is clearly of importance in the analysis of (im)politeness in fiction, specifically its prediction that we will pay particular attention to elements of language that deviate to some degree from what constitute the norms of the 'standard language' (Mukařovský 1983). To a certain extent, we as readers (and as researchers) rely on our intuitions about norms to determine foregrounding (either consciously or subconsciously), and this extends to our intuitions about pragmatic norms. For example, the humour in the comedian Catherine Tate's 'Nan Taylor' character arises in part from the fact that Nan, a senior citizen, uses language that seems unexpected for a woman of her age (e.g. the swear words and exhortations heard in her catchphrases, 'What a fucking liberty!' and 'Oh, fucking chill out!'). Clearly, this usage exploits stereotypes about the kind of language we expect from particular people and particular social groups. In the case of examples like Nan Taylor, whether or not we see the language use in question as foregrounded depends on our experience of language use in that particular social group and the extent to which we recognise a stereotype. This can be a serious issue for analysts. For instance, in analysing historical texts, it would be easy to identify an instance of usage as foregrounded in comparison to the norms of present day English that was, in fact, perfectly normal for the time the text was produced.

As we have alluded to, above, in Sect. 3.1, identifying foreground reliably, then, necessitates a clear sense of sociocultural and sociohistorical norms, and the extent to which these are fixed. This might well rely on relevant sociological and historical scholarship. An avid reader/viewer of fiction without access to such scholarship might expect to have enough textual cues embedded to allow a close to reliable reading and interpretation to be made—assuming the fiction in question is well handled by those producing it.

Stylisticians of fiction who have utilised pragmatic approaches have demonstrated that the violation of politeness principles and/or other social norms can be connected to the cornerstone of stylistics, foregrounding theory. The study of (im)politeness in fiction has led to the broadening within stylistics of the concept of foregrounding, such that it is now widely accepted that foregrounding effects can be created not just through the breaking of formal linguistic norms (e.g. syntactic or lexical deviation) but also by deviating from readers' pragmatic expectations. What such work has also demonstrated is that deviation from pragmatic norms gives rise to a range of literary effects, many of which arise from the complexities of discourse structure to be found in fictional texts, and the relationships between discourse participants in such texts.

3.4 (Im)politeness for Characterisation and Plot Development

As we described in the previous section, in his study of *You Never Can Tell*, Leech (1992) employs his own Politeness Principle, a maxim-based view of politeness, to explore the concept of discursive foregrounding. In so doing, he is also able to explain how particular types of linguistic behaviour have characterising effects. In a similar manner, Simpson (1989) utilises Brown and Levinson's (1987) approach to politeness to explain characterisation in Ionesco's play *The Lesson*. Additionally, he also uses his analysis to account for the shifts in characterisation that occur across the course of the play. *The Lesson* is an absurdist one-act play that centres on a private lesson delivered by an ageing professor to an eighteen-year-old student. The professor begins the lesson as a timid and nervous character while the student is confident and outgoing. By the end of the play, these roles have reversed and the play culminates with the professor supposedly murdering the student. Simpson (1989) analyses three sections from the play, observing the following general patterns: in the first section analysed, the professor proliferates negative politeness strategies, to the extent that his linguistic behaviour is more in line with our expectations of powerless characters; in the second section, the

professor's politeness strategies decrease and we can observe reasonably symmetrical uses of deference; in the final section, the professor has abandoned mitigating strategies in favour of bald-on-record statements while the student displays considerable (and apparently genuine) deference. What is interesting about Simpson's analysis is that it relates changing conversational behaviour to the development of the play's plot, thereby suggesting a means of locating potential sources of plot development.

While Simpson's (1989) analysis is clearly indicative of changing aspects of characterisation, it does not take specific account of impoliteness nor does it centre claims about characterisation within a fully worked-out model of how this process happens. Culpeper (1998) addresses these issues in an analysis of an extract from the 1992 film, *Scent of a Woman* (see also Culpeper 2001: 255–61). Briefly, Culpeper (2001) sees characterisation as a process that relies on both top-down and bottom-up cognitive processing. In reference to characterisation specifically, these terms refer respectively to the practice of drawing on our schematic knowledge of character types while supplementing this with information about character gleaned from the text, be this a novel, playscript or screenplay. (In the case of watching drama on stage or screen, we can only make bottom-up inferences from character dialogue). Like Simpson (1989), Culpeper (1998) analyses three extracts from the film, each of which features a dialogue between the film's two main characters, the Colonel (a retired serviceman whose blindness has led his family to advertise for a carer for him) and Charlie (a student who answered the advertisement). Also like Simpson, Culpeper (1998) notes a shift in characterisation across the course of the film, which he relates to conceptualisations of plot (such as that by Bremond 1973) which see plot development as movement from a state of disequilibrium to equilibrium. Culpeper observes that Charlie's linguistic behaviour remains fairly uniform until three-quarters of the way into the film, when the Colonel attempts to commit suicide by shooting himself. When his efforts to politely persuade the Colonel not to do this seem to be getting him nowhere, Charlie changes tactic and adopts a deliberately face-damaging strategy. He switches from indirect requests to direct commands, saying 'So let's get on with it, let's fucking do it. Let's fucking… pull the trigger… you miserable blind motherfucker. (*Pause*) Pull the trigger' (quoted in Culpeper 1998: 92). This is clearly foregrounded behaviour since our characterisation of Charlie is built on the schematic frame of a nice-guy student, a stereotype that Charlie's linguistic behaviour up to this point has supported. This radical change in behaviour is likely to trigger a bottom-up reconceptualisation of Charlie (via the strategies for impoliteness that Culpeper notes, such as the use of name-calling, direct commands and the taboo vocative), shifting him from a category-based character to one that is more complex.

Culpeper's (1998) analysis of *Scent of a Woman* draws on the model of impoliteness outlined in Culpeper (1996), which presents impoliteness as essentially the opposite of politeness in Brown and Levinson's (1987) terms. That is, where politeness is concerned with mitigating face-damage, impoliteness is concerned with aggravating it; and mitigating strategies can often be reversed to achieve this objective. Since the publication of his 1996 article, Culpeper has developed this view of impoliteness (see Culpeper 2011) and more recent work on (im)politeness in fiction has attempted to take account of new developments. Bousfield (2007), for instance, offers an analysis of *Henry IV, Part I*, which draws on a model of impoliteness later explicated fully in Bousfield (2008, 2010). Bousfield analyses a conversation that takes place between the characters Hal and Falstaff in a tavern. He argues that the impoliteness in the dialogue is masked behind apparent banter and that this serves as a means for Hal to develop the linguistic skills that he deploys to impressive political effect later in the play, including his distancing of himself from Falstaff. The scene that Bousfield (2007) analyses features Falstaff attempting to prepare and support Hal in what he must say, given that Hal has been summoned to answer for his wayward behaviour by his father, King Henry IV. As part of this preparation, Falstaff takes the role of Hal and Hal takes the role of his own father, Henry. This sets up a context within which it is possible for comedic mocking of each other to take place. In analysing both the language used by Hal to Falstaff, and the discourse levels that pertain in a scene where Hal is playing the role of his own father and Falstaff is playing the role of Hal, Bousfield (2007) argues that:

> Hal [is] able to plausibly deny personally meaning any of the things he has said in impolitely calling Falstaff a fat idle diseased wastrel. This is because he said such things *whilst playing the role of his father*, Henry IV.
>
> (Bousfield 2007: 218).

Bousfield, in effect, argues that by Hal playing the role of his father in a mock meeting between Henry (played by Hal) and Hal (played by Falstaff), Hal is afforded the opportunity to insult Falstaff using direct, on record impoliteness whilst simultaneously enjoying the protection of plausible deniability that off record comments provide. Bousfield's analysis demonstrates that a refined model of impoliteness provides insights into the literary functions of the characters' dialogue, insights that supplement literary critical commentaries on the play.

More recent work on fiction from an (im)politeness perspective has sought to extend the range of text-types that this analytical approach is able to deal

with. Dynel (2012), for instance, analyses film discourse (specifically, extracts from the US TV series *House*). Her choice of film discourse as data is driven in part by the fact that it is a rich source of multiparty communication, in which multiple recipients (e.g. interlocutors, overhearers, viewers, etc.) often perceive (im)politeness differently to each other. Dynel (2012) uses her analysis to demonstrate that the interactional complexity of both fiction and everyday discourse demands an approach to (im)politeness that goes beyond the classic dyadic model of communication and takes full account of the range of participants in a communicative act. Her study is particularly valuable for its dual function, in advancing both our understanding of how (im)politeness is communicated and the nature of film discourse.

