



### INTRODUCTION

- In previous presentations we've seen how an optimising agent reacts to the market.
  - Use the comparative statics method
- \* We could now extend this to other similar problems.
- But first a useful exercise in microeconomics:
  - Relax the special assumptions
  - We will do this in two stages:
  - Move from one price-taking firm to many
  - Drop the assumption of price-taking behaviour.



### AGGREGATION OVER FIRMS


- \* We begin with a very simple model.
- \* Two firms with similar cost structures.
- \* But using a very special assumption.
- \* First we look at the method of getting the market supply curve.
- Then note the shortcomings of our particular example.




### SIMPLE AGGREGATION


- Individual firm supply curves derived from MC curves
- "Horizontal summation" of supply curves
- Market supply curve is flatter than supply curve for each firm See presentation on duopoly
- But the story is a little strange:
  - Each firm act as a price taker even though there is just one other firm in the market. Later in this
  - Number of firms is fixed (in this case at 2)
  - Firms' supply curve is different from that in previous presentations

# X Two price-taking firms. X Similar "piecewise linear" MC curves: + Each firm has a fixed cost. + Marginal cost rises at the same constant rate. + Firm 1 is the low-cost firm. X Analyse the supply of these firms over three price ranges.








## X Nonconcave production function can lead to discontinuity in supply function. Discontinuity in supply functions may mean that there is no equilibrium.





### ★ The problem of nonexistent equilibrium arose from discontinuity in supply. ★ But is discontinuity likely to be a serious problem? ★ Let's go through another example. + Similar cost function to previous case + This time – identical firms + (Not essential – but it's easier to follow)


















# INTERACTION AMONGST FIRMS \* Consider two main types of interaction \* Negative externalities + Pollution + Congestion + ... \* Positive externalities + Training + Networking + Infrastructure \* Other interactions? + For example, effects of one firm on input prices of other firms + Normal multimarket equilibrium + Not relevant here











### THE ISSUE


- \* Previous argument has taken given number of firms.
- \* This is unsatisfactory:
  - How is the number to be fixed?
  - Should be determined within the model
  - ...by economic behaviour of firms
  - ...by conditions in the market.
- Look at the "entry mechanism." Base this on previous model
- Must be consistent with equilibrium behaviour
- So, begin with equilibrium conditions for a single firm...


### **ANALYSING FIRMS' EQUILIBRIUM**

- \* price = marginal cost
  - determines output of any one firm.
- **x** price ≥ average cost
  - determines number of firms.
- \* An entry mechanism:
  - If the p C/q gap is large enough then this may permit another firm to enter.
  - Applying this rule iteratively enables us to determine the size of the industry.

### **OUTLINE OF THE PROCESS**

- x (0) Assume that firm 1 makes a positive profit
- $\star$  (1) Is pq C ≤ set-up costs of a new firm?
- ...if YES then stop. We've got the eqm # of firms
  - ...otherwise continue:
- x (2) Number of firms goes up by 1
- (3) Industry output goes up
- (4) Price falls (D-curve) and individual firms adjust output (individual firm's S-curve)
- (5) Back to step 1





THE ISSUES

- \* We've taken for granted a firm's environment.
- \* What basis for the given price assumption?
- \* What if we relax it for a single firm?
- \* Get the classic model of monopoly:
  - An elementary story of market power A bit strange – what ensures there is only one firm?
  - The basis for many other models of the firm.


### A SIMPLE PRICE-SETTING FIRM

- × Compare with the price-taking firm.
- \* Output price is no longer exogenous.
- \* We assume a determinate demand curve.
- × No other firm's actions are relevant.
- \* Profit maximisation is still the objective.

### MONOPOLY - MODEL STRUCTURE

- \* We are given the inverse demand function:
  - p = p(q)
  - Gives the price that rules if the monopolist delivers q to the market.
  - For obvious reasons, consider it as the average revenue curve
- Total revenue is:
  - p(q)q
- Differentiate to get monopolist's marginal revenue (MR):

  - $p_q(\bullet)$  means  $dp(\bullet)/dq$
- Clearly, if  $p_q(q)$  is negative (demand curve is downward sloping), then MR < AR.




### **MONOPOLY - OPTIMISATION PROBLEM**

- \* Introduce the firm's cost function C(q).
  - Same basic properties as for the competitive firm.
- From C we derive marginal and average cost:

  - MC:  $C_q(q)$ . AC: C(q)/q.
- **\times** Given C(q) and total revenue p(q)q profits are:
  - $\Pi(q) = p(q)q C(q).$
- ★ The shape of II is important:
  - We assume it to be differentiable
  - Whether it is concave depends on both  $C(\bullet)$  and  $p(\bullet)$ .
  - Of course  $\Pi(0) = 0$ .
- Firm maximises  $\Pi(q)$  subject to  $q \ge 0$ .

