Simple Partial equilibrium example with linear functions

Linear PE example

- Two individuals with the following utility functions:
- $u_1(m_1, x_1) = m_1 + 5x_1 0.5x_1^2$
- $u_2(m_2, x_2) = m_2 + 3x_2 0.5x_2^2$
- $\phi_1 = 5x_1 0.5x_1^2$ and $\phi_2 = 3x_2 0.5x_2^2$

Linear PE example

- Two firms with the following cost functions:
- $C_1(q_1) = 0.3q_1^2$
- $C_2(q_2) = 0.6q_2^2$

Linear PE example

- Competitive equilibrium requires all agents maximize subject to their constraints:
- $Max \ u_1(m_1, x_1) \text{ s.t. } m_1 + px_1 \le \omega_{m_1} + \theta_{11} \left(pq_1 c_1(q_1) \right) + \theta_{12} (pq_2 c_2(q_2))$
- Substitute m_1 in utility function to get
- $\max_{x_1} 5x_1 0.5x_1^2 px_1 + [\omega_{m_1} + \theta_{11}(pq_1 c_1(q_1)) + \theta_{12}(pq_2 c_2(q_2))]$

Linear PE example


- $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \max_{x_1} 5x_1 0.5x_1^2 px_1 + [\omega_{m_1} + \theta_{11} (pq_1 c_1(q_1)) + \theta_{12} (pq_2 c_2(q_2))] \end{array}$
- FOC gives us consumer 1's demand function
- $5-x_1-p=0 \Rightarrow x_1=5-p$
- Can easily see that consumer 2 will have:
- $3 x_2 p = 0 \Rightarrow x_2 = 3 p$

Profit maximization


- $\max_{q_1} pq_1 C_1(q_1) or pq_1 0.3q^2$
- FOC $p 0.6q_1 = 0 \Rightarrow q_1 = \frac{p}{0.6}$
- Likewise for firm $2 \Rightarrow q_2 = \frac{p}{12}$

Competitive Equilibrium

- For a C.E. we must have markets clearing
- $x_1 + x_2 = q_1 + q_2$
- So
- $5 p + 3 p = \frac{p}{0.6} + \frac{p}{1.2}$
- Solving for p we find p=1.77
- Competitive equilibrium allocation is
- $(x_1^*, x_2^*, q_1^*, q_2^*; p^*) = (3.22, 1.22, 2.96, 1.48)$
- You may note that in the market clearing there is no wealth (this has dropped out due to demand for good being independent of wealth)



Aggregate Supply $q_1 + q_2 = 2.5p \Rightarrow Q = 2.5p \text{ or } p = \frac{Q}{2.5}$



Pareto optimal allocations

- Suppose consumption and production levels of the good in question is fixed at $(\overline{x_1}, \overline{x_2}, \overline{q_1}, \overline{q_2})$
- With these production levels total amount of numeraire available for distribution is $\omega_m \sum_j C_j(\overline{q_j}) = \omega_m C_1(\overline{q_1}) C_2(\overline{q_2})$
- The set of attainable utilities by our two consumers are:
- $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \; \{(u_1,u_2) \colon u_1+u_2 \leq \phi_1(\overline{x_1}) + \phi_2(\overline{x_2}) + \omega_m \\ C_1(\overline{q_1}) C_2(\overline{q_2}) \} \end{array}$

Pareto optimal allocations

- It follows that the optimal consumption and production levels of the good in question can be obtained as the solution to
- $\max_{\substack{x_1,x_2 > 0 \\ q_1,q_2 > 0}} \phi_1(x_1) + \phi_2(x_2) + \omega_m C_1(q_1) C_2(q_2)$
- Subject to $x_1 + x_2 = q_1 + q_2$

Pareto optimal allocations

• With μ as multiplier in constraint the optimal values $(x_1^*, x_2^*, q_1^*, q_2^*)$ satisfy the following 2+2+1 conditions:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mu \leq C_1'(q_1^*) \\ \mu \leq C_2'(q_2^*) \\ \phi_1'(x_1') \leq \mu \\ \phi_2'(x_2') \leq \mu \\ x_1 + x_2 = q_1 + q_2 \end{array}$$