Film is also the object of study for McIntyre (2008), though his analysis incorporates both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. McIntyre (2008) examines how aspects of *mise-en-scene* in a film version of *Richard III* can be seen as reflective of face-threatening linguistic acts, arguing that Richard's movement towards the camera is akin to an invasion of personal space in a real-life context. Conversely, the camera's movement away from Richard represents the viewer attempting to back away from this imposition. Bousfield and McIntyre (2011) develop this work in their multimodal analysis of a tense scene from Martin Scorsese's film *Goodfellas*, arguing that camera movement in relation to character dialogue is key to generating a sense of growing unease in the viewer, and that deploying a model of (im)politeness offers a means of accounting for viewers' emotional responses to the scene. These studies are indicative of a growing interest among pragmaticians in multimodal data and the analysis of multimodal aspects of (im)politeness (see, for instance, Bonacchi and Mela 2015).

4 Case Study

To illustrate the value of applying (im)politeness theory in the analysis of fiction, we analyse a short scene from the US sitcom *Friends*. The text below is a transcription of the scene rather than the original screenplay. This is because the screenplay differs slightly from the performance of it:

> [Context: Ross (a palaeontologist) and Phoebe (a new age singer) are with Chandler, Rachel, Joey and Monica in the apartment where Rachel and Monica are flatmates. Phoebe is discussing the recent death of a neighbour, Mr Heckles, insisting that she still feels his presence. Mr Heckles' worldly goods surround the friends as he left them everything in his will.]

1. Phoebe: It's very faint, but I can still sense him in the building. (*Pause*) GO INTO THE LIGHT MR HECKLES.
2. Chandler: Okay Phoebe?
3. Phoebe: I'm sorry, but sometimes they need help.

The friends make faces and noises of disbelief.

4. Phoebe: Ahaa that's fine. Go ahead and scoff. There are lots of things out there that I don't believe in but that doesn't mean they're not true.
5. Joey: Such as?
6. Phoebe: Like crop circles, or the Bermuda triangle, or evolution—
7. Ross: Oh whoa whoa whoa. Wha—(*laughs, nervously*). What you don't er you don't believe in evolution?
8. Phoebe: Nah, not really. (*Reaches for a bowl of snacks*)
9. Ross: (*Moving the bowl of snacks away*) You don't believe in evolution?
10. Phoebe: I don't know it's just, you know … monkeys, Darwin, y' you know it's a nice story I just think it's a little too easy.
11. Ross: Too easy? Too – (*laughs*). The process of every living thing on this planet evolving over, millions of years from single celled organisms is too easy?
12. Phoebe: (*Thinks for a moment*) Yeah, I just don't buy it.
13. Ross: Erm, excuse me. Evolution is not for you to 'buy', Phoebe. Evolution is scientific fact like, like, like the air that we breathe, like gravity -
14. Phoebe: Don't get me started on gravity.
15. Ross: You, er… you don't believe in gravity!?
16. Phoebe: It's not so much like, you know that I don't *believe in it* you know, it's just, I don't know, lately I get the feeling that I'm not so much being pulled down, as I am being pushed.

Ross looks at his sister Monica who, like the rest of the friends is smiling, amused. She raises her hands in a mock resignation gesture. There is a knock at the door.

17. Chandler: (*To Phoebe*) Uh oh, it's Isaac Newton, and he's pissed!

[Scene change.]

Ross and Phoebe are standing by the apartment door. The door is open. Piles of Mr Heckles' unsorted goods surround them. The other friends are busy getting ready to leave or are sorting through Mr Heckles' goods.

18. Ross:	(*To Phoebe*) How can you not believe in evolution?
19. Phoebe:	I dunno, just don't. Look at this funky shirt.
20. Ross:	Pheebs, I've studied evolution my entire adult life. I can tell you we've collected fossils from all over the world that actually show the evolution of different species, okay. I mean you can, you can literally see them evolving through time.
21. Phoebe:	Really? You can actually see it?
22. Ross:	You bet, in in the US, China, Africa, all over.
23. Phoebe:	See I didn't know that.
24. Ross:	Well, there you go.
25. Phoebe:	Huh, so now, the real question is who put those fossils there, and why.

(Curtis and Malins 1995)

Of course, not everything that is uttered is functionally face enhancing/mitigating or face damaging. In turn 1, for example, it is clear (partly from our existing knowledge of Phoebe's character) that, in her mind, she is not trying to do anything other than help Mr Heckles, the deceased resident of the apartment block, find peace in the after-life she assumes he is now experiencing. However, in turn 2, Chandler's polite question to Phoebe may be interpreted as an off-record request to her to stop making noise. This interpretation is supported by Phoebe's indirect apology in turn 3, which would suggest that she appears to understand that her utterance in turn 1 may have been inadvertently negative face-threatening (the desire on the part of the others to be free from noise may be seen as related to the general desire to be unimpeded). This analysis is only possible, note, if we blend Brown and Levinson (1987) style analyses, with observations about uptake and response by the recipients (see Sect. 3.1). In this case, Phoebe's apologetic response is an attempt to mitigate the negative face threat caused (see Brown and Levinson 1987: 187–190). She supplements this by giving reasons for her outburst, which is also a mitigating strategy according to Brown and Levinson (1987: 128–9).

Between turns 3 and 4, the noises that the other characters make would seem to constitute both paralinguistic and non-linguistic threats to Phoebe's positive face. Indeed, Phoebe's utterance in turn 4 suggests that she interprets,

as the audience might also do, the other characters' noises as scoffing, which could be deemed an impoliteness strategy (see Culpeper 1996, Bousfield 2008). We can note here that Phoebe's response partly serves to guide audience interpretation of the other characters' vocal activity and facial expressions. This is in line with Mullany's (2008) argument that fuller, discursive-based analyses rely not only on verbal but also non-verbal information that is available to the analyst. Stylistically, this is an instance of authorial filtering; that is, a means of conveying information through the speech of a particular character about how another set of utterances should be interpreted. Phoebe's utterance in turn 4 is an attempt to defend herself against this perceived face attack by providing what she sees as evidence for her beliefs (see Culpeper et al. 2003 and Bousfield 2008 for discussions of defensive moves to face-threatening acts).

Although minimal, turn 5 might also be seen as a face threatening act because of the potential implicature from Joey that he cannot conceive of anything which is true which one might then choose not to believe in. Phoebe's response in turn 6, in which she claims not to believe in evolution, constitutes an inadvertent challenge to Ross who, as a palaeontologist, has built his entire career and large aspects of his professional identity on the concept of evolution. For one of his closest friends to not believe in it (albeit Phoebe accepting that her lack of belief does not mean the concept doesn't exist in practice) strikes at the heart of her acceptance of him. Inevitably, Ross challenges Phoebe's view in turns 7, 9 and 11. In turns 7 and 9, his challenges (potentially threatening to the positive and negative face wants of Phoebe) are nevertheless phrased as questions rather than outright statements that Phoebe is wrong. Questions, in an appropriate context, can be seen as polite (according to Brown and Levinson 1987 and Lakoff 1973, though see the discussion in Bousfield 2008: 235–60). Ross is, in effect, attempting to reduce the threat of his challenge to Phoebe's avowed belief system.

Ross's challenge to Phoebe's beliefs becomes more marked and direct in turn 11. This is because of two major factors. The first is that Ross' attempts in turns 7 and 9 to seek clarification from Phoebe by challenging what she has stated as her belief have patently not worked (evidenced, from a discursive perspective on the importance of uptake, by Phoebe's responses 'Nah, not really' and 'I just think it's a little too easy.'). The second is that Ross is at this point exhibiting longstanding character traits which long-term viewers of the show will have built into their characterisation of him. Ross is a character who does not easily let things go, constantly reminding the others of events in their shared past, especially those that he perceives as slights against his character or himself. His impoliteness in this sequence, in addition to its local function, also serves as bottom-up reinforcement of his general character. (In the same

episode, Ross returns to the topic of Phoebe's non-acceptance of evolution as a factual concept three further times).