### MONOPOLY - SOLVING THE PROBLEM **x** Problem is "max $\Pi(q)$ s.t. $q \ge 0$ ," where: $\Pi(q) = p(q)q - C(q).$ \* First- and second-order conditions for interior maximum: $\Pi_{q}\left( q\right) =0.$ $\Pi_{qq}\left( q\right) <0.$ Evaluating the FOC: $p(q) + p_q(q)q - C_q(q) = 0.$ Rearrange this: + p(q) + $p_q(q)q = C_q(q)$ + "Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost" This condition gives the solution. From above get optimal output $q^*$ . Put $q^*$ in $p(\bullet)$ to get monopolist's price:

 $p^* = p(q^*).$ 



### MONOPOLY - PRICING RULE

Introduce the elasticity of demand η:

$$+ \eta := d(\log q) / d(\log p)$$

$$+ = p(q) / qp_q(q)$$

$$+ \eta < 0$$

\* First-order condition for an interior maximum

$$+ p(q) + p_q(q)q = C_q(q)$$

...can be rewritten as

+ 
$$p(q) [1+1/\eta] = C_q(q)$$

This gives the monopolist's pricing rule:

$$+ p(q) = \frac{C_q(q)}{1 + 1/\eta}$$

### **MONOPOLY - THE ROLE OF DEMAND**

× Suppose demand were changed to

$$+a+bp(q)$$

a and b are constants.

Marginal revenue and demand elasticity are now:

 $MR(q) = bp_q(q) \ q + [a + bp(q)]$   $\eta = [a/b + p(q)] / qp_q(q)$ 

Rotate the demand curve around  $(p^*,q^*)$ . + db>0 and  $da = -p(q^*)$  db < 0. + Price at  $q^*$  remains the same. + Marginal revenue at  $q^*$  increases –  $dMR(q^*) > 0$ .

Abs value of elasticity at  $q^*$  decreases –  $d|\eta| < 0$ . But what happens to optimal output?

Differentiate FOC in the neighbourhood of  $q^*$ :

 $dMR(q^*)db + \Pi_{qq} dq^* = 0$ 

So  $dq^* > 0$  if db > 0.

### **MONOPOLY - ANALYSING THE OPTIMUM**

\* Take the basic pricing rule

$$+ p(q) = \frac{C_q(q)}{1 + 1/\eta}$$

Use the definition of demand elasticity

• 
$$p(q) \ge C_q(q)$$

 $p(q) \ge C_q(q)$   $p(q) > C_q(q) \text{ if } |\eta| < \infty.$ 

"price > marginal cost"

Clearly as |η| decreases:

output decreases.

gap between price and marginal cost increases.

■ What happens if  $|\eta| \le 1$   $(\eta \ge -1)$ ?

### WHAT IS GOING ON?

\* To understand why there may be no solution consider two examples.

**x** A firm in a competitive market:  $\eta = -\infty$ 

$$+p(q) = p$$


**\*** A monopoly with inelastic demand:  $\eta = -\frac{1}{2}$ 

$$+ p(q) = aq^{-2}$$

Same quadratic cost structure for both:

$$+ C(q) = c_0 + c_1 q + c_2 q^2$$

Examine the behaviour of  $\Pi(q)$ .



### THE RESULT OF SIMPLE MARKET POWER

\* There's no supply curve: + For competitive firm market price is sufficient to determine output.

Here output depends on shape of market demand curve.


Price is artificially high:

Price is above marginal cost

Price/MC gap is larger if demand is inelastic


There may be no solution:


What if demand is very inelastic?



### MARKET POWER AND PRODUCT DIVERSITY

- Each firm has a downward-sloping demand curve:
   + Like the case of monopoly.
- \* Firms' products may differ one from another.
- New firms can enter with new products.
- Diversity may depend on size of market.
- Introduces the concept of "monopolistic competition."
- Follow the method competitive firm:
  - + Start with the analysis of a single firm.
  - Entry of new firms competes away profits.





### **REVIEW**

- Individual supply curves are discontinuous: a problem for market equilibrium?
- × A large-numbers argument may help.
- The size of the industry can be determined by a simple "entry" model
- With monopoly equilibrium conditions depend on demand elasticity
- Monopoly + entry model yield monopolistic competition.

### WHAT NEXT?

- We could move on to more complex issues of industrial organisation.
- Or apply the insights from the firm to the consumer.