MICROECONOMICS *Principles and Analysis*

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: BASICS

LIMITATIONS OF CRUSOE MODEL

- The Crusoe story takes us only part way to a treatment of general equilibrium:
 - + There's only one economic actor.
 - + So there can be no interaction.
- Prices are either exogenous (from the mainland? the world? Mars?) or hypothetical.
- **×** But there are important lessons we can learn:
 - + Integration of consumption and production sectors.
 - + Decentralising role of prices.

When we use something straight from Crusoe we will mark it with this logo

ONWARD FROM CRUSOE...

- × This is where we generalise the Crusoe model.
- × We need a model that will incorporate:
 - + Many actors in the economy...
 - + ...and the possibility of their interaction.
 - + The endogenisation of prices in the economy.
- But what do we mean by an "economy"...?
- × We need this in order to give meaning to "equilibrium"

OVERVIEW...

The components of the general equilibrium problem.

	neral Equilibrium: sics
	The economy
	and allocations
	Incomes
	Equilibrium

THE COMPONENTS

- At a guess we can model the economy in terms of:
 - + Resources
 - + People
 - + Firms
- Specifically the model is based on assumptions about:
 - + Resource stocks
 - + Preferences
 - + Technology
- (In addition –for later we will need a description of the rules of the game)

WHAT IS AN ECONOMY?

Resources (stocks)

$$R_1$$
 , R_2 ,...

n of these

Households (preferences)

$$U^1, U^2, ...,$$

$$n_h$$
 of these

• Firms Φ^1, Φ^2, \dots (technologies)

 n_f of these

AN ALLOCATION

A <u>competitive</u> allocation consists of:

utility-maximising

× A collection of bundles (one for each of the n_h households)

profit-maximising

* A collection of net-output vectors (one for each of the n_f firms) $[\mathbf{q}] := [\mathbf{q}^1, \mathbf{q}^2, \mathbf{q}^3, ...]$

 A set of prices (used by households and firms) Note the shorthand notation for a collection

$$[x] := [x^1, x^2, x^3, ...]$$

 $\mathbf{p} := (p_1, p_2, ..., p_n)$

HOW A COMPETITIVE ALLOCATION WORKS

$$\mathbf{p} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{q}^{f}(\mathbf{p}), f=1,2,...,n_{f}\}$$


$$\mathbf{p}, \{\mathbf{y}^h\} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{x}^h(\mathbf{p}), h=1,2,\dots,n_h\}$$

just a minute! Where do these incomes come from??

- Implication of firm f's profit maximisation
- Firms' behavioural responses map prices into net outputs
- Implication of household's utility maximisation
- Households' behavioural responses map prices and incomes into demands
- The competitive allocation

AN IMPORTANT MISSING ITEM


- For a consumer in isolation it may be reasonable to assume an exogenous income.
 + Derived elsewhere in the economy.
- Here the model involves all consumers in a closed economy.
 - + There is no "elsewhere."
- × Incomes have to be modelled explicitly.
- We can learn from the "simple economy" presentation.



MODELLING INCOME


- × What can Crusoe teach us?
- × Consider where his "income" came from
 - + Ownership rights of everything on the island
- **×** But here we have many persons and many firms.
 - + So we need to proceed carefully.
 - + We need to assume a system of ownership rights.

WHAT DOES HOUSEHOLD H POSSESS?



Shares in firms' ζ_1^h , ζ_2^h , ... profits

INCOMES



THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF PRICES

• Net good *i*. $q_i^f = q_i^f(\mathbf{p})$ *n*-vector of prices d on prices:

Supply of net outputs

• Thus profits depend or indirectly $\Pi^{f}(\mathbf{p}) := \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i} q_{i}^{f}(\mathbf{p})$ • So Holding by h of resource i $y^{h} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i} R_{i}^{h} + \sum_{f=1}^{n_{f}} \zeta_{f}^{h} \Pi^{f}(\mathbf{p})$

• Incomes depend on prices : $y^h = y^h(\mathbf{p})$ Note that the function y^h(•)
 depends on the ownership
 rights that h possesses

PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE ALLOCATION

$$\mathbf{p} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{q}^{f}(\mathbf{p}), f=1,2,...,n_{f}\}$$
$$\mathbf{p} \rightarrow \{\mathbf{x}^{h}(\mathbf{p}), h=1,2,...,n_{h}\}$$
$$y^{h} = y^{h}(\mathbf{p})$$

 The allocation as a collection of responses


 Put the price-income relation into household responses
 Gives a simplified relationship for households


Summarise the relationship

$$p \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} q(p) \end{bmatrix}$$

 $[x(p)]$

THE PRICE MECHANISM






WHAT IS AN EQUILIBRIUM?

- What kind of allocation is an equilibrium?
- Again we can learn from previous presentations:
 - + Must be utility-maximising (consumption)...
 - + ...profit-maximising (production)...
 - +and satisfy materials balance (the facts of life)
- We can do this for the many-person, manyfirm case.


COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM: BASICS

- For each *h*, maximise $U^{h}(\mathbf{x}^{h})$, subject to $\sum_{i=1}^{h} p_{i} x_{i}^{h} \le y^{h}$
- For each f, maximise
 - $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i q_i^f$, subject to $\Phi^f(\mathbf{q}^f) \le 0$



- Households maximise utility, given prices and incomes
- Firms maximise profits, given prices
- For all goods the materials balance must hold

CONSUMPTION AND NET OUTPUT



Appropriate if *i* is a *rival* good
Full additional resources are needed for each additional person consuming a unit of good *i*.

• An alternative way to aggregate:

$$x_i = \max_h \{x_i^h\}$$

• Aggreg By definition Output: $q_i := \sum_{f=1}^{n_f} q_i^f$

- Opposite case: a nonrival good
- Examples: TV, national defence...

- if all the q^f are feasible will q be feasible?
- Yes if there are no externalities
- Counterexample: production with congestion...

TO MAKE LIFE SIMPLE:

- × Assume incomes are determined privately.
- × All goods are "rival" commodities.
- × There are no externalities.

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM: SUMMARY

• It must be a competitive allocation

A set of prices p
Everyone maximises at those prices p

• The materials balance condition must hold


• Demand cannot exceed supply: $x \le q + R$

AN EXAMPLE


- x Exchange economy (no production)
- × Simple, standard structure
- × 2 traders (Alf, Bill)
- × 2 Goods:

	<u>Alf</u>	<u>Bill</u>
• resource endowment	(R_1^a, R_2^a)	$(R_1^{\ b}, R_2^{\ b})$
• consumption	(x_1^a, x_2^a)	$(x_1^{\ b}, x_2^{\ b})$
• utility	$U^a(x_1^a, x_2^a)$	$U^b(x_1^b, x_2^b)$

ALF'S OPTIMISATION PROBLEM



BILL'S OPTIMISATION PROBLEM




- Resource endowment
- Prices and budget constraint

Budget constraint is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} p_i x_i^{\ b} \leq \sum_{i=1}^{2} p_i R_i^{\ b}$$

Bill, of course, sells good 1 in exchange for 2

COMBINE THE TWO PROBLEMS



ALF AND BILL AS A MICROCOSM

- The Crusoe equilibrium story translates to a many-person economy.
- Role of prices in allocations and equilibrium is crucial.
- Equilibrium depends on distribution of endowments.
- × Main features are in the model of Alf and Bill.
- Sut, why do these guys just accept the going prices...?
- × See <u>General Equilibrium: Price-Taking</u>.