Following the scene change, Ross instigates another conversation with Phoebe about her stance on evolution, asking 'How can you not believe in evolution?' [18]. The phrasing of the question, which includes the negative 'not', implicates a degree of incredulity on the part of Ross for the belief that Phoebe has previously expressed. This challenge to her beliefs is less polite than his turns at the beginning of the previous scene, as the incredulity he implies via the negatively phrased question puts the onus of the maintenance of harmonious face relations (see Brown and Levinson 1987) firmly on Phoebe. This results in a threat to her negative face in that she is obliged to engage in remedial facework that she might not otherwise have chosen to do. In turn 19, however, Phoebe demonstrates intense reluctance to continue discussing such matters with Ross, as she quickly changes the subject and topic by talking about a shirt. Again, taking a discursivist approach to uptake and response, in conjunction with the Brown and Levinson-style reading of the utterances, allows us, as analysts, to make this judgement call. In this case, Phoebe's topic change constitutes the 'avoidance of topics which may prove controversial' strategy, which is yet another politeness approach noted by Brown and Levinson (1987: 51, 92), and it is therefore obvious to the audience, and to Ross, that Phoebe is trying, politely, to stay away from a divisive topic. Again, this has a characterising function, portraying Phoebe as someone who prefers to avoid conflict. The indirect characterisation that results from this (in conjunction with established facts about the character) is that she cares about her friendships and is happy to be friends with people with whom she does not share beliefs.

However, despite Phoebe's attempt in turn 19 to saving her own and Ross's face, Ross presses the issue. In turn 20 he returns to the topic of evolution and face-threateningly ignores Phoebe's attempt from turn 19 to change the topic. He continues with a criticism, albeit an off-record one, when he points out that he has spent a long time studying evolution and has seen evidence from all over the world that it is possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that species have evolved slowly over time. This off-record criticism of Phoebe's belief generates an implicature by flouting the Gricean (1975) maxims of manner and possibly quantity, given the level of detail Ross uses to try to convince Phoebe. By now, it has been apparent for some time to the audience what types of character Ross and Phoebe are. Ross is the type of character not to let a topic drop when he thinks he's right. What we can also observe here is that there is an inherent conflict between Ross's beliefs and Phoebe's. The sequence of face-threats, mitigation and face-attacks throughout the scene foreground

this conflict which serves to add dramatic impetus to the episode. In plot terms, the conflict generates a state of disequilibrium which is likely to cause the viewer to wonder how this tension will be resolved by the end of the show.

5 Summary and Future Directions

In this chapter we have aimed to show how fiction can constitute useful data for the analysis of (im)politeness. In some cases, as in the Early Modern English studied by Brown and Gilman (1989), fiction offers the only possibility of gaining an insight into what naturally occurring conversation might have been like at an earlier point in history. But beyond this, the centrality of pragmatic violations and (im)politeness to fiction, and the opportunity to gain insights into intentions and motivations behind particular forms of linguistic behaviour, is what makes fiction such a rich resource for study. From a stylistic perspective, the application of theories, models and frameworks for the analysis of (im)politeness can be revealing of processes of characterisation, and can also assist analysts in uncovering the locus of plot developments. Furthermore, theories of (im)politeness can also offer insights into likely interpretations of texts, giving stylisticians further evidence of how real readers understand and interact with texts. Looking to the future, it seems likely that the development of (im)politeness theory from a stylistic perspective will involve adapting analytical methods to take account of multimodal texts (see Bousfield and McIntyre 2011 for an indication of some of the issues involved in this work). The complexities here include accounting not just for (im)politeness expressed verbally, but that which is expressed paralinguistically and even non-linguistically. This also necessitates understanding the interplay between (im)polite elements at the various discourse levels of the text in question. This involves (i) taking account of authorial, narratorial and character meanings, (ii) determining how these are interpreted by recipients, (iii) assessing the meaning potential of non-linguistic elements of the data, and (iv) ascertaining the relationships between these linguistic and non-linguistic meanings.

Finally, it should be noted that the observations made in this chapter centre entirely on fiction written in English. Brown and Levinson's (1987) original model has been criticised for being Anglo-centric by failing to take account of norms and practices in politeness in other cultures (see Gu 1990; Wang 2011). We therefore see it as important that future work on (im)politeness from a stylistic perspective addresses the operation of (im)politeness in fiction written in languages other than English.

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30

(Im)politeness in Digital Communication

Sage L. Graham and Claire Hardaker

1 Introduction

It is undeniable that, in many parts of the world, digital interaction is an ever-present component of daily life. We use computers to manage finances, create/maintain/negotiate business relationships, find and distribute information on practically any topic imaginable, and foster personal relationships. As a (relatively, within the scope of human development) new context for interaction, it is no surprise, therefore, that facets of computer-mediated communication (CMC) would come under scrutiny.

Howard Rheingold's (1993) book, *The Virtual Community*, is regarded by many as the first ethnographic examination of an online community where geographically dispersed members formed a close-knit interactive community via the internet. As of the mid-1990s, researchers from a wide-range of disciplines began exploring what (at the time) was a relatively new and novel form of communication. Some examined virtual community formation (Baym 1996, 1998; Jones 1995, 1998; Smith and Kollock 1999), while others were among the first to explore online identities and how computer

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_30

communication did not allow people to overcome prejudices that exist in face-to-face (f-t-f) environments (Herring 1996a, 1996b). Still others examined the rules of 'Netspeak'—how people assess 'appropriate' use of language that is unique to CMC (Crystal 2001; Shea 1994). All this has led to a new generation of popular-science books, such as those by Melanie Citron (2014), Jon Ronson (2015), and Jamie Bartlett (2014), that explore the darker side of the internet, including aggression, mob-shaming, and even the online black market.

The flood of research that has followed has explored multiple facets of all different media (many of which did not even exist when research on CMC began), from SMS/text messages, to social media sites, to (v)blogs, to email lists and discussion boards, and the list goes on. As technology continues to advance, moreover, new modalities are always being updated and/or added, so that communication in digital contexts is a quickly changing and ever-evolving component of daily life. As more and more of our daily interactions take place in digital formats, we naturally shift our expectations about what counts as (in)appropriate and (im)polite in these contexts.

For the purposes of this chapter, we adopt Culpeper's view (2011, p. 254), and define (im)politeness as behaviour that conveys a positive (polite) or negative (impolite) attitude. The relative degree and type of (im)politeness is shaped by its context of occurrence, by reference to the expectations, beliefs, desires, and so forth of the participants in that context, and by the identity (or identities) of those participants. Taking this definition as a starting point, here we examine digital (im)politeness within the framework of Relational Work (Locher and Watts 2005, 2008).

As Locher et al. note, 'today, scholars tend to focus on the emergence of norms of appropriateness against which interactants make judgments on politeness and to explore the link between these norms and relational effects' (2015, p. 3). Continuing this trend, we will take an Interpersonal Pragmatic approach, focusing on the ways that interactants interpret and use their understandings of (im)politeness in given digital contexts to regulate their identities and interactional choices within emergent discourse (for further discussion see Locher and Graham 2010).

Given the ongoing change in digital media, it would be fruitless for any chapter addressing 'digital contexts' to claim to give an all-encompassing view. Building on previous research of individual modalities, however, there are common threads that digital media share that contribute to assessments of (im)polite behaviour, and those will be our focus here. It is also important to note that the title of this chapter, 'Digital (Im)politeness' encompasses a wide range of technologically-mediated communicative channels. Within the body of previous research, the terms 'Computer-mediated

Communication' (hereafter CMC) and to a lesser extent Computer-mediated Discourse Analysis (CMDA) have been the prevailing terms used to describe digital interactions. With current advances in digital technology, however, mediated interactions that used to require a computer may now be accessible using other types of mediating devices. 'Digital communication' or 'Digitally-mediated communication' is therefore more accurate as a descriptive term. Since most of the communication we will discuss here is in fact mediated via computer, however, we will use the terms CMC and digital communication interchangeably.

2 Key Concepts and Theories

When exploring interactional strategies within particular digital media, there are elements of communicating online that have an impact on the interpersonal strategies we choose and the ways that we interpret (im)politeness. We will discuss these in turn below.

2.1 Asynchronous Versus Synchronous

In CMC, there is a spectrum of digital platforms which operate on a sliding scale of (a)synchronicity. Some environments, such as the audio-visual function on Skype or within gaming interactions where participants communicate orally via headsets with microphones, are highly synchronous. Others, such as email or blogs, can be highly asynchronous, since there might be a time lapse of days or months (or longer) between the time something is posted and the time it is read. This (a)synchronicity exists on a sliding scale, but as Graham (2007a) notes, the more asynchronous an environment is, the more likely it is that any perception of impoliteness will expand and multiply within a community. This is because in some cases, any conflict, no matter how small, may expand and multiply if multiple participants join a discussion before the original poster becomes aware of and can explain/mitigate an act that is perceived as impolite (whether it is intended that way or not).

2.2 Private-Oriented Networks Versus Public-Oriented Networks

In addition to the question of (a)synchronicity, perceptions of impoliteness in CMC are also affected by the participation structures inherent in different media. In private short-form messages such as SMS (text messages) or IM

(instant messages), for example, users typically select recipients from a catalogue of contacts that they have pre-approved, and so they are aware of their audience. An individual writing a blog, on the other hand, might have no real sense of who is reading his/her posts. Since expectations for what constitutes (im)polite behaviour change according to the closeness/distance that exists in the relationships between interlocutors, the level of privacy that exists within different media will inevitably have an impact on assessments of (im)politeness.

2.3 Relational Versus Task-Oriented

Some computer settings focus on the accomplishment of specific goals—e.g. corporate emails that outline marketing strategies (in which the goal is to produce a product and successfully sell it) versus a literature discussion board (in which the goal is more to interact with others who have a similar interest). In the case of the former, there is a clear, measurable task at hand and this is the motivation for the communicative act(s). In the second case, however, the communicative goal is focused on the relationship between the interactants (for a related discussion see Schwämmlin and Wodzicki 2012).

This distinction is not absolute; a discussion board for people who grow different varieties of chili peppers, for example, may begin with a practical and measurable task-oriented focus (e.g. discussion of which soil to use, what varieties work best in specific climates, fertilisers, pest control, recipes, etc.), but it is often the case that subscribers to such groups form personal bonds that may lead to off-topic discussion in the group or even off-line meetings and activities (e.g. meeting f-t-f with individuals met via online channels).

Any media format may be relational or task-oriented—or may evolve to switch the focus or bridge the two. Although Facebook began as a way for people to connect with one another (relation-oriented), for example, businesses now frequently use Facebook pages to promote their products or services (task-oriented). The degree to which a given computer medium is task- or relation-oriented will play a role in determining what counts as (im)politeness and what users view as appropriate in any such situation.

2.4 Interaction-Focused Versus Declaration-Focused

In addition to catering to different goals, different digital media have different expectations for the types and amounts of recipient participation. Platforms like Pinterest, for example, are declaration-focused because they allow participants to 'pin' photos and images to a board and let others (who can follow

them) see what they have pinned. As Graham notes, 'In this case, users are constructing an identity by choosing which images to 'pin', but the platform does not lend itself to in-depth discussion and the negotiation of relationships' (2015, p. 310). Other formats focus more readily on establishing relationships between participants (i.e. they are interaction-focused). There is an expectation on message boards, for example, that participants will share their thoughts and feelings with one another in a dialogue; the platform allows for, and encourages, reciprocal interaction.

That said, as with the other categories discussed so far, these categories are not absolute; while some media lend themselves more readily to a focus on either interaction or declaration, there can also be variation in how people use a given media platform. Deumert, for example, observes that Twitter is used by some as a way to simply publish thoughts to a global audience while others use it to create a sense of community and belonging (2014, p. 36). Nevertheless, the fact that some platforms lend themselves more readily to declaration or interaction still affects the strategies that individuals may use to perform relational work in these contexts.

2.5 Anonymity

In the early days of CMC, there was speculation that the anonymity of the digital environment would lead to chaos and harassment by people who could not be held accountable for their behaviour. While the term chaos might be a bit extreme, in 1991, Lea et al. argued that anonymity in CMC contexts could have a liberating effect and make participants less-inhibited and/or might reduce feelings of accountability. In the case of employees asked to complete a web survey about their satisfaction with their jobs, for example, a guarantee of anonymity is likely to yield much more candid responses since employees don't have to worry about being fired or otherwise punished for what they say. This can certainly be extended to apply to multiple digital formats where relative levels of privacy and anonymity will affect people's behaviour.[1]

2.6 Longevity

One striking difference between f-t-f communication and CMC is that, once something is posted digitally, it is often 'out there' for good—and awareness of this factor can influence both people's perceptions and production of

[1] See, for instance, boyd and Hargiattai (2010), Herring and Stoerger (2014), and Marwick and boyd (2014) for further discussion of privacy and context in social media.

(im)politeness. The ability to retrieve previous communication varies across platforms, of course. Some discussion boards are archived indefinitely, for example, while others purge content when a fixed period or number of messages is reached. Other social networks limit the ability to recover previous postings beyond a predetermined timeframe. This easily-forgotten longevity has the potential to cause trouble many years after the original act.

In 2015, Hillary Clinton, the then-US Secretary of State, came under scrutiny because of archived personal emails that were sent from a State Department email server. Scandals such as this make us aware that, whatever our behaviour is like online (whether benign or malicious; discreet or indiscreet), it is possible that someone will recover a record of our previous interactions and scrutinise them. Some platforms have recently been developed to specifically counter the problem of 'permanent-ness.' Snapchat, for example, automatically erases posted pictures after a few seconds or minutes have passed, so that posters, theoretically at least, don't have to worry that their content will be archived and recovered later. Likewise there are services that offer to delete old tweets from a user's Twitter accounts, or erase all posts on a user's Facebook profile. In short, the knowledge that our previous behaviour may be resurrected and evaluated at some future point in time can have an impact on how we choose to behave in digital formats.

2.7 CMC versus Face-to-face Communication

While all of the factors discussed above are elements that influence interactions in computer-mediated settings, one might question whether they are actually unique to the computer medium (Benwell and Stokoe 2006). The general consensus among research at this point is that CMC and f-t-f communication are not as different than was once thought and, as Locher et al. (2015) argue, CMC and f-t-f communication are not truly separable, since 'often we cannot clearly split the norms interactants bring to the keyboard with those that emerge in online interactions' (9). While this is certainly true, there are nevertheless aspects of digital communication that make it distinct from f-t-f interaction.

One noteworthy example is the prominence of tools that can be used to *catalogue* (im)politeness. Many (perhaps most?) digital media show a host of tools to declare feelings toward others' behaviour—it is encoded into the media themselves via spam filters, Terms of Service, blocks, and 'report abuse' buttons, etc. There are also ways to indicate positive reactions such as 'Like', 'Favourite' and 'Share' buttons. This establishes a sub-text that (im)politeness

is something that can (and perhaps should) be constantly not just evaluated, but also *declared* in digital interaction. While notions of (im)politeness are certainly ever-present in f-t-f interactions, when interacting f-t-f we are not staring at buttons asking us to explicitly share our evaluation of that (im)politeness during each interaction. Rather, in f-t-f interactions there is an assumption of appropriateness (Locher and Watts 2008). We would argue that the act of pressing a button to declare a stance by 'liking', 'blocking', or otherwise proclaiming an assessment of another's online personas or behaviours gives those assessments a weight that might not exist in f-t-f environments, and this is just one area where f-t-f interaction and CMC differ. We go on to explore some of these other areas (e.g. anonymity, identity, and control over interactions) below.

3 Critical Overview of Previous Research

3.1 Digital Relationships, Communities, and Identity

Anytime we interact with someone, whether offline or online, a part of what we are doing is creating an identity for ourselves and proposing a relationship with our assumed audience. It is therefore useful to examine research in computer-mediated identities as one component of digital (im)politeness.

Unlike identity construction in f-t-f environments, in CMC users often have far more control over self-presentation:

> The potential for constructing alternative identities is one of the most salient features of Internet use. In face-to-face interaction restrictions are placed on the identity a person is able or permitted to construct for themselves at that particular point in time; for example, people cannot instantly change their physical appearance at will. However, as Reid (1994) notes, the anonymity and physical separation of cyberspace enables social experimentation, as well as explorations of identity and self. (Baker 2001)

Users can carefully create and curate online content, and from this, invent and explore identities that they would struggle to enact convincingly, if at all, offline. But at the same time, other users can automatically equate discrepancies between online and offline identities as perniciously motivated. This raises the issue that whilst academic research may discuss theoretical perspectives of the mutability and multifaceted nature of identity, for lay users, the interpretation may be far more simplistic.

It is difficult in digital contexts to classify types of online identities, due to the nature of the various media and our understandings and expectations of participation within the digital world. Goffman's (1981) framework of participation structures (which included ratified and non-ratified participants, speakers, hearers, overhearers, bystanders and eavesdroppers) might be used as a starting point since it includes categories for people who receive messages but aren't part of a conversation (like Lurkers), but this framework is difficult to employ (in f-t-f as well as digital contexts) and may only be used as a beginning in understanding participant roles.

Some of the commonly acknowledged roles in computer-mediated Communities of Practice (Lavé and Wenger 1991) (hereafter CofP) are:

1. Participants—a category that includes:

   (a) Newbies/Out-group members—who are present and who participate, but are not ratified as in-group members.
   (b) Core Group/In-group members—ratified participants who often have social leverage to modify, enforce, and even violate CofP norms and expectations.

2. Lurkers—non-ratified and both present and non-present. CofP participants generally understand that there are likely to be lurkers in many digital contexts, but their presence is uncertain and fluid since they may come and go at any time without anyone knowing.
3. Disruptors (including Spammers/Pimpers/Trolls)—non-ratified but present; lacking the commitment to the group exemplified by Participants. Spammers post repetitive or redundant messages, either themselves or through automated software. Pimpers use a given forum to shamelessly promote their work to achieve personal gain, as with authors who promote their recent books. Trolls deliberately set about disrupting the group for their own entertainment. (This category is discussed further in Sect. 4 below)
4. Administrators/Moderators—ratified, may or may not actively participate. Have administrative authority and the access required to block or sanction messages or participants.

Different CofPs have different definitions of these individuals, and these identities are fluid—a Lurker may change to a Participant at any time, a peripheral Participant may become a member of the In-group (or be ejected from it) at any time, and someone who might have once been classified as a

Participant might stop contributing and fade back into the role of Lurker. And while digital communication has some broad, across-the-board rules, specific CofPs may have additional norms and rules of their own and members of specific types may be held to a different standard than other members.[2]

While there has been growing research on how (im)politeness is received and how conflicts emerge and play out in online settings, there has been less research that specifically examines how online identities are indexed by computer-users and how these intersect with relational work. Among the recent research in this area are Gallagher and Savage's (2015) exploration of newcomer and lurker identities and the ways that these groups establish legitimacy in online discussion forums, Graham's (2015) discussion of impoliteness as a component of transition from out-group to in-group membership in an online literary discussion board, Haugh et al.'s (2015) examination of 'Newbie' identities on a discussion board, and Kleinke and Bös' (2015) investigation of rudeness strategies by in-group and out-group members on discussion boards. Overall, however, this is still an underexplored area. Moreover, as Bolander and Locher (2015) point out in their examination of identity and relational work on Facebook, there is still limited research on the identities that *individuals* claim in CMC, and *community/group* identities, while taken for granted in many cases, are still underexplored.

3.2 Netiquette

Before examining impoliteness and individual digital media, it is worth noting that people have acknowledged some overarching rules of online (im)politeness since CMC became commonplace. In 1994, Virginia Shea published her book *Netiquette*, which outlined basic 'polite' behaviours for communicating in online contexts. These were:

1. Remember the human;
2. Adhere to the same standards of behaviour online that you follow in real life;
3. Know where you are in cyberspace;
4. Respect other people's time and bandwidth;
5. Make yourself look good online;
6. Share expert knowledge;
7. Help keep flame wars under control;

[2] See, for example, Graham's (2008) discussion of how FAQ guidelines are not applied equitably to all subscribers to an email list.

8. Respect other people's privacy;
9. Don't abuse your power;
10. Be forgiving of other people's mistakes.

Some of these guidelines were motivated by practical constraints related to the available media at the time (e.g. don't waste bandwidth). At that time, computer users used dial-up modems and had to pay a fee according to how much data they transmitted. The result was a rule that users shouldn't re-quote long chunks of text from previous messages, since others' cost would increase only to get information that they had already seen. While outmoded now (since the decline of dial-up internet connections and the increase in 'unlimited data' services), the rule still exists, though in a different form. This rule is one reason that spamming is frowned upon—it wastes a different valuable commodity—the reader's time—and this tends to be evaluated as impolite.

While each given CofP typically publishes its own rules of behaviour that it outlines in FAQs, Terms of Service, and Codes of Conduct, each one addresses at least some of Shea's original rules of Netiquette. In particular, guidelines for behaviour within e-CofPs almost always address the concepts of not wasting time/bandwidth and respecting other participants by 'remembering the human' (i.e. respecting others) and 'keep[ing] flame wars under control' (i.e. refraining from impolite/aggressive behaviour). While the lexical terms used to describe the sanctioned behaviours may vary from community-to-community, the underlying rules of Netiquette are still present.

3.3 (Im)politeness in Digital Media

Regarding (im)politeness in digital contexts, we must remember that the constraints of various media platforms can have an enormous effect on the way(s) that (im)politeness is enacted. In part, this is because, with the exception of features such as emoticons, punctuation, and so forth (Vandergriff 2013), prosodic (and in text-based formats, non-verbal) cues that are used regularly in f-t-f contexts to clarify meaning and negotiate (im)politeness are unavailable. For this reason, it is useful to examine types of digital platforms separately, assessing the research that has been done on each. It should be noted, however that, as is the case with any research on CMC, by the time any scholarly work on digital communication is published there will be new computer-mediated tools and platforms. The work is therefore never complete and may-or-may not still reflect 'current' communicative practice. In addition, while the scope of what counts as 'digital' communication casts a wide net, we have chosen

to focus here on email, discussion fora, chat, blogs, SMS/IM, and social networks. While we recognise that there are certainly other digital contexts where (im)politeness is a worthy focus of research (see the chapter on reality in this volume, for example), for reasons of space we cannot include them all.

Email

A great deal of the early linguistic research on CMC focused on asynchronous interactions such as email. Since those early days, however, the ways that people use email have changed significantly. While email was at one time primarily used for business communication (and therefore followed business conventions of formality and content), over the past two decades email has expanded to be not only a vehicle for business but also for personal connection. This being the case, ideas about what constitutes (im)politeness in email have expanded and changed dramatically, particularly with regard to audience and relational goals.

As laid out in the structure above, email is asynchronous (which allows increased time to formulate identities and mitigate any acts that might possibly be seen as impolite), but is less clearly categorised when it comes to public/private and relational-/task-oriented distinctions. Recent examinations of (im)politeness in teacher/student and workplace interactions include Bella and Sifianou (2012), Bolkan and Holmgren (2012), Chejnova (2014), Merrison et al. (2012), and van den Eynder Morpeth (2012), all of which examine email interactions that are task-oriented and fall closer to the 'private' end of the spectrum. Other research on email impoliteness focuses on emails sent to large groups (e.g. Graham 2005, 2007a, 2007b and Ho 2011) which are more public and frequently more relation-oriented. Haugh (2010) and O'Driscoll (2013) bridge the two in examining private email exchanges that are then interpreted on a public stage. The variety of influences on (im)politeness and relational work in these studies illuminate the variability of this platform and further research is warranted as the email context continues to evolve in the ways it is used to perform relational work, particularly with regard to public/private and task/relational intersections.

Discussion Boards/UseNet/BBSs

It is important to note that discussion fora, like blogs (which will be discussed in greater depth below), encompass a broad spectrum of media platforms and are often embedded within other multimodal settings. We would place

discussion comments about a YouTube video, for example, in the category of discussion board posts rather than blogs because, while the YouTube videos themselves could be classified as vlogs (video-blogs) since they are declarative and asynchronous, the comments that they generate more closely follow the format of discussion board postings—discussion *about* a blog (e.g. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich's 2013 study on responses to a YouTube broadcast).

While the first linguistic research on discussion boards tended to focus on community building and interactional practice, a sharp increase in recent research (far too much to be listed exhaustively here), has incorporated both politeness and impoliteness as specific research foci. Nishimura (2010) and Planchenault (2010), for example, draw on politeness theory to examine Discussion Board interactions, while other research has begun to focus more on *im*politeness, (e.g. Angouri and Tseliga (2010), Dynel (2012), Hardaker (2013, 2015), Haugh et al. (2015), Langlotz (2010), Lorenzo-Dus et al. (2011), Richet (2013) and Upadhyay (2010)), and flaming (e.g. Perelmutter 2013).

Despite the large number of studies on this type of CMC, however, there is little focus on how the constraints of the medium itself may affect norms of (im)politeness (see, however, Neurauter-Kessels' 2011 discussion of Netiquette). Despite (or perhaps because of) the breadth of this format, continued research is needed that explores the technology itself and the ways that the constraints of the media influence how (im)politeness is accomplished.

Chat, Virtual Worlds and Online Gaming

While originally primarily text-based (e.g. MUDs—Multi-User Domains), Virtual Worlds have evolved as technology has advanced to include visual components as well. Platforms such as *Minecraft* allow users to create computer-generated worlds (e.g. by designing buildings, adding landscaping, etc. (alone or in collaboration with others) and create characters/avatars that can operate within the world(s) they have created. An offshoot of this type of platform—online gaming—allows users to create avatars which perform in-game tasks and interact with others in attempting to achieve them. Chat is a critical feature of interaction in virtual worlds, which are highly synchronous, though they may be interaction- or goal-oriented.

While use of Virtual Worlds (especially online gaming platforms) is increasing, there is not a great deal of research that examines (im)politeness and relational work in these contexts. Pojanapunya and Jaroenkitboworn's (2011) examination of face in Second Life and Arendholz's (2013) exploration of the

online world The Student Room are exceptions, but investigations that bring together Relational Work and (im)politeness in these contexts would be fruitful.

Similarly, there is increasing interest across disciplines in research into online gaming, but *linguistic* research in this area almost all focuses on gaming as a socialisation tool for L2 learners. There is very little linguistic research that addresses how players negotiate interaction in highly synchronous and frequently multimodal settings (exceptions include Ensslin 2012, Keating and Sunakawa 2010, and Rusaw 2011), and this would be another fruitful area for additional exploration.

SMS/Text Messages

Yet another form of digital communication is SMS (Short Message Services) and IM (Instant Messages). These types of CMC are related to microblogging systems such as Twitter because they transmit short-form messages, but SMS/IM messages tend to privately target already-known individuals or small groups rather than large (hundreds or even thousands) of recipients for each post.

One of the medium-specific characteristics pointed out by early researchers on SMS/IM communication was its blend of oral and written strategies (e.g. Crystal 2009). Soffer (2010) has continued that trend while others have examined variables such as gender (see for example Rojo-Laurilla 2002) and interpersonal norms (see, for example Shuter and Challopadhyay 2010).

As with other digital platforms already discussed however, the ways that people use SMS/IM have changed and expectations about what is normal (e.g. writing full words v. using txt-speak) have changed as well. While researchers continue to explore the impact of the oral/written blend of SMS/IM, research that specifically focuses on (im)politeness as a component of Relational Work is lacking.

Blogs and Microblogs

Blogs, vlogs (video-blogs) and microblogs (like Twitter) constitute a broad category of online interaction. Some allow responses, others don't. Some have massive influence and huge followerships (e.g. the Huffington Post in the US, the Mumsnet Blogs in the UK), others don't. Topics can vary from irregular diary-like musings on dog-hair-weaving to well-funded, politically motivated campaigns. Some are deliberately commercial, public, and/or run by groups, others are deliberately non-profit, private, and/or run by one person, and

some small blogs/vlogs occasionally gain enough popularity that they become large, commercial ventures. Some are open to anyone with an internet connection, others are only available to select audiences based on their use of a VPN (virtual private network), IP address, or password.

Despite these possible variations, however, all blogs/vlogs are representations of identity which tend to chronicle events or opinions from the perspective of the blogger(s). Some blogs are static (where still graphics and text are crafted and published to be viewed/read), whereas some, such as vlogs can be much more dynamic and include animation or video feeds. And while some blogs allow viewers to respond, there is no guarantee that they will do so and the declarative communicative act is not dependent on getting a response from viewers.

Despite reflecting a very broad category, blogs and vlogs have many similarities that affect their interactional impact. All are declarative, all have large numbers of (potentially unknown) audience members (i.e. they are publically-oriented networks as described above), and all are asynchronous since bloggers cannot know when their posts will be read.

In his examination of blogs and wikis, Myers (2010) raises the issue of audience, noting that,

> 'the vast majority of bloggers get along with just a few people looking at their work…. but the readers can be complete strangers anywhere in the world' (p. 77).

He goes on to say that 'Bloggers are often surprisingly careful in how they present their opinions to an audience, using a range of markers that suggest how they are making this statement' (2010, p. 95) and that Wikipedians 'draw on an implicit rhetoric of politeness that they refer to as 'Civility'' (2010, p. 145). Since audience awareness is critical to the examination of (im)politeness, this is a key factor in any assessment of how (im)politeness works in this environment.

With regard to microblogs, alongside services such as Tumblr, FriendFeed, and Jaiku, Twitter is the one of the world's largest microblogging platforms. Created in 2007, at the time of writing today, in 2015, it has approximately 302 million monthly active users who send around 3000 posts (known as tweets) per second, or 500 million tweets per day (Oreskovic 2015). The site's Terms of Use explicitly forbid threatening and abusive behaviour, there are a range of pages on the site dedicated to describing abusive behaviour and offering safety advice, and particularly in recent years, Twitter has created numerous abuse-tackling mechanisms, including the option to mute, block, or report others. Despite its prominence and reach, however, research into

abuse and (im)politeness on Twitter remains thin on the ground (see, however Page 2014; Sifianou 2015).

Pihlaja (2014) examines metaphor use in a vlog conflict that occurred on YouTube. While the format of the data in this study was video (rather than text-based), the structure of interaction classifies it as one type of blog—the data were asynchronous, the audience was unknown, and the format was declaration-based. Further research on this type of blog would potentially illuminate the ways that audio or text-based (im)politeness differ from video-based (im)politeness which, while still mediated, allows the vlogger to incorporate at least some of the mitigation strategies that are frequently used f-t-f.

Social Network Sites (e.g. Facebook, Instagram)

Research on social network sites (hereafter SNSs) such as Facebook has been steadily growing in recent years (e.g. Santamaría-García 2014). The latest research on SNSs has addressed the representation of identity and relational work as it is proposed and negotiated through status updates (see Bolander and Locher 2015; Mak and Chui 2014) and posted messages such as birthday wishes (Theodoropoulou 2015). Maiz-Arevalo's (2013) study of 'liking' is of particular interest since it examines the digital constraints of disembodiment, privacy and asynchronicity as they affect politeness. As noted above, these recent studies begin to address how SNSs operate as a context for relational work, particularly with regard to emergent and interactive construction of identities. SNSs, however, as is the case with all media, are in a constant state of flux. Changes in privacy policies on Facebook, for example, will continue to change the audience for any posting, and this will, in turn, change people's strategies for navigating (im)politeness norms and performing Relational Work.

3.4 Methods in Digital (Im)politeness Research

When performing research on digital interactions, there are two concerns that must be addressed: (1) methodological difficulties in data collection and analysis, and (2) ethical considerations. We will examine each of these in turn.

Methodological Difficulties in Data Collection and Analysis

When examining interaction in digital contexts, methods are often problematic for synchronous media. For asynchronous media, it is possible to compile large corpora of data, sometimes without a great deal of effort, particularly

when the data being collected is text rather than audio or video. It is relatively easy, for example, to subscribe to a Twitter feed and archive the received tweets into a (potentially quite large) dataset which can then be analysed at any time, or to subscribe to an email list or bulletin-board feed. There are also tools which will spider the internet and download texts based on criteria set by the user, as well as pre-existing CMC datasets—some extremely large—taken from platforms as diverse as AOL searches, Reddit comments, and Usenet posts. *Synchronous* media, on the other hand, can be a harder to capture, sometimes requiring specialised software or hardware to perform screen captures and/or audio feeds, which must then be transcribed and coded for analysis.

A second concern is that, because of anonymity on one hand, and deception on the other, it can be difficult on some platforms to determine or validate demographic information about participants. Usernames created by participants may or may not give clues as to the participants' gender, age, ethnicity, etc., and even if these clues are present, there is no guarantee that they are accurate (a female might choose a username that implies an identity as a male, for example), and the same individual might also have multiple usernames within the same community. These factors mean that in many mediated settings, performing quantitative analysis of specific demographic or sociolinguistic variables can be highly impractical.

Ethical Considerations

In addition to the logistical problems discussed above, any discussion of methods in examining digital discourse must also include a mention of the ethics involved. Ethical concerns in any study of linguistic behaviour hinge on minimising the risk of harm to the participants. In most academic contexts, this is accomplished in 2 ways: (1) obtaining consent from the participating individuals, and (2) removing any identifying factors that would link the individual to the data by inserting pseudonyms/alternative identifiers.

Academic institutions often require that researchers obtain consent from participants before investigating any human subject. Researchers also frequently remove identifying details to protect participants from any negative consequences that might result from the information they disclose (Deumert 2014, p. 26). As Herring (1996a) points out, however, there are two schools of thought on anonymising data: one claiming that researchers must eliminate all identifiers when publishing research on digital communication and the

other claiming that NOT identifying authors of computer-mediated messages is a violation of copyright.

Obtaining consent and minimising harm, at least in non-digital environments, is often determined by whether language use is 'public' or 'private.' The consensus among linguistic researchers at this point is that public texts are free to use without consent, while texts that are private require consent (Frankel and Siang 1999; Herring 1996a, 1996b; King 1996; Morris 2004; Pihlaja 2014; Walther 2002). According to this argument, people posting to public online forums can have no reasonable expectation that their behaviour will not be examined. They are 'putting themselves out there' and public discourse is not off limits in terms of scientific study. In these cases, participants implicitly accept any harm that might come their way because they chose to make their communication available in a setting where others (who may be unknown) will have access.

An equivalent example might be someone in a shopping mall screaming that they have contracted a sexually-transmitted disease. By proclaiming the information in a public place where unknown and unidentified individuals may hear that information, they can have no expectation that the overhearers will not act on that knowledge in some way. Others may avoid them, for instance, or they may be denied the ability to try on clothing in a lingerie store, or potential future partners may decide to decline dating invitations, and so on.

Regardless of the level of 'public-ness', obtaining consent online may not be especially straightforward. For instance, if one is analysing email messages sent to a distribution list with a large number of subscribers, obtaining consent from all members whose emails had been harvested could be difficult, since subscriptions are fluid (i.e. people subscribe and unsubscribe all the time), and especially since the time of collection could be weeks, months, or even years after the time of posting. An alternative would be to request consent by posting a message to all subscribers asking for their consent, but the likelihood of getting a response from every subscriber is slim, particularly if some duration has passed between posting and collection. In such a case, the researcher would be faced with the task of eliminating all messages in the dataset which included non-consenting subscribers. In larger datasets this is likely to be prohibitively time-consuming, and if prominent or significant members are removed, this could ultimately alter the overall results. While the ends (meaningful data, good results) do not justify any means (failing to gain consent) this does add another complication to conducting good quality, transparent, responsible research on digital communication.

A further and crucial complication to this debate is that digital communication is not always clear-cut in terms of what is public and therefore supposedly not in need of consent, and what is private and therefore supposedly much more sensitive. On some sites such as Facebook, users can control settings so that posts are available to (1) a limited number of Friends only (a clearly private setting), (2) to a global audience (a clearly public setting), or (3) to Friends of Friends. This third setting is neither fully private, nor is it fully public. It can be seen by those that the user may not know, and they may choose to interact with that content—sharing, forwarding, saving, or otherwise distributing it further—in a way that the user would not authorise if forewarned. Other platforms have similar settings that do not fall neatly into either public, or private. As such, the classification of digital contexts as public versus private exists on a sliding scale, and many media can be used in a more-public or more-private way according to restrictions that are determined by users.

An additional complication is that even this view fails to account for contexts in which users of public, anonymous mediums over a period of time convey enough personal information to identify themselves. Indeed, if a dataset is large enough, even if it is low-resolution (i.e. not especially detailed) most users can be uniquely identified by reference to only four spatiotemporal points. A tweet about having coffee at a particular café, picking up essentials from a certain supermarket, being stuck in a specific traffic jam, and then seeing a film at a given cinema can be sufficient to uniquely pinpoint one person out of billions (de Montjoye et al. 2013).

Related to privacy are constructs of anonymity as they are encoded into the various media themselves (see discussion of public v. private networks in 2.2.2 above). In contexts where anonymity is built into the communicative environment, there is supposedly no risk to the participants and therefore, it could be argued that research on their talk cannot be called unethical since their anonymity protects them from harm.[3]

In the end, whilst some organisations such as the British Association for Applied Linguists (BAAL) and the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) have released guides on ethics and good practice, there has been no consensus as to the ethical responsibilities of CMC researchers, and individuals have chosen their methods according to the data they are using and the questions they are investigating. Myers (2010), for example, states that he would be

[3] Note, however, that such a stance cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances such as the 2015 Ashley Madison hack in which 30 to 40 million users of a site designed to facilitate extramarital affairs had their details posted online.

wary of examining messages from a support network for a medical condition, but 'public blogs on public issues where the bloggers obviously expected to have their words read by the widest possible audience' are not problematic (2010: 162). Nevertheless, he also states that he restricted his examples in his book to ones produced by bloggers who gave consent so as to respect copyright. Herring, likewise, notes of the papers in her 1996 volume '… an attempt has been made to follow common sense in respecting as much as possible the privacy of those whose messages are cited as examples, while giving credit for ideas where credit is due' (1996: 6)

Given the wide variability in digital media, we would argue that the public nature of the discourse and the presence of anonymity offer protection to the individual on a sliding scale, and that each medium must be evaluated separately to assess the degree of public-ness and the degree of anonymity. Settings or media with a high degree of public-ness and anonymity might not require consent from participants, while in more private and less-anonymous settings the consent of individuals may be more critical and it may be more important to remove identifying information. The dilemma for researchers is to determine where any given digital context/setting falls on the scale of anonymity/privacy and make a reasonable decision that will protect subjects from harm.

4 Case Study: Identifying and Managing Impoliteness in Online Gaming

Returning to the definition of (im)politeness outlined in Sect. 1 above, we will now discuss the ways that impoliteness is identified and managed in a particular CofP—an online gaming community. As noted in Sect. 3.1 above, there are some agreed-upon identities that are recognised as components of digital communication. With regard to impoliteness, Spammers, Pimpers, Flamers and Trolls are of particular interest since these labels are frequently associated with deliberate, habitual impoliteness online.

As is often the case with terms originating in CMC, definitions can and do vary across times and communities—sometimes very widely indeed. For instance, in some communities the term 'troll' refers to behaviour akin to a light-hearted linguistic prank that should be rated for its cleverness in eliciting responses. In other contexts, however, it has been used to describe much more extreme, and in some cases illegal online behaviour ranging from bomb, rape, and death threats to coordinated mass-attacks on individuals or organisations. Just one potential definition from more recent research is that, at its broadest,

trolling is 'online antagonism undertaken for amusement's sake' (Hardaker 2015, p. 202). In other words, unlike flaming which involves a sincere (over-) reaction to a perceived trigger, trolling tends to be predicated on a deception of intent, where the user appears to be sincere but is, in fact, looking to cause trouble.

Spammers' disruptions are often based on repetition and/or irrelevance of some sort. The Twitch.tv Rules of Conduct explain it like this: 'Spam: No one likes a broken record, so please respect the channel moderators and do not participate in posting repetitive or unwanted messages.' Flaming, meanwhile, according to Thurlow et al. (2004) is 'hostile and aggressive interaction.' Arendholz notes, however, that whatever constitutes flaming (constant capitalisation, swearing, etc.) 'needs to be decided by the interlocutors, making flaming [an] emergent and evaluative notion' (2013, p. 100).

The primary distinguisher between trolling, spamming, and flaming, according to these definitions, is intent. Trolls are intentionally harmful, whereas flamers may simply be carried away by their emotions in the moment. Spammers intend to be disruptive, but not necessarily harmful. As Culpeper (2013) points out, however, intent is not a necessary component of impoliteness. In this CofP and for the purposes of this chapter, in fact, these distinctions are unnecessary, since intent is not only impossible to access but, as Haugh argues, it 'underplays both the inherent discursivity of intentions, and the pivotal role (perceptions of) norms play in evaluations of impoliteness' (Haugh 2010, p. 10). In the CofP that is the focus of this study, it is not the disruptive/impolite acts themselves (or the motivations/intent behind them) that are of interest, but instead the methods of addressing them.

The CofP that is the focus here is a live, real-time game stream for the game League of Legends hosted by Twitch.tv. The game stream is highly multimodal, and includes a live open chat that is visible on one side of the screen next to a window showing the gameplay itself and a video feed of the gamer as s/he plays. In this CofP, the distinctions between Spammers, Pimpers, Flamers and Trolls is artificial, since the methods for countering any kind of disruption (whether spam, flame, pimp or troll) are the same regardless of the motivation behind the disruptive actions themselves and/or how those disruptive acts are labelled.

In many online gaming contexts, chat streams include moderators, both robot and human, to assess the talk and delete messages that are disruptive, without necessarily worrying about whether a poster is a Spammer, Pimper, Flamer or Troll. For this reason, for the purposes of this chapter, we label individuals who fall into these categories Disruptors. In the case of this game stream, a continually-updated list of moderators is accessible in the participant

list that appears in each chat room, and all moderators are identifiable through a 'mod' icon that is displayed next to their usernames. Robot moderators are additionally identifiable because they have some form of the word 'bot' in their usernames. In the chat that is the focus of this study, the bot mods are further programmed to post a message chastising the disruptor for violating the rules after they delete a given post.

As discussed above, one long-standing rule of Netiquette is the dictum to not waste time/bandwidth. The Moderation Guide for twitch.tv states that problematic messages include 'copy pasted text (often large), links, geometric block images, repeated text (texttexttexttexttext), excessive use of emoticons, and excessive symbol use' as part of this category. The guide also prohibits 'racism, sexism, homophobia, or other hate speech.' When examining the types of messages that are classified as impolite we might ask the question—how are these messages identified and who enforces the rules against impolite behaviour? One way to explore this is through chat messages—examining which messages are deleted by moderators for breaking the rules of appropriate behaviour to determine what counts as impolite in this context. Example 1 illustrates one type of deleted message:

(1)

Stemededb[4]: – .,RAF2*com * ! Get ^ Medieval* Twitch, Grey_ Warwick and 5.000^ IP from Riots – Refer, A_ Friend on -,RAF2*com _ + # everything# is, worth $8 – . 71p <message deleted>

In this case, Stemededb is attempting to promote a false website—RAF2.com (ReferAFriend2.com) that is meant to mimic a legitimate gaming website (RAF2.net) produced by Twitch.tv. To make the message seem authentic, the post includes a promise of experience points and other game perks. The message was deleted however, most likely because of (1) the excessive symbol use and (2) the formulaic repetition (this exact message was posted by multiple usernames in the chat streams of multiple gamers at different times).

To deal with these types of repetitive disruptive messages, it is possible to create software that appears within the chat as a 'bot mod' or robot moderator. This software looks for pre-coded criteria such as repetition with excessive symbol use (as seen in the message above), and when contravening messages

[4] In accordance with the guidelines outlined in the discussion of ethics above, usernames in this publically-available forum have been reproduced in their original form. Real names or any other identifying information revealed during the chat or talk, however, has been anonymised. Likewise, unless otherwise noted, all examples are included in their original form, including grammatical errors, typos, and formatting.

are found, the bot mod will automatically delete them. Other disruptions, however, are based not on repetition but on inclusion of offensive, bigoted, discriminatory, sexual or profane language. Profanity filters are fairly easily circumvented, and tend to be rather crude in their operation, in that they will block non-offensive uses (e.g. discussion of a rape crisis helpline) as well as offensive ones (e.g. a rape threat). As a result, the streamers must rely on human moderators rather than bot mods to identify and delete offending messages, as illustrated in the examples below.

(2)

forlord111:	jesus **fuck**[5] so hot 	<message deleted>

(3)

Roseblade7:	Lol you're a **hoe**	<message deleted>

(4)

Wozleee:	id honestly **rape** this girl	<message deleted> […][6]
Wozleee:	why would you donate to this **slut**	<message deleted> […]
Wozleee:	worst stream ever	<message deleted> […]
Wozleee:	can i see ur **pussy**	<message deleted> […]
EliteShogun:	@Wozleee Can I see yours?	
lolnignog:	u can see my **pussy** […]	
lolnignog:	its in my backyard […]	
Wozleee:	sure	<message deleted>
BTYeung:	she is not adding anyone […]	
Wozleee:	coz she is a huge **fuckhead**	<message deleted>
Wozleee:	**dickface**	<message deleted>
gtfoi0:	best streamer in my life	
lolnignog:	with a bunch of little **pussies**	

In Examples 2–4, it is the human moderators that determine what types of posts are impolite (racist, sexist, homophobic, or hate speech) and delete them. In the examples above, the deleted messages include offensive words (*fuck* in Example 2), name-calling (the streamer is called a hoe [a substitute for

[5] **Bold** text within messages has been added for emphasis. With this exception, messages are printed in their original form, including spacing, formatting, and spelling/grammatical variations.

[6] A […] notation marks a place where, for space reasons, intervening text has not been included. The conversational structure of statements and replies, however, has been maintained.

whore] (Example 3) and a fuckhead (Example 4) and the human moderator is called a dickface (Example 4). Offensive references to sexual conduct (rape and requests to see private body parts, e.g. 'can I see your pussy') also occur and are deleted in Example 4.

On closer examination, we can see the complexity involved in identifying impoliteness in this setting. In Example 4, Wozleee's references to 'pussy' are deleted, while others' use of the same term are not. In this case, Wozleee's early posts included the terms *rape* and *slut*; then, as the chat progressed, all posts by Wozleee were deleted (whether they included offensive content or not). Wozleee's statement 'worst stream ever,' for example, does not seem particularly offensive in terms of gender, ethnicity, etc., nor does the 'sure' in the response to lolnignog in the following lines. This seems to indicate that message deletions are not always motivated by content; sometimes messages are deleted simply because a given user has had messages deleted previously.

This interpretation is further supported by the fact that lolnignog uses the same term as Wozleee, *pussy*, but is not sanctioned. Lolnignog, unlike Wozleee, hasn't posted offensive messages thus far in this chat and is also using the term in reference to a cat ('it's in my backyard') rather than a body part. While a botmod would be unable to make the distinction between a reference to a body part and a domesticated animal, the human mod assesses the contextual meaning of the word in order to decide whether a given message or a given user should be deleted.

Of course, disruptors may also *combine* repetition with offensive content, as in Example 5 below:

(5)

aseaturtle:



<message deleted>

In Example 5, the blocky and repetitive content of the image that is copied and pasted in the chat stream (called 'Copypastas') takes up a large amount of space as well (i.e. it wastes bandwidth) and if it were repeated frequently, would disrupt the flow of the chat. Moreover, this particular copypasta has potentially offensive content since it depicts an obscene gesture and so is problematic for multiple reasons.

Just as in f-t-f interaction, there are multiple elements that go into identifying and dealing with impoliteness. In the case of this CofP, however, the community has enlisted automated tools in the form of bot mods to regulate some of the elements of impolite behaviour that CMC makes possible. Some of the strategies that can be used for impoliteness online are unique to the digital context, but by the same token, moderators can also use similar capabilities to identify and regulate at least some aspects of impolite behaviour.

5 Summary and Future Directions

As has been established in previous research, (im)politeness is highly context-dependent and is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to link to a particular setting. In CMC, this is also complicated by the characteristics of the media and platform involved. One gap in the research on digital (im)politeness is that there is no research to our knowledge that compares (im)politeness across different platforms. As noted above, while a direct and micro-comparison between different media platforms would be close to impossible, a macro-comparison of norms across comparable CofPs, i.e. groups on the same topic, but on different platforms would be illuminating. Shea's framework of Netiquette is still a reasonable overarching guideline today, despite the fact that it was written in the 1990s when widespread computer communication was in its relative infancy. A worthy area of exploration would be to perform a systematic comparison of platforms that exist now to see if Shea's rules still apply in the same ways and how the evolution of different and new media have affected the development of new norms and expectations of (im)politeness.

A second possible area for future research revolves around the use of methods such as site-deployed bots, filters, human moderators, and Terms of Service, and user-deployed blocks, bans, and reporting mechanisms. In particular, it would be interesting to know whether top-down, site-imposed controls, or bottom-up, user-controlled methods have greater impact on instantiating, contesting, and shaping the norms of (un)acceptable and (im)polite behaviour.

Finally, a third potential area for future research involves aspects of multimodality, an aspect of CMC that is becoming increasingly more prevalent. As outlined in Sect. 2, different digital modalities have different parameters that affect the identification and assessment of (im)politeness (such as anonymity, public/private differences, a/synchronicity, etc.). If different platforms have differing norms for (im)politeness, then examining the impact of *combining* these varying norms in multimodal interactions is a worthwhile focus of inquiry. In the case of game streams, for example, gamer verbal talk is declaration-oriented, while the simultaneous open chat is interaction-oriented. The game itself is task-focused, while the open chat is relation-focused. While studies like Ida (2011) make some initial strides into helping our understanding of the interplay between different (but simultaneous) digital modalities, our current understanding of the ways that multimodal communication intersects with norms and notions of (im)politeness is still inadequate and this would be a fruitful area for future research.

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J. Culpeper et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7

